Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1831             February 2, 2007

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, 

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

In 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson) borrowed ₱4,250,000 from petitioner Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When Bengson defaulted in the payment of
the amortizations, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties and sold them at public auction
where it emerged as the highest bidder.

In 1977, Bengson filed an action in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 26 1 to annul
the extrajudicial foreclosure. The trial court, through Judge Antonio Fineza, declared the foreclosure void and
directed petitioner to restore to Bengson the foreclosed properties, pay damages and costs of suit.

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s
decision and remanded the case for reception of evidence on the costs of suit and determination of the replacement
value of the properties should petitioner fail to return them. The CA decision became final and executory on February
10, 1988.

When petitioner failed to return the foreclosed properties, the new presiding judge of Branch 26, respondent Judge
Vicente A. Pacquing, ordered it to pay Bengson the equivalent value of the foreclosed properties. Thereafter,
Bengson moved that it be permitted to present evidence on the costs of suit. On April 6, 1995, the trial court directed
petitioner to pay Bengson ₱31 million as costs of suit. This order became final on April 24, 1995.

Petitioner filed an urgent omnibus motion with the court a quo stating that its counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado, went on
AWOL and never informed it of respondent judge’s order.2 This motion, treated as petition for relief from judgment by
respondent judge, was dismissed on January 16, 1997. 3

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) but respondent judge denied the same on April 23, 1998.

Petitioner then instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47669 4 assailing
the court a quo’s denial of its petition for relief from judgment. The CA, however, dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47669
for having been filed out of time as three years had elapsed since the order awarding Bengson ₱31 million as costs
of suit became final and executory.5

Petitioner filed an MR of the above decision and, while it was pending resolution at the CA, respondent judge, on
December 16, 1998, issued an alias writ of execution ordering petitioner to pay Bengson the ₱31 million. 6 Pursuant
thereto, respondent Atty. Mario Anacleto M. Bañez, acting as sheriff of Branch 26, executed the writ and levied on
petitioner’s shares of stock in San Miguel Corporation (SMC) worth ₱6.2 million. The garnished shares were later
sold at public auction with Bengson as the only bidder.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved to quash the writ on the ground that its funds and properties were exempt from
garnishment, levy and execution under Section 39 of RA 8291. 7 Respondent judge denied the motion stating that
only funds and properties that were necessary to maintain petitioner’s actuarial solvency, like contributions of GSIS
members, were exempt from garnishment, levy and execution under RA 8291.8

Petitioner filed its MR of the trial court’s denial of its motion to quash the writ but this was rejected as well.

Via a special civil action for certiorari with an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order (TRO), petitioner came to us questioning the garnishment and sale on execution of its SMC shares.
The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 136874. 9
We referred G.R. No. 136874 to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits. In the CA, it was re-
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 51131 and was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP. No. 47669. 10

Later, the CA dismissed both petitions.11

Petitioner questioned the CA’s dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 47669 via a petition for review in this Court docketed as
G.R. No. 137448,12 the ultimate issue of which was the existence of grounds for relief from the ₱31 million costs of
suit judgment by respondent judge.

Later, petitioner filed another case, a special civil action for certiorari in this Court, this time contesting the CA’s
dismissal of its petition in CA-G.R. No. 51131. Docketed as G.R. No. 141454, 13 the petition ascribed grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA for upholding the trial court’s issuance of the alias writ of execution and the
subsequent garnishment and sale of its shares in SMC.

Petitioner also filed this administrative complaint 14 against respondents for ignorance of the law, bias and partiality,
and for violation of RA 8291. In its complaint, petitioner alleged:

In fine, [respondent judge] refused to take cognizance of [Section 39, RA 8291]. He refused to await an authoritative
and definitive resolution of the issues [on the exemption of GSIS’s funds and properties] from execution or the issue
of whether GSIS is entitled to a relief from judgment of his [₱]31 million peso cost[s] of suit. …[H]e was in a hurry, as
Bengson, to execute the ₱31 million costs of suit…[O]n the other hand, Sheriff Mario Anacleto M. Bañez, seemed to
have the same objective when he refused to take heed of [GSIS’s request] to hold in abeyance the execution sale on
the basis of Section 39 (RA 8291).

The foregoing only shows [respondent judge’s] deliberate disregard of the express provisions of [RA 8291],
specifically Section 39…and his bias, given his exorbitant award for cost[s] of suit, bereft, as it is, of any legal basis. It
evidently reveals a malicious scheme that seriously undermines the very integrity and impartiality of his court.

The same can be said of the acts of Sheriff Bañez in garnishing and selling [GSIS’s shares of stock in SMC] to
Bengson, characterized by an unusual swiftness and in clear disregard of the express provision of Section 39, RA
8291…15

We referred the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In its report16 to the Court, the OCA found nothing in the records to support petitioner’s accusations
against both respondents. According to the OCA, even assuming that respondent judge erred in interpreting RA
8291, such error did not constitute gross ignorance of the law. It added that the records also failed to prove malice,
fraud, dishonesty or bad faith on the part of respondent judge in issuing the assailed alias writ of execution.

On petitioner’s allegations against respondent Atty. Bañez, the OCA likewise found no reason to hold him liable for
failing to defer the execution of the writ.

The OCA then recommended the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint against respondents. 17

On petitioner’s motion, we referred the case to the CA for further investigation. It was assigned to Associate Justice
Roberto A. Barrios, who acted as investigating officer. Before a hearing on the case could be conducted, respondent
judge died.18 The hearing proceeded but we withheld his benefits pending the completion of the investigation of his
case by Justice Barrios.

Subsequently, Justice Barrios submitted his report 19 to us agreeing with OCA’s findings that petitioner’s complaint
against respondents was unfounded. According to Justice Barrios:

Assuming for the nonce that [respondent judge] erred in issuing the Order of 16 December 1998 without awaiting the
resolution of [petitioner’s motion for reconsideration], and in holding that [its] properties are not exempt from
execution, these would not be errors that are gross and patent, or done maliciously, deliberately or in evident bad
faith. [Petitioner] has not presented proof to the contrary, which with the factual milieu would call for administrative
sanctions against [respondent judge]. As a matter of public policy, the acts of the judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of [the] law can
find refuge.20

He added that the filing of the administrative charges against respondents was premature because this Court at that
time had yet to decide G.R. No. 137448 and G.R. No. 141454. He thus recommended the dismissal of the
administrative charges against respondents.

On January 31, 2002,21 we handed down our decision in the above cases nullifying the CA’s resolutions dismissing
G.R. Nos. 5113122 and 47669.23 In the same decision, we set aside respondent judge’s January 16, 1997 order
dismissing petitioner’s petition for relief from judgment and his April 23, 1998 order denying the MR. 24
Notwithstanding the nullification of respondent judge’s orders, we are adopting the findings and recommendations of
the OCA and Justice Barrios.

For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must be gross or patent. 25To
constitute gross ignorance of the law, such acts must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but also
motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty. 26 That certainly does not appear to be the case here as
petitioner’s complaint was spawned merely by the honest divergence of opinion between petitioner and respondent
judge as to the legal issues and applicable laws involved. 27 Petitioner also proffered no evidence that respondent
judge’s acts were imbued with malice or bad faith.

In the same vein, we hold that respondent judge was neither biased nor partial against petitioner when he issued the
alias writ of execution. Petitioner’s assertion that respondent judge precipitately issued the alias writ is not supported
by the records. On the contrary, the records indicate that the writ was issued more than three years from the finality
of the order directing petitioner to pay Bengson ₱31 million as costs of suit. Its issuance was not all tainted with
undue haste. In the exercise of his judicial discretion, respondent judge believed that the issuance of the alias writ
had become forthwith a matter of right following the finality of said order. The rule is that once a judgment becomes
final, the winning party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a court’s ministerial duty. 28

Assuming ex gratia argumenti that respondent judge erred in issuing the alias writ, his act would still not merit
administrative sanction absent malice or bad faith. 29 Bad faith does not simply connote poor or flawed judgment; it
imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity or conscious doing of a wrong.

Furthermore, for allegations of bias and partiality to stand, petitioner should have demonstrated that respondent
judge’s decisions and orders came from extrajudicial sources or from some bases other than what he had learned
from his study of the case. 30 Decisions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although they appear erroneous,
are not necessarily partial as long as they are culled from the arguments and evidence of the parties. 31The party who
alleges partiality must prove it with clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed in that aspect.

Interestingly, this Court, in our decision in G.R. Nos. 137448 and 141454, nullified the orders of respondent judge
only to give petitioner another chance to seek redress from the gross negligence and mistake of its then counsel,
Atty. Terrado. We did not at all declare respondent judge’s orders as erroneous or tainted with malice or bad faith. In
our decision, we said:

It is readily apparent that part of [petitioner’s] predicament stemmed from the negligence or mistake, to put it mildly,
of its former counsels.

Indeed, it is undisputed that despite ample opportunity, [petitioner’s] counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado, did not rebut
BENGSON’s evidence on the costs of suit or, at the very least, verify the schedule of costs and cross-examine
BENGSON’s witnesses. Much worse, he allowed the 6 April 1995 Order awarding BENGSON ₱31 million costs of
suit to attain finality by not filing a motion for reconsideration with the trial court or a petition with the Court of Appeals.
Instead, he went AWOL without informing petitioner of the said Order. These acts constituted gross negligence, if not
fraud, and resulted in the deprivation of petitioner of an opportunity to move to reconsider or appeal the adverse
order.

…[A]s a general rule, the negligence or mistake of a counsel binds the client for otherwise there would be never be
no end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that the former counsel had
not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned. But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit
exceptions thereto and prevent miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a particular
case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it. 1awphi1.net

Moreover, the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting the actions of a judge
perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient remedy exists. 32 The actions against judges
should not be considered as complementary or suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial remedies which can be
availed of by a party in a case.33

Regarding the accusations against respondent Atty. Bañez, the Court finds no basis to hold him liable for executing
the assailed writ at that time. Undeniably, the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of
judgment.34Charged with this task, he must act with considerable dispatch to administer justice. Otherwise, a
judgment, if not executed at once, would just be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. 35 In executing the
writ, Atty. Bañez merely carried out a ministerial duty. He had no discretion to implement the writ or not.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, and violation of RA 8291 against the late
Judge Vicente A. Pacquing and Atty. Mario Anacleto M. Bañez, is hereby DISMISSED.

Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator so that the benefits due the late
respondent judge can be promptly released to his heirs, unless there exists some other lawful cause to withhold the
same.
SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice