5/25/23, 1:44 PM ROAN I. LIBARIOS v. JUDGE ROSARITO F.

DABALOS

276 Phil. 53

EN BANC

[ A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July 11, 1991 ]

ROAN I. LIBARIOS, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS,

RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his
client Mariano Corvera, Jr. against respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, gross misconduct and partiality,
relative to Criminal Case No. 3464. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On 10 March 1988, former Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr. was shot by Pablo Macapas
inside the courtroom of respondent Judge Dabalos, after a hearing in a frustrated
murder case against said Pablo Macapas. Corvera, Sr. was the private complainant in
the aforesaid criminal case, while Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr. was appearing as
counsel of Macapas. As a result of the killing of Corvera Sr., a formal charge of murder
(I.S. No. 88-138) was filed with the City Fiscal's Office of Butuan City against Pablo
Macapas, Mayor Tranqui­lino Calo, Jr., and his driver-bodyguard Belarmino Allocod,
and (2) other "John Does". Macapas was a bodyguard of respondent Calo, Jr.
On 22 June 1988, Investigating Fiscal Macario Balansag issued a resolution, finding a
prima facie case for murder against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-138.[1]
On 29 June 1988, the information was signed by the Investigating Fiscal; however, a
motion for reconsideration of the resolution was filed by respondent Calo, Jr., which
delayed the filing of the Information against Calo, Jr. and his co-respondents.

https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c9b98 1/9
5/25/23, 1:44 PM ROAN I. LIBARIOS v. JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS

On 21 July 1988, respondents in I.S. No. 88-138 filed with the RTC Butuan City a
petition for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, to enjoin the Investigating Fiscal from acting on their afore-
mentioned motion for reconsideration. Then Executive Judge Vicente Hidalgo issued
a TRO, directing the Investigating Fiscal to refrain from acting on the said motion for
reconsideration and from further proceeding with the preliminary investigation of the
murder charge against respondent Calo, Jr. and his co-respondents. However the TRO
expired after the lapse of twenty (20) days, without a preliminary injunction being
issued.

Before the motion for reconsideration could be resolved, Investigating Fiscal Balansag
was himself gunned down in cold blood while on his way to his office. Based on the
investigation conducted by the NBI linking the death of Fiscal Balansag to the killing
of Corvera, Sr., another formal complaint for murder was filed against Calo, Jr. and
four (4) others.
On 14 September 1988, Acting City Fiscal Brocoy resolved the pending motion for
reconsideration, affirming the 22 June 1988 resolution finding a prima facie case for
murder against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-138.
On 29 September 1988, the information earlier signed by Investigating Fiscal
Balansag, carrying a NO BAIL recom­mendation, was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Butuan City, Branch IV, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3464. On 14 October
1988, upon motion of the prosecution and with the approval of the court, the
information was withdrawn for being fatally defective in form, the same having been
signed by Fiscal Balansag who was already dead at the time of the filing of said
information.
On 29 November 1988, a new information signed by Acting Fiscal Brocoy carrying
also a NO BAIL recommendation, was filed with the court without the necessary
supporting affidavits and papers. The case was erroneously assigned to Branch IV of
the RTC of Butuan City, where the original information prior to its withdrawal was
assigned. The accused filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the Issuance of
a Warrant of Arrest Without Bail, and in the alternative, accused sought the fixing of
bail for their temporary release.[2] Said motion was set for hearing on 15 December
1988.

https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c9b98 2/9
5/25/23, 1:44 PM ROAN I. LIBARIOS v. JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS

Upon motion of the prosecution, the case was scheduled for raffle on 7 December
1988. On said scheduled date for raffle, accused Calo, Jr. and his counsel personally
filed an opposition to the holding of the raffle on the ground of lack of notice to the
parties.
On 6 and 8 December 1988, Corvera, Jr. and his counsel together with their
sympathizers staged a rally demanding the immediate arrest of the accused in
Criminal Case No. 3464. After their rally in the afternoon of 8 December 1988, they
personally went to see respondent judge in his chamber to reiterate their demand.
After said meeting between Corvera, Jr., et al. and respondent judge, the latter issued
an order of 8 December 1988[3] in his capacity as Executive Judge, directing the raffle
of the case with due notice to the parties. Without conducting any prior hearing, in the
same order of 8 December 1988, respondent judge directed the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against the accused, fixing at the same time the bail for accused Calo, Jr. and
Allocod at P50,000.00 each; however, no bail was recommended for the temporary
release of accused Macapas. Respondent judge fixed bail for the temporary release of
accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod on the ground that they were not charged as co-
principals by cooperation or inducement, and that the evidence of guilt against them
was merely circumstantial.

On 14 December 1988, a petition for certiorari was filed by herein complainant with
the Court of Appeals, assailing the 8 December 1988 order of respondent judge,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 16383. In response to the urgency of the petition, a
resolution dated 20 December 1988 was issued by the Court of Appeals restraining the
execution and implementation of the assailed order, pending the resolution of the
petition on the merits. However, on 26 December 1988, respondent judge and Calo,
Jr. informed the Court of Appeals that accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod had already put
up their respective bail bonds of P50,000.00 as of 9 December 1988 and that both
have been released, thus rendering the primary objective of the CA temporary
restraining order moot and academic.
[4]
On 31 January 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside the
questioned 8 December 1988 order as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The warrants of arrest as well as
the bail bonds filed by the accused in said Criminal Case No. 3464 were declared void
and without force and effect; the court of origin was ordered to immediately issue and
serve new warrants of arrest upon the accused. To determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, the trial court was ordered to conduct a
https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c9b98 3/9
5/25/23, 1:44 PM ROAN I. LIBARIOS v. JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS

hearing and thus resolve the motion for fixing the bail for the temporary release of the
two (2) accused, Calo, Jr. and Allocod. The decision of the Court of Appeals became
final and executory on 23 February 1989.[5]

In the administrative complaint at bar, complainant claims that the act of respondent
judge in granting bail to the accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod without a hearing, is
tantamount to gross ignorance and willful, malicious and blatant disregard of the
provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which require a
hearing before an accused charged with a capital offense can be granted bail. The
impartiality of respondent judge in issuing the questioned warrants of arrest but
allowing bail is also questioned on the ground of his "close association" with the
accused Calo, Jr.
In his defense, respondent judge argues that Sec. 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure which requires a hearing of an application for admission to bail,
filed by any person who is in custody for the commission of a capital offense, is
applicable only to cases where the accused is already in custody, but neither of the
three (3) accused in Criminal Case No. 3464 was being detained at the time their
application for bail was acted upon by respondent judge. In his capacity as Executive
Judge, respondent judge claims that he merely followed the precedents set by his
predeces­sors, in issuing warrants of arrest before the raffle of a case in order to avoid
delay in the arrest of the accused.
In addition, respondent judge denied the allegation that he was a law partner of
accused Calo, Jr., claiming that he was a mere employee in the business of said
accused, and that he appeared with accused Calo, Jr. as co-counsel in a case, but not
as an associate. To justify his finding that the evidence of guilt is circumstantial
against accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, respondent judge stated that -

https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c9b98 4/9
5/25/23, 1:44 PM ROAN I. LIBARIOS v. JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS

"Herein respondent has some doubts whether accused Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr.
could have done the acts of giving a revolver to accused Pablo Macapas outside
the courtroom and pushed Pablo Macapas into the courtroom to shoot Mariano
Corvera, Sr., which acts were allegedly done in the presence of witness (sic)
Pacifico Largonita and Fernando Casinao, who by their own admissions, are
security personnel and companions of the late Mayor Corvera. These acts being
attributed to accused Calo as the brain behind the killing do not appear to be a
natural conduct of man. These are stupid acts and accused Calo does not impress
herein respondent as having that kind of mental intelligence. Respondent has
known accused Tran­quilino O. Calo, Jr. as a law practitioner and as a person for
about twenty years already. Respon­dent finds accused Calo to be of above-
average intelligence. Thus, when respondent reviewed the findings of the
investigating fiscal regarding the statements of P. Largonita and F. Casinao,
respon­dent entertained some serious doubts. Questions cropped up in
respondent's mind. Respondent asked himself the questions that if he were the
master-­mind, would he give, in the presence of some individuals, the gun to the
gunman only at the vicinity where the intended victim was to be shot moments
before the appointed time of the killing and pushed the gunman to the place
where the victim was? Respondent's answer was that he would not behave in
such manner, otherwise he would appear to be an inept mastermind and the
gunman was reluctant that the latter had to be pushed to execute the plan."[6]

While it does not form part of the record of the case at bar, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 16383 is quite enlightening. That decision, as already
mentioned, declared as null and void the warrants of arrest issued by respondent
judge as well as the bail fixed by him for the temporary release of the accused, all
accomplished without a hearing. The Court of Appeals said:

https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c9b98 5/9
5/25/23, 1:44 PM ROAN I. LIBARIOS v. JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS

"It is conventional wisdom in legal circles that the determination as to whether or

not the evidence of guilt is strong in a capital offense rests upon the sound
judgment and discretion of the court which can only be exercised and reached
after due or summary hearing. (People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522; Ocampo vs.
Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55). In that hearing, the fiscal must be notified and given the
opportunity to present his evidence. If the court grants bail without affording
such opportunity to the prosecution, due process is seriously violated. (People vs.
San Diego, supra; Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCRA 373). And even where the
prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant
and fix bail, the Court may ask the prosecution 'questions to ascertain the
strength of the state's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail.'
(Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 789).

x x x                                    x x x                               x x x

In the petition at bar, private respondents argue that since they are no longer in
custody of the law, the respondent court having granted and fixed their bail
which they did forthwith post, the hearing to determine whether or not their guilt
is strong is no longer necessary. The argument sounds but casuistic because in
Our judgment the respondent court acted deliberately with precipitate haste and
with grave abuse of discretion, when on December 8, 1988 it issued the order
granting and fixing the bail without any hearing at all, even as private
respondents themselves had requested their motion to be heard on December 15,
1988 yet, when respondent court in the same order directed the issuance of
warrants of arrest against private respondents, the act was nothing more than a
superfluous and useless ceremony because with the grant of bail the accused
could and did effectively secure their freedom at once without even seeing a copy
of the warrant of arrest itself. As a matter of fact, there is nothing in they records
before Us to show that warrants of arrest were actually issued against private
[7]
respondents."

Respondent judge was declared by the Court of Appeals to have acted with grave abuse
of discretion in fixing the bail of the accused without a hearing. Generally, a judge
cannot be held liable to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively, for

https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c9b98 [8] 6/9

5/25/23, 1:44 PM ROAN I. LIBARIOS v. JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS

an erroneous judgment or decision rendered by him in good faith.[8] However, good

faith may be negated by the circumstances on record.
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be
erroneous. But, while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account
merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that
[9]
they should be conversant with basic legal principles.
In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the
applicable law unswayed by partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of
criticism.[10] Respondent judge should not have allowed himself to be swayed into
issuing an order fixing bail for the temporary release of the accused charged with
murder, without a hearing, which is contrary to established principles of law. A judge
owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed
to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the
administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the
occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles.[11]

The fact that the complainant and his sympathizers had staged a rally demanding the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused is not a sufficient excuse for the
unjustified haste of respondent judge's act of fixing bail without a hearing.
It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is
accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary
proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the
accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the instant case amounted
to a violation of due process.[12] Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the
evidence of guilt against herein accused is not strong, the law and settled
jurisprudence demanded that a hearing be conducted before bail was fixed for the
temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, if bail was at all justified.
Respondent judge's disregard of an established rule of law by depriving the
prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused
was strong, amounted to gross ignorance of the law, which is subject to disciplinary
action.
https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c9b98 7/9
5/25/23, 1:44 PM ROAN I. LIBARIOS v. JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS

Furthermore, considering that respondent judge had a close association with

respondent Calo, Jr. as a former employee of the said accused, prudence and regard
for his position as judge demanded that he should have refrained from fixing the bail
of said accused and from concluding that the evidence against him was merely
"circumstantial", in order to avoid any doubt as to his judicial impartiality.
Respondent judge should have waited for the raffle of the case and allowed the judge
to whom the case was actually raffled to resolve the issue of fixing the bail of said
accused, if he was bailable. A judge should not only render a just, correct and
impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to
his fairness, impartiality and integrity.[13]
ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge is hereby imposed a FINE of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) and WARNED to exercise more care and diligence
in the performance of his duties as a judge, and that the same or similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., on leave.

[1] Rollo, pp. 74-98

[2] Rollo, pp. 18-19
[3] Rollo, pp. 20-24
[4]
Penned by Associate Justice Segundino G. Chua, with the concurrence of Associate
Justices Serafin E. Camilon and Justo P. Torres, Jr.
[5] Entry of Judgment was made on 3 May 1989
[6]
Rollo, pp. 60-61, Comment of Respondent Judge
[7]
31 January 1989 Decision of the Court of Appeals
[8] Padilla vs. Dizon, A.C. No. 3086, 23 February 1988, 158 SCRA 127
[9] Abad vs. Bleza, A.C. No. 227-RTJ, 13 October 1986, 145 SCRA 1
[10]
https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c9b98 8/9
5/25/23, 1:44 PM ROAN I. LIBARIOS v. JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS
[10] Canon 3, Rule 3.02, Code of Judicial Ethics
[11] Daplas vs. Raquiza, A.C. No. 1129 MJ, 21 August 1980, 99 SCRA 141
[12] People vs. Sola, G.R. Nos. 56158-64, 17 March 1981, 103 SCRA 393
[13]
Martinez vs. Gironella, G.R. No. 37655, 22 July 1975, 6 SCRA 245

https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c9b98 9/9