Qualitative Model For Risk Assessment in Construction Industry: A Fuzzy Logic Approach
Qualitative Model For Risk Assessment in Construction Industry: A Fuzzy Logic Approach
Qualitative Model For Risk Assessment in Construction Industry: A Fuzzy Logic Approach
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1 Introduction
Safety is a prominent feature to be taken into account in the construction industry, and
Risk Assessment for Health and Safety (RAH&S) is a key step to achieve it, particu-
larly to support decision-making in safety programs (Ringdahl, 2001).
In general, risk assessment is a complex process that entails the consideration of
many qualitative parameters which are difficult to quantify. Risk assessment in the
construction industry, due the specific nature of the sector (Dedobbeleer e Beland,
1991; Ringen et al., 1995; Gillen et al, 1997; Laitinen, 1999; Loosemore, 2001; Tam
et al., 2004), must deal with ill-defined and imprecise data and information. So far
traditional approaches do not seem to provide adequate answers (Ringen et al., 1995)
to deal with this issue. Moreover, using probability (classical or Bayesian) or statistics
theories may mask other aspects of incomplete and imprecise knowledge and can lead
to a false sense of accuracy and precision, thus leading to inadequate and/or ineffi-
cient decisions.
To overcome some of the mentioned problems in assessing safety risks, we pro-
pose a qualitative model for risk assessment, hereinafter denoted QRAM (Qualitative
Risk Assessment Model), which based on elicited data and using a fuzzy logic ap-
proach. The goal is to contribute to work safety by improving risk assessment in con-
struction sites.
L.M. Camarinha-Matos, P. Pereira, and L. Ribeiro (Eds.): DoCEIS 2010, IFIP AICT 314, pp. 105–111, 2010.
© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2010
106 A. Pinto1, I.L. Nunes, and R.A. Ribeiro
FD ⊕ FA
RAC = OI ⊗ (1)
SB
FD are the main direct factors related with the hazard under analysis (for example, in
falls from height, the factor is the height of the fall).
108 A. Pinto1, I.L. Nunes, and R.A. Ribeiro
FA are additional factors; they also depend on hazards under analysis and include
a variable number of parameters. Examples of aditional factors (for the same hazard)
are: tidiness of workplace, inclination of work floor, friction level between shoe´s
soles and soil.
Both direct factors and additional factors include a variable number of parameters,
which will depend on the site being evaluated. The risk specialist will choose which
factors will be evaluated for the specific site. In general the formulation will be:
F( D ∪ A) = ⊕( f1 , f 2 ,..., f n ) / N (2)
Where N is the number of parameters that will be considered for any of the two
factors.
OI express organizational inadequacies and are a function of the lack (or poor):
safety culture ( Sc ), safety organisation ( So ), work organisation ( Wo ), supervision
( S ), leadership ( L ), personal factors and communications ( C ). Formally,
OI = ⊕( S c , S o ,Wo , S , L, P, C ) / N (3)
with N being the number of parameters.
S B represent the Safety Barriers implemented in the site for controling the risk.
Their effectiveness should be measured by:
S B = ⊕( M , A, S , I ) / N (4)
where ( Hollnagel 1999):
o M -Material barriers physically prevent an action from being carried out or
the consequences from spreading;
o A -Functional (active or dynamic) barriers work by impeding the action to
be carried out, for instance by establishing a logical or temporal interlock.
o S -Symbolic barriers require an act of interpretation in order to achieve their
purpose, hence an “intelligent” agent that can react or respond to the barrier.
o I -Immaterial barriers are not physically present or represented in the
situation, but depend on the knowledge of the user to achieve their purpose.
The proposed process to obtain the final RAH&S measure, RAC (eq 1), will use
concepts and techniques from fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1965, 1975, 1983).
In this first work we use a single discrete fuzzy set for classifying the factors and
their respective parameters. The proposed fuzzy classification can be used to elicit
classifications from different sources (e.g. workers, engineers, safety experts), for all
parameters in a user-friendly semantic form. Formally, the general fuzzy parameter
classification membership function, to be used in this preliminary model is:
⎧ Excelent / 1, VeryGood / 0.8, Good / 0.6, ⎫
ParameterClassificat ion = ⎨ ⎬ (5)
⎩ Satisfacto ry / 0. 4, Mediocre / 0 . 2, Bad / 0. 001⎭
At this stage, the terms and respective values considered are just indicative and in
future work they will be validated and tuned. All parameters in eq. 2, eq. 3 and eq. 4
Qualitative Model for Risk Assessment in Construction Industry 109
(e.g. material barriers M ) will be classified using the above discrete fuzzy set. To
obtain the values for the respective factors (e.g. S B ) we plan to use an aggregation
operator, ⊕ , such as arithmetic sum, average or any other compensatory operator
(Zimmerman, 1991). Finally to obtain the overall risk measure for the construction
site, we plan to use conventional arithmetic operators.
At this stage of the research work we are not yet sure about which operators are
more suitable for obtaining the risk assessment in the construction industry, but a
study about them is foreseen in the near future. Here, as mentioned, we just focused
on the conceptual model for determining the risk assessment.
5 Illustrative Example
In order to illustrate the applicability of the method, we will use a simple illustrative
case for the risk that causes more deaths in Portugal, in the sector: falls from height.
F
In this example we only describe the calculations for additional factors, A , because
the process is similar for the other factors in eq. 1.
Consider a construction work on a scaffold with three meters high, thus the single
direct factor, is FD = 0.001 , because we assumed the intervals: [0 to 0,5m] FD = 1 ;
FD = 0.8 ; ]1 to 1,4m], FD = 0.6 ; ]1,4 and 1,6 m] FD = 0.4 ; ]1,6 to 1,
]0,5 to 1m]
8m] FD = 0.3 ; ]1,8 to 2m] FD = 0.2 , and > 2m FD = 0.001 .
The additional factors considered and the respective semantic classification, using
the fuzzy membership semantic variables (eq. 5) are: (a little clean and tidy) = medio-
cre; (horizontal surface) = good; (foot boards, wood, presented in good repair) = satis-
factory; (when dry, the material floor provides good traction on the sole of the shoe) =
satisfactory; (lighting level well suited to work) = good, (irons waiting on the surface
of the collision) = bad; (dry weather and no wind) = good ( scaffolding meet all legal
and regulatory requirements, was well fitted and properly anchored) = good.
Now, aggregating the classifications for the additional factors (eq. 2), using the
membership values of eq. 5, we have:
F A = (0.2 + 0.6 + 0.4 + 0.4 + 0.6 + 0.001 + 0.6 + 0.6) / 8 = 0.4375
Notice that in this example we used arithmetic operators to aggregate the values, but
in the future other operators will be tested to improve the method.
Although the six factors are appropriate, in various degrees: good (4) and satisfac-
tory (2), there are two factors with inappropriate levels, one mediocre and another
bad. Hence, the combination is only satisfactory (closest semantic level in the classi-
fication fuzzy set for the result 0.4375). This result means the site safety has to be
improved, particularly to protect the irons on hold (bad) and clean and organize the
workplace (mediocre).
Regarding the safety barriers S B , the scaffold has railings around the outside pe-
rimeter of the platforms, properly fitted, good and robust (very good), the inner side
is 20 cm from the construction (very good), the access to work platforms is appro-
priate and also well protected (very good). The company implemented a procedure
110 A. Pinto1, I.L. Nunes, and R.A. Ribeiro
for working at heights which includes work on scaffolding, the procedure is well
prepared and written in language appropriate to their users (very good). The com-
pany provides training to all workers on scaffolding, however, the training records
do not show the knowledge acquired by trainees is properly understood, hence the
company did not prove the effectiveness of training (mediocre). Following the
above calculation for additional factors and using eq. 4,
S B = (0.8 + 0.8 + 0.8 + 0.8 + 0.2) / 5 = 0.68
This result shows that the efficiency in the safety barriers is good (closest semantic
value for the result 0.68) .
Regarding the organizational factors OI (eq. 2) and for simplicity we consider an
overall classification of excelent (membership value = 1).
Finally we can determine the level of risk assessment for the example, following
eq. 1,
0.1 + 0.4375
RAC = 1 × = 0.79
0.68
Notice we used again arithmetic operators to improve clarity of method´ explanation.
The final risk level in the construction site for the falling height, yields a value of very
good (corresponding to the closest semantic variable).
Although the criteria for acceptability of risk is appropriate and very good there is
room for improvements, namely implement new safety barriers and also improve
some additional factors (e.g. improve some aspects related to training).
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