Cultural theorists have become less teleological in their hope that the crises will bring about capitalism's disintegration. This attitude may be attributed in part to the intensification of debt, speculation, and risk. Fictitious capital refers to the flow of money capital not backed by any commodity transaction.
Cultural theorists have become less teleological in their hope that the crises will bring about capitalism's disintegration. This attitude may be attributed in part to the intensification of debt, speculation, and risk. Fictitious capital refers to the flow of money capital not backed by any commodity transaction.
Cultural theorists have become less teleological in their hope that the crises will bring about capitalism's disintegration. This attitude may be attributed in part to the intensification of debt, speculation, and risk. Fictitious capital refers to the flow of money capital not backed by any commodity transaction.
Cultural theorists have become less teleological in their hope that the crises will bring about capitalism's disintegration. This attitude may be attributed in part to the intensification of debt, speculation, and risk. Fictitious capital refers to the flow of money capital not backed by any commodity transaction.
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INTRODUCTION: CULTURES OF FINANCE
WHEN THE CRISIS, WHICH WAS A CERTAINTY,
BECOMES A CONTINGENCY
Kay Bal and Mar Wdtu
I
Since Karl Polyani published The Great Transformation in 1944,
cultural theorists have become less teleological and more chastened in their hope that the crises, which reveal the contradictions inherent in capitalism, will inevitably bring about its disintegration.1 At the start of the new millennium, this attitude may be attributed in part to the intensification of debt, speculation, and risk on global, national, corporate, and individual levels that has attended changing patterns of accumulation in the post-World War II era. Greta R. Krippner understands financialization as "a pattern of accumulation in which profit-making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity produc- tion."2 Her initial analysis gauging relative industry shares of corpo- rate profits between 1952 and 2001 in the United States demonstrates a dramatic decline of manufacturing in contrast to the finance, insur- ance, and real estate industries.3 These industries have not only be- come the dominant sector of the economy but also grow increasingly volatile the more they disengage from production. This state of affairs provides part of our impetus as guest editors of this special issue to reevaluate Marx's arguments about the com- petition between finance and industrial capital and to consider the role of fictitious capital vis-A-vis public perceptions of debt and risk. According to David Harvey, fictitious capital refers to the flow of money capital not backed by any commodity transaction. More specifically, "the category of fictitious capital is, in fact, implied whenever credit is extended in advance, in anticipation of future labour as a counter- value."4 Harvey's emphasis on the inherently fictitious character of credit is consonant with Krippner's use of the term financial to
Cultural Critique 65-Winter 2007-Copyright 2007 Regents of the University of Minnesota
2 1 KARYN BALL AND MARK WOYTIUK
comprise "activities relating to the provision (or transfer) of liquid
capital in expectation of future interest, dividends, or capital gains."' In his attention to the hegemonic emergence of a "mass investment culture," 6 Adam Harmes notes that "new trends, associated with the rise of the mutual-fund industry and an emerging 'investment cul- ture' may be creating the perception of a growing link between the interests of workers and finance capital," which has transformed "tens of millions from passive savers into 'active' investors." Harmes argues that this transformation disciplines voting constituencies into favoring neoliberal, macroeconomic polices and structures that are 7 opposed to their interests as workers. A few events have recently heightened scholarly and media atten- tion to the potentially catastrophic consequences of shareholder value as a fulcrum of corporate governance as well as speculative trading associated with the proliferation of new financial instruments. In the hysterical wake of the punctured dotcom bubble, Enron's bankruptcy in 2001 was among the first of many scandals to traumatize market faith by devastating U.S. stockholder savings and pensions. Enron's employees shared their fate with those at Nortel Networks Corpora- tion, Lucent Technologies, and Global Crossing, who were also over- invested in company stock when it dove and dissolved their savings. In the same year, Argentina declared its inability to make payments on its external debt, thereby precipitating the largest sovereign default in history. Notably, finance has also become an important term in the "war against terrorism" as the United States and other G7 countries have sought to control the flow of funds to particular groups. While official responses to these events have varied nationally, most are mediated by "common-sense" assumptions about market rationality and a fetishistic faith in the magical potency of financial liberaliza- tion. This faith has made workers susceptible to a disciplinary rhetoric that currently promotes the privatization of investment risk in retire- ment planning. Studies of financialization conducted by researchers in the social sciences have often resulted in positivistic and economistic views of speculation, debt, and risk. Yet, as Marcus Taylor and Adam Morton have recently pointed out, even those political economists commit- ted to challenging this tendency seem to have forgotten the category of socially necessary labor, despite their almost exclusive reliance on INTRODUCTION I
Marxist theories.8 These methodological and theoretical shortfalls have
narrowed the range of inquiry about financialization and its implica- tions for subject formation. To open up this line of inquiry, the editors of this special issue have invited scholars from the social sciences and the humanities to consider the value of cultural theory for critical approaches to financialization. Karyn Ball's "Death-Driven Futures, or You Can't Spell Deconstruc- tion without Enron" turns to Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, and David Harvey to examine how Enron inadvertently "deconstructed" a fetishistic faith in market rationality through its calculated gaming with the imaginary proleptic potential of value determinations in its trading, financing, and accounting strategies. Her argument is that such strategies "hyperrealized" projected revenues and derealized debt in order to inflate Enron's stock values from the letter rather than the sub- stance of speculative gains. The essay also considers debates about the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which responded to the implosions of Enron and Worldcom by legislating for the reform of corporate gov- ernance structures and enjoining greater transparency in financial representations. Ball's consideration of diff6rance as the horizon of postmetaphysical theories of designation and production links her analysis with A. Kiarina Kordela's "Marx's Update of Cultural The- ory." Kordela sees the differentiation and deferral of surplus value as the "transcendental" principle of capital accumulation as a whole and thus calls on us to rethink the presumed historical break between productive and virtual capital. A reading of Spinoza serves as a de- parture point for her critique of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's failure in Empire to acknowledge the interrelationship between "tran- scendent" and "immanent" authority. Just as the normal functioning of capital is revealed in fictitious capital, Kordela argues, the normal functioning of power is revealed in disciplinary power. Kordela reaffirms Marx's relevance in light of Spinoza, Derrida, Kojin Karatani, and Lacan. Their writings inform her theorization of a hysterically Cartesian introjection of market uncertainty: "the Other/ Capital exists, therefore I am," or "I capitalize (through risk-taking), therefore I am." Public- and private-sector manipulations of this un- certainty play a crucial role in producing a mass investment culture, as Paul Langley's contribution contends. In "Uncertain Subjects of Anglo-American Financialization," Langley brings Foucault's theses 4 KARYN BALL AND MARK WOYTIUK
on governmentality and subjectification to bear on personal invest-
ment and consumption as disciplinary modes of "securing, advanc- ing, and expressing individual freedom in neoliberal society." The essay thus repoliticizes discourses of financial literacy that configure investment and pension planning as technologies of the self. Susanne Soederberg also considers the neoliberal disciplining of investor sub- jects in "Freedom, Ownership, and the Privatization of Social (In-) Security in the United States." The essay historicizes the Social Secu- rity system in the United States from the advent of pension plans after the Civil War to the present in order to situate George W. Bush's Ownership Society rhetoric as a strategic adaptation to crises of overaccumulation. Maureen Sioh's and Marieke de Goede's contributions illuminate the global power of financial regulation to unravel state autonomy. In "Pricing Race, Circulating Anxieties, and the Fate of Malaya's Cur- rency Reserves at Independence," Sioh offers a case study of the Malayan government's decision to peg its currency to sterling rather than U.S. dollars after the break from British imperial rule. Her analysis problematizes the assumption that independent postcolonial states make completely autonomous financial decisions by highlight- ing the extent to which the combined force of colonial structures and racial stereotypes institute social hierarchies that overdetermine eco- nomic practice. De Goede's "Underground Money" also probes the ideological coding of financial hierarchies. Like Kordela, de Goede is critical of Hardt and Negri's conceptualization of Empire, but she selectively draws on it to expose a discourse that projects "a clearly bounded and rationally organized space for global finance on the one hand and a clearly bounded and centrally organized space for under- ground money on the other." De Goede's analysis of the detection and prevention strategies employed in the post-9/11 war on terrorist fund- ing isolates the terrorist underground as a discursive construct that consolidates the apparent "legitimacy" of global finance. In "Debt and Denunciation in Post-bubble Japan: On the Two Freeters," Mark Driscoll identifies an anxious rhetoric at the official political level and in popular culture that blames national and eco- nomic degeneracy on "freeters"-unmarried 15-34 year olds who work part time or are unemployed. Driscoll reveals that freeters are alternately tolerated or condemned for their purported postnationalist INTRODUCTION 1 5
apathy, yet they engage in concerted protest against state practices.
The ambivalence that surrounds them as fringe figures is sympto- matic of a climate that refracts the fallout from Japan's "orgy of finan- cial speculation in the 1980s" by disciplining workers and leftists into accepting financialization as part of a neoliberalized social contract. In "Escape Artists: Germany, Fortress Europe, and the Situation- ist Rescripting of Travel," Ole Gram interprets the avant-garde prac- tices of the Munich-based artist collective Bundesverband Schleppen & Schleusen, an ostensible "PR firm and lobbying organization" that "hijacks" corporate discourse and iconography. Their situationist style of intervention ironically enunciates how the term mobility gains a privileged place in a universalistic discourse about "globalization" as long as it pertains to finance, technology, and commodities but not to "human capital." Gram revisits Peter Bilrger's Theory of the Avant- Garde and Guy Debord's Society of the Spectacle to foreground the per- formativity of Schleppen & Schleusen's advocacy on behalf of human mobility and global capital flow over and against EU policies that criminalize migrant workers while occulting the exploitation of their labor. We conclude the volume with Driscoll's and Gram's contribu- tions because they move beyond an earnest literalization of Marxist universals while responding to Taylor and Morton's 2006 call to main- tain the visibility of labor in cultural theories of finance.
Notes
1. Karl Polyani, The Great Transformation:The Political and Economic Originsof
Our Time, introduced by R. M. MacIver (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). 2. Greta R. Krippner, "The Financialization of the American Economy," Socio- economic Review 3 (2005): 173-208 at 181. She adopts this definition from Giovanni Arrighi's The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times (London: Verso, 1994). 3. Krippner, "The Financialization of the American Economy," 179-80. 4. David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 266. 5. Krippner, "The Financialization of the American Economy," 174-75. 6. Adam Harmes, "Mass Investment Culture," New Left Review 9 (2001): 103-24. 7 Ibid., 105. 8. These remarks were made in the context of panels devoted to labor issues at the 2006 International Studies Association Conference in San Diego. COPYRIGHT INFORMATION
TITLE: Introduction: Cultures of Finance: When the Crisis,
Which Was a Certainty, Becomes a Contingency SOURCE: Cult Crit 65 Wint 2007
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