The use

FUNCTIONS OF ELECTIONS IN DEMOCRATIC

Abstract:
Elections are a procedure typical for democratic systems, but also
systems which do not respect the principles of democracy often employ them. 
However, due to their different functional positioning, they fulfill various funct
ions. The presented text is an attempt to present the most important functions pe
rformed by the elections in democratic systems. The adopted model of generali
zation has allowed for separation of seven basic functions, present in all electio
ns: delegation of political representation; selection of the political elite; legitimi
sation of those in power; control over authorities; political accountability; creati
on of political programmes; recreation of public opinion image.
The presented typology allows for its use both in different types of electi
ons  (parliamentary,  presidential,  local,  regional  and  European 
Parliament) as  well  as  in  relation  to  different  electoral  systems.  The 
general 
nature of the described types of functions allows the separation of specific categ
ories within its framework, but the objective of the present study has determine
d that the focus remains on the description and analysis of the presented types.

. 

Functions of elections
Competitive elections determine the democratic legitimization of the ex
ercise of public authority, and through this legitimizing criterion will be differe
nt from the non-
competitive selection methods. Competition ensures legitimacy of decisions
taken by the elected representatitves, provided all adults are
eligible to participate in the elections. Key features of
elections in democratic systems are: uncertainty of the electoral outcome, whic
h depends only on the decision of voters; possibility of a real alternation of pow
er and formation of a de facto division into those in power and the opposition. A
s a consequence, citizens decide to whom and to what extent they will grant legi
timacy
25
 Waldemar Wojtasik

   
to exercise power on their behalf, and when a change in power should occur. Im
portantly, the decision legally made during the election is irrevocable, and cann
ot be changed in any other way than through the next election. The real empowe
rment of the opposition makes it that, as a result of the election, it has the manda
te to control the ruling, and present solutions alternative to those proposed by th
e government. As noted by Andrew Heywood, mutual influence of the citizens 
and those in power, as well as elites and the masses is ensured through elections
 [Heywood 2000: 200].
Authors taking up the issue of functions of elections in the presented typ
ologies at most name only a few, rarely more [for example Burdeau 1950; Rose,
 Mossawir 1967; Harrop and Miller 1987; Katz 1997, 2000; Birch 2001; Żukow
ski 2004; Glajcar 2004; Heywood 2006; Dye, Schubert, Zeigler 2009; 
Medvic 2010; Dalton, Farrell, McAllister 2011; Antoszewski 2012; TurskaKa
wa, Wojtasik 2013]. In the presented article as a basis for analyzing the function
s of elections, the following types of functions were adopted: (1) delegation of p
olitical representation; (2) selection of the political elite; (3) legitimisation of th
ose in power; (4) control over authorities; (5) ensuring political accountability; 
(6) creation of political programmmes; (7) recreation of the image of public
opinion.
The function of delegating political representation allows voters to choo
se those persons who, in their opinion due to the views and values held, seem to 
be the best representatives [Żukowski 2004: 16]. As a result of the democratic 
mandate to exert power, the elected have sufficient legitimacy to make decision
s on behalf of the public, and their decisions have the same value of legitimacy. 
The pragmatic will of transfering the decision-
making level from all eligible to those who were elected may be due to three ma
in reasons: (1) to increase the efficiency of decision-
making, (2) presumption that those elected have higher competencies than the a
verage, and this will positively affect the accuracy of their decisions, (3) to give 
a higher degree of importance to the decisions made, and thus increase their soc
ial impact.
Delegation of political representation as a result of the elections and tran
sfer of the decision-
making powers rests on the assumption that voters will be able to choose from a
mong themselves those who have the appropriate attributes (knowledge, integri
ty, loyalty to the principles, ability to cooperate and reach a compromise), and
     

26
 Functions of elections in democratic systems

   
furthermore that those who are elected will not make decisions based on
their own particular interests, but pro publico bono.
Neither of these two conditions is final, as the democratic freedom of choice all
ows voters to choose anyone who meets the regulatory criteria, and voters can s
elect their favorites not by assessing their competence, but taking into account o
ther factors. Among them we can indicate such as the represented political optio
n, direct acquaintance, family ties and the previous social activity. Within the el
ectoral systems one can identify solutions that at least in theory could serve to i
ncrease the competence of the winners of the election. These include for examp
le high age limit for passive voting rights, restricting campaign financing and th
e possibility to vote for a particular candidate, not the party list [Haman 2003: 6
3]. Elections in a democracy are not a simple transfer of decision-
making powers onto the level of political representatives, similarly as the mere 
possession of political subjectivity by a voter does not always determine his or 
her participation in the elections. Additional conditions have to be satisfied, am
ong which the most important are: (1) possession by those elected of some of th
e political potential of implementation of the programme goals, (2) equipment o
f the authority with imperative powers, enabling the realisation of postulated tas
ks, (3) ability to select competing objectives thanks to political cooperation and 
compromises. In the present context, elections are not only a political mechanis
m to choose who will hold the office they relate to, but also who will represent t
he people [Medvic 2010: 12]. 
The function of elite selection has a two-
stage character. The first results from the existence of political parties as entitie
s the action of which leads to institutionalization of the political sphere, the seco
nd takes into account the causative role of the electorate. Against the backgroun
d of the democratization process, the parties have become a factor in organizing
 the chaotic political objectives and demands of individuals, grouping around th
emselves members and supporters. The institutionalization of political parties i
s an ongoing process that bagan with establishing foundations of modern demo
cratic principles, and is based on the possibility of their inclusion in the political
 system of links with other institutions, while enabling the implementation of th
e previously mentioned functions. Selection carried out by the parties can have t
wo main dimensions: substantive and political, although one may also identify i
ts other priorities that occassionally take the dominant role. The substantive pos
tulate specifies the candidate needs to have the appropriate characteristics, whic
       

27
 Waldemar Wojtasik

   
h on one hand can help generate support and, consequently, votes, and on the ot
her hand - predispose her or him to the proper fulfillment of the duties of the ele
cted office. The political dimension presupposes the necessity of membership i
n the party, or at least ideological identity with the core values that form its axio
logical and programme
values. The practical effect of selection of candidates for the electoral lists
is the process of nominating candidates to compete
in elections. The process exists in four basic forms: non-
regulated; nomination by the local party authority; nomination by the central au
thorities; primaries (selection by the members of the party) [Sokół 2003: 73-
75]. Determinants of the  role of
the party in the function of recruitment and selection of political actors show
[Antoszewski 2006: 21] that they are able not only to guide the decisions of vot
ers towards the proposed candidates, but in specific situations also to actually si
gnificantly limit the choice [Wojtasik 2010: 390-391].
The second stage of political elites’ selection refers to the role of the elec
torate in their shaping by participating in the elections, and by manifestation of t
heir personal preferences for the individual characteristics of the candidates and
 their political affiliations. In the context of individual voting behavior, there ar
e three types of electoral votes: (1) vote of
opinion, which is the result of the analysis of electoral programmes made by the
 voter, (2) vote of belonging,
which is an expression of social and party identification of the voter, (3) vote of
exchange, given
as a manifestation of the strong relationship between the voter and a given candi
date [Żukowski 1999: 93]. In the case of selection of political elites, a single vot
er can simultaneously act upon different types of motivations to vote for a partic
ular candidate, with the resultant deciding about the final vote allocation.
Democratic legitimization of those in power is indicated as one of the ba
sic functions of the elections and consequences that they bring [Raciborski 200
3:67-
69]. The possibility of universal participation in the elections, the resultant 
transfer  of  decision-making  onto  representatives  and 
legitimization of authority are the stabilizing elements, giving legitimacy to the 
political system [Banducci, Karp 2003: 443]. In a situation of institutional crisis
, direct and general elections may help to maintain the legitimacy of the democr
     

28
 Functions of elections in democratic systems

   
atic system by consolidating and mobilizing to participate in them the moderate
 voters, who will vote against the radical politicians, parties and their extremist 
postulates [Rose, Mossawir 1967: 179 ]. The question of the legitimacy of politi
cal regimes is one of the central problems that are posed by the researchers of p
olitical systems, especially in the context of change and transition towards dem
ocratic solutions. Classic authoritarian solutions drew their legitimacy from tra
ditions, religion, divine right of kings and submissive stance of society that toda
y have been replaced by nationalism and ideology [Huntington, 1995: 55]. Dem
ocratic  elections  in  the  presented  approach  are  a  legitimised 
procedure of peaceful takeover of power, giving those exercising power the co
mfort of having a social mandate, contributing to the consolidation of the politic
al system. Such consolidation includes not only institutional changes that stabili
ze the functioning of democracy. It is achieved through participation of
citizens in the creation of social
development, formation of leadership mechanisms,
and other functions carried out by civil society [Diamond 1994: 15]. 
Implementation of the function of control over those in power exists
in two basic dimensions: (1) negative, when as a result of the elections the mand
ate of the governing is revoked, (2) positive, when the ruling, through elections,
 renew their mandate to govern for the next term. The main political consequen
ce of the elections is the division into winners and losers, and indirectly – those 
who will exercise political power and the opposition (controlling the authority).
 Those in power obtain a mandate to govern thanks to legitimizing attributes the
y were granted, and their political opponents are legitimized to control the politi
cal authorities and create political alternatives to official governmental action. 
Control expressed in the vote, and the consequent ability to change those holdin
g power is, according to Key, the only truly effective weapon of social control i
n a democracy [Key 1966: 76].
The impact of the control function of elections is manifested in two main
 areas. Firstly, thanks to the cyclical nature of the elections and preferences expr
essed in them, it is possible for the voters to control those in power. If voters dec
ide to once again offer thir support, the mandate to govern is renewed and awar
ded for the next term in office. In a situation where voters withdraw their suppo
rt, alternation of power is a possibility. It is a procedural protection for individu
als and groups against possible tyranny of power, voted in in democratic electio
ns [Katz 1997: 309]. In the latter case, the citizens give their power of attorney t
       

29
 Waldemar Wojtasik

   
o indirect control in their own name, carried out by the opposition over those in 
power. One factor that may determine the level of support for the opposition, ev
en if the authorities are evaluated critically, is whether the opposition is a true p
olitical alternative. If aspring political groupings are not seen as capable of repl
acing the ruling and doing their job better, the voters may refrain from offering t
heir support, despite the declared opposition to the current government [Medvic
 2010: 12].
Realization of the control function is based on the potential to cause refle
ction in voters whose aim is to assess what has been done by the government an
d make a comparison with the visions for the future, projected both by those see
king re-
election, as well as those aspiring to seize power. In this case, voters may refer t
o two basic motivations when deciding how to vote: retrospective and prospecti
ve. In the first option, important for the decision is the aspect of evaluation of pe
rformance of those in power and, consequently, the desire to provide them with 
political mandate or the need to make changes. Prospective voting focuses on th
e political plans of entities competing for power (disclosed in the political progr
ammes during the election campaign), triggering among voters the
mechanism of assessing the direction, reasonableness and feasibility of their
implementation. The subject of this vote are the election promises, and its
prospectivity refers to anticipation of future events, as
political promises have not yet been fulfilled. Prospectivity is a basic assumptio
n of the model of “economic voting,” oriented towards an analysis of the future
effects of electoral decision [Kukliński, West 1981: 437] and their evaluation
from the voters’ perspective [Lewis-
Beck 1988: 135]. Some researchers raise two major concerns in terms of actual 
impact of these motivations. Primo, retrospective voting requires voters to poss
ess enough competencies to make a retroactive assessment of effects of actions 
previously taken by the government. Secundo, in case of the prospective model,
 the ability of voters to assess what politicians should do in the future is equally 
questionable [Manin, Przeworski, Stokes, 1999: 30]. The control function of el
ections is therefore not only critical to ensure smooth operation of the political s
ystem, but also allows for proper orientation of the existing political potential. 
Thanks to the division into the ruling and the opposition, the latter can exert con
trol over the authorities and inform about possible irregularities in the exercise 

30
 Functions of elections in democratic systems

   
of power; at the same time, preparing for the possible takeover of power, they s
hould learn from the mistakes of their predecessors.
The function of enforcement of political accountability assumes the poss
ibility of drawing consequences against persons holding public office. It consist
s in the expression of disapproval for their political activity – and the consequen
ces  thereof,  including  the  political  consequences.  This  distinguishes the 
political  accountability  from  other  types  of  responsibility  found  in 
the political  system,  such  as  constitutional  or  criminal.  Scott  Mainwaring 
and Timothy R. Scully see in elections the primary mechanism of enforcement 
of political accountability, focusing on the possibility of changing those in pow
er as a result of the election. Elections provide parties with opportunity of creati
ng communication links between voters and the government, and the elections t
hemselves give them the option of replacing the existing political leaders and re
presentatives with new ones [Mainwaring, Scully 1995: 21]. The enforcement o
f political accountability is expressed through the cyclical nature of the election
s, as a result of which the previously granted power of attorney may be extende
d if voters are satisfied with the policies – or revoked, as a sanction for failure to
 meet the expectations placed upon the government [Antoszewski 2004: 13].
Enforcement of political accountability requires voters to participate
in the elections by casting a valid vote. If voting against the incumbent authoriti
es, voters should therefore vote for opposition candidates, who must be able to s
eize power, or vote “against all” if the electoral system provides for such a possi
bility. However, in the latter case, voting “against all” may be, in practice,
a form of support for the current government, especially in a situation where
the ruling party has a loyal and disciplined electorate. To allow the alternation o
f power, it is therefore necessary to participate in the election, rather than
to stage a passive protest, involving deliberate absence. Among the factors influ
encing the level of voter turnout in this context may include, for example,
the actual distribution of power as a result of the elections, uncertainty of the fin
al outcome and related competitiveness, as well as the associated media covera
ge [Cześnik 2007: 92-
93]. These factors all favour greater participation in elections. It is worth pointi
ng out, however, that there are concepts that attempt to justify the low turnout b
y social satisfaction with the ruling and policy direction, which are not factors 
mobilizing electoral participation [Lipset 1998: 232233]. Voters, satisfied with 
the general state of politics and ongoing activities, cannot see much point in taki
       

31
 Waldemar Wojtasik

   
ng part in the elections, especially if the prospect of power alternation does not s
eem real. An indirect confirmation of the validity of these concepts, in some cir
cumstances, may be the presence of the mechanism of increase in electoral
participation in crisis situations.
Elections are not only an arena of political competition, but also,
for the candidates and political parties, a way to communicate with the public. T
he most common form of communication are wide political programmes and th
eir ad hoc electoral versions, created as part of election programming function. 
An important medium influencing the implementation of the programming fun
ction are the political parties that create political agenda, referring to the represe
nted values  and their translation into the realm of ideological abstracts. Realiza
tion of the programme creating function by political parties assumes formulatio
n of political and electoral programmes and their public dissemination, mainly i
n order to obtain social support and votes. The process takes place on at least tw
o major planes. The first is the translation of general principles and values  repre
sented by the parties into postulates of specific political action. The second, refe
rring in part to the creational function of parties, assumes public dissemination 
of the programme in order to gain on its basis new members and supporters, and
 generate electoral support. However, the programme must meet the needs of th
e changing political situation, which requires the possibility of ongoing adjustm
ents [Migalski, Wojtasik, Mazur, 2006: 95]. Research on electoral programmes 
most often refers to the spatial intra-
party competition theories, built around the concept of competition in areas per
ceived by the parties and electorates as important. The range of possible solutio
ns creates a continuum from one extreme to the other (with multiple intermediat
e options) [Bukowska, Cześnik 2002: 268].
Through creation of political programmes parties carry out their progra
mme functions. This occurs on at least two main planes: (1) translation of
general principles and values  represented by the parties into postulates
of specific political action, (2) public dissemination of the programme in order t
o gain on its basis new members and supporters, and generate electoral support.
Programmes are an attempt at modeling the expected shape of reality, assuming
the possibility of a directional impact on the policies pursued. The approach
remains a model only, as it employs high degree of generalizations and simplifi
cations in order to create, in line with one’s abilities and knowledge, a compreh
ensive picture of social reality. The reality described is idealized, as by referenc
     

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 Functions of elections in democratic systems

   
es to the category of ideal types it makes it possible to explain the positive (for p
otential recipients of the programme) aspects of implementation of the propose
d solutions. Moreover, political pragmatism forces the winners of the election t
o try to fulfill as many election promises as possible, as it may increase their cha
nces in the next vote. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that the programmes of political parties are 
more of a general indication of the direction of their future actions, than a specif
ic agenda. Implementation of the agenda is after all dependent upon many facto
rs, many of which are independent from the political party itself. On the other h
and, attention is also drawn to the uncertainty of the public as to the course of ac
tion after the elections, because: (1) government programmes may differ signifi
cantly from the declared election programmes, (2) political parties and candidat
es may during the election campaign refrain from revealing their real views and 
intentions [Stokes 1999: 102-
103]. The difference between election programmes and government plans may 
result from their purpose – during the campaign social promises are emphasized
, while after the elections the government, as a rule, chooses means of greater ec
onomic efficiency. The desire to hide one’s true political views and plans durin
g the electoral campaign may be a function, for example, of the knowledge of pr
eferences of the majority of voters, and expertise as to the necessity of undertak
ing a given action in the future. All aforementioned factors point to non-
programmatic determinants of voters’ decisions.
The last function of the elections covered by the present article is recreat
ion of the image of the public opinion [Turska-
Kawa 2010A; 2010B]. They serve as a mechanism for translating public prefer
ences into legitimization of power, and also by the opportunity to actively enga
ge citizens in the processes of electing authorities and systemic channeling of th
eir activity in this field. Elections build a map of significance of individual topic
s in the puiblic consciousness, and translate them into the realm of current polic
y. Cyclical nature of the elections permits observation of possible dynamics of c
hange in this regard, since both on the basis of the topics covered in electoral dis
course, as well as the focusing of voters’ interest on specific
demands, evolution in
the public perception of politics can be observed. Apart from
specific demands that are the pragmatic and ideological axis of disputes in each 
campaign, one can also indicate more general factors helping in diagnosis of the
       

33
 Waldemar Wojtasik

   
 public opinion. The politics itself uses such general categories as individual ide
ological formulas or concepts of left and right to illustrate important issues visi
ble in the public discourse. These abstract ideas are used to show the crucial poi
nts of political differences, as well as to define the basic political options. Withi
n the described framework, a vote serves to identify the most important issues, 
which by their social “carrying capacity” may influence decisions made by vote
rs, and assignment of positions on each issue to the specific parties, candidates a
nd voters. In addition, elections should allow voters to identify further with the 
values represented 
 by them, contributing to their linkage with the existing system of constitutional
 norms and values [Rose, Mossawir 1967: 176].
Image of the public opinion mirrored in the election result may be interp
reted according to two basic models. In the first, specific one, citizens making a
n electoral decision address the specific issues that are the subject of pre-
election discourse. In the most popular approaches, attention is paid to the role 
of axiological and economic determinants as important elements shaping votin
g preferences [Jasiewicz 2002: 76-
78]. All elections are held in different (sometimes even dramatically) socio-
economic circumstances, what also very differently shapes the focal points of s
ocial interest. In periods of profound change and economic crises, social attenti
on is focused on the economic issues. In times of economic stability and sustain
able economic growth, the accents shift towards axiological matters, making th
e economic demands a less important platform for the political competition. Thi
s in turn may lead to the impression that the choice of representatives and deter
mination of main policy directions in this situation is relatively less important [
Rose, Mossawir 1967: 181].
The second model of the public opinion image recreated in the elections 
uses a certain generalization, in which the role of specific demands in the electo
ral discourse is replaced by ideological self-
identification of the voters. Since the individuals describe their attitudes and the
ir structuring employing generalized concepts, one can attempt to identify the p
osition on the right – left scale. The result is a generalized image of the public o
pinion, in which the voters take into account the degree of consistency of their s
elf-identification with the party dimension of the left – right continuum. 

34
 Functions of elections in democratic systems

   
Conclusion
Larry Diamond argues that today, just as there is no single form of demo
cracy, it is also impossible to talk about one model of authoritarianism,
what affects the ability to describe various forms of political hybrids [Diamond
1999: 23]. This observation allows not only to distinguish different types of regi
mes, but also points to the existence of many systemic conditions that affect the 
elections, and consequently functions they perform. In democratic systems, the 
multiplicity of alleged election functions may result from both these systemic c
onditions, as well as from scientific approach of the authors raising this issue. In
 different political system contexts, elections will be able to fulfill varying funct
ions. That conclusion is clear not only from their different normative location, b
ut primarily from the relationships that exist between the elections and the pote
ntial possibility of emergence of the leaders and their alternation as a result of th
e vote. Therefore, outside the political system context, elections and their functi
ons can be analyzed as consequences of the decisions of those in power, wantin
g to avoid the possibility of losing this very power [Gandhi, Przeworski 2009: 4
]. Democratic systems refering to the competitive elections formula signify unc
ertainty of the final outcome, and possibility of actual alternation of power.
Elections respecting the free and fair principles will serve as a stabilizer 
for the democratic system, ensuring repeatable mechanism of recruitment and s
election of candidates for elective positions in the political institutions. They cr
eate patterns of peaceful transfer of power in the event of changes in the politica
l frame of reference. They are also a forum for cyclical opportunity to evaluiate 
the government, renew or revoke its mandate to rule and, consequently, cause p
ower alternation. Elections also offer a moral title to rule, granting legitimacy to
 take action in respect of the domestic and foreign policy. A function that increa
ses stabilization of the political system is the socialization of citizens and their p
olitical integration, and the opportunity to present political positions and progra
mmes by small political parties and independent candidates [Jackson, Jackson 1
999: 366]. These factors will affect the adaptive changes in the political system,
 constituting the stabilization mechanism for democratic procedures and
institutions.

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