A Sideways View of The World
A Sideways View of The World
A Sideways View of The World
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Exhibit 2.1
69
64 60
62
47
Aug-1999
Feb-2001
Aug-2002
Feb-2004
Aug-2005
Though its shareholders experienced plenty of volatility over the past 10 years, the stock has gone nowhereit fell prey to a cowardly lion. Over the last decade Wal-Marts earnings almost tripled from $1.25 per share to $3.42, growing at an impressive rate of 11.8 percent a year. This doesnt look like a stagnant, failing company; in fact, its quite an impressive performance for a company whose sales are approaching half a trillion dollars. However, its stock
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chart led you to believe otherwise. The culprit responsible for this unexciting performance was valuationthe P/Ewhich declined from 45 to 13.7, or about 12.4 percent a year. The stock has not gone anywhere, as all the benefits from earnings growth were canceled out by a declining P/E. Even though revenues more than doubled and earnings almost tripled, all of the return for shareholders of this terrific company came from dividends, which did not amount to much. This is exactly what we see in the broader stock market, which is comprised of a large number of companies whose stock prices have gone and will go nowhere in a sideways market. Lets zero in on the last sideways market the United States saw, from 1966 to 1982. Earnings grew about 6.6 percent a year, while P/Es declined 4.2 percent; thus stock prices went up roughly 2.2 percent a year. As you can see in Exhibit 2.2, a secular sideways market is full of little (cyclical) bull and bear markets. The 19661982 market had five cyclical bull and five cyclical bear markets. This is what happens in sideways markets: Two forces work against each other. The benefits of earnings growth are wiped out by P/E compression (the staple of sideways markets); stocks dont go anywhere for a long time, with plenty of (cyclical) volatility, while you patiently collect your dividends, which are meager in todays environment.
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Exhibit 2.2 Dont Let Your Emotions Make You Miss These Cyclical Bulls and Bears (Dow Jones Industrial Average 19661982)
Bear
Bull
Bear
Bull
Bear
Bull
Bear
Bull
Bear
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
A quick glimpse at the current sideways market shows a similar picture: P/Es declined from 30 to 19, a rate of 4.6 percent a year, while earnings grew 2.4 percent. This explains why we are now pretty much where we were in 2000.
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Exhibit 2.3
Market Bull Sideways Bear
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Economic Growth
Starting P/E
?
Starting Valuation (P/E) Low High High
and always remained at its average of 15, then we would not have bull or sideways market cycleswed have no secular market cycles, period! Stock prices would go up with earnings growth, which would fluctuate due to normal economic cyclicality but would average about 5 percent, and investors would collect an additional approximately 4 percent in dividends. That is what would happen in a utopian world where people are completely rational and unemotional. But as Yoda might have put it, the utopian world is not, and people rational are not. The P/Es journey from one extreme to the other is completely responsible for sideways and bull markets: P/Es ascent from low to high caused bull markets, and P/Es descent from high to low was responsible for the rollercoaster ride of sideways markets. Bear markets happened when you had two conditions in place, a high starting P/E and prolonged economic distress; together they are a lethal combination. High P/Es reflect high investor expectations for the economy. Economic blues such as runaway inflation, severe deflation,
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declining or stagnating earnings, or a combination of these things sour these high expectations. Instead of an above-average economy, investors wake up to an economy that is below average. Presto, a bear market has started. Lets examine the only secular bear market in the twentieth century in the United States: the period of the Great Depression. P/Es declined from 19 to 9, at a rate of about 12.5 percent a year, and earnings growth was not there to soften the blow, since earnings declined 28.1 percent a year. Thus stock prices declined by 37.5 percent a year! Ironicallyand this really tells you how subjective is this whole science that we call investingthe stock market decline from 1929 to 1932 doesnt fit into a secular definition, since it lasted less than five years. Traditional, by-the-book, secular markets should last longer than five years. I still put the Great Depression into the secular category, as it changed investor psyches for generations. Also, it was a very significant event: Stocks declined almost 90 percent, and 80 years later we are still talking about it.*
*What if we start with low valuations and contracting earnings (i.e., a bad economy)? Though this has not happened for over 100 years, the combination would likely lead to either a mild bear market or a sideways market. The outcome would depend on how low the starting P/E was and how bad was the economic decline.
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However, a true, by the book, long-term bear market took place in Japan. Starting in the late 1980s, over a 14-year period, Japanese stocks declined 8.2 percent a year. This decline was driven by a complete collapse of both earningswhich declined 5.3 percent a yearand P/Es, which declined 3 percent a year. Japanese stocks were in a bear market because stocks were expensive, and earnings declined over a long period of time. In bear markets both P/Es and earnings decline. In sideways markets P/E ratios decline. They say that payback is a bitch, and that is what sideways markets are all about: Investors pay back in declining P/Es for the excess returns of the preceding bull market. Lets move to a slightly cheerier subject: the bull market. We see a great example of a secular bull market in the 19822000 period. Earnings grew about 6.5 percent a year and P/Es rose from very low levels of around 10 to the unprecedented level of 30, adding another 7.7 percent to earnings growth. Add up the positive numbers and you get super-juicy compounded stock returns of 14.7 percent a year. Sprinkle dividends on top and you have incredible returns of 18.2 percent over almost two decades. No surprise that the stock market became everyones favorite pastime in the late 1990s.
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Most of the time common stocks are subject to irrational and excessive price fluctuations in both directions as the consequence of the ingrained tendency of most people to speculate or gamble . . . to give way to hope, fear and greed. Benjamin Graham
As the saying goes, the more things change the more they remain the same. Whether a trade is submitted by telegram, as was done at the turn of the twentieth century, or through the screen of an online broker, as is the case today, it still has a human originating it. And all humans come with standard emotional equipment that is, to some degree, predictable. Over the years weve become
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more educated, with access to fancier, faster, and better financial tools. A myriad of information is accessible at our fingertips, with speed and abundance that just a decade ago was available to only a privileged few. Despite all that, we are no less human than we were 10, 50, or 100 years ago. We behave like humans, no matter how sophisticated we become. Unless we completely delegate all our investment decision making to computers, markets will still be impacted by human emotions. The following example highlights the psychology of bull and cowardly lion markets: During a bull market stock prices go up because earnings grow and P/Es rise. So in the absence of P/E change, stocks would go up by, lets say, 5 percent a year due to earnings growth. But remember, in the beginning stages of a bull market P/Es are depressed, thus the first phase of P/E increase is normalization, a journey towards the mean; and as P/Es rise they juice up stock returns by, well say, 7 percent a year. So stocks prices go up 12 percent (5 percent due to earnings growth and 7 percent due to P/E increase), and that is without counting returns from dividends. After a while investors become accustomed to their stocks rising 12 percent a year. At some point, though, the P/E crosses the mean mark, and the second phase kicks in: The P/E heads towards the stars. A new paradigm is born: 12 percent price appreciation is
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the new average and the phrase this time is different is heard across the land. Fifty or 100 years ago, new average returns were justified by the advancements of railroads, electricity, telephones, or efficient manufacturing. Investors mistakenly attributed high stock market returns that came from expanding P/Es to the economy, which despite all the advancements did not turn into a super-fast grower. In the late 1990s, during the later stages of the 1982 2000 bull market, similar observations were made, except the names of the game changers were now just-in-time inventory, telecommunications, and the Internet. However, it is rarely different, and never different when P/E increase is the single source of the supersized returns. P/Es rose and went through the average (of 15) and far beyond. Everybody had to own stocks. Expectations were that the new average would persist 12 percent a year became your birthright rate of return. P/Es can shoot for the stars, but they never reach them. In the late stage of a secular bull market P/Es stop rising. Investors receive only a return of 5 percent from earnings growthand they are disappointed. The love affair with stocks is not over, but they start diversifying into other asset classes that recently provided better returns (real estate, bonds, commodities, gold, etc.).
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Suddenly, stocks are not rising 12 percent a year, not even 5 percent, but closer to zeroP/E decline is wiping out any benefits from earnings growth of 5 percent and the lost decade (or two) of a sideways market has begun.
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Since 1900, the S&P 500 traded on average at about 15 times earnings. But it spent only a quarter of the time between P/Es of 13 and 17the mean zone, two points above and below average. In the majority of cases the market reached its fair valuation only in passing from one irrational extreme to the other. Mean reversion is the Rodney Dangerfield of investing: It gets no respect. Mean reversion is as important to investing as the law of gravity is to physics. As long as humans come equipped with the standard emotional equipment package, market cycles will persist and the pendulum will continue to swing from one extreme to the other.