A Tactical Guide To Urban Operations

B-GL-322-008/FP-001
UNIQUE OPERATIONS
A TACTICAL GUIDE TO URBAN

OPERATIONS
(ENGLISH)
This publication is effective upon receipt
WARNING
ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT, MAY BE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE TO THE
PUBLIC UNDER THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE
CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE
RELEASED.
Published under the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff

PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
B-GL-322-008/FP-001
UNIQUE OPERATIONS
A TACTICAL GUIDE TO URBAN

OPERATIONS
(ENGLISH)
This publication is effective upon receipt
WARNING
ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT, MAY BE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE TO THE
PUBLIC UNDER THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE
CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE
RELEASED.
Published under the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff
OPI: DAD ACT 2010-12-01

A Tactical Guide to Urban Operations
FOREWORD
1. B-GL-322-008/FP-001 A Tactical Guide to Urban Operations is issued on the authority of

the Chief of the Land Staff by the Army Publishing Office, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario.
2. B-GL-322-008/FP-001 A Tactical Guide to Urban Operations is effective upon receipt.
3. The French version of this publication is B-GL-322-008/FP-002 Le Guide tactique pour
les Opérations urbaines.
4. There is no limit placed upon distribution or restriction placed upon this publication. The
electronic version of this publication can be found in the Army Electronic Library
http://lfdts.kingston.mil.ca/ael.
5. Suggested amendments should be forwarded through normal channels to DAD Act.
© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada,
as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2010
i
PREFACE
1. The aim of this publication is to provide tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for the
conduct of full-spectrum operations (FSO) within an urban environment at the sub-unit level and
below. It focuses on offensive and defensive tactical level operations. TTP for stability tactical
operations are discussed for consideration, but detail is provided in other publications.
2. The primary audience for this publication is the sub-unit commander and below in the
training, planning and conduct of all-arms tactical operations in urban areas. Throughout the
publication, an effort is made to place the material in the context of higher unit and formation
operations.
3. Although the publication is written primarily for the employment of combat arms in urban
terrain, the material is applicable to any military force operating in such an environment. All
arms must be aware of the characteristics, advantages, limitations and challenges found in
urban terrain, for they will affect all facets of any operation.
4. A focus has been placed on urban operations (UO) within the contemporary operating
environment (COE). It is understood that intensive, major combat operations (MCO) will be the
exception and that campaigns will often be conducted at the lower (i.e. less violent) end of the
spectrum of conflict. Many operations will be part of peace support or counter-insurgency
(COIN) campaigns. However, competent, professional militaries must be prepared to move
rapidly to combat operations at all levels of command. Furthermore, the principles and TTP that
are applicable to combat operations remain valid and extant for all military operations in the
urban environment, regardless of the level or intensity of combat. For example, considerations
in planning the defensive battle are applicable in planning the defence of a company patrol
base, or a government vital point during a COIN campaign.
5. Having said this, however, commanders at all levels must take into consideration the
overarching principles and aims of the campaign and environment in which they find
themselves. The presence of civilians and the need to secure a stabile environment at the end
of operations, for instance, will affect the use of supporting fires, demolitions, and the tempo of
battle, so that collateral damage, civilian casualties, general lawlessness, and civil instability
following tactical operations, can be avoided.
6. Such situations and resulting considerations help make environments complex.
Commanders and soldiers, even at the lowest levels, must understand at least the key issues of
the complex environment at hand and the desired, long term goals of the operation.
7. To this end, the principles applied at the tactical level cannot violate the principles of the
overarching campaign. For example, an attack against an insurgent stronghold in an urban
area during a COIN campaign will follow the principles and TTP for any attack in an urban area.
However, the use of supporting fires and other tactical enablers will have to be restricted, and
certain risks taken, to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage to the surroundings. Not
to do so will simply set the civilian population against friendly forces, and create support and
sympathy for the insurgents, thus undermining the long-term goals of the campaign. Therefore,
the importance of campaign principles and long-term goals must be understood at the lowest
levels. For this reason, an attempt has been made throughout the publication to remind
commanders of these overarching, environmental considerations.
8. Any recommendations for future changes and editions should be made through the
combat arms schools and to the Directorate of Army Doctrine.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD..................................................................................................................................i
PREFACE .................................................................................................................................... iii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
SECTION 1 AIM AND SCOPE........................................................................................... 1-1
101. General.................................................................................................................. 1-1
102. Aim ........................................................................................................................ 1-1
103. Scope .................................................................................................................... 1-1
104. Urban Operations in The Contemporary Operating Environment ......................... 1-2
105. Full-spectrum Operations ...................................................................................... 1-2
SECTION 2 NATURE OF URBAN OPERATIONS ............................................................ 1-4
106. Categories of Urban Centres ............................................................................... 1-10
107. Characterization of an Urban Area ...................................................................... 1-10
108. Street Patterns..................................................................................................... 1-15
SECTION 3 TERRAIN AND WEATHER CONSIDERATIONS ........................................ 1-16
109. Terrain Considerations ........................................................................................ 1-16
110. Weather Considerations ...................................................................................... 1-17
SECTION 4 EFFECTS OF URBAN TERRAIN UPON OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES .... 1-18
SECTION 5 CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN OPERATIONS AND THEIR TACTICAL
CONSIDERATIONS ..................................................................................... 1-19
CHAPTER 2 THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
SECTION 1 FACTORS AFFECTING BUILDING SELECTION ......................................... 2-1
SECTION 2 BUILDING TYPES AND DESCRIPTIONS..................................................... 2-2
201. Introduction............................................................................................................ 2-2
202. Mass Construction Buildings ................................................................................. 2-2
203. Framed Building .................................................................................................... 2-7
204. Floor Plans ............................................................................................................ 2-9
205. Residential Buildings and Compounds................................................................ 2-10
206. Structures in The Third World and Developing Nations....................................... 2-11
SECTION 3 NON-COMBATANTS ................................................................................... 2-12
207. Planning for Non-Combatants ............................................................................. 2-12
208. Non-Combatant Casualties ................................................................................. 2-12
209. Non-Combatants as an Information / Intelligence Source ................................... 2-13
SECTION 4 CAMOUFLAGE IN AN URBAN SETTING ................................................... 2-13
SECTION 5 IDENTIFICATION OF FRIEND OR FOE AND COMBAT
IDENTIFICATION IN URBAN AREAS ......................................................... 2-15
SECTION 6 CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR
DEFENCE CONSIDERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS ........ 2-16
210. General................................................................................................................ 2-16
211. Protection Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats ...... 2-16
212. Logistic Requirements and Decontamination ...................................................... 2-17
213. Use of Smoke in the Urban Area......................................................................... 2-17
214. Environmental Threats ........................................................................................ 2-18
CHAPTER 3 INDIVIDUAL SKILLS AND TACTICAL MOVEMENT
SECTION 1 INDIVIDUAL SKILLS...................................................................................... 3-1
301. General.................................................................................................................. 3-1
302. General Techniques .............................................................................................. 3-1
303. Crossing a Wall ..................................................................................................... 3-1
304. Moving Around a Corner ....................................................................................... 3-2
305. Moving Past Windows ........................................................................................... 3-5
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306. Using Doorways .....................................................................................................3-6

307. Moving Outside of Buildings...................................................................................3-6
308. Moving Inside A Building ........................................................................................3-9
SECTION 2 METHODS OF ENTRY...................................................................................3-9
309. General ..................................................................................................................3-9
310. Entry at Upper Levels...........................................................................................3-10
311. Use of Ladders .....................................................................................................3-10
312. Grappling Hooks ..................................................................................................3-11
313. Rappelling ............................................................................................................3-13
314. Summary of Upper Level Entries .........................................................................3-14
315. Entry at Lower Levels...........................................................................................3-14
316. Assisted Lifts ........................................................................................................3-15
317. Entering Through a Door......................................................................................3-21
318. Entering a Mousehole ..........................................................................................3-22
SECTION 3 SELECTION AND USE OF FIRE POSITIONS.............................................3-23
319. General ................................................................................................................3-23
320. Hasty Positions ....................................................................................................3-23
321. Prepared Positions ...............................................................................................3-26
SECTION 4 GRENADES (INCLUDING STUN GRENADES)...........................................3-26
SECTION 5 NAVIGATIONAL AND CONTROL MEASURES ...........................................3-28
322. Navigational and Control Aids ..............................................................................3-28
323. Marking Standing Operating Procedures .............................................................3-30
324. NATO Standard of Marking ..................................................................................3-30
SECTION 6 MOVEMENT WITH VEHICLES ....................................................................3-31
325. Movement with supporting vehicles .....................................................................3-31
326. Considerations for Light Armoured Vehicles ........................................................3-32
SECTION 7 BREACHING ................................................................................................3-33
327. General ................................................................................................................3-33
328. Types of Door and Windows ................................................................................3-34
329. Construction of Doors and Windows ....................................................................3-34
330. Manual Breaching of Doors..................................................................................3-36
331. Mechanical Breaching ..........................................................................................3-37
332. Breaching with Shotguns and Personal Weapons ...............................................3-39
333. Mechanical Wall Breaching ..................................................................................3-40
334. Explosive Breaching.............................................................................................3-41
SECTION 8 SUBTERRANEAN OPERATIONS................................................................3-41
335. General ................................................................................................................3-41
336. Subterranean Reconnaissance ............................................................................3-43
337. Cave and Tunnel Clearance ................................................................................3-45
338. Defending Tunnels and Subterranean Features ..................................................3-46
CHAPTER 4 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
SECTION 1 GENERAL.......................................................................................................4-1
SECTION 2 STAGES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND PLANNING .........................4-1
401. The Stages of Offensive Urban Operations ...........................................................4-1
402. Planning .................................................................................................................4-5
403. Control of Movement in the Urban Area.................................................................4-6
SECTION 3 ALTERNATIVE TACTICAL CONCEPTS FOR URBAN OPERATIONS .........4-7
404. General ..................................................................................................................4-7
405. The Tactic of Urban Penetration ............................................................................4-7
406. The Tactic of Urban Thrust ....................................................................................4-8
407. The Tactic of Urban Saturation ..............................................................................4-9
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408. Summary of Alternative Tactical Concepts.......................................................... 4-10
SECTION 4 SUPPORTING ARMS AND COMBAT SUPPORT....................................... 4-10
409. Light Armoured Vehicles ..................................................................................... 4-10
410. Mortars ................................................................................................................ 4-13
411. Tanks and Direct Fire Gun Systems.................................................................... 4-15
412. Direct Fire System and Infantry Cooperation ...................................................... 4-19
413. Direct Fire Missile Systems ................................................................................. 4-22
414. Artillery................................................................................................................. 4-23
415. Engineers ............................................................................................................ 4-25
416. Snipers and Marksmen........................................................................................ 4-25
417. Tactical Aviation—Helicopters ............................................................................. 4-27
CHAPTER 5 OFFENSIVE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
SECTION 1 GENERAL ...................................................................................................... 5-1
SECTION 2 FUNDAMENTALS FOR SECTION AND PLATOON URBAN ATTACKS ...... 5-1
SECTION 3 SECTION COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION .............................................. 5-2
501. General.................................................................................................................. 5-2
502. Key Aspects for Section Tactics and Drills ............................................................ 5-2
503. Section Organization ............................................................................................. 5-3
SECTION 4 SECTION ENTRY AND CLEARANCE TACTICS .......................................... 5-6
504. General.................................................................................................................. 5-6
505. Section Drills for Building Entry and Clearance..................................................... 5-6
506. Methods of Approach and Clearing ....................................................................... 5-7
507. Top-down and Bottom-up Clearing........................................................................ 5-8
SECTION 5 SECTION CLEARING DRILLS ...................................................................... 5-9
508. General.................................................................................................................. 5-9
509. Components of Building Clearing ........................................................................ 5-10
510. Approach—Clearing Methods ............................................................................. 5-11
511. Staging ................................................................................................................ 5-11
512. Entry .................................................................................................................... 5-29
513. Dominate Room/Neutralize the Threat ................................................................ 5-44
514. Control the Area .................................................................................................. 5-46
515. Casualty Evacuation............................................................................................ 5-52
516. Cursory Search of Enemy and Non-combatants ................................................. 5-52
517. Situation Report................................................................................................... 5-53
518. Evacuation of all Non-combatants and Combatants ........................................... 5-53
519. Follow-on Action .................................................................................................. 5-54
520. Movement Across Open Areas and Between Structures .................................... 5-55
521. Multi-room Assault............................................................................................... 5-55
522. Stairwells ............................................................................................................. 5-56
523. Hallways .............................................................................................................. 5-63
SECTION 6 PLATOON LEVEL TACTICS ....................................................................... 5-66
524. General................................................................................................................ 5-66
525. Mounting.............................................................................................................. 5-66
526. The Assault.......................................................................................................... 5-67
527. Consolidation....................................................................................................... 5-68
528. Link-up Drill and Forward Passage of Lines ........................................................ 5-70
529. Platoon Organization ........................................................................................... 5-70
SECTION 7 SUB-UNIT LEVEL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS .......................................... 5-71
530. General................................................................................................................ 5-71
531. Task Organization ............................................................................................... 5-72
532. Mounting the Deliberate Attack ........................................................................... 5-73
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533. Isolation of the Objective ......................................................................................5-74

534. The Break-in and Securing of a Foothold ............................................................5-76
535. Securing Immediate Objectives............................................................................5-77
536. Clearing the Urban Objective ...............................................................................5-77
537. Attack on a Block or Group of Buildings...............................................................5-78
538. Consolidation Considerations ..............................................................................5-79
539. Consideration of Full-Spectrum Operations as Part of Consolidation ..................5-80
540. Advance to Contact, Reconnaissance and Securing of Attack Routes................5-82
541. Direct Fire Planning and Control ..........................................................................5-83
CHAPTER 6 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
SECTION 1 GENERAL.......................................................................................................6-1
SECTION 2 STAGES AND PLANNING .............................................................................6-1
601. Conduct of the Defence .........................................................................................6-1
602. Stages of a Defensive Operation ...........................................................................6-3
603. Planning and Coordinating the Defensive Battle: Unit and Sub-unit Levels...........6-6
SECTION 3 WEAPON AND POSITION SITING ................................................................6-8
604. Tactical Considerations ..........................................................................................6-8
605. Selection of Weapon Positions ............................................................................6-10
606. Construction of Weapon Positions .......................................................................6-10
607. Siting and Constructing Positions for Weapons and Individuals ..........................6-13
608. Fire Positions for Support Weapons.....................................................................6-20
SECTION 4 CONSTRUCTION TASK ..............................................................................6-25
SECTION 5 DEFENCE AGAINST FIRE...........................................................................6-32
SECTION 6 SUPPORTING ARMS IN THE DEFENCE....................................................6-33
609. ARMOURED DIRECT FIRE VEHICLES ..............................................................6-33
610. Artillery .................................................................................................................6-34
611. Engineers .............................................................................................................6-34
612. Tactical Aviation—Helicopters..............................................................................6-34
613. Air Defence ..........................................................................................................6-35
614. Defensive Use of Demolitions ..............................................................................6-36
SECTION 7 DEFENCE AGAINST ARMOUR ...................................................................6-36
615. Planning Steps .....................................................................................................6-36
616. Tank Hunting ........................................................................................................6-38
SECTION 8 COMPANY GROUP AND COMBAT TEAM DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS....6-40
617. Company Group and Combat Team in the Hasty Defence..................................6-41
618. Defence of a Block or Group of Buildings ............................................................6-44
619. Defence of an Urban Defended Locality ..............................................................6-45
620. Defence of Vital Points in an Urban Area.............................................................6-46
CHAPTER 7 STABILITY OPERATIONS
SECTION 1 STABILITY OPERATIONS AS PART OF FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS7-1
SECTION 2 CONDUCT OF STABILITY OPERATIONS ....................................................7-1
SECTION 3 TACTICAL TASKS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS......................................7-2
CHAPTER 8 MOBILITY AND COUNTER-MOBILITY
SECTION 1 GENERAL.......................................................................................................8-1
SECTION 2 OBSTACLES ..................................................................................................8-1
801. Anti-personnel Obstacles .......................................................................................8-1
802. Anti-vehicle Obstacles............................................................................................8-4
SECTION 3 MINES, BOOBY TRAPS AND IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES...........8-6
803. Detecting Enemy Booby Traps ..............................................................................8-7
804. Improvised Explosive Devices ...............................................................................8-8
CHAPTER 9 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
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SECTION 1 GENERAL ..........................................................................................................1
901. Introduction................................................................................................................1
SECTION 2 CONSIDERATIONS SPECIFIC TO AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT ....................2
SECTION 3 SUB-UNIT RESUPPLY OPERATIONS .............................................................5
SECTION 4 LOAD PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT...........................................................6
SECTION 5 HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT..........................................................................7
902. General......................................................................................................................7
903. Medical Considerations .............................................................................................7
SECTION 6 PSYCHOLOGICAL HAZARDS ..........................................................................9
SECTION 7 CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE MEDIC AND EVACUATION ............................9
SECTION 8 PRISONERS OF WAR.....................................................................................11
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1–1: Full-spectrum Operations Breakdown....................................................................1-3
Figure 1–2: Typical Urban Area ..............................................................................................1-12
Figure 1–3: Example of a City Core ........................................................................................1-12
Figure 1–4: Outlying High-rise Area........................................................................................1-13
Figure 1–5: Commercial Ribbon .............................................................................................1-13
Figure 1–6: Residential Sprawl ...............................................................................................1-14
Figure 1–7: Outlying Industrial Areas ......................................................................................1-14
Figure 1–8: Street Patterns .....................................................................................................1-16
Figure 2–1: Mass Construction Buildings..................................................................................2-3
Figure 2–2: Brick Buildings .......................................................................................................2-4
Figure 2–3: Brick Built Shop......................................................................................................2-4
Figure 2–4: Warehouse.............................................................................................................2-5
Figure 2–5: Public Gathering Places.........................................................................................2-5
Figure 2–6: Public Places .........................................................................................................2-6
Figure 2–7: Box Wall Principle Building ....................................................................................2-6
Figure 2–8: Box Wall Principle Building Floor Plan ...................................................................2-7
Figure 2–9: Light Structured Framed Buildings.........................................................................2-7
Figure 2–10: Heavy Clad Framed Building ...............................................................................2-8
Figure 2–11: Heavy Clad Framed Department Store................................................................2-8
Figure 2–12: Lightly Clad Framed Building ...............................................................................2-9
Figure 2–13: Multi-story Car Park .............................................................................................2-9
Figure 2–14: Building Shapes and Sizes ................................................................................2-10
Figure 2–15: Middle East Style Enclosed Courtyard...............................................................2-11
Figure 2–16: Aerial Photograph of Grand Ravine area of Port au Prince, Haiti, May 2004 ....2-11
Figure 3–1: Crossing a wall.......................................................................................................3-2
Figure 3–2: Looking Around A Corner ......................................................................................3-2
Figure 3–3: The Pie Method......................................................................................................3-3
Figure 3–4: The Step-out Method .............................................................................................3-3
Figure 3–4a: The Step-out Method ...........................................................................................3-4
Figure 3–5: The High-Low Method............................................................................................3-4
Figure 3–5a: The High Low Method ..........................................................................................3-5
Figure 3–6: Passing by a Window.............................................................................................3-6
Figure 3–7: Exiting Doorways ...................................................................................................3-6
Figure 3–8: Moving Outside of Buildings ..................................................................................3-7
Figure 3–9: Selecting the Next Position ....................................................................................3-7
Figure 3–10: Group Movement .................................................................................................3-8
Figure 3–11: Moving within a Building that is under Attack.......................................................3-9
Figure 3–12: Entry with a Ladder ............................................................................................3-11
Figure 3–13: Throwing a Grappling Hook ...............................................................................3-12
Figure 3–14: Rappelling ..........................................................................................................3-14
Figure 3–15: Two-man Vertical Lift .........................................................................................3-16
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Figure 3–16: Two-man Lift Supported .................................................................................... 3-17

Figure 3–17: Shin Lift.............................................................................................................. 3-17
Figure 3–18: Single Stirrup Lift ............................................................................................... 3-18
Figure 3–19: Two-man Pull.....................................................................................................3-21
Figure 3–20: Kicking open a Door .......................................................................................... 3-22
Figure 3–21: Entering a Mouse Hole ...................................................................................... 3-23
Figure 3–22: Firing Around a Corner ...................................................................................... 3-24
Figure 3–23: Firing from a Covered Position .......................................................................... 3-25
Figure 3–24: Firing from the Peak of a Roof........................................................................... 3-26
Figure 3–25: Example of an Urban Sketch Map ..................................................................... 3-29
Figure 3–26: Example of Urban Sketch Map Identification..................................................... 3-29
Figure 3–27: NATO Standing Operating procedure for Markings in Urban Operations.......... 3-31
Figure 3–28: Construction of an Entrance Door ..................................................................... 3-35
Figure 3–29: Construction of a Window.................................................................................. 3-35
Figure 4–1: Light Armoured Vehicle Cover for Close Combat................................................ 4-11
Figure 4–2: Light Armoured Vehicle Supporting Infantry Movement ...................................... 4-12
Figure 4–3: Mortar Operations of Separate Firing Groups ..................................................... 4-14
Figure 4–4: Tank Gun Dead Space at Street Level ................................................................ 4-17
Figure 4–5: Tank Gun Dead Space above Street Level ......................................................... 4-17
Figure 4–6: Direct Fire System—Infantry Mutual Support: Theory ......................................... 4-21
Figure 4–7: Direct Fire System—Infantry Mutual Support: Illustrated..................................... 4-22
Figure 4–8: Indirect Fire Dead Space (Low Angle)................................................................. 4-24
Figure 5–1: Staging with Open Door....................................................................................... 5-13
Figure 5–2: No 1 in Stack Conducting a Limited View into Room .......................................... 5-14
Figure 5–3: Stack Spacing From Wall .................................................................................... 5-14
Figure 5–4: Staging with Closed Door .................................................................................... 5-15
Figure 5–5: No 1 Moves to Cover the Front............................................................................ 5-16
Figure 5–6: Staging in a Split Stack........................................................................................ 5-17
Figure 5–7: Staging for a Window Entry ................................................................................. 5-18
Figure 5–8: No 1 Steps Out to Cover into Room. Breacher Conducts the Breach ................. 5-18
Figure 5–9: Use of Assault Ladder for Window Staging ......................................................... 5-19
Figure 5–10: Soldier in Low Crouch Position as part of Staging for Entry .............................. 5-20
Figure 5–11: Ladder Preparation and Placement ................................................................... 5-21
Figure 5–12: Ladder is Placed Under Cover from Section ..................................................... 5-21
Figure 5–13: Soldier Securing the Ladder .............................................................................. 5-22
Figure 5–14: No 4 Steps Out to Cover Area of Entry Point .................................................... 5-22
Figure 5–15: Stealth Movement by No 1 to Entry Point.......................................................... 5-23
Figure 5–16: Staging with No 1 and No 2 ............................................................................... 5-24
Figure 5–17: Breacher Covered by Entry Team. (Two ladders should be used.)................... 5-25
Figure 5–18: Squeeze-Up Signal that Team is Ready............................................................ 5-26
Figure 5–19: Removal of Diversionary Device........................................................................ 5-27
Figure 5–20: Preparation of Diversionary Device or Grenade ................................................ 5-27
Figure 5–21: No 2 Prepares to Throw Device......................................................................... 5-28
xii
Figure 5–22: No 2 Prepares to Throw Device once Breach is Complete................................5-28
Figure 5–23: Squaring Off in the Entry Point ..........................................................................5-29
Figure 5–24: Start of Entry. No 1 leads ...................................................................................5-30
Figure 5–25: Entry of No 1. No 2 Squares Off in the Entry Point ............................................5-30
Figure 5–26: Entry of No 2. No 3 Squares Off in the Entry Point ............................................5-31
Figure 5–27: Entry of No 3. No 4 Squares off in the Entry Point.............................................5-31
Figure 5–28: No 1 Enters and Clears Corner..........................................................................5-32
Figure 5–29. No 1 and No 2 Clearing Corners5-32
Figure 5–30: Static Positions ..................................................................................................5-33
Figure 5–31: Commander Adjusts Positions of Entry Team ...................................................5-33
Figure 5–32: No 1 Covers Forward. Breacher in Position.......................................................5-34
Figure 5–33: No 3 prepares a grenade or diversionary device ...............................................5-35
Figure 5–34: Breacher Covers Forward. No 1 Leads Entry ....................................................5-35
Figure 5–35: No 4 enters and Breacher Provides Cover Forward ..........................................5-36
Figure 5–36: Breacher Covers Forward and No 5 Covers Rear Until Ordered to Enter .........5-37
Figure 5–37: No 1 and No 2 in Split Stack Enter ....................................................................5-37
Figure 5–38: No 3 and No 4 Enter from Split Stack ................................................................5-38
Figure 5–39: Entry with Offset Entry Point ..............................................................................5-39
Figure 5–40: Entry of No 3 and No 4 with Offset Entry Point ..................................................5-39
Figure 5–41: Static Positions following Entry Through Offset Entry Point...............................5-40
Figure 5–42: Offset Entry Point to a Small Area .....................................................................5-40
Figure 5–43: Low Window Entryl ............................................................................................5-41
Figure 5–44: Low Window Entry Without Ladder ....................................................................5-42
Figure 5–45: Low Window Entry Static Positions....................................................................5-43
Figure 5–46: Small Room Drill ................................................................................................5-44
Figure 5–47: Threat Ready Position .......................................................................................5-45
Figure 5–48: Low Ready Position Once all Threats have been Neutralised ...........................5-46
Figure 5–49: Pressing a Door Open Upon Entry ....................................................................5-48
Figure 5–50: Clearing Behind a Door......................................................................................5-49
Figure 5–51: Clearing Behind Obstacles ................................................................................5-50
Figure 5–52: Simultaneous Obstacle Clearing........................................................................5-51
Figure 5–53: Clearing a Large Room or Area .........................................................................5-51
Figure 5–54: Sweep of Large Room Under Control of Section Commander ..........................5-52
Figure 5–55: Wall Flooding to Cover the Staging of the Next Entry Point...............................5-56
Figure 5–56: Description of a Stairway ...................................................................................5-57
Figure 5–57: Clearing Stairways .............................................................................................5-58
Figure 5–58: Covering Opening to the Next Storey ................................................................5-59
Figure 5–59: Fire Team Dominates Up and Down From a Strong Point.................................5-60
Figure 5–60. Pairs Movement from One Stairway to Another.................................................5-61
Figure 5–61: Fire Team Provides Cover on the Inside as Another Fire Team
Assumes the Lead ............................................................................................5-62
Figure 5–62: Fire Team Staging at a T-Junction.....................................................................5-65
Figure 5–63: Simultaneous Corner Clearing ...........................................................................5-66
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Figure 5–64: Isolating an Urban Objective.............................................................................. 5-75

Figure 5–65: Clearing Selected Buildings Within Sector ........................................................ 5-78
Figure 6–1: Sandbag Dimensions........................................................................................... 6-11
Figure 6–2: Sandbag Filling .................................................................................................... 6-12
Figure 6–3: Sandbag Wall ......................................................................................................6-12
Figure 6–4: Sandbag Slope .................................................................................................... 6-12
Figure 6–5: Laying Sandbags in Corners ............................................................................... 6-13
Figure 6–6: Window Firing Position ........................................................................................ 6-14
Figure 6–7: Cellar Firing Position............................................................................................6-15
Figure 6–8: Attic Firing Position .............................................................................................. 6-15
Figure 6–9: Corner Firing Position .......................................................................................... 6-16
Figure 6–10: Individual Position..............................................................................................6-16
Figure 6–11: Interior Wall Position.......................................................................................... 6-17
Figure 6–12: Position Established at the Entrance of a Tunnel .............................................. 6-17
Figure 6–13: Loopholes Concealed from Observation ........................................................... 6-18
Figure 6–14: Loophole Shape................................................................................................. 6-19
Figure 6–15: Firing through Loopholes ................................................................................... 6-20
Figure 6–16: Sandbagged Machine Gun Emplacement under a Building .............................. 6-21
Figure 6–17: Machine Gun Position........................................................................................ 6-21
Figure 6–18: Mortar Fire Position ........................................................................................... 6-22
Figure 6–19: Anti-armour Team Firing from a Roof Top......................................................... 6-24
Figure 6–20: Corner Room Anti-armour Weapon Firing Position ........................................... 6-24
Figure 6–21: Blocking Hallways and Stairs............................................................................. 6-26
Figure 6–22: Types of Props...................................................................................................6-28
Figure 6–23: Setting up a Prop ............................................................................................... 6-28
Figure 6–24: Multi-story Propping........................................................................................... 6-29
Figure 6–25: Rubbling Building for Fire Position..................................................................... 6-31
Figure 6–26: Tank Hunting Team ........................................................................................... 6-40
Figure 6–27: Vehicle Position .................................................................................................6-42
Figure 6–28: Field-expedient Obstacles ................................................................................. 6-43
Figure 6–29: Urban Defended Locality based upon Platoon and Section Strongpoints ......... 6-46
Figure 6–30: Perimeter Defence of Key Terrain ..................................................................... 6-48
Figure 8–1: Street Wire Obstacle..............................................................................................8-2
Figure 8–2: Building Obstacle................................................................................................... 8-2
Figure 8–3: Roof Obstacle ........................................................................................................ 8-3
Figure 8–4: Open Space Obstacles.......................................................................................... 8-3
Figure 8–5: Underground Obstacles......................................................................................... 8-4
Figure 8–6: Underground Obstacles......................................................................................... 8-4
Figure 8–7: Log and Vehicle Cribs............................................................................................ 8-5
Figure 8–8: Steel Hedgehog ..................................................................................................... 8-6
Figure 8–9: Detecting Trip Wires ..............................................................................................8-7
xiv
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
SECTION 1
AIM AND SCOPE
101. GENERAL
1. As the world has continued to develop and transform, a greater portion of the world’s
population has come to live in urban areas. Urban areas are expected to be the future
battlefield and military operations, including combat, in urban areas cannot be avoided. History
is replete with examples of major urban battles, from the sieges of fortified cities during the
Middle Ages to more recent battles such as Baghdad, Basra and Grozny. Urban combat was
then, and remains now, an exceptionally difficult type of warfare. It has the potential to
consume enormous resources in labour and effort, cause high casualties on both sides, and
destroy large sectors of the contested city or town. Regardless, urban operations (UO) have
recently become more frequent. Geography and demographics have given urban areas
increased importance. The world has seen an increasing trend to urbanization as cities expand
and greater amounts of agricultural land are turned into industrial and residential use. With the
end of the Cold War and an increase in ethnic conflicts, political unrest and civil wars in
industrialized countries have become more frequent. In such conflicts, the control of strategic
cities and their populations takes on a political importance out of proportion to the tactical value
of the contested terrain. Furthermore, belligerent forces, particularly those seeking to conduct
insurgency campaigns, have exploited the urban terrain and its population for their own tactical,
operational and strategic advantages. The nature of urban combat and the likelihood of fighting
in urban areas in any future conflict demands that commanders and soldiers at all levels
develop expertise in operations conducted in urban terrain.
102. AIM
1. UO are full-spectrum operations (FSO)1 planned and conducted in an area of operations
(AO) that includes one or more urban areas. An urban area consists of a topographical
complex where man-made construction or high population density is the dominant feature. This
publication details and explains the individual, section, platoon and combined arms tactics,
techniques and procedures (TTP) required to conduct successful UO.
103. SCOPE
1. This publication provides commanders and soldiers at company/squadron level and
below with a discussion of the principles of UO and the TTP required to fight in urban areas. It
concentrates on the skills and drills at the individual soldier, section and platoon levels.
Additionally, it deals with sub-unit level tactics for the company group and combat team. Some
discussion is also made as necessary regarding higher-level tactics, which is included to
provide relevant context for the presentation of information. Tactical considerations for the
employment of support weapons and support arms will be briefly discussed, but only as they
relate to the conduct of low-level battle. The conduct of UO at company/squadron level and
above is discussed in B-GL-322-007/FP-001 Unique Operations—Urban.
1
“Full-spectrum operations (FSO)” are defined in the Army Terminology Repertoire as, “the simultaneous
conduct of operations by a force across the spectrum of conflict.” It is considered synonymous with “three
block war.”
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 1-1
104. URBAN OPERATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

1. A focus has been placed on UO within the contemporary operating environment (COE).
It is understood that intensive, major combat operations (MCO) will be the exception and that
campaigns will often be conducted on the lower (i.e. less violent) end of the spectrum of conflict.
Many operations will be part of peace support or counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns.
However, competent, professional militaries must be prepared to move rapidly into combat
operations at all levels of command. Furthermore, the principles and TTP that are applicable to
combat operations remain valid and extant for all military operations in the urban environment,
regardless of the level or intensity of combat. For example, considerations in planning the
defensive battle are applicable in planning the defence of a company patrol base, or a
government vital point during a COIN campaign.
2. Having said this, however, commanders at all levels must take into consideration the
overarching principles and aims of the campaign and environment in which they find
themselves. The presence of civilians and the need to secure a stabile environment at the end
of operations, for instance, will affect the use of supporting fires, demolitions, and the tempo of
battle, so that collateral damage, civilian casualties, general lawlessness, and civil instability
following tactical operations, can be avoided.
3. Such situations and resulting considerations help make environments complex.
Commanders and soldiers, even at the lowest levels, must understand at least the key issues of
the complex environment at hand and the desired, long term goals of the operation.
4. To this end, the principles applied at the tactical level cannot violate the principles of the
overarching campaign. For example, an attack against an insurgent stronghold in an urban
area during a COIN campaign will follow the principles and TTP for any attack in an urban area.
However, the use of supporting fires and other tactical enablers will have to be restricted, and
certain risks taken, to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage to the surroundings. Not
to do so will simply set the civilian population against friendly forces, and create support and
sympathy for the insurgents, thus undermining the long-term goals of the campaign. Therefore,
the importance of campaign principles and long-term goals must be understood at the lowest
levels. For this reason, an attempt has been made throughout the publication to remind
commanders of these overarching, environmental considerations.
105. FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
1. Throughout military history, armies have done much more than simply conduct combat
operations. In the late 19th century, the regular army deployed elements to the Yukon to
undertake policing activities. Indeed, non-combat duties have often been mixed with offensive
and defensive operations throughout history, particularly with respect to the British military
tradition. Armies have routinely undertaken, in emergencies or extreme circumstances, policing
and humanitarian duties. They fought peer enemies, countered insurgents, policed lawless
lands, and helped farmers collect their harvests. In short, they have undertaken tasks that span
a whole range of conflict.
2. This practice remains extant for the COE. Forces will be expected to undertake FSO,
defined as the simultaneous conduct of operations by a force across the spectrum of conflict.
Hence, a battle group for instance, may have a combat team conducting an attack against an
enemy location, another combat team employing checkpoints to control movement of a local
populace or protecting a supply route, and another sub-unit delivering emergency aid to a
civilian community.
1-2 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Introduction
3. Within the COE, it is likely that FSO will occur in urban areas. Contemporary enemies
tend to exploit urban areas and many contemporary operations focus on protecting and
supporting the civilian population.
4. FSO fall into one of three categories of tactical level operations: offensive operations;
defensive operations; and stability operations.2 Note that these are not types of missions or
deployments.3 They are tangible tactical tasks that may be assigned at the unit and sub-unit
level. Thus, for instance, offensive operations will include the attack, and in turn, consist of
tactical tasks such as “destroy,” “support by fire,” or “block.” Moreover, operations are made
possible by “enabling operations,” such as advance to contact or reconnaissance. The table
below indicates the various categories and their constituent parts.
Offensive Operations Defensive Operations Stability Operations
Attack Defence Control and Security (See Note 1)
Pursuit Delay Support to Governance and
Exploitation Infrastructure (See Note 2)
Feint and Disarmament, Demobilization and
Demonstration Reintegration (DDR) (See Note 3)
Security Sector Reform (SSR)
(See Note 3)
Assistance to other Agencies
(See Note 4)
Enabling Activities
Reconnaissance Link-Up Retirement
Security Relief of Encircled Force Withdrawal
Advance to Contact Relief of Troops in Combat Obstacle Breaching/Crossing
Meeting Engagement
NOTES
1. Control and security establishes a framework of security in which other agencies and a civil
populace may function.
2. CIMIC operations will generally be restricted to limited reconstruction and humanitarian aid.
3. The DDR of former combatants and SSR may be multi-agency lines of operation within a
campaign, but will include specific military tactical tasks to support their successful completion.
4. Assistance to other agencies refers to the military’s role in direct support to civilian and
government agencies working to reach strategic goals. One example is the support provided to
agencies that conduct elections.
Figure 1–1: Full-spectrum Operations Breakdown

5. The tactical tasks that will support stability operations will be wide ranging, and will
include tasks such as observation posts, framework patrolling, observation and monitoring, and
crowd confrontation operations. Further details are provided in Chapter 7.
6. At a unit level and above, FSO may well be conducted simultaneous as illustrated
above. At the sub-unit level, they will likely be conducted successively. For example, a
2
Stability operations are those operations conducted by military forces in conjunction with other agencies
to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function
effectively and progress can be achieved.
3
Missions or deployments are referred to as campaign themes. Campaign themes generally fall into one
of four categories: major combat, counter-insurgency, peace support, and peacetime military
engagement. Each of these campaigns will consist of a mix of the tactical operations: offensive,
defensive, and stability.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 1-3
company may complete an attack against an objective (possibly in an urban area), adopt a
hasty defensive position, man checkpoints to control the civilian population, and then be tasked
to coordinate the emergency delivery of aid to the local populace. Meanwhile, other elements of
the battle group will continue with other types of tactical operations.
7. Commanders and soldiers at all levels must be prepared to make rapid shifts, physically
and intellectually, in terms of applying levels of force. The force and posture needed to destroy
an enemy position must be altered rapidly when the troops and their leaders switch to dealing
with the local populace. Soldiers, who have just completed engaging the enemy, may be
manning a vehicle checkpoint that is being approached by a civilian vehicle, carrying women
and children, confused and trying to flee the local area. An overreaction in such a situation will
not only involve civilian casualties, but also undermine the populace’s support of our forces, and
thus, have strategic implications.
8. As a mission or campaign moves away from major combat, and develops into a peace
support campaign, the number and frequency of offensive and defensive operations will
decrease, and the number of stability tasks will increase.
SECTION 2
NATURE OF URBAN OPERATIONS
9. UO are not new to the Canadian Army. What is new is that urban areas and urban
populations have grown significantly during the late twentieth century and have begun to play a
much greater role in military operations. The COE, including the emphasis the urban battlefield,
and the need to be able to operate across the continuum of operations have affected our
doctrine and structures. The brigade and unit will be the primary headquarters around which
units will be task-tailored to perform UO. Companies, platoons, and sections will seldom
conduct UO independently, but will most probably conduct assigned missions as part of a unit
conducting an UO. This section provides the necessary background information to facilitate an
understanding of how higher-level headquarters plan and conduct UO.
10. The general principles of attack and defence hold true for operations in urban areas.
How these principles are translated into practice depends upon whether operations occur in a
collection of farm buildings, a small village, or a large city. Wherever the operation occurs, it will
be primarily an infantry battle once inside the urban area. Combined arms operations will be
devastatingly effective when employed properly, but mechanized forces are often difficult to
manoeuvre or to bring to bear when employed within the confines of narrow or blocked city
streets. Therefore, the infantryman is usually required to fight the battle at section and platoon
level with carefully planned intimate support from supporting arms. Indeed, recent operations
continue to demonstrate the effectiveness of mechanized and armoured forces in the urban
battle.
11. Urban Combat. These offensive and defensive operations are the part of UO that
include a high density of infantry-specific tasks. Urban combat operations are conducted to
defeat an enemy on urban terrain who may be intermingled with non-combatants. Because of
this intermingling, and the necessity to limit collateral damage, the rules of engagement (ROE)
and the restrictions placed upon the use of combat power may be more restrictive than under
other combat conditions.
12. Conditions of Tactical Urban Operations. Within the COE and the Army's growing
role in maintaining regional stability, UO will be conducted across the spectrum of conflict and in
all types of operations. The requirement to conduct FSO (commonly known as the “three block
war”—simultaneous and/or consecutive execution of offensive, defensive and stability
operations) within an urban environment will affect how units plan and execute their assigned
1-4 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Introduction
missions. Most operations will be based in urban areas, and the specific tactical missions within
a campaign may be conducted under varying conditions. The theme of the campaign, the
enemy's actions, the tactical situation, and possible constraints placed upon the force, will
dictate the conditions under which UO are conducted. These conditions may change rapidly.
For example, a peace support campaign consisting of mainly stability operations may
deteriorate into a COIN operation with an ensuing increase in offensive and defensive
operations. Additionally, units may be conducting operations under different conditions at two
locations at the same time. The following descriptions of the three general conditions of UO
provide a framework for commanders conducting tactical planning for UO:
a. Urban Operations under Surgical Conditions. This condition is the least
destructive and most tightly focused of all the conditions of UO. Operations
conducted under surgical conditions include special-purpose raids, small
precision strikes, or small-scale personnel seizures or arrests, focused
psychological (PSYOPS) or civil-military (CIMIC) operations, or recovery
operations. They may even involve the cooperation between Canadian forces
and host nation police and/or other coalition forces. Special forces may execute
them, and though conventional units may not be involved in the actual execution,
they may support them by isolating the area or providing security or crowd
control.
b. Urban Operations under Precision Conditions. Under precision conditions,
either the threat is thoroughly mixed with non-combatants, or political
considerations require the use of combat power to be significantly more
restrictive than UO under high-intensity conditions. Units and commanders must
routinely expect to operate under precision conditions, especially during stability
operations. Considerations:
(1) UO under precision conditions normally involve combat action, usually
involving close combat. Some of this combat can be quite violent for
short periods. It is marked, however, by the commander’s conscious
acceptance of the need to focus and sometimes restrain the combat
power used. The commander may bring overwhelming force to bear, but
only on specific portions of the urban area occupied by the threat. He
may choose different tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to remain
within the bounds of the imposed constraints.
(2) Such operations may include intense combat, but for short durations and
within limited areas.
(3) When preparing for UO under precision conditions, commanders must
ensure that subordinates are well aware of the constraints and that
opportunities for mission-specific, focused training occur.
c. Urban Operations under High-Intensity Conditions. These conditions include
combat actions against a determined enemy occupying prepared positions or
conducting planned attacks. UO under high-intensity conditions require the
coordinated application of the full combat power of the combined arms team.
Infantry units must be prepared at all times to conduct MCO under conditions of
high-intensity UO. Considerations:
(1) An infantry unit's mission is normally to seize, clear, or defend urban
terrain, engaging and defeating the enemy by using whatever force is
necessary. Although the changing world situation may have made large-
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 1-5
scale high-intensity UO less likely, they represent the high end of combat
and units must be trained appropriately.
(2) Even though the fully integrated firepower of the joint combined arms
team will be used, commanders must prevent unnecessary collateral
damage and casualties amongst non-combatants.
(3) Commanders, even when involved in major combat, must be prepared to
transition rapidly to stability operations, and they must be aware of the
need to identify when and where such a transition will aid and maintain
the force’s legitimacy amongst the existing populace. Failure to make the
right transition from major combat at the right time will undermine
subsequent peace support operations (PSO) and the overall legitimacy of
the force.
13. Tactical Challenges. Companies, platoons and sections do not normally operate
independently while conducting UO. The units and battle groups to which they are assigned will
face a number of challenges during the planning and execution of UO. The most likely
challenges that units will face are noted below:
a. Contiguous and Non-contiguous Areas of Operations. Formations and units
must be prepared to conduct operations in both contiguous and non-contiguous
areas of operations (AO). They may be required to command and control
subordinate units and elements over extended distances, and to deploy
subordinate battalions and companies individually in support of operations
outside the unit’s immediate AO. Considerations:
(1) Contiguous operations are conducted in an AO that facilitates mutual
support of combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support
(CSS) elements. They have traditional linear features including
identifiable, contiguous frontages and shared boundaries between forces.
Relatively close distances between subordinate units and elements
characterize contiguous operations.
(2) In non-contiguous operations, subordinate units may operate in isolated
pockets, connected only through the integrating effects of an effective
concept of operations (CONOPS). Non-contiguous operations place a
premium on initiative, effective information operations (Info Ops),
decentralized security operations, and innovative logistic measures. They
make mutual support of combat, CS, and CSS elements complicated, or
hinder it by extended distances between subordinate units and elements.
(3) Some operations may include a combination of contiguous and non-
contiguous battlespaces. While a formation or unit may have a
battlespace that is contiguous to that of other formations or units, its
subordinate elements may operate in small unit or sub-unit AOs that are
non-contiguous. The formation or unit normally assumes tactical
responsibility over the non-assigned terrain between units/sub-units.
Such a situation may exist in an operation in mixed terrain in which
units/sub-units are allocated small urban/town centres within a
formation/unit’s AO.
(4) In UO, AOs will likely be contiguous. However, within stability operations,
these areas will be large and possibly heavily populated. There will not
be enough combat power to dominate the entire area, and thus, many of
1-6 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Introduction
the problems associated with non-contiguous AOs will apply

(e.g. asymmetric threats to lines of communication).
b. Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Threats. In addition to being required to face
symmetrical threats, units must be prepared to face threats of an asymmetrical
nature:
(1) Symmetrical threats are generally “linear” in nature and include those
threats that specifically confront a unit's combat power and capabilities.
Symmetrical threats include conventional enemy forces conducting
offensive or defensive operations against friendly forces.
(2) Asymmetrical threats are those that are specifically designed to avoid
confrontation with a unit's combat power, capabilities, or strengths.
These threats may use the civilian population and infrastructure to shield
themselves, particularly from kinetic effects. Asymmetrical threats are
most likely to be based in urban areas to take advantage of the density of
the civilian population and infrastructure.
c. Minimization of Collateral Damage and Non-combatant Casualties. A
condition that commanders will be required to confront during UO will be the
minimization of collateral damage and non-combatant casualties. This will have
to be balanced with mission accomplishment and the requirement to provide
force protection. Commanders must be aware of the ROE and limitations
imposed upon their capabilities, and must be prepared to request modifications
when the tactical situation requires them. Changes in ROE must be
disseminated rapidly. Commanders must ensure that changes to the ROE, along
with the requirement to minimize collateral damage, are clearly understood by all
soldiers.
d. Quick Transition across Full-spectrum Operations. In addition to being able
to transition between offensive and defensive operations, commanders must
ensure that their forces are able (mentally and physically) to transition rapidly
across FSO. This must occur in both the planning and execution phases. In this
regard, units must be prepared to conduct all types of operations—offensive,
defensive and stability—sequentially or simultaneously. Subordinate
commanders and their troops must be prepared mentally to transition
automatically. For example, a destroy or seize mission may be followed
immediately by a tactical task to secure an area with vehicle check points and
presence patrols, along with immediate humanitarian assistance to civilians
remaining in the objective area.
14. Characteristics for Small Unit Operations. UO are primarily a small unit infantry fight,
requiring significant numbers of infantry to accomplish the mission; however, combined arms
must support the infantry. Operations in the early 21st century continue to give testimony to the
effectiveness of combined arms (in particular, mechanized forces) in UO. Commanders should
facilitate this fight by anticipating what their subordinates will need to accomplish the mission.
a. Changing Conditions. Platoons and sections may find themselves executing
missions in changing conditions during UO. Commanders and soldiers at the
lowest levels must understand the need to be prepared to transit rapidly across
FSO. Sections and platoons will be required to select different TTP based upon
the conditions they face. Stability operations will include incidents of combat,
and MCO will include or be followed quickly by stability and humanitarian tasks.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 1-7
b. Small Unit Battles. Given the density of urban terrain and the dispersal of
enemy forces, sections and platoons are the focus of operations but execute
them in a decentralized fashion. It is easy for soldiers to feel isolated. Soldiers
and their immediate commanders must have the initiative, skill, and courage to
accomplish their missions while operating in a decentralized fashion. A skilled,
well-trained defender has tactical advantages over the attacker in this type of
combat. Greatly reduced line-of-sight ranges, built-in obstacles, and
compartmented terrain may require the commitment of more troops for a given
frontage. While the defence of an urban area can be conducted effectively with
relatively small numbers of troops, the troop density required for an attack in
urban areas may be greater than for an attack in open terrain. Individual soldiers
must be trained and psychologically ready for this type of operation. The state of
a unit's training and cohesion are vital, decisive factors in the execution of
operations in urban areas.
c. Communications. UO require centralized planning and decentralized
execution. Therefore, effective vertical and horizontal communications are
critical.
(1) Structures and a high concentration of electrical power lines normally
degrade radio communication in urban areas. Communications should
be allocated to the section and platoon level so that contact can be
maintained when elements move out of the line-of-sight of each another.
(2) Visual signals may also be used, but they are often not effective because
of the screening effects of buildings, walls, and so forth. Signals must be
planned, widely disseminated, and understood by all assigned or
attached units. Increased noise makes the effective use of sound signals
difficult. Verbal signals may also reveal the unit's location and intent to
the enemy. Standing operating procedures (SOP) for the marking of link-
up and passages of lines are key to the successful transition of sub-units
and units in the urban environment.
(3) Runners and wire can be used for communication. However, runners are
slow and susceptible to enemy fire when moving between buildings or
crossing streets. Wire is the primary means of communications for
controlling the defence of an urban area. It should be considered an
alternative means of communications during offensive operations, if
assets are available. However, wire communications can often be cut by
falling debris, exploding munitions, and moving vehicles.
(4) Communication is facilitated through well-practised SOP at the sub-unit
level. Standardized signals for link-up, entry points, cleared rooms and
booby traps will facilitate communications and rapid actions.
d. Non-combatants. Urban areas, by their very nature, are centres of population.
Non-combatants will be present and will affect both friendly and threat courses of
action across the spectrum of UO. In most cases, they will hamper our
operations and benefit those of the enemy. Besides the local inhabitants,
refugees, governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
the international media are likely to be present. Units must be prepared to deal
with all categories of non-combatants.
1-8 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Introduction
e. High Expenditure of Ammunition. Units conducting UO use large quantities of

ammunition in MCO because of short ranges, limited visibility, briefly exposed
targets, constant engagements, and the requirement for suppression. Breaching
munitions, rifle and machine gun (MG) ammunition, 40 mm grenades, hand
grenades, and breaching explosives are high-usage items in this type of fighting.
Battle procedure and planning must consider the high expenditure of these
natures, and the carriage and resupply of additional loads.
f. Increased Casualties. UO engender more casualties than operations in other
environments. Due to increased risk, a higher threat of fratricide also contributes
to this problem. Non-battle injuries resulting from illnesses or environmental
hazards, such as contaminated water, toxic industrial materials (TIM), and so
forth, will also increase the number of casualties.
g. Limited Mounted Manoeuvre Space. Buildings, street width, rubble, debris,
and non-combatants, all contribute to limited mounted manoeuvre space within
urban areas. Armoured vehicles will rarely be able to operate inside an urban
area without infantry support. While most operations will be conducted
dismounted, they will require the support of mechanized vehicles and their
integral support weapons.
h. Three-dimensional Terrain. Friendly and threat forces will conduct operations
in a three-dimensional battlespace. Engagements can occur on the surface,
above the surface, or below the surface of the urban area. Additionally,
engagements will occur inside and outside of buildings. Multi-story buildings will
present the additional possibility of different floors within the same structure
being controlled by either friendly or threat forces.
i. Reliance upon Human Intelligence. Technology and its ability to support
situational awareness (SA) will be even more limited in urban terrain. Given the
nature of UO and the likely presence of non-combatants, there will be an
increased reliance upon human intelligence (HUMINT) in all types of operations
from major combat to COIN to humanitarian operations. Specialist teams, and in
a general sense all soldiers in contact (i.e. with the enemy and with the local
population), will conduct this exploitation. Soldiers and section commanders
must fully understand this requirement and its importance in all operations
(including stability and COIN operations) in identifying target areas of interest
(TAIs).
j. Need for Combined Arms. While UO have historically consisted of a high
density of infantry-specific tasks, UO conducted purely by infantry units have
proven to be unsound. Properly tasked-organized combined arms sub-units
consisting primarily of infantry, engineers and armour, supported by other
combat, CS, and CSS assets have proven to be more successful both in the
offence and defence.
k. Need to Isolate Critical Points. During offensive operations, companies,
platoons, and sections will assault buildings and clear rooms. More often, assets
will not exist to isolate large portions of the urban area. Therefore, skilful use of
direct and indirect fires, obscurants, and manoeuvre must occur to isolate key
buildings or portions of buildings to secure footholds and clear them.
l. Snipers. Historically, snipers have had increased utility in urban areas. They
can provide long and short-range precision fires, and can be used effectively to
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 1-9
assist company and platoon-level isolation efforts. Along with engaging assigned
targets, snipers are a valuable asset for providing observation and over watch
along routes and suppressive fires during an assault. During stability operations,
they provide over watch for cordon and search operations and urban patrolling in
high-risk areas. They are also useful for surveillance tasks that can act as a
trigger to launch other forces to meet a threat or rapidly exploit an opportunity.
m. Support by Fire Positions. Buildings, street width, rubble, debris, and non-
combatants all dictate the positioning and fields of fire for crew served and other
key weapons used in urban areas. The dense terrain will shorten movement
bounds and slow progress. In many third world cities and towns, buildings are
surrounded by walled compounds, which must be breached or crossed to gain an
approach to the inner structures.
106. CATEGORIES OF URBAN CENTRES
1. Urban centres will vary greatly in most nations or areas in which we will operate. Even
within and around a large urban centre, regions will vary in terms of density, population mass
and layout. In general, we can describe urban centres based upon their size:
a. Villages—population of 3,000 inhabitants or less. The brigade’s AO may contain
a number of villages. Battalions and companies bypass, move through, defend
from, and attack objectives within villages as a normal part of brigade operations.
During stability operations, units and sub-units may find themselves based within
these small urban centres, and operating from within and in the surrounding rural
areas.
b. Towns—population of 3,000 to 100,000 inhabitants and not part of a major urban
complex. Operations in such areas normally involve brigades or a division.
Brigades may bypass, move through, defend within, or attack enemy forces in
towns as part of division operations.
c. City—population of 100,000 to one million inhabitants.
d. Metropolis—population of one million to 10 million inhabitants.
e. Megalopolis—population of over 10 millions inhabitants.
107. CHARACTERIZATION OF AN URBAN AREA
1. UO are those operations planned and conducted in an AO that includes one or more
urban areas. An urban area consists of a topographical complex where man-made construction
or high population density is the dominant feature. UO usually occur when:
a. The assigned objective lies within an urban area and cannot be bypassed.
b. The urban area is key (or decisive) in setting and or shaping the conditions for
current or future operations.
c. An urban area is between two natural obstacles and cannot be bypassed.
d. The urban area is in the path of a general advance and cannot be surrounded or
bypassed
e. Military, political, or humanitarian concerns require the control of an urban area
or necessitate operations within it.
f. Defending from urban areas supports a more effective overall defence or cannot
be avoided.
1-10 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Introduction
g. Occupation, seizure, and control of the urban area will deny the enemy control of
the urban area and the ability to impose its influence on both friendly military
forces and the local civilian population. Therefore, friendly forces can retain the
initiative and dictate the conditions for future operations.
2. The density of construction and population, street patterns, compartmentalization,
affluent and poor sections, modernization, and the presence of utility systems (e.g. power,
water, and sewage) characterize the cities of the world. The differences in urban areas are in
size, density, level of development and layout:
a. Most major cities throughout the world have European characteristics. They
have combination street patterns, concrete and steel high-rise structures, and
distinct economic and ethnic sections. In most third world cities, major sections
of their urban areas are given over to shantytowns or slums, which due to their
density and lack of infrastructure, hinder movement, complicate navigation, and
limit radio communications.
b. Variations in cities are caused mainly by differences in economic development,
terrain features, and cultural diversities. Developed and developing countries
differ more in degree and style rather than in structure and function. Major urban
trends include high-rise buildings, reinforced concrete construction, truck related
industrial storage, shopping centres, detached buildings, suburbs at the outer
edges, and apartment complexes.
c. The spatial expansion of cities in the last three decades presents problems for
UO. The increased use of reinforced concrete framed construction is only one
example of the trend to use lighter construction, which affects how forces will
attack or defend such an area. Another example is the growing number of
apartment complexes, shopping centres, and industrial business areas that lie on
the outskirts of towns and cities.
3. A typical urban area consists of its city core, commercial ribbon, core periphery, residential
sprawl, outlying industrial areas, and outlying high-rise areas. Most urban areas resemble the
generalized (typical) model shown in Figure 1–2.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 1-11
Figure 1–2: Typical Urban Area

a. In most cities, the core has undergone more recent development than the core
periphery; as a result, the two regions are often quite different. Typical modern
city cores consist of high-rise buildings, which vary greatly in height. The core
tends to be the financial and political centre with a large population of workers
during the daytime. There is more space between buildings in modern urban
planning than in the older city cores or core peripheries. Outlying high-rise areas
are dominated by this open construction (see Figures 1–3 and 1–4).
Figure 1–3: Example of a City Core
1-12 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Introduction
Figure 1–4: Outlying High-rise Area

b. Commercial ribbon developments are rows of stores, shops, and restaurants built
along both sides of major streets throughout built-up areas. Usually such streets
are wide and open. The buildings are uniformly two to three stories tall, about
one story taller than the dwellings on the streets behind them. In third world
countries, these commercial areas may simply be connected shop fronts with
open markets spilling into the street (see Figure 1–5).
Figure 1–5: Commercial Ribbon

c. The outer city core consists of streets with continuous fronts of brick or concrete
buildings. The building heights are generally uniform: two or three stories in
small towns, and five to 10 stories in large cities.
d. Residential sprawl and outlying industrial areas consist of low buildings that are
one to three stories tall. Buildings are normally detached and arranged in
irregular patterns along the streets, with many open areas (see Figures 1–6
and 1–7).
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 1-13
Figure 1–6: Residential Sprawl
Figure 1–7: Outlying Industrial Areas

e. It is not so easy to categorize in cities and towns the underground systems that
provide an additional dimension to operations. Many houses have cellars,
usually self-contained, which differ with the type of building. Many towns have
sewage systems or passages for electric or telephone cables, which are
frequently large enough to permit the passage of troops. Some cities have
underground railways, subways or rivers. It is important to be aware of the
tactical implications of any underground systems. Within the core, many modern
high-rises have large underground parking areas.
f. For towns, particularly the centre or older parts, the houses are normally closely
packed with smaller streets and open areas laid out in an irregular manner.
Outside the town, a more modern and methodical layout may be the case.
g. Although many urban areas will have commercial centres with densely packed
tall buildings, most of the population will inhabit dense urban slums either in town
or on the outskirts. These shantytowns will have no regular pattern; will be
densely packed with people, yet with little or no infrastructure. They will have
open sewers, narrow and poorly constructed roads or paths, and low hanging
electrical wires. Compound walls over six feet in height will surround many of the
middle class or larger residential homes. These walls must be crossed or
breached in any operation against such structures.
1-14 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Introduction
4. Most villages are small and compact, usually comprising a few streets and one central
street with shops. Although there may be much open land around a village, within the village
itself the density of housing and construction could well be the same as for a town.
5. The physical characteristics of the buildings and the layout of the urban area will
influence UO. A broad general classification of the types of building construction is provided in
Chapter 3.
108. STREET PATTERNS
1. Knowledge of street patterns and widths gives commanders and leaders a good idea of
whether or not mounted mobility corridors in different zones can permit wheeled or tracked
vehicles and facilitate command and control. For example, a rectangular, radial, radial ring, or
combined pattern facilitates movement and control better than irregular pattern. Common street
patterns within areas of interest/operations are described below.
Shape Street Pattern Effect
Rectangular or Streets are grid-like, with parallel streets intersected

Chessboard by perpendicular streets.
Rayed Streets that fan out at various angles from a given

focal point and through less than 6400 mils.
Radial Primary thoroughfares radiate out from a central

point. These streets may be extended outward
6400 mils around the central point or within an arc
from a point along a natural barrier, such as a
coastline.
Radial-ring Successively larger loops and rings surround loops

or rings. These are usually found in conjunction
with a larger radial pattern. Radial rings incorporate
the elements of both radial and ring-concentric
designs.
Contour forming Pronounced terrain relief influences construction of

roadways along lines of elevation. Primary streets
run parallel to contour lines, with intersecting roads
connecting them. This is the case normally in urban
centres along coastlines where the ground rises
sharply away from the coast.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 1-15
Irregular pattern Irregular street patterns have either occurred

intentionally (usually in planned suburban areas) or
unintentionally in older or poorer sections of an
urban area.
Combined pattern Any combination of the above and is best

demonstrated by the development of modern areas
next to older commercial districts and slums.
Linear pattern A primary thoroughfare radiates down the centre

with buildings on either side. Strip malls and main
shopping districts are patterned this way for ease
and convenience.
Figure 1–8: Street Patterns
SECTION 3
TERRAIN AND WEATHER CONSIDERATIONS
109. TERRAI N CONSIDERATIONS
1. Several considerations have implications in terrain analysis and must be considered
when conducting UO. Terrain products can be developed to include specialized overlays,
maps, and plans:
a. Military Maps. Military maps, normally the basic tactical terrain analysis tool, do
not provide sufficient detail for terrain analysis in built-up areas. Due to growth,
towns and cities are constantly adding new structures and demolishing existing
ones. Thus, any map of an urban area, including city maps or plans published by
the governments, will tend to have inaccuracies and may be, in some cases,
obsolete. The nature of operations can radically alter the terrain of an urban area
within a short period. Incidental or intentional demolition of structures can
change the topography of an area and destroy reference points, create obstacles
to mobility, and provide additional defensive positions for defenders.
b. Underground and Industrial Systems. Maps and diagrams of sewer systems,
subway systems, underground water systems, elevated railways, mass transit
routes, fuel and gas supply and storage facilities, electric power stations,
emergency systems, and mass communications facilities (e.g. radio, telephone)
are of great importance in operations. Sewer and subway systems provide
covered infiltration and small unit approach routes. Elevated railways and mass
transit routes provide mobility between city sectors, and point to locations where
obstacles might be expected. Utility facilities are obvious targets for insurgents,
guerrillas, and terrorists, and their destruction can degrade the capabilities of any
defending force and threaten the indigenous population.
c. Public Buildings. Certain public buildings have to be identified during the
terrain analysis phase of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
Religious sites, hospitals, and surgical facilities are critical because the laws of
1-16 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Introduction
war prohibit their targeting when not being used for military purposes other than
for medical support. The locations of civil defences, air raid shelters, and food
supplies are important in dealing with civilian affairs. The same is true during
insurgency or terrorist actions.
d. Stadiums, Parks, Sports Fields, and School Playgrounds. These are of high
interest during both conventional and unconventional operations in urban areas.
They provide civilian holding areas, detainee centres, insurgent segregation
areas, and prisoner of war (PW) holding facilities. These open areas may
provide the opportunity for resupply by air. Additionally, they may prove useful
areas in which forces may establish centres for operations during stability
operations.
e. Construction Sites and Commercial Operations. Construction sites and
commercial operations, such as warehouses, brickyards, and railway
maintenance yards, serve as primary sources of obstacle and barrier
construction materials when rubble is not present or is insufficient. They can also
provide engineers with materials to strengthen existing rubble obstacles or crib
type roadblocks.
f. Roads, Rivers, Streams, and Bridges. These provide suitable avenues of
movement. Public baths, swimming facilities, and cisterns are useful in providing
bathing facilities. They also provide an alternative water source when public
utilities break down.
2. A close liaison and working relationship should be developed with local government
officials, police and military forces. This is particularly true in counter-insurgency and stability
operations. In addition to information on items of special interest, they may provide information
on the population, size and density of the built-up area, firefighting capabilities, the location of
hazardous materials and security capabilities, civil evacuation plans, and key public buildings.
They may also provide interpreters, if they are needed.
110. WEATHER CONSIDERATIONS
1. Some weather effects peculiar to an urban environment are of relevance and will affect
tactical considerations. These are:
a. Precipitation. Rain or melting snow often floods basements and subway
systems. This is especially true when automatic pumping facilities that normally
handle rising water levels are deprived of power. Rain also makes storm and
other sewer systems hazardous or impassable. Chemical agents are washed
into underground systems by precipitation. As a result, these systems contain
agent concentrations much higher than surface areas and become contaminated
“hot spots.” These effects become more pronounced as the agents are absorbed
by brick or unsealed concrete sewer walls. Many major cities are located along
canals or rivers where there is the potential for fog in low-lying areas. Industrial
and transportation areas are the most affected by fog due to their proximity to
waterways.
b. Temperature and Humidity. Air inversion layers are common over cities,
especially cities located in low-lying “bowls” or in river valleys. Inversion layers
trap dust, chemical agents, and other pollutants, reducing visibility and often
creating a greenhouse effect, which causes a rise in ground and air temperature.
The heating buildings during the winter, and the reflection and absorption of
summer heat, make built-up areas warmer than surrounding open areas during
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 1-17
both summer and winter. This difference can add to the already high logistic
requirements of urban combat, and could degrade troop performance due to heat
stress.
c. Winds. Wind chill is not as pronounced in urban areas. However, the
configuration of streets, especially in close, orderly blocks and high-rise areas,
can cause wind tunnels. This increases the effects of the wind on streets that
parallel the wind direction, while cross streets remain relatively well protected.
d. Visibility. Light data has special significance during UO. Night and periods of
reduced visibility favour surprise, infiltration, detailed reconnaissance, the
insertion of covert observation posts (OPs), attacks across open areas, seizure
of defended strongpoints, and the reduction of defended obstacles. However,
the difficulties of night navigation in restrictive terrain, without reference points
and near the enemy, means that forces must rely upon simple manoeuvre plans
with easily recognizable objectives.
SECTION 4
EFFECTS OF URBAN TERRAIN UPON OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES
2. While the general principles of offensive and defensive operations remain extant for UO,
their relative importance and application will vary because of peculiar conditions. The following
effects should be kept in mind:
a. Ground. Generally, observation and fields of fire are limited. In some cases
(e.g. streets and parks), good fields of fire are offered and these areas assume
particular significance when making an estimate of the ground. The nature of the
ground dictates the employment of large numbers of infantry. Local knowledge
will offer a considerable advantage, and generally, this favours the defence. The
attacker therefore needs to obtain, as a priority, the best possible topographical
information. Additionally, the exploitation of HUMINT from the local population
will assist in battle procedure. The selection of dominating terrain, which may be
buildings, as objectives will be just as important as if fighting in open country. As
urban areas are ideal for infiltration, there are many chances for bypassing the
enemy. Invariably, progress can be very slow.
b. Concealment. It is difficult to locate the enemy, estimate his strength, and
identify his plan. Little information can be gained through ground observation,
and as a result, the enemy must be forced to reveal his plan. This leads to close-
quarter fighting, which is very labour-intensive and can produce heavy casualties.
Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR)
capabilities, even with advances in technology, will always be limited in urban
areas. Control of the operation becomes a major problem. In addition to short
visual ranges, smoke and dust drastically reduce visibility. Local knowledge is
vital to identify possible enemy defensive areas and withdrawal routes.
c. Movement. Streets and open spaces invite movement, but are easily covered
by fire. Therefore, security and protection of mechanized forces in combined
arms operations is paramount since tanks and armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs)
are more vulnerable to short-range attacks. They will require intimate support
from dismounted troops. The movement of mechanized forces can become
severely restricted through man-made obstacles and rubble produced during
fighting. The more buildings are damaged the more cover there is for the
defender, and the harder it is for the attacker to advance. There are, however,
1-18 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Introduction
many opportunities for bypassing the enemy by going over or under them via
rooftops, cellars and sewers. Progress is slow, and providing they are not
exposed to direct fire, helicopters will be invaluable for observation, the insertion
of forces, resupply, and casualty evacuation.
d. Fire Support. Short-range weapons and grenades will predominate. Mutual
support will be difficult to achieve because of short ranges and limited
observation, nevertheless all movement must be covered by fire. Support
weapons and tanks will be restricted in their employment in close fighting,
although they will be invaluable for dominating open areas, suppressing and
neutralizing enemy positions, and depending upon the ammunition type,
breaching walls. The use of artillery and air support will depend upon the policy
for destruction of the built-up area and the precision available. With many forms
of construction, the defender can be burned out of buildings, but the use of fire
may prove equally disadvantageous to the attacker.
e. Leadership. Street fighting is physically and mentally exhausting; success is
measured in meters, building by building. Such operations are demanding and
tax leadership capabilities to sustain morale and an aggressive spirit. In these
circumstances, much will depend upon the initiative and standard of leadership at
section, platoon and company level. Additionally, the need to conduct precise
operations, to avoid non-combatant casualties and collateral damage, and the
need to transition quickly across FSO, will demand mental agility and stamina
from all leaders.
SECTION 5
CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN OPERATIONS AND
THEIR TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
3. The brunt of fighting in any urban areas is borne by infantry and fought mainly at the
section and platoon level. Therefore, commanders at this level must realize that the urban
battlefield has unique characteristics that must be understood and considered. Comprehensive
training and personal initiative by all soldiers and commanders will be crucial to success in UO.
The unique characteristics of UO and their tactical considerations are as follows:
a. Three-dimensional Battlefield. Troops must be able to fight in all three
dimensions of a built-up area: on, above, and below ground level. Forces can
exploit the use of the raised levels, which can include the use of rooftops and
high-rise buildings for observation and fire position. Shelter provided by buildings
and walls must be fully exploited to cover approaches, resupply and withdrawals.
Underground systems, including cellars, sewers and subways, may be used for
tactical movement and protection.
b. Restricted Fields of Fire and Observation:
(1) Inside buildings, weapons are sited well back from windows to conceal
their positions. With this, wider fields of fire are sacrificed to achieve
surprise and to protect the weapon’s position.
(2) Due to the close proximity of urban structures, fields of fire and
observation will be reduced. Streets and open areas such as squares
and parks will provide better fields of fire and observation, however, both
attackers and defenders will treat these localities as danger areas and
killing zones, covering them with fire and observation.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 1-19
(3) Supporting weapons must be further forward to support operations, again

because of the close nature of buildings within the urban environment.
This will limit weapon ranges and stand-off distances, which in the case of
machine guns (MGs), will affect factors related to the theory of MG fire. It
will not be possible, except in rare circumstances, for support weapons
and AFVs to remain outside of the urban area to support those fighting
within the area. Furthermore, AFVs, in marrying up to support the
dismounted troops, cannot do so without the intimate support from
dismounted troops.
(4) Close mutual support is difficult, and operations will slow down naturally
to allow sections, platoons and companies to ensure mutual support
during manoeuvre.
(5) Control is difficult and much depends upon the leadership, initiative, and
tactical expertise of junior commanders.
c. Cover from View and Fire:
(1) An urban area offers excellent cover and concealment for both the
attacker and the defender. However, the defender has an advantage
since the attacker will be exposed while moving through the area.
(2) The effectiveness of cover depends upon the density of the buildings and
the nature of their construction. Buildings constructed of flimsy or
flammable materials are easily destroyed or burned and may prove a
death trap for those using them.
(3) Buildings of heavy stone and concrete, with thick walls and cellars,
provide excellent cover even when bombardment has reduced them to
rubble. Proper preparation of strongpoints (including individual firing
positions) will protect the firer and allow him to remain in place, even after
the majority of the structure has been destroyed or levelled.
d. Restricted Space. Urban areas, particularly in developing countries, are
comprised of restricted spaces. This characteristic limits the effective
employment of support weapons and restricts vehicle movement. Where
movement is possible, it is canalized and vulnerable. Rubble and obstacles will
further hamper vehicle (particularly wheeled) and foot movement. This
characteristic reinforces the need for good planning and the coordination of
movement, cover by fire, and intimate support for armoured vehicles.
e. Target Engagement. Most target engagements in urban areas are at or above
ground level. The following characteristics are considered when engaging
targets:
(1) Ground Level. At ground level, the ranges of observation and fields of
fire are reduced by structures and obscured by the dust and smoke of
battle. The density of urban terrain limits the ability of soldiers to employ
their weapons to the weapons' maximum effective ranges. As a result,
urban engagements consist mostly of close, violent firefights. This
situation requires an increase of precision/accurate small arms fire as well
as strict fire control and proper identification of friend or foe.
Opportunities for using anti-tank guided missiles may be restricted
because of the short ranges involved and the many obstructions that
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Introduction
interfere with missile flight. Danger close is normal for the use of indirect
fires in most engagements. Targets will be fleeting and will only appear
for short periods, making engagements by missile systems difficult if not
impossible. It is highly unlikely that supporting weapons and AFVs will be
able to support operations by remaining outside of the urban area;
consequently, with intimate support from dismounted troops, will have to
move into the urban area.
(2) Above Ground Level. Tall buildings and aircraft provide opportunities to
observe and engage targets from much longer ranges than from ground
level positions. However, target exposure times will generally be very
short because of the multiplicity of cover available to the enemy on the
ground. Observers positioned on very high buildings sometimes feel that
they are able to observe everything in their AO, and hence, experience a
false sense of security. In fact, even observers in good above ground
positions are often limited in their ability to see much of what is occurring,
particularly in between structures and at their bases. Aerial observers are
very useful during UO. Helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft carry
sophisticated sensors that can greatly improve the ability to observe in
the urban area. A commander's best course of action is to integrate both
ground level and above ground level observers to obtain the most
complete picture of the situation.
f. Difficulty in Locating Enemy Fire:
(1) The attacker has difficulty in locating fire, as the majority of weapons will
be sited well back from windows, doors, and other openings. In most
cases, weapons fire will be through small slits or loopholes.
(2) Observation will be difficult because of the smoke and dust that collects
and remains in the streets.
(3) Sound is magnified and echoes are common between buildings and
streets.
(4) Indication of targets will be difficult, due in most part to the vast numbers
of rooms, floors, and buildings that will be encountered, combined with
limited arcs available for observation. Laser pointers, tracer and pertinent
SOP are effective methods of target indication in the urban environment.
g. Close Quarter Fighting:
(1) Once inside the urban area, fighting usually occurs at extremely close
quarters, with the enemy possibly in the next room, floor, building, or on
the other side of the street.
(2) Hand-to-hand fighting is a probability rather than a possibility when
fighting a determined enemy. Soldiers must be proficient in the skill of
bayonet fighting as well as having basic unarmed combat expertise. High
levels of physical fitness and mental robustness are demanded.
Equipment must be light, compact and robust.
h. Vehicle Movement and Intimate Support. Most urban areas are close terrain.
Vehicle movement will be greatly restricted and vehicles will be susceptible to
attack at short ranges. They will require intimate support from dismounted forces
and should never move in an urban area without intimate protection. The
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 1-21
primary task for the fighting vehicles in UO is to provide intimate direct fire
support to dismounted forces. Given the density of urban terrain, not all of a
unit’s fighting vehicles may be required to provide intimate fire support, and those
not engaged in this role can perform a variety of other tasks such as resupply,
casualty evacuation, and movement of reserves.
i. Supporting Arms and Support Weapons:
(1) Artillery and Mortars. Indirect fire supports the fighting on the perimeter
and within the urban area. Medium and heavy howitzer projectiles are
effective against concrete buildings and other fortifications. If necessary,
some guns may be employed in the direct fire role in support of elements
fighting in the urban area. Mortars are particularly useful because their
high trajectory permits target engagement from behind high cover onto
enemy positions, which could also be behind high cover. Considerations
with respect to limiting collateral damage may restrict the use of artillery
and mortars. Their use may be completely precluded (e.g. in a COIN
operation) or they may be restricted to precision munitions only.
(2) Armour and Anti-armour Weapons. Armour can give highly effective
close support, but individual vehicles require all-round protection from
infantry while in the built-up area. The characteristics of short-range anti-
armour weapons make them ideal for anti-armour engagements in urban
areas. Depending upon the ammunition type, they may also be employed
in anti-structure and breaching roles.
(3) Engineers. Engineer support is essential in UO, both in the preparation
of the defence and in the conduct of the attack. For attacks in urban
areas, engineers provide engineer reconnaissance and assist in mobility
by clearing obstacles and opening routes for infantry and tanks. Field
sections may augment the lead infantry elements of a battle group to
assist in mobility and breaching. During the consolidation or in the
defence, engineers assist in placing obstacles and clearing fields of fire.
In certain situations, they may also assume their secondary role of
infantry, such as a reserve force or for local defence in a stability
operation. Engineers will fulfil a wide range of additional roles such as
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). During stability operations, they will
provide expertise and support to operations by assisting the local
population and infrastructure.
(4) Aviation. Helicopters can insert troops, deploy OPs and provide air OPs,
radio rebroadcast, medical evacuation, and resupply. Armed and attack
helicopters can support the fighting in the urban area, but they may be
more effective attacking enemy reserves or enemy troops on the outskirts
or in depth.
j. Chemical and Biological Weapons and Hazards. Chemical and biological
weapons block approaches and create casualties in urban areas, thus troops
must conduct monitoring tasks and be prepared to adopt adequate defensive
measures. It must be kept in mind that chemical agents remain effective in
closed areas for longer periods. Additionally, operations in urban areas may
include the intentional (by the enemy) or accidental (through collateral damage)
release of toxic chemicals from industrial centres. Planning should include the
1-22 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Introduction
consideration of such threats, including the possible requirement to treat civilian

casualties.
k. Command, Control, and Communications. Command and control is more
difficult in urban areas due to the degradation of communications (e.g. from
interference by the screening effects of buildings and high-tension wires) and
limited visibility. Control measures are essential to the successful completion of
any operation, but their importance is paramount in UO. They must be simple
and well understood at all levels. There will be greater reliance upon initiative by
junior commanders and the pervasive understanding of the commander’s intent.
Commanders should plan for decentralized command. Alternative means of
communications and recognition signals must be planned.
l. Civilians. The presence of civilians will hamper operations and restrict freedom
of movement and action. To prevent killing or injuring non-combatants, troops
must be able to distinguish between threatening and non-threatening personnel.
Planning must include consideration for the treatment and evacuation of civilians,
and a humanitarian approach must always be followed. Each section of the
urban area has particular demographics and populous characteristics. Effective
use of information operations must be considered. Additionally, troops and
leaders at all levels must realize that the local population is a wealth of
information and they must be ready to exploit this information in support of
immediate combat operations and long-term stability operations.
m. Devastation. Collateral damage caused by direct and indirect fires will hamper
movement, particularly that of the attacking force. The defender can greatly
enhance the defence by preparing defensive positions in the rubble. The
requirement to limit collateral damage will restrict the use of certain types of
weapons and calibres.
n. Booby Traps and Improvised Explosive Devices. Fighting in urban areas
lends itself to the use of defensive and harassing devices such as booby traps
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). They will continue to pose a threat in
most types of operations. It is expected that strongpoints, avenues of approach,
areas suitable for shelter, and randomly selected locations will be booby-trapped
by the enemy in its defence in an urban area. These can vary from those
designed for use against individuals to those designed to bring down whole
buildings. Additionally, IEDs will be employed by insurgent and enemy forces to
harass, undermine and kill forces conducting operations against them. For
example, they may be planted in cars or dead animals along the roadside, and
remotely/electronically initiated as friendly forces pass by the area. Booby traps
and IEDs can have psychological effects disproportional to their physical effects.
Engineer support must be considered early in the planning phase and tactical
groupings must reflect the threat.
o. Night. In UO, both the defender and attacker can use the cover of darkness to
mount operations to disrupt the other’s plan, infiltrate areas previously captured,
and conduct normal resupply and casualty evacuation. While the attacker will
find that detailed clearance of streets and houses is hard to control in darkness,
the night, as a minimum, can be used to reinforce the primary axes or probe the
defence. Surveillance, patrolling, harassment, infiltration, or attacks will enable
the more aggressive force to gain the initiative and wear the opposition down.
Training and effective employment of night vision devices is required to enhance
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 1-23
proficiency and confidence. Maximum use should be made of any technological

advantage to exploit night operations. During stability operations, the main effort
will likely be placed upon night operations when insurgents and criminal gangs
are usually most active.
p. Logistic Support. The terrain and the nature of operations will create unique
demands upon units. Increased ammunition consumption and high casualty
rates are indicative of UO. The resupply of combat supplies, the movement of
troops, and pre-positioning of special equipment has to be planned in detail.
Logistic planning and preparation has to be thorough for both offensive and
defensive operations. The movement of echelons to the forward forces is
complicated by the close terrain and potential asymmetric threats. Therefore, in
such situations, there may be a requirement to provide armoured vehicle escort
to the resupply convoys.
q. Leadership. Urban combat can be a highly dangerous and costly undertaking.
It can be a slow and protracted battle, physically and mentally exhausting. Even
during operations short of combat, the ubiquitous threat of a sudden ambush or
bombing by insurgents weighs heavily upon the minds of soldiers. Much will
depend upon individual initiative, physical fitness, mental robustness, high
standards of training, and above all, on good leadership at those levels in
constant contact with the enemy. Commanders will have to instil and inspire in
all ranks a spirit of committed aggression and confidence.
4. The requirement for Canadian soldiers to train and become proficient in fighting in urban
areas is challenging. The battlefields of the future will be the urbanized areas of the world, and
we must be prepared, mentally and physically, to operate in those areas across the full
spectrum of operations.
1-24 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
CHAPTER 2
THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
SECTION 1
FACTORS AFFECTING BUILDING SELECTION
1. Climate, available materials, function, and cultural development of the region all
influence the design and construction of buildings. Since there are numerous hybrid
construction methods, and the possibility exists of different types of buildings being adjacent or
sharing a common wall, distinct tactical evaluations for attacking and defending each type of
building are not practical. The primary platoon and section level tasks in the defence are the
preparation of fighting positions within their perimeter, ambush positions (as part of the
disruption battle), and within a platoon/company strongpoint. Such positions in built-up areas
are usually constructed in buildings, whose selection is based upon an analysis of the area in
which the building is located, the building’s location and orientation to help meet the task
assigned, and the individual characteristics of the building. When considering the selection of
buildings for use as a fighting position (particularly within a strongpoint), leaders should consider
the following factors:
a. Protection. Buildings that provide more protection from direct and indirect fire,
such as those constructed of reinforced concrete rather than wood, panelling, or
other light material, should be selected because they will require less
reinforcement to gain sufficient protection. The addition of strongly constructed
basements and strong load-bearing walls/beams adds protection from indirect
fire.
b. Dispersion. Commanders must avoid establishing positions in a single building
when it is possible to occupy two or more buildings that will permit mutually
supporting fire. A position in one building, without mutual support, is vulnerable
to bypass, isolation, and subsequent destruction from any direction. Individual
soldiers must never occupy rooms in a building, but should be deployed in pairs
as a minimum, and no building should be occupied by less than a half section.
c. Concealment. Avoid buildings that are obvious defensive positions, as the
enemy easily targets them. Ideally, such buildings should be used as dummy
positions or initially defended to deceive the enemy. In certain situations, the
need for both security and fields of fire requires the occupation of exposed
buildings. In such cases, additional reinforcement provides suitable protection
within the building.
d. Fields of Fire. To prevent isolation, positions must be mutually supporting and
have fields of fire in all directions. Clearing fields of fire, if desirable, may require
the destruction of adjacent structures by using explosives, engineer equipment,
and field expedients. Destroying selected buildings can enlarge fields of fire.
Clearing obstacles, such as telephone wires in order to use anti-armour
weapons, must also be considered.
e. Covered Routes. Defensive positions will have at least one covered route that
permits resupply, medical evacuation, reinforcement, or withdrawal from the
building. This route may be established through walls to adjacent buildings,
underground systems, communications trenches, or behind protective buildings.
f. Observation. Buildings should permit observation and fields of fire into all enemy
avenues of approach and adjacent defensive sectors. Although upper stories allow
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 2-1
for greater observation, they also attract the attention of the enemy. The use of
mirrors and periscopes allows improved observation while reducing the risk of
detection.
g. Fire Hazards. Avoid buildings that are a fire hazard. If flammable structures must be
occupied, soldiers must take measures to reduce the danger of fire, such as wetting
down the immediate environment and laying 50 mm of sand on the floors. Filling up
bathtubs and buckets with water, flooding basements and having fire extinguishers
available, are other precautions that should be taken.
h. Time Available. Time available to prepare the defence may be the most critical
factor. If enough time is not available, buildings that require extensive reinforcement
with sandbags, fire prevention measures, clearing fields of fire, and other preparation
may not be used. Conversely, buildings located in less desirable areas that require
little improvement will probably become a focus for preparation.
SECTION 2
BUILDING TYPES AND DESCRIPTIONS
201. INTRODUCTION
1. A force conducting urban operations (UO) will encounter several different types of
building structures within the urban environment. Knowledge of how buildings are constructed,
the materials used in their construction, and their basic layout can be useful to a force in
planning and conducting an operation. Such information used in the offence can influence the
resources required to attack a structure, the possible plan for clearance, and the mitigation of
collateral damage. In the defence, building construction and location will be factors considered
for siting the defensive layout.
202. MASS CONSTRUCTION BUILDINGS
1. Mass construction buildings are those in which the outside walls support the weight of
the building and its contents. Additional support, especially on wide buildings, comes from
using load-bearing interior walls, strong points (called pilasters) on the exterior walls, cast iron
interior columns, and arches or braces over the windows and doors (see Figure 2–1). Modern
types of mass construction buildings are wall and slab structures such as many modern
apartments and hotels, and tilt-up structures commonly used for industry or storage. The walls
of mass construction buildings are built in many ways:
a. constructed on site using brick, block, or poured concrete;
b. prefabricated of tilt-up or reinforced concrete panels; and
c. prefabricated and assembled like boxes.
2-2 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
The Urban Environment
Figure 2–1: Mass Construction Buildings

2. Brick buildings are the most common and the most important of the mass construction
buildings (see Figure 2–2). These buildings are often different at ground floor level than on
upper levels, with the outer walls becoming thinner with elevation:
a. While under contact, the best way to enter a brick building may be to create a
breaching hole in a wall by using explosive charges, tank / direct fire mobile
system fire, or a breaching round from a direct fire (e.g. anti-armour) weapon. If
neither is available, a door or window at the point of the building that provides the
best cover and concealment can be used, remembering that these points are
danger areas for entry. The interior layout is usually uniform from floor to floor
with the interior walls easily breached using a mechanical method.
b. One of the most common types of brick buildings is the small shop. These
buildings are found in many built-up areas but are most common at the edge of
any business and industrial area (see Figure 2–3). Brick building shops have
similar floor plans on each floor; therefore, the same clearing procedures may be
used on each floor level.
c. Brick buildings in third world nations are often made from mud bricks or from
materials of poor standards. In all circumstances, but particularly in these
nations, consideration must be given with respect to the effects of over-
penetration by weapon systems.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 2-3
Figure 2–2: Brick Buildings
Figure 2–3: Brick Built Shop

3. Another common mass construction building in industrial areas and along commercial
ribbons is the warehouse. It is normally built of poured concrete, reinforced with steel bars, or of
prefabricated walls that are tilt-up. Warehouse walls provide good cover, although the roof is
vulnerable. These buildings are built on slabs that can normally support the weight of vehicles
and thus provide cover and concealment for armoured vehicles (see Figure 2–4).
2-4 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 2–4: Warehouse

4. Public gathering places (e.g. churches, stadiums) are mass construction buildings with
large, open interiors. The walls provide good cover, but the roofs generally do not. The interior
walls are not load-bearing walls and are normally easy to breach or remove. Public gathering
places are most common in the centre and on the edge of cities, in residential areas, and
outlying high-rise areas (see Figures 2–5 and 2–6). Note that in such buildings small arms
ammunition and grenade shrapnel will pierce internal walls, possibly injuring friendly troops.
Commanders must keep this in mind to carefully control the direction of attack, and all must be
aware of the location of friendly troops.
Figure 2–5: Public Gathering Places
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 2-5
Figure 2–6: Public Places

5. The box wall principle is another type of mass construction. Such buildings are made
from prefabricated concrete panels that are normally reinforced concrete, 15 cm to 20 cm thick.
The outside walls often have large surface areas of glass. This type of building provides ground
cover, except for the glass portions. A good circulation pattern exists from room to room and
from floor to floor. These buildings are commonly used as hotels or apartments, and are
located in residential and outlying areas (see Figure 2–7).
Figure 2–7: Box Wall Principle Building

6. The walls in these buildings are difficult to breach because of the reinforcing bars. As a
result, the best way to enter is to blow down doors or side windows. Once inside, the clearing
group can easily predict the floor plan of these buildings. Clearing may consist of clearing the
rooms off a central hallway (see Figure 2–8). Interior walls are also constructed of reinforced
concrete and will require breaching tools or purpose-built explosives. Stairs are usually located
at the ends of the hallways, making these points easier to secure.
2-6 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 2–8: Box Wall Principle Building Floor Plan
203. FRAMED BUILDING

1. Framed buildings are supported by a skeleton of columns and beams, and are usually
taller than frameless buildings (see Figure 2–9). The exterior walls are not load-bearing and are
either heavily or lightly clad.
Figure 2–9: Light Structured Framed Buildings

2. One type of framed building often found in cities is the multi-storey car park, which
normally has no cladding. Other types include:
a. Heavy clad buildings, which were common when framed buildings were first
introduced. Their walls are made of brick and cinder block that are sometimes
almost as thick as frameless brick walls, although not as protective. Heavy clad
framed buildings are found in the centre and on the edges of large population
concentrations. They can be recognized by the classic style of architecture used
for such buildings. There are three distinct sections to this building style: the
pediment, the shaft, and the capital. Unlike the brick building, the outer walls are
the same thickness on all floors and the windows are set at the same depth
throughout. Often, the frame members (the columns) can be seen, especially at
the ground floor. The cladding consists of layers of terra blocks, brick, and stone
veneer, and does not provide as good a cover as the walls of brick buildings. It
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 2-7
protects against small arms fire and light shrapnel, but does not provide much
cover against heavy weapons (see Figure 2–10).
Figure 2–10: Heavy Clad Framed Building

b. Floor plans of these buildings depend upon their functions. Office buildings
normally have small offices surrounding an interior hall or larger common work
area. Department stores normally have large, open interiors (see Figure 2–11).
Often, there is a mezzanine level within the store.
Figure 2–11: Heavy Clad Framed Department Store

c. Another type of heavy clad framed building is used as a high-rise factory. Such
buildings are normally easily recognizable because the concrete beams and
columns are visible from the outside. These buildings are usually located in older
industrial areas. Since the floors are often made to support heavy machinery,
these buildings provide good overhead cover.
d. Lightly clad buildings are more modern and may be constructed mostly of glass
(see Figure 2–12). Most framed buildings built in recent years are lightly clad
buildings. They are found in both core and outlying high-rise regions, and usually
stand detached from other buildings. Their walls consist of a thin layer of brick,
lightweight concrete, or glass. Such materials provide minimal protection against
any weapon. However, the floors of the buildings are much heavier and provide
2-8 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
moderate overhead cover. The rooms in lightly clad framed buildings are
generally bigger than those in heavy clad buildings but the interior partitions are
thin, light, and easy to breach.
Figure 2–12: Lightly Clad Framed Building

e. The multi-story car park is one of the few buildings in an urban area in which all
floors can support vehicles. Multi-story car parks are normally high enough to
provide a 360-degree field of fire for anti-armour weapons (see Figure 2–13).
Figure 2–13: Multi-story Car Park
204. FLOOR PLANS

1. Floor plans in buildings generally follow predictable patterns. One of the factors that
determine floor plans is the building shape (see Figure 2–14). The basic principle governing
building shapes is that rooms normally have access to outside light. This principle helps to
analyze and determine the floor plans of large buildings.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 2-9
Figure 2–14: Building Shapes and Sizes

205. RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS AND COMPOUNDS
1. Two basic types of houses in the developed world are found in and around cities, and in
rural areas. City houses are normally mass construction, brick buildings. Rural houses in North
and South America, and in Southeast Asia, are commonly made of wood. In continental
Europe, Southwest Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, where wood is scarce, rural buildings are
normally constructed of concrete cinder blocks. In many of the future areas of operations (AO),
residential areas will be tightly packed slums with the indigenous people living in wood or mud-
brick huts with only two or three rooms, cinder block houses, or in the worst areas, metal sea
containers.
2. In many parts of the world, residents and businesses will be constructed as a compound,
surrounded by high walls (i.e. greater than 2.0 m tall) and have normal access through only one
or two gates, usually big enough for an automobile. These walls exist mainly for local security;
yet, provide an impediment for UO. Any assault on the building requires that the wall be
crossed or breached. In some cases, the outside walls of a building will form part of the wall
structure, and thus, a single breach only may be required.
2-10 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 2–15: Middle East Style Enclosed Courtyard.
206. STRUCTURES IN THE THIRD WORLD AND DEVELOPING NATIONS

1. Many future operations will occur in third world or developing nations that have few
modern structures. Many will have downtown cores and residential areas, but they will be far
from the construction standards of Western Europe and North America.
2. As shown in Figure 2–16, most buildings will be constructed of sub-standard brick,
cinder block or even mud blocks and light, wood frames. The urban areas will be immensely
dense, crowded and over-populated. Buildings will shoulder against one another, and access to
the rear of one building may only be possible by going through another building. Streets will be
narrow and will hamper or even preclude vehicle movement. Electrical wires will be poorly and
unprofessionally established between buildings and will hang low, posing a danger to vehicle
crews and antennas.
Figure 2–16: Aerial Photograph of Grand Ravine area of Port au Prince, Haiti, May 2004
3. Many residential buildings and businesses will include small compounds surrounded by
high, cement block walls, established for local security. These will have to be breached in any
assault operation.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 2-11
4. Careful consideration must be given to the employment of support weapons in such

areas. Many ammunition natures will penetrate any target and continue to penetrate several
buildings beyond the target. The probability of collateral damage and civilian casualties should
be a constant concern. These areas also constitute fire hazards, and the use of illumination
aids such as para-flares must be carefully considered and employed in such a way to avoid
accidental fires and extensive collateral damage.
SECTION 3
NON-COMBATANTS
207. PLANNI NG FOR NON-COMBATANTS
5. Non-combatants are those individuals in an operational area who are not engaged in
hostile acts in relation to the campaign. They will include local indigenous civilians, domestic
and international media, and national and international civilians working with non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian organizations. Urban areas, by their very nature, are
population centres and non-combatants will be present more often than not. Their presence or
potential presence on the battlefield will have to be carefully considered in all planning. Non-
combatants may be supportive, neutral, or hostile to the force’s presence and operations.
Commanders and soldiers must be prepared to encounter all types. Handling non-combatants
can be as simple as moving them out of immediate harm’s way, or as complicated as a non-
combatant evacuation operation (NEO) that sees them removed from country.
6. Non-combatants may be supportive of the friendly force’s mission. This should be
reinforced and exploited to the greatest extent possible throughout any operation. In most
cases, there will be an element of the non-combatant population, which is at least, passively
opposed to the presence of friendly forces. Any physical threat posed by them will be covered
under the applicable rules of engagement (ROE). Notwithstanding, in all operations the non-
combatant population is an important planning factor. Commanders must consider their
protection, humanitarian needs, the potential source for information and intelligence, and the
means (e.g. civil-military cooperation [CIMIC], information operations [info ops]) by which
friendly forces will gain and secure the support of the non-combatants, particularly the
indigenous population.
208. NON-COMBATANT CASUALTIES
1. Regardless of the type of operation, be it a major combat operation, a counter-
insurgency (COIN) or a stability operation, commanders at all levels will be required to avoid, to
the greatest extent possible, non-combatant casualties. Commanders must ensure that
subordinates at all levels understand this requirement, and that the danger of causing civilian
casualties increases with the density of the urban area and the willingness of enemy forces to
conceal themselves amongst the indigenous population. The risk of causing non-combatant
casualties will have to be balanced with mission accomplishment and the requirements for
effective defence or force protection at any given time.
2. The cost of causing non-combatant casualties, regardless of how unavoidable it may
have been, will be great. In the immediate sense, as a priority there will be the need to divert
medical resources to care for the civilian casualties. There will also be long-term effects of
resentment from the indigenous population, as well as the loss of their confidence in the friendly
forces and in the validity of the campaign. This will be particularly acute in any COIN or stability
operation where the support of the indigenous population is paramount.
2-12 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
209. NON-COMBATANTS AS AN INFORMATION / INTELLIGENCE SOURCE

1. Non-combatants, particularly those who are indigenous to the AO, are potentially a great
source of information. Not only will they know the physical lay of the land, but will be able to
indicate enemy forces, their locations, and possibly their intentions. They will be able to indicate
covered approaches and ways to bypass or flank enemy locations. Commanders and soldiers
must treat such assistance with caution as it may not be accurate, and may even be
intentionally false.
2. During stability and COIN operations, the local population and aid workers will be a
potential wealth of information regarding the presence and infiltration of insurgents, belligerents
and criminal elements. They will, in many cases, be willing to pass information regarding
enemy/belligerent locations, identities and actions. Commanders and soldiers in contact with
the indigenous population and other non-combatants must be receptive to this information, and
become skilled in developing trust and confidence with the local population and in drawing such
tactical information from them. This is just not the remit of specialist human intelligence
(HUMINT) or counter-intelligence (CI) teams, but every soldier must understand his role in
collecting information from the local population.
3. For fear of their own safety, members of the local population will often be reluctant to
provide friendly forces with information. Commanders and soldiers must be sensitive to this and
look to alleviate the risks to potential sources of information. Potential sources may be passed
to specialist HUMINT or CI teams (who at times will operate covertly), or other means can be
used to avoid comprising a source. For example, a source may be unwilling to lead a patrol to a
possible weapons cache, but may be willing to drop an infrared (IR) light source at the entrance
to the suspected building; thus, a follow-up patrol can then identify and prosecute the potential
target after the informant has departed the area. Again, caution must be exercised. False
information can be given to friendly forces in order for belligerent groups to embarrass the
friendly forces, to undermine the population’s confidence in them, or to target them for an attack.
4. During stability operations, the indigenous population will often provide a means for
commanders to measure mission success. The attitudes of the local population towards the
friendly forces, their feelings of security, their ability to be free from harassment and attack
(particularly at night), and their ability to conduct normal business, will all be measures of
success in terms of the mission. Again, commanders and soldiers at the lowest levels must be
sensitive to this, be able to collect the information, and able to pass it to higher headquarters.
SECTION 4
CAMOUFLAGE IN AN URBAN SETTING
5. General. Camouflage in built-up areas is as important to the survival of troops and
equipment as in any other environment. However, the changing patterns of terrain and
individual buildings make the task of blending with urban terrain more challenging.
6. Application. Only sufficient material needed to camouflage a particular position should
be used since excess material could reveal the position. Material from the urban environment
itself can be used to great effect, but has to be pinned down securely to prevent creasing or
producing a billowing effect. Materials can be obtained from a wide area. For example, if
defending a masonry block building, do not strip the front, sides, or rear of the building to
camouflage the position, but instead, use materials from buildings not being defended:
a. Buildings provide numerous concealed positions. Armoured vehicles can often
find isolated positions under archways or inside small industrial or commercial
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 2-13
structures. Thick masonry, stone, or brick walls offer excellent protection from
direct fire and provide concealed routes.
b. After camouflage is completed, a position should be inspected from the enemy's
viewpoint. Routine, periodic checks should be made to see if the camouflage
remains natural looking and actually conceals the position. If it does not look
natural, it should be rearranged or replaced.
c. Positions have to be camouflaged progressively as they are prepared. Work
should continue until all camouflage is complete. Work may be possible only at
night. Shiny or light-coloured objects that attract attention from the air should be
hidden.
d. If the enemy has thermal imagery (TI) capability, soldiers must be aware that
urban camouflage materials and other drape materials will not, on their own,
conceal vehicles. Thermal camouflage has to be used in conjunction with
camouflage material from the urban environment. Also, care should be taken to
avoid giving off a heat signature within an obviously derelict building.
7. The Use of Shadow. Buildings in built-up areas throw sharp shadows, which can be
used to conceal vehicles and equipment. Soldiers should avoid areas that are not in shadows.
Vehicles may have to be moved periodically as shadows shift during the day. Emplacements
inside buildings provide better concealment. Other features of shadows that can have useful
military applications are:
a. Soldiers should avoid lighted areas around windows and loopholes, since they
will be better concealed if they fire from the shadowed interior of a room.
b. Interior lights should not be used, and if curtains are common to the area, a lace
curtain or piece of cheesecloth provides additional concealment for soldiers in
the interior of rooms.
8. Textures and Colour. Standard camouflage pattern painting of equipment is not as
effective in built-up areas as a solid, dull, dark colour hidden in shadows. Since repainting
vehicles before entering a built-up area is not practical, camouflage patterns should be subdued
with mud or dirt:
a. Breaking up the silhouette of helmets and individual equipment is required in
built-up areas the same as elsewhere. Predominant colours are normally
browns, tans and sometimes greys, rather than greens, but each camouflage
location needs to be checked for texture and colour.
b. Weapon emplacements should use a wet blanket, canvas, or cloth to keep dust
from rising when the weapon is fired.
c. Command posts and logistic emplacements are easier to camouflage and better
protected if located underground. Antennas can be made remote to upper
stories or to higher buildings depending upon capabilities. Field telephone wire
should be laid in culverts, sewers or through buildings.
d. Soldiers should consider the background to ensure that they are not silhouetted
or sky-lined, but rather that they blend into their surroundings. To defeat enemy
surveillance, soldiers should be alert for common camouflage errors such as the
following:
(1) tracks or other evidence of activity, with vehicles being kept to hardened
roads and tracks wherever possible;
2-14 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
(2) shine or shadows;

(3) unnaturally coloured or textured camouflage nets should not be used in
an urban environment unless the surroundings call for it;
(4) muzzle flash, smoke or dust; and
(5) no movement while under contact unless essential to the mission.
e. Dummy positions can be used effectively to distract the enemy, make them
reveal their positions, or cause them to flank through a killing zone.
9. Summary. Urban areas afford cover, resources for camouflage, and locations for
concealment. The following basic rules of cover, camouflage and concealment should be
followed:
a. Use the terrain and alter camouflage techniques to suit your surroundings.
b. Employ dummy positions in buildings.
c. Continue to improve positions and reinforce fighting positions with sandbags or
other fragment and blast absorbent material.
d. Maintain the natural look of the area.
e. Keep positions hidden by clearing away minimal debris for fields of fire.
f. Place firing positions in inconspicuous spots when available and suitable for the
task.
SECTION 5
IDENTIFICATION OF FRIEND OR FOE AND
COMBAT IDENTIFICATION IN URBAN AREAS
10. Combat identification is the use of identification measures to reduce losses caused by
friendly fire, and to increase the operational effectiveness of forces and weapon systems. It is
an all-encompassing system to identify friendly forces and avoid fratricide. It begins with basic
recognition training and includes control measures, recognition/password signals, markers (e.g.
panels) in both the visible and IR ranges, and advanced laser or radio based inquisitor-
responder systems.
11. Due to shorter ranges, fleeting views, the dense cover of the environment and the
decentralized manner of urban operations, the ability to differentiate between enemy and
friendly forces becomes more difficult in the urban terrain. Flanking friendly forces, even with
the same platoon, can easily get out of line with other friendly forces and become subject to
friendly fire. Thus, any actions, such as the assault of a building, must be carefully planned and
coordinated, not only to ensure adequate fire support, but to ensure that friendly troops are
aware of each other’s locations and planned moves. If necessary, the battle may have to be
slowed to safeguard against fratricide. Recognition measures must be planned, widely
distributed as possible, and understood by all before the start of the operation.
12. Combat identification may be enhanced through a wide variety of means:
a. Recognition training of friendly and enemy vehicles, equipment, uniforms, and
recognition standing operating procedures (SOP) before the operation. These
must be continually updated in theatre.
b. Good communications and tactical control features, and the dissemination of the
control features to the lowest applicable levels.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 2-15
c. Standardized recognition signals in both the visible and IR ranges. It must be

remembered that an enemy equipped with IR capabilities will be able to identify
any IR signals and markings.
d. The inclusion of recognition signals in any marry-up drills with supporting arms or
coalition forces.
e. The use of laser pointers for indications.
f. Commanders take a measured approach to the speed of the operation, and if
necessary, slow the pace to limit the dangers of friendly fire casualties.
g. Standardized signals/markers for link-up points, particularly for the passage of
lines.
h. Clear and timely situation reports indicating the progress of the battle and the
locations of friendly forces.
SECTION 6
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE
CONSIDERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS
210. GENERAL
1. Commanders have to be prepared to assume an adequate chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defensive posture when engaged in operations, including UO.
The threat exists from a number of sources: intentional targeting by enemy forces; accidental
chemical or biological release from residual or stockpiled materials; and environmental
accidents. Commanders should also be aware of how the built-up environment affects the
protection, detection, and decontamination process. Buildings are usually not strong enough to
provide shelter from a nuclear explosion, but do provide some protection against fallout. They
also have unique characteristics concerning the effects of biological and chemical agents.
211. PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND
NUCLEAR THREATS
1. Using the Built-up Environment. The lowest floor or basement of a reinforced
concrete or steel formed building offers good protection from nuclear hazards and liquid
chemical contamination. Tunnels, storm drains, subway tubes, and sewers provide better
protection than buildings. Tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) also provide some
protection:
a. Biological Attacks. These are difficult to detect or recognize. Biological agents
can be disseminated through aerosol, vector, and covert methods. Since
biological agents can be sprayed or dropped in bomblets, personnel who observe
such indicators should promptly report them. Prompt reporting and treatment of
ill personnel speeds the employment of medical countermeasures. Buildings and
shelters provide little protection against biological agents.
b. Chemical Agents. These cause casualties by being inhaled or by being
absorbed through the skin. Soldiers may only have a few seconds to put on
respirators. Buildings have a channelling effect and tend to contain the effects of
an agent, causing great variation in chemical concentration from room to room or
from building to building. Chemical agents usually settle in low places, making
sewers and subways hazardous hiding places. A prepared defender should
include some collective protective measures in the defensive network. The use
2-16 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
of fans may be able to create enough overpressure inside tunnels to keep some
chemical agents from entering. Respirators and CBRN protective clothing
provide the best personal protection against chemical agents.
c. Radiological and Nuclear Threats. Much of the current threat of radiological or
nuclear nature comes from the poor industrial standards of third world and
developing nations. Commanders and soldiers must be aware of such industrial
infrastructure within their areas of responsibility and operate carefully around
them. The effects of munitions used near such industrial areas must be
considered. Troops discovering industrial or suspicious storage areas must
report them to their immediate headquarters.
d. Detection. Detection in built-up areas is complicated by the containing nature of
buildings. Teams should conduct tests and surveys of major streets,
intersections, and buildings in their area for inclusion in initial CBRN reports. A
systematic survey of all buildings, rooms, and underground facilities has to be
accomplished before any occupation by unmasked troops. All data should be
forwarded using the appropriate reports.
212. LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AND DECONTAMINATION
1. Logistic Planning. Commanders must plan for the logistic requirements for any CBRN
equipment to be used in operations. Protective clothing, detection and decontamination
equipment, and sealed containers of food and water have to be stockpiled. When operating in
protective clothing, commanders must also make allowances for the strenuous activities
normally associated with combat in built-up areas, which results, for example, in increased
water intake.
2. Decontamination. Combat troops have to begin decontamination operations as soon
as the mission allows after a CBRN attack or exposure. They should conduct individual
decontamination of themselves and their personal equipment:
a. Radiological. Troops should wear issued CBRN protective clothing for certain
decontamination operations (e.g. hosing down buildings) to prevent radioactive
material from touching the skin.
b. Chemical and Biological Decontamination. If time permits, roads, sidewalks,
and other hard surfaces are best decontaminated by weathering. Agents can
also be covered with several inches of earth or sand to provide protection.
Fragment testing should be conducted periodically to ensure that the agent has
not seeped through the covering. Buildings are difficult to decontaminate,
especially wooden ones. Some techniques for their decontamination are
scrubbing with slurry; washing with hot, soapy water; washing or spraying with a
soda solution; and airing.
213. USE OF SMOKE IN THE URBAN AREA
1. Offensive operations in built-up areas can make effective use of smoke. In the attack,
smoke supports the manoeuvre of assault sections or platoons. Smoke should not be used
when it degrades the effectiveness of aimed fire from friendly forces. Moreover, an extremely
dense concentration of smoke in an enclosed room displaces the oxygen and poses a danger to
friendly troops even when they are wearing protective masks.
2. Smoke pots, generators, or indirect fire smoke munitions may be used to cover the
movement of attacking forces. White phosphorous munitions may be used to start fires, with
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 2-17
the aim of destroying equipment and supplies; however, in accordance with the Geneva
Conventions, they shall not be used to deliberately cause personnel casualties. It must be
remembered that complex wind patterns caused by buildings affects the use of smoke in this
environment, and the incendiary effects of both white phosphorous and base ejection munitions
igniting litter and debris in built-up areas must be considered.
214. ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS
1. Soldiers operating in third world and developing nations will be exposed to a number of
environmental threats due firstly to the tropical or equatorial nature of the country, and secondly,
to the lack of proper health standards and sanitation:
a. Threats of Tropical or Equatorial Nature. Tropical diseases and dangerous
reptiles will naturally exist in any tropical or equatorial country. Soldiers must
continue to realize that such threats exist in urban areas just as they do in the
deepest jungle. Commanders must ensure that troops exercise caution and take
prescribed medications in urban areas just as they would in rural or remote
regions.
b. Threats due to a Lack of Proper Health and Sanitation. Many nations to
which troops will deploy will be remarkable in their lack of proper sanitation and
urban safety standards. Driving conditions may be dangerous due to poor local
infrastructure and weather conditions. Troops will routinely patrol in, and
possibly fight from, open sewage swales running alongside roads. Soldiers will
be in danger of falling down unguarded escarpments, or falling into sewers
lacking manhole covers and filled with water. Commanders must ensure that
subordinates exercise good awareness, caution, and good hygiene standards.
While these threats are secondary in a major combat operation, they pose a
pervasive and ever-present threat to soldiers conducting stability operations.
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CHAPTER 3
INDIVIDUAL SKILLS AND TACTICAL MOVEMENT
SECTION 1
INDIVIDUAL SKILLS
301. GENERAL
1. The material covered in this section in dealing with individual skills must be read and
applied within the context of the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) given in Chapter 5.
302. GENERAL TECHNIQUES
1. Tactical movement in urban areas is one of the most fundamental skills a soldier must
master. Movement techniques must be practised until they become second nature. The basic
principle of movement is not to move unless covered by fire, or at least having the capability to
provide fire. Covering fire can be as simple as a fire team partner observing, and when
required, covering movement with fire. To minimize exposure to enemy fire, urban fighters must
follow some basic guidelines for movement:
a. Do not give off a silhouette, keeping low at all times. Special attention must be
paid when passing by windows—soldiers must move under them, not by them.
b. Avoid open areas (e.g. streets, alleys and parks).
c. Select the next covered position and the route to it before moving, and ensure
that those providing cover fire are prepared and aware of the movement plan.
d. Conceal movement by using smoke, buildings, rubble or foliage.
e. Move rapidly from one position to another.
f. Move without masking covering fire.
g. Remain alert, ready for the unexpected.
h. Remember the three dimensional nature of operations, looking up and down, left
and right. Those providing cover fire or watching arcs must ensure that the third
dimension is covered as well.
303. CROSSING A WALL
1. The correct method of going over a wall begins, if possible, with the soldier observing
the other side. The soldier then quickly rolls over the obstacle, keeping the body as close to the
wall as possible (see Figure 3–1). The speed at which this move is executed and the low
silhouette denies the enemy a good target. Avoid obvious openings, such as gaps and gates,
as they will likely be covered by fire or booby traps. The same drills should be used for all
obstacles where soldiers are required to cross up and over.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-1
Figure 3–1: Crossing a wall
304. MOVING AROUND A CORNER

1. Corners are dangerous, since enemy activity beyond them is unknown. Obviously, the
area past the corner must be observed before moving beyond it. Although this should be done
with the aid of a viewing device, the soldier must initially check with a direct visual view before
moving. The most common mistakes made when looking around a corner are extending the
weapon beyond the corner or exposing portions of the soldier’s body, thus giving away his
position and possibly his intent. In addition, the soldier should not show his head at the height
that an enemy soldier would expect to see it. When observing around the corner, the soldier
must look both high and low, ensuring that he observes locations at a distance from his corner,
and then working his way in to observe locations close to the corner:
a. Use of a Mirror. The correct technique for just looking around a corner without
exposing oneself is to use a mirror (see Figure 3–2). Once the soldier has
observed the area beyond the corner and found it to be clear, he then proceeds
around the corner, keeping a low silhouette, and moves to his next position as
quickly as possible.
Figure 3–2: Looking Around A Corner

b. The Pie Method. There will be times when troops will be required to observe
and move around corners at a quicker pace. For this, three methods can be
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Individual Skills and Tactical Movement
used. The pie method is shown below (see Figure 3–3). The soldier conducting
the drill steps away from the wall, observing only as far around the corner as his
weapon carry and position will allow, remembering to look around the corner at
all levels. The soldier then slowly rotates outward in an arc around the corner,
observing each new sector of the “pie” in turn, as he moves around the corner.
Note that in doing so, a second soldier should be covering adjacent arcs.
Figure 3–3: The Pie Method

c. The Step-out Method. The step-out technique consists of a two-man team
moving quickly around a corner side by side (see Figure 3–4). The two soldiers
quickly stack or line up closely before the corner. On the given signal, both
soldiers will simultaneously sidestep out. The first rifleman will step further out,
and the second rifleman will take a smaller step so both soldiers will be standing
side by side. They will adopt a proper shooting position and are ready to engage
targets as required.
Figure 3–4: The Step-out Method
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-3
Figure 3–4a: The Step-out Method

d. The High-Low Method. The high-low technique consists of a two-man team
moving quickly around a corner at different levels (see Figure 3–5). Stacking
before the corner, the first rifleman will adopt a kneeling fire position, and the
second rifleman will adopt the standing position, and in tandem, move quickly
around the corner. The first rifleman will stand-up only after the second one
gives him the authorization (verbal or hand signal), thus avoiding a possible
fratricide.
Figure 3–5: The High-Low Method
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Figure 3–5a: The High Low Method
305. MOVING PAST WINDOWS

1. Windows present another hazard. Soldiers must be careful not to expose themselves
when passing a window. Should a soldier expose himself, enemy inside the building could
engage through the window without ever being exposed to friendly covering fire:
a. The correct technique for passing by a window is for a soldier to be below
window level, taking care not to silhouette himself, and hug the side of the
building (see Figure 3–6). To engage the soldier, any enemy inside the building
would have to expose themselves to covering fire. If the window is lower, the
soldier should adjust his technique of movement, using the leopard crawl.
b. Care must also be taken when passing a basement window. The danger comes
from not noticing the window. A soldier should not merely walk or run past a
basement window, as he presents a good target to enemy inside the building.
The correct procedure is for the soldier to stay close to the wall of the building,
stepping over or jumping past the window without exposing his legs.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-5
Figure 3–6: Passing by a Window

306. USING DOORWAYS
1. Doorways should not be used as entrances or exits because they are normally covered
by enemy fire, blocked, or possibly booby-trapped. If a soldier must use a doorway, he must
first inspect it, then move quickly through it to his next position, staying low to avoid silhouetting
himself (see Figure 3–7). The soldier checks the door and the immediate area from within the
building and selects his next covered position. He exits the doorway rapidly, keeping low, and
moving quickly to the next position. In doing so, he should be covered by another rifleman.
Pre-selection of positions, speed, a low silhouette, and the use of covering fire must be
emphasized in exiting doorways.
Figure 3–7: Exiting Doorways
307. MOVING OUTSIDE OF BUILDINGS

1. At times, it may not be possible to use the inside of buildings as a route of advance, and
individuals, teams, groups or sections must move outside of the buildings. When doing so, the
move must be covered by fire and concealed by smoke and available cover:
3-6 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
a. The correct method of moving outside of a building is for the soldier to follow the
side of the building, being sure to stay slightly out from the wall to avoid the
possibility of small arms ricochets (see Figure 3–8). He stays in the shadows,
presents a low silhouette, and moves rapidly to his next position, after ensuring
that the rifleman providing the covering fire is prepared. It would be difficult for
enemy inside the building to hit the soldier without exposing themselves to the
friendly force’s covering fire. Furthermore, it would be difficult for enemy farther
down a street to detect and engage him. The soldier takes full advantage of the
available cover and concealment to select his next position (see Figure 3–9).
Figure 3–8: Moving Outside of Buildings
Figure 3–9: Selecting the Next Position

b. Open areas such as streets, alleys and parks should be avoided whenever
possible because they are natural killing zones for enemy crew-served weapons.
This does not mean, however, that such zones cannot be crossed. They can be
crossed with reduced risk if the individual, the team/group leader, or the section
commander applies the correct method and drills.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-7
c. The most common mistake in crossing an open area is crossing diagonally from
one point to another. In so doing, the soldier exposes himself to enemy fire for
too long. The soldier moving across an open area must cross using the most
direct route, and once across, use cover to move to his desired position. By so
doing, he greatly reduces the time he is exposed to enemy fire.
d. Before moving to a subsequent position, the soldier observes and selects the
position that will best afford him cover and concealment. In addition, he selects
the route that he will take to get to that position. He must take care to use
existing cover and concealment. Rapid movement, covered by supporting fire
and the use of smoke, enhances the chances of success.
e. Moving as a fire team or assault group from building to building, or between
buildings, offers some advantages: it has the element of surprise; it limits overall
exposure time; and prevents the enemy from taking aim at a specific individual,
particularly if they have seen one move and are anticipating the subsequent
movement of others. On the other hand, it may expose a large target to fire from
a support weapon. Smoke should be used to cover movement when this
technique is used (see Figure 3–10). If the decision is taken to move as a group,
another group must be prepared to provide covering fire.
Figure 3–10: Group Movement

f. Moving from the side of one building to that of an adjacent building presents a
similar problem. The technique of movement is the same as the one just
described; however, when moving in this manner, the fire team should use the
building it is moving along as cover. In moving to the adjacent building, team
members should keep a proper distance between themselves, and using a
prearranged signal, make an abrupt flanking movement in a staggered line
across the open area to the next building. In many third world urban areas, the
roofs will be flat, and movement from one building to another can be done across
rooftops and the next building cleared from top to bottom. Caution must be used
on rooftops to avoid exposure to enemy fire from other buildings.
g. When moving from position to position, each soldier must be careful not to mask
his supporting fire. When he reaches his next position, the soldier must be
prepared to cover the movement of other member(s) of his team or section. To
do so, he must take full advantage of his new position. One of the most common
errors a soldier can make in firing from a position of cover is to observe and/or
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fire over the top of cover and silhouette himself against the background. Just as
in any other environment, soldiers should observe and fire around or through
their cover.
308. MOVING INSIDE A BUILDING
1. Soldiers must avoid silhouetting themselves in open doorways and windows. Moreover,
to cut down any observation the enemy has into the building, turn the lights off unless required
and close any curtains or shades that are still attached. This holds true during stability
operations in which security forces may be the target of belligerent or insurgent snipers, or
drive-by shootings. The soldier ensures that he keeps a low silhouette when passing openings
and stays well back from the opening to take advantage of depth and shadow (see
Figure 3–11).
Figure 3–11: Moving within a Building that is under Attack
SECTION 2
METHODS OF ENTRY
309. GENERAL
1. When entering a building, a soldier should enter with minimum exposure. The section
commander will usually dictate the point of entry, but the soldier must clearly identify the entry
point before moving towards the building, being sure to avoid windows and doors unless
previously cleared. Smoke can often be used to conceal his advance to the building, and entry can
be assisted with the use of demolitions, direct fire support weapons, combat engineer vehicles, or
other methods to make entry points. Other points to note when entering buildings are:
a. When conducting entry while exposed to enemy fire, all available concealment
methods have to be employed. Smoke and diversionary measures improve the
chance of success. When using smoke for concealment, soldiers should plan for
wind direction. They should use fire and deception to distract the enemy
attention away from the area of the entry point.
b. A soldier is vulnerable to enemy fire when performing the entry drill. Soldiers who
are moving from building to building, and climbing buildings, have to be covered
with supporting fire, carefully coordinated by the section and platoon commanders.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-9
Areas between buildings offer the enemy good fields of fire. Properly positioned
supporting weapons can suppress and eliminate this enemy fire.
c. For whatever entry technique is used, the entry drill is conducted by at least one
fire team, with the assistance of other fire teams as required. Covering fire and
security will normally provide this assistance.
d. If there is a requirement to neutralize enemy in the area of the entry point, this
should be done before sending assault teams forward to conduct the entry.
Grenade launchers and direct fire support weapons can be very effective in this
role.
310. ENTRY AT UPPER LEVELS
1. Clearing a building from the top down is the preferred method. Clearing or defending a
building is easier from an upper story. Gravity and the building's floor plans become assets
when throwing hand grenades and moving from floor to floor. Other points to note are:
a. An enemy who is forced to the top of a building may be cornered and fight
desperately knowing there is no possibility of escape, whereas an enemy who is
forced down to the ground level may withdraw from the building, thus exposing
himself to friendly fire from the outside.
b. Various means such as ladders, assisted lifts, drainpipes, helicopters, or roofs
and windows of adjoining buildings, may be used to reach the top floor or roof of
a building.
c. A soldier performing high entry should avoid silhouetting himself in windows of
uncleared rooms and avoid exposing himself to enemy fire from lower windows.
He should climb with his weapon slung to his side for quick employment. If the
situation requires the entry team to move past an opening to get to a higher entry
point, the team may clear these lower level openings with a hand grenade before
going past them, but this should only be considered if no other option is
available. Grenades should be placed on your person for easy access; that is, in
the front lower pockets of the load carrying vest on the side of your throwing
hand. The use of grenades fired from a grenade launcher before the entry team
moves forward to clear lower or upper entry points is an effective option and
would allow the entry team to concentrate on the entry itself.
d. All entry drills must be conducted with at least one fire team, with assistance from
other fire teams when required. Any assistance will mostly be in the form of
security and covering fire.
e. When climbing into an entry point there are several individual methods of entry to
use, as follows:
(1) hook a leg over the side, such as a windowsill, and enter sideways,
straddling the ledge;
(2) enter head and weapon first; or
(3) roll over the ledge.
311. USE OF LADDERS
1. Ladders offer a quick method to gain access to the upper levels of a building. Although
ladders will not permit access to the top of some buildings, they will offer some security and
3-10 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
safety through speed and ease of use. Ladders can be used for climbing into a building or
traversing from building to building. They can also assist in climbing obstacles. Ladders should
be placed as near to parallel and as vertical to the wall as safety will allow. Being closer to the
wall gives better concealment and a higher reach with the ladder. There are two methods used
to place a ladder. The first is to place the ladder to one side of the entry point with the top of the
ladder in line with the top of the opening, thus allowing the soldier to adopt a position of
observation in relation to the entry point. The second method is to place the ladder centred on
and directly below the entry point, allowing ease of movement for soldiers moving into the entry
point. If the available ladders are not long enough to enter the objective opening, the use of an
armoured vehicle as a platform to add extra height is an option.
2. Conduct of Entry. An assault team with a ladder prepared for use moves to the side of
the building and places the ladder next to the chosen point of entry, with one soldier guiding the
top of the ladder and the second pushing from the bottom. In doing this, they are covered by
the rest of the section. Once the ladder is in position, the soldier who was pushing from the
bottom places himself underneath the ladder, securing it by holding its base with his arms and
legs, and reports “ladder secure.” The second member, who guided the ladder into place, acts
as local protection once the ladder is in place, paying particular attention to the upper windows.
The next assault team, which will actually conduct the entry, moves up with the first team and
takes up positions of security. On hearing “ladder secure,” the team climbs the ladder and
quickly gains entry into the building. From here, the room clearing drill is carried out (see
Figure 3–12).
Figure 3–12: Entry with a Ladder
312. GRAPPLING HOOKS

1. The grappling hook is a multi-purpose hook, which can be used for climbing, anchoring,
and pulling down wire or other obstacles. It can be used to pull open doors, etc., which are
suspected of having booby traps attached. A grappling hook should be sturdy, portable, easily
thrown, and equipped with at least three strong curved hooks that can grip onto pipes,
furnishings, corners of openings, etc. The scaling rope should be at least 16 mm in diameter
and long enough to reach the objective area. Knots should be tied in the rope at 30 cm
intervals, leaving at least 30 cm knot free from where the hook and rope meet. The proximity of
the knots makes climbing easier for the entry teams. Grappling hooks are used as follows:
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-11
a. When throwing the grappling hook, stand as close to the building as possible,
cutting down on possible exposure to enemy fire. The closer the range, the less
horizontal distance the hook has to be thrown.
b. Make sure there is enough rope to reach the target, and hold the hook and a coil
of rope in the throwing hand. The remainder of the rope, in loose coils, should be
in the other hand, allowing the rope to play out freely. The throw should be a
gentle, even, upward lob of the hook, with the other hand releasing the rope as it
plays out (see Figure 3–13). The grappling hook can also be thrown in an
overhead lob, or if positioned further from the wall, in an underhand throw. Both
are good methods but require a lot of practise to achieve proficiency.
c. Once the grappling hook is positioned inside the entry point, the thrower moves
to one side, pulling the hook to that side of the entry point so that the hook grabs
a secure hold. The soldier ensures a proper hold by pulling on the rope, putting
his body weight on the rope, and swinging out to the centre of the opening before
beginning to climb. When using a window, pull the hook to one corner to ensure
it is well secured and to reduce exposure to lower windows during the climb.
Figure 3–13: Throwing a Grappling Hook

d. Once the hook is secure, the fire team moves to the side of the building and
takes cover. The thrower stands flush against the wall, centred under the chosen
point of entry. The other soldier from the fire team acts as local protection while
the grappling hook is thrown. Another assault team could be used to move
forward and assist in giving local protection, or if possible, provide local
protection from nearby cover. Once the hook is secure, the thrower scales the
wall. If enemy are suspected to be in the room or nearby, the soldier should
utilize a grenade in the room, just before entering. In throwing the grenade, he
must ensure that he remains just below the windowsill and moves quickly with his
weapon ready immediately following the detonation. Once entry is gained into
the room, the fire team partner follows. He should have an alternative device to
gain entry for the remainder of the section, such as a rope ladder. A lightweight
pull rope should be attached to the alternative climbing device so that the second
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soldier is not attempting to climb with added weight. From here, the room
clearance drill is carried out.
e. The use of a grappling hook is the least preferred method for gaining entry to
upper levels of buildings. It should be used only as a last resort and away from
potential enemy positions. It is a difficult method of entry and exposes the fire
team for an extended period. This method may be used on adjacent buildings
that offer concealed locations and a connecting roof to enemy positions. It can
be used to gain initial entry into a building with the secondary intent of hooking-
up another means of entry for following soldiers, such as a rope ladder. The
team that will be conducting this entry drill, to be efficient, should carry only the
mission essential kit required for the initial clearance of the entry point. Even if
the use of a grappling hook as a means of entry may be rare, they are an
excellent training aid for teaching urban skills, building skills and fitness, and
building confidence in individual soldiers.
f. Grappling hooks have other uses in urban combat. They can be used as an
emergency escape route for elements withdrawing from strongpoints in which the
normal entrances are blocked. Of course, they would need to be sited in an area
concealed from the direction of expected attack. Grappling hooks are also ideal
for assisting in the clearance of obstacles, particularly those that may be booby-
trapped. Before an assault or movement, they can be thrown from cover into a
wire obstacle to help clear the wire and initiate any booby traps.
313. RAPPELLI NG
1. Rappelling can be used to descend from a rooftop or upper windows into lower entry
points. However, this method of entry requires a safe and secure platform from which to
operate and some practise in the techniques of rappelling. Since this drill will likely expose
soldiers in a vulnerable position for a longer period, support fire, smoke, and deception must be
employed while rappelling is being conducted.
2. As for any entry drill, covering fire must be a priority, especially now that soldiers will be
in the open with limited means of quickly gaining cover. The rappel site should be placed out of
direct sight of the enemy, back away from the exit point, and if possible, directly above the point
of entry. Two rappel ropes should be used, enabling a fire team to perform the entry. If this is
not feasible, the second member must be prepared to quickly hook up and descend once the
first member gains entry. If possible, a grenade should be placed in the room that will be
entered. Before rappelling, the soldier must have his weapon slung to his side for quick
employment and must also have a grenade easily accessible. When exiting the building, the
fire team must keep a low silhouette by sliding out the opening, and once out, walking down the
side of the structure, staying away from any other openings. The fire team stops approximately
1.0 m above the entry point, and if a grenade is necessary, they prepare and throw the grenade
through the entry point, ensuring that they pull their bodies in towards the building to protect
themselves from the blast. Once the grenade has detonated, the team member makes a bound
out from the wall and down into the room, followed by the second member. They then secure
the entry room and unhook from the rappel rope. From here, section clearance drills are carried
out. See Figure 3–14.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-13
Figure 3–14: Rappelling
314. SUMMARY OF UPPER LEVEL ENTRIES

1. There are other methods for gaining entry to upper levels that have not been mentioned,
all of which are effective if the basic rules of upper level entry are followed. Alternative
techniques stemming from past experience or new techniques developed in theatre may be
used. The methods must be relatively simple, well practised, and deliberately completed so that
adequate covering fire and security are provided. Upper level entry techniques during training
also serve to build confidence and urban skills.
2. Although there are great advantages to clearing a building from its upper levels
downwards, there can be difficulties. Gaining upper level access is the first difficulty to
overcome. Secondly, it allows the enemy to easily withdraw using pre-planned, covered routes.
Additionally, as forces move downwards, they can become more easily isolated. Lastly, it is
more difficult to evacuate casualties and withdraw from the building should that be necessary.
315. ENTRY AT LOWER LEVELS
1. In many cases, entry at the bottom or lower level may be the only immediately available
course of action. When entering a building at the lower level, soldiers should avoid entry
through windows and doors since both can be easily booby-trapped and are likely to be covered
by enemy fire:
a. Ideally, when entering at lower levels, it is preferable to create a new entrance
using demolitions, artillery, direct fire weapons, or by using manual methods such
as sledgehammers or battering devices. By making a new entrance, soldiers
avoid any booby traps that may have been placed, and may surprise the enemy
by entering from an unexpected direction or location. Direct fire weapons will
also incapacitate enemy in the room being entered. Quick entry is required to
follow-up the effects of the blast and concussion.
b. In some cases, breaching assistance may not be available if deemed
unnecessary (i.e. if no enemy presence has been confirmed in the building), or
may be restricted to limit collateral damage. In a building where the selected
entrance is through a window or door, extra precautions should be taken before
entering. Supporting fire should be directed at the window or door before
entering. Armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) and other direct fire support
3-14 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
weapons should be sighted and prepared to support. Before entering, a grenade

could be thrown into the entrance if enemy are known or suspected to be in the
room. Even if the entry point was made with demolitions or direct fire support
systems, a grenade should still be thrown as the pause between the breach and
the entry will allow the enemy to reoccupy the room, or to shift fire onto the
obvious entry point. When making a new entrance in a building, the effects of
the blast on the building and adjacent buildings should be considered.
c. The same drills apply for low entries as for upper entries in that the other
members of the section will provide local protection, fire support, security, or
assistance for the fire team conducting the entry. The following methods are
basic low entry techniques, which have many different variants but serve the
same purpose. Soldiers must practise these drills with their weapons in their
shooting hand for quick deployment.
316. ASSISTED LIFTS
1. Lifts. Assisted lifts are employed when the entry point is too high for one soldier to gain
entry by himself, but low enough that the use of an upper entry device is not required. In all
cases, the initial entry man is assisted by at least one other soldier while others provide local
security, watching the flanks and upper windows. The other members of the section and
platoon provide fire support from a secured area. Methods:
a. Two-man Vertical Lift. This method requires the employment of two fire teams.
One team is employed as the entry team and the other team as the lifters. This
method is used for an entry point that requires the entry team to be lifted no more
than approximately 2.0 m:
(1) The first soldier of the entry team stands underneath the point of entry
facing the wall. The palm of his free hand is against the building, and his
weapon held in his shooting hand, is placed against the building. He
stands on his toes, heels raised off the ground, with his feet
approximately 60 cm apart, and 60 cm from the wall. His body must be
angled such that his upper body is closer to the wall than his legs. The
other soldier of the entry team takes up a position of security to the
immediate left or right of the entry point.
(2) The lifter team moves up with the entry team and place themselves facing
each other, on either side of the first soldier of the entry team, in a
squatting position. Their weapons will be placed to their sides against the
building for easy access. They then place their outer hands underneath
the heels and prepare to lift, with their inner hands bracing the knee of the
entry man. If required, one of the lifters can also throw a grenade into the
entrance room.
(3) The lifters, with one quick movement, then lift the entry man into the
chosen point of entry. Once entry has been gained, this action is
repeated with the second member of the entry team (see Figure 3–15).
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-15
Figure 3–15: Two-man Vertical Lift

b. Two-man Lift Supported. This method also employs the use of two fire teams,
with one team conducting the entry and another employed as lifters. This
method is used for entry points that are approximately 2.0 m to 3.0 m high:
(1) The lifter team will require a board, metal pipe or other lifting device that
is at least 120 cm in length and strong enough to hold at least 120 kg
(Note: a personal weapon should never be used). Under section covering
fire, the lifter team moves to a position centred and underneath the entry
point, with their inner shoulders placed firmly against the wall. Facing
each other, they hold the lifting device with interlocking fingers.
(2) The entry team moves up with the lifter team and provides security for
that team until they are ready. One member of the entry team (normally
the one about to enter, may throw the initial grenade if deemed
necessary). Once ready, the entry team will approach the lifter team one
at a time, straight on at a walking pace, placing one foot on the lifting
device and using the other to spring upwards. Concurrently, if required,
the lifter team can assist this action by lifting the device upward,
launching the soldier through the entry point. This assistance will only be
required if warranted by the height of the entry point. As the entry team
moves through the entry point, they carry their weapons in their shooting
hand and use their other hand to assist in guiding their body through the
entry point (see Figure 3–16).
(3) Another commonly used variation is for the lifter team to crouch with their
backs supported against the wall, their upper leg parallel to the ground
and the lifting device braced on their upper thighs. The lifting device is
used as a step, and the lifter team gives no upward assistance. This
method is used when the height of the entry point does not warrant any
assistance.
3-16 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 3–16: Two-man Lift Supported

c. Shin Lift. This method requires the use of one additional soldier to assist the
entry fire team into an entry point:
(1) The entry team, with at least one other soldier, moves up to the entry
point, with one entry team soldier taking up a position of security and the
other standing with palms flat against the building underneath the
selected point of entry, his weapon held in his shooting hand. This soldier
has one foot firmly on the ground, the second bent at the knee. Just
before setting this position, if deemed necessary, this soldier may also
throw a grenade into the entry room.
(2) The lifter moves behind this soldier, holding one hand under his shin and
the other grasping his ankle. Simultaneously the entry man straightens
his leg as the lifter propels him upward. This drill is now repeated with the
second member of the entry team (see Figure 3–17).
Figure 3–17: Shin Lift

d. Single Stirrup Lift. This drill also requires an additional soldier to assist the
entry fire team into an entry point. This method should be used for entry points
that are approximately 1.5 m to 2.0 m high:
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-17
(1) The entry team and at least one other soldier (lifter) moves up to the entry
point, with the entry team taking up positions of security and the lifter
standing with his back against the wall underneath the point of entry. The
lifter’s legs are bent at the knee and heels dug into the ground. Hands
are clasped, forming a stirrup, which hangs between his legs. His
shoulders are pressed back against the wall with arms straightened and
locked.
(2) Once the lifter is in position the entry team move out one at a time to a
position approximately 1.0 m from the lifter and advance at a walking
pace, indicating to the lifter which leg will be put into the lifter’s hands.
The entry soldier uses the lifter’s hands as a support for his leading foot,
using his momentum and his other leg to push himself upward. The lifter
is only there as a support and should not have to push the soldier upward
unless warranted by the height of the entry point. Once the first soldier is
in the entry point, the second member conducts the same drill. If it is
deemed necessary, the first soldier of the entry fire team should throw a
grenade into the entry point.
(3) The designation of which foot is going to be placed into the lifter’s hands
allows the lifter to move his head in the opposite direction to avoid being
hit in the face by the climber’s knee. As well, the soldier’s weapon must
be in the hand opposite the foot being placed into the lifter’s hands, so
that the weapon does not hit the lifter’s face. The lifter’s head must be
tucked down into his opposite shoulder, exposing only his helmet. The
lifter must keep his hands low so that the soldier being lifted will be able
to maintain momentum. Due to restricted movement caused by webbing
and equipment, most soldiers will not be able to raise their legs to any
great height without losing their forward momentum (see Figure 3–18).
Figure 3–18: Single Stirrup Lift

e. One-man Back Lift. This drill also requires an additional soldier to assist the
entry team into an entry point. This method should be used for entry points that
are approximately 1.0 m to 2.0 m high:
3-18 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
(1) The entry team and at least one other soldier (lifter) moves up to the entry
point, with the entry team taking up positions of security and the lifter
positioning himself underneath the entry point. The lifter goes onto his
hands and knees, with the side of his body pressed firmly against the
building for support. His arms are locked into a straight position with his
knees bent underneath himself. His weapon is positioned between
himself and the wall.
(2) Once the lifter is in position, the first member of the entry team moves at
a quick pace towards the lifter and places one foot in the high centre of
the lifter’s back, roughly between his shoulder blades. Maintaining his
momentum, he uses his other leg to push upward, using the lifter’s back
as a step. The second member of the entry team completes the same
drill once the first soldier moves through the entry point. If it is deemed
necessary, the first soldier of the entry fire team should throw a grenade
into the entry point.
(3) The lifter should ensure that his head is tucked in at all times to avoid
being struck in the face.
NOTE
The above entry drills are written based upon a two-man entry team. Wherever there
is a significant known or potential threat, a four-man entry team should be used. The
above techniques are adjusted accordingly and are further discussed in Chapter 4
under Section Drills and Techniques.
f. Two-man Pull. This method is used when friendly forces already occupy a
building and there is a requirement for troops within the building to assist others
to gain entry. Several aids can be used in conjunction with this method (e.g.
weapon slings, straps or ropes) if warranted by the height of the entry point:
(1) When there is a requirement to assist other soldiers into a building, two
soldiers inside assist them by grabbing the soldier’s extended arms and
pulling him up into the entry point. The soldier that is being pulled into the
building will stand facing the building with his weapon slung muzzle down.
The two soldiers that are pulling the soldier in will stand to either side of
the window frame, reach down with their inside arm, grabbing the
corresponding arm of the soldier being lifted. The grip used will be the
“grabbing the wrist” technique, which gives two points of contact for
security. On the command “lift,” given by the senior soldier in the window,
the soldier being lifted will force his body upward, guiding his movement
up the wall with his feet. The lifters pull upward in one motion, rotating
their bodies inward and grabbing the soldier’s webbing or tactical vest
with their free hand. Pulling the soldier in through the entry point
completes the drill. Note that while this is being conducted, security must
be maintained inside and outside the building. See Figure 3–19.
(2) There are two variations of this method. First, the soldiers in the building
lower their weapons along the wall grasping their slings. The soldier
seeking entry grabs hold of the two slings and is pulled into the entry
point. The second method involves the use of two long straps or ropes,
with loops fashioned in the ends. The soldiers in the window lower their
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-19
straps with the looped ends towards the soldier seeking entry. He will
overlap the straps, forming an “X.” The soldier will then place his arms
through the loops in the straps, fit the loops around his shoulders, and
prepare to be lifted by holding on to the straps, confirming verbally he is
ready. The soldiers pulling will steadily walk backwards or pull hand over
hand if unable to back up. The soldier being pulled upward must guide
himself by positioning his body in a rappel position once off the ground
and walking up the wall. He must remain in this position ensuring he
keeps his hands away from the wall and the bottom edge of the entry
opening. To do this, he must force himself outwards with his legs. This
becomes more critical the closer he comes to the entry point. He should
enter in an upright position and the lifters must control his entry by
slowing down the ascent near the entry point.
3-20 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 3–19: Two-man Pull
317. ENTERING THROUGH A DOOR

1. When a door is the chosen means of entry into a building or room, soldiers must be
aware of possible fire from enemy soldiers within the room and of booby traps. Doors can be
opened by hand, kicking, weapons fire, or by using tools such as a sledgehammer or a battering
ram. When opening a door, soldiers must not expose themselves to fire through the door or thin
walls. A four-man fire group should be used when opening doors by any of the above methods.
A breacher should never follow his own breach and be the first soldier through a door. If a four-
man group is clearing a room, assigned breachers should be part of the clearing group.
2. The clearing group takes up its position (see Chapter 5), ready to enter and clear the
room. Along with other elements of the section or platoon, it provides all-round cover while the
breacher conducts the breaching action.
3. There are various methods for forcing a door open:
a. The best mechanical method is the use of a battering device (e.g.
sledgehammer, heavy axe, or battering ram). Once all-round observation and
cover has been established, the breaching soldier positions himself on the side of
the doorframe furthest away from the lock or door handle. This gives him a clear
swing. On command from the assault team leader, the soldier with the battering
device hits the door. The door must be struck as close to the door handle or lock
as possible. It is important to try to open the door on the first hit because enemy
within may respond with fire through the door and walls. Once the door has been
opened, the breaching soldier moves out of the way so the assault team can
conduct the room clearance drill. It is not imperative that the breaching soldier
stay on the side previously indicated, as all doorways are not designed alike and
much depends upon the soldier’s ability to use the device from different sides.
The rule of thumb is to occupy a position that does not mask the fire of the
clearing team.
b. With doors that open outward, battering devices will be less effective and a
prying device such as a crowbar or Halligan tool will be required. The drill is
identical to that for the battering device. Prying devices require one or two
soldiers; one to operate the device, and possibly another to assist wedging it into
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-21
the door by using a blunt object, like a sledgehammer. The soldier with the
breaching tool positions himself on the side closest to the door handle or locking
device, and wedges the tool between the door and its frame. Once the
breaching tool is wedged in, the bar is put into position perpendicular to the door
with the soldier’s hand halfway down the bar. The second soldier positions
himself on the opposite side, and once the tool is at the perpendicular position,
moves forward and with one swing of the sedge hammer hits the end of the tool,
wedging it deeper into position. The soldier holding the breaching tool then pulls
it towards himself, thus prying the door open.
c. A door can be opened by hand if it is not locked or booby-trapped, but an
unsecured door should give cause for suspicion. If opening doors by hand where
booby-trapping is suspected, a grappling hook can be employed to pull the door
open once the lock has been disengaged.
d. A door can be kicked in. One assault team member crouches to the side of the
door frame providing security. He prepares to post/throw a grenade and enter
the room, while the other kicks the door in. As per the battering device method,
the door should be kicked as close as possible to its locking device. If the door
does not open on the first kick, enemy within will probably reply with fire through
the door and walls. Once the door is open, the soldier providing security should
enter first, followed by rest of the clearing team. Soldiers must practise this
method to avoid getting hurt by kicking the door incorrectly (see Figure 3–20).
Figure 3–20: Kicking open a Door
318. ENTERI NG A MOUSEHOLE

1. Another way to enter a room is to create mouse holes. There are several ways to create
mouse holes, such as the use of a battering device, weapons fire, or demolitions. The most
common method used within buildings is the battering device. For this method, one assault
team creates the mouse hole, while another provides security and entry. The team tasked with
creating the mouse hole moves up to the intended location of the hole with a member positioned
3-22 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
on either side. Both carry sledgehammers, and once in position, commence hitting the same
point with alternate swings to create a loophole. Once a loophole has been created, the
soldiers work their way outward keeping the hole rounded for ease of dislodging material. The
use of heavily weighted devices, such as sledgehammers or battering rams, should be reserved
for sturdily constructed walls made of material such as concrete or masonry. With walls
constructed of light material, use of a lighter device such as an axe may be more effective
because heavier tools tend to go through thin walls and become stuck. Once the mouse hole
has been completed, the entry team who were providing security enter the mouse hole one
behind the other, ensuring a low silhouette (see Figure 3–21). From this point on, the room
clearance drill is conducted. It should be noted that soldiers creating a mouse hole with
mechanical devices might be exposed to enemy fire from the room into which the mouse hole is
being created. If enemy are known or suspected to be on the far side of the breach, it may be
best to utilize an explosive means of breaching.
Figure 3–21: Entering a Mouse Hole
SECTION 3
SELECTION AND USE OF FIRE POSITIONS
319. GENERAL
1. At the tactical level, success or failure of urban operations (UO) depends in great deal
upon the abilities of the individual soldiers to produce effective fire upon the enemy with the
least possible exposure to enemy fire. Consequently, the section commander and individual
soldiers must be constantly seeking firing positions and must use them properly.
320. HASTY POSITIONS
1. A hasty firing position is normally occupied in the attack, possibly during the disruption
stage of the defensive battle, and during counterattacks. It is a position from which the soldier
can fire upon the enemy while best exploiting available cover to gain some degree of protection.
The soldier may occupy it through selection or he may be forced to occupy it due to enemy fire.
In either case, the position lacks preparation before occupation. Some examples of hasty firing
positions in urban areas and techniques for occupying them are given below:
a. Firing Around Corners. The corner of a building or wall provides cover for a
firing position if used properly. The firer must be able to fire his weapon with both
his right and left shoulder to engage effectively around corners. By firing from his
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-23
outside shoulder, the firer can reduce the area exposed to enemy fire. Firing
from the outside shoulder means that when firing around a corner to the right, the
soldier must fire from his left shoulder, and vice versa. Another common mistake
when firing around corners is firing from the standing position. When standing,
the firer exposes himself at the height the enemy would expect a target to
appear. He also risks exposing the entire length of his body as a target. The
most effective fire position for firing around corners is the prone position because
it gives the best support to the firer and exposes the least amount of the firer to
enemy fire (see Figure 3–22). For this method to be effective, the firer must be
able to fire his weapon from both the left and right side.
b. Firing Around Corners—Alternative Method (Master Firing Side Only). An
alternative method is for the soldier to fire from his master side, using a leaning
method. This can be done for firing around corners in either direction. Firstly,
firer needs to view the maximum space around the corner without exposing
himself (i.e. piece the pie), and then lean around the corner and engage targets
as required, thus limiting to the greatest extent possible, exposure of the body.
This can be done in the standing, kneeling, or prone positions. With practise, this
method of engagement will be more accurate then firing from the non-master
side. Exposure of the body should be minimized to engaging targets and firing
positions should be adjusted so soldiers do not expose them selves at an
expected height.
Figure 3–22: Firing Around a Corner

c. Firing from behind Rubble or Other Obstacles. When firing from behind a
rubble pile or other similar obstacle, the soldier must fire around cover where
possible, using the same procedure as for firing around a corner (see Figure
3–23). A common mistake that must be avoided is firing from over the top of
cover, which will silhouette the soldier.
3-24 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 3–23: Firing from a Covered Position

d. Firing from Windows. In an urban area, windows provide readily accessible
firing ports. The soldier must avoid firing from the standing position, as it
exposes most of his body and could silhouette him against a lighted interior or a
window on the other side of the building. The soldier must not allow the weapon
muzzle to protrude beyond or close to the window opening because it is an
obvious sign of the soldier's position. The soldier should also be well back into
the room to prevent muzzle flash and blast from being seen, and should kneel to
limit exposure and avoid silhouetting himself. Soldiers should use the shadowed
areas within the room, or if required, create them by making the room darker than
the outside area. Since the soldier is back from the window, his arc of fire and
observation will be greatly reduced. Although this is a major disadvantage, it
must be stressed in training that the closer the soldier is to the opening, the
better is the chance he will be observed by the enemy.
e. Firing from Unprepared Loopholes. Whenever possible, soldiers should take
up fire positions firing through holes in walls, and avoid the use of windows or
large openings. The soldier must stay back from the hole so that the weapon
muzzle does not protrude beyond the wall and so that muzzle flash is concealed.
As with the window position, the soldier’s arc of fire and observation will
decrease the further he is back from the loophole. Soldiers must be trained that,
unless absolutely necessary, not to compromise a concealed fire position by
moving their weapons forward to widen arcs. When firing from a loophole, the
soldier must position himself perpendicular to the loophole's entrance, and thus
use the same fire position methods as for firing around corners (see firing from
loopholes, Chapter 5). This will help reduce his exposure to fire coming back
through the loophole.
f. Firing from the Peak of a Roof. The peak of a roof provides a vantage point for
the employment of snipers or marksmen, increasing their field of view and the
ranges at which they can engage targets. As with firing from walls and rubble,
soldiers must adopt positions that allow firing around cover (e.g. a chimney,
smokestack or any other object protruding from the roof of a building) to avoid
silhouetting themselves above the rooftops. This method will reduce the amount
of the body exposed to enemy observation and fire (see Figure 3–24).
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-25
Figure 3–24: Firing from the Peak of a Roof

g. No Position Available. When the soldier is subjected to enemy fire and no
positions are available, the firer must still adhere to the rule of exposing as little
as possible. When a soldier in an open area between buildings (e.g. a street or
alley) is fired upon by an enemy in one of the buildings to his front, he should lie
prone as close as possible to a building, obstacle, curb or similar structure on the
same side of the open area as the origin of the enemy fire. The enemy must
then move outward to engage his target, exposing himself to return fire. When
no cover is available, target exposure can be reduced by:
(1) firing from the prone position;
(2) firing from shadows;
(3) presenting no silhouette against buildings, the skyline, etc.; and
(4) using tall grass, weeds or shrubbery for concealment.
321. PREPARED POSITIONS
1. The principles for planning, constructing, and fighting prepared positions are the same in
UO as those employed in any defensive battle. Mutual support, depth, alternative positions, and
security are all factors that must be addressed in the planning and use of prepared firing
positions.
2. One key factor in urban combat is that prepared positions, particularly those in platoon
and company strong points, must be robust enough to withstand the collapse of any
surrounding structure. Prepared firing positions are dealt with in Chapter 5.
SECTION 4
GRENADES (INCLUDING STUN GRENADES)
3. UO in particular call for the use of hand grenades. Grenades can be used not only in
clearing buildings but also in any danger area within the urban environment. Commanders at
the lowest tactical level will need to determine, based upon the tactical situation, when and
where grenades are used. Since hand grenades could be used in large numbers, plans must
include the maintenance of a continuous supply of grenades.
4. When employing grenades the following factors must be considered:
3-26 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
a. The construction material used in the building to be cleared influences the use of
grenades. If the walls of a building are made of thin material, such as drywall
(i.e. gypsum) or thin plywood, and a grenade has to be used, the soldier must
either lie flat on the floor with his helmet pointing towards the area of detonation,
or move completely away from any wall that grenade fragments might penetrate.
As well, he and his section commander must be aware of the location of the
other members of the section.
b. The over-pressure that a grenade will create upon exploding will affect both the
structure and soldiers near the blast. In most cases, when a grenade is used in
buildings, the assault team should withdraw from the entry point or throw the
grenade from a position of cover away from the blast effects. Once the grenade
has detonated, the assault team can enter and clear the room.
c. Due to the blast and over-pressure effects mentioned above, using alternative
grenade types is often preferable. Stun or “flash-bang” grenades may be used in
confined spaces to produce limited concussion and distraction without causing
casualties to friendly forces.
d. Throwing grenades into an opening before entering a building, room or any other
area that has to be cleared, must be practised and is done on the command of
the section commander or team leader. Use of a grenade launcher is the best
method of putting a grenade into a building. This will provide a stand-off distance
for the entry teams and allow the grenade to penetrate light barricades on doors
and windows. More often than not due to the close range, grenades will have to
be hand thrown when clearing rooms within buildings. The most common
scenarios that should be practised for throwing grenades in a urban area are:
(1) overhand throwing from the side of a building into a window;
(2) overhand lobbing using low cover (e.g. from behind a low wall or mound
of rubble);
(3) underhand lobbing, from the side of a building into a top floor window, or
from room to room within a building;
(4) throwing like a baseball, from one building to another (e.g. window to
window);
(5) posting, from the side of a building into a cellar or down through a top
floor mouse hole; and
(6) throwing backhanded into a room from the side of a wall.
e. Soldiers must practise theses methods in a realistic setting. When soldiers are
practiced in throwing grenades, the drill of calling out “grenade” before throwing
is enforced to instil the requirement for friendly forces to take cover, which is just
as important in urban areas as it is in any other operation.
f. When throwing a grenade into a room, section commanders and soldiers must
be aware of the possibility of the enemy picking up the grenade and throwing it
back before it explodes.
5. Use of stun grenades (often termed “flash-bangs”) is an excellent aid to gaining entry
into a building or room. These non-lethal munitions distract and disorient occupants of the room
and provide the assaulting soldiers with additional time to acquire enemy targets. Furthermore,
these munitions can be used in all types of building construction. They avoid collateral damage
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-27
and the threat of friendly casualties. Depending upon the tactical scenario, the type of
operation, and the presence of non-combatants, fragmentation (high-explosive [HE]) grenades
may not be authorized. Stun grenades thus offer an alternative aid to entry drills.
SECTION 5
NAVIGATIONAL AND CONTROL MEASURES
322. NAVIGATIONAL AND CONTROL AIDS
1. Navigation in an urban area presents a unique challenge. In the centre of a city, the
normal terrain features to which soldiers are accustomed in open country do not exist. Instead,
buildings become the major terrain features and units become tied to streets. Fields of view and
observation of recognisable terrain features are greatly restricted. Additionally, urban combat
will create destruction that will alter landmarks and block streets. In many urban areas in
developing nations, streets and buildings are poorly marked. The effects of these problems can
be mitigated somewhat if the unit and its soldiers make the best use of all available maps and
photographs, impose pervasive control measures, have good standing operating procedures
(SOP), and communicate well during battle.
2. Military topographical maps of an urban area, air photos, or civilian produced maps are
all effective aids to navigating within the urban environment, as long as they provide detailed
information concerning the city’s streets, buildings, underground systems, and other urban
elements. Aids to navigation in an urban environment are:
a. Sketch Maps. The most effective map that can be employed is a sketch or
computer generated map made from the latest intelligence. This map can be
produced at unit level, but must be distributed to section level and to all
supporting arms.
b. Control Measures. Maps, including sketch maps, must display the required
control features: sectors of responsibility (normally sub-unit level); report lines;
boundaries; etc. A series of checkpoints or reference points at key road
junctions or other prominent points will also help in movement control and
communications, and in link-ups with other forces such as reserves. All buildings
within an assigned sector should be numbered, and streets and routes named.
Buildings should be numbered in relation to the sector in which they are located;
for example, references to K1 would indicate the first building in the sector
identified as K.
c. Global Positioning System. The use of a global positioning system (GPS) will
greatly aid navigation in urban areas, although the urban area may downgrade
the GPS performance because it works on line of sight, which can be blocked by
buildings or other structures. For the same reason, GPS will not be effective in
underground locations.
d. Compass. The compass can be used, but due to the amount of metal and
electrical wiring in the urban environment, its accuracy must be regularly
checked. The use of pacing can supplement the compass but it requires an
accurate distance from a map to be effective.
e. Aerial Photographs. Recent aerial photographs are an excellent supplement to
maps because they show changes that have taken place since the map was
made and changes that occur due to combat (e.g. enemy defensive
preparations, destroyed buildings, or blocked streets). Depending upon unit
capabilities, they can quickly be transformed into topographical maps.
3-28 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
f. City Maps/Plans. City maps such as tourist maps usually stay current and give
good information on streets and buildings. City plans for services and utilities
(e.g. telephone, electricity, sewers and subways) should be obtained if available.
The urban sketch map (see figure 3–25) assists elements in quickly defining an urban
area. The area is broken down into sectors, which are given a letter identifier, and the
buildings within each sector are numbered. The combination of a sector letter and
building number identifies each building. Routes are identified by the combination of
numbers and colours with intersections identified by numbers. Any combination of the
above can be used to identify an area on a road. An example of this (using Figure 3–26)
identifies the movement indicated by the green arrow as “location: blue 3 to 2, east of D4.
Figure 3–25: Example of an Urban Sketch Map
Figure 3–26: Example of Urban Sketch Map Identification
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-29
3. Navigation within the urban environment will require a combination of the above
navigational aids and subsequent coordination with other units and arms. Controlling
headquarters (HQ), normally attached at formation and unit level, must ensure that all units and
elements use the same reference points and control measures. This will also assist in the
combat identification of friendly forces, the operations between different units, and in the
deployment of a force or formation reserve. It should also be stressed that any discrepancies
between the map and actual ground must be reported to higher as soon as possible.
Additionally, during stability operations, it is important that patrols note and report the name of
streets and roads within the area of operations (AO), so that reference can be made to them in
intelligence reports and in dealings with civilian agencies.
323. MARKING STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
1. Units have long identified a need to mark specific buildings, rooms, and other points of
note during UO. Sometimes rooms need to be marked as having been cleared, or buildings
need to be marked as containing friendly forces. In the past, units have tried several different
field-expedient marking devices. A variety of means and symbols can be used within units,
such as chalk, panel markers, and chemical lights. Infrared chemical lights have proved very
effective in marking objectives, particularly when the enemy or insurgent forces lack similar
night vision aids.
2. A marking procedure will identify the progress made by friendly troops in clearing an
urban area. Panel markers on rooftops will indicate to close air support the forward line of own
(i.e. friendly) troops (FLOT). They can also be used to indicate progress to ground troops
(hanging them from window) and to indicate a link-up point for reserves or a passage of lines.
324. NATO STANDARD OF MARKING
1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has developed a standard marking SOP
for use during UO. It uses a combination of colours, shapes, and symbols. These markings
can be fabricated from any material available. Figure 3–27 illustrates.
SAMPLE MARKING PROCEDURE

Exterior Daylight Marking in accordance with NATO SOP—30 cm2
Form Colour Meaning Progress through the building
should be marked with
Red Entry point something hung out of every
window. This will help prevent
fratricide and allow the support
Yellow Medic needed by fire to follow the progress of
the manoeuvring elements.
Green Building clear
Blue Booby trap
All night markings are two glow sticks on a double arm’s length of engineer
tape hung out the window or door.
3-30 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
All interior markings may be

made with paint, camouflage
stick, chalk, or any other
Entry point
writing material. The only
criterion is that the marking
must be semi-permanent and
not affected by moisture.
Room clear Markings should be placed at
the upper left side of the door.
Enemy prisoner of war If this is not possible, they
(EPW) should be placed anywhere
that will be visible to anyone
passing through the entry.
Medic needed
Booby trap
Figure 3–27: NATO Standing Operating procedure for Markings in Urban Operations
SECTION 6
MOVEMENT WITH VEHICLES
325. MOVEMENT WITH SUPPORTING VEHICLES
1. Armoured vehicles are essential to the urban conflict, and recent operations have
revealed their effectiveness in both major combat operations (MCO) and counter-insurgency
(COIN) operations. These vehicles offer firepower, protection and mobility. Since the close
terrain and shorter weapons ranges that characterize UO restricts their mobility and makes
them vulnerable, they cannot work independently of dismounted infantry. Therefore, a balance
must be reached between the need for the extra firepower and the requirement for dismounted
forces to protect these vehicles.
2. The relationship between the vehicles and the troops is reciprocal: as the vehicle
provides intimate support to the dismounted troops, commanders must ensure that the
dismounted troops provide intimate support to the vehicles that are especially vulnerable in the
close urban terrain. Training at the section and platoon level must focus on good
communications and drills between the dismounted rifle section and the integral vehicle crews.
Whenever possible, vehicles integral to respective rifle sections should be in support of their
own sections and platoons. Certain situations will see light forces being supported by attached
armoured vehicles in the conduct of UO. Hence, marry-up drills must be thorough and include
rehearsals and detailed crew briefings.
3. In working and moving with armoured vehicles in urban areas and operations, the
following must be considered:
a. The AFVs will be key in supporting the break-in and should be located with the
lead assault elements. If they are to be committed, they cannot simply come
forward from outside the urban area when needed. They must provide intimate
support to the lead elements throughout the battle.
b. Move AFVs forward to support infantry movement. Position the vehicles before
the infantry begins moving, whether the vehicles are supporting by fire, being
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-31
used as shields, or both. Good communications between the crews and

supported infantry is key.
c. Pre-plan positions to help maintain momentum. Moreover, devise a marking
system and communications signals to designate situational dependent
positions. During the defence or counterattack battle, AFV positions will be sited,
integrated into the overall plan, and rehearsed as with any other defensive battle.
d. Unless considerable risk is taken, AFVs cannot be committed without intimate
infantry support. The density of close urban terrain, the limited fields of view, and
short engagement ranges make AFVs vulnerable to attack, particularly from
dismounted enemy forces armed with light anti-armour weapons. Dismounted
infantry (or other supporting forces) must provide all-round defence for AFVs in
support.
e. During the break-in battle, AFVs can support the infantry with fire. The integral
AFVs (i.e. light armoured vehicles [LAVs]) can deliver the infantry across open
areas to their break-in point. Once a foothold is secured, AFVs will support the
infantry’s successive bounds forward and then quickly move up with the lead
elements. Again, the dismounted infantry commander must ensure that the
supporting AFVs are not exposed to enemy fire, and that they are constantly
given all-round protection.
f. For very short periods, AFVs can be used to screen friendly troops from enemy
small arms fire. However, the enemy will eventually bring to bear sufficient anti-
armour weapons or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to defeat the vehicles.
It must be remembered that all AFVs are vulnerable to attack by light anti-armour
weapons, IEDs and firebombs.
4. While mechanized infantry companies will be supported by their integral LAVs, light
infantry companies may be temporarily allocated armoured vehicles to provide intimate support
during UO. Indeed, experience in recent operations has clearly shown the benefits of armoured
vehicle support to light forces in urban areas, even when combating insurgency forces in an
intense COIN operation. Hence, light forces must be trained to work with armoured vehicles—
AFVs, tanks, and other direct fire systems—in urban areas.
326. CONSIDERATIONS FOR LIGHT ARMOURED VEHICLES
1. Generally, LAVs should not be separated from their infantry sections. Mechanized
forces are designed on the premise that the vehicle will provide intimate support to the section
and the vehicle may be considered the “8th rifleman” in the dismounted element. Working as a
team, infantry provide security for the vehicles and the LAVs provide critical fire support and
protection.
2. The LAV, through its firepower, mobility and protection can be used for a wide variety of
tasks in support of tactical movement, including:
a. covering (suppressive) fire;
b. fire support to a breach and assault;
c. anti-sniper fire;
d. smoke cover;
e. protected movement of troops, particularly reserves;
f. resupply; and
3-32 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
g. casualty evacuation.
3. In employing the LAV to support tactical movement, the following should be noted:
a. AFVs, particularly LAVs, should be employed in pairs.
b. When moving, if the street is large enough, LAVs should stay close to a building,
staggered on either side of the street. This allows each LAV to cover the
opposite side of the street.
c. LAV crews should “button-down” hatches for protection, but the LAV crew must
remain alert for signals from dismounted infantry. Coordination between
mounted and dismounted elements is critical in urban terrain, and SOP will have
to be developed for communications between the crew commander and the
commander of the dismounted element. Again, this reinforces the need that
LAVs support their respective rifle section.
d. Depending upon the situation and threat, an air sentry or top cover should be
provided by at least one soldier in the upper rear hatches. This will assist with
all-round defence and provide increased situational awareness for the crew
commander.
e. Unless additional armour is added, the LAV is vulnerable to all types of anti-
armour weapons, even rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) that an enemy or
insurgent can fire from close range. Additionally, the crew have limited fields of
view and are unable to adequately scan for potential threats. Thus, it is unlikely
that the attack will be lead by LAVs. Under adequate cover and supporting fire,
LAVs can move troops under protection over open ground for the break-in to the
urban area. However, once the foothold is established and the battle moves
deeper into the urban area, LAVs will require dismounted infantry to provide
intimate support. Normally, LAVs support the next bound of the infantry from a
secured location, and on order, move up to join the lead elements, with the line of
advance having been secured by the infantry.
f. With its main gun (25 mm) and coaxial machine gun (MG) (7.62 mm), the LAV
offers excellent fire support to the dismounted element. Good communications
and aiming devices, such as laser pointers, will help indicate desired targets for
engagement by the LAV.
SECTION 7
BREACHING
327. GENERAL
1. The requirement to repeatedly breach exterior and interior walls, buildings, doors and
barricaded entrances is a pervasive element of all urban combat. Even stability operations, in
which cordon and searches are routinely conducted, require the ability to force an entry through
an established entrance, window or wall. A wide variety of means may be used depending
upon the situation and threat, including explosive means. It is important that although prepared
and improvised explosives are available on the battlefield, only fully qualified personnel must be
permitted to employ explosive charges in support of operations.
2. Engineers will be available in certain circumstances to assist in breaching, but recent
operations have demonstrated a significant requirement for demolition-qualified infantrymen.
Breaches will be required to gain entry into a compound, then into a building and then into
rooms within the building. The breacher must be an integral part of the tactical force conducting
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-33
the attack. However, a clear rule must be stated up front: the soldier conducting the breach
must never be the first to enter the building or room being breached. Once the breach is
complete, the breacher either takes the responsibility of front cover, or on order of the section
commander, moves to the rear of the element conducting the assault.
328. TYPES OF DOOR AND WINDOWS
1. Commanders and soldiers assigned to breaching tasks must be familiar with the various
types of walls, doors and windows that they may encounter during an operation. This
understanding will help select and effectively plan the correct method of breaching.
2. The common types of doors that may be encountered are as follows:
a. Panel Door—consists of wood panels held in place by wood stiles and rails.
Panels can be made from solid wood, plywood, metal or glass.
b. Solid Core Door—consists of a solid lumber core, compressed wood fibre core,
or rigid foam board laminated to plywood or metal facing.
c. Hollow Metal Insulated Door—consists of shop fabricated and welded sheet
metal. Mineral or cement board (fire resistant or rigid foam board/insulation) is
usually added as a core.
d. Hollow Core Wood Door—consists of a plywood or pressboard face and a
honeycomb wood or paper interior core. Hollow core wood doors are usually for
interior use only.
3. The most common types of windows that may be encounter are as follows:
a. Single-Hung/Double Hung—in double-hung units, both sashes slide vertically.
Only the bottom sash slides upward in a single-hung window. Screens can be
placed on the exterior or interior of the window unit.
b. Casement—casement windows are hinged at the sides. Casement windows
project outward.
c. Awning—awning windows are hinged at the top and open outward. Screens are
placed on the interior of the window unit.
d. Bay Window—a bay window is made up of three or more windows. The side or
flanker units project out from the building in 30, 45, or 90-degree angles. The
centre is parallel with building wall and is made up of one or more windows. All
the units can be stationary, operating, or be any combination thereof.
e. Bow Window—a series of four or more adjoining window units, commonly five in
number, installed on a radius from the wall of the building.
f. Fixed Frame—refers to windows that are non-venting or inoperable.
g. Skylight—a window installed in a roof and assuming the same slope.
h. Slider—both sashes slide horizontally in a double-sliding window. Only one sash
slides in a single-sliding window. Ventilation areas can vary from a small crack to
an opening of one-half the total glass area. Screens can be placed on the
exterior or interior of the window unit.
329. CONSTRUCTION OF DOORS AND WINDOWS
1. Doors and windows come in different shapes, styles and size but their composition
remain the same:
3-34 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
a. Construction details of entry doors:
Figure 3–28: Construction of an Entrance Door

b. Construction details of windows:
Figure 3–29: Construction of a Window
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-35
(1) Head—the main horizontal member forming the top of the window or
doorframe.
(2) Jamb—the main vertical members forming the sides of a window or door
frame.
(3) Frame—the enclosure in which window sash or door panels are mounted.
(4) Glazing—glass in a window or door.
(5) Pane—a framed sheet of glass within a window.
(6) Sash—a single assembly of stiles and rails made into a frame for holding
glass.
(7) Sill—the main horizontal member forming the bottom of the frame of a
window or door.
(8) Muntin Bar—any small bar that divides a windows glass. Also called a
grille or windowpane divider.
330. MANUAL BREACHING OF DOORS
1. Manual breaching includes opening the door normally or by kicking it open. Extreme
care must be used in all circumstances. Before a door is opened a check, if possible, should be
made for any sign of booby traps.
2. During searches of buildings as part of a peace support operation (PSO) or COIN
operation (e.g. during a cordon and search), the occupant of the building should be asked or
directed to personally open doors and closets. Commanders must provide security and ensure
that troops are clear of the entrance.
3. In opening a door by hand, the soldier should first position himself on the side of the
door on which the doorknob is located. He should be facing the wall, and of course, be wearing
his body armour. On order from the section or group commander, he reaches down, turns the
knob or lifts the latch, and swings the door open, while simultaneously turning away from the
door to protect his face and body. Therefore, if the door is booby-trapped, the back of the body
armour will absorb the blast.
4. During combat operations, it is not recommended that doors be breached through
kicking. It places the breacher in a vulnerable position and clearly signals the force’s intention
as it may require more than one attempt. If however, it is deemed suitable to use such a
breaching method, the following procedure should be followed for kicking open a locked door:
a. Confirm that the door is indeed locked and cannot be opened by the door handle.
b. With other soldiers covering, the breacher stands a couple feet back from the
door and locates the lock.
c. He aims to kick just immediately next to the lock.
d. The soldier should attempt to kick through the door as hard as he can the first
time. This attempt to follow through creates more power. He should use a front
kick, planting the sole of the foot next to the lock.
e. If required, he must kick again. A pause should be made to listen for possible
enemy movement inside the room. The breacher must ensure that each kick is
made with the maximum force.
3-36 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
f. A breacher should never ram the door with his shoulder as it is less effective and
leaves him more prone to injury.
5. During stability operations, it will be normal to conduct cordon and search operations of
various types of buildings, including private homes and businesses. These can be conducted
for a variety of reasons (e.g. for searching for weapon caches), but can cause animosity
amongst the local population if conducted in a callous manner and/or if collateral damage is
caused. Occupants should always be asked or directed to open doors. If the doors are locked
and occupants cannot produce a key, then breaching tools (e.g. sledgehammers and bolt
cutters, normally carried as part of a breaching kit in the section/platoon vehicles) can be
produced. The mere demonstration of a capability and willingness to use such means will often
cause the reluctant occupants to produce the required keys. If a door remains locked, it is often
not necessary to destroy the door or to cut a lock. If time permits, the door can be simply
removed from its hinges. If nothing is found, the door can then be replaced without damage
having been caused.
6. Although this type of practice may seem unnecessary and time consuming, it can go a
long way to maintaining good relations with the civilian population, and reduces embarrassment
for friendly forces, particularly when the search fails to produce results.
331. MECHANICAL BREACHING
1. General. Breachers work in conjunction with a clearing/assaulting section to support
their mobility and access through doors, windows and walls. The breacher should never be the
first member of the assault group to enter the room or building, but should follow the lead group.
While the breacher is working, members of the assault group and other members of the platoon
provide all-round defence.
2. Ram. The hand-held ram is a low cost tool that provides a wide spectrum of door and
wall breaching capabilities. It is designed to push the obstacle or barrier into the building. The
breacher can use a close-quarter light one-hand-operated ram that allows the breacher to swing
it from behind cover while retaining a weapon at the ready. Also available is a heavier two-
hand-operated configuration. The battering ram is employed to gain entry through medium
exterior doors and lightweight interior doors. When the breacher uses the ram, he is to strike
the door relatively in line with and behind the handle. He must avoid smashing through panels,
which may cause the ram to blow out the panel, or cause the operator to drop the ram inside the
door. Another effective method is to ram the hinges. The ram is not the preferred tool for
ramming heavy steel reinforced exterior doors.
3. Halligan Tool. The Halligan tool works in a combination prying, pulling and spreading.
It seeks to pull structural components out of alignment so they will break or loose their integrity.
It is easy to carry and has proven to be very effective inside buildings. Procedure for use:
a. Striking a door with a Halligan tool:
(1) Strike on the knob on the stile not on the rail.
(2) The rail that connects the upright component of the door (stile) often
dislodges the rail but leaves the locking mechanism in place.
(3) Strike the door solidly near the latch to either bend the throw or split the
jamb.
(4) Hit the door above or below the doorknob, as striking the door to the side
will usually only remove a rail, or in the case of a hollow core door, simply
push a hole through it.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-37
b. Pick and pry method of forcing a door:

(1) This method may require the efforts of more than one person. Place the
adze end into the crevice at the jamb side of the door. Strike it hard with
a ram or sledgehammer, and pry back on it. The objective is to pull the
deadbolt throw from the catch.
(2) As a group, it works best if one fire team executes the technique while the
other provides cover. Ideally, a two-man breaching team conducts the
operation while a four-man group prepares to enter and clear.
c. Forcing Windows. At times, it may be easier to defeat the frame structure of
the window vice the window itself. In this regard, the Halligan tool can be used to
pry out the window frame itself. If this is not possible, follow the break and rake
method described below:
(1) Many windows are reinforced, either the frame structure or the window
itself (e.g. steel frame structure). This method can be effective to remove
glazing.
(2) Break the window with the Halligan tool and rake broken shards of glass
from the pane sides and frame of the window.
(3) Strike the Halligan tool as straight as possible into the uppermost corner
nearest you. Rake the tool across the top of the window, then down the
far side, and finally rake the tool across the bottom of the window back
towards yourself. Raking the tool across the bottom multiple times will
also help pull shards of glass out of the frame.
(4) The soldier should never push the tool up into the glass as he might push
his hands into the glass. Always hold the tool with two hands, palms
down with the forward hand-held back slightly from the head of the tool.
(5) If possible, place a fragmentation protective vest or some sort of material
on the sill to protect fire teams from being cut by glass shards as they
crawl through.
d. Forcing Walls and Roofs. A Halligan tool can also breach an interior wall. This
method takes a lot of time, but provides a good way to enter the top and clear
down.
e. Construction Type. The type of structure and the materials used in the
construction must always be considered in planning a breach. Every structure
cannot be treated the same. For example, a masonry wall presents different
problems than a wooden wall. Improperly breaching a load-bearing wall can
cause catastrophic failure of other structural members.
4. Sledgehammer. A heavy sledgehammer can be used for gaining entry through a door
much the same way as a ram is used. Strike the door above the doorknob, or if the door has a
deadbolt and doorknob, strike between them. Do not strike the doorknob as it could cause the
throw mechanism to become stuck in the jam. A sledgehammer can also be used to force entry
through a window using the same technique as a Halligan tool. The sledgehammer can be
effective against a masonry or brick wall. It must be remembered that this method may take
some time and effort, and therefore, any surprise will be lost.
5. Crowbar. A crowbar can also be used much like a Halligan tool to pick and pry at a
door, or to force a window.
3-38 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
6. Picket. A metal picket can also be used to pry or pick open doors, or to break windows.
It can also be used to breach through walls if it is properly placed and struck with a
sledgehammer.
332. BREACHING WITH SHOTGUNS AND PERSONAL WEAPONS
1. Since anyone could be employed as a breacher at any time, the techniques employed
when conducting a ballistic breach must be rehearsed and mastered by the entire section and
platoon. Ideally, a 12-gauge shotgun is used for this purpose, but one may not always be
available. The types of ammunition available, the type of obstacles expected, and the aim of
the tactic must be fully understood by commanders and breachers, to ensure that proper rounds
and personnel are ready. Once the decision to employ a weapon breach is taken, the breacher
should conduct the following action:
a. Door Breach:
(1) Under all-round cover by the section, the breacher will step out and
square off on the door.
(2) The breacher will conduct a visual inspection of the door by employing
the weapon’s tactical light. This should be done in a systematic (e.g.
circular) manner, where all four seams of the door, the door jam, the
hinges, and locking mechanism are inspected.
(3) In inspecting the door, the breacher will determine:
(a) the location of the hinges;
(b) the location of the doorknob and deadbolt;
(c) the style of door, whether of light or heavy construction;
(d) the direction to which the door opens (in or out); and
(e) signs of booby traps.
(4) This inspection should take only seconds and based upon the findings,
the breacher will determine his method of attack.
(5) If the breacher decides to attack the hinges, the following action should
be taken:
(a) Starting at the top hinge, the breacher will fire up to three rounds
approximately 2.5 cm away from the hinge. The goal is to
dislodge the screws holding the hinge to the door.
(b) The breacher continues to the middle and bottom hinges carrying
out the same action.
(c) Once the hinges have become dislodged, the breacher will kick or
ram the door in and allow the assaulting force to enter the room.
NOTE
If the hinges cannot be clearly identified during the inspection, the breacher
should not attack their presumed location as damage could result that will cause
the door to bind on the jam.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-39
(6) If the breacher decides to attack the locking mechanism, the following
action should be taken:
(a) The breacher will aim at the gap between the door and the jam in
the area between the doorknob and the lock plate on the jam.
(b) To minimize any fragmenting effects, the weapon should be aimed
down at a 45-degree angle or 800 mils and away from any friendly
forces.
(c) At least one round is fired no more than 2.5 cm away from the
target. As many rounds as necessary are fired until the lock/plate
mechanism is dislodged from the door frame.
(d) The same technique is applied to the deadbolt if one is present.
(e) Once the door lock mechanism is dislodged, the breacher will kick
or open the door clear of the jam and allow the assaulting force to
enter the room.
b. Window Breach:
(1) The breacher will step out and conduct an inspection of the window in the
same manner as a door.
(2) Once the breacher has determined that there are no booby traps, he will
aim at the bottom corner of the window.
(3) The breacher will fire one round to break the glass and then rake the
window in the same manner as when employing the Halligan tool.
(4) The breacher will clear the window of glass and allow the assaulting force
to enter the window.
c. Cinder Block Wall Breach:
(1) The breacher will step out and conduct an inspection of the wall in the
same manner as a door to determine the area for attack and to determine
if the wall is reinforced.
(2) The breacher will fire one round into each the two hollow areas of a
cinder block, and continue attacking the cinder blocks on the wall in a
circular pattern to begin the breach. The size of the circular pattern will
determine the size of the breach.
(3) The breacher will then employ a mechanical device (e.g. Halligan tool or
sledgehammer) to exploit the breach working his way from the bottom
upwards. This allows gravity to assist in breaking up the cinder blocks.
NOTE
Once the breach of any obstacle is complete and the assaulting force is making its entry,
the breacher will automatically provide front cover until the commander determines a
different course of action or another task.
333. MECHANICAL WALL BREACHING

1. Generally, the easiest place to breach a wall is where an opening already exists.
Structural members have already been installed to distribute the load of the ceiling and roof
3-40 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
around the opening. The opening is usually constructed of material that is easier to penetrate
than the wall construction. Commanders and breachers must keep the following in mind when
attempting a wall breach:
a. The worst place to breach a wall is right next to an opening. It is unlikely that the
normal 16-inch space between studs will exit near an opening. There are more
structural members next to these features since the weight above a window or
other opening must be distributed to the footing and foundation below.
b. A long blank wall is the best area for a breach, except for the area that is half
way between two windows. It is normal for an interior wall to exist at this point.
c. Avoid attempting breaches at the corner of buildings, as they are normally
strongly reinforced.
d. The best way to move between a cleared and adjacent building may be to batter
a hole into an adjoining upper story wall between the two buildings.
334. EXPLOSIVE BREACHING
1. The use of purpose-built and improvised explosives to create breaches in doors,
windows and walls will support the mobility of assaulting troops. While combat engineers will be
primarily responsible for the employment of explosive breaching methods, infantry platoons and
sections will require basic skills and equipment to employ breaching charges. Only those
formally qualified and considered “current” in their skill set will employ explosive breaching.
2. Information dealing with explosive breaching will be found in the chapter and sections
dealing with mobility and counter-mobility.
SECTION 8
SUBTERRANEAN OPERATIONS
335. GENERAL
1. Introduction. In larger cities, subterranean features comprise an environment all their
own. This includes sunken garages, underground passages, subway lines, utility tunnels,
sewers, and storm drains. Many of these features can accommodate the movement of large
numbers of troops. Even in smaller towns, sewers and storm drains may permit troops to move
beneath the battle area to surface in the enemy’s rear.
2. The Threat from Underground Features. Enemy forces can successfully use
subterranean avenues of approach to infiltrate friendly force positions. To guard against this, it
will be required to conduct subterranean patrols or to counter hostile subterranean operations.
Unit commanders should always seek information on the nature and the location of
subterranean features. While sewers and drains come immediately to mind, there are many
more urban subterranean features from which a threat can be mounted:
a. underground transportation systems such as subways, trains, tunnels, and large
vehicular tunnels;
b. underground commercial structures such as malls and parking lots;
c. maintenance access tunnels;
d. electrical grid/utility lines;
e. pedestrian passages;
f. sewer drainage systems and waterways; and
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-41
g. natural underground passages.

3. Underground Networks. There are two types of underground networks that are
designed to interconnect and can bear significant traffic. These are sewers and subways:
a. Sewers. All sewers generally follow street patterns and flow in a slight
downward slope that may increase as the sewer progresses. Sewers are
separated into three types—sanitary, storm and combined systems:
(1) Sanitary sewers carry human waste and are usually too small to permit
entry.
(2) Storm sewers function to remove rainfall from the streets and are usually
large enough for people and small vehicles to enter. They are usually dry
when there has been no recent precipitation.
(3) Combined systems, found in older cities, merge the two functions creating
a large sewer that remains partially full at all times.
b. Subways. Most large cities have extensive subway systems of various sizes.
Description:
(1) Subways are usually built under major roadways and may have
potentially hazardous electrified rails and power leads.
(2) Subways often have underground stations that connect to subterranean
malls or storage areas.
(3) Utility and maintenance tunnels are often found near subways.
(4) Older cities may have extensive catacombs below street level and
underneath buildings.
4. Disadvantages of Subterranean Features. There are two types of disadvantages in
conducting a subterranean operation. They are natural and combat related:
a. Natural Disadvantages:
(1) Sewers may fill rapidly during rainstorms—especially if the area electrical
system is off line and the drainage pumps are not operating properly.
(2) During cold weather, snowmelt and the resulting run-off may restrict
operations in underground drainage systems.
(3) Sanitary sewers that have become blocked may build-up methane gas,
which is flammable and explosive.
(4) Poor ventilation can be a problem in subterranean features. Also, smoke
and other heavy substances may displace oxygen.
(5) Underground areas are excellent breeding grounds for disease and
rodents. Personal hygiene and immunization is especially important.
Small wounds can easily become infected.
(6) The lack of light and near-total darkness in many subterranean systems
will have a negative psychological effect on personnel and will make
navigation difficult. If not used cautiously during tunnel clearing
operations, light sources may disclose the user’s position.
b. Combat-related Disadvantages:
3-42 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
(1) The noise and effect of weapons is amplified inside subterranean

systems. Bullets and shrapnel ricochet off walls and along the sides of
tunnels. Weapon noise may temporarily deafen riflemen.
(2) Adequate cover is often not available inside confined tunnels.
(3) Chemical agents will persist for longer periods inside subterranean
features due to the lack of wind and sunlight necessary to break down the
chemical compounds. Soldiers must be alert to the signs of a lack of
oxygen and psychological duress. In addition to chemical agents,
noxious gases emanating from decomposing sewage may also pose a
threat. These gases may not be detected by the automatic chemical
alarm system, nor will they be completely filtered by the protective mask.
Nausea and dizziness are the physical symptoms that indicate the
presence of these gases in harmful quantities. The patrol commander
should be constantly alert to these signs, and should know at all times the
shortest route to the surface and fresh air.
(4) Flame weapons are more dangerous inside subterranean features as
they will follow the walls around corners and consume oxygen.
336. SUBTERRANEAN RECONNAISSANCE
1. Conduct. Detailed knowledge of the nature and location of underground facilities is of
great value to both the attacker and the defender. Such facilities should be reconnoitred.
Typical of such features is a tunnel under the street, high and wide enough to permit the
passage of one or more soldiers at a time. Such tunnels are commonly used as sewers and
storm drains. Larger facilities would, of course, require some modification to the basic
techniques described here, but the following fundamentals would remain the same:
a. The reconnaissance of underground passages should be conducted by at least a
four-man reconnaissance patrol, but consideration should be given to the
commitment of a full rifle section. The number of soldiers in a four-man group is
enough to gather the required information, but not so many that they would get in
the way of one another within the confines of the tunnel. Only an extremely large
subterranean feature requires a patrol larger than an infantry section.
b. The four-man reconnaissance patrol is the basic template used for a tunnel
patrol. The remainder of the section should be employed as a covering group
and reserve. The patrol organization, tasks and equipment are as follows:
(1) Point Man—a rifleman tasked with initial entry into the tunnel, clearing
routes, using a tripwire feeler, and front security. Special equipment
required is a chemical agent alarm system, tripwire feeler, and an indirect
viewing device.
(2) Patrol Leader—section commander or second-in-command (2IC) tasked
with command, navigation, and recording data collected by the patrol.
Special equipment required is navigation equipment. He should carry a
small red lens flashlight, and a notebook for recording information and for
drawing a basic map or sketch of the subterranean system to include
direction, distances, and location of openings, including manhole covers.
(3) Communicator/Rifleman—a rifleman tasked to maintain communications
and serve as back-up navigator. Special equipment required is a
radio/field phone and navigation equipment.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-43
(4) Rear Security—a rifleman tasked with rear security, marking the route,
and if required, reeling out the telephone wire. Special equipment
required is route-marking aids.
(5) Covering Group—section 2IC with light machine gun (LMG) team tasked
with entrance point security, covering fire, and maintaining
communications with the patrol. Special equipment required is a
radio/field phone with wire and dispenser. They must be prepared to act
as a reserve for the patrol group.
2. Individual Equipment. In the selection of patrol equipment, the mission, size of
passage, likelihood of obstacles, and enemy situation must all be considered. Overburdened
soldiers will have difficulty in negotiating obstacles and will fatigue quickly. The following should
be considered:
a. All Soldiers carry field protective masks, white lens flashlights, gloves, and
personal weapons with tactical light. Helmets protect the head from unseen
obstructions. Body armour should be assumed unless it precludes movement in
the tunnel.
b. The C8 or C7A2 are the preferred weapons for tunnel teams as they are easily
employed with one hand and are very manoeuvrable in a tight area.
c. IR chemical lights and night vision devices will assist in operations. They work
very well together.
d. If there is a possibility of chemical agents existing in the system, the point man
should carry the chemical agent detection kit to test the area. At the first
indication that harmful gases are present, each member of the patrol must mask.
e. Chicken wire wrapped around boots can improve footing.
f. A mirror on a pole or attached to a weapon, or a fibre optic scope, can be used
for peering around corners.
g. Tools for opening manhole covers and grates should be carried.
h. Patrols should have some means of marking the route in the tunnel.
i. Field telephones and wire provide reliable communications underground and can
link the patrol with its cover team. Wire will have to be reeled out as the patrol
moves through the tunnel.
3. Procedure. Once the patrol is properly organized and equipped, it moves to the area of
the tunnel entrance, possibly a manhole. The point man and rear security move forward,
remove the manhole, and then move back to the patrol in a secure area. The patrol then waits
15 minutes before entering to allow time for any harmful gases to dissipate. After the wait time
elapses, the patrol moves forward with the point man entering the tunnel to determine whether
the air is breathable and to determine how much the tunnel restricts movement. The point man
should remain in the tunnel entrance for 10 minutes before the rest of the patrol follows. During
this wait, the patrol must be positioned to remain in direct contact with the point man. If he
becomes ill, or gets into trouble, the remainder of the team evacuates him. A safety rope tied
around the entry man (before entry) should be considered to assist in extraction.
4. When the patrol is moving through the tunnel, the point man moves about 10 m in front
of the patrol leader. Other patrol members maintain 3.0 m to – 5.0 m intervals. If the water in
the tunnel is flowing fast enough to present a balance problem for soldiers, or if the sewer
contains many slippery obstacles, intervals for the remainder of the patrol can be increased so
3-44 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
that if one man slips he will not trip the others. If conditions warrant, all patrol members should
stay tied to the safety rope so that they can be easily retrieved from danger. The rear security
man marks the route during movement under the direction of the commander.
5. The patrol leader should note the bearing and count paces for each turn taken in the
tunnel, and this data is recorded on the patrol leader’s map or sketch. When a manhole to the
surface must be opened, the section commander will determine its location and contact friendly
forces to alert them of his intention. The point man will open manhole covers, but upon doing
so, should give a prearranged recognition signal before exposing his body. There is no major
advantage to opening manhole covers en route unless absolutely necessary. The times it may
be necessary include: to assist the covering group to locate the patrol’s position; when a patrol
is lost; when enemy contact is made; or when the manhole is part of the patrol exit route.
6. The drill for moving around corners begins when the point man signals “obstacle.” The
patrol closes up, with the leader moving up to the corner and the remainder moving up
approximately 3.0 m from the corner. The point man and leader observe around the corner with
the use of their viewing aid. If clear, the leader covers the movement of the point man to the
opposite side, where he commences moving again. Once the point man reaches his normal
patrol spacing, the rest of the patrol moves out. Intersections can be dealt with in the same
manner, but all branching tunnels should be observed before moving out on the planned route.
If route security is a task of the patrol, then two-man security teams must be added to the patrol
with the task of securing junctions. All other drills should be employed as for a normal four-man
reconnaissance patrol.
7. Once the patrol has returned and submitted its report, the tactical unit commander must
decide what to do about the tunnel. In the offence, it may provide a covered route to move
behind the enemy’s defences. In any case, the patrol members should act as guides along the
route if required.
337. CAVE AND TUNNEL CLEARANCE
1. Tunnels, like buildings, have drills tailored to fit the surroundings. Tunnels have their
own unique set of characteristics that have to be considered when clearing them. The following
paragraphs detail the drills for the lead elements during a tunnel clearance. Commanders must
remember that the actions of a clearance team differ from those of a tunnel patrol, although a
patrol can become a clearance team if engaged by the enemy.
2. When clearance is the priority, the mission follows the basic principles of any clearance
operation. With underground systems, the enemy will make use of the limited visibility and
space for manoeuvring to funnel the attacking force, slow its movement, and cause confusion.
The element that is clearing the tunnel will keep its organization the same as for any other
clearing operation. Specialized equipment to assist in entry and clearance must be considered.
3. The section drills for clearance follow the same procedure as for a building clearance.
The covering group should provide security for the entry team, and from there, should move
along the outside of the tunnel orienting on the clearance team to provide cut-off. The entry
team conducts the entry employing the method required. For example, if going through a
manhole, the team moves forward and provides an entry, which could be as simple as using a
grappling hook to open a manhole. The remainder of the section follows-up until pushed
forward by the section commander to clear the tunnel system. Upon consolidation, the section
remains in the tunnel system covering all exits and entrances. If possible, all drills are
completed as for building clearance, with the following procedures employed:
a. Grenades or other explosive devices can be used while conducting the entry, but
once inside, these weapons should not be employed unless absolutely
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-45
necessary. Tunnels magnify and funnel any explosion in both directions and will
easily cause friendly casualties if not employed properly.
b. The clearing teams should take away any advantage of darkness from the
enemy and add to the clearing momentum by using white light devices such as
flashlights, light sticks, or any other available tools. However, if such devices are
attached to a soldier or his kit, it will illuminate his position and make him a ready
target. This can be avoided by pushing the light forward to illuminate the enemy
positions (e.g. lights attached to poles, and light sticks or similar devices thrown
forward).
c. The tunnel diameter will dictate the formation used. If the tunnel is large enough,
the team should move as in a hallway. If the tunnel is narrow, and only allows
one soldier to move through at a time, the team members should be spaced
approximately 2.0 m apart, allowing for some unrestricted movement if required.
Other teams should be at least 5.0 m behind the clearing team, and in the case
of smaller branch tunnels, back by the last branch or corner.
d. Turning a corner should be conducted as for hallways unless the tunnel is too
narrow. If it is too narrow, then the turn should be conducted with one soldier
covering and one soldier moving around the corner. Corner viewing devices
should be employed in conjunction with white light when turning all corners. If
clearing with night vision devices, the use of a corner viewing device and an IR
light stick is also effective.
e. Intersections can be a complex problem, and due to their nature and variety, no
hard and fast drill can be adopted. Generally, only one tunnel should be cleared
at a time, and once cleared, each new tunnel should be marked and have a
sentry posted for security.
f. To mark the FLOT, every entrance that is bypassed must be opened and a
marker placed high enough to be seen by the covering group and other friendly
forces. To avoid enemy and friendly fire, soldiers must never expose their bodies
through these openings.
4. Tunnel clearance, like any other clearing operation, requires momentum. To achieve
this, firepower, violence of action, and effective employment of drills must be used to keep the
enemy off guard. However, having said this, tunnels also allow for the use of silent clearing
techniques, or a combination of silent and noisy techniques. The commander should consider
all possibilities.
5. A reserve element should be allocated and prepared to extract any tunnel clearing
element should it encounter stiff enemy opposition or dangerous conditions.
338. DEFENDING TUNNELS AND SUBTERRANEAN FEATURES
1. Tunnels can be blocked and secured in the same manner as buildings and rooms. If
deemed necessary, tunnels may be blocked permanently, defended temporarily, or covered by
fire. The following should be noted:
a. If soldiers are to occupy fixed fighting positions inside a subterranean feature, the
defensive position should be constructed on a platform to protect against
flooding.
3-46 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
b. Caution should be used when employing light devices in the tunnel so that the
position is not revealed. Light devices may be positioned to illuminate possible
enemy approaches on command.
c. Grenades and explosives must be used sparingly as they will have adverse
effects on friendly forces, such as ruptured eardrums and wounds from flying
debris in the confined space.
d. The blast effects of munitions can ignite gas (generally methane gas) found in
sewers.
e. If possible, friendly personnel should be outside the tunnels or out of range when
grenades or demolitions are used.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 3-47
CHAPTER 4
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
"In Artois, the British by destructive fire lasting for four weeks have turned the
foremost German positions into a shell hole area like that in Flanders. . . . They
engaged the whole of their four Canadian Divisions. The Canadians, whom the
British Higher Command always employ for the most difficult and costly fighting,
advanced with obstinate bravery during the whole day against the German
positions. . . "
—German wireless report, 18 August 1917
SECTION 1
GENERAL
1. Like all offensive operations, those conducted in an urban area are conducted with the
aim of eliminating or neutralizing a threat. The urban offensive often aims to destroy, defeat, or
neutralize an enemy force that may be mechanized and well organized, or may be of an
insurgent nature, fleeting and lightly armed. In most cases, a combined arms force will conduct
urban offensive operations, particularly during major combat operations (MCO).
2. Generally, offensive operations in built-up areas require large numbers of troops.
Although a raid may only require a small force, any MCO, counter-insurgency (COIN), or
stability operation will require troops in quantity. Planning has to be centralized and
coordinated, but the execution should be as decentralized as possible.
SECTION 2
STAGES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND PLANNING
401. THE STAGES OF OFFENSIVE URBAN OPERATIONS
1. General. The attack on a built-up area may be divided into five stages although some
stages may overlap. In any event, there should be no pause between the stages, with units
moving rapidly to deepen the penetration before the defender can react. Even if the offensive
operation will be limited to a thrust or penetration of the urban area (vice a complete attack and
clearing), many aspects of the offensive stages still apply.
2. Offensive Stages. The stages of the offensive battle are as follows:
a. investment or isolation;
b. break-in;
c. securing objectives;
d. clearance; and
e. consolidation.
NOTE
These stages apply at virtually all levels of urban operations (UO), from a formation
conducting a MCO against a defended urban centre, to a company securing an isolated
farm complex, to a platoon clearing a small urban block of insurgents.
3. Investment or Isolation. The aim of this initial stage is to isolate the area by seizing
terrain features and dominating the approaches. Enemy defences may prevent complete
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-1
encirclement. In the attack against a large city, it may only be possible or necessary to isolate
the area around the point of break-in:
a. Grouping. Ideally, the investment force should be grouped under a dedicated
commander at the unit or sub-unit level depending upon the size of the operation.
Reconnaissance troops and direct fire assets are best suited to the task. They
should be supported by indirect fire controllers, aviation, and if available, air.
b. Tasks. Principal tasks are:
(1) Provide information on enemy dispositions.
(2) Prevent enemy withdrawal, or limit withdrawal routes.
(3) Prevent enemy reinforcement.
(4) Support the break-in, including the provision of direct and indirect fire
support if necessary. It should be noted that once the attacking forces
have entered the urban area and begin to clear or seize objectives in
depth, the density of the urban area would preclude any elements outside
of the built-up area, including those conducting the isolation, from
providing direct fire support to the attacking infantry and engineers.
c. Planning Considerations. The following should be considered:
(1) Timing of the deployment elements for the isolation must be planned
carefully to avoid loss of surprise.
(2) Coordination of employment of the isolating force with all subsequent
stages of the operation.
4. Break-In. The aim of this stage is to assault and seize a foothold in the built-up area. It
is a critical stage of any offensive operation and is the point at which the attacker is most
vulnerable:
a. Grouping. The break-in force should be comprised mainly of infantry with
engineer support and indirect fire controllers. The minimum combat power
necessary is likely to be a rifle company group:
(1) Armour. It may be used to support the break-in, but is vulnerable to
hand-held anti-tank weapons. Armoured vehicles, be they tanks or light
armoured vehicles (LAVs), can provide intimate support or fire support
from a stand-off position.
(2) Artillery and Mortars. The use of high explosives (HE) and smoke to
support the break-in may neutralize enemy positions and cover the
movement of assault forces. In addition, artillery could be used to fix the
enemy elsewhere on the wider battlefield not in direct contact.
Commanders also have to consider the problems created by obscuration
and rubble and the risk of injury to civilians. Rules of engagement (ROE)
in certain campaigns may preclude or restrict the use of indirect fire
support. The use of precision munitions will limit collateral damage.
(3) Aviation. Aviation may be used to enhance the direct fire support and to
provide observation and surveillance.
(4) Air. Air support should be coordinated with indirect fire support. Again,
the use of precision munitions will limit collateral damage.
4-2 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Offensive Operations
b. Tasks. The main tasks of the break-in force are:

(1) establish a foothold on the edge of the built-up area;
(2) seize key objectives that dominate the area;
(3) establish routes for the forward passage of lines;
(4) determine the strength, location and future intentions of the enemy; and
(5) be prepared to provide fire support for subsequent stages of the
operation.
c. Planning Considerations. A number of issues are to be considered in the
planning for the break-in:
(1) The plan has to be simple with limited objectives.
(2) The synchronization of direct and indirect fire support is critical. This is
best achieved by preparing a detailed direct support (DS) fire plan.
(3) The use of engineers to clear obstacles and safe lanes will also require
coordination.
(4) The break-in may be conducted at night, either as a silent or noisy attack,
as an enhancement to security.
(5) The provision of direct fire support at all levels of command is critical
during the break-in. This should suppress both the enemy positions that
the break-in seeks to capture and enemy positions in depth that pose a
major threat to assaulting forces.
(6) The concentration of combat power will be essential for a successful
break-in. To meet this requirement and maintain momentum (itself a
critical requirement for success), it may be necessary to conduct a
forward passage of lines.
(7) A commander may consider a deception or feint as an aid to surprise. To
be effective, it should be credible and the enemy will need time to react to
the deception.
5. Securing Objectives. This stage of the operation should be launched from the foothold
secured by the break-in. The aim is to secure objectives that provide a firm base from which to
launch an assault on the next objective, or to unhinge the enemy's defence:
a. Grouping. The infantry is the primary arm for this stage of the operation.
Engineer support is critical to breach obstacles and provide force entry into
structures. Armour and artillery in the direct fire role may provide intimate
support. Snipers will be particularly effective in neutralizing the enemy and
securing the flanks from infiltration.
b. Tasks. These may include the following:
(1) Seizing key terrain. This includes dominating ground, principal routes,
bridges, and buildings of tactical significance. In urban terrain, this will
include dominating the rooftops.
(2) Destroying enemy defensive positions.
(3) Blocking enemy withdrawal and logistic routes.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-3
(4) Destroying enemy reserves, command posts, and communications.

c. Planning Considerations. The following should be considered in planning:
(1) The plan should adopt a systematic approach to ensure that the enemy's
ability to influence the securing of each objective is limited. This requires
effective control and careful coordination between units.
(2) Objectives and the routes to them may need to be held to prevent enemy
counterattacks or re-infiltration.
(3) The securing of objectives is best done by day, unless troops are both
trained and specifically equipped for night operations.
(4) Medical support needs to be as close as possible to forward units,
together with safe routes for casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). The
demand for ammunition resupply is likely to great and stocks need to be
well forward.
(5) The value of indirect fire support in this stage and the subsequent
clearance stage is limited. Nevertheless, consideration should be given
to having indirect fire controllers well forward to react to the unforeseen,
and to have them well placed for the consolidation stage. Precision
munitions will be most effective in destroying or neutralizing the enemy
positions.
(6) Direct fire weapons, and support systems able to breach walls and
support building entry, should be well forward providing intimate support
to the infantry.
6. Clearance. This stage is a methodical clearance of the whole area of the operation.
The aim is to clear all remaining enemy from the area. As securing objectives is paramount,
this task may be carried out by follow-up troops:
a. Grouping. The infantry is best suited for this stage of the operation. They are
likely to require engineer support, and the use of armour and artillery in the direct
fire role may be of assistance. Again, snipers will be particularly effective.
b. Tasks. The main task is to clear the complete area of enemy.
c. Planning Considerations. These are:
(1) The use of sectors, or other control measures is essential, to ensure that
the clearance is systematic and that it leaves no pockets of enemy.
(2) Clearance tasks may be allocated to small groups at platoon, or even
section strength.
(3) Clearance tasks are best done during daylight, but night vision aids
(passive and active) will still be required as buildings will be unlit and
dark.
(4) Provision has to be made for the collection of casualties, control of
prisoners of war (PWs), and the evacuation of civilians.
7. Consolidation. In general terms, the consolidation is no different from that of any other
offensive operation. The conduct and time available for consolidation will be dictated by plans
for subsequent operations. The following points should be considered:
4-4 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
a. Despite the clearance, the threat from snipers and counterattacks may remain.
As a minimum, temporary defensive measures should be adopted at all levels,
including the preparation of hasty defensive fire plans. This is particularly true if
the operation has conducted a thrust or penetration with the aim of seizing a
limited objective in depth.
b. Regrouping may be essential if casualties have been high.
c. Resupply of ammunition, water, and fuel will be necessary, and means to do so
should be an important planning factor, especially if only limited areas were
cleared.
d. The treatment of casualties, control of PWs, and the evacuation of civilians are
likely to require considerable labour and time.
402. PLANNI NG
1. Offensive operations in urban areas require large numbers of troops. Planning has to be
centrally coordinated, but the execution should be as decentralized as possible. The following
points are important when planning offensive operations in an urban environment:
a. Simplicity. Control is difficult and plans have to be simple and flexible. It is
unwise to plan in detail too far ahead, and it should be possible to adjust plans to
exploit local success. Orders may cover the whole operation in outline and only
the first stage in detail. Plans for each subsequent stage should be made and
detailed orders issued as the preceding state is completed. If control is to be
maintained, time should be provided to allow for the passage of information to
the lowest level.
b. Information. Information gathering must be carried out in urban operations (UO)
as in any other operation of war. Maximum information on the layout of the town
and the defender's dispositions is essential. Sources will be:
(1) Maps, town plans, guidebooks, and plans of essential services, both
above and below ground. Street maps, in particular, will need to be
widely reproduced and issued down to section level. These maps should
include a building marking system and other control features.
(2) Reconnaissance and standing patrols, and observation posts.
(3) Air reconnaissance and air photos.
(4) PWs, inhabitants, refugees, and local agencies, including national
territorial forces.
c. Rules of Engagement. There may be specific ROE imposed during UO due to
the nature of the terrain. The presence of a civilian population, some specific
protected buildings (e.g. churches, historical sites, etc.), and infrastructure
needed for people’s survival (e.g. water supply system, electricity sources), all
need to be considered during both offensive and defensive operations. The
potential for collateral damage to non-combatants, protected cultural sites and
vital infrastructure to will always be of concern. This must be understood at all
levels.
d. Logistics. As soon as it seems likely that an assault on an urban area will take
place, there should be early resupply of large quantities of ammunition and
explosives of all types. Urban assault equipment should also be distributed. If
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-5
possible, the casualty evacuation system should be reinforced, especially in

assaulting units.
e. Limited Objectives. The attack has to be planned so that by capturing a series
of intermediate objectives progress is made to the final objective. These provide
the firm base for a subsequent stage and should be held in strength to prevent
recapture by the enemy. The selection of buildings as objectives is frequently
necessary, but care should be taken to consider both ground and the enemy to
determine objectives. In UO, the dominating ground will be key rooftops or
buildings that will support consolidation and progress to the next stage or
objective.
f. Momentum. Momentum must be maintained night and day, as the slightest
pause will give the defender time to regroup, react, and regain the local initiative.
It is therefore essential that the plan provide for:
(1) successive units and sub-units taking over the advance by leap-frogging;
(2) reserves placed well forward so that they can be committed quickly to
deal with the unexpected or to exploit a tactical advantage;
(3) replenishment of ammunition and combat supplies; and
(4) CASEVAC. This requirement must be balanced with the need for control.
g. Control. Strict control by commanders and frequent re-briefings at all levels is
vital. Axes of advance, limited objectives, report lines, fire support control
measures and boundaries assume particular importance.
h. Tempo. It is vital that it is understood at every level of command that
maintaining the right tempo is the key to success in offensive operations. UO are
characterized by extremely short, violent bursts of action followed by periods of
decreasing action to regain balance. During a peace support operation (PSO) or
COIN, this aspect will be exaggerated with sudden outbreaks of violence
between long periods of calm. Commanders must guard against soldiers
becoming laxity.
i. Communication. Due to the nature of operations and terrain, communications
need to be specifically considered. Within/around high concrete buildings, radios
may not work as well as they would in open country, thus forcing command to be
decentralized. Also, soldiers will have to work in much smaller teams (down to
groups or four-man bricks) rather than at the usual section level. The use of
hand signals, personal role radios (PRR), and alternative forms of
communications will be required to effectively operate in an urban environment.
403. CONTROL OF MOVEMENT IN THE URBAN AREA
1. To control movement through the urban area, the following measures must be put into
effect in the planning stage:
a. Sectors. The area must be divided into clearly defined and recognizable sectors
that should be numbered or lettered and have a named commander. Normally,
sectors will be allotted as company clearance tasks and then divided into sub-
sectors for platoon tasks, bearing in mind the need for local reserves. The area
must be cleared methodically sector by sector.
4-6 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
b. Bounds and Report Lines. Bounds, which should be defensible features or

locations, and report lines, which are merely landmarks, will normally be selected
along streets, rivers, railway lines, etc., at right angles to the line of advance.
c. Boundaries. It is important that boundaries should be easily identifiable, so
main thoroughfares are an obvious choice. However, such approaches will be
the focus for operations; therefore, commanders should seek alternatives (e.g.
back alleys and gardens). This also ensures that one element is responsible for
clearing both sides of the main thoroughfare. Boundaries also restrict fire and
therefore should help avoid instances of fratricide.
d. Report Centres. These should be established for each sector. These centres
are the focal points for delivering ammunition and supplies, and collecting
casualties and PWs.
e. Nicknames. Key points (e.g. important buildings, main streets, open areas) may
be allotted nicknames.
f. Checkpoints and Named Routes. During operations other than major combat,
movement will be dispersed, decentralized and conducted at the lowest levels by
a wide variety of different units, some only visiting a unit’s area of operations
(AO). The use of checkpoints and named routes will greatly facilitate control and
communications.
2. The use of such control measures will facilitate combat identification and help prevent
fratricide.
SECTION 3
ALTERNATIVE TACTICAL CONCEPTS FOR URBAN OPERATIONS
404. GENERAL
1. Offensive tactics in UO have traditionally focused on large-scale attacks and the
eventual seizure and clearance of an entire urban area. This has generally reflected
conventional war scenarios and the linear and contiguous or single dimensional aspect of such
operations. However, with various types of operations, this may not be necessary or desirable,
at least initially in an operation. Commanders and staff may find it advantageous to simply
seize one or more limited but key objectives in an urban area, which will allow them to out-
manoeuvre an enemy and undermine his defences on both the physical and moral planes.
These tactics will take advantage of modern technologies and improved capabilities to disperse
forces and enhance manoeuvre.
2. Three such manoeuvre tactics have been developed:
a. urban penetration;
b. urban thrust; and
c. urban saturation or swarm.
405. THE TACTIC OF URBAN PENETRATION
1. The tactic of urban penetration relies upon mobile forces to penetrate an urban area to
focus on clearly defined objectives, be they enemy or terrain. An urban area contains a great
number of man-made potential objectives, or nodes, such as power plants, government
facilities, and food distribution centres, that may provide a basis for establishing control over an
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-7
urban area. The ability to rapidly seize and secure these types of facilities may be critical to any
type of UO.
2. Penetration is designed to quickly manoeuvre to the objective area(s) and establish
control in a non-contiguous and dispersed operational area. The tactic requires sufficient
mobility to move quickly to the objective area, to seize it, and to isolate and protect it from the
enemy and non-combatants. Movement to the objective area can either be by surface, sub-
surface or above the surface. The unit must possess sufficient firepower and protection to
arrive at the objective area in a combat effective state, with sufficient force to seize it, protect it,
and control it. Stealth could be the preferred movement tactic to provide force protection and
exploit surprise.
3. During a penetration, the flanks of any axis of advance or route are not secured. The
force is like a self-contained tactical “bubble” moving to its objective area. Upon arrival in the
objective area, the force conducts an offensive operation to seize the objective and any
dominating terrain in the immediate area. The attacking force must then move systematically
and rapidly to isolate and defend the objective area.
4. Forces conducting the penetration must be structured and prepared for an opposed
move to the objective area, an assault of the objective, and the subsequent defence of the
objective area. Conduct of the penetration should permit maximum flexibility and initiative while
supporting the commander’s intent and concept. It is possible for the attack to occur on several
axes of advance by dispersed units, as well as on multiple dimensions (e.g. surface, sub-
surface, above surface, structural).
5. Isolation and defence of the objective area must account for both enemy forces and non-
combatants. This may imply the potential use of lethal and non-lethal weapon systems. The
defending force has to be sufficiently robust to accomplish its mission. The force must therefore
include elements capable of controlling direct and indirect fires from supporting units.
6. In conducting a penetration attack on an enemy force, the commander may choose to
withdraw once the objective has been achieved. In this case, the penetration will assume many
of the characteristics of a raid and should be conducted accordingly. Note that the withdrawal
could take the form of a subsequent penetration to a second objective.
406. THE TACTIC OF URBAN THRUST
1. The tactic of urban thrust focuses on achieving an assault against the enemy on a
narrow axis. The thrust maximizes combat power at the point of the attack. It can be described
as an arrow or dagger thrust into the enemy defence.
2. As this narrow attack is occurring, the axis of advance is defended to hold the flank
against potential enemy attacks. Potentially, this can be accomplished through a combination of
forces, sensors, and/or lethal/non-lethal barriers.
3. The urban thrust can be conducted simultaneously on multiple axes. These attacks
should be conducted in parallel, and thus, be mutually supporting. When possible, the thrust
should be conducted on an oblique axis to the street, which should help reduce exposure in
open spaces. However, this results in the need to breach buildings at their strongest structural
points.
4. As the thrust is being conducted, a commander should conduct periodic shifts in the axis
of attack to confuse the enemy and avoid a pattern. This implies the ability to coordinate units
and sub-units effectively within the urban environment. It establishes a requirement for
coordination based upon location and timing and/or communications and location. In this type
4-8 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
of operation, it is necessary for the commander’s intent and concept to be known down to
section level.
5. The thrust, conducted on several axes, offers the commander with a number of options.
Thrusts can be made into a certain point, with the commander ordering one thrust to act as an
anvil and a second thrust to act as a hammer (i.e. in a fix and strike concept). Thrusts can also
be conducted whereby one line remains stationary while a second thrust conducts a right or left
turn to complete an encirclement.
6. The overall intent of the tactic is to avoid a linear assault, while confusing the enemy,
forcing his flanks, isolating his forces, and deceiving him as to the real objective for the
assaulting force. Ideally, this will force his withdrawal and exposure, without the necessity of a
room-by-room clearing of buildings. If the enemy is forced to withdraw, the resulting exposure
can be exploited by tactical aviation and indirect fire systems, cued by sensor resources.
Refusal to withdraw can be countered by isolation and reduction by siege.
407. THE TACTIC OF URBAN SATURATION
1. An urban saturation (also known as urban swamp or urban swarm) is akin to the tactic
used by police forces when responding to an emergency that requires backup. The saturation
concept considers numerous groups (as small as four-man) or section-sized elements operating
in a dispersed, non-contiguous fashion in an urban environment. As these elements patrol their
assigned area, they have to be prepared to respond rapidly to calls for assistance from
neighbouring elements. Whether they can respond to a request for support will depend upon
their own current situation and their distance from those making the request.
2. A call for support should naturally include an estimate of the support required. The
situation report and request for support/assistance should be transmitted to an all-informed net,
thus informing other elements and the higher headquarters. The controlling operations cell
would then direct the appropriate elements to respond to the request, and then adjust other
elements to fill or cover gaps that are created. Alternative methods include the elements
nearest the call responding automatically and reporting their intention to do so. As situational
awareness improves at all levels, and elements are aware of the near real-time position of other
elements, coordinating this tactic will become easier.
3. The overall command of elements responding to a call for support could take a number
of forms. The commander of the element requesting support could assume overall command
as the one with the most situational awareness. Alternatively, the senior commander arriving
could assume command, or the controlling operations centre could dispatch a separate
command element. Normally, standard procedures will apply: the requesting commander will
retain command until the next higher level of command arrives, at which time he will conduct a
handover. Should the contact continue and require additional support, a specific command
element would likely arrive to assume command. For example, a section commander
requesting support could retain command as other elements and sections arrive, and then
handover command to an arriving platoon commander. Should the contact continue to develop
and require further support, the company commander will arrive to assume command.
4. Another option for control of this tactic is to have units conduct the saturation as a version of
the platoon patrol base. In this construct, the platoon commander and platoon second-in-command
(2IC) would be near the platoon’s patrols, and thus, at least one of them would be on scene quickly in
case of a contact. This process could be repeated up to company and battalion with appropriate
levels of command to meet situations at hand. Commanders must remain disciplined in this
approach and effort must be made to avoid situations in which there are too many commanders on
the ground in one particular area. Commanders must remain with the majority of their troops and
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-9
allow the on-scene commander to deal with the situation until it requires the commitment of most of
the commander’s force.
5. The keys to the tactic of urban saturation are speed and flexibility. The requesting element
must be able to quickly and concisely inform the responding units of the situation and manoeuvre
them to advantage as they arrive on the scene. The responding elements must have the flexibility,
understanding, and training to effectively enter an emerging situation.
6. Implicit in this concept is the capability of junior leaders to assume increased levels of
responsibility and command. The tactic also requires the controlling operations cell to be able to
respond to the situation and to adjust forces to cover gaps as they are identified.
7. In conducting this urban saturation or swarm, the establishment of patterns must be avoided.
If units respond to situations in similar patterns, the enemy or belligerent forces will quickly identify
this fact. They will then deliberately create situations to lure responding units into ambushes, or to
exploit the temporary gaps between responding elements. The execution of this tactic requires skilful
leaders at all levels that are thoroughly prepared and trained for such operations and tactics.
8. Operations against guerrilla-type insurgent forces have noted that the tactic employed by
guerrillas is to engage and then withdrawal once the friendly forces begin to close with them. This
saturation tactic lends itself well to the concept of identifying a target and then isolating the block or
set of buildings so that withdrawal is cut-off before the forces begin to close with the enemy position.
9. It should be noted that insurgents themselves use such saturation or swarming tactics. Once
a target is located, for example a dismounted patrol, small groups will attack it from numerous
directions until it is overwhelmed and destroyed.
408. SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVE TACTICAL CONCEPTS
1. Provided they have sufficiently well trained troops and the necessary equipment,
commanders in most UO can employ these three tactical concepts with suitable variations. The
concepts all make use of the manoeuvrist approach to operations. They can be adjusted easily
for use in different military campaigns such as peace support or counter-insurgency.
SECTION 4
SUPPORTING ARMS AND COMBAT SUPPORT
409. LIGHT ARMOURED VEHICLES
1. General. All infantry conduct their operations dismounted. Mechanized infantry have
the added advantages of firepower and protection afforded by their integral fighting vehicles.
The use of the LAV III, or other armoured personnel carriers (APCs), in offensive UO goes beyond
troop transport, since their weapon systems can be used to great advantage to support dismounted
troops. However, it must always be remembered that the use of LAVs normally precludes the use of
stealth, and despite the protection they afford, they are vulnerable to short-range anti-armour
weapons fired from defilade positions.
2. Employment Considerations. Streets and alleys provide natural fields of fire and
killing zones. All vehicle traffic is greatly restricted, canalized, and subject to ambush and short-
range attack by various weapons. The vulnerability of the LAV family of vehicles in such
conditions must be offset by employing the following considerations:
a. Fighting in the urban environment is centred on prepared positions in houses and
buildings, combined with disruption (e.g. hit and run) tactics. These positions are
designed to cover street approaches and are protected by mines, obstacles, and
booby traps. Thus, bridges, overpasses, and buildings must be inspected and
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cleared of mines before vehicles use them. In addition, reconnaissance must

ascertain the load-bearing capacity of roads, bridges, and floors to determine if
they can support the weight of combat vehicles.
b. LAVs are not employed alone. Working as a team, dismounted infantrymen
provide security for vehicles. In turn, LAVs provide critical fire support and
protection for the dismounted infantry. For mechanized forces, the LAV is an
integral part of the section, and in essence, is the eighth rifleman in the section.
The vehicle is not normally employed away from the section except for a specific
tactical task and grouping for a very limited time.
c. When moving in an urban area, the LAV should keep close to the buildings on
either side of the street. This allows each vehicle to cover the opposite side of
the street. Vehicles must “button-down” for protection, but crews must remain
alert and responsive to signals from the dismounted infantry being supported. Close
cooperation between the dismounted infantry and the LAV commander or gunner is
critical, and this places a great reliance upon reliable communications and well-
practised standing operating procedures (SOP) (see Figure 4–1). The golden rule is
that the dismounted infantry controls the LAV’s actions. The same principles of
dismounted infantry and LAV mutual support and coordination hold true for operating
with tanks.
Figure 4–1: Light Armoured Vehicle Cover for Close Combat

3. The Attack. Although much of the attack in an urban area is conducted dismounted,
armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) such as LAVs have a key role to play in all aspects of the
attack. LAVs can be employed to best effect by providing direct fire support for dismounted
infantry. The employment of LAVs and other AFVs in support of the attack should take into
consideration the following:
a. Initially, LAVs may be employed to support the investment/isolation stage of
offensive UO and in support of the break-in battle. In this respect, the LAVs will
be employed as follows:
(1) Destroying enemy positions with direct fire.
(2) Suppressing enemy positions in the objective area.
(3) Providing overwatch and cut-off to prevent enemy withdrawal,
reinforcement or counterattack.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-11
(4) Destroying enemy AFVs.

(5) Providing information on enemy dispositions and movements.
(6) The assault for the break-in and seizure of the initial foothold. In order for
the platoons and sections to be delivered successfully to the break-in
location, enemy positions, particularly those with anti-armour weapons,
must be destroyed or neutralized.
b. LAVs are best employed in intimate support within the built-up area. In order for
this to be implemented, the supporting LAVs must be located within the urban
area, yet secured by dismounted troops. Rarely if ever will a dominating position
outside of the urban area allow for direct support to troops within the urban area.
c. Successful intimate support from the LAVs requires close and well-practised
cooperation between the dismounted troops and the AFVs (see Figure 4–2).
Dismounted infantry must clear routes and fire positions for their supporting
LAVs. The LAVs should then be called forward, engage the target and then
withdraw to a safe location or remain under mutual support of the infantry, but
normally just back from the forward edge until required.
Figure 4–2: Light Armoured Vehicle Supporting Infantry Movement

d. Likely tasks for LAVs within the built-up area include the following:
(1) Breaching walls en route to and in the objective structure (this is best
accomplished with a cannon using a spiral firing pattern).
(2) Suppression and destruction with direct fire of enemy positions within a
building.
(3) Establishing a roadblock or barricade.
(4) Securing cleared portions of the objective.
(5) Providing resupply of ammunition and other combat supplies for the
assault force.
(6) CASEVAC.
(7) Obscuring the enemy's observation using smoke dischargers.
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e. Ideally, LAVs support the sections to which they are integral. Communications
between the LAV crews and the dismounted troops are vital and must be well
practised, particularly in terms of target indications and coordinated
engagements. A combination of voice, visual and radio must be used.
f. LAVs should generally move behind the infantry, moving forward or to a vantage
point to engage targets once directed to do so by the dismounted troops. This
method will ensure that the LAVs are protected and that the route is secured by
the advancing dismounted infantry.
g. LAVs can provide direct fire support to infantry and engineers assaulting enemy
objectives and clearing buildings and streets. They can also be used to provide
security for the whole local operation by blocking reinforcement or withdrawal
routes, or securing axes of attack for thrusts and objective areas for urban
penetrations.
h. Even if some LAVs are assigned such protection tasks, they still require local
protection from dismounted infantry.
i. Infantry support to their LAVs should include:
(1) Assaulting and reducing enemy positions, and clearing buildings under
the covering fire of LAVs.
(2) Neutralizing and destroying enemy anti-armour weapons.
(3) Locating targets for engagement by LAV weapons.
(4) Protecting LAVs against enemy individual anti-armour measures and
surprise attacks.
(5) Securing and defending an area, once it is cleared.
j. The LAV’s smoke dischargers can be used to conceal infantry movement. This
requires careful analysis of wind conditions to ensure that the smoke affects the
enemy more than it does friendly troops. This may be difficult, because wind
currents can be unpredictable between buildings. The smoke may also screen
the movement of the LAVs once the infantry crosses the danger area.
k. The LAV III has optical, thermal imaging (TI), and infrared (IR) sights that make it
very effective for observing and identifying enemy in an urban setting. The
enemy will site their fire positions using loopholes, windows, doorways, and other
openings, making best use of shadow. Locating them with the naked eye or low
magnified optics will be difficult. The LAV’s sights are thus a valuable resource,
especially the thermal sight, which can pick up the enemy’s signature around and
even inside buildings.
410. MORTARS
1. General. The urban environment restricts low-angle, indirect fire due to overhead
masking. While all indirect fire weapons are subject to overhead masking, mortars are less
affected than field artillery weapons due to the mortar's higher trajectory. For low-angle artillery
fire, dead space is about five times the height of the building behind which the target sits. For
mortar fire and artillery high angle fire, dead space is only about one half the height of the
building. Because of this, mortars can be used effectively during combat in urban areas.
2. Employment. Not only can mortars fire into deep defilade positions created by tall
buildings, they can also fire out of them. Mortar emplacements behind buildings are difficult for
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-13
the enemy to locate accurately, and even harder to hit with counter fire. Due to their lightweight,
even heavy mortars can be hand carried to firing positions that may not be accessible to
vehicles. However, muzzle blast effects must be considered. In planning the use of mortars,
the following should be noted:
a. Mortars can be fired through the open roof of a ruined building if the ground level
flooring is solid enough to withstand the recoil. If there is only concrete in the
mortar platoon's area, mortars can be fired using sandbags as a buffer under the
base plate, and using curbs as anchors and braces. Aiming posts can be placed
in dirt-filled cans.
b. The 60 mm and 81 mm mortars have limited effect on structural targets. Even
with delay fuses, they seldom penetrate more than the upper stories of light
buildings. However, their wide area coverage and multi-role fuses make them
useful against an enemy force advancing through streets, through other open
areas, or over rubble.
c. As there is usually a lack of large open areas, mortar troops often operate as
separate firing groups during combat in urban areas. Separate fire groups also
increase flexibility while maintaining the ability to mass fires when necessary.
Figure 4–3 shows how two mortar positions, separated by only one street, can be
effective in massing fire and be protected from counter-mortar fire by employing
defilade and dispersion.
Figure 4–3: Mortar Operations of Separate Firing Groups

d. The three standard mortar projectiles (HE, smoke, and illumination) are useful
during combat in urban areas. HE fragmentation is the most commonly used
round. White phosphorous is effective in starting fires in buildings and forcing the
enemy out of cellars and lightly framed buildings, and it is the most effective
mortar round against dug-in enemy tanks. Even near misses blind and suppress
enemy tank crews for limited periods.
e. Since the artificial roughness of urban terrain reduces wind speed and increases
air turbulence, mortar smoke tends to persist longer and give greater coverage in
urban areas than in open terrain; however, its effects are also less predictable.
Urban masking affects the use of illumination. In built up areas, commanders
4-14 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
must plan illumination in consideration of the effects that buildings will have on
producing shadows. For example, illumination may be fired behind friendly
positions, so that friendly troops are placed in shadows and enemy troops in the
light.
3. Effects of Mortar Fire. Multi-role fuses for mortars make them effective on urban
terrain. Delay settings can increase penetration slightly and proximity bursts can increase the
lethal area covered by fragments. However, tall buildings can cause proximity-fused mortar
rounds to detonate prematurely if they pass too closely, and the risk to friendly forces must be
considered:
a. 81 mm Mortar. The 81 mm mortar has much the same effect against urban targets
as the 60 mm mortar. It has a slightly greater lethal area, and its smoke rounds are
more effective. The 81 mm round cannot significantly crater a hard surfaced road.
b. 120 mm Mortar. In coalition operations, 120 mm support may be allocated. The
120 mm mortar shell is large enough to have a major effect on common urban
targets. It can penetrate deep into a building, causing extensive damage due to
its explosive power. A minimum of 45 cm of packed earth or sand is needed to
stop the fragments from a 120 mm HE round that impacts the ground 3.0 m
away. A direct hit from a 120 mm round can crush fortifications built with
commonly available materials. The 120 mm mortar round can create a large but
shallow crater in a road surface, which is not deep or steep-sided enough to
block vehicle movement. However, the craters could be deep enough to damage
or destroy storm drain systems, water and gas pipes, and electrical or phone
cables.
4. Collateral Damage. As with any weapon system or effects, the threat of collateral
damage must be considered. In certain situations and in some types of operations, the tactical
and operational level consequences of collateral damage will outweigh any tactical benefits
gained from using indirect fire weapons. ROE for specific operations, particularly those less
intense than major combat, may very well restrict the use of non-precision indirect fire weapons.
411. TANKS AND DIRECT FIRE GUN SYSTEMS
1. General. The direct fire system (DFS) consists of the tanks and direct fire mobile
systems, the multi-mission effects vehicle version 1 (MMEVv1), the light armoured vehicle (LAV)
tube-launched optically tracked wire-guided missile (TOW) Under Armour (LAV TUA), and the
25 mm gun. In this regard, the powerful, high-velocity gun that is mounted on tanks and other
DFS elements provides the infantry with a key requirement for victory in built-up areas; that is,
heavy and protected direct fire support. The tank provides a large degree of protection against
all but the largest of direct fire weapons systems. Lighter DFS elements can provide only the
same level of protection as provided by a LAV III.
2. Role of the DFS. The primary role of DFS elements during combat in urban areas is to
provide intimate support to the infantry, mainly in the form of heavy direct fire against buildings
and strongpoints that are identified as targets, normally by the infantry. The wall and fortification
breaching effects of the tank and direct fire mobile systems main armament are major assets to
infantrymen fighting in urban areas. Although the infantry will normally assume the lead role
during combat in urban areas, DFS elements and infantry must work as a combined arms team
down to the lowest tactical level. Just as with LAVs, other DFS elements move down streets
protected by the infantry, and in turn, support the infantry with fire. DFS elements can also
provide support such as flank protection during a thrust operation to a particular key node.
However, they still require infantry support to defeat local dismounted threats. The tank in
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-15
particular is one of the most effective weapons for heavy direct fire against structures and
enemy positions, and provides an unmatched level of protection in all types of operations.
3. Obliquity. Direct fire 120 or 105 mm guns produce their best urban target effects when fired
perpendicularly (90-degree angle) to hard surfaces. During combat in urban areas; however, finding
a covered firing position that permits this firing is unlikely. Most shots strike the target at an angle that
will normally reduce penetration. With armour-piercing rounds, angles up to 25 degrees have little
effect and angles greater than 45 degrees have greatly reduced penetration. For example, due to
ricochet, a 105 mm armour-piercing round cannot penetrate a 5 cm reinforced concrete wall at an
angle greater than 45 degrees.
4. Ammunition. Armoured piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) rounds are
commonly carried tank ammunition. These rounds are optimized for use against armoured vehicles,
and when used against urban structures, create minimal secondary effects (i.e. effects upon enemy
inside a building). The most effective DFS rounds for use in the urban environment are the high
explosive squash head (HESH) and multi-purpose anti-tank (MPAT) munitions. These rounds will
create man-sized breaches in almost all structures encountered and have excellent secondary
effects. DFS elements can also provide supporting fire from coaxially mounted machine gun (MG).
During battle procedure, the threat and support required from the DFS should inform the decision
regarding the natures of munitions to be carried during the operation.
5. Gun Characteristics. The DFS gun (i.e. tank or direct fire mobile system) has two specific
characteristics that affect its employment in urban areas—limited elevation and depression; and short
arming ranges:
a. The lower depression limit creates a dead space around a tank and direct mobile fire
system (see Figure 4–4). On a 16-m-wide street, this dead space extends to the
buildings on each side. Similarly, there is an overhead zone into which the tank and
direct mobile fire system cannot fire (see Figure 4–5). This dead space offers ideal
locations for enemy short-range anti-armour weapons and the close-range
employment of firebombs. It also exposes the tank’s most vulnerable areas—the
flanks, rear, and top. Consequently, infantrymen must move ahead, alongside, and
to the rear of tanks to provide close protection. Tanks and direct mobile fire system
also have a blind spot caused by the zero-degree depression over part of the back
deck. To engage any target in this area, the tank must pivot, and the direct mobile
fire system must jockey, to change the rear target to an oblique flank target.
4-16 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 4–4: Tank Gun Dead Space at Street Level
Figure 4–5: Tank Gun Dead Space above Street Level

b. The short arming distances allow the tank to engage targets from shorter ranges.
The armour of the tank protects the crew from both the blowback effects of the
round and enemy return fire. However, as the overpressure and concussion
effect of the main gun when fired can cause serious injury to friendly forces,
dismounted troops must be very aware of the tank and direct mobile fire system
in relation to themselves. Moreover, the discarding portions of the APFSDS
round are lethal to exposed infantry forward of the tank.
6. Target Effects. HESH rounds are most effective against masonry walls. The APFSDS
round can penetrate deeply into a structure, but it does not create as large a hole or displace as
much spall behind the target, and thus has very limited effects on enemy taking cover behind
walls. Tank HESH rounds are effective enough to displace flying debris and shrapnel to inflict
casualties inside a building. One HESH round normally creates a breach hole in all but the
thickest masonry construction. A single round demolishes brick veneer and wood frame
construction. However, even the 105 mm HESH round cannot cut steel reinforcing rods, which
are usually left in place to hinder entry through the breach hole. Both HESH and APFSDS
rounds are effective against all field fortifications. Only large earth berms provide protection
against tank fire.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-17
7. Employment. Tank-heavy forces could be at a severe disadvantage during combat in

urban areas because they lose their advantage of their long-range stand-off capability and
target acquisition (TA) systems (e.g. optics, TI and imagery intensification [II]). However, tanks
or direct mobile fire systems working with the infantry can be most effective, especially if they
work well together at the sub-unit level. The tank has proven vital during mounting and break-in
phases of operations. DFS elements, including main battle tanks, continue to have great utility
during offensive operations conducted as part of peace support or COIN campaigns. Individual
tanks or direct mobile fire systems, or pairs of tanks or direct mobile fire system, can work
together with rifle sections or platoons:
a. Tanks and direct mobile fire systems need infantry on the ground to provide
security in closed-in areas because they will be high priority targets and they are
vulnerable to enemy dismounted ambushes. This applies during any time that
they are in an urban environment. Given their wider field of view and smaller
profile, infantry can greatly assist in designating targets for the DFS.
b. When the tank or direct mobile fire system main gun fires it creates a large
fireball and smoke cloud. In the confines of an urban area, dirt and debris is
picked up and added to this cloud. The target is further obscured by the smoke
and dust of the explosion. Depending upon local conditions, this obscuration
could last for as long as two or three minutes. Infantry can use this period to
reposition or advance unobserved by the enemy. Caution must be exercised,
however, since the enemy might also move.
c. Tank and direct mobile fire system main guns create an overpressure and noise
hazard to exposed infantrymen. All dismounted troops working near tanks
should wear their helmet and protective vest, as well as eye protection. If
possible, they should also wear earplugs and avoid entering within the arc of 45
degrees either side of the main gun.
d. Tanks and direct mobile fire systems are equipped with powerful thermal sights
that can be used to detect enemy personnel and weapons hidden in shadows
and behind openings. Dust, fires, and thick smoke significantly degrade these
sights.
e. Tanks and direct mobile fire systems have turret-mounted grenade launchers
that project screening smoke grenades. The grenades use a bursting charge
and burning white phosphorous particles to create this screen. Burning particles
can easily start uncontrolled fires and are hazardous to dismounted infantry near
the tank or direct mobile fire system. The vehicle commander and the supported
infantry section or platoon commander must coordinate when and under what
conditions these launchers are used.
f. The tank’s size and armour can provide dismounted infantry with cover from
direct fire weapons and fragments. Properly coordinated, tanks can provide
moving cover for infantrymen as they advance across small open areas.
However, anti-armour rounds striking a tank, but not penetrating, are a major
threat to nearby infantry.
g. Additionally, any armoured vehicle employing activated defensive aid suites
(DAS) will endanger infantry within the immediate radius of the vehicles when
these systems defeat incoming missiles and rockets. Training and marry-up
drills between the infantry and DFS elements should cover the states of DAS
systems and the danger radius when they are activated. Tactics, techniques and
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procedures (TTP) will have to be adjusted accordingly to ensure soldiers are not
injured by the systems.
412. DIRECT FIRE SYSTEM AND INFANTRY COOPERATION
1. Communications. Both infantry and DFS elements must have the ability to
communicate with each other, and tanks/direct mobile fire systems must be in radio
communications with the supported/supporting infantry. To better support each other, both
arms must have situational awareness of each other’s activities. Any external telephone or
remote headset should not be the main source of communications, but rather alternative means
used at the section level for target indication and giving direction when required.
2. Mutual Support. The use of tanks and direct mobile fire systems to support infantry in
offensive operations will provide the firepower and shock action that the infantry alone cannot
produce. DFS elements will be able to neutralize enemy positions, destroy strong points, and
create breaches for the assaulting infantry and engineers. The infantry provide the armoured
vehicles with close intimate support in the form of local protection and security. Hence, the
support is mutual. Infantry must employ their armoured vehicle resources by assessing the
tactical situation in terms of what may be best achieved by both arms working in concert. The
enemy’s anti-armour capability and employment will directly affect the infantry’s ability to
effectively employ its supporting armour. It will be the responsibility of both elements to ensure
detailed coordination throughout an operation to limit the enemy’s ability to isolate either
element. The mutual support the infantry LAVs require, and the TTP used, will be the same for
DFS elements.
Operations in Iraq in 2003 and late 2004 repeatedly demonstrated the important role
played by tanks and DFS elements even during counter-insurgency battles. When United
States Marine Corps (USMC) sections came under contact from a building they had yet to
enter, their immediate drill was to isolate the building or block and move tanks or other
armoured vehicles forward under close protection from the infantry. The DFS vehicles
then neutralized the threat and assisted in breaching the building walls.
3. Security. As stated above, armoured vehicles should never work alone in the urban battle.
With this in mind, the infantry must provide close, intimate support through local protection and
security. Even when the armoured vehicles move forward to engage targets, the infantry must still
provide that local security:
a. When armour is moving behind the lead infantry section, it is the platoon
commander’s responsibility to ensure the armour’s security and to control their
movement, ensuring that they do not go beyond the platoon’s ability to provide
security. The lead infantry section should not be tasked to provide security unless
they are stationary. Once they are required to assault, they require all their soldiers
and will not be able to fulfil both tasks effectively. If armour is required to move
forward, the platoon must provide security, prove the route the tank will take, and
direct the tank into position. This can be the lead section’s previously cleared route,
with a section member waiting at a rendezvous (RV) to direct the tank or direct mobile
fire system, or a security team can move with the armour. Whichever method is used
will depend upon the tactical situation at the time. If a security team is required,
possibly due to enemy mines or tank hunting teams, the platoon commander should
consider the employment of tank security teams for limited periods. These teams
should come from the depth section. This will degrade the reserve section’s
effectiveness, so should be utilized only when absolutely necessary. Another method
of providing security is to provide the tanks or direct mobile fire systems with
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-19
permanent security teams from the reserve or depth platoon in the company. They
will be tasked to stay with the tanks or direct mobile fire systems, provide security
against tank hunting teams, and be the eyes on the ground to warn of anti-armour
mines and ambushes. This will be labour intensive, but effective in ensuring security
for the DFS elements.
b. If employed, the tank/direct mobile fire system security team should consist of a
security commander, one light machine gun (LMG), and one team of riflemen. Their
task is to move ahead and to the flanks of the tank or direct mobile fire systems,
securing positions by moving out from alternate positions and covering likely routes or
areas that the enemy could use to engage them. This team serves as an early
warning system and local defence for the DFS elements, and it must position itself to
defeat any immediate, close range threats. Direct radio communications between the
vehicle and security team is necessary to be able to give timely warnings and to allow
for general coordination. In conducting this task, the commander must unsure that
his subordinates remain outside of the main gun danger template and be aware of
any activated DAS systems.
c. In much of urban movement, an armoured vehicle(s) supporting a platoon can remain
under the local protection of the depth section. When it is required to move forward, it
can be pushed forward to a linkman from the lead element, with security for it being
passed to the lead sections as the vehicle moves forward.
4. Movement. When engaged in dismounted operations where the enemy is known to have an
anti-armour capability, the infantry should always lead, with tanks or direct mobile fire systems
following close behind the lead section, ready to quickly push forward to support. When the enemy is
known not to have an anti-armour capability, tanks or direct mobile fire systems should be moving
with the lead section:
a. Tanks or direct mobile fire systems moving behind the lead section for mutual support
should be in a position to avoid contact from the front, yet remain close enough to
immediately move forward. Movement forward will be on the platoon commander’s
call, using the secured route to a location where it can fire on the indicated targets.
4-20 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 4–6: Direct Fire System—Infantry Mutual Support: Theory (Abbreviations: T—tank / direct
fire mobile system; P—patrol; OBJ—objective; and ME—mutual engagement)
b. Tanks or direct mobile fire systems tasked to do so should move with and support the
lead section. The movement should be controlled by the section commander using
bound and overwatch, the infantry moving first to clear buildings, the tanks or direct
mobile fire systems providing overwatch and moving up once the infantry is firm.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-21
Figure 4–7: Direct Fire System—Infantry Mutual Support: Illustrated (Abbreviations: T—tank /
direct fire mobile system; P—patrol; Bldg—building; OBJ—objective; and ME—mutual
engagement)
413. DIRECT FIRE MISSILE SYSTEMS

1. General. The reduction in potential enemy armour threats and the increased focus on
UO has altered the requirement for direct fire missile systems.
2. Roles. Direct fire missile systems can have the following roles in UO:
a. Defeat enemy armour during all phases of the offensive operations.
b. Observation and cut-off, particularly during the isolation phase of the operation.
c. Intimate support to the infantry in the close fight. This may be provided from
stand-off positions that dominate an urban area. However, such positions will be
4-22 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
rare, as even a high piece of ground overlooking an urban area will not allow fire
into many defilade positions and will preclude rapid target indication.
d. Flank protection when faced with an armoured threat. Again, infantry will be
required to protect the systems from a dismounted threat.
e. Neutralization, including defeat, of enemy positions and strongpoints. This is
best done with missile types specially designed for such purposes.
f. Breaching or the forced entry of buildings in support of the infantry. Again, this is
best done with missile types specially designed for such a purpose.
g. Observation and surveillance using the long-range optical sights of the missile
systems.
3. Limitations. The employment of missile systems in an urban environment is limited.
Targets are often fleeting and may only reveal themselves as they dart from one piece of cover
to another. The time of engagement for missile systems, particularly the time of flight, limit their
ability to effectively engage such targets. Just as with any other armoured vehicles in urban
terrain, mounted systems will require close protection by the infantry. Dismounted, light
systems will be more flexible in employment in the urban area and can be mounted on building
tops to provide observation and support, but time for movement and set-up will be needed.
4. Infantry Support. Just as with any other DFS, missile systems, particularly those
mounted in armoured vehicles, will require dismounted infantry support for close protection.
The cost of this support must be weighed against the benefits that the missile system will
provide in such areas, particularly when other DFS elements and LAVs will also require close
protection.
414. ARTILLERY
1. General. A major source of fire support for infantry fighting in urban areas is field
artillery. If the urban area is near the coast, naval gunfire could also be used. Field artillery
engagement can be either indirect or direct. The development of precision munitions allows for
the employment of indirect fire systems with a reduced threat of collateral damage.
2. Indirect Fire Effects. Indirect artillery fire has only limited effects on targets within walls
and masonry structures. Rounds tend to impact on roofs or upper stories rather than
structurally critical wall areas or pillars:
a. Weapons of at least 155 mm are necessary against thick reinforced concrete,
stone or brick walls. Even with heavy artillery, large expenditures of ammunition
are required to knock down buildings of any size. Tall buildings also create areas
of indirect fire dead space, which are areas that cannot be engaged by indirect
fire due to a combination of building height and angle of fall of the projectile (see
Figure 4–8). Usually the dead space for low-angle indirect fire is about five times
the height of the highest building over which the rounds must pass.
b. The effectiveness of artillery in terms of defeating or neutralizing a point target is
limited due to its circular probable error and the shelter provided to the enemy by
buildings in terms of reducing fragmentation. Desires to limit collateral damage
have also limited the use of artillery in recent urban battles. However, the
development of precision munitions allows for first round hits of point enemy
targets and greatly reduces the chance and extent of collateral damage. At
times, mass artillery fires will be required, but in many instances of the
contemporary operating environment (COE), when battles are often fought in the
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-23
midst of populated areas, the demand to use only precision munitions will
increase.
Figure 4–8: Indirect Fire Dead Space (Low Angle)

3. Direct Fire Effects. Towed and self-propelled artillery pieces may be used in the direct
fire role to support offensive action. The most likely use of artillery in an urban direct fire role is
to reinforce tank fire against well-protected or important urban targets. Due to their availability
and habitual relationship with infantry, tanks remain a more common means of direct fire
support than artillery. Should the commander decide to deploy a part of his artillery forward to
give direct fire support to the infantry, artillery will have the same need for close security and
target designation as do DFS elements. Light guns of 105 mm will have less effect on fortified
structures than the larger 155 mm calibre in either the direct or indirect roles.
4. Employment. During offensive operations, likely artillery tasks will be:
a. neutralize and destroy the enemy;
b. mask enemy observation;
c. suppress enemy air defence (AD) systems;
d. illuminate the battlefield;
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e. intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR)

collection through forward target acquisition resources and forward observation
officer (FOO) parties;
f. destroy enemy light armoured vehicles;
g. protect the flanks;
h. engage enemy counterattacks; and
i. disrupt the movement of enemy reserves and supplies.
415. ENGI NEERS
1. Engineer advice will be essential in planning any attack in the urban area, even if major
obstacles are not anticipated. Apart from providing advice on mobility and counter-mobility, they
are well suited to assess the potential for collateral damage and recommend methods of limiting
such damage. Field engineers can support the break-in, assault, and consolidation phases. A
field troop or armoured engineer troop may well be put under infantry company command and
should work closely with the supported forces. Their tasks in offensive operations may include:
a. Provide engineer reconnaissance and assist in mobility by clearing mines, booby
traps, debris and obstacles.
b. Breach obstacles blocking mobility using various resources.
c. Assist in the assault by breaching buildings. Qualified infantry personnel may
employ simple explosive means, but fortifications or buildings that are more
complicated may require planned engineer specialist breaching in support of the
assault elements.
d. Prepare explosive charges to be used to breach buildings (e.g. mouse holes and
satchel charges).
e. Reduce enemy strong points using demolitions and heavy equipment.
f. Assist/advise in the consolidation by constructing hasty strong points and
obstacles.
g. Clear resupply routes.
h. Prepare helicopter landing zones.
i. Provide advice and expertise in general engineering functions, particularly in
terms of avoiding collateral damage, and assessing the priority and follow-on
reconstruction requirements.
j. When required, assuming their secondary role as infantry.
416. SNIPERS AND MARKSMEN
1. General. Snipers have always played a major role in modern urban combat. They have
been used to gain information through observation and surveillance, disrupt operations, inflict
casualties (through engagement of high value targets), and tie down large numbers of troops.
The lethality and accuracy of modern weapons, and the three-dimensional aspect of urban
battlefields, make them a serious threat. Heavier calibre weapons allow them to extend their
ranges and undertake anti-material tasks. Commanders and leaders at all levels must be aware
of the value of employing snipers and the threat posed by enemy snipers. They must
understand the effects a sniper can have on unit operations, and the steps by which snipers can
be countered and the threat minimized.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-25
2. Employment. The use of snipers will be a key force multiplier for a unit or sub-unit
involved in an offensive operation. Their tasks will be set by a higher commander but will
possibly affect operations down to platoon level. In a non-contiguous battlespace, they may be
allocated down to sub-unit level command. Knowledge of sniper tasks and coordination with
them will greatly influence any offensive operation. During offensive operations snipers could
be tasked with the following:
a. Counter-sniper operations.
b. Overwatch of manoeuvring forces.
c. Flank protection, particularly during offensive operations against insurgents and
other lightly armed enemy.
d. Suppressing enemy defensive positions.
e. Engaging high priority targets to include commanders, vehicles, and key
equipment and personnel (e.g. crew-served weapons, FOOs).
f. Providing fire support for the assault.
g. Gathering information.
h. Calling and adjusting fires.
3. Deployment and Coordination. The sniper team will be given an area of operation in
which to conduct their tasks, which must be closely coordinated with forward fighting elements
to limit the chance of fratricide. To increase security and surprise, snipers should move into
position in advance of the main force and reposition themselves as required during the assault.
They may occupy a higher position that is to the rear or flank and some distance away from the
element they are supporting. By operating far from the other elements, a sniper avoids decisive
engagement but remains close enough to kill distant targets threatening the unit.
4. Sniper Positioning. Snipers will be able to advise commanders on how they can best
support the commander’s intent and fulfil the assigned tasks. They should be afforded as much
freedom as possible in the selection of their positions. Snipers must not be confined to
operations in areas where obvious positions such as church steeples and rooftops dominate the
area, since the enemy often observes these positions and targets them as defensive fire
targets. Snipers should also not be positioned where there is heavy traffic because these areas
invite enemy observation. Snipers should operate throughout the AO, moving with and
supporting units as necessary. Some teams may be tasked in independent searches for targets
of opportunity, especially in the counter-sniper role. The team may occupy multiple positions,
since a single position may not afford adequate observation for the entire team and could
increase the risk of enemy detection. Forward troops must be aware of the sniper positions to
avoid friendly fires, and if necessary, assist in their extraction.
5. Employment Considerations for Snipers. An effective sniper group can disrupt the
enemy a great deal and create effects disproportional to their numbers. During employment
planning, the following should be considered:
a. General areas (e.g. a building or group of buildings) are designated as sniper
positions, but the sniper selects the best position for engagement. Masonry
buildings that offer the best protection, long-range fields of observation and fire,
and all-round observation are preferred. The sniper also selects several
secondary positions to cover his areas of responsibility. However, sniper
positions should not be limited to buildings.
4-26 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
b. Engagement priorities for snipers are determined by the relative importance of

the targets to the effective operations of the enemy. Sniper targets usually
include commanders, enemy snipers, and the personnel of crew-served
weapons. During offensives against insurgent forces employing guerrilla tactics,
snipers will be most effective in killing the insurgents withdrawing from their
positions.
c. Built-up areas often limit snipers to firing down or across streets, but open areas
permit engagements at long ranges. Snipers can be employed to cover rooftops,
obstacles, dead space, and gaps.
d. Snipers employed on open flanks can greatly interdict enemy movement.
6. Platoon Marksmen. Designated and specially equipped marksmen in the infantry
section or platoon also provide advantages. Although they can be employed in many of the
same roles as snipers, they are given tasks that support the immediate platoon and section-
level missions. Therefore, they are kept under the control of the platoon or section commander,
and given specific tasks to affect immediate operations.
417. TACTICAL AVIATION—HELICOPTERS
1. General Employment and Tasks. Tactical aviation (tac avn) helicopters can play a
vital role in the urban battle. They may be used in any of the following roles:
a. ISTAR support.
b. Overwatch and flank security/protection (depending upon the level of armament).
c. Movement of troops and airmobile insertion (ground and rooftop).
d. Direct fire support (if armed or armoured platform).
e. Indirect fire support coordination.
f. Resupply.
g. CASEVAC.
2. Airmobile Troop Insertions. The employment of tac avn assets to move troops around
the urban battlefield offers significant advantages, but can entail certain risk. It will normally
require a favourable air situation, and minimal enemy ground based air defence (GBAD), to
reduce much of the vulnerabilities. Troops may be inserted onto a flank of the urban area, into
an urban area to seize a key node, saturate an area, or to out-flank and cut-off enemy
movement. Additionally, troops may be inserted onto a rooftop in small numbers to assist in the
capture of a key building or complex.
3. Small-scale Airmobile Insertions. Platoons or sections may land on the rooftop of a
key building to seize the building and clear it of enemy. Although such a tactic will exploit
surprise and allow for a potentially rapid clearance of a structure by going top to bottom, it does
run some significant risk. The recovery of casualties will be slow (e.g. moving the casualty back
up the building); withdrawing from the building will be impossible should the resistance prove to
be too great; and, reinforcement will be difficult, if not impossible. Success will depend upon
minimum exposure and the suppression of all enemy positions that could fire on the
helicopter(s). The insertion must be preceded by a confirmation that no obstacles exist (e.g.
electrical wires, telephone poles, antennas, mines and wire) that could damage either the
helicopter or the deplaning troops. Depending upon the construction of the roof, rappelling or
fast roping troops may be more of an advantage than landing them on the rooftop. The rappel
or fast rope technique is often more reliable and safer for the troops than a jump from a low
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 4-27
hover. With practise, a rappel or fast rope insertion can be accomplished very quickly with
minimum exposure. Obviously, thorough training must have taken place before any such option
should be considered.
4. Movement of Troops and Supplies. Once objectives and routes have been secured,
tac avn can be used for the movement of additional troops and supplies. Troops may be used
to reinforce positions in forward areas or isolated nodes. Additionally, tac avn assets may be
used to resupply such forward areas or isolated positions. Commanders must always be
mindful of the need to secure suitable landing zones (LZs) as they clear and capture positions.
Sports fields, parking lots, and large building tops provide suitable LZs. In all cases, LZs for tac
avn reinforcement and resupply must be sited so that they are out of direct line of sight and fire
from the enemy.
5. Casualty Evacuation. Tac avn assets will likely be dedicated to the evacuation of
casualties at the start of an operation. However, there will likely be a requirement for all
available air assets to exploit their mobility and speed to evacuate as many casualties as
possible. Hence, tac avn used for troop movement and resupply, and not specifically configured
for casualty evacuation, can still be used in this capacity as available. In this regard, once
helicopters unload their supplies or troops in a forward location, they can be used to evacuate
serious casualties to field medical facilities. Given that these helicopters will not be provided
with medics, commanders will have to consider sending their medics back with any casualties
evacuated by such ad hoc means.
6. Fire Support. Tac avn can also be exploited for fire support. Armed helicopters in
support can be used for flank protection, and as part of a tactical plan, to neutralize point enemy
positions. They will be most useful in assisting forces in protecting the flanks of other forces
conducting an urban thrust to a specific objective. Employment will depend upon the type of
helicopter and level of armament carried. Helicopters can also be used as a platform for indirect
fire controllers.
7. ISTAR Support. Tac avn can be used in support of an ISTAR plan. The mounting of
sensors on the airframes will prove advantageous in planning and conducting operations.
During operations, commanders must be positioned to command and lead their troops on the
ground. Moreover, observers and liaison officers (LOs) can be flown by tac avn to warn of
enemy movement and intentions.
4-28 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
CHAPTER 5
OFFENSIVE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
SECTION 1
GENERAL
1. During any campaign, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) will vary and will
change continuously over time, as forces come to know the environment and enemy, and the
enemy adapts itself to the situation and changes their TTP. Commanders follow and balance
the over-arching principles, but TTP are adjusted to the situation.
2. In preparing for urban operations (UO), commanders must ensure their troops develop
sound, well-practised and disciplined TTP. During operations, leaders must ensure that they
are applied with common sense and flexibility. These two demands must be balanced during
training so that TTP are rationally applied to best effect.
SECTION 2
FUNDAMENTALS FOR SECTION AND PLATOON URBAN ATTACKS
3. The standard fundamentals for any offensive operation remain extant regardless of the
environment. During offensive operations in urban terrain, tactical level commanders should
give specific consideration to the following:
a. Simple Planning. Commanders must develop a simple and flexible plan that
allows subordinate commanders and soldiers to exercise initiative. A plan must
employ the following:
(1) Short bounds and limited objectives (e.g. a room or house at a time).
This allows the attacking force to consolidate and guard against possible
counterattacks while maintaining momentum.
(2) Having a firm base from which all movement can be covered by fire.
Sections should move from one foothold to another. Each foothold is
secured until the next is obtained, and serves as a rally point should a
temporary withdrawal have to be conducted.
b. Control. Control in street fighting is difficult because of restricted observation,
and because fighting tends to be conducted as small, independent actions. This
demands initiative and aggressiveness at the lowest level and decentralized
control. Platoon and section commanders must always be well forward to make
quick decisions and to control the fighting. Notwithstanding this level of
independent action, detailed coordination and control is key to ensure proper
support between section and platoon actions.
c. Thoroughness. Each objective must be cleared thoroughly and consolidated.
Every building, room, attic, cellar, garden shed, large drain, sewer, etc. must be
checked. Walls must be checked for mouse holes (including searching for
hidden ones), especially in the upper floors and attics of terraced houses and
apartments.
d. Momentum. The attack must be planned in depth, and the platoon commander
must be well forward to make quick decisions and issue orders for quick attacks.
As each objective is taken, consolidation must be carried out rapidly. This will
ensure that the momentum of the attack is maintained.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-1
e. Supporting Fire. Open spaces, particularly main roads, are enemy killing
zones. Before crossing these spaces, advancing troops must have fire support
to cover their movement. There must be no movement, especially into open
areas, unless there is covering/supporting fire. Maximum use must be made of
smoke and all the weapons at the platoon and section’s disposal. Before any
action is taken, commanders must ensure that appropriate, coordinated
supporting fire is planned, be it section light machine guns (LMGs) covering
down a hallway, or a platoon light armoured vehicle (LAV) suppressing
supporting enemy positions during the break-in to a building.
SECTION 3
SECTION COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION
501. GENERAL
1. Despite centralized planning, the urban battle will be conducted in a decentralized
fashion and will be won or lost at the section and platoon level. Rifle sections and their
competent command will always carry the day in the urban battle. Platoons and sections can
be temporarily task-tailored in various ways to make the best use of their weapon systems, but
in all situations, a careful appreciation of the objective and enemy threat must be made at each
level in the formulation of a plan.
2. Sections will have key but limited responsibilities in the conduct of an attack. A section,
supported by the rest of the platoon and other elements may be responsible for the breach (i.e.
forced entry of a structure) and the clearing of the initial room or floor. In a small building or in
an operation in which the enemy is dispersed (such as in a counter-insurgency [COIN]), it may
be responsible for the clearing of the entire structure. Commanders must always be well
forward to understand the immediate situation, and section commanders cannot hesitate to
seek reinforcement if necessary.
502. KEY ASPECTS FOR SECTION TACTICS AND DRILLS
1. All actions, even those that occur at close quarters must be planned and executed in
detail. They are based upon sound and well-practised drills, but led through robust, practical,
and flexible command that can react effectively to the unexpected. Units must train, practise,
and rehearse building and room clearing techniques until each assault group and section
operates smoothly. In leading the section level tactics, section commanders must apply and
balance key principles:
a. Surprise. This is the key to a successful assault at close quarters. The assault
group or section clearing the room must achieve surprise, if only for seconds, by
deceiving, distracting, or startling the enemy. Tactical lights, diversionary
devices, and stealth should be used to achieve surprise.
b. Speed. Speed provides a level of momentum for the force and provides a
measure of security to the clearing group. Speed has different levels of
application. It allows soldiers to use the first few vital seconds provided by
surprise to their maximum advantage. In precision room clearing, speed is not
how fast you enter the room, rather it is how fast the threat is eliminated and the
room is cleared. Other principles should not be completely sacrificed for the
sake of speed. Good control and the proper coordination of the required combat
power will ensure success and save lives.
c. Control. Control is not only exercised by robust command of the section
commander, but also through well-practised drills and techniques. The
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Offensive Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
controlled, precise application of deadly force and violence will quickly eliminate
the threat and minimize collateral damage. To realize good control, good
communications must be practised.
d. Communications. Communications in all its forms is vital for the successful
conduct of offensive operations in the dense urban terrain. This will facilitate the
other principles, and when required, will ensure rapid reinforcement and support
from the remainder of the platoon.
503. SECTION ORGANIZATION
1. General. The rifle section, like the rifle platoon itself, can be tasked-tailored to
complement any plan and situation. To the greatest extent possible, section integrity within the
platoon should be maintained. A section commander should be able to lead in battle those
whom he trained and knows best.
2. Factors affecting Section Organization. UO are not conducted in sterile, isolated or
ideal conditions. Numerous factors will influence the section and platoon organization, and
platoon commanders together with the platoon second-in-command (2IC) and section
commanders, collectively consider the options. Some factors that will affect the decision as to
how the platoon and sections will be organized are as follows:
a. Platoon and section strength.
b. Location and intent of the enemy. The enemy may be dispersed and using
guerrilla tactics that cause them to engage and rapidly withdraw.
c. Type and size of buildings and rooms to be cleared. Urban slum type buildings
will not have large rooms, and therefore, assault groups will have to be small in
number.
d. The immediate mission and plan. If the platoon has a concentrated objective that
can be isolated, then a separate support section can be created and the other
sections simply organized and tasked to clear. If the sections are operating in a
dispersed fashion with their own objectives, then sections may be best to retain
their own support groups.
3. Basic Manning. Tactics are based on the building block of pairs, and more often, are
based on the “brick” of four soldiers. The options for organizing a rifle section are based upon
the premise that the section will consist of eight troops, or two bricks of four, including the
section commander. In a mechanized LAV section, the vehicle is considered the 8th man in the
section. When separated from the vehicle (e.g. when inside a building), the section commander
will adjust techniques and drills accordingly. When operating in UO, the platoon commander
may opt to assign the individuals from the platoon weapons detachment (wpns det) to each of
the rifle sections, thereby creating eight soldiers in each section. Rifle platoons from light
companies, with their support weapons section, have more options for section and platoon
organization.
4. Basic Section Organization. In many tactical situations, the section can be organized
along its basic structure with three components:
a. Command Group. The command group consists of the section commander and
one rifleman as the section linkman. The section commander coordinates
movement and supporting fire onto a section objective. Once inside a building,
he works with the assault group, directing the clearance of rooms and
coordinating section support fire. The section linkman remains at the entrance to
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-3
the building where he can relay messages from within the building to the
remainder of the platoon/company outside. He will be responsible for all
communications rearward to the platoon commander, for the marking of entrance
points, and for guiding a forward passage of lines.
b. Assault Group. The assault group consists of three or four riflemen, ideally
armed with rifles, vice support weapons. They affect entry into buildings and
clear objectives under the direction of their section commander. In many
circumstances, they should do so as a four-man team. In some situations (e.g. in
a building with many small rooms), they may act as two assault teams of two
riflemen each. They may include a breacher who is responsible for breaching a
door or window so that the others may enter. If necessary, the section
commander may act as part of this group.
c. Support Group. The support group should consist of the LMGs and section 2IC.
There may be a requirement for the section 2IC to operate one of the LMGs, thus
freeing one of the LMG gunners to become a rifleman in the assault group or to
act as the linkman. Alternatively, a senior LMG gunner can command this group
and the section 2IC can join the assault group. The support group is responsible
for providing support fire and security for the rest of the section. During the initial
breach and building entry, the group remains outside the building providing
covering fire for the assault. At platoon level, another section and the support
wpns det can provide covering fire. The LMGs can then join the rest of the
section and help to immediately secure the initial break-in. Once inside the
building, the support group should be directed to secure the footholds, covering
the hallways, stairwells and rooms not yet cleared. The support group can also
be employed to act as cut-off to prevent an enemy withdrawal from the complex.
5. Assault and Support Sections. Within the confines of an overarching platoon mission
and plan (e.g. the clearing and seizure of a specific block of buildings), the platoon commander
may choose to reorganize the sections within the platoon to reflect their tasks. In such a
situation, the platoon commander can regroup the sections to create two clearing (i.e. assault)
sections and one support section. The possible section structure within the platoon is as
follows:
a. Assault Section x 2:
(1) Assault Group—section commander and three riflemen.
(2) Assault Group—section 2IC and three riflemen.
NOTE
LMG gunners have been moved to the support section.
b. Support Section x 1. Section commander, section 2IC, and six LMG gunners.
They can be employed as detailed above for the support group within a section.
NOTE
Riflemen from the support section have been moved to the assault sections.
6. Additional Organizational Options and Considerations:
5-4 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
a. The rifle section can be organized in any manner to suit the operation. Ideally,
initial building and room entry is conducted by an assault group of four soldiers
armed with rifles. This will not always be possible and will be adjusted to suit
various factors, such as the number of troops conducting the clearance, the size
of the rooms, and the tactics of the enemy.
b. M203 (40 mm grenade launcher) gunners are effective in breaching doors and
windows, and can be placed with a support group or with the assault group.
c. LMG gunners, placed as part of a support group, should be used to support the
building entry, act as cut-off, support room entry by suppressing enemy positions,
and to secure rooms once they have been taken. If they are not needed to
provide support to their own section, then they can immediately follow the assault
and be assigned support and security tasks as required. Once inside the
building, the support group should be allocated to securing the footholds,
covering the hallways, stairwells and rooms not yet cleared.
d. When necessary, soldiers can be designated as breachers, responsible to
creating the entry point for a building or room. They should be constantly pushed
forward to the lead assault group and support the entry as required. The
breacher may have a shotgun as a primary weapon (useful for shooting off locks
and hinges) and should only enter the room once it has been controlled. Soldiers
should never follow their own breach; that is, the soldier who does the breach,
does not lead the clearance of the room.
e. Section 2ICs, like in trench clearing operations, should constantly position
themselves to the rear of their sections and allow section members to push past.
The section 2IC should facilitate the resupply and movement of casualties,
prisoners and non-combatants to the platoon headquarters (HQ) / casualty
collection point (CCP).
f. Depending upon the situation, company and platoon commanders have several
options available to reinforce rifle sections. Soldiers from support wpns dets (e.g.
from LAV companies) or support weapons sections and platoons (e.g. from light
infantry companies) may be allocated to rifle sections. These additional riflemen
may be used as breachers or used as assault groups.
g. When working in a dispersed manner, such as clearing a lightly defended area,
or conducting an advance to contact or saturation of the urban areas, section and
platoon commanders should consider retaining the normal section organization
of two groups (i.e. two four-man bricks), each with a LMG. This will ensure each
brick has integral LMG fire to suppress encountered enemy until reinforcement
can arrive. Once more groups have concentrated on the threat, the section or
platoon commander can quickly reorganize the section(s) to conduct a clearance.
7. Role of the Linkman. A linkman may be employed at the section or platoon level. The
increased distribution of radio communications to section level has somewhat reduced the role
of a dedicated linkman, but there will remain a need to mark entrances and guide ambulances,
assorted direct fire systems, and follow-on troops. If the situation demands that the section
commander and/or linkman join the assault groups, the section commander must be prepared
to assign one soldier as a linkman when required. When a linkman is assigned, he may have
some of the following responsibilities:
a. Remain in contact with the section support group until it rejoins the section.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-5
b. Remain in contact with the platoon commander or follow-on section as required.

c. Pass information and signals as required.
d. Act as a guide for follow-on sections, DFS elements moving forward, and
casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) teams.
e. Indicate to incoming groups the cleared route through the building or where to
reach the section commander.
f. Warn of any enemy counterattack.
g. Mark the entry point in accordance with standing operating procedures (SOP).
SECTION 4
SECTION ENTRY AND CLEARANCE TACTICS
504. GENERAL
1. Sections gaining entry into a building or complex of buildings can be done in isolation or
with support from other elements of the platoon. Mechanized sections will make the best use of
their vehicles to support such entries, while light infantry sections may require support from the
platoon weapons section or company support weapons platoon.
505. SECTION DRILLS FOR BUILDING ENTRY AND CLEARANCE
1. Upon receipt of orders from the platoon commander for a task to assault and/or clear a
building, the section commander will reconnoitre the objective, make a plan and issue a
fragmentary order to include the following:
a. Entry—assault team or group, method, entry point, and breachers if necessary.
b. Support element—fire position, arcs of fire and targets to suppress, use of
smoke, and coordination of other platoon assets.
c. Support from other elements and arms.
d. Routes to be used—approach and assault.
e. Sequence following the entry.
f. Limit of exploitation (LOE) for the entry group/team, usually the initial foothold to
be secured.
g. Consolidation plan.
2. If it is known that the building to be assaulted contains enemy, then the section
commander should ensure fire support from an armoured vehicle. Speed should never override
the requirement for support and security or failure will likely occur. Section commanders will
have to carefully coordinate support and security with supporting elements, be they the section’s
LMGs, LAV, or other support elements.
3. In many second and third world countries, buildings will comprise of a structure
surrounded by a walled courtyard. Often, the wall will be more than 2.0 m in height and include
a metal gate, solid doorway, or both. Hence, before clearing the main building, the courtyard
and any outbuildings will have to be breached, secured, and cleared.
4. In general, the section uses the following sequence of drills to force entry to a building
and establish its foothold:
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a. The section commander issues his fragmentary order, ensuring full coordination
between supporting vehicles, any platoon fire support, and if used, his own
supporting element.
b. The lead assault group, with the support of a breacher, initially does the breach
and entry, on order and once sufficient support has been established. A four-
man, or depending upon the situation, a two-man group may be used to initially
enter. This reduces the number of personnel exposed in the approach and entry,
but it limits the combat power that may be needed to defeat enemy initially
encountered inside the building. If a breacher is required to breach a lock or
remove a door, then he should be in addition to the entry assault group.
c. The assault group, with any breacher, moves, on order, under cover of the
support elements to the designated entry point. If an armoured vehicle main
armament is used to create a breach, then the assault group is held back until
the breach is created. The breach may have created rubble that will have to be
cleared before entry is gained.
d. Once the assault element moves to the breach, they stack up along the wall next
to the opening with all-round security, in all three dimensions. This security
should be provided by other elements of the section and platoon, but may have
to be covered by the members of the assault group as they prepare for the entry.
e. Under command of the section commander or assault group commander, the
assault group enters the entry point, having used a grenade or diversionary
device if deemed appropriate. The initial room or two are cleared and
consolidation ordered. Once security is established and an initial search has
been done of the entry room(s), the remainder of the section can be ordered into
the building.
f. This will be the initial foothold for the clearance of the rest of the building. The
section and platoon will move from secured foothold to foothold. If the section
has to temporarily withdraw following stiff resistance, it can use the previous
foothold as a rally point.
g. The detailed drills for the actual breach and room entry are based upon those
given below for room clearance. The commander, and soldiers, as required,
adjust drills depending upon the terrain, threat and the soldiers themselves.
506. METHODS OF APPROACH AND CLEARING
1. General. During the attack on and clearing of a structure, the section commander can
use three methods of approach to achieve entry into and clearance of the structure:
a. dynamic;
b. stealth; and
c. transitional.
2. Dynamic. The dynamic approach is violently aggressive from start to finish. The
commands are verbal and yelled. Fragmentation grenades and distraction devices are used to
gain the advantage of surprise. At night, tactical white lights are employed to assist in the
clearance. The movement of the group is swift and overwhelming.
3. Stealth. The stealth approach is exactly the opposite of the dynamic approach. The
assault force places breaching charges quietly, moves slowly, speaks only in whispers, and
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-7
listens for any movement within the house. During night operations or in darkened buildings,
night vision aids and laser pointers are used instead of tactical (white) lights. The stealth
approach confuses the enemy on exactly where the assault force is in clearing the structure and
allows the assault force to maintain the element of surprise.
4. Transitional. This approach is a combination of the dynamic and stealth methods. The
clearing force moves quietly to and/or through the building, keeping their actual position in the
building concealed, until they actually conduct the entry itself. Upon entry into the room,
soldiers are violently aggressive and conduct a dynamic entry. After the room is cleared, the
assault force switches back to the stealth method of entry. This type of approach maintains
some element of surprise against the enemy while making best use of speed, aggression, and
violence at the point of contact.
5. Training and Employment of Approach Methods. Platoon and section commanders
must train their troops in all three types of approach methods and conduct them in operations.
This will help prevent the enemy from predicting the methods and intents, and help keep the
enemy off balance.
507. TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP CLEARING
1. General. Buildings may be cleared from the bottom to the top, or from the top to the
bottom. Each tactic has advantages and disadvantages as discussed hereunder. The decision
as to how to clear a building will be done in conjunction with the platoon commander so that the
platoon may appropriately support the clearing section.
2. Top-down Clearing. Buildings may be entered from the roof or upper stories and
cleared downwards to the ground or basement levels. In many foreign countries, buildings will
have flat roofs that, once secured, will provide a good foothold for clearing the lower stories.
However, the rooftop may be vulnerable to fire from nearby buildings, and therefore, must be
secured with all-round covering fire before the start of clearing. Top-down clearing provides the
following advantages and disadvantages:
a. Advantages:
(1) Moving from the top down may surprise and throw the enemy off balance.
The enemy’s defences may not be prepared for a top-down assault and
the assault force could overwhelm them rapidly.
(2) The assault force has more momentum when moving with gravity, down
the stairs and ladder wells.
(3) If the assault force knows that the enemy is inside the structure, the roof
can be breached in order for grenades and explosives to be dropped onto
the enemy.
(4) The enemy escape routes are greatly reduced because the section and
platoon will have deployed covering and cut-off elements.
b. Disadvantages:
(1) Once the assault force is under contact, pulling out of the structure is
extremely difficult. This limits the options a commander has to engage
the enemy. The structure must be flooded with assault forces, and
soldiers will have to go overtop of casualties to kill the enemy.
Momentum may be lost as the reinforcement of clearing troops may be
difficult.
5-8 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
(2) If the assault force breaks contact, they will be moving opposite to their
momentum and more casualties can result.
(3) Assault forces may not have enough soldiers to effectively flood the
structure.
(4) If friendly casualties occur, they are nearly impossible to pull back to the
entry point with all their gear and physical weakness. This is another
reason the structure must be flooded.
(5) Friendly casualties will not receive immediate first aid due to the
difficulties in evacuation and because the entire assault force must be
committed to immediate neutralization of the threat.
3. Bottom-Up Clearing. Most buildings will likely be cleared after entry is gained at
ground level. This tactic will likely provide more cover from surrounding buildings. In many
foreign countries, buildings will be surrounded by a walled compound, which must be breached
and secured before clearing the building. Once the compound has been breached, the support
element can deploy to secure the area and clear any small outbuildings. Once secure, the main
building or buildings may be entered and cleared. The advantages and disadvantages of
bottom-up clearing are as follows:
a. Advantages:
(1) Commanders have many options when contact is made. The structure
does not have to be flooded.
(2) Momentum can be maintained in assaulting or breaking contact, and
commanders can switch rapidly from one to the other.
(3) The structure can be cleared with fewer solders because the clearing is
more controlled and smooth, whereas top-down clearing must be done
with speed.
(4) Casualties can be pulled out faster and easier simply because gravity is
working for the assault force.
b. Disadvantages:
(1) The assault force is moving into the enemy’s defences. It is easy for the
enemy to hold second stories and stair/ladder wells. The clearing
element is susceptible to grenades and fire from upper stories.
(2) The assault force moves slowly up the stair/ladder wells, which makes it
harder to maintain momentum.
(3) The enemy can have the ability to escape by using pre-planned
withdrawal routes.
SECTION 5
SECTION CLEARING DRILLS
508. GENERAL
1. Detailed drills carried out by a rifle section are used in gaining entry to a building or when
clearing the building room to room. Like all drills, they are adjusted to meet the situation.
Commanders must remember that building entry and room clearances do not occur in sterile,
isolated environments. They are part of a dynamic, fluid situation that is continuously affected
by a myriad of factors, which must be incorporated into training environments.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-9
Section and platoon commanders must train and practise their subordinates in varying
situations and configurations. The drills given hereunder are based upon a four-man assault
group, which may be an ideal situation. This may not always be practical or feasible; for
instance, small rooms in a complex may not support a four-man assault, the manning may not
allow for a four-man assault, or other tasks may be required, and given the assessed threat, the
size of the clearing group must be balanced with other tactical task requirements. Section
commanders must be ready to adjust drills and techniques, and soldiers must be trained for a
variety of contingencies.
509. COMPONENTS OF BUILDING CLEARING
1. Sequence. It is very important that platoon commanders, section commanders and
soldiers have a solid understanding of the drills involved in interior combat, and be able to adjust
them to meet any situation. The following is the sequence of clearance drills:
a. Approach.
b. Staging.
c. Entry.
d. Dominate room and neutralize threat.
e. Control the room and room search.
f. CASEVAC.
g. Cursory search of enemy and non-combatants (i.e. once a room is cleared).
h. Situation report (SITREP) (i.e. once a room is secure).
i. Evacuation of all non-combatants and combatants.
j. Follow-on action. This may include evacuation of the room, securing it for the
next foothold, supporting the forward passage of another section, or directly
proceeding to eliminate an additional threat in the immediate vicinity.
2. Approach. Commanders must vary the method of approach to and through a building
between the dynamic, stealth, and transitional methods described in the above section. The
objective is to keep the enemy off balance.
3. Staging. A simple, well-rehearsed plan will help ensure a successful entry. Under the
command of the section commander, soldiers form a stack outside the point of entry and
receive final instructions from the section commander and/or assault group commander.
Soldiers must remain flexible and aware, as they will encounter a variety of structures to
assault.
4. Entry. Whatever method of entry that the assaulting force employs, entry must be
guaranteed to the greatest extent possible. If substantial enemy resistance is expected or
known, time should be taken to ensure sufficient force and support is available to defeat the
threat. To maximize surprise and ensure speed of movement, the entry should be close to the
objective.
5. Dominate Room and Neutralize the Threat. Movement must as fast as possible while
retaining the ability to assess the threat and accurately engage all targets. Soldiers are not in a
one-man fight, but are team members working in mutual support of one another.
6. Control the Room and Evacuate the Casualties. All immediate threats must be
neutralized before there is any movement to clear the room. There may be combatants and
5-10 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
non-combatants who need to be verbally controlled. The entry team must communicate to
secure danger areas, obstacles, and arcs of fire. Once the room is controlled, the section
commander or group commander directs a search of the room with some members searching
and other members covering. Those covering must pay special attention to other entry points,
mouse holes or holes in the ceiling. Soldiers must be aware of the threat of booby traps and of
enemy hidden in closets or behind furniture. Once the room is controlled (and before a detailed
search has begun), casualties that occurred in the entry/clearance should be evacuated.
7. Cursory Search of Enemy and Non-combatants. All personal found in the room must
be searched. The situation will dictate where this is completed. At least a cursory search must
be done before their removal from the room. This will be done in pairs, one covering, and one
searching. The rest of the team will cover the room.
8. Situation Report. Troops must continue to control the room and cover any potential
threats and entry points. All combatants and non-combatants are to be counted and
segregated. The section commander sends a situation report (via the radio, or if necessary,
verbally via the linkman) to the platoon commander. Depending upon the tactical situation,
explosive and medical experts can move as close as possible to offer immediate support.
9. Evacuation of all Non-combatants. If non-combatants are to be evacuated, then they
should be removed first. They should be taken back to the platoon CCP and turned over
soonest to the military police (MP) or follow-on troops. The platoon 2IC will control the platoon
CCP and this can contain medical and MP support. If non-combatants are to remain in place,
any requiring immediate medical support shall receive care. If a threat in the next room or
remainder of the building must be defeated before any safe evacuation occurs, then the non-
combatants must be calmed, controlled, and placed in as safe a location as possible until the
threat is defeated.
10. Evacuation of all Combatants. Any captured enemy will be evacuated only after the
non-combatants and wounded friendly forces. Combatants are evacuated to the company
prisoner of war (PW) / detainee collection point and passed to the MP or follow-on troops.
11. Follow-on Action. In certain situations, the entry group may be evacuated from the
room, or possibly, the entire structure. In most cases, this secured room will be the next
foothold for the continued clearing of the structure. Otherwise, the room is marked as cleared,
and it is secured until the remainder of the floor or building is cleared.
510. APPROACH—CLEARI NG METHODS
1. As described above, during the attack on and clearing of a structure, the assault force
can use three methods of approach—dynamic, stealth, and transitional. Commanders must
ensure their troops are practised in all three. Section commanders should vary their use to
keep the enemy off balance.
511. STAGI NG
1. Forming the Stack. Under the direction of the section commander, the entry point is
confirmed and the entry group prepared for entry. Near the entry point, the group forms a linear
queue, or line-up known as the “stack.” Here, they are given confirmatory direction from the
section commander and/or group commander. Ideally, the entry group consists of four soldiers,
but this may not be always possible or desirable, and commanders and troops must be able to
adjust drills for working in three-man teams or even pairs. Breachers may also be assigned in
addition to the entry group.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-11
2. Numbering the Stack. While in the stack preparing for entry, the entry group (i.e.
assault group) personnel are identified by number. They should be armed with rifles, not
support weapons. The lead soldier is number one (1) and number designation continues in this
manner to the last soldier, number four (4). The group leader is usually the number three (3).
Additional soldiers can be included, such as the breacher (number 5), but only a maximum of
four (4) personnel with rifles will initially enter the room. Once it has been determined that the
team will enter a structure or room, their focus will be on the objective.
3. Considerations in Staging. It is the responsibility of commanders to ensure that the
entry team has all-around protection provided from the other elements of the section or platoon.
If this is not possible, then members of the stack must cover off three-dimensional arcs while
they stage the entry. The following considerations must be planned for prior to staging:
a. Primary and an alternative entry points must be planned.
b. Other members of the section or platoon provide all-round protection for the entry
team. If this is not possible, the entry group covers off the arcs while preparing
for entry.
c. The entry point must be as close to the objective as possible. This is usually a
doorway or window into the room or building, but may be a created or planned
breach hole.
d. Avoid areas of potential compromise; that is, areas that are likely covered by
enemy observation and supporting fire.
e. Explosives (if used) are placed with weapons on safe and safety distances
observed. The gap to the entry point can be covered while the enemy is
recovering from the explosive entry (if used).
f. Verbal communications should be quiet and hand signals used.
g. Ideally, if high-explosive (HE) grenades are not employed, the entry group should
make use of diversionary devices such as tactical lights or stun grenades.
Stealth may also be employed as a means of entry.
h. All danger areas must be covered during the staging.
i. The tactical situation and structure will dictate the form of the stack and entry
method.
4. Possible Entry Points. Staging can occur at various types of entry/breach points and
can be achieved through the following:
a. doors—open, closed or barricaded;
b. mouse holes;
c. low windows;
d. high windows;
e. roofs; and
f. breach points created by explosives, mechanical means, or direct fire support
weapons.
5. Open Doors. Once the section commander has identified a possible entry point, during
the approach the number one (1) will report if it is open or closed, and will inspect the door. The
following sequence should be employed during staging:
5-12 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
a. The number one (1) will state what he sees, “Open Door Left/Right.” The section
commander will order to prepare for entry and the entry group will stack as
indicated. The command for this is, “Stack Left/Right.”
b. The stack should be done 15–30 cm off the wall to avoid ricochets. All soldiers
are to be behind the number one (1), using him for front protection.
Figure 5–1: Staging with Open Door. Note that if other members of the section are not providing
all-round defence, this would have to be done by members of the entry team
c. Only the number one (1) will have his weapon in the ready and conduct a limited
view into the room. In doing so, he must not expose himself beyond the
entryway. He simply covers any portion of the room visible from the stack
position. The remainder of the group will close up and have their weapons down,
remaining muzzle aware. All-around protection of the group is provided by the
platoon. Again, if this is not possible, the members of the entry team must cover
all-round arcs.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-13
Figure 5–2: No 1 in Stack Conducting a Limited View into Room
Figure 5–3: Stack Spacing From Wall
5-14 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
d. Once ordered to make entry by the commander, the number four (4) will initiate
the “squeeze up” (see below), which is passed along to the number one (1), thus
indicating all in the stack are ready.
e. When the number one (1) receives this signal, or the grenade detonates, he will
initiate the assault by moving into the room. See below for further details of the
entry itself.
6. Closed Doors. As with the previous drill, during the approach the number one (1) will
confirm if the door is open or closed, and will inspect it. The following sequence should be
employed during staging:
a. The number one (1) will state what he sees, “Closed Door Left/Right.” The entry
group will stack up and prepare for entry. The command for this is, “Stack
Left/Right.”
b. Once ordered to assault this room, the number one (1) recognizing that it is a
closed door will call for the “breacher” or fifth man, or the section commander will
order the breacher forward upon receiving the report from the number one (1).
The command for this is, “Breacher Up.”
Figure 5–4: Staging with Closed Door

c. The number one (1) will move past the door and provide front cover for the
breacher and the assault group. The number one (1) and number two (2) will
have their weapons at the ready, while the remainder of the group will close up
and continue to have their weapons down (unless covering off arcs).
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-15
Figure 5–5: No 1 Moves to Cover the Front

d. The initiation to enter the room is after the breacher gains entry and upon the
order of the section commander, or the detonation of a grenade or diversionary
device. See below for further details of the entry itself.
7. Split Stack. A split stack should be ordered when, due to the configuration of the
hallway or point of entry, the stack must have half of the entry group on one side of the door and
the other half on the opposite side. The split stack is ideal for a breach entry point that has
been caused by a direct fire weapon, for a breacher may be required to clear rubble before the
group enters. In this way, the adoption of a split stack will avoid the number one (1) having to
move to the far side of an open breach, thus exposing himself. The techniques employed are
very similar to staging for an open or closed door, and as are follows:
a. The lead group member or section commander will state what they observe,
“Open/Close Door Front.” The entry group will stack up on both sides of the
entry point and prepare for entry. The command for this is, “Split Stack.”
b. Two (2) members of the group will stage of the left of the open door, and the
other two (2) members of the group will stage on the right. Only the lead
member of each side will have their weapon in the ready and be conducting a
limited view into the room. The remainder of the group will close up and have
their weapons down (unless they are ordered to cover off all-round arcs).
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Figure 5–6: Staging in a Split Stack

c. Before being ordered to make entry by the commander, the section commander
will assign one of the soldiers as the lead or number one (1). The other soldiers
will then automatically adopt stack numbers with one (1) and two (2) on one side
of the point of entry, and three (3) and four (4) on the opposite side.
d. On order or following a grenade or diversionary device, the number one (1) will
initiate the assault.
8. Mouse Holes. Staging at a mouse hole is the same as staging on a closed door;
however, the following differences should be noted:
a. Once the breacher has set the explosive charge, he will determine the safe
distance required for detonation.
b. Once detonation occurs, the breacher may be required to manually finish the
breach or clear rubble.
c. If a DFS element or anti-Armour weapons are employed to create the breach,
safety distances must be respected.
d. Upon explosive detonation or the breacher completing the hole, the order to
enter the room is given. The same drills for any entry are then followed.
9. Low Windows. Entry through a low window is similar to a door entry; however, a few
techniques should be considered:
a. The number one (1) or section commander will state what he sees, “Window
Left/Right.” The entry group will stack up and prepare for entry. The command
for this is, “Stack Left/ Right.”
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-17
Figure 5–7: Staging for a Window Entry

b. Once ordered to assault, the number one (1) will call for the “breacher” or fifth
man, or the section commander will order the breacher forward. The command
for this is, “Breacher Up.”
c. The number one (1) will “step out,” away from the window, and provide cover into
the room for the breacher and the assault group. The number one (1) will have
his weapon in the ready. The number (2) conducts a limited view into the room,
while the remainder of the group will close up and continue to have their
weapons at the low ready. All-around protection of the group is provided by the
platoon. If this is not possible, then the section commander must adjust the arcs
to provide all-round protection. The number one (1) may be ordered to the other
side of the breacher to cover forward, and the number two (2) may have to step
out to cover into the room.
Figure 5–8: No 1 Steps Out to Cover into Room. Breacher Conducts the Breach
5-18 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
d. Once the breacher has completed clearing the window of obstacles, the use of
an assault ladder, vehicle, or another soldier can be employed to assist in entry if
required:
(1) Assault Ladder. Once the breacher has cleared the window, a soldier
can move forward to place and support the assault ladder for entry. This
soldier is the sixth (6) man in the stack. Note that if this number of
personnel is not available, then these tasks will have to be assumed by
the other members of the team, and the entry may have to be done by
only two troops. Other precautions can be taken, such as the use of
fragmentation grenades.
Figure 5–9: Use of Assault Ladder for Window Staging

(2) Vehicle. Once the breacher has cleared the window, a vehicle can
move forward to be used in place of a ladder.
(3) Soldier Assist. Once the breacher has cleared the window, a soldier
can move forward to assist the assault group during entry. This soldier is
the sixth (6) man in the stack, and will move up the window and adopt a
“low crouch” or “high crouch” position as appropriate and as detailed in
previous chapters.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-19
Figure 5–10: Soldier in Low Crouch Position as part of Staging for Entry
e. The initiation to enter the room occurs once the breacher gains entry, and if
required, the lift aid is put in place. Despite well-practised drills, the section
commander will continue to control and order subsequent movements and
actions.
10. High Window. This type of entry point requires the most preparation to achieve a
successful breach. The section commander may require additional time to plan and prepare for
this entry, and additional equipment may have to be brought forward in support. The methods
are similar to those used in a low window entry, with the additional considerations:
a. High window entry with a ladder uses six (6) soldiers in an ideal situation. If a
breacher is required, then ideally a second ladder and eight (8) soldiers are used.
b. If the use of a long assault ladder is contemplated, it must be prepared before
staging by silencing exposed metal and attaching safety lines.
c. Before the ladder is placed, it should be adjusted to the proper height so it will sit
just below the window sill.
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Figure 5–11: Ladder Preparation and Placement

d. The ladder is placed on order, and under security and covering fire provided by
the entry team and others in the section and platoon. Once the ladder is placed,
a soldier should be dedicated strictly to holding the ladder using the pre-applied
safety straps.
Figure 5–12: Ladder is Placed Under Cover from Section
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-21
Figure 5–13: Soldier Securing the Ladder

e. Before movement up the ladder has begun, a soldier should “step out” to provide
protection against the window. This may be a soldier in addition to the four in the
entry team, or it may be the last man of the entry team, as the number one (1)
and number (2) will have cleared the room by the time number four (4) is ready to
move up the ladder.
Figure 5–14: No 4 Steps Out to Cover Area of Entry Point
5-22 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
f. Movement up the ladder can be done using stealth, or the entry team can move
quickly and noisily. The number one (1) up the ladder will always have his
weapon aimed toward the threat. If stealth is necessary, he can move up the
ladder quietly and slowly by taking one rung at a time.
Figure 5–15: Stealth Movement by No 1 to Entry Point.

g. Number one (1) and number two (2) will be staggered on the ladder, and the
remainder of the group will close up at the bottom and be prepared to mount the
ladder. Note that two ladders may be used, particularly if a breacher is required
so that the breacher can move aside for entry team.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-23
Figure 5–16: Staging with No 1 and No 2

h. Only two soldiers will mount the ladder at any one time. The other two will cover
arcs with the other members of the section/platoon.
i. The breacher, if employed, should stage on a separate ladder while being
covered by the entry group and the other members of the section.
5-24 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 5–17: Breacher Covered by Entry Team. (Two ladders should be used.)
11. Roofs. Staging in this environment can include any of the above techniques. The main
consideration here is gaining access to the roof. Methods that can be employed in gaining roof
access are as follows:
a. helicopter insertion by landing, rappelling or fast roping;
b. ladder from the ground or from another building; and
c. movement from the top of one building to another.
12. Initiation of the Entry. Three methods are generally used to initiate the entry into a
room. A diversionary device should always be used if available when assaulting any unknown
area:
a. The Squeeze-up. This entry method is used when the assault group does not
use a diversionary device, or the stealth approach is being used. The following
sequence is taken:
(1) Once the room has been identified for assault, and the assault group is
ready to enter, the last soldier in the stack will squeeze up on the soldier
ahead on him to indicate that the he is ready.
(2) With his free hand, he must squeeze on the upper body of the man to his
front. Generally, this will be on the triceps because this is the only area of
skin exposed when wearing body armour.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-25
Figure 5–18: Squeeze-Up Signal that Team is Ready

(3) It must be a firm squeeze and always on the same arm so it is not
confused with an accidental bump.
(4) The signal is passed along the stack. Once the number one (1) has the
signal, he knows that all are ready and he may commence the entry.
b. Upon Diversionary Device or Fragmentation Grenade Detonation. The use
of a fragmentation grenade or diversionary device (e.g. a stun grenade) provides
advantages to the entry team. However, the dangers of a fragmentation grenade
must also be considered particularly if non-combatants are thought to be in the
area. The following procedure is followed when using grenades or diversionary
devices:
(1) Once a room has been identified for assault, and the entry group is ready
to enter, the last soldier in the stack will squeeze up on the soldier ahead
on him.
(2) Once this signal reaches the number two (2), he will remove the
diversionary device from the back of the number one (1), or a
fragmentation grenade from a grenade pouch.
5-26 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 5–19: Removal of Diversionary Device

(3) Number two (2) prepares the device or fragmentation grenade.
Figure 5–20: Preparation of Diversionary Device or Grenade

(4) Number two (2) crouches and moves beyond the number one (1) where
he has a visual into the entry area, or is in position to wait for the breach
to be complete.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-27
Figure 5–21: No 2 Prepares to Throw Device. (Note that this entry is being conducted with more
than four individuals.)
Figure 5–22: No 2 Prepares to Throw Device once Breach is Complete. (Note the No 1 is covering
forward and the breacher is ready to conduct a shotgun breach.)
(5) Number two (2) taps the leg of the number one (1) at thigh level and gets
a visual that the number one (1) is ready. In the case of a breacher being
used, the Number one (1) will be forward and thus, the Number two (2)
will co-ordinate with the Number three (3).
(6) Number two (2) throws the diversionary device or fragmentation grenade.
Entry into the room is initiated with the detonation of the device. Those at
the door may have to pull back somewhat to shield themselves from the
blast. The first individual to enter must take care not to follow the device
or grenade into the point of entry.
5-28 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
c. Upon Verbal or Non-verbal Command from the Breacher. Once the breacher
has completed the breach, he can initiate the entry by using a verbal command,
“Stand By, Go.” Note that any breach, even an explosive one can be followed by
the use of a diversionary device or fragmentation grenade. In such cases, the
above drills are followed. Note that the section commander may opt to issue the
executive order in place of the breacher.
512. ENTRY
1. General. A correct entry into a building or room is a vital aspect of effective UO, and
done correctly, will save lives and help ensure success. A combination of speed and controlled
aggression must be employed, and soldiers must not move faster than they can think and react.
Once the breacher has completed the breach, the diversionary device or grenade has
detonated, and/or the order has been given, the assault group will commence their entry.
Ideally, the entry is completed with a four-man entry group. As stated above, this may not
always be possible or desirable. Rooms may be too small, the threat may be limited and spread
throughout the building, and the troops may not be available for such an entry every time. Thus,
section commanders and soldiers must adopt the entry group drills given hereunder to the
situation at hand.
2. Four-man Entry. The members of the entry group support each other throughout the
entry. The drills employed by the entry group are as follows:
a. Clear the Doorway. With the number one (1) leading the way, the assault group
will ensure that they “square off” in the doorway, and have their head and
weapon up as they enter:
(1) Square Off. This presents the soldier’s body amour towards the threat
and allows the body to have a clean entry through the doorway.
Figure 5–23: Squaring Off in the Entry Point

(2) Head/Weapon Up. Number one (1) will always have his weapon up, but
once he is clear, the number two (2) automatically raises his weapon to
the shoulder firing position (threat ready position). Once he is clear, the
number three (3) automatically raises his weapon to the soldier firing
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-29
position, and so on. Soldiers must avoid looking at the ground as they
enter to remain aware and ready to engage.
b. Entry Direction—Key Off the Threat and the Others. Once a soldier enters
the room, he may cross the gap in a straight line, or buttonhook around the entry
point. The direction the soldier takes is generally not pre-planned. The direction
is determined by where the soldier encounters the first threat. Whatever
direction number one (1) takes, the number two (2) will key off him and go in the
opposite direction. Number three (3) will key off number two (2), and move in the
opposite direction, and number four (4) will do the same based upon the direction
taken by the number three (3).
Figure 5–24: Start of Entry. No 1 leads
Figure 5–25: Entry of No 1. No 2 Squares Off in the Entry Point
5-30 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 5–26: Entry of No 2. No 3 Squares Off in the Entry Point
Figure 5–27: Entry of No 3. No 4 Squares off in the Entry Point

c. Clearing Corners. Number one (1) and two (2) must clear their corners, but
never move too far towards them (i.e. eyes and bullets can clear corners more
easily than bodies), or too far into the room. Number one (1) and two (2) must
leave enough room for number three (3) and four (4) to enter the room (see
Figures 5–28 and 5–29).
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-31
Figure 5–28: No 1 Enters and Clears Corner
Figure 5–29. No 1 and No 2 Clearing Corners. (Note that No 3 and No 4 not shown. If only two
soldiers are clearing the room, then they much clear front and corners and then overlap arcs.)
d. Engaging Threats. If the number one (1) or two (2) have a threat on the far wall
when they enter, they can engage it. However, their priority is the corners, and if
engaging that threat will slow them down, they should move out of the way, focus
on their corner, and allow the number three (3) and four (4) to eliminate the threat
as they enter. Number three (3) and four (4) have the least distance to travel.
The group commander will generally enter as the number three (3) to remain in
control, and aware of the situation.
e. Remain Close to Walls. Entry group soldiers stay close to the wall as they
enter, but not against it. As during the staging, soldiers should remain 15 to 30
cm off the wall to avoid ricochets (see Figure 5–30).
5-32 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 5–30: Static Positions

f. Static Positions and Control of Room. Once the room has been flooded with
the entry group, corners cleared and individual tasks completed, all soldiers will
turn to face the far wall and remain clear of the doorway. The commander must
ensure that other entry points in the room (e.g. doors, windows, mouse holes in
walls, floors and ceiling) are covered. The commander ensures firm control of
the room and issues direction to any PWs or non-combatants found inside. Other
members of the section or platoon may come forward (see Figure 5–31 (see
Figures 5–28 and 5–29)).
Figure 5–31: Commander Adjusts Positions of Entry Team. (Other platoon members may move
forward.)
3. Arcs of Fire. Arcs of fire are very important during a room entry and each entry group
member has a certain responsibility or a “piece of the pie” to cover. All danger areas must be
covered as well as any enemy and non-combatants encountered. Soldiers must communicate
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-33
with one another to alleviate confusion and ensure that all danger areas are covered. With
respect to assigning arcs of fire, the commander and soldiers must consider the following:
a. Must interlock.
b. Must cover any obstacles in the room (e.g. furniture or closets not yet cleared).
c. Must know the location of other soldiers, enemy and non-combatants.
d. Must know and cover all possible entry points (i.e. other doors or windows) and
be prepared for a counterattack.
e. Must know the type of construction of the walls, and be aware of the dangers of
over penetration.
4. Four-man Entry with a Breacher. When a breacher is employed, the entry group
follows the same drills as those given above, but with the following changes:
a. The number one (1) will have moved forward to the other side of the entry point
to cover forward; that is, he will cover the open flank while the breacher conducts
the breach. Once the breacher has completed the breach, the breacher will
move forward to the open flank to provide front cover with the number one (1)
(see Figure 5–32).
Figure 5–32: No 1 Covers Forward. Breacher in Position

b. Simultaneously, the number three (3) will have prepared a diversionary device
(removed from the back of the number two (2)) and will throw it through the entry
point once the breacher is clear (see Figure 5–33).
5-34 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 5–33: No 3 prepares a grenade or diversionary device

c. The number two (2) will have become the number one (1) and will be conducting
the limited view into the room as the number three (3) throws the grenade or
diversionary device. Upon detonation or order, the (new) number one (1) is the
first assaulter to enter the room, followed by number three (3) and four (4) (see
Figure 5–34).
Figure 5–34: Breacher Covers Forward. No 1 Leads Entry

d. The original number one (1) becomes the number four (4) and is the last man to
enter the room.
e. The breacher remains outside to provide front cover unless required and called
into the room by a verbal command (see Figure 5–35).
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-35
Figure 5–35: No 4 enters and Breacher Provides Cover Forward

5. Six-man Entry with a Breacher. A large room or the initial entry into a building may
require an entry element larger than the four-man group. Alternatively, the section commander
may simply wish to get all his troops into the cover of a room or building soonest. In this case,
the entry drills described above are used with the slight modification noted below:
a. The entry group stacks with the breacher as number six (6). The breacher will
cover to the rear. The number five (5) will become rear cover once the breacher
(number six [6]) moves forward. As the breacher moves forward, the number
one (1) will move forward to the open flank and cover forward as shown in
diagrams above.
b. Once the breacher has completed the breach, he will again move forward to the
open flank and provide front cover with the number one (1).
c. The number three (3) will have prepared a grenade or diversionary device, the
number two (2) will cover into the entry point, and on order, the number three (3)
will throw the diversionary device or grenade into the room.
d. The number two (2) becomes the number one (1) and is the first assaulter to
enter the room, followed by number two (2) and number three (3).
e. The original number one (1) becomes the number four (4) and is the last man to
enter the room
f. The breacher (number six [6]) remains outside as front cover and the number five
(5) remains outside as rear cover unless they are called into the entry point (see
Figure 5–36).
5-36 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 5–36: Breacher Covers Forward and No 5 Covers Rear Until Ordered to Enter
6. Split Stack. Once it is determined who the number one (1) is, split stack entry
techniques are similar to four-man entry techniques as given below:
a. If a grenade or a diversionary device is to be used, it is prepared by the number
two (2) and thrown through the entry point.
b. On order, or once the grenade or diversionary device detonates, the number one
(1) enters the room and is followed by the number two (2) (see Figure 5–37).
Figure 5–37: No 1 and No 2 in Split Stack Enter

c. Number three (3) and four (4), from the other side of the entry point, enter the
room, keying off the number two (2) (see Figure 5–38).
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-37
Figure 5–38: No 3 and No 4 Enter from Split Stack

d. If a breacher is used, he must ensure that he is clear of the two groups when he
moves into a position to cover forward or any other threat areas (Diagram?).
7. Offset Doors. Often, structures have doors towards the corners of rooms in order to
maximize the wall space. A door is considered offset if the entry does not provide equally
spaced corners for the number one (1) and two (2) to clear. The following techniques should be
employed when assaulting through an offset entry point, be it a door, window or mouse hole:
a. The number one (1) makes entry into the room, keying off the threat, and if
possible, goes to the corner not readily seen upon entry.
b. The number two (2) keys off the number one (1). The number two (2) moves into
the room far enough to clear the doorway but not far enough to obstruct arcs of
fire. All positions are dependant upon where the number one (1) moves when he
enters (see Figure 5-39).
5-38 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 5–39: Entry with Offset Entry Point. Note that No 1 keys off the threat but, if possible,
clears to the corner not readily seen upon entry
c. The number three (3) keys off the number two (2) and moves into a position
beside the number one (1) (see Figure 5–40).
Figure 5–40: Entry of No 3 and No 4 with Offset Entry Point

d. The number four (4) keys off the number three (3) and moves into a position
beside the number two (2), ensuring he is not in silhouette by the doorway ) (see
Figure 5–41).
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-39
Figure 5–41: Static Positions following Entry Through Offset Entry Point
e. If employed, the breacher, once the breach is complete, will move into a position
to cover an open flank outside the room/building and will enter on order.
f. If there is not enough room for all the soldiers to gain entry and clear the
doorway, the number three (3) and four (4) can position themselves along the
long wall) (see Figure 5–42).
Figure 5–42: Offset Entry Point to a Small Area. Note that No 3 and No 4 have placed themselves
along the long wall
8. Mouse Holes. Entry through a mouse hole is the same as any of the above techniques,
but the following considerations should be noted:
a. The size of the breach will determine whether a traditional four-man entry can
occur, or whether the room must first be prepared by grenades or fire, because a
rapid four-man entry cannot take place.
5-40 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
b. In many third world nations, the gap in the doorway or entrance to a second story
is much smaller than doorways found in the western world. Commanders must
assess their area of operations (AO) to determine if a thinning-out of personal
equipment must occur, or adjustments be made to SOP.
9. Low Windows. This entry technique is similar to the four-man entry; however, when
mounting the window the following must be considered:
a. The number one (1) moves into the window, taking one-step on the lift aid and
the next step onto the windowsill. Simultaneously, his weak hand will grip the
side of the window frame and step/pull himself through the window) (see
Figures 5–43 and 5–44).
Figure 5–43: Low Window Entry. Note the position of the right foot, braced in the corner of the
widow sill
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-41
Figure 5–44: Low Window Entry Without Ladder

b. Number two (2), three (3) and four (4) will follow using the same technique.
c. The footsteps into the windowsill will be against the interior window frame corner so the
foot will not slip.
d. The breacher should focus on clearing any glass and debris from the side of the window
frame to reduce the chance of injury to the soldiers’ hands.
e. Due to slower nature of entering through a window, use of a grenade or diversionary
device by the number two (2) and/or preparatory fire into the room by the number one
(1) should be considered.
f. If using other soldiers to assist in the entry, the soldier entering will step only on the
portion of the other soldier’s back between the shoulder blades and for as short a period
as possible. As the entry is made, the soldier must have his head up looking for threats.
g. The weapon will remain at the threat ready position throughout entry and held by the
strong hand.
h. Once the soldier lands inside the room, he conducts the same drills as for a normal
entry.
5-42 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 5–45: Low Window Entry Static Positions

i. The breacher and any soldier assisting with the lift will move into a position to
cover a threat area on the open flank and enter on order.
10. High Window. The same techniques from a low window entry apply, but because of the
height and the safety considerations associated with this entry point, the speed of entry will be
slower. Use of a grenade, diversionary device and/or preparatory fire into the room by the
number one (1) should be considered.
11. Roof Entry. Entry into a building or portion of a building through a roof is dependant
upon accessibility and the threat. A breach created through the roof of a building will allow
entry, but the difficulty in dropping into an unknown room must be carefully considered. Troops
entering will have to key off each other to cover a 360-degree arc within the room.
12. Small Rooms. Normally, the entry group will not know the exact size and layout of the
room or structure they are entering. Whenever possible, entry groups should always stage for
four-man entries because quickly flooding the room with four rifles will dominate the area. If the
lead entry men discover the room is too small to support a full group, the following techniques
should happen:
a. Upon entry, the number one (1) or two (2) will state “Small Room.”
b. Any assaulters who have not entered the room will advance forward and become
front cover. If a breacher is present as front cover, group members will bypass
him, ensuring all assaulters are clear of the doorway.
c. No matter what size of room, when a “Small Room” is ordered, at least the first
two assaulters should enter to provide mutual support. Soldiers never enter a
room alone.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-43
Figure 5–46: Small Room Drill. Note that No 3 and No 4 remain outside to provide cover forward.
Breacher is in the rear
513. DOMINATE ROOM/NEUTRALIZE THE THREAT

1. The assault group can only dominate the room by conducting the entry as fast as
possible and flooding the room with assaulters. Assaulters must quickly complete their entry
tasks but retain the ability to accurately assess and engage all threats. The following should be
conducted:
a. Troops will assess the threat of the unknown personnel within the room by
observing their hands. If no weapon is observed the soldier will scan his arc of
responsibility for additional threats) (see Figure 5–47).
5-44 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 5–47: Threat Ready Position

b. All threats will be engaged until they are no longer a threat. This may take more
than one or two rounds.
c. All troops will continue to scan for additional threats until the left and right side
state that “Left/Right OK.”
d. The group commander will report room clear. He will also report any other
entrances to the room and assign troops to cover them. All others can adopt a
low-ready position (see Figure 5–48).
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-45
Figure 5–48: Low Ready Position Once all Threats have been Neutralised
2. Troops must be reminded that they are not alone in the fight, and that the assault group
is working in mutual support of each other.
514. CONT ROL THE AREA
1. All immediate threats will be neutralized before any movement can be conducted to clear
the room. The section or entry group commander will assign any tasks required, but the
remainder of the group should employ initiative to identify any of the following threat areas:
a. There may be combatants and non-combatants that need to be verbally
controlled. Troops should order all unknown persons to get down, and by
ordering or indicating that hands are to be shown, determine if there are any
weapons.
b. The commander will communicate to all group members and ensure that all
danger areas (e.g. windows, doors, mouse holes and obstacles) are identified
and covered.
c. The commander will position his group to ensure interlocking arcs of fire, and
sufficient manoeuvre room is provided for follow-on forces.
d. Windows overlooking approach or withdrawal routes for the enemy must be
covered, but soldiers must be careful not to expose themselves in the window.
2. Unarmed Threats. In a complex environment, there may be individuals that are threats
to the operation or security of the force, but are neither armed nor pose a threat of deadly force.
In dealing with them, minimum force must be used and the situation calmed as quickly as
5-46 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
possible. Physical force may have to be employed to subdue such individuals until they are
under control or the task is complete. On order from the section commander, two soldiers will
continue to cover the room while another pair subdues and restrains any hostile, unarmed
individual.
3. Searching Danger Areas. Before any additional tasks can occur, the room must be
cleared of any enemy. Soldiers will always work as a team and never search alone. Cover
must be provided to any soldier(s) conducting a search. Soldiers must be conscious of the
threat of booby traps. Depending upon the type of operation, soldiers must be aware of the fact
that they may be searching not only for threats, but also for weapons caches, certain types of
equipments and/or documentary evidence. The following danger areas must be searched
before the room can be deemed clear:
a. behind doors;
b. obstacles/barricades; and
c. inside closets and storage areas.
4. Behind Doors. Although a door may have been opened upon entry, the area behind all
doors in the room must be cleared. Some doors may hide mouse holes leading to other areas.
The following techniques can be used to secure and clear behind doors:
a. Upon entry, the first soldier to move by an open door will press the door fully
open as a check for any enemy hiding behind it) (see Figure 5–49).
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-47
Figure 5–49: Pressing a Door Open Upon Entry

b. The next soldier that is positioned in front of the door will continue to press the
door fully open while dominating of the room.
c. If enemy is hidden behind this door, the soldier can continue to apply pressure by
repeatedly ramming the door.
d. Once the room is dominated, the soldier will state, “Door.” Upon confirmation by
the section commander, the fire team partner will move into a position to cover
the door.
e. Once the door is covered, the soldier can then move into a position to open the
door.
f. Once the area behind the door is cleared, or any threat is neutralized, the cover
man will state, “Door Clear.” (see Figure 5–50)
5-48 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 5–50: Clearing Behind a Door

5. Obstacles/Barricades. These are defined as any area within the room where the
assault group cannot visually clear from their static positions. The actions taken to clear these
must be planned and communicated to the group. Obstacles may hide mouse holes. The
following actions should occur:
a. The group will identify any obstacles in the room by stating, “Obstacle/Barricade
Left/Right/Front.”
b. Normal tactics still apply—one soldier to cover and one to search, or two to cover
and two to search.
c. The soldier with the obstacle directly in front will always cover.
d. The commander will order which team will cover and which team will search.
e. The search team will use any available cover during the approach and avoid the
centre of the room as this reduces the arcs of fire.
f. The search team will approach the obstacle/barricade by “piecing the pie” until
they reach a point where they expose themselves to the obstacle.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-49
Figure 5–51: Clearing Behind Obstacles

g. Some obstacles may be cleared visually, or a searcher with a weapon at the
ready, may have to commit himself by stepping out.
h. Once the danger area is clear, the search team will state, “Obstacle/Barricade
Clear.”
i. The search and cover team will communicate throughout the drill.
j. All group members will remain at the ready position until the room is clear.
6. Closets and Storage Areas. Care must be taken in the search of closets. Soldiers
must be prepared to clear a large closet as a small room.
7. Simultaneous Clearing. Multiple obstacles/barricades can be cleared at the same time
if they are present on both sides of the room; however, in doing so, the section commander
must ensure that other areas of the room are covered while the obstacles are being cleared.
Pairs on opposite sides of the room may cover obstacles across the room with overlapping arcs.
At some point, the obstacles will be handed off to the nearest pair for detailed, simultaneous
clearing.
5-50 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 5–52: Simultaneous Obstacle Clearing

8. Diversionary Device. A diversionary device or fragmentation grenade can be used
before committing to assault any large obstacle/barricade. This should only be done on order of
the section commander and once all others have been warned.
9. Large Rooms. The commander can order, “Sweep” if the entry group encounters a
large room and must quickly clear it. The entry group will advance forward at the same time,
continually scanning and covering arcs. The clearing will stop and clear any obstacle/barricade
encountered. The group will sweep and clear the room, under the control of the section
commander and cover any other entrances to the room.
Figure 5–53: Clearing a Large Room or Area
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-51
Figure 5–54: Sweep of Large Room Under Control of Section Commander
515. CASUALTY EVACUATION

1. Once the room has been controlled, the section commander can arrange for CASEVAC.
Soldiers not required to secure the room or cover unclear areas or entranceways may assist the
platoon and company medic(s).
2. Troops may have to fight pass their own casualties to eliminate the immediate enemy
threat. The assault and its momentum cannot suffer or stall due to a casualty being taken.
However, if heavy resistance in a room or building forces a temporary withdrawal, casualties
must be withdrawn and not be left behind.
516. CURSORY SEARCH OF ENEMY AND NON-COMBATANTS
1. Once the assault group has control of the room, the commander will determine a course
of action to complete additional tasks. Time and the situation will dictate what must happen. At
this point, the platoon HQ and follow-on section may have closed up to the assaulting section.
2. All combatants and non-combatants must be secured. Searching and securing them will
take time. Once a detainee or prisoner is secure, he must be searched. This will likely be an
immediate, cursory search to ensure he is not armed or pose a threat. It will also allow vital
intelligence documents to be quickly identified. At minimum, a team of two is required to search
a person—one to cover and one to search. The rest of the group will continue to cover the
room. Once searched, the detainee will be evacuated to the platoon PW/detainee holding area
and turned over to the platoon 2IC. If the prisoner/detainee changes custody, the assuming
authority must understand that a detailed search has not been conducted. A detailed search
will likely be conducted at the company or battle group PW/detainee collection point.
3. To be secured, personnel do not necessarily need to be handcuffed. The tactical
situation and the threat they pose will determine the decision. Flex cuffs must be prepared as
part of battle procedure. Measured force (i.e. the minimum required) may be necessary to
secure of a non-compliant detainee.
4. Once the search is complete, any item found must be inspected. If the searcher
suspects an improvised explosive device (IED), engineer specialists must be brought forward.
Ideally, they will be close behind the lead clearing elements. The searcher will return any item
5-52 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
deemed of personal or protective nature. Items returned to the detainee or PW may be placed
into a clear bag and attached to the handcuffs securing the individual.
517. SITUATION REPORT
1. The clearing forces will hold when ordered, or when they reach their LOE and report,
“Room Secure.” The drills are the same as the consolidation phase of any attack. The assault
force will:
a. Remain vigilant, and be ready to complete additional tasks:
(1) Link-up with other sections or platoon HQ (e.g. in stairwells or hallways).
(2) Centralize and pass back to the platoon 2IC any non-combatants, PWs
and detainees.
(3) Continue to cover arcs or adjust them as the section or platoon
commander deems necessary.
(4) Provide support to other sections, and support any forward passage of
lines.
(5) Picket booby traps.
(6) Provide medical support.
b. Enemy/non-combatants and wounded must be accounted for. The count must
be accurate. The section commander sends the situation report (SITREP) in
standardized format.
c. The assault force will physically control their room, or sector, including any
rooms, hallways, and areas cleared.
d. Radio use should be minimized and verbal reports sent unless stealth is being
maximized.
e. Ideally, the platoon commander will be able to come forward to get a face-to-face
SITREP from the section commander, and to issue further direction for the next
bound. If the platoon is dispersed, for example clearing both sides of a street or
ally in an environment with light or dispersed threats, the SITREP must be
transmitted by radio. Clarity is important for the section commander to give a
clear and accurate assessment of the situation and the need for reinforcement or
relief.
f. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units, engineers, and medics can move as
close as possible to the forward forces depending upon the tactical situation. At
this point, they may be pushed forward to assess the situation and assume
responsibility for certain aspects, such as suspected booby traps.
g. Platoon and Section 2ICs conduct their ammunition and casualty drills.
518. EVACUATION OF ALL NON-COMBATANTS AND COMBATANTS
1. The evacuation of the wounded should occur as soon as tactically possible. It is the
responsibility of section 2ICs to evacuate wounded to the platoon CCP. Once the wounded
have been passed to the CCP, others such as PWs, detainees or non-combatants may be
passed back as well.
2. By leaving soldiers at various points within the building to act as security and linkmen,
the evacuation of personnel or the withdrawal of the assault force has a well-defined and secure
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-53
path to follow. These linkmen can assist in the evacuation by giving voice commands and
guiding others, and by illuminating the route with their tactical lights while in dark and dusty
conditions. They can also inform the CCP of incoming personnel.
3. Soldiers not directly involved in security will be employed to move the wounded or escort
PWs/detainees or others back to the platoon CCP. The platoon CCP will be controlled by the
platoon 2IC. The CCP will contain a medic and may be reinforced by other medics, MP or
company personnel, to assist with the passage of the wounded, PWs, detainees, and non-
combatants.
4. Before evacuation, all PWs and detainees will remain in location with security covering
them. They should be placed on the ground, and restrained if deemed necessary or prudent. In
escorting PWs and/or detainees, if restrained, will require assistance to get to their feet. When
moving, they have to be physically guided and should be made to keep their head down. Those
providing security, such as linkmen, could help guide them but must maintain security
throughout any evacuation of PWs and detainees.
5. The evacuation must be done in an aggressive and orderly fashion. The assault
element and those providing security must remain vigilant throughout.
6. This organized evacuation will be conducted only after any immediate threat has been
removed. Wounded friendly soldiers should be evacuated throughout the battle whenever
possible.
7. Once all PWs, detainees, and non-combatants are evacuated to the platoon CCP,
commanders will send an updated SITREP.
519. FOLLOW-ON ACTION
1. Once all casualties, combatants, and non-combatants have been evacuated from the
room or structure, the assaulting force can prepare for follow-on action. This may include one
or more of the following:
a. establish a hasty defensive position;
b. continue the clearing operation;
c. conduct a forward passage of lines with another element of the platoon or
company; or
d. conduct a withdrawal.
2. The normal principles and procedures apply for the above tactics when employed in an
urban setting. Any forward passage of lines must be done quickly to maintain momentum, but
must include fire support and security from the in-place force and a clear briefing between
commanders.
3. Any withdrawal from the room or structure must be done quickly but orderly under
control of the section commander. Soldiers continue to cover their arcs while they withdraw.
Normally, those with the widest and deepest arcs of fire (usually near the entrance to the room)
withdraw last, covering those further forward in the room or structure. The last man is informed
that he is the last to leave and then withdraws on order of the section commander.
4. In the case of a fire, building collapse, or discovery of an IED, the commander may order
an immediate withdrawal. This is still done under control, but with an added sense of urgency.
Soldiers exiting a room or building must alert those covering the entrance area. SITREPs to the
platoon and company must be transmitted concurrently.
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520. MOVEMENT ACROSS OPEN AREAS AND BETWEEN STRUCTURES

1. Open Areas. During house-to-house movement, assaulting forces must minimize
exposure in the street. Open streets can become killing zones. The assaulting forces should
run from house to house in a stack with a covering force providing security in an appropriate
position. Obscuration methods should be used when necessary. On the open street, the stack
should be slightly staggered. Assaulting forces should have some dispersion, and the pace of
the running should still allow for controlled movement and all-around security. Once the lead
assault group reaches the primary entry point, the stack should close up and move swiftly to
accomplish their tasks.
2. All-round Security. Danger areas while on the move must be covered. Security must
be three-dimensional and all-round. Each soldier in the group will look to the soldiers to his
front, assess any danger areas that are not covered, and then cover one of them. The section
or group commander must ensure that all-round security is achieved.
3. Gaining Footholds. Footholds are extremely important. By establishing footholds, the
assaulting forces can re-establish control, confirm plans and support further clearing. A foothold
can be used as the platoon CCP and evacuation point. Commanders will determine the location
of footholds. Foothold locations can be moved continually and additional ones can be added to
better support the assault. When breaking contact or evacuating, footholds can be used as rally
points, and commanders can get account for all their soldiers. Moreover, the assault groups
can move back through each foothold.
521. MULTI-ROOM ASSAULT
1. Section Tactics. Assaulting from room to room, the assault force’s movement is critical.
The group will be most vulnerable when moving to the next room via a hallway or stairway.
There is limited cover once exposed in these open areas. Section commanders, ensuring that
all arcs are covered and that movement is rapid but controlled, will minimize risk.
2. Methods of Multi-room Assaults. There are two methods the assaulting force can use
to advance through buildings, clearing room to room:
a. the lead group continues the advance; or
b. the lead group is bypassed.
3. The Lead Group Continues the Advance. Once the group has gained control of the
room, the commander may decide to continue the assault. The commander will determine how
to maintain the axis of advance, and order the group to prepare for the next room entry. The
commander must ensure security is left in the room and stage for the next assault with sufficient
troops to counter any threat.
4. The Lead Group is Bypassed. Once the group has gained control of the room, the
commander may decide to order a new assault group forward. Coordination and
communication between the two groups is essential. A forward passage of lines is conducted in
a rapid but thorough manner, and the in-place group supports the movement of the follow-on
group. The in-place group commander will ensure the following:
a. Before any movement by the follow-on group into the room, all information about
the room is communicated (e.g. location of doors, windows and obstacles).
b. Indicate how the new group should approach the next entry point (e.g. stack
left/right).
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-55
c. Indicate how the new group should move through the secure room. This may be
done by wall flooding. This technique allows the follow-on force to quickly stage
on a new entry point, while the initial group can still maintain cover.
Figure 5–55: Wall Flooding to Cover the Staging of the Next Entry Point
d. The lead assault group will ensure that before the new group moves into their arc
of fire that they adjust their aim.
e. Once the new assault group has completed their assault of their room, the
commander will add his forces back into the platoon advance.
The same methods are used when one section is assuming the lead from another section.
5. Simultaneous Assaults. Commanders can conduct simultaneous assaults of different
objectives within the building. However, commanders must be aware of the dangers of the
over-penetration of weapons’ fire, and ensure that friendly forces do not move into each other’s
arcs of fire.
522. STAIRWEL LS
1. General. Stairwells can be the most dangerous area within a structure. They are easily
defended and blocked by obstacles. Movement through stairwells is slow and easily exposes
the assault force to the defenders’ fire. The types of stairwells encountered in an urban
environment are:
a. open stairwells;
b. closed stairwells; and
c. vertical ladder wells.
2. All types can include landings with or without a door access. These stairwells can be
sided by open or closed railings, windows, or solid walls.
3. The same techniques can be applied when travelling up or down stairwells / ladder
wells.
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4. Many stairways are complicated by the presence of an intermediate landing that creates
a level area followed by a change in direction for the next flight of stairs. When climbing stairs,
movement should be as swift as possible and covered by fire. If possible, supporting fire should
be directed into the upper floors before the stairs are cleared. One or two fire teams, depending
upon the number of flights to be cleared, can clear stairs. The width of the stairs is also a factor
when determining the method and number of soldiers to conduct the clearance. The terms
“outside” and “inside” edge of a stairs are used. The “outside edge” refers to the side opposite
the turn to the next flight up, and is normally the position on the staircase from which one can
see the largest amount of the landing above. The “inside edge” refers to the side closest to the
turn to the next flight up, and is normally the position on the staircase from which one can see
the least amount of the above landing.
Figure 5–56: Description of a Stairway. Note that from the outside edge, more of the next landing
can be seen
5. Covering the Open Flank and Upper Levels. When movement up a stairway exposes
soldiers to another flight of stairs on the flank and an upper landing, the soldier on the outside
must lead the movement up the stairs and adjust his arcs to cover the open flank, and upon
reaching the next landing, to the rear.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-57
Figure 5–57: Clearing Stairways. Note that once the next landing and flight of stairs is identified,
the outside soldier (to the right) should assume the lead as he will have better observation
6. Open Stairwells. Open stairwells are those that have sides exposed to flanking stairwells.
Before any movement into the stairwell, commanders should assign arcs of fire to cover as much of
the visual area as possible from protected positions. Clearing a stairwell requires a fire team to clear
each flight of stairs, and depending upon the overall situation, one fire team may be directed to
continue the advance once each landing is secured. The first man takes the inside and the second
man takes the outside position. Depending upon the type of stairwell, their actions are as follows:
a. If the stairwell is wide enough, both members of the fire team can advance up the
stairs together. The inside man covers forward as they move, and initially, the
outside man covers forward as well.
b. If there is a landing present along with another flight of stairs leading up to another
storey, their flank will be exposed as they move. In this situation, the outside man will
take a slight lead and adjust his arcs so that he can clear the next flight of stairs on
the open flank, and on the next storey, turn about to cover any open landing to their
rear. The inside man continues to cover the forward arcs as they approach the
intermediate landing. Eventually, the outside man will be stepping sideways, and as
he moves to cover the landing above them and to their rear, he will be walking
backwards. Given the difficulty of the outside man’s movement, he will set the pace
of advance. Movement must be slow and deliberate when employing this technique.
As the team approaches the landing, the inside man will have to push to the outside
in order to better observe the landing and next flight of stairs.
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Figure 5–58: Covering Opening to the Next Storey. Note that as the team approaches the landing,
the inside man will have to push to the outside in order to better observe the landing and next
flight of stairs
c. If the initial landing leads to another open corridor, another fire team will have to
move quickly up the stairs and cover the open corridor. The fire team clearing
the stairs can then go firm to cover any upper flights of stairs and landings. The
commander will then allocate teams to clear the corridor and rooms on this new
floor, while a fire team covers access from the next upper floor.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-59
Figure 5–59: Fire Team Dominates Up and Down From a Strong Point. If a landing leads to an
open corridor, the next flight of stairs can be covered while the corridor is cleared
d. If the stairwells are confined and will not allow the movement of two soldiers at the
same time, they must take turns advancing up the stairs. Once the inside man is set,
he will cover the outside man who moves up and covers the next flight of stairs on the
open flank, and eventually covers the next landing to their upper rear. The inside
man can then bound forward and clear the intermediate landing and swing his arcs
about to cover the next flight of stairs and upper landing.
e. In a particularly wide stairwell, it may be best for the outside man to face forward to
cover the widest arcs while the inside man covers the open flank and the next upper
landing. If wide enough, the stairwell may permit the use of three men to advance
and clear, with the middle man slightly to the rear facing upwards to the rear and
covering the next, upper landing. As the stairwell is being cleared, these different
situations will demand good communications and an understanding of the key
requirements.
f. Once the fire team has cleared the flight of stairs, they will form a firebase and the
next fire team will bypass to the outside and continue the advance. Depending upon
the threat level and the size of the entire stairwell, a single fire team may clear more
than one flight of stairs. Note that when the inside man reaches the intermediate
landing, while covered by the outside man watching the next landing, he moves to the
outside edge of the next flight of stairs. The man on the outside for the initial flight of
stairs then moves to the inside of the next flight of stairs.
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Figure 5–60. Pairs Movement from One Stairway to Another

g. Static cover on the stairwell will always be set on the inside to allow follow-on
forces to travel on the outside.
7. Closed Stairwells. Closed stairwells are those that are walled on either side and do not
allow exposure to the next flight of stairs. With a lack of observation, commanders cannot
support movement similarly to open stairwells. In this case, the same techniques apply as for
open stairwells, except that a different fire team, with the last team providing cover, should
assume the clearance at each turn and corner.
8. Continuing the Clearance of a Closed Stairwell. Moving from the top of one flight of
stairs around a landing wall to face up the next flight of stairs is akin to clearing around any
corner. Clearing through a stairwell landing, and covering the next flight of stairs, is a fire team
task using the following techniques:
a. The fire team can clear around the corner and to the next level using a modified
“step out” drill.
b. If the number two (2) is reversed covering a different level before staging, he will
turn about and face the direction of travel.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-61
c. The senior man will control the action by ordering “Standby, Go” before any
movement.
d. The number one (1) on the inside will step short and provide cover on the inside.
The number two (2) will step long and provide cover on the outside beside the
number one (1).
e. The fire team will leave enough room for the next team or assault group to travel
on the outside and assume the advance.
Figure 5–61: Fire Team Provides Cover on the Inside as Another Fire Team Assumes the Lead
9. Stairwell Doors. If the fire team encounters a doorway while clearing through the
stairwell, it will either:
a. picket, and allow follow-on forces to bypass; or
b. provide cover for an assault group to stage and gain entry.
10. Vertical Ladder Wells. Movement into a ladder well is extremely dangerous and should
be avoided if possible. Assault forces should picket this obstacle and manoeuvre to clear it from
another level. If the decision to assault is taken, the following should occur:
a. Once the lead assaulting force identifies a ladder well, they provide cover while
an assault group stages and prepares to make entry.
b. If a hatch is present, a breacher is employed to clear it.
c. Movement through this obstacle is the same for a ladder entry.
11. Movement Down a Stairway. The drill for clearing down a stairway is the same as for
clearing up. Clearance down a stairway is less physically stressful, and will tend to be more
natural. Arcs of fire are greater, and when corners are turned, bottom landings and stairways
are more exposed than when going up.
12. Reaction to Grenades. The natural reaction of a soldier when encountering a grenade
while moving up a stairway is to move down to get away from it. In most cases, this reaction is
incorrect. The action taken will depend upon several factors such as the location of the
grenade, the location of soldiers in the stairway, and whether the grenade is bouncing down the
5-62 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
stairs or lands and remains stationary. The basic rule when dealing with a grenade in a
stairway is to move up if it is below you and to move down if it is above you. At no time should a
soldier higher than the grenade on a stairway attempt to move down the stairway past the
grenade, or a soldier lower than a grenade move up past it. The design of the stairs affords
some protection, causing a grenade’s blast to be directed out and up. The following reactions
can be taken in reaction to an enemy grenade:
a. In the case of a grenade bouncing down a stairway, soldiers in close proximity
should rapidly move past the grenade. This may provide protection against the
blast and surprise the enemy that threw the grenade. This movement must be
conducted like an ambush drill, by charging up to the enemy’s next position.
b. Personnel further away from the grenade or at the bottom of the stairway should
take the closest cover, around a corner or under a lower landing.
c. Once an enemy grenade is identified, the soldier must alert other section
members by shouting, “ENEMY GRENADE.”
13. Use of Grenades. Using fragmentation grenades to clear upwards in a stairway can be
fraught with difficulties. Grenades, due to their construction, will have a tendency to deflect and
bounce off objects. With the added effects of gravity, there is a good chance that a grenade will
move back down to the thrower’s position. Thus, if grenades are to be used while clearing up,
soldiers must be practised in both throwing up the stairs and in the actions to be taken when a
grenade falls short or falls back onto their position. Fragmentation grenades are more useful to
clear downwards. As with room clearing, the effects of fragmentation grenades must be
considered, and if possible, other types of grenades should be used.
14. Drill for Throwing Grenades. The team designated to throw the grenade moves up to
the landing where the clearance starts, with one soldier providing security and the other
preparing to throw the grenade. The soldier providing security moves to the inside edge and
covers up the stairwell to the next landing, while the thrower positions himself on the outside
edge, adopting a throwing position with the grenade in the ready position. The thrower must
observe the area where the grenade is to be thrown to ensure that there are no obstacles to
obstruct the grenade’s path. When the grenade is thrown, the flight and final landing is
observed, both soldiers withdraw to a covered position, and immediately upon the grenade’s
detonation, begin the stairwell clearance drill.
15. Summary. Commanders must ensure that their soldiers are well practised in stairwell
clearing drills. Each situation will be different, but key issues will apply. As a landing is
approached, any follow-on upper stairway must be covered and any upper landing must be
covered. Once a landing is secure, it supports movement to the next landing or clearance of the
remainder of that floor.
523. HALLWAYS
1. General. Hallways provide multiple entries and exit points, and are difficult to secure.
Hallways are another danger area from which the enemy can easily defend or stage
counterattacks.
2. Security and Clearing. The hallway’s width and length will determine the number of
soldiers and method to be used to clear a hallway. Before moving down a hallway, security
must be provided against any enemy attacking out of any uncleared rooms. Ideally, a four-man
group will be used to clear a corridor. Follow-on soldiers can remain in cleared rooms until
needed.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-63
3. Wall Construction. Commanders must be aware of the wall construction. Where

commanders stage their assault groups, or hold follow-on forces, may provide visual cover but
no protection from friendly or enemy fire.
4. Commander. A section commander will control the hallway clearance. As entrances to
rooms are encountered, he will organize the assault team/group to clear it. He will ensure that
while this is being prepared (i.e. stacked), security is maintained in the hallway.
5. Clearing Techniques. Depending upon the size of the hallway, threat expected and
number of troops available, the following techniques may be employed:
a. Bound and Over Watch. This technique is best used to clear short hallways
that have limited space for movement, yet need to be cleared to get to the next
area/room. One fire team conducts this drill with another, if required, providing
rear security. The fire team enters the hallway with one soldier on either side,
staying approximately 30 cm away from the walls in case of ricochet. Rear
security should be positioned to cover back down toward the opposite end of the
hallway from a position of cover (e.g. from around the corner of a room). If it is
not possible to cover from outside the hallway, the covering team enters the
hallway with one soldier on either side, covering to the rear from a position
behind the clearing team. Movement will be conducted with one soldier covering
and one moving. Bounds will be short so that the moving soldier does not mask
the fire of the covering soldier. During movement, the clearing team never
moves past areas that must be cleared (e.g. a room), but stops and reports to the
section commander. From there, the fire team will be designated to clear the
area, with the covering assault team moving up to reverse roles once the
area/room has been cleared.
b. Travelling. This technique gives a section the speed and security to clear long
hallways. It is normally conducted with four soldiers but will depend upon the
space available in the hallway. This technique can take two forms:
(1) T-Formation. This is used to clear hallways, such as wide unobstructed
hallways, that afford the section room to manoeuvre. This drill is
conducted using two two-man fire teams. Once in the hallway, the
members of the lead fire team move in line with each other on opposite
walls, covering down the hallway. The lead member of the second fire
team covers down the hallway from a position in between the two lead
members and slightly behind them. The last man provides rear security
from a position behind. If the remainder of the section is providing rear
security, this last man may cover forward but to any upper levels.
Otherwise, he is not required and the drill can be done with only three
soldiers.
(2) Cross Formation. The cross formation is used to clear narrow hallways
or passageways. It again uses two two-man fire teams. The members of
the lead fire team move in line with each other on opposite walls, covering
down their respective side. The third man moves slightly forward of them
and provides security straight down the hallway. The last man assumes
rear security. If other elements of the section have the rear covered, then
the team could be reduced to three men.
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6. Hallway Corners and T-Junctions. If a corner or T-junction is encountered, a

commander can order the corner to be cleared or conduct a simultaneous assault around both
corners. The following actions will occur:
a. The assault group will stage with two soldiers on both sides of the hallway, like a
split stack.
b. The lead soldiers will have their weapons at the threat ready, conducting a
“limited” into each other’s area, thus crossing arcs of fire.
c. Fragmentation grenades or diversionary devices can be used to prepare the
position.
d. On the command ”Go,” each side will conduct a “step out” drill on their corner.
e. If at a T-junction, the commander will determine which route to clear, and will
leave security on the other route or conduct simultaneous assaults in both
directions.
f. Clearing in both directions should be avoided for the same reasons it is avoided
in trench clearing. Firstly, it is too easy for soldiers and commanders to become
disorientated and create situations of potential fratricide. Secondly, should
strong enemy positions be encountered in both directions, forces may not be
available to deal with them simultaneously.
Figure 5–62: Fire Team Staging at a T-Junction. Note that each lead rifleman is doing a limited
visibility into the opposite hallway
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-65
Figure 5–63: Simultaneous Corner Clearing. Not that the fire teams simultaneously clear their
corners with a step-out drill
SECTION 6
PLATOON LEVEL TACTICS
524. GENERAL
1. When the house or building is too large for a section, or when several houses or
buildings are to be cleared and significant enemy presence is suspected, an entire rifle platoon
will conduct the operation under the centralized control of the platoon commander. The attack
on an objective will be conducted using the same three stages as any other attack, and
incorporate the stages applicable to UO:
a. mounting (planning and isolation of the area);
b. assault (break-in, securing of initial objectives and clearance); and
c. consolidation.
2. Proper application and integration of the following drills reduces casualties and
increases the likelihood of successfully accomplishing the mission. The type of building(s) to be
attacked and the nature of adjacent terrain and the surrounding environmental factors will
determine how drills and tactics are applied. For example, open ground and spaces between
buildings require increased fire support to suppress or obscure enemy gunners. Conversely,
the centres of small and medium sized towns, with twisting alleys and courtyards or continuous
buildings, provide numerous covered routes that may decrease fire support requirements.
525. MOUNTING
1. The mounting phase includes the isolation of the objective area. The objective area may
be an independent group of buildings, or a single or multiple buildings within a larger urban
centre. Isolation prevents the withdrawal, reinforcement, or resupply of the defenders, and may
be coordinated at the company level. However, the platoon may have to isolate its objective
with its own resources. The platoon must secure the ground dominating the approaches, but as
a minimum, it must secure positions from which it can support the point of entry and the
systematic capture of the building. Fire support for the assault section is provided by the
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platoon’s covering and cut-off section. The covering and cut-off section, under control of the
platoon 2IC, will be tasked in the mounting phase to:
a. Neutralize, suppress, or obscure enemy gunners within objective buildings and
adjacent structures.
b. Isolate the objective building(s) with direct and indirect fire to prevent enemy
withdrawal, reinforcement, or counterattack.
c. Breach walls en route to and in the objective structure with available resources
(e.g. supporting DFS elements, 84 mm Carl Gustav, grenade launchers, and
engineer resources).
d. Destroy enemy positions with direct fire weapons.
e. Secure cleared portions of the objective.
526. THE ASSAULT
1. In the assault, the assault section(s) must quickly execute the assault and subsequent
clearing action. Once momentum has been gained, it must be maintained to prevent the enemy
from organizing a more determined resistance on other floors or in other rooms. It is important
that section and platoon commanders keep the assault moving, without allowing the operation
to become disorganized. Control should never be sacrificed for momentum. Rapid assault and
clearing must be balanced with control and good coordination.
2. Suppressive and neutralizing fire should be fired constantly on the objective and
surrounding enemy positions by the sections’ covering groups, the platoon covering section,
and any supporting vehicles, and it must be continued until masked by the assaulting troops.
Covering troops must also cover approaches to the platoon’s objective area and be prepared to
act as a cut-off force. Once masked, supporting fire is shifted to upper/adjacent windows and
enemy positions and is continued throughout the assault. If the platoon commander has
organized sufficient covering fire, the assaulting section(s) may forego their own covering group
fire. However, the section should not expose more than a single entry group at one time.
3. The use of DFS elements, be they support vehicles or direct fire weapons integral to the
platoon and company, will have to be carefully coordinated by the platoon and section
commanders. Commanders must coordinate directly with the vehicle crew commander or wpns
det commander to ensure effective supporting fire for the assault. The commander may also
have to coordinate fire that will create a breach, such as that from a direct fire vehicle or from a
missile system. The commander must clearly indicate the desired location of the breach and
the timing of the fire. The commander must be prepared to exploit the obscuration and
confusion amongst the enemy that will immediately follow the use of a direct fire breach.
4. The assault section closes rapidly on the building and uses its entry drills to secure the
break-in and initial foothold. Only one entry group should be exposed at a time with the others
in the section prepared to give covering fire. The platoon HQ must carefully coordinate
supporting fire from platoon elements and any attachments such as DFS elements. This will
include any firers meant to create a breach for the assaulting sections. The platoon 2IC
normally commands the fire support group, using the company wpns det and assigned sections
or dets.
5. On order from the platoon commander, the lead section moves its entry group forward
with breaching support if needed, or direct fire is ordered for the purposes of breaching. Once
the breach is created or entry point made, the entry group moves to gain entry and secure its
immediate objective.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-67
6. Once inside the building, the assault section immediately covers the stairwells leading to
the upper floors and the basement, and seizes the rooms overlooking the approaches to the
building. These actions are required to destroy, capture, or isolate enemy forces within the
building. Ideally, the initial section(s) will be able to cover forward to the next tactical bound, be
it inside or outside the building.
7. Once the assault section has established the section objective, which is normally the
platoon’s initial foothold, the section’s covering group (if used) can be brought up to rejoin the
section, provided the platoon’s covering section is able to continue suppression and cut-off.
8. Once the initial foothold has been established, the platoon commander and his HQ will
enter the building. This should include the platoon medic. The platoon 2IC should remain
outside in control of the supporting fire and uncommitted sections.
9. The assault force minimizes enemy defensive fire during movement by:
a. Using covered routes through underground structures, through or behind secured
buildings, and in the streets using rubbled areas or vehicles.
b. Moving only after enemy defensive fire has been suppressed or obscured.
c. Moving during periods of reduced visibility (e.g. night, smoke).
d. Selecting routes that will not mask friendly suppressive fire.
e. Crossing open areas rapidly under the concealment of smoke and suppression
provided by supporting forces.
f. Close coordination between the covering elements and the assaulting troops.
10. In lightly defended areas, the requirement for speed may dictate moving through streets
and alleys without first clearing all buildings. When dismounted, infantry move along each side
of the street with leading sections keeping ahead of the lead DFS elements. When not
accompanied by DFS elements, infantry move in a single file along one side of the street under
cover of fire from supporting weapons. They should be well dispersed and move quickly. Each
soldier is detailed to observe and cover a certain area such as second floor windows on the
opposite side of the street.
11. If conducting a penetration or thrust to seize a vital node or a particular objective without
systematically clearing all buildings en route, armour will most likely lead with mounted infantry
close behind. The infantry must be prepared to suppress enemy infantry with vehicle weapons,
and dismount and destroy any enemy positions threatening the armoured and infantry vehicles.
In a thrust operation, in which flanks are secured as the advance is taking place, allocated
infantry elements will dismount at critical junctions to protect the flanks while dedicated infantry
elements support the armoured elements in the drive to the node/objective.
527. CONSOLI DATION
1. Rapid consolidation of the platoon in a cleared building is required to repel enemy
counterattacks and to support further clearing by other sections and platoons. After securing
the objective, fire teams are assigned to cover potential enemy counterattack routes. These
sentries alert the assault section when enemy forces approach the building. Areas where
observation and fire should be placed are:
a. enemy mouse holes between adjacent buildings;
b. covered routes to the building;
c. underground routes into the basement;
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d. approaches over adjoining roofs; and

e. points of observation that dominate approaches and that can support the
movement of other sections and platoons.
2. Non-tasked elements of the section and platoon, such as the depth section, are
allocated to search the objective building(s), while the remainder of the platoon is assigned
defensive positions. After the building(s) has been searched, the following actions are taken:
a. Replenish/redistribute ammunition.
b. Mark buildings to indicate to friendly forces that the building has been cleared.
c. Treat and evacuate wounded (this will be done simultaneously with the other
tasks).
d. Support an assault on another building.
e. If the building is to be occupied, start developing it into a defensive position.
3. Commanders must position themselves to be prepared to support the continuation of the
attack by other platoons or forces as required.
4. If civilians and other non-combatants are discovered in the area, they should be
evacuated and given any assistance required. They may also be a good source of intelligence
regarding the enemy’s location, strength, and intentions. If the building’s occupants insist on
remaining in the building, for their own security they should be centralized in one room on a
lower or basement floor and provided emergency food, water, and medical aid. Their presence
must be reported to higher HQ. However, if the premise is to be used as a defensive position,
then they must be evacuated under the control of the higher HQ.
5. Once the platoon has gained entry into the building, drills are conducted at the section
level. The platoon commander must maintain situational awareness of both inside and outside
the building, as his primary role is to direct the flow of battle and the use of reinforcements.
6. As the platoon clears the building, personnel will be dropped off as sentries. Once
sectors and floors have been secured, re-consolidations can be preformed to free up additional
personnel.
7. Multi-floor Assault. When clearing an urban area of a fleeing insurgent, a section may
be responsible for clearing a multi-floor building as the platoon and company will have a large
area of responsibility and will only concentrate when faced with a robust threat. In an intense
offensive operation with a pervasive enemy threat, a multi-floor building will normally be a
platoon task to secure. Sections will be assigned different tasks, such as support and assault,
with the platoon commander in charge of overall coordination. Eventually, all sections will likely
be committed to the clearing of the structure. Control measures like LOEs and link-up points
(LUPs) must be established within the structure. All control measures must be known by the
assaulting elements. Commanders must ensure that a depth is maintained to react to any
unknown enemy action. Consolidation must occur at the group level whenever it clears any
room, and at the platoon level when a commander reaches his LOE or there is a requirement for
the platoon to reorganize.
8. Actions upon Consolidation. Commanders must ensure the following occurs upon
consolidation:
a. Resupply and redistribute ammunition.
b. Mark the building to indicate to friendly forces the extent of the friendly advance
and location of the platoon CCP, cleared routes, and IEDs/booby traps.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-69
c. Assume an overwatch mission, all-round defence, and be prepared to support

the assault of a platoon on another building or the forward passage of lines of
other forces.
d. Treat and evacuate wounded personnel, PWs, and non-combatants to the
company CCP.
e. Develop a defensive position if the building is to be occupied for any period.
528. LINK-UP DRILL AND FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES
1. With its tight confines and intense engagements, interior combat can quickly become a
confusing battlespace and disorientate an assaulting force. Link-ups can be a planned and
coordinated event with the use of a pre-planned LUP. On many occasions, link-ups and forward
passages of lines will be coordinated and conducted as deemed appropriate.
2. Link-ups and forward passages of lines will normally occur in hallways or more open
areas that will allow a natural consolidation point and room to support the forward passage.
Signals for link-ups, both inside and outside structures, must be well known and rehearsed in
training.
3. Link-ups will occur between sections within the structure and possibly between platoons
within or between structures. As one section consolidates it prepares to support a forward
passage of lines with the next section. As with any forward passage of lines, key information
must be passed between commanders. The in-place commander must be prepared to pass the
following information to the moving-in commander:
a. location of own in-place forces;
b. location of enemy and likely intent;
c. recent enemy TTP and their likely defence or strength/layout;
d. location of other friendly forces and elements in the local area;
e. the in-place force’s ability to support the passage of lines with observation and
fire; and
f. coordination of support during the forward passage.
4. Once the forward passage of lines has occurred, the LUP must be maintained and
secured until it is no longer required. A section or the entire platoon may be required to hold the
position while other operations are conducted.
5. Commanders, particularly if civilians are present in the local area, should seek
opportunities to stabilize the local area, prevent the unnecessary exposure of civilians to fires,
and provide any emergency aid required. Any attempts at criminal exploitation of the situation,
such as looting, should be prevented. In due course, this will possibly provide intelligence
sources from the local population, avoid disorder and casualties, and help maintain support for
friendly force actions.
529. PLATOON ORGANIZATION
1. The basic rifle platoon structure will support offensive operations in an urban area, with
sections having their integral fire support elements. Depending upon the situation, the rifle
platoon may be temporarily reorganized to concentrate supporting fire (this is, from support
weapons) and optimize the clearing sections. The following provide possible options for tactical
organization:
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a. Option 1. The standard organization of the platoon is maintained:

(1) Platoon HQ—includes the platoon commander, platoon 2IC, signaller and
wpns det;
(2) Assault section—includes a section commander, section 2IC, M203,
riflemen and LMG gunners;
(3) Cover section—includes a section commander, section 2IC, M203,
riflemen and LMG gunners; and
(4) Depth section—includes a section commander, section 2IC, M203,
riflemen and LMG gunners.
b. Option 2. The platoon commander may group all section support weapons
under one section commander, re-allocate the rifleman from that section to the
other sections, and thus, create two clearing sections and one support section.
This may be a suitable organization for the clearing of a large platoon objective
that has to be isolated and cleared under close platoon control:
(1) Platoon HQ—includes the platoon commander, platoon 2IC, signaller,
and wpns det;
(2) Assault section 1—includes a section commander, section 2IC, and six
riflemen;
(3) Assault section 2 / depth section—includes a section commander, section
2IC, and six riflemen; and
(4) Support section—includes a section commander, section 2IC, and six
LMGs.
2. The platoon wpns det should be used to support the platoon’s entry into a building.
Once the objective is secured, the wpns det can support the platoon’s assault into another
building.
3. Light infantry platoons with support weapons sections will have more options for
supporting the attack of rifle sections. Apart from supporting breaches and assaults, the support
weapon sections can be used to protect flanks and to cover possible enemy approaches.
4. Breachers, properly equipped and trained, are vital at the section and platoon level. The
sections may use their own personnel for breaching or the platoon may allocate a minimum of
two breachers to support section level clearing. They may be drawn from the support section or
from the platoon wpns det.
5. The platoon 2IC should support the operation from the support section and then from the
CCP. Disengaged sections can aid the movement of ammunition and casualties under the
control of the 2IC.
SECTION 7
SUB-UNIT LEVEL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
530. GENERAL
1. This section discusses the TTP and considerations that sub-units must consider when
operating in offensive UO, whether in a single offensive action or as part of an overall battle
group attack.
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531. TASK ORGANIZATION

1. As with any offensive operation, the combat team commander normally task-organizes
the combat team into three elements: an assault element, a fire support element, and a reserve
or depth section. In certain tactical situations, the frontage may require a simultaneous assault
by two platoons. The fire support element may be given a number of tasks that are conducted
simultaneously or on order. These may include: support by fire, isolation of the objective, and
flank protection. The tactical situation dictates whether or not separate elements need to be
task-organized to conduct these support missions. The mission to breach is dependent upon
the situation, and may be given to the assault element or to the supporting direct fire systems
within the fire support element. If available, engineers may be task-organized to support the
assaulting element to conduct the breach and follow in support. If the combat team is part of a
battle group operation, the combat team could be given the mission to conduct one or more of
the tasks mentioned above.
2. In tactical situations involving the clearing of a large urban area, such as in a COIN
operation of a fleeting or dispersed enemy, the sub-unit commander may allocate large areas to
individual platoons, ideally keeping one platoon as a reserve. These platoons will be
responsible for clearing their own assigned areas. Should stiff enemy resistance be
encountered, the sub-unit commander can allocate this reserve and additional resources to the
battle.
3. Assault Element. The purpose of the assault element is to attack and secure the
objective area and/or defeat the enemy holding it. The assault element of a combat team may
consist of one or more platoons usually reinforced with engineers, LAVs, and direct fire vehicles.
Building and room clearing are conducted at the platoon and section level. The assault element
must be prepared to breach to gain entry into buildings. Generally, dismounted infantry
supported by armoured vehicles, be they integral LAVs or allocated direct fire vehicles, will
conduct the fighting. When LAVs are included as part of the assault element, they require
dedicated local protection. Once infantry forces have dismounted from their integral LAVs, it
may be desirable to withdraw those LAVs not required by the lead assaulting elements for
immediate intimate support. This will reduce the number of vehicles that will require local
protection, and the troops can use building structures for cover as they advance and clear.
4. Fire Support Element. The support element provides intimate fire support to the
assault element and must be prepared to secure flanks. The support element at combat team
level normally consists of the rifle company’s support section, possibly reinforced with rifle
platoon support dets and any other elements allocated to the commander. The fire support
element may initially include a rifle platoon that will eventually follow, and possibly assume, the
assault once the break-in is complete. Tasks allocated to the fire support element may include
the following:
a. Suppressing and obscuring enemy within the objective buildings and adjacent
structures.
b. Isolating the objective buildings with observation and direct or indirect fires to
prevent enemy withdrawal, reinforcement, or counterattack.
c. Breaching walls en route to and in the objective structure with direct fire from the
fire base location.
d. Destroying or suppressing enemy positions with direct fire weapons.
e. Securing cleared portions of the objective.
f. Adopting follow and assume tasks when the support is no longer required.
5-72 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
g. Providing resupply of ammunition, explosives, and personnel.

h. Evacuating casualties, PWs, and non-combatants if required.
5. Reserves. Combat teams fighting in urban terrain may not be able to designate a
reserve due to the number of troops required to conduct offensive operations. A platoon may
be detached from the combat team to form a battle group reserve. The combat team reserve
should be mobile and prepared for commitment, but as with all reserves, it must remain out of
contact until committed. Because of the available cover in urban areas, the reserve can stay
close to forward units. The reserve normally follows within the same block so that it can
immediately influence the attack. The size of the reserve is dependent upon the situation, but at
combat team level, the reserve normally consists of at least a section. The reserve may be
called upon to perform one or more of the following tasks based upon the commander's priority
of commitment:
a. Assume the mission of the assault element.
b. Clear bypassed enemy positions.
c. Move behind the assault element to provide security in cleared buildings,
allowing the assault element to continue to move.
d. To counter any unexpected threat from the enemy.
6. Breaching Element. Engineers may be attached to the infantry assault elements to
assist with breaching, particularly if the attack is against a major, well-prepared, objective, or if
the assault occurs during the initial break-in to the objective area. Otherwise, qualified infantry
troops may be assigned the responsibility for breaching. If a major obstacle is encountered in
the initial break-in or while clearing or advancing through the urban area, breaching may
become an operation in itself. Thus, as with any breaching operation, the forces will have to be
organized to conduct the breach, bridgehead, and breakout for the continuation of the assault.
532. MOUNTING THE DELIBERATE ATTACK
1. General. At the combat team level, a deliberate attack of an urban area usually involves
the sequential execution of the tactical tasks below.
2. Reconnaissance of the Objective. Reconnaissance of the objective will begin with a
map study and a review of any air photos, imagery, diagrams, or plans. Key aspects of human
intelligence (HUMINT) reports will be passed down to the lower levels. Unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) over flights and other means of remote surveillance can provide a good deal of
information regarding an objective area. The use of a reconnaissance det (i.e. from a
reconnaissance platoon/troop or from within the combat team resources) will provide detailed
information with constant updates, for once reconnaissance is established on an objective, it
must be maintained. The use of snipers inserted before the start of the attack will help ensure
that an accurate and constant picture is given of the objective area.
3. Approach to the Objective. The approach to the objective should make best use of
covered routes. The method used will vary with the type of offensive operation being
conducted, the type and disposition of the enemy, and the location of the objective within the
urban area. Should the objective be located deep within an urban area, primary and alternative
routes will have to be chosen to reach the objective, and attacking forces should consider using
more than one approach route through the urban area. A mechanized approach with
armour/direct fire vehicles in support will use speed and firepower in its approach to the
objective area, whereas a dismounted, light force moving to an objective area may use stealth
to reach the objective.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-73
533. ISOLATION OF THE OBJECTIVE

1. Isolate the Objective. Isolation of the objective involves seizing terrain that dominates
the area to prevent reinforcement and to engage any withdrawal. Ideally, the isolation will offer
positions from which supporting fire can engage the objective area and support the assault.
Companies may be required to isolate an objective as part of a larger battle group operation, or
may be required to do so independently as part of its own operation. Depending upon the
tactical situation, a combat team may isolate an objective by infiltration and stealth. A nodal
attack against an objective area within the urban area will require the lead elements to secure
the area and isolate the objective. Note that this isolation force will have to cover towards the
objective and to its own rear, as it will be vulnerable from attack from other directions in the
urban area. The isolation should be quickly followed by the assault force break-in and securing
of the immediate objective or foothold.
2. When planning the isolation, commanders must consider three-dimensional and in-depth
isolation of the objective (e.g. front, flanks, rear, upper stories, rooftops, and subsurface). All
available direct and indirect fire weapons, to include attack helicopters and close air support
(CAS), should be employed consistent with the ROE. In certain situations, companies may be
required to isolate an objective or an area as part of a Special Forces operation.
3. Recent combat experience has shown that many casualties can be sustained when
moving between buildings, down streets, and through open areas to gain entry into a building
either to gain a foothold or to clear it. One of the purposes of isolation at the combat team level
must be to dominate the outside area that leads to the point of entry to allow assaulting troops
to establish a foothold while minimizing effective fire from the enemy. This method is
accomplished by the effective use of direct and indirect fires, obscurants, overall situational
awareness, and the exercise of patience before movement. Depending upon the tactical
situation, combat teams may use infiltration to isolate the objective.
4. Isolating the Objective as Part of a Battle Group Attack. As the support element for
a larger operation, a combat team may be tasked to isolate the objective. When a combat team
is given this mission, the objective is normally a larger structure, a block, or a group of buildings.
The combat team commander task-organizes his platoons and assigns them fire positions. In
addition to isolating the objective, the combat team may be given additional tasks that will be
conducted simultaneously or on order. Examples of these additional tasks include assuming
assault element missions, securing cleared buildings, handling non-combatants and PWs, and
CASEVAC.
5. Isolating the Objective as Part of a Combat Team Attack. The isolation of an
objective area may include responsibility for fires directly supporting the assault. When a
combat team conducts an attack, the tasks assigned to the isolation element are determined by
the tactical situation. If a combat team conducts an attack, the objective can be a building, a
small group of buildings, a traffic circle, or a small village. Emphasis must be placed on
suppressing or neutralizing the fires on and around the objective. The Figure 5–2 below depicts
an infantry combat team with DFS vehicles assaulting buildings 41 and 42. To secure a
foothold and clear these buildings, the combat team commander has assigned a platoon to
support by fire and suppress the enemy in buildings 11 and 21. The MGS suppresses an
enemy LMG in building 51 and assists in the suppression of building 11. Another platoon
supports by fire and suppresses any enemy fire from buildings 31, 41, and 42. The combat
team's third platoon positioned in buildings behind the fire support element, acts as the assault
element to clear buildings 41 and 42. In this manner, three-dimensional isolation of the
objective (i.e. buildings 41 and 42) is accomplished. Note that should this objective be situated
5-74 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
within an urban area that has not been cleared in detail, elements will be assigned all-round
arcs of observation and fire to counter any unexpected attack from a flank.
Figure 5–64: Isolating an Urban Objective (Abbreviation: OBJ—objective)

6. Tasks. The combat team commander isolates the objective with direct and indirect fires
before and during the assault element's execution of its mission. The combat team will:
a. Consistent with the ROE, suppress known, likely and suspected enemy targets
with direct and indirect fire weapons. Under restrictive ROE, suppression may be
limited to only enemy locations positively identified. This will also limit collateral
damage.
b. Cover mounted avenues of approach with anti-armour weapons.
c. Cover dismounted avenues of approach with automatic weapons.
d. Control key terrain near or adjacent to the objective to prevent the enemy from
reinforcing his positions, withdrawing, or counterattacking.
e. As the assault element performs its tasks, be prepared to move to other locations
to suppress enemy fires and neutralize enemy positions.
7. Combat team commanders must give specific instructions to subordinate commanders
concerning where to place fires in support of the assault element. Once suppressive fires begin
to engage the objective, they will normally increase and continue until masked by the advancing
assault element. Depending upon the ROE, suppressive fires may or may not be used from the
outset of the assault.
8. Once masked, fires are shifted to upper or lower windows and continued until the assault
force has entered the building. At that time, fires are shifted to adjacent buildings to prevent
enemy withdrawal or reinforcement. If the ROE are restrictive, the use of supporting fires is
normally limited to known enemy locations that have engaged the unit.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-75
534. THE BREAK-IN AND SECURING OF A FOOTHOLD

1. The break-in to the objective area allows the force to secure an initial foothold. This
foothold should provide cover from enemy fire and a location for the attacking troops to enter
the urban area. The size of the foothold is dependent upon the situation and is usually a
combat team intermediate objective. In some cases, a large building may be assigned as a
combat team intermediate objective (i.e. foothold). As the combat team attacks to gain a
foothold, suppressive and neutralizing fires should provide support. If the attack is against a
specific objective deep within the urban area, an initial foothold at the edge of the urban area
may be required to allow the main body the freedom to quickly manoeuvre to the specific
objective node. Once at the node, the force will have to conduct the break-in (following the
isolation) and secure its foothold in the objective area.
2. The combat team may conduct the break-in as part of an overall battle group operation,
or it may conduct the operation as part of an independent sub-unit task. If it is conducted as the
assault element of a battle group task force, it will probably be conducted against a large
building or group of buildings defended by a strong enemy force. Combat team commanders
need to clearly understand the specified and implied tasks that are required to accomplish the
mission, as well as the brigade or battle group commanders' intent, and the desired end state.
3. Supporting Fires. The assault plan must include supporting fires. These will be
provided in part by the element providing the isolation, but supporting fires onto the immediate
objective area / point of entry will likely come from elements within the assaulting force. For
example, battle group elements may provide the isolation and outer supporting fires, but
supporting fires onto the point of entry and immediate break-in area will be the responsibility of
the assault combat team. Consideration and care must be taken when white phosphorous,
illumination, or tracer munitions are used since they can cause structural fires. Moreover, if
supporting fires are provided by DFS elements, care must be taken due to their penetration
capabilities. Ammunition can penetrate many walls and travel great distances to include
passing through multiple buildings, creating unintended damage, casualties, and fratricide.
4. Assault. Depending upon the situation and supporting fires from other assets, rifle
platoons may simultaneously assault intermediate platoon objectives as part of the overall sub-
unit objective, or they may consecutively assault these objectives, completing forward passage
of lines with one another. Against a large structure, platoons may be assigned floors in the
assault. This allows the platoon to consolidate and rest during the assault and provides for a
clear passage of lines. It is likely that platoons are required to leave security teams on floors
and in cleared rooms, and to also facilitate the passage of lines to another platoon to continue
the assault. The assault element must quickly and violently execute its assault and subsequent
clearing operations. Once momentum has been gained, it should be maintained to prevent the
enemy from organizing a more determined resistance on other floors or in other rooms. If
platoons come across rooms, hallways, or stairwells that are barricaded with furniture, or where
obstacles have been placed, they should first attempt to bypass the barricade or obstacle and
maintain the momentum of the attack. If they cannot bypass the barricade or obstacle, security
should be posted, the obstacle checked for booby traps, and any booby traps marked, removed,
or neutralized. In addition, securing uncleared areas may be an option to maintain momentum
against the main enemy force. Commanders should continue the momentum of the assault;
yet, they must not allow the operation to become disorganized.
5. Ammunition and Equipment. The tactical situation will influence how the assault
element is equipped and armed. The assault element carries only a combat load of equipment
and as much ammunition as possible, especially grenades (e.g. fragmentation, smoke,
concussion). The fire support element can maintain control of additional ammunition and
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equipment not immediately needed by the assault element. Resupply should be pushed to the
assault element. Commanders must carefully manage the soldier's load during the assault.
Normally, ammunition, water, special assault weapons and equipment, and medical supplies
and litters, are the only items carried in the assault.
6. Breaching. Sections and platoons will have to conduct breaching. Engineers may be
attached to the unit responsible for breaching. Depending upon the situation, combat team
commanders may need to designate specific breaching locations or delegate the task to platoon
commanders. The ROE and restrictions seeking to minimize collateral damage will determine
the method of breaching.
7. Immediate Clearing Tasks. Once inside the building, the priority tasks are to cover the
stairwells and seize rooms that overlook approaches to the building. These actions are required
to isolate enemy forces within the building and to prevent reinforcement from the outside. The
assault element clears each room on the entry floor and then proceeds to clear the other floors
to include the basement. If there is a sub-level (i.e. basement), it should be cleared as soon as
possible, preferably immediately following the securing of the ground floor. The procedures for
clearing a basement are the same as for any room or floor, but important differences do exist.
Basements may contain entrances to tunnels such as sewers and communications cable
tunnels. These should be cleared and secured to prevent the enemy from infiltrating back into
cleared areas.
535. SECURING IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES
1. The combat team will likely be allocated a specific objective area to secure as part of the
overall battle group plan. Once this has been secured, the combat team must be prepared to
support other sub-units clearing objective areas and must be prepared to conduct detailed
clearing operations. A combat team commander will likely assign portions of the objective area
to rifle platoons and support their actions with direct fire support and vehicles. The company
commander must maintain depth in this attack to overcome stiff resistance and maintain
momentum once forces have been committed.
536. CLEARING THE URBAN OBJECTIVE
1. Before determining to what extent the urban area must be cleared, the overall tactical
situation must be considered. A pervasive conventional enemy in a determined defence will
require intensive and extensive close combat fighting. However, a fleeting insurgent force
seeking to create casualties and then withdraw, will sustain combat at lower, less intensive
levels. Notwithstanding the depth and determination of the enemy, thoroughness will be
required in clearing, as a minimum, all immediate objective areas. ROE and the presence of
civilians in the area will affect the robustness of tactics. Care must be taken to avoid civilian
casualties, and whenever possible, they should be provided with assistance:
a. Initially, the commander may decide to clear only those areas necessary for the
immediate success of his mission if:
(1) an objective must be seized quickly;
(2) enemy resistance is light or fragmented; or
(3) the buildings in the area have large open areas between them. In this
case, the commander would clear only those buildings along the
approach to his objective, or only those buildings necessary for security.
b. Eventually, depending upon the tactical and operational situation and desired
end states, the entire objective area will likely have to be cleared.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 5-77
Figure 5–65: Clearing Selected Buildings Within Sector (Abbreviation: OBJ—objective)
537. ATTACK ON A BLOCK OR GROUP OF BUILDINGS

1. A combat team may attack a block or group of buildings as part of a larger offensive
operation. To attack a block or a group of buildings, a company group may need to be
reinforced, particularly with engineers and DFS elements.
2. The execution of this mission is characterized by platoon attacks supported by both
direct and indirect fires. Success depends upon isolating the enemy positions that often
become platoon objectives, suppressing enemy weapons, seizing a foothold in the block, and
clearing the block's buildings room by room.
3. The objective should be broken down into smaller intermediate objectives that can be
taken consecutively or simultaneously depending upon the objective size and the enemy
resistance expected.
4. As one intermediate objective is secured, a brief consolidation will be ordered, and the
force then prepared to conduct a forward passage of lines and support the attack onto any
subsequent intermediate objective. This staging should be well planned, and subordinate
elements must clearly understand their responsibilities for providing fire support to other
elements.
5. The sub-unit commander must plan the operation in detail, and must be well forward
during the action to closely coordinate the actions of the platoons and any supporting elements.
Forward passages of lines must be done rapidly to maintain momentum, but ongoing
coordination will be vital during the battle to ensure proper mutual support and that neutralizing
fires are maintained.
6. Direct Fire Weapons. Direct fire support will be required on the objective area, ideally
from defilade positions. These weapons should not be fired from one position for a prolonged
period. Gunners should use a series of positions and displace from one to the other to gain
better fields of fire and to avoid being targeted by the enemy. Some possible considerations for
direct fire support are given below:
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a. MGs should be sited to fire along streets and into windows, doors, mouse holes,
and other probable enemy positions. ROE may restrict firing to only engaging
confirmed enemy locations.
b. LAVs, other allocated DFS elements, and anti-armour weapons engage enemy
tanks and other armoured vehicles, and due to their range and target acquisition
capability, can provide a counter-sniper capability. They must be sited and
prepared to engage enemy counterattacks.
c. During battle procedure, commanders should consider the type and nature of
munitions that will be appropriate for the expected tactical situation and
operation. If the enemy armoured threat is low, then missile systems should be
allotted a greater percentage of breaching and bunker-busting munitions.
Likewise, armoured vehicles will balance ammunition loads towards high
explosive squash head (HESH), vice sabot rounds.
7. Before an assault, the combat team commander should employ smoke to conceal the
assaulting platoons. He secures their flanks with direct fire weapons. Concealed by smoke and
supported by direct fire weapons, an assaulting platoon attacks the first isolated building. The
assault element uses the cover of suppressive fires to gain a foothold. The combat team
commander must closely coordinate the assault with its supporting fire so that the fire is shifted
at the last possible moment. The sections and platoons then clear each designated building.
After seizing the block, the combat team consolidates and reorganizes to repel a counterattack
or to continue the attack. Periods of limited visibility may provide the best conditions to attack,
especially if night vision aids provide the attacking force an advantage over the enemy.
538. CONSOLI DATION CONSIDERATIONS
1. General. Consolidation, including reorganization, will occur once the combat team has
obtained its objective or upon order by the commander. In some circumstances, the
commander may wish to consolidate on an intermediate objective and regroup and/or issue
fragmentary orders before continuing with the move to the planned objective. Conversely, the
commander may come to the assessment that he lacks the force to achieve the planned
objective, and therefore, is forced to consolidate and prepare to support follow-on forces.
2. Consolidation. Consolidation provides immediate security and allows the combat team
to defend, repel counterattacks, to reorganize, and to support the forward passage of lines by
another force. Within the combat team, sub-sub-units will conduct their own consolidation at
various points in the battle. It is extremely important in an urban environment that units
consolidate and reorganize rapidly after each engagement. The assault force in a cleared
building must be quick to consolidate in order to repel enemy counterattacks and to prevent the
enemy from infiltrating back into the cleared building. After securing a floor, selected members
of the assault force are assigned to cover potential enemy counterattack routes to the building.
Priority must first be given to securing the likely direction of enemy attack.
3. Reorganization. Reorganization occurs as part of consolidation and allows the
commanders to allocate remaining forces to the task. The commander must provide the higher
echelon with an accurate SITREP and assessment of the enemy and of his own capabilities.
He must ensure that coordination mechanisms (e.g. markers and guides) are established to
assist in a rapid passage of lines by follow-on forces.
4. Consideration of Full-spectrum Operations. As part of consolidation process, the
local commander must assess the entire situation around him, and decide upon the requirement
for the immediate commencement of stability operations (to include security and control
(particularly of movement), framework patrols and emergency humanitarian aid). This will be
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dependent upon the presence of a civilian population. The need to take measures to ensure the
immediate protection and well being of the civilian population and property, and in turn, their
long-term support of the military forces, must be considered and implemented, even at the cost
of short-term tactical gains against a fleeing enemy force. This is further discussed in the
following section.
5. Considerations for the Consolidation. In conducting the consolidation, the
commander must consider the following:
a. Platoons assume hasty defensive positions after the objective has been seized
or cleared. Based upon their specified and implied tasks, assaulting platoons
and sections should be prepared to support an assault on another building, or
another assault within the building. As required, commanders will have to adjust
consolidation orders given before the attack. Commanders must ensure that
platoons guard enemy mouse holes between adjacent buildings, covered routes
to the building, underground routes into the basement, and approaches over
adjoining roofs.
b. Platoons and sections must be prepared to receive fragmentary orders for the
forward passage of lines, and commanders must assess how they can best
support the passage.
c. Markers and guides should be dispatched to allow for a rapid marry-up of
commanders. Markings in accordance with SOP should be placed to indicate to
other friendly forces that the area is clear.
d. Direct fire vehicles may be brought forward to assist with the consolidation and to
support the attack to the next objective.
e. Resupply and redistribute ammunition, equipment, and other necessary items.
f. Move support or reserve elements into the objective.
g. Redistribute personnel and equipment on adjacent structures.
h. Treat and evacuate wounded personnel, PWs, and civilians.
i. Process the remaining PWs.
j. Segregate and safeguard civilians.
k. The combat team commander anticipates and prepares for future missions, and
prepares the combat team chain of command for transition to defensive, or
possibly, stability operations.
539. CONSIDERATION OF FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS AS PART OF
CONSOLIDATION
1. The Imperative. Once a tactical combat operation, such as an attack, is complete, the
local commander, particularly at the combat team level, must make a holistic assessment of the
local situation. In assessing the immediate situation at hand, the commander must understand
and appreciate the potential requirement for the conduct of operations other than combat; that
is, for stability operations to consolidate the operation for the long-term benefit of the civilian
population and society. This requirement will be dependent upon the operational and tactical
situation, but the presence of civilians and civilian infrastructure will necessitate these
considerations and any immediate action. Immediate action must be taken to ensure the
protection and short-term well being of the civilian population. This must be done not only
because it may be seen as the morally correct action, but in order to help ensure the
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population’s continued support for the military force and its actions. Furthermore, these actions
may need to be taken at the expense of short-term tactical success. For example, troops may
have to be tasked to protect a local population and prevent looting, vice pursuing a fleeing
enemy.
2. Immediate Situation Report. In such circumstances, the local commander must
include in his SITREP a tactical assessment of the enemy and his own forces, and any threat to
general stability should an element of the civilian population remain. He must indicate their
immediate humanitarian requirements, their actions, and the recommended actions of the
military force. He must be able to recommend whether his force consolidates, supports the
forward passage of lines of another force, and begins stability operations, or whether another
force should assume this responsibility.
3. Required Actions. Any mass disorder, such as looting and rioting by civilians, must be
brought under control. Movement and area control must be instituted to stabilize the immediate
situation, to prevent enemy or insurgents from escaping amongst the civilian population, and to
protect the civilian populace from collateral damage. These requirements will necessitate the
allocation of troops to conduct vehicle checkpoints and area patrols. Emergency first aid may
be required for wounded civilians. If civilians have been trapped by enemy forces and/or by the
fighting for an extended period, they may require emergency humanitarian aid as well. Tactical
commanders and soldiers must understand the inherent change to the application of force in
such rapidly altering circumstances. For example, a soldier having just completed an attack
may be assigned to a section vehicle checkpoint. He and his immediate commander must
adjust their mindset to the new situation. Thus, a vehicle with civilians seeking emergency
medical assistance is not automatically engaged if it does not immediately respond to the
checkpoint.
4. Exfiltration of Enemy Forces. Commanders and troops must be aware of the threat of
enemy forces and/or insurgents attempting to escape the area by mixing with the civilian
population. Such a threat may cause HQ to order forces to prevent any civilian movement out
of the local area. This may create anger and frustration for the civilian population and riots may
ensure. Troops must be prepared to conduct low-level crowd confrontation operations (CCO).
It is unlikely that equipment or specialised units will be available for high-level CCO immediately
following combat operations, so commanders must be quick to engage local leaders to alleviate
their concerns and help calm the situation.
5. Intelligence Exploitation. Commanders must remember that civilians left behind in the
local area may be able and willing to provide valuable information regarding enemy forces, their
locations, strengths, and intentions. They may be able to indicate booby-trapped or mined
areas, other danger areas or hidden weapons caches. Additionally, local leaders may be able
to identify insurgents or enemy personnel who have taken refuge amongst the civilian
population.
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In a September 2005 ABCA [American, British, Canadian and Australian Armies’

Standardization Programme] Coalition Conference, US officers with recent experience in Iraq,
stated that during the major combat campaign of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, the
advance to seize the capital had not considered the need to exercise control over civilian
populations once each intermediate objective was secured. They stated that roadblocks were
established along the way during hours of darkness, not for movement control or stability, but
for force protection, and as a result, a significant number of Iraqi civilians were accidentally
killed. Likewise, when civilian populations began to loot and riot in areas cleared of Iraqi
forces, no actions were taken to prevent or stop such instability. This resulted in significant
damage to civilian institutions and infrastructure, numerous deaths and an overall
undermining of support for the coalition. Had consideration been given to the requirement for
stability operations and the required measures taken on the battlefield at the time to impose
public security and avoid casualties, a greater amount of public support for coalition forces
may have been realised in the long term.
From the ABCA Project Team Stability Operations meeting in Australia, September 2005.
540. ADVANCE TO CONTACT, RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURING OF ATTACK

ROUTES
1. In some tactical situations, a company group or combat team may have to conduct an
advance to contact through an urban area to find and fix enemy forces or to reach an objective
area within the urban area. Similarly, a combat team may have to reconnoitre and possibly
secure such a route to prepare for a battle group attack against a specific objective within the
urban area. It is preferable to conduct this mission supported by direct fire support elements.
These operations are characterized by alternating periods of rapid movement, to quickly cover
distances, and much slower movement for security. The speed of movement selected depends
upon the terrain and enemy situation. Although such a reconnaissance or route security may be
conducted mounted in vehicles, the force will require rifle platoon troops prepared to dismount
to deal with any enemy resistance or defended positions.
2. Danger Areas. The combat team should cross danger areas (e.g. crossroads, bridges,
and overpasses.) by a combination of actions:
a. Between danger areas, the combat team moves with the infantry mounted, or
when contact is not likely, rapidly on foot.
b. When enemy contact is likely, the combat team moves to clear enemy positions
or to secure and overwatch the danger area. Combat vehicles support the
infantry.
3. Axis of Advance. In peripheral areas, this advance should be on one axis with the lead
unit well forward, and security elements checking side streets as they are encountered. In the
city core, for more flank security, this operation is conducted as a coordinated movement on two
or three axes.
4. Enemy Positions. Enemy positions can be either destroyed by the combat team itself,
or if the need for speed is great and the situation allows, bypassed, reported, and left to the
follow-on units. In the latter case, the positions are picketed and handed-off to follow-on forces.
5. Coordination. The combat team commander must ensure that the actions of platoons
and attached elements are well coordinated, and that the he is well forward to ensure that this
occurs. Situational awareness must be maintained in a rapidly moving or changing
environment.
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541. DIRECT FIRE PLANNING AND CONTROL

1. One of the combat team commander's primary responsibilities will be to plan and control
direct fires during the attack into an urban objective. The information below applies to a combat
team isolating an objective and providing supporting fires for either a battle group or combat
team attack. Direct fire support can be very resource intensive, thus commanders must ensure
that enough ammunition is available to support their fire plans.
2. Considerations for Direct Fire Planning. The principles and considerations for
planning direct fire support for any offensive operation remain extant for offensive UO. Within
the urban area, the following should be given specific consideration in view of the unique
characteristics of the urban terrain:
a. Mass Fires. Massing of fires is defined by the terminal effect on the enemy, not
by the number of systems firing or the number of rounds fired. Massing fires is
achieved by placing precise, effective fires on multiple targets at the same time.
This method means firing at enemy targets in or outside of buildings laterally and
in depth. The objective is to force the enemy to respond to multiple threats and
to kill or suppress enemy soldiers or positions. Open areas through which
reinforcing or withdrawing enemy must pass must be covered by redundant fires.
b. Commanders Control Fires. Commanders at all levels must control fires to
simultaneously engage different priority targets. Allowing individual crews to
select their own priority target will probably result in multiple systems engaging
the same target while leaving other dangerous targets free to engage and
possibly manoeuvre against friendly units. Given the complexity of urban terrain
and the difficulty in seeing in depth of the objective, it is vital that commanders be
well forward to ensure that the planned fires are effectively supporting the
assaulting element and that they are ready to quickly adjust fires if necessary.
c. Fire Plans must be Understood by the Soldiers who Execute Them. It is
imperative that every soldier understands how to execute his portion of the direct
fire plan. This understanding is necessary to avoid fratricide and to allow low-
level commanders to exercise mission command in meeting their commander’s
intent. This is particularly important given the complexity of urban areas.
Soldiers must be able to identify where they are responsible for firing and if there
is an enemy to engage. Moreover, they must understand how the fires are to be
controlled and directed during the course of the fight. Exchanging SOPs, chalk
talks, terrain models, and rehearsals assist in developing this understanding.
Soldiers and commanders must be made to understand the overall commander’s
intent and fire support requirements.
d. Focus Fires at the Section and Detachment Level. Focusing fires means
accurately directing fires to hit specific targets, points, or areas, and is the most
difficult task of controlling fires. The commander focuses fires by clearly
conveying instructions to direct the fires of the individual platoons, sections, and
dets on specific targets or areas that support his plan. Recognizable control
measures and reference points allow the support element to focus fires. Orders
and rehearsals must paint the visual picture of how the commander wants the
fires, and should provide section and det commanders with clear reference and
control points.
e. Overlapping Arcs and Secondary Arcs. As with any supporting fire plan, arcs
should overlap to allow a redundancy of fires. This is particularly important in an
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urban area in which structures may contain a greater enemy threat than
anticipated. Furthermore, fire support elements may be assigned secondary
tasks and secondary arcs to counter additional enemy threats.
f. Distribute Fires. Fires must appropriately distributed in order to simultaneously
engage different enemy threats, to avoid unnecessary redundancy—multiple
systems engaging the same targets—and to remove the enemy’s freedom of
action. It may take careful reconnaissance, detailed plans, and patience in
sighting to ensure that supporting elements can properly distribute their fires
across all enemy threats (and potential threats), and thus, effectively support the
assault. Proper distribution ensures critical targets are engaged first and that the
enemy is engaged three-dimensionally. The following points should be
emphasized:
(1) Avoid target overkill. Minimize engaging targets that are already
destroyed or suppressed.
(2) Use each weapon system in its optimal role. Different weapon systems
and ammunition types have specific characteristics that maximize their
capability to kill or suppress specific enemy threats at different ranges.
(3) Destroy the most dangerous targets first. Proper focus, distribution, and
firing first are the keys to effective supporting fires.
(4) Concentrate on enemy crew-served weapons and combat vehicles. This
method deprives the enemy of his ability to use its fire support weapons
against friendly troops.
(5) To protect friendly forces as long as possible, take the best shots and
expose only those weapons systems actually needed to fire to maximize
the probability of hitting and killing enemy targets.
g. Shift Fires. Shifting fires is the process of re-focusing weapons systems to
change the distribution of fires as targets are destroyed, friendly forces advance,
or as the situation changes. At the combat team level, this method is
accomplished by shifting the fires of the support element to focus on new targets.
h. Rehearse the Fire Plan. Fire plans should be rehearsed along with the other
facets of a planned attack. The role of the fire plan in each stage of the offensive
operation—isolation, break-in, securing of objectives, clearing and
consolidation—should be briefed, discussed, and rehearsed. A rehearsed fire
plan enhances execution, prevents fratricide, identifies shortcomings, and works
to synchronize the operation.
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CHAPTER 6
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
SECTION 1
GENERAL
1. While much of the material contained within this chapter is set within the context of
urban-based defensive tactics in a major combat operation (MCO), the practices, principles, and
considerations discussed are applicable to defensive planning during operations lower on the
spectrum of conflict. Such operations include peace support operations (PSO), counter-
insurgency (COIN) operations, and limited intervention operations such as a non-combatant
evacuation (NEO) from unstable region. In conducting defensive operations within these less
combat intensive campaigns, the application of principles and practices for the defensive
planning and conduct must not violate the principles of the overall campaign. For example, a
defensive position created during a COIN campaign (i.e. when forces are attempting to gain and
retain the support of the public) should not include the destruction of private property for the
sake of creating ideal fields of fire.
SECTION 2
STAGES AND PLANNING
601. CONDUCT OF THE DEFENCE
1. Defensive operations will be conducted in urban areas when:
a. Retention of the area offers decisive advantages.
b. Defence of the area is integral to the overall concept of operations.
c. Defending forces require the cover and concealment afforded by urban areas.
d. The inherent nature of such areas permits economical use of troops, thus
releasing forces for more critical areas
e. The operational and/or strategic requirements of the overall campaign require
defence of the urban area and/or its population.
2. Key terrain is any feature where seizure, retention, or control affords a marked
advantage to either enemy or friendly forces. Within an urban area, key terrain may be bridges,
building complexes, public utilities or services, or open areas. Where defence or support of a
population is part of the defensive plan (or perhaps the very reason for the operation itself), then
key terrain may be a feature that is considered important by the population. This may include a
religious or historical site. Its retention or defence may be key to maintaining the support of the
population.
3. The defence of an urban area is organized around key terrain features and buildings that
preserve the integrity of the defence and provide ease of movement to the defender. Defences
are prepared in depth, with the bulk of the fighting in the urban area conducted by infantry
supported by other arms.
4. Static defence is used in villages, small towns and minor urban areas, and may be part
of a larger defensive area. In larger cities and urban areas the defence is more fluid, with the
defender concentrating on moving forces from key terrain features/buildings to other similar
features in order to counter the main enemy thrust. Although the principles employed are
generally the same as for other defensive operations, the difference lies in the techniques
employed and the degree of emphasis placed upon the following considerations:
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-1
a. When time permits, planning for the defence is detailed and centralized. Yet, the
control is decentralized since small units conduct the majority of the action.
b. Due to the likely abundance of concealment and cover, yet limited observation,
special attention must be given to mutual support and all-round defence to
counter enemy infiltration. The nature of the ground usually leads to close
quarter combat with enemy forces. Defensive measures may include the
barricading of streets and the employment of short-range direct fire weapons.
Ideally, the defence should be based upon the following:
(1) The Perimeter Force Battle. The perimeter force consists of mutually
supporting posts (i.e. temporary fighting positions) on the perimeter of the
urban area that prevent the enemy from bypassing the defensive area.
They provide updated information and begin the destruction of the enemy
forces. They withdraw or shift when they can no longer influence the
battle and the enemy commits to an assault.
(2) The Disruption Force Battle. A mobile and coordinated force disrupts
the enemy assault as it attempts to break-in, establish a foothold and
clear immediate objectives. The force and its tactics cause attrition,
delay, disruption, and draw the enemy towards selected killing zones.
(3) The Main Defensive Area Battle. The main defensive area (MDA) is
based upon a series of defended localities with mutually supporting
strongpoints sited in depth and with the aim of defeating the enemy in
selected killing zones. A local reserve should be designated in each
sector or area. This battle should consist of aggressive, offensive tactics
with counterattacks at all levels preventing the enemy from grouping or
regrouping, and from encircling any defended localities.
(4) Reserve. As in any defensive operation, a central, mobile reserve
(combined arms) is essential.
c. The forward line of troops (FLOT) in an urban operation (UO) should be near the
forward edge of the city or town. This prevents the enemy from entering the
outskirts and deploying its forces by using the cover provided by buildings. The
FLOT should not appear to the enemy as a clearly defined line on which
supporting fire can be concentrated. Under some conditions, such as during the
conduct of a demonstration or a feint, it may be necessary or desirable for the
FLOT, or portions thereof, to be located further back from the forward edge to
shape the enemy’s actions.
d. Defences are coordinated to prevent encirclement and penetration, and all units
and sub-units are assigned specific areas to be defended. Measures are taken
to maintain maximum surveillance over the entire area, and to defend, at short
notice, in any direction. Platoons and sections will likely be assigned primary and
secondary positions.
e. Buildings or groups of buildings may be employed as obstacles. Their
channelling effect may be improved by using local material, barbed wire, craters,
and roadblocks to create barriers. The obstacle plan must be carefully
coordinated and disseminated to all units, otherwise the defender's main asset—
the ability to move quickly based upon knowledge of the ground—will suffer.
This will impose heavy demands upon engineer resources, which will have to be
closely controlled. The desire to limit the damage to urban areas that will be re-
6-2 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Defensive Operations
populated must be carefully considered, and will likely limit the type and number
of obstacles to be created.
f. Counterattacks are characterized by centralized planning and decentralized
execution. Small units taking advantage of the cover and concealment afforded
by built-up areas should counterattack key terrain/buildings to drive the enemy
from the area, isolate its forces, offset its advantage of mobility, and subject it to
piecemeal destruction.
602. STAGES OF A DEFENSIVE OPERATION
1. Perimeter Force. The perimeter force is likely to be the first element of the defence to
encounter the enemy; notwithstanding a covering force external to the urban area may have
been employed. It plays a vital role in the conduct of defensive operations, and its grouping and
employment requires careful consideration, as follows:
a. Grouping. The perimeter force should be grouped in a series of posts that
dominate the approaches and perimeter of the built-up area. The grouping for
each post could comprise a mix of reconnaissance, direct fire assets, and indirect
fire controllers, with some infantry support. Support from indirect fire, air and
aviation should be integral to the grouping. Engineers are required to provide
mobility corridors for withdrawal.
b. Role and Tasks. The role of the perimeter force is to prevent the enemy from
bypassing the urban area / defensive position and to begin the destruction of the
enemy as it attacks. The normal tasks for the perimeter force are:
(1) Identify enemy strength, intentions, and main effort.
(2) Destroy enemy reconnaissance, force the enemy lead elements and/or
main body to deploy, and destroy (to the greatest extent possible) the
investment forces / lead elements.
(3) Destroy assault forces in assembly areas and attack positions, primarily
using offensive support assets, air, and indirect fire
(4) Cover obstacles.
c. Planning Considerations. The following should be considered in planning the
perimeter force battle:
(1) Siting. Elements may be sited both on the outskirts of the urban area
and beyond. They should not be easy to identify, as they are likely to be
high priority targets for enemy indirect fire and air attack.
(2) Command. To be effective, the perimeter force requires a designated
commander. This may be a direct fire squadron commander or
reconnaissance squadron commander.
(3) Withdrawal. The amount of combat power allocated to the perimeter
force should be balanced against the risk that it might sustain a high
number of casualties. The withdrawal of the force is likely to be a difficult
operation, and it requires detailed planning and rehearsals. Once
withdrawn, the force may be regrouped or assigned follow-on tasks.
2. Disruption Force. The disruption force is a mobile force deployed behind the perimeter
force and has the role of engaging the enemy elements as they attempt to establish a foothold,
secure immediate objectives, and expand into the urban area. The force should cause attrition,
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-3
disrupt the attack, and draw the enemy towards selected killing zones. In a sense, the
disruption force should conduct a delaying operation (although success should be measured in
ground denied and casualties created, rather than time delayed):
a. Grouping. The grouping should be based upon a number of small infantry
teams conducting mobile operations (e.g. ambushes and tank hunting patrols),
snipers, some direct fire system (DFS) support, and indirect fire controllers. Note
that DFS elements include the direct mobile fire system, the multi-mission effects
vehicle version 1 (MMEVv1), the light armoured vehicle (LAV) tube-launched
optically tracked wire-guided missile (TOW) Under Armour (LAV TUA), and the
25 mm gun.
b. Tasks. The normal tasks for the disruption force are:
(1) Cause enemy attrition.
(2) Delay and disrupt the enemy assault.
(3) Draw the enemy into killing zones.
(4) Confuse the enemy by disguising the layout of the defence.
c. Planning Considerations:
(1) Location. The disruption force should operate between the perimeter
force and MDA force. To be effective, it requires a large area of
operations (AO) in which to conduct highly mobile offensive action.
(2) Obstacles. Maximum use should be made of indirect fire, obstacles,
rubble, and anti-armour mines to slow the enemy's movement and
channel it onto selected routes and into killing zones.
(3) Deception. Scope exists for the disruption force to practise deception,
both before and during the battle, to deceive the enemy as to the location,
strength, and intentions of the defender.
(4) Command and Control. Despite the decentralized nature of operations,
effective command and control is essential if the force is to contribute to
the defensive battle. An ad hoc grouping may be created for this stage of
the battle, but the commander will likely be from the infantry corps given
the nature of the terrain and battle itself. Maximum use of mission
command is essential for the force to exploit fleeting opportunities to
engage the enemy forces as they expose themselves.
(5) Communication. Protection and duplication of communications links is
essential.
(6) Tactics. The disruption force fights in a highly mobile fashion that
engages and creates attrition on the enemy assault elements, but avoids
decisive engagements. It should hit the enemy, force him to stop and
deploy, then withdraw and attack again from another direction and
position. Given the complexity of urban terrain, a disruption force does
not have to continually withdraw rearwards, but may exploit well-planned,
covert routes to attack the enemy forces from various directions at
various times. The battle should be planned in as much detail as possible
and must be well rehearsed.
6-4 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
3. The Main Defensive Area Force. The role of the MDA force is to complete the
destruction of the attacking enemy. The MDA force will be based upon a number of defended
localities, each consisting of mutually supporting strongpoints sited to defeat the enemy in
selected killing zones. The strongpoints will be based upon sections and platoons supporting
each other within a company’s defended locality. Ideally, these localities will combine the rifle
company positions with DFS vehicle support. Each defended locality should have a small
reserve:
a. Grouping. Infantry will provide the bulk of the force, and should be supported by
direct and indirect fire assets.
b. Tasks. The normal tasks for the MDA force are:
(1) Destroy the enemy.
(2) Break-up the momentum of the enemy attack.
(3) Prevent the enemy breaking out of the urban area.
c. Planning Considerations. In planning the MDA battle, the following should be
considered:
(1) Alternative Positions. If time permits, alternative positions supporting
the assigned tasks should be prepared.
(2) Killing Zones. Defended localities should be sited to cover designated
killing zones. Achieving mutual support between localities will be
essential for a coordinated battle.
(3) Reserves. Each defended locality area requires a local reserve.
(4) Fire Plan. Where conditions allow, a defensive fire plan should be
prepared.
(5) Non-combatants. The presence of non-combatants (e.g. civilians or aid
organization personnel) remaining in the area will complicate planning.
Ideally, all would have evacuated before the commencement of the battle.
However, if some remain, their protection within the MDA must be
incorporated into the plan.
4. Reserve. As with any operation, the reserve is formed to counter the unexpected and is
held out of contact until required. It is usually launched against a developing and unexpected
enemy threat, such as the loss of a defended locality or a sudden attack from an open flank. It
should be located centrally and consist of mobile forces, grouped to counter the enemy force
and its capabilities. Generally, it will be an all-arms grouping with a large proportion of infantry;
that is, those required to dismount and clear enemy that are sited in hasty defensive positions.
It may be used to support any part of the defence, but normally, it will be employed within the
MDA:
a. Grouping. The grouping of the reserve should be based upon armoured and
mounted infantry. Engineers may be allocated once they have completed their
primary task.
b. Planning Considerations. In the planning the reserve force and its
employment, the following should be considered:
(1) Selection of routes for counterattacks.
(2) Allocation of time for rehearsals.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-5
(3) Trigger for commitment of the reserve.

(4) Options for the employment of elements of the perimeter force after their
withdrawal.
603. PLANNING AND COORDINATING THE DEFENSIVE BATTLE: UNIT AND SUB-UNIT
LEVELS
1. In planning the defence, emphasis must be placed on intelligence. To supplement the
intelligence data provided by patrols and higher headquarters (HQ), commanders must conduct
a thorough reconnaissance of the area to be defended, including the surrounding terrain. Use
should be made of civilians living in the area.
2. During the reconnaissance, commanders should complete several tasks:
a. Determine the killing zones and buildings that can best engage these areas.
Buildings are evaluated and carefully inspected to determine their defensive
strengths and weaknesses. Depending upon the type of buildings within the area
and the size of the designated battle position, specific buildings and ground are
selected and prepared for the defensive battle.
b. Select key weapon and crew-served weapon positions to cover likely mounted
and dismounted avenues of approach. Position anti-armour weapons to cover
armoured avenues of approach, and position machine guns (MGs) to cover
dismounted avenues of approach.
c. Assign section arcs of fire, engagement priorities, and other fire control
measures. Develop plans for obstacles, indirect and direct fire, observation
posts, snipers, and redundant communications.
d. Identify areas that are occupied by non-combatants, and if they are located in the
AO, have them moved to safe areas.
e. Ensure positions are free of enemy mines and obstacles.
f. Designate positions for early warning systems (e.g. chemical or air sentries).
g. Identify sewer locations and other possible enemy infiltration routes.
h. Identify locations where materials for preparing fighting positions and obstacles
may be obtained (e.g. hardware stores, construction sites).
i. Identify all functional public and other services that may be of assistance (e.g.
telephone systems, electric power, water supply, works departments, medical
facilities, gas stations, and food stores).
j. Prepare a sketch map of the area, ensuring that the following are incorporated:
(1) numbering system for all buildings;
(2) killing zones;
(3) arcs of fire for all crew-served weapons and rifle sections; and
(4) obstacle plan.
These sketches are provided to each commander, so that all use the same sketch and
numbering system for identifying areas and targets during the operation.
6-6 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
k. Like any defence, the area must be reconnoitred from the enemy’s perspective.
This will identify areas of concern (e.g. dead space, enemy routes, and fire
positions).
3. When planning for the defence, other factors that commanders should consider are:
a. The building type and construction must be carefully considered. Generally, core
areas and the outer city core contain stronger, better-constructed brick and
heavy clad buildings. In many third world regions, many structures will be made
from mud, clay, or light wood. Any such building will require substantial
resources and time to properly prepare it as part of a defensive position.
Depending upon the type of buildings within the area, their location for meeting
the tactical tasks, and the size of the designated battle position, specific buildings
and ground are selected and prepared for the defensive battle.
b. In very general terms, frontages for infantry forces will roughly be as follows:
(1) rifle platoon—one to two city blocks;
(2) company / combat team—two to four city blocks; and
(3) battalion / battle group—four to 12 city blocks.
NOTE
In many third world or developing regions, it will be difficult to neatly delineate organized
blocks in the dense urban slums. As with any defensive battle, the commander must
understand the tasks assigned and the desired intent of his superior, and then site his
defensive position to meet those requirements. Companies, platoons, and sections must
be sited based upon the desired effects and the principles of the defensive (e.g. mutual
support), vice strict doctrinal frontages.
c. One of the most common defensive tasks a platoon will be given is the
strongpoint defence of a building, part of a building, or a group of small buildings.
Strongpoints should not, however, be restricted to buildings that can be easily
isolated and destroyed. Defensive strength can best be achieved by grouping a
strongpoint around an intersection, with fire positions in two or three different
buildings to provide interlocking and mutually supporting fire. Strongpoints,
although platoon strength, can be strengthened by the allocation of supporting
arms.
d. Defended localities will normally be of at least company strength, with section
and platoon strongpoints grouped in a mutually supporting manner, to form
company or company group defended localities. These localities will be sited in
depth throughout the area and organized for all-round defence to counter enemy
penetration. Ideally, localities should be sited so that penetration between their
constituent strongpoints is virtually impossible. Boundaries between localities
should be arranged so that likely enemy avenues of approach fall solely into the
area of responsibility of one defended locality or another.
e. Whenever possible, mutually supporting fire positions will be sited outside
buildings. Restricting defensive positions to buildings becomes resource
intensive, limits fields of fire, and makes the defenders obvious targets. Despite
the advantages to defending from buildings, rubble created by bombardment
provides better concealment and less vulnerable positions.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-7
f. Streets and open areas are killing zones for both sides and must be avoided.
g. Streets are usually avenues of approach. However, forces moving along streets
are often channelled by the buildings and have little space to manoeuvre. Thus,
streets should be blocked with obstacles. They tend to be more effective than
obstacles emplaced on roads in open terrain since they are more difficult to
bypass. These obstacles must be covered by fire from nearby houses or other
vantage points.
h. Local reserves in the defended localities will be held centrally to help eject any
enemy that has infiltrated into the area. Fighting will be at short ranges.
i. Once a firing position is spotted it can be easily neutralized, thus the enemy’s
task can be made more difficult if friendly forces occasionally adjust positions.
j. Subterranean systems found in some built-up areas are easily overlooked, but
can be important to the outcome of operations. They include subways, sewers,
cellars, and utility systems. These routes could allow enemy forces to move
undetected to bypass friendly defensive positions. Consequently, infantry should
deny the enemy the use of these routes by establishing subterranean defensive
positions and ambushes.
k. The defence must be aggressive, with the defender conducting offensive
operations by day and night, and exploiting his knowledge of the area through
planned/rehearsed contingencies. Aggressive patrolling, raids, sniping, and
ambush tactics can be used to surprise and disrupt enemy attacks. Defending
forces can also attempt to infiltrate back into areas that the enemy has cleared,
but not occupied.
l. Through a combination of well-sited positions, well-sited obstacles, and offensive
action, the defensive layout and its conduct should surprise and keep the enemy
continually off balance.
m. Counterattacks require centralized planning and decentralized execution. They
should be well planned and rehearsed, and commanders must remain flexible to
counter or exploit unexpected developments. At the lower level, counterattacks
take advantage of the cover and concealment afforded by urban structures.
SECTION 3
WEAPON AND POSITION SITING
604. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Climate, available materials, function, and the cultural development of the region all
influence the design and construction of buildings. Since there are numerous hybrid
construction methods, and the possibility exists of different types of buildings being adjacent or
sharing a common wall, distinct tactical estimates and principles for attacking and defending
each type of building are not practical. The primary platoon and section level task in the
defence is the preparation of fighting positions within their strongpoint. Such positions in built-
up areas are usually constructed in buildings, whose selection is based upon an analysis of the
area in which the building is located, the tactical responsibility or assigned task, and the
individual characteristics of the building. When considering the selection of buildings for use as
a strongpoint, leaders should consider the following factors:
a. Protection. Buildings that provide more protection from direct and indirect fire,
such as those constructed of reinforced concrete rather than wood, paneling, or
6-8 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
other light material, should be selected because they will require less
reinforcement to gain sufficient protection. Strongly constructed basements and
strong load-bearing walls/beams add protection from indirect fire.
b. Dispersion. Commanders must avoid establishing positions in a single building
when it is possible to occupy two or more buildings that will permit mutually
supporting fire. A position in one building, without mutual support, is vulnerable
to bypass, isolation, and subsequent destruction from any direction. Soldiers
must never individually occupy rooms in a building, but as a minimum, should be
deployed in pairs, and no building should be occupied by less than a half section.
c. Concealment. Selecting buildings that are obvious defensive positions must be
avoided, as the enemy easily targets them. In certain situations, the need for
both security and fields of fire requires the occupation of exposed buildings. In
such cases, additional reinforcement provides suitable protection within the
building. Some defensive positions, particularly those for missile systems, may
be sited outside of buildings. They should be carefully selected so that they
blend in with the surrounding terrain, exploit materials at hand, and offer
concealed withdrawal routes to secondary positions and strongpoints.
d. Fields of Fire. To be effective and to prevent isolation, positions should be
mutually supporting and have fields of fire in all directions. Those defending a
building may be assigned primary and secondary arcs to ensure that all
directions are covered. Clearing fields of fire, if desirable, may require the
destruction of adjacent structures by using explosives, engineer equipment, and
field expedients. Destroying selected buildings can enlarge fields of fire, but will
likely indicate the location of the defending force. Clearing obstacles, such as
telephone wires that will interfere with guided weapon systems, must also be
contemplated.
e. Covered Routes. Defensive positions will have at least one covered route that
permits resupply, medical evacuation, reinforcement, or withdrawal from the
position. This route may be established through walls to adjacent buildings,
through underground systems and by communications trenches, or behind
protective buildings. They must be clearly briefed and rehearsed.
f. Observation. Buildings should permit observation and fields of fire into all
enemy avenues of approach and adjacent defensive sectors. Although upper
stories allow for greater observation, they also attract the attention of the enemy.
The use of mirrors and periscopes allows improved observation while reducing
the risk of detection.
g. Fire Hazards. Buildings that are an obvious fire hazard should be avoided. If
flammable structures must be occupied, soldiers must take measures to reduce
the danger of fire, such as wetting down the immediate environment and laying
50 mm of sand on the floors. Filling up bathtubs and buckets with water, and
having fire extinguishers available, are other precautions that should be taken.
h. Time Available. Time available to prepare the defence may be the most critical
factor. If enough time is not available, buildings that require extensive
reinforcement with sandbags, fire prevention measures, clearing fields of fire,
and other preparation, may not be used. Conversely, buildings located in less
desirable areas that require little improvement will probably become the centre of
the defence. The overarching consideration, however, is to select defensive
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-9
positions that will best meet the tactical requirements and intent of the superior
commander, and allow the troops to meet their assigned tactical tasks.
605. SELECTION OF WEAPON POSITIONS
1. Each weapon should be assigned a primary arc of fire to cover enemy approaches and
to fulfil its assigned tasks. Whenever possible, alternative positions that cover the primary arc
should also be selected. These may be located in an adjacent room on the same floor. Each
weapon system and section should be assigned a secondary position to engage attacks from
another direction; that is, to meet secondary tasks.
2. The best area to site a weapon in a building to maximize its arc of fire is at a corner of a
building. Siting weapons on basement or ground floors allows for grazing fire, but will be
affected by all obstacles, reducing both observation and fields of fire. Siting weapons on upper
floors allows for longer fields of view and fire, but the fire will be plunging fire and the enemy is
likely to quickly identify and engage these elevated locations from a greater distance.
606. CONSTRUCTION OF WEAPON POSITIONS
1. Weapon positions can be prepared in windows, loopholes, and other places in buildings.
If positions are part of the MDA and are to be held, they should have overhead and all-round
protection. This includes protection from below if weapon positions are on upper floors. Some
materials that could be used for protection are:
a. battlefield debris (e.g. furniture, old doors, tables);
b. ammunition boxes;
c. tires;
d. bricks or blocks;
e. sandbags;
f. oil drums; and
g. corrugated iron.
2. When preparing fire positions, soldiers should follow a basic work sequence to ensure
work is efficient and effective. The following sequence is recommended:
a. Gather available materials, such as tables, dressers, and appliances, to construct
positions.
b. Construct a stable firing platform for the weapon.
c. Build frontal, side, overhead and underneath protection for the position with the
materials gathered. Ensure cabinets, dressers, end tables, and other furnishings
are filled with material to stop small arms fire.
d. Construct alternative and secondary firing positions similar to the primary
position.
e. Remove fire hazards and pre-position fire-fighting equipment.
f. Construct dummy positions in rooms above or below the primary and alternative
positions to draw enemy fire away from the primary and alternative positions.
3. When constructing fire positions, a basic skill required is the correct filling, laying, and
use of sandbags. The following procedure is recommended:
6-10 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
a. Sandbags are filled three quarters full with soil or sand, and their necks are tied
with the attached string. When laid, neither the neck nor the side seams are on
the outer face of the wall as these are the weakest points. In addition, the necks
and corners are tucked in as they are laid.
b. When laid, the sandbags are beaten with a shovel, pick handle, or board into a
rectangular block to increase their density and bond them together. Sandbags
are laid in horizontal rows like bricks. The bottom row consists of sandbags laid
head on (headers), while the next row consists of sandbags laid lengthwise along
the wall (stretchers). Subsequent rows are composed alternately of headers
then stretchers. Sandbags should be set at right angles to maintain a slope with
a 4:1 ratio. It is important to maintain the bonding when the wall turns a corner.
Good alternatives to sandbags are ammunition boxes or furniture (e.g. dresser
drawers) filled with sand.
Figure 6–1: Sandbag Dimensions
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-11
Figure 6–2: Sandbag Filling
Figure 6–3: Sandbag Wall
Figure 6–4: Sandbag Slope
6-12 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 6–5: Laying Sandbags in Corners

4. Given that the urban battlefield is three-dimensional and the chances of being fired upon
from any direction are high, protection from above and below is just as important as having
frontal protection. A very simple way to protect fire positions from lower floors is to lay
sandbags on the floor. Two rows should be laid (one row at the very minimum) using the laying
technique described at Figures 6–3 to 6–5. For overhead protection, the soldier should make
use of furniture and other building debris, like doors and tables. Using a strongly constructed
table with two rows of sandbags on top and lining the sides is a very simple method of providing
overhead cover. Another method is to build two sidewalls with two rows of sandbags, and for
the top, using a sturdy door along with two rows of sandbags.
607. SITING AND CONSTRUCTING POSITIONS FOR WEAPONS AND INDIVIDUALS
1. The urban area offers a wide variety of options for siting and constructing positions for
support and individual weapons. Positions may be external to the structures, constructed inside
structures, or placed within or amongst the rubble and debris. Perimeter post positions and
positions within the MDA have to be well prepared, whereas those sited as part of the disruption
force require less preparation as they will not be defended for a lengthy period.
2. Considerations for siting and constructing urban defensive positions for weapons and
individuals are provided below:
a. Window Position. When using window positions (see Figures 6–6), soldiers
should reinforce the wall on either side of the window, and use this protection to
provide a protected kneeling or standing position. In order to fire downward from
upper floors, soldiers can place tables or similar objects against the wall to
provide additional elevation and a stable platform. They must, however, be
positioned to prevent the weapon from protruding through the window. Weapons
should be sited in the depth of the room so that flash and dust do not reveal the
position. Water should be used to wet the fire position so that dust, caused by
the firing, does not reveal the position.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-13
Figure 6–6: Window Firing Position

b. Cellar Position. Using a cellar/basement (see Figure 6–7) as a fire position will
reduce the amount of materials required to construct the position. There is no
requirement to construct protection from below or along a major portion of the
front. The weapon will be sited at ground level, which will allow for grazing fire.
c. Attic Position. A firing position located in an attic (see Figure 6–8) requires a
greater amount of material and time to build; firstly, it requires all-round
protection, and secondly, the materials have to be carried up to its location. It is
very vulnerable to top attack from mortars and artillery. It will produce plunging
fire for automatic weapons and the angle of fire will cause targets to appear
smaller, therefore creating smaller targets. Such positions usually have wide
fields of vision, which make them ideal for snipers and fire controllers.
d. Corner Position. A firing position constructed in the corner of a building (see
Figures 6–9) allows a greater arc of fire from a single location. This can be
accomplished by putting a loophole on either side of the corner.
6-14 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 6–7: Cellar Firing Position
Figure 6–8: Attic Firing Position
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-15
Figure 6–9: Corner Firing Position

3. Individual Positions. Individual positions, particularly those that are part of the MDA
(see Figure 6–10), must be well constructed with overhead protection to counter any indirect fire
threat. Soldiers in fire teams should be sited in close proximity covering the same or
complementary arcs.
4. Internal Positions. Depending upon the field of view and arcs of fire required and
available, positions facing outside of a building can be sited in depth from within a structure (see
Figure 6–11). Such positions provide a soldier greater concealment and protection.
Figure 6–10: Individual Position
6-16 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 6–11: Interior Wall Position

5. Tunnels. If a tunnel is to be blocked, concertina wire, early warning devices, command-
detonated munitions, and other easily prepared obstacles, may be used. A fire team position
established at the tunnel entrance provides security against any enemy approach (see Figure
6–12). This position should be prepared on a platform built as high as possible so it would not
have to be abandoned should water rise in the tunnel. The platform should be equipped with
command-detonated illumination. The confined space amplifies the sounds of weapons fire to a
dangerous level. As was the case with the reconnaissance patrol, soldiers in this position
should mask at the first sign of a chemical threat.
Figure 6–12: Position Established at the Entrance of a Tunnel
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-17
6. Loopholes. Loopholes are purposely constructed firing holes placed in the walls of
structures where there are no other appropriate openings to allow required arcs of fire to be
covered from a firing position. To avoid establishing a pattern of firing from windows, fire
positions should be developed by preparing loopholes in the outer walls where no openings
currently exist. Several loopholes may be required for each weapon (e.g. primary, alternative
and secondary positions), but the number of loopholes should be carefully considered because
they may weaken walls and reduce protection. Walls with a loophole usually require
reinforcement to provide adequate protection for the defender. Engineers should perform these
tasks, or should be consulted for advice and assistance before an excessive number of
loopholes are made. Care must be taken to ensure that loopholes are not made so large that
the enemy would easily recognize them. Loopholes should be placed where they can be
concealed (see Figure 6–13):
Figure 6–13: Loopholes Concealed from Observation

a. To obtain a wide arc of fire and facilitate the engagement of high and low targets,
loopholes should be cone shaped (with the wide end to the firer) to reduce the
size of the exterior aperture (see Figure 6–14). The edges of a loophole splinter
when hit by bullets, especially in brick walls. A protective lining, such as an
empty sandbag held in place by wire mesh, reduces spalling effects and prevents
the enemy from firing into or observing through loopholes. Loopholes can be
placed in the corner of buildings to offer a wider arc of fire.
6-18 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 6–14: Loophole Shape

b. Loopholes should also be prepared in interior walls and ceilings of buildings to
permit fighting when necessary within the structure. Interior loopholes should
cover stairwells, halls, and unoccupied rooms. To conceal loopholes, pictures,
drapes, or furniture can be used. Loopholes in floors permit the defender to
engage enemy personnel on lower floors with small arms and grenades. These
holes must be reinforced and should be covered/hidden when not in use.
c. To enhance individual protection, soldiers should avoid firing directly through the
loophole. They should fire at an angle, using the reinforced wall as protection
(see Figure 6–15).
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-19
Figure 6–15: Firing through Loopholes
608. FIRE POSITIONS FOR SUPPORT WEAPONS

1. The principles for siting support weapons do not change in the urban area. Siting is still
done making the best use of weapon characteristics and siting considerations. Although these
weapons are best employed in trenches outside of buildings, they can be placed inside. With
direct fire missile systems, however, there are firing restrictions that must be followed when
placing firing positions in confined spaces:
a. Machine Guns. In the urban environment, medium (7.62 mm) MGs provide high
volume, long range, and automatic fire to suppress, neutralize, or destroy targets.
They provide final protective fire along fixed lines and can be used to penetrate
light structures. The primary consideration for employing MGs within built-up
areas is the limited availability of long-range fields of fire. Although MGs should
be placed at the lowest level possible, urban obstacles often obstruct grazing fire
at ground level. The placement of MGs at a higher level produces plunging fire,
which decreases the beaten zone the closer the weapon is to its target. To
produce the most effective type of fire within an urban environment, the weapon
should be sited at the lowest level of the building that is not masked by urban
obstacles. The MG can be mounted on its tripod to deliver accurate fire along
fixed lines, or converted to bipod fire to cover secondary fields of fire. The
construction of a MG position (see Figures 6–16 and 6–17) is similar to that for
other positions except that more room is required for the three-man crew and
extra ammunition. Also, due to the higher muzzle velocity, there is a greater
need for camouflage. The weapon must not be sited so that it extends beyond
the edge of the window. It should be sited as far back into the room to the
greatest extent possible while still covering its assigned arcs and producing the
required effects.
6-20 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 6–16: Sandbagged Machine Gun Emplacement under a Building
Figure 6–17: Machine Gun Position

b. Mortars. Although a light mortar is a weapon more suited for fire positions on
the outside of buildings, indoor fire positions can be constructed if required. Like
any other fire position it requires all-round protection, but unlike other weapons it
requires an upward firing hole, formed for example, by removing a section of the
roof so that rounds can pass through (see Figure 6–18). Care must be taken to
ensure that the bombs do not hit the remaining roof sections.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-21
Figure 6–18: Mortar Fire Position

2. Direct Fire Missile Weapons. Direct fire missile weapons normally have an anti-
armour capability, but ideally will be capable of range of effects, including that of anti-structure
and breaching. Various principles for employing direct fire missile systems have universal
application (e.g. make maximum use of available cover, provide mutual support, and allow for
back blast and proper ventilation). However, operations in an urban area introduce new
considerations, and crew detachment (det) commanders must be prepared to provide advice to
sub-unit commanders regarding the employment of their systems. When selecting urban area
firing positions for direct fire missile systems, the following general guidelines must be observed:
a. Ensure proper clearance to the rear of the weapon. The back blast will create
overpressure that may cause injury to friendly forces. This is particularly
important if the weapon is sited near other troops and when other troops are
moving in the local area to alternative and secondary positions.
b. Missile systems are often best sited outside structures to take advantage of the
surrounding cover of buildings and terrain, and to avoid overpressure inside
structures. In general, it also allows them to have larger arcs.
c. Site the missile system to counter the threat against which their employment is
planned. If the system is to be used primarily in an anti-armour role, it must be
sited to cover the likely approach routes of enemy armour.
d. If sited inside a building, the room from which it will be fired must be large
enough to allow the weapon to fire without overpressure effects injuring or
affecting the crew and nearby troops. Det commanders and gunners must know
the characteristics of the weapon system and the minimum size for internal firing
positions.
e. All glass must be removed from the windows and all small objects/debris
removed from the room.
f. Ensure there is enough ventilation in the room (e.g. open a door or window).
6-22 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
g. Floors and camouflage must be wetted down to prevent dust/dirt from blowing
around.
h. All personnel operating or located near the weapon must wear some form of
hearing protection.
i. Missile systems that have a vertical rise in the missile flight path (e.g. top-attack
missiles) must be sited near or at the edge of any opening. This will cause
concealment problems; therefore, the weapon system may be held back in the
room and only brought forward to fire on the command of the det commander,
who may be forward in the room watching for targets.
j. Alternative positions should be planned to allow different options for covering the
same area of responsibility.
k. Commanders should plan for the missile systems to be used at various stages in
the defensive battle. Long-range systems may be employed in the perimeter
force, and then redeploy to the MDA, while short-range systems may be
employed as part of the disruption force.
3. Weapons detachment (wpns det) commanders and gunners must be intimately familiar
with their weapons systems, and understand the restrictions and requirements for firing missile
systems from enclosed spaces. When selecting indoor firing positions for these weapons the
following specific guidelines must be observed:4
a. Short-range anti-armour weapon light (SRAAW[L]—M72):
(1) There must be at least 1.2 m clearance between the rear of the weapon
and the nearest wall.
(2) There must be at least 1.9 m2 of ventilation (e.g. open door or large
window).
(3) All personnel in the room must be forward of the rear of the weapon.
(4) All combustible material should be removed from the area rearward of the
weapon.
b. Short-range anti-armour weapon medium (SRAAW[M]—84 mm):
(1) The building must be of sturdy construction.
(2) The ceiling must be at least 2.1 m high.
(3) The floor size must be at least 4.6 m x 3.7 m.
(4) There must be at least 1.9 m2 of room ventilation to the rear of the
weapon (e.g. open door or large window).
(5) All personnel in the room must be forward of the rear of the weapon.
(6) At least 150 mm clearance between the tube and the aperture from which
it is fired.
c. Short-range anti-armour weapon heavy (SRAAW[H]—Eyrx):
4
Nothing in this section overrides the regulations contained in B-GL-381-001/TS-000 Training Safety
regarding individual weapon systems. These figures are given as a guide only and commanders and
instructors must confirm safety specifications and employment limitations with the individual weapon
publication.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-23
(1) The weapon can be fired from within a room or enclosed space with a
minimum floor size of 3.0 m2.
(2) The rear wall must be at least 2.0 m away.
(3) There must be 1.0 m2 of room ventilation to the rear of the weapon.
(4) Everyone in the room must be forward of the rear of the weapon.
Figure 6–19: Anti-armour Team Firing from a Roof Top
Figure 6–20: Corner Room Anti-armour Weapon Firing Position

d. Long-range anti-armour weapon (LRAAW—tube-launched optically tracked wire-
guided missile [TOW]):
(1) The building must be of sturdy construction (e.g. masonry or solid frame).
(2) The ceiling must be at least 2.2 m high.
6-24 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
(3) The floor space must be at least 5.4 m x 7.5 m.

(4) There must be at least 2.5 m2 of room ventilation to the rear of the
weapon.
(5) The distance from the firing port or window should be such that the
launch tube is not visible from the outside, and muzzle clearance of
23 cm and line of sight clearance of 75 cm must be maintained.
SECTION 4
CONSTRUCTION TASK
4. General. All fire positions require siting and some level of preparation. Those that will
form part of platoon strongpoints and sub-unit defended localities will require a great deal of
time and preparation. Those that will form part of the mobile, disruption battle will need very
little preparation, but time is necessary to rehearse rapid occupation and withdrawal from the
positions. In preparing defensive positions, maximum use should be made of materials at hand.
However, if the defence is temporary and a civilian population may reoccupy the urban area
following combat operations, limitations may be imposed on the use of locally available
materials.
5. Doors. All doors not used by defenders must be obstructed in some manner to deny the
enemy easy access to a building. Doors should be locked, nailed shut by driving nails through
the door into the doorframe, or blocked by nailing boards to the door case and door. They can
be then reinforced with furniture, sandbags, or any other available field expedient materials.
When authorized by the appropriate higher authority, outside doors can be booby-trapped.
Suitably qualified personnel will do this task. Booby traps must be recorded and commanders
must ensure they do not endanger friendly troops. They must be removed once an operation is
complete.
6. Stairs and Hallways. Stairs will be an advantage to the attacker, giving them easy
access to other building levels. Stairs may be removed, but at the very least should be blocked
by some type of obstacle such as furniture, barbed wire, etc. The defender may use ladders or
ropes that can be removed when not required once stairways have been closed. Other
common obstacles that are quickly employed are boards nailed down with nails protruding
upward, or corrugated metal nailed down with grease applied to the exposed portions. Hallways
are best blocked in the manner methods used for blocking stairs. Hallways, however, are
danger areas for attacking forces, so secondary fire positions should be constructed to cover
these areas.
7. Windows. Windows, like doors, are access points into buildings that if not in use must
be blocked. All glass should be removed to eliminate dangerous projectiles that might injure
friendly soldiers during an attack. Nailing boards across the width of the opening can block
windows. Other materials can be used, such as spare wooden/metal doors placed up against
the window with boards or sandbags placed behind to create an anchor. Priority for such
construction should be given to the lower-level windows where it is more likely that the enemy
will be able to use equipment to gain access. If time does not permit blocking all windows, the
higher windows are lower in priority, but should at least be covered with wire mesh. The wire
should be loose at the bottom to permit the defender to drop grenades out of the window, while
able to block grenades thrown from the outside. All openings that are not blocked should have
some type of covering (e.g. burlap, curtains or blankets) to conceal movement inside the
building.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-25
Figure 6–21: Blocking Hallways and Stairs

8. Floors. The bottom floors of buildings that have no basement can have trenches dug
into the floor for additional protection against direct fire weapons. In areas not being used,
floorboards can be removed to prevent freedom of movement for enemy that may gain entry
into the building. Holes can be made in floors and covered up to allow friendly forces to fire
down through them. Vertical mouse holes may be made to permit movement within the building
once stairways are blocked.
9. Ceilings. Ceilings should be reinforced with supports to withstand any structural
damage caused by enemy fire. In addition, the building will need strengthening due to the extra
weight from reinforcing firing positions on upper floors. Buildings should be selected which are
strong enough not to require a large amount of shoring, but most buildings will require some
level of reinforcement to enhance the protection of troops inside. The following materials and
methods are suggested for shoring:
a. Equipment required:
6-26 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
(1) Props are of three types (see Figure 6–22 below). Arco props, a civilian
style prop, are made of two metal telescoping poles that are screwed into
place. Square timber props can be used, and should be at least
120 mm2. Round timber props—basically, tree trunks—should be at least
125 mm in diameter. To ensure maximum strength all timber props
should be as straight as possible.
(2) Spreaders distribute the load across a larger area and prevent point
loading of floors and ceiling. They consist of a board that has a minimum
depth of 5 cm, the width of the prop being used, and the length of the
ceiling or floor, depending upon where it is being used.
(3) Wedges are used at the bottom of each prop to ensure there is a tight fit
for the timber props. Wood, cut into wedges, is placed under the timber
props to force them upwards.
(4) Timber dogs/nails are used to secure props in place.
(5) Claw hammers.
(6) Wood cutting saw.
(7) Sledgehammers.
(8) Level.
(9) Chalk.
b. Procedure for setting up a timber prop (see Figures 6–23 and 6–24):
(1) Before positioning the prop, plaster boards or loose plaster should be
removed from the ceiling. This is done to identify the direction of the
ceiling joists to allow correct orientation of the props, and to reduce the
quantity of dust and debris that will come down from the ceiling if the
building is hit.
(2) Locate and mark the joists every 1.5 m (if 120 mm props are used).
(3) Cut spreaders to length for use on the floor and at the ceiling.
(4) Make wedges.
(5) Cut props to fit the effective gap between the spreaders, less half the
thickness of the wedges.
(6) Nail the spreaders into place on the floor and ceiling, and then stand the prop
into place between the spreaders. The wedges are then bashed into place
on the bottom of the prop with sledgehammers until the props are firmly in
place. The wedges and props are held into place by nails or timber dogs.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-27
Figure 6–22: Types of Props
Figure 6–23: Setting up a Prop
6-28 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 6–24: Multi-story Propping

10. Unoccupied Rooms. Unoccupied rooms not used for the initial defence and not
needed for a withdrawal or counterattack route should be blocked with material (e.g. barbed
wire, furniture) to make them impassable. If material is not available, entry points into the room
can be blockaded and the floor made impassable by removing sections of the floor or making
obstacles such as nail-boards.
11. Basements. Basements require preparation similar to that of the ground floor. Any
underground system not used by the defender, but which may provide enemy access to the
position, must be blocked. Basements not in use may be prepared the same way as
unoccupied rooms. Another method is to block all drainage systems and fill the basement with
water, thereby making it unusable. Use of the basement in the defence must be carefully
considered, due to certain advantages offered. Most basement areas, because of their heavy
construction and underground location, make excellent areas for storing ammunition, water,
rations, medical supplies, and other important materials. Basements can also provide
protection for troops during heavy artillery bombardments, particularly if time is not available to
construct proper overhead protection in fire positions. They can also be used for fire positions
at ground level and for withdrawal routes from a house. If the basement is to be used for the
above-mentioned tasks, particularly in the MDA, the ceilings have to be propped and shored,
and bunkers must be built with overhead protection.
12. Upper Floors. Upper floors require the same preparation as ground floors, except that
blocking windows is a lower priority, as it is less likely that the enemy will use these areas to
enter buildings. If a room is to be used as a firing position, there is a requirement to have
protection from possible enemy fire from the floors below. Using sandbags is the most effective
method, as long as a minimum of two rows is laid. It will be impossible and impractical to layer
all the floors with sandbags, but fire positions should be layered. If sandbags are not available,
using other materials with proven protection value may be considered.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-29
13. Interior Routes. Routes are required to permit defending forces to move within the
building and engage enemy forces on the outside from multiple directions. Withdraw routes
must also be planned and constructed to permit rapid evacuation of a room or the entire
building. Mouse holes should be made through interior walls to permit movement between
rooms. These holes should be concealed in some form (e.g. behind furniture). The knocking of
holes in ceilings or floors, and the use of ropes or ladders that can be quickly installed or
removed, can achieve movement between floors. Once the defender has withdrawn to upper
floors, these holes should be blocked with timber, furniture, or other expedients. The defender
must continue to engage the enemy by moving from room to room or floor to floor until a
complete withdrawal is ordered. Building withdrawal routes should be clearly marked for both
day and night identification. All personnel must be briefed as to the location of the various
prepared routes and their uses. Rehearsals must be conducted using these routes during
blackout conditions so that all personnel are familiar with the routes and can navigate them from
memory.
14. Fire Prevention. Buildings that have wooden floors and ceilings, or are of adobe
construction, require extensive fire prevention measures. The attic and other wooden floors
should be covered with about 50 mm of sand or dirt. Buckets of water, sand, or dirt should be
positioned for immediate use as fire extinguishers. Sinks and bathtubs should be filled with
water for firefighting. All combustible materials should be removed from defended buildings,
and all electricity and gas should be turned off once the fighting has begun. Destroying
buildings adjacent to the defensive position can create firebreaks.
15. Communications. Telephone lines should be laid throughout adjacent buildings or
underground systems, or buried in shallow trenches. Radio antennas can be concealed by
placing them on the sides of chimneys, steeples or out windows that direct communications
away from enemy early warning sources and ground observation. Within the building,
telephone lines should be laid through walls and floors. The local telephone service if
operational can be used, but should not be considered a secure method.
16. Rubbling. Parts of a building can be rubbled to provide additional cover and
concealment for weapons and emplacements (see Figure 6–25). Rubbling should be done only
by engineers and must fit into the defensive scheme, and must not contravene restrictions on
collateral damage.
6-30 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 6–25: Rubbling Building for Fire Position

17. Roofs. Flat-roofed buildings within the defence provide excellent areas for the enemy to
land helicopters and/or disembark soldiers. Consequently, anti-helicopter obstacles must be
employed. Any object that has a height of approximately 2.0 m (e.g. poles) and can be attached
firmly to a roof is an effective anti-helicopter obstacle. Enemy entry to a defended building from
an adjacent roof must also be countered. Roofs that are accessible from adjacent structures
can be covered with wire obstacles or other expedients, which like any obstacle, must be
covered by fire to be effective. Entrances to buildings from rooftops can be blocked and booby-
trapped if this is compatible with the defence of those buildings and with the overall defensive
plan.
18. Exterior Structure. Any structure on the outside of a building that could assist scaling
the building to gain access to upper floors or to the roof (e.g. drainage pipes, fire escapes,
ladders, lightning rods and trees) should be removed or blocked. Like any defensive position,
there should be minimum alterations made to the outside appearance of the buildings being
defended. If this is not possible, the surrounding buildings not being defended should have
similar changes so as not to give away the position.
19. Obstacles. Obstacles should be positioned adjacent to buildings to stop tanks and to
delay or channel infantry. They can also be placed against occupied buildings so that the
enemy cannot get close enough to gain entry:
a. Buildings near defensive positions that could provide cover for enemy infantry or
that could be suitable enemy weapons positions should be:
(1) destroyed;
(2) mined;
(3) barricaded with barbed wire; and
(4) prepared for demolition.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-31
b. Command-detonated munitions can be used effectively either inside or outside

buildings to cover the withdrawal of friendly troops, or to supplement final
protective fires. They must be manned and detonated from a secure position.
20. Fields of Fire. As time permits, fields of fire should be improved around the defensive
position. Selected buildings can be destroyed to enlarge fields of fire. Obstacles to anti-armour
guided missiles, such as telephone wires, should be cleared. Dead ground should be covered
with obstacles, observation, and fire. Fields of fire must be prioritized, and primary and
secondary positions assigned as appropriate.
SECTION 5
DEFENCE AGAINST FIRE
21. Incendiary ammunition, special weapons, and the ease with which incendiary devices
may be constructed from gasoline and other flammable items, combined with the nature of the
urban areas, makes fire a very real threat in UO. During defensive preparations and operations,
fire prevention should be a primary concern. To minimize the risk of fire rendering a chosen
position indefensible, the following steps should be taken:
a. Minimize the Chance of Exposure. Choose or create positions that do not
have large openings and provide as much built-in cover as possible. This may
prevent incendiary ammunition from penetrating the position.
b. Minimize the Combustibility of Selected Positions. Remove all unnecessary
flammable materials, including ammunition boxes, furniture, rugs, newspapers,
curtains, and anything else not necessary to the defence. Turn off all electricity
and gas to the building.
c. Improve the Position. A building of concrete block construction, with concrete
floors and metal roof, is ideal. Most buildings, however, have wooden floors or
sub-floors, wooden rafters and wooden inner walls, which means steps must be
taken to improve the position. Remove inner (i.e. non-load bearing) walls and
replace them with blankets to resemble walls from the outside. Spread sand on
floors and in attics to a depth of 50 mm to retard fire.
d. Be Prepared to Fight the Fire. Pre-position firefighting gear, which for the
individual soldier means entrenching tools, buckets, water, sand, and blankets.
Supplement these items with fire extinguishers from vehicles that are not being
used. Pre-position all available firefighting equipment so it can be used during
actual combat and not necessitate a lull in the fighting to employ.
e. Plan Escape Routes. Fire is so catastrophic that it can easily overwhelm
personnel in spite of extraordinary precautions. Plan routes of withdrawal and
establish a priority for evacuation from fighting positions to provide an exit that is
relatively free of combustible material and covered from direct enemy fire.
f. Plan for First Aid Requirements. The confined space and large amounts of
combustible material in urban areas encourages the enemy to use incendiary
devices. Two major first aid problems are more critical in UO than on the open
battlefield. Firstly, burns, which can be reduced by wearing suitable clothes.
Secondly, respiratory problems, including the inhalation of flames and smoke,
and the lack of oxygen. Although there is little defence against smoke inhalation,
it can be greatly reduced by wearing the individual protective mask. Medical
assistants should be included in defensive planning for UO, and planning must
6-32 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
ensure that medical assistants have extra supplies for the treatment of burn and
inhalation injuries.
SECTION 6
SUPPORTING ARMS IN THE DEFENCE
609. ARMOURED DIRECT FIRE VEHICLES
1. As in the attack, dismounted infantry conducts most of the fighting in the defence, but
armoured direct fire vehicles and LAVs are very important to the overall defence of an area, and
in certain situations, infantry and vehicle tasks are complementary. In planning the use of
vehicles to support the defence, commanders must consider their vulnerabilities and limitations
in the urban environment. If the situation and level of risk allow for their employment, the
advantage gained can be dramatic. Given that a platoon normally defends from positions in one
or more buildings, depending upon the size, strength and disposition of the buildings, fighting
vehicles can be employed to support the battle as follows:
a. Typical tasks for fighting vehicles (including LAVs) in the urban defence include:
(1) Fire support for defending forces and mutual support to other vehicles
and direct fire missile weapons.
(2) Destroying armoured enemy vehicles and direct fire artillery.
(3) Neutralizing or suppressing enemy positions in support of local
counterattacks.
(4) Neutralizing or suppressing enemy snipers.
(5) Mobile reserve.
(6) Destroying or making enemy footholds untenable by fire.
(7) Providing rapid, protected transport for infantry.
(8) Reinforcing threatened areas by movement through covered and
concealed routes to new firing positions.
(9) Covering obstacles with fire.
(10) Smoke screens.
(11) Resupplying ammunition and other supplies.
(12) Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).
b. Buildings in which vehicles are to be placed must be able to withstand the weight
of the vehicle and the effects of the weapon system.
c. In the defence, fighting vehicles should be integrated into the platoon and sub-
unit fire plan. Fields of fire should cover likely enemy approaches and killing
zones. Once placed in position, fighting vehicles should not be moved for logistic
or administrative functions. If concealed by structures, their crew should remain
under cover to not give away their existence and position. Other vehicles should
accomplish these tasks when possible.
d. To satisfy the tactical tasks assigned by the company commander, platoon
commanders select the area they are to defend and position their sections and
LAVs in primary, alternative, and secondary positions. These positions should
permit continuous coverage of the primary arcs and all-round defence. Other
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-33
direct fire vehicles should be superimposed on this layout to provide grazing fire
and to take advantage of their long range and protection.
610. ARTILLERY
1. Artillery is a powerful weapon to suppress and neutralize an enemy attack. It is effective
in slowing down the enemy force as well as helping to shape the battlefield. Artillery will play a
significant role during the perimeter battle and should continue to engage the enemy as they
approach the urban area. This will require forward observers to remain on the perimeter or in
high buildings that can observe routes to the immediate urban area. Due to the proximity of
forces and the problems of observation, indirect fire becomes difficult to employ during the
disruption battle and in support of the MDA battle. In defensive operations, the tasks of the
artillery are:
a. Close support for troops in contact.
b. Attacking enemy forces in depth.
c. Disrupting enemy preparations for attack.
d. Separating enemy tanks from dismounted infantry.
e. Attacking enemy artillery and forward air defence (AD).
f. Covering barriers, gaps, and open areas.
g. Assisting in the conduct of deception.
h. Providing illumination and smoke.
i. Observation and situational awareness.
611. ENGI NEERS
1. Engineers may perform the following tasks during the defence of a urban area:
a. Constructing complex obstacle systems.
b. Providing technical advice to commanders, to include the use of existing
facilities.
c. Rubbling buildings.
d. Coordinating and laying minefields.
e. Assisting in the preparation of defensive strongpoints.
f. Maintaining counterattack, communications, and resupply routes.
g. Enhancing movement between buildings (e.g. catwalks, bridges).
h. When needed, fighting as infantry, (e.g. as part of the reserve force).
612. TACTICAL AVIATION—HELICOPTERS
1. Tasks for helicopters in support of urban defensive operations may include:
a. Reconnaissance and screening, particularly on a flank. If equipped with
enhanced reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition mission
packages, helicopters can provide real-time battlefield coverage to greatly assist
commanders at multiple levels.
6-34 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
b. Fire support and observation for defending forces, particularly for the perimeter
force and disruption force. Fire support will only be possible if attack helicopter
resources have been allocated; otherwise, helicopters will only provide
observation for indirect fire or close air support (CAS). Several fire/observation
positions will be required. Care has to be taken that helicopter fire/observation
positions do not provide a target signature for either the helicopter or the
supported troops.
c. Rapid insertion, relocation, or extraction of troops. The withdrawal of elements of
the perimeter force and the movement of counterattack or blocking forces may
be conducted using helicopters.
d. Combat service support, primarily for CASEVAC and ammunition resupply.
e. Command and Control. Helicopters may be used to support communications
means that have been disrupted by urban density. Commanders can use
helicopters to quickly view a number of key areas while retaining control of their
operations, in effect, using the helicopter as an airborne command post.
However, commanders must avoid micro-management from the air, which will
often hamper rather than assist operations on the ground. In this regard,
favouring the use of helicopters may preclude a commander from personally
joining his subordinate commanders on the ground (normally at the point of main
effort), which restricts his ability to personally influence the battle and may detach
him from the battle and its risks.
613. AIR DEFENCE
1. Basic AD policy does not change when units operate in urban terrain. The fundamental
principles of mutual support, all-round defence, depth and concentration of force all apply to the
employment of AD assets. The ground commander needs to consider the following when
developing his AD plan:
a. Targets for enemy air (e.g. principal lines of communication, road and rail
networks, and bridges) are often found in and around urban areas.
b. Good firing positions for long range AD missile systems may not be available in
urban areas, therefore, the number of weapons a commander can employ may
be limited.
c. Movement between positions is normally restricted in urban areas.
d. Some AD systems can provide AD coverage from positions on or outside of the
edge of the urban area.
e. Radar masking and degraded communications reduce AD warning time for all
units. AD control measures must to be adjusted to permit responsive AD within
this reduced warning environment.
2. Positioning short-range AD systems in urban areas is often limited to open areas that
lack masking (e.g. parks, fields and rail yards). When AD is employed within the urban area,
rooftops normally offer the best firing positions. Some systems may be deployed on rooftops in
dense urban areas to provide protection against air attacks from all directions. MGs employed
on rooftops can also provide additional low-level AD coverage as part of the all arms air defence
(AAAD) plan.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-35
614. DEFENSIVE USE OF DEMOLITIONS

1. Demolitions are used in defensive operations the same as in offensive operations.
When defending an urban area, demolitions may be used to create covered and concealed
routes, which may be used for withdrawal, reinforcement, or counterattack. Demolitions also
create obstacles and clear fields of fire, and are employed as follows:
a. Infantry make wide use of demolitions for creating mouse holes in structures that
cannot be penetrated manually or mechanically, or for reasons of expediency.
b. Satchel charges and other expedient demolitions may be concealed in likely
enemy weapon firing positions or on likely routes. Expedient shaped charges,
which are very effective against lightly armoured vehicles, may also be integrated
into anti-armour ambushes.
c. Selective rubbling requires technical assistance from engineers. Usually,
buildings can be rubbled using shaped charges or C4 explosive on the supports
or major beams of buildings.
d. Charges should be placed directly against the surface that is to be breached,
unless a shaped charge is used. Whenever possible, demolitions should be
tamped since this dramatically increases their effectiveness.
e. Explosives can be used to crater roads to limit enemy vehicle access to certain
areas or to channel them into killing zones or ambushes.
2. Demolitions will only be employed by appropriately qualified personnel and in keeping
with the commander’s intent. The use of demolitions may be restricted due to the need to avoid
specific levels of collateral damage.
SECTION 7
DEFENCE AGAINST ARMOUR
615. PLANNI NG STEPS
1. The type of terrain found in urban areas is well suited to defence against mechanized
infantry and armoured forces. Being forced to fight in urban areas deprives heavy forces of the
advantages that they possess in open terrain. Mechanized infantry and armoured forces try to
avoid urban areas because they lose the inherent value of their long-range sensors and
firepower. Within the contemporary operating environment (COE), urban centres will play a
major role in future operations. Well-trained infantry can inflict heavy casualties on mechanized
forces in an urban area.
2. In examining the considerations for defending against mechanized forces in an urban
area, it is important to remember that the enemy will use the same tactics and considerations in
their defence against any mechanized force. Hence, the following considerations should be
examined with this in mind.
a. Built-up areas have certain characteristics that favour infantry anti-armour
operations:
(1) Rubble in streets can be used to block enemy vehicles, conceal mines,
and cover and conceal defending infantry.
(2) Streets restrict armour manoeuvre, fields of fire, and communications,
thereby reducing the enemy’s ability to reinforce.
(3) Buildings provide cover and concealment for defending infantry.
6-36 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
(4) Rooftops, alleys, and upper floors provide good fighting positions.
(5) Sewers, storm drains, and subways may provide underground routes for
infantry forces.
b. Anti-armour operations in urban areas involve the following planning steps:
(1) Engagement Area. There should be planned engagement areas for
each stage of the defensive battle, beginning with the perimeter force.
Enemy tanks and other combat vehicles should be engaged where most
restricted in their ability to support each other. Typical locations include
narrow streets, turns in the road, “T” intersections, bridges, tunnels, split-
level roads, and rubbled areas. Less obvious locations can also be used
for demolitions or mines to create obstacles and choke points.
Engagement areas should be layered in accordance with the optimal
range engagement bands of the various weapons systems.
(2) Weapon Positions. The best weapon positions are places where the
enemy armoured vehicles will be at a disadvantage and the defending
infantry most protected. An armoured fighting vehicle’s ability to see and
fire is limited, mainly to the rear and flanks, particularly if hatches are
closed. They have dead space where nearby targets located at ground
level and overhead cannot be seen or engaged. Although small arms
have little effect against armoured vehicles, they will cause the crew to
close down, thus reducing their capability.
(3) Target Reference Points. Once the engagement area and fire position
are determined, target reference points are assigned to ensure rapid
target engagement and control of fire. These points should be clearly
visible through the gunner’s sights and should be resistant to battle
damage (e.g. large buildings or bridge abutments).
(4) Method of Engagement. Weapon positioning and the enemy’s direction
of advance will likely determine the type of engagement. Frontal fire is
the least preferred since it might expose the gunner to the greatest
probability of detection and is where the enemy vehicle’s armour is
thickest. The preferred locations to fire on tanks and armoured fighting
vehicles (AFVs) are the flanks and rear at ground level, or the top of
vehicles from an elevated weapon position. If engaging the tank from the
flank at close range, the point of impact should be over the second road
wheel. If firing from an elevated position, allow the tank to approach to a
range that precludes if from returning fire to the elevated position.
(5) Coordinated Engagements. Armoured vehicles are most vulnerable
when the crew is closed down and they are in confined areas. Therefore,
the first task of the anti-armour plan should be to force the crews to close
down inside the vehicles. A combination of direct and indirect fire may be
used to cause this and should begin with the perimeter battle. Anti-
armour weapons fire is coordinated so that all targets in the engagement
area are engaged at or near the same time, and ideally precluding their
withdrawal or movement to cover. Since enemy infantry may attempt to
clear a route for their armoured vehicles, anti-armour weapons must have
local protection within the defensive layout. Also, there must be a
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-37
planned signal or specific order, as for any ambush, that dictates when
the armoured vehicle(s) will be engaged.
616. TANK HUNTING
1. General. The employment of tank hunting teams within the urban environment is an
offensive tactic used to support the disruption battle and the main defensive battle. The
decision to deploy tank hunting teams is normally made at the battalion / battle group and
above. Tank hunting teams are deployed to destroy enemy armour in close country and to
force enemy infantry to dismount. They destroy high-value targets; maintain an offensive spirit
in the defence; and force delay and losses upon the enemy. The teams avoid decisive
engagement and withdraw before the enemy can attack them. A secondary effect of tank
hunting is to lower the enemy’s morale by causing delays and uncertainty.
2. Guidelines for Employment. Guidelines for the planning and use of tank hunting
teams should include the following:
a. Tank hunting teams can control but not hold terrain, and this control is achieved
by denying enemy tanks the use of routes through close terrain.
b. The tank hunting teams will require infantry support for security and carriage of
ammunition. A four-man group should be the minimum grouping.
c. Tank hunting teams are vulnerable to dismounted infantry, but by causing enemy
infantry to dismount and clear terrain, they will have achieved success. Once the
target vehicles are destroyed or the task achieved, the teams withdraw to the
next position or to the main body.
d. In addition to destroying enemy tanks, teams are effective against and can be
employed to destroy armoured personnel carriers (APCs), engineers, and
artillery in the direct fire role, AD systems, logistic vehicles, and any other high-
value target.
3. Fundamental Considerations. A commander tasked with employing tank hunting
teams should consider the following:
a. Surprise. Achieve surprise by:
(1) Detailed planning based upon current and reliable information.
(2) Detailed preparation, including full rehearsals.
(3) Engagement from unexpected distances and ranges.
(4) Engagements from optimal ranges to ensure first round hits.
(5) Engagement in depth rather than at the front of any formation.
(6) Knowledge of tactics and techniques used by enemy tanks and AFVs in
urban areas.
b. Coordinated Fire Plan. The fire plan for tank hunting teams must be
coordinated amongst teams and with the supporting fires from other elements of
the defence. Weapon effects, which may include support fire from the main
defence, supporting arms, mines and demolitions, must be coordinated to
achieve the desired effects and the attrition of the enemy. The following should
be considered:
6-38 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
(1) Teams must be coordinated within engagement areas to gain

simultaneous engagements of the enemy in multiple locations.
(2) Positions should be sited to support the successful withdrawal of one
another once an engagement is complete.
(3) Supporting fires may be sited to isolate the killing zone and force the tank
crews to close down hatches to restrict their fields of vision.
(4) Supporting fires should be planned to separate tanks from their intimate
infantry support.
(5) Tank hunting teams may be sited to cover the same engagement area to
provide redundancy and to reduce the possibility of misses against high-
value targets, and to support withdrawals.
(6) Firing positions should be sited in defiladed positions to provide protection
and concealment.
(7) A tank hunting team may include more than one type of anti-armour
weapon. Light anti-armour weapons can complement heavy anti-armour
weapons to provide mutual anti-tank and anti-APC fires.
c. Control. Effective control is essential for any tank hunting team and must
include:
(1) AOs identified with boundaries, within which they are free to move (i.e. each
team having their own AO).
(2) Covered and concealed routes for movement.
(3) Early warning of the approach or location of targets.
(4) Positive identification of the targets as enemy.
(5) Fire control until the target is in the killing zone.
(6) Open fire policy.
(7) Immediate action drill upon being detected or a target unsuitable to engage.
(8) Plan for withdrawal.
(9) Friendly force recognition signals, to aid friendly force recognition, and
withdrawal.
(10) Communications.
4. Organization. The tank hunting team can vary in size and organization. It should
consist of a minimum four soldiers. This will provide a weapons crew of two, and two additional
soldiers to carry ammunition and provide local security. However, it is cautioned that any group
this size will find it difficult to evacuate any casualties or to counter any unexpected contact.
The tank hunting team may be drawn from platoon and company wpns dets; however, these
dets may be held in the MDA to prepare their positions and to ensure that they do not become
casualties early in the battle. Thus, tank hunting teams may come from the rifle sections.
Depending upon the terrain, distances to be covered and the overall plan, mechanized and light
infantry rifle sections equipped with light wheeled vehicles may employ their integral vehicles in
support of the tank hunting teams.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-39
5. In Figure 6–26 below, Group A may be employed as the minimum size for a tank hunting
team. However, Groups A and B may be combined to create a more robust tank hunting team.
Note that dedicated radio communications will be required for each tank hunting team.
Figure 6–26: Tank Hunting Team

6. Tank hunting teams will have to plan and conduct coordination before operating forward
of a defensive line. This coordination should be very similar to that for a patrol operating
forward, with special emphasis on the following:
a. Routes in and out through the defensive area.
b. Obstacles forward of the position.
c. Any friendly activity, outposts, other tank hunting teams, or patrols forward of the
position.
d. Support that can be provided from the defensive position (e.g. weapons fire,
casualty evacuation).
e. Recognition signals and passwords, especially to identify teams moving back
through the defensive position.
f. Tank hunting teams’ areas of operation.
g. Drill for re-entering the defensive position.
SECTION 8
COMPANY GROUP AND COMBAT TEAM DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
7. This section discusses planning considerations and provides tactics and techniques for
the planning of combat team defensive operations in the urban area. Defensive operations
within an urban area follow the same principles as any defensive operation. However, the
6-40 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
terrain specific to built-up areas demands consideration of the limitations and advantages
offered.
617. COMPANY GROUP AND COMBAT TEAM IN THE HASTY DEFENCE
1. A very likely defensive mission for the combat team in urban terrain will be to conduct a
hasty defence. Like all hasty defensive tasks, this mission is characterized by reduced time for
the preparation of the defence. The priorities of work are generally the same as for any
defence, but much of the work will take place concurrently. Units will be deployed, weapons
emplaced, and positions prepared in accordance with the mission analysis and amount of time
the combat team commander has available. Even during PSO or COIN operations, a company
group or combat team may have to conduct a hasty defence, for instance, when moving into a
new AO or when conducting a tactical surge in a particular area.
2. Occupation and Preparation of Positions. Once the defensive plan is made and
orders have been issued, the priority goes to siting and preparing fighting positions in detail. As
with any hasty defensive position, the sub-unit commander will ensure the platoons and
sections understand their role, their mutual support responsibilities, their areas of engagement,
and the effects that they are to achieve against the enemy. Platoon commanders and section
commanders can then site their own positions in detail. The sub-unit commander will verify the
positions in detail as time allows. Within an urban area, given the density and complexity of the
terrain, additional time and effort must to be taken to coordinate even hasty defensive positions.
The primary effort is to camouflage and conceal the presence of the hasty fighting positions and
provide soldiers with as much protection as possible. Positions are constructed back from the
windows in the shadows of the room using appliances, furniture, and other convenient items
and materials:
a. Position Crew-Served Weapons and Armoured Fighting Vehicles.
Generally, crew-served weapons will be employed from the inside of buildings,
unless an outside position is preferable and can be protected and camouflaged.
Armoured vehicles can exploit longer fields of fire or a reverse slope engagement
using buildings to protect the vehicle positions. Vehicles may be held to the rear
of their firing position, and cued to move into position by a spotter or commander
deployed forward who observes and indicates when a target moves into the
engagement area.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-41
Figure 6–27: Vehicle Position

b. Counter-mobility: Emplacement of Barriers and Obstacles. Lack of time
means there will only be two obstacle belts established and they will not be as
extensive as in a defence that usually permits more. All obstacles must be
covered with observation and fire:
(1) First Belt. The first belt is usually between 50 m to 100 m from and
parallel to the defensive trace. It will normally consist of wire obstacles,
improvised barriers, road craters, and minefields. Anti-tank and
command-detonated mines are used consistent with the rules of
engagement (ROE). This belt blocks, fixes, turns, or canalizes the
enemy; disrupts attack formations; and inflicts casualties.
(2) Second Belt. The second belt is the denial belt. It consists of wire
obstacles placed around, through, and in the defensive buildings and
close-in minefields, as well as in subsurface accesses. It impedes and
complicates the enemy's ability to gain a foothold in the defensive area.
Command-detonated explosives are used extensively consistent with the
ROE.
(3) Field-expedient Obstacles. Field-expedient obstacles made from
available materials, such as rubble, cars, and light poles, should be
employed as time permits. These may be done at the section and
platoon level to enhance their killing zones.
6-42 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Figure 6–28: Field-expedient Obstacles

c. Prepare Positions. Sections and platoons prepare positions using whatever
materials are available.
d. Rehearsals. Rehearsals must be conducted for all stages of the defence; for the
withdrawal of each force; and for counterattacks. Plans for CASEVAC and
resupply must be examined. In doing rehearsals, commanders must focus on
the synchronization of direct and indirect fires to accomplish the overall intent.
e. Mobility Enhancement. There will not be much time to improve mobility within
the defence. Priority should be given to improving withdrawal and counterattack
routes.
f. Communications. Communications should be checked and confirmed. As time
allows, landlines should be laid.
3. Improving the Defence. As time permits, the following areas should be given
consideration and prioritized in accordance with tactical situation.
a. Barrier and obstacle improvement.
b. Improvement of primary and secondary positions.
c. Preparation of alternative positions.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-43
d. Additional movement enhancement efforts.

e. Initiation of patrols.
f. Improvement of camouflage.
g. Stockpiling of combat supplies.
h. Continued rehearsals for counterattacks and withdrawals.
618. DEFENCE OF A BLOCK OR GROUP OF BUILDINGS
1. General. A combat team or company group operating in urban terrain may have to
defend a city block or group of buildings in a core periphery or residential area. The sub-unit
conducts this operation in accordance with the battle group’s defensive scheme of manoeuvre.
The operation should be coordinated with the action of elements charged with covering or
delaying to the front of the combat team's position. The defence should take advantage of the
protection offered by buildings that dominate the main avenues of approach. An infantry
combat team is particularly well suited for this type of mission, since fighting will force the
enemy to move its infantry into the urban area to seize and control key terrain.
2. A well-organized combat team defence in an urban area should accomplish the
following:
a. Defeat an enemy's attack on the streets and city blocks by using obstacles and
fire.
b. Coordinate the destruction of the enemy through all stages of the defence by
indirect and direct fire from prepared positions within defensible buildings.
c. Counterattack to clear the enemy from footholds.
3. Reconnaissance and Security. At times, there may be a pause between the
withdrawal of the covering or delaying force and the arrival of the enemy. The forces in the
MDA may be required to send patrols or establish observation posts (OPs) forward of the
perimeter force. Layback patrols (LPs) and OPs should be supplemented by foot patrols,
mainly during periods of limited visibility, and wire communications should be used.
Furthermore, if gaps exist between the defended localities of sub-units within a battle group
defensive area, the sub-units will have to deploy OPs and standing patrols to cover these
undefended areas. This is the case in peace support or COIN campaigns, or in other
operations in which the enemy is dispersed and covert.
4. Execution. The combat team may be responsible for all stages of the defence (e.g.
perimeter battle, disruption battle and MDA) within a sector, or may simply be responsible for
one or two of the stages, such as the disruption battle and main defensive battle. Rehearsals
must be conducted by day and night, and close coordination must be completed with any forces
operating in the combat team’s area. For example, if another element of the battle group is
providing the perimeter force, the combat team will have to ensure close coordination is
completed for the withdrawal of this perimeter force.
5. Throughout each stage of the defensive battle, an aggressive, offensive spirit must be
maintained. Although heavy casualties should be inflicted upon the enemy as soon as possible,
decisive engagement must be avoided until battle reaches the defended localities and
strongpoints of the MDA.
6. Once the enemy has been suffered attrition and been halted by the MDA, the
counterattack elements are launched to complete the destruction or routing of the enemy.
Counterattack forces should be given specific instructions for their follow-on actions once the
6-44 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
counterattacks are complete. They may remain in place to hold terrain and reinforce the MDA,
they may pursue the enemy (if warranted), or they may withdraw to reconstitute the reserve.
619. DEFENCE OF AN URBAN DEFENDED LOCALITY
1. In defending a block or group of buildings, a combat team may establish a defended
locality based upon a series of platoon and section strongpoints that are mutually supporting.
This will normally be done as part of a battle group defence (see Figure 6–29 below) and will
constitute part of the MDA stage of the defensive battle.
2. The sub-unit will likely be allocated engineer support, at least in the preparation of the
locality. Part of the battle procedure and position preparation will be the stockpiling of combat
supplies. Direct fire assets will likely be allocated for the position and to assist with the local
reserve.
3. Urban areas are easily converted to strongpoints. Stone, brick, or steel buildings
provide cover and concealment. Buildings, sewers, and some streets provide covered and
concealed routes, and can be rubbled to provide obstacles. All of these must be integrated into
the plan and layout of the defended locality.
4. Detailed coordination must occur between those forces conducting the other stages of
the battle—perimeter force, disruption force, and reserve force—so that the defended locality
can de-conflict movement and support the withdrawal and manoeuvre of those other forces.
5. The specific positioning of elements in the defensive locality depends upon the
commander's mission analysis and estimate of the situation. The following should be
considered:
a. Sections and platoons should form mutually supporting strongpoints. Together,
they create the defended locality.
b. Each individual fighting position (to include alternative and secondary positions)
must be reinforced to withstand small arms fire, mortar fire, and artillery
fragmentation.
c. Combat supplies such as food, water ammunition, engineering tools, firefighting
equipment and medical supplies should be stockpiled in each fighting position.
d. Individual fighting positions should be mutually supporting. Covered and
concealed routes between positions and along routes of supply and
communication must be planned and constructed. These routes will support
counterattack and manoeuvre within and through the defended locality.
e. The section and platoon strongpoints that make up the defended locality should
provide both mutual support and all-round defence. Primary and alternative
positions will cover off the most likely enemy approaches and ensure mutual
support, while secondary positions will provide all-round defence. Strongpoints
should be able to provide or support counterattacks against each other.
f. Obstacles should be constructed to disrupt and canalize enemy formations, to
enhance killing zones, and to protect the strongpoint from the assault. They
should also be placed between strongpoints to stop infiltration through gaps.
g. Range cards must be prepared for each position. Indirect fires should be
planned in detail and dry-registered.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-45
h. Redundant communications must be established and tested within the

strongpoint and to the higher HQ. These may be radio, wire, runner, and pre-
arranged signals using pyrotechnics.
i. Improvements and rehearsals should continue until the combat team is relieved
or withdrawn. More positions can be built, routes to other positions marked,
existing positions improved or repaired, and barriers built or enhanced.
Figure 6–29: Urban Defended Locality based upon Platoon and Section Strongpoints
620. DEFENCE OF VITAL POINTS IN AN URBAN AREA

1. During PSO or COIN campaigns, a sub-unit may be given the task of defending a vital
point. Often, the vital point may have significant importance for the civilian populace and local
government. The vital point may be a public utility, such as gas, electrical, or water plants, a
communications centre, a transportation centre or a key government office or institution.
2. The defence will be planned in accordance with the principles of any defence and
adjusted to suit the situation and terrain at hand. The terrain to be occupied may not be ideal in
terms of location, fields of observation and fire, and dominance of the surrounding terrain.
Therefore, the commander may have to place some forces at the vital point and some outside
the immediate area to occupy dominating features in the surrounding area.
3. The defence will have to be coordinated with local police and military authorities, and the
local civilian security agencies. It should be remembered that these elements could provide a
wealth of local intelligence and early warning of any increased threat. At the same time,
however, these local forces may pose an operational security (OPSEC), so caution must be
exercised in the sharing of information.
6-46 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
4. The planning and establishment of the defence will be governed by the applicable ROE
and the need to limit collateral damage and unintended effects on the local population, the
support of whom will likely be vital to the success of the overall campaign.
5. Standing patrols, overt OPs and covert OPs can all be used to assist in the defence.
Agreements can be made with local residents to use their homes and buildings for OP locations
when needed. Usually, small compensation can be given in return for their support.
6. The plan for defence should include measures to counter a coordinated overt attack, a
raid, or a covert sabotage operation.
7. Task Organization. The tactical situation, including the threat and ground, will
determine the task organization of the sub-unit. The figure 6–30 depicts an infantry company
reinforced with an additional rifle platoon to defend the objective (water purification plant).
Additional assets may be given to the sub-unit commander based upon mission requirements
and availability. In the situation depicted, the organic weapons of the company are sufficient to
accomplish the mission. The only additional requirement was for another rifle platoon to defend
to assist in the defence of the objective. Other support arms may be allocated include:
a. Sniper dets may be allocated to provide OPs and overwatch positions.
b. Direct fire assets may be allocated to support the MDA and to act as mobile
reserve forces.
c. AD assets may be co-located depending upon the threat.
d. Engineers may be allocated to assist with obstacle construction. They may also
be allocated to assist in the operating the vital point, should it be a public utility
facility.
e. Local forces may be allocated to assist with security and defence. Liaison dets
may be allocated to or from local forces to coordinate plans and actions.
f. Liaison dets or information operations (Info Ops) teams may assist in
coordinating efforts with local authorities and in explaining the actions to the local
public.
g. Aviation assets may be allocated to provide observation support and overwatch.
h. Military police (MP) may be allocated to assist with traffic control.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-47
Figure 6–30: Perimeter Defence of Key Terrain

8. Tasks. In the security and defence of a vital point, the sub-unit commander will have to
consider supporting and enabling tasks. These may include the following:
a. Provide inner and outer security patrols.
b. Conduct counter-reconnaissance. OPs and soldiers must be constantly aware
that insurgents or belligerents may blend with the local population in the
immediate area to conduct reconnaissance of the defences. Patrols should be
employed to deter this practice, and patrols or reserves should be dispatched to
detain any suspicious individuals.
c. Establish LP/OPs.
d. Establish checkpoints and roadblocks.
e. Conduct crowd confrontation operations (CCO).
f. Conduct coordination with local authorities and other security forces.
g. Supervise specific functions associated with the operation of the facility, such as
water purification tests, site inspections, and so forth.
9. Execution. In the execution of the defence of a vital point, the following will likely be
undertaken:
a. The sub-unit commander will normally deploy platoons around the objective to
dominate key terrain and cover the mounted and dismounted avenues of
approach. If the vital point is located in unfavourable terrain, elements will have
6-48 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
to be deployed to alternative terrain that dominates the area so that the

defending forces are not disadvantaged.
b. Standing patrols and overt/covert OPs should be deployed in the local area in
conjunction with the static defensive positions.
c. The plan and defensive routine should be coordinated with local security forces.
Joint patrols and positions may be appropriate and advantageous.
d. Commanders, liaison teams, and Info Ops teams can coordinate with local
authorities and media centres to explain the operations and measures required.
For the public’s perception, this will help add legitimacy to the operation.
e. MGs and other direct fire weapons (depending upon the threat) will be emplaced
to cover the dismounted and mounted avenues of approach.
f. Wire obstacles will normally be used to restrict and deny entry to the vital point
area. These will complement roadblocks and checkpoints to control access and
movement. Inspection and search areas will be required and should be a
pervasive practice.
g. Obstacles should be covered by fire and linked with detection devices and trip
flares. Anti-tank and command-detonated mines will be used consistent with the
ROE.
h. The commander makes an assessment as to the overall importance of the key
facilities within the vital point objective and prioritizes security requirements.
i. The defence should include preparations for the conduct of CCO.
j. Aviation support may be required for observation and overwatch.
k. Ongoing rehearsals will be required.
10. Camp Force Protection. In certain campaigns, sub-units may be required to defend
base camp locations, permanent or temporary, from which forces will conduct routine
operations. The considerations given above for vital point defence apply to base camp
defences as well.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 6-49
CHAPTER 7
STABILITY OPERATIONS
SECTION 1
STABILITY OPERATIONS AS PART OF FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
1. Stability operations are those tactical level operations conducted by military forces in
conjunction with other agencies to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which
responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved. They are not
operational level campaign themes such as peace support operations (PSO) or peacekeeping.
They are tangible, tactical tasks conducted at the unit level to provide a secure framework within
which other agencies, government authorities, and society may operate in general.
2. Together with offensive and defensive tactical tasks, stability operations constitute the
full range of operations. Moreover, stability operations span a wide variety of tasks. They may
include high-level tasks such as a cordon and search for suspected insurgents (i.e. as part of a
COIN operation), or they may include low-level tasks such as humanitarian relief.
2. Military forces must be prepared to conduct a range of operations—offensive, defensive,
and stability operations—simultaneously or consecutively, in complex environments. For
example, a company group may complete an attack to seize a bridge leading to a battle group
objective. The company group may then adopt a defensive position. Following a handover of
the defensive task to a follow-on force, the company group may move to a rear area to conduct
movement control and framework patrolling to reassure the local populace, and to prevent
looting and other illegal, destabilizing activities. In this example, operations are conducted
consecutively. On the other hand, at the battle group level, sub-units could be simultaneously
conducting various offensive, defensive, and stability operations; hence, at this level, the battle
group is conducting full-spectrum operations (FSO).
3. In short, no competent military force can deploy prepared only for stability operations.
They must be prepared to conduct FSO. Even forces deploying on major combat campaigns in
which the majority of tasks (at least initially) will be offensive and defensive combat tasks,
commanders and soldiers, even at the lowest levels, must be prepared to transition to stability
operations in order for the long-term goals of the campaign to be realized. For example, a
company may consolidate an attack against an enemy position in a village, only to find a
destabilized local situation with a populace requiring humanitarian aid. The short-term tactical
success would be to pursue the fleeing enemy force. However, the long-term goals of the
campaign may require the force to consolidate and begin immediate stability operations to
cease criminal exploitation of the local populace and to render first aid. Low-level tactical
commanders must be aware of these factors in a complex environment and they, with their
subordinates, must be prepared to switch tactical operations on exceedingly short notice.
SECTION 2
CONDUCT OF STABILITY OPERATIONS
4. Just as offensive operations take a variety of forms depending upon the goals or effects
desired, such as an attack, raid, or pursuit, stability operations are conducted in various forms
for various reasons. Specifically, stability operations will take the following forms:
a. Control and Security. Control and security provide the framework of security
and stability in which other agencies and the populace may function. Tactical
tasks as part of control and security may be conducted to preclude illegal
activities, intercept the flow of weapons and illegal goods, to capture insurgents,
to secure sensitive areas of vital points, to prevent the intimidation of the public,
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 7-1
and reassure the public with a sense of security. It normally consists of

deliberate and hasty vehicle checkpoints, curfews, framework patrols,
observation posts (OPs), monitoring measures and similar means. During
certain operations, measures may be taken to stop the movement of a portion of
the population that has been infected or contaminated.
b. Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration. Demobilization,
disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) is a stability operation that involves the
handing over of arms and equipment, the disbanding of military structures, and
the return to civilian life of military and para-military personnel. DDR should be
initiated following a large-scale major combat campaign where there exist a large
number of domestic military and para-military (often conscripts) personnel. While
a DDR will involve economic and diplomatic issues well above the unit level,
units and sub-units will assist through the accomplishment of tactical tasks such
as monitoring, the provision of security, and weapons collection.
c. Security Sector Reform. Security sector reform (SSR) is a stability operation
that develops security institutions in order for them to play an effective, legitimate
and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security.
DDR is the precursor to successful SSR. States that require support and reform
normally first require the reform and development of their military and other
security forces, including constabularies. In short, they need to professionalize
their security institutions so that they become credible, reliable, and
democratically accountable. Thus, stability tasks in support of SSR will include
the provision of military training teams, monitoring training, equipment
verification, and assistance in military staff development. Combined tactical
operations may be conducted with the trainers accompanying newly formed local
forces on tactical missions. The soldiers and their commanders should consider
themselves as trainers, not advisors.
d. Civil-military Cooperation. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) will play a major
role in improving the overall operational situation of a region. It will include the
tactical tasks that support limited reconstruction (within the resources of the
military) and humanitarian aid. Military forces themselves may conduct
immediate reconstruction needs in the early stages of a campaign or following
combat operations. However, as the overall security situation improves, much of
the reconstruction of civilian infrastructure should be assumed by civilian
agencies. Military forces will continue to provide the secure framework within
which this work may occur (ideally in conjunction with local forces) and may
assist where necessary and possible. Additionally in times of emergency,
military forces may have to provide humanitarian aid, to include the evacuation of
the population threatened by natural disasters and the delivery of emergency
food and water.
SECTION 3
TACTICAL TASKS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS
5. Stability operations are realized through a wide range of tactical tasks. Many of the
tactical tasks assigned to army units for stability operations are termed framework operations.
Framework operations are those overt military operations conducted to establish a safe and
secure environment, which contributes to the defeat of the threat in an area.5 They provide the
5
British Army Field Manual, Vol 1, Part 10, Counter-Insurgency Operations 2001
7-2 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Stability Operations
secure environment (i.e. framework) in which other agencies may conduct their lines of
operation in support of the campaign. For example, establishing standing patrols around
schools, which insurgent forces were trying to keep closed, will allow schools to remain open.
6. Although most stability operations are overt, such as framework patrols, OPs, etc., some
may be covert. Covert OPs may be tasked in areas of enemy or belligerent activity to
overwatch patrols and other activities, or to act as a trigger for reserves or quick reaction forces.
7. Most tactical tasks for stability operations will be conducted at the sub-unit level. This is
particularly true during PSO or COIN operations. The tactical tasks provide that framework of
stability and security. The range of tactical tasks are provided below:
a. Framework Patrolling. Framework patrolling will take place mainly amongst the
civilian population. Apart from providing security, they will provide confidence
and reassurance to the population so that a normal pattern of life may occur.
Framework patrolling is also an excellent opportunity for troops to make contact
with the local populace, to gather intelligence and to get a measure of the
success of ongoing operations. Such patrols will help deter crime and the
conflict between belligerent forces. They may be done in conjunction with local
and international police forces. For example, framework patrols will help put
security forces deployed on a COIN campaign amongst the civilian populace on
a daily, familiar basis, and will prevent the security forces from being seen only
when conducting checkpoints and searches.
b. Vehicle Checkpoints and Roadblocks. Vehicle checkpoints (VCPs) are an
important feature in movement control. They provide reassurance to the local
populace and disrupt the movement of illegal goods, weapons, and enemy or
belligerent individuals. The following should be noted in planning and executing
VCPs:
(1) Deliberate VCPs should be planned in detail and forces conducting them
should be well equipped with warning signs and other supporting
equipment. Cut-off elements must be prepared to intercept anyone
attempting to avoid or run the checkpoint.
(2) VCPs may be conducted with local and/or international police forces.
(3) With modern communications, knowledge of the VCP will quickly be
passed amongst any targeted audience such as insurgent groups. Those
wishing to avoid the checkpoint will likely be able to do so. Thus, a series
of hasty checkpoints may be more effective than a single, long-term
checkpoint.
(4) VCPs, like many other stability tasks, will cause significant disruption to
the local populace and may undermine their support for security forces
and their actions. This must be understood by those planning the
framework operation, and by those soldiers dealing directly with the local
populace. The potential value of the VCP must outweigh the negative
affects on the populace.
(5) Framework patrols should be well practised in conducting hasty VCPs.
That is, should a patrol see a suspicious vehicle, they should be well
practised in stopping it and conducting checkpoint drills.
(6) Vehicles being targeted should generally fit a known profile. Time at a
checkpoint should not be wasted on unlikely enemy or belligerent forces,
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 7-3
and troops should focus on those individuals and vehicles that fit the
known profile. It must be kept in mind, however, that enemy forces such
as insurgents will learn, adapt and quickly start to avoid a certain pattern
or profile being targeted.
c. Crowd Confrontation Operations. Crowd confrontation operations (CCO) may
be required as part of stability operations. Crowds peacefully protesting genuine
grievances can easily become controlled by nefarious elements seeking to
disrupt stability and create violence and confrontation. These elements may use
crowds to cover their own operations as well, and will attempt to create riot
situations.
d. Security for Humanitarian Convoys and Distribution Sites. Units may be
tasked to provide security to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as they
conduct humanitarian aid convoys and distribution sites.
e. Humanitarian Aid. In certain situations, the military may have to undertake
emergency humanitarian aid (e.g. first aid, water and food distribution) to relieve
suffering and protect a threatened civilian populace. Not only will this save lives
and relieve suffering, but also help ensure continued support from the local
population for the military operation.
f. Protection and Security for Civilian Security Agencies. Military forces may
have to provide protection and security for civilian constabulary and other
security forces. This may include combined patrols and co-location of patrol
bases with police stations. This combined approach will also allow the military to
monitor the professional conduct of the native security forces, and to provide a
positive example for standards of discipline and ethical conduct. Military forces
will have to be cautious with respect to operational security (OPSEC). Local
security forces will not be as secure in terms of information control, and thus,
insurgents and criminals may be intentionally/unintentionally informed of pending
operations should planning information not be carefully controlled.
g. Civil-military Cooperation Support. Military elements, and CIMIC specialists in
particular, may be tasked with assessing emergency and priority aid
requirements for a civilian area.
h. Monitoring in Support of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration.
Military forces may be tasked with monitoring and providing assistance in the
demobilization and disarmament of former indigenous military forces. This may
include weapons collection and storage, containment site inspections, and similar
supporting tasks.
i. Military Training Assistance. During SSR, military forces may be called upon
to establish and train competent indigenous military and other security forces. In
many instances, this will consist of basic military discipline, skills, drills, and
various tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). While special forces may be
required to train local units in special duties such as very important person (VIP)
protection and specific counter-terrorist operations (e.g. hostage rescue), line
units are best suited for most military training assistance tasks. Embryonic
indigenous forces require basic training in discipline and tactics. Indigenous
forces will quickly identify and strive to emulate the uniformity of line units in
terms of their individual appearance and well-honed skills in basic military tactics.
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Stability Operations
Line unit discipline in drills and structure will provide a sound template for the
indigenous troops and their commanders.
j. Cordon and Search Operations. Cordon and search operations are conducted
to secure and search an area for suspected individuals, contraband items,
weapons caches, or evidence, to name a few possibilities. Cordon and search
operations can be deliberately planned, usually at the sub-unit level, or can be a
hasty “cordon and knock” launched by a section or platoon that witnesses
suspicious activity during routine operations. In planning and conducting cordon
and search operations, the following should be considered:
(1) They are driven by intelligence and should result from an assessment of
that intelligence.
(2) Before conducting a hasty cordon and search, the section or platoon
having discovered the suspicious activity, should send a situation report
(SITREP) to the sub-unit headquarters (HQ) detailing the reasons for the
suspicions and the local commander’s intention. If the reporting element
does not have sufficient combat power to safely conduct the operation,
then the sub-unit must make a decision to withdrawal or to send
reinforcements to assist and assume command. In the latter case, the
on-site element could either temporarily withdraw to avoid indicating their
intentions, or the normal and preferred action, establish the cordon and
isolate the area until a larger force arrives.
(3) Cordon and searches disrupt and potentially upset the local populace;
therefore, they could undermine public support for the military and
security forces. Thus, commanders must consider the time of day and
the method of conduct in order to lesson the collateral, unintended effects
on the local populace.
(4) Intelligence on cordon and search operations will often be sketchy, and
many such operations will prove fruitless, at least in finding what was
sought. Hence, it may be prudent for a covert OP to be inserted to watch
a target area and confirm any illegal or enemy activity before a cordon
and search is conducted.
(5) Technology is greatly restricted in an urban area. Consequently, there is
greater reliance upon human intelligence (HUMINT). However,
commanders must be careful that HUMINT sources do not provide false
information seeking to lead troops into and ambush or trap.
(6) Depending upon the tactical and operational situation, troops and
commanders may have to adjust the tone and profile or robustness taken
in conducting cordon and search operations. Many cordons will be done
in private homes and many will fail to produce results. In order to limit
embarrassment and avoid angering the local populace, care must be
taken. Soldiers should be as polite as possible and careful not to damage
property. Once the cordon is set, time is normally on the side of the
searchers. Hence, locked doors for example that the owners cannot
open, do not have to be broken down when they can simply be removed
from their hinges.
(7) Commanders and soldiers must appreciate the potential second and third
order effects (e.g. the results) of their operations. Even if a cordon and
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 7-5
search operation fails to produce any findings, the threat elements (e.g.
insurgents, belligerent forces not complying with ceasefires, criminals,
etc.) will feel threatened and may flee the area, and the local populace
will feel a greater sense of security. This in turn may lead to increased
cooperation and improved intelligence.
k. Delivery of Emergency Humanitarian Aid. At times, the military may be the
only agency available to deliver emergency humanitarian aid to a threatened
civilian populace. This is most likely to occur immediately following combat
operations, or at the start of a campaign when the security situation is not secure
enough for NGOs or governmental agencies to conduct such operations. Even
after NGOs or other agencies assume responsibility for such operations, the
military element may wish to maintain input. Such operations engender positive
support for the military effort amongst the local population, and because of the
close contact they create with civilians, new intelligence sources may be
cultivated. It also demonstrates a unity of purpose and effort between the military
and other agencies.
l. Reconstruction. On their own accord, sub-units may be assigned and
undertake low-level reconstruction tasks to support the local populace, or to
assist NGOs or specialist military elements (e.g. construction engineers) in
supporting the local populace. Not only do such tasks assist the public, often
living in deprived conditions in poor regions, but endears the military forces to the
local populace and gives visible, reinforcing evidence of the positive benefits of
the presence of the military and security forces. Major reconstruction projects
will be planned, authorized and funded at the highest levels, yet will take a long
time to produce tangible benefits. At the tactical level, units and sub-units can
undertake low-level, quick impact tasks, such as fixing water pumps at schools,
building desks for orphanages, and the like. Such initiatives reinforce the
positive aspects of the military’s presence, reinforce the mission’s legitimacy, and
provide an opportunity to gather cultural and tactical intelligence. Units and sub-
units, however, may lack the resources to undertake all such initiatives.
8. The list of tactical tasks that constitute stability operations is lengthy and may grow over
time as new means are encountered for bringing stability and security to a region. Additionally,
there are a wide variety of enabling tasks. These tasks include reconnaissance and intelligence
gathering, particularly HUMINT where support to stability operations is concerned, and
information operations. While troops are conducting stability operations, such as framework
patrols, they should also be tasked with intelligence collection, ideally in support of specific
information requirements, and when necessary, information operations which would explain
current and pending operations to the local populace.
7-6 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
CHAPTER 8
MOBILITY AND COUNTER-MOBILITY
SECTION 1
GENERAL
1. Man-made and natural obstacles are used extensively in urban operations (UO) by the
defender to channel the enemy, impede his movement, and disrupt his attack while enhancing
the effects of friendly firepower. Obstacles and other defensive measures may also be used
during peace support and counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns to defend secure locations
and vital points.
2. Insurgents and other unconventional threats will use improvised explosives devices
(IEDs) to create destruction and to undermine the morale and will of the military and other
security forces. Additionally, they may be used to target civilians to embarrass security forces,
and undermine the public’s confidence and will to fight.
SECTION 2
OBSTACLES
3. Obstacles are categorized as either tactical or protective. Tactical obstacles are
executed as part of the barrier plan in support of the tactical plan, and are usually emplaced by
engineers. Protective obstacles are used to protect friendly forces from an assault on their
position, and are usually emplaced by the defender.
4. Tactical obstacles should always be sited with support and advice from Engineers. Their
support may also be sought for the creation of protective obstacles.
801. ANTI-PERSONNEL OBSTACLES
1. Anti-personnel obstacles will consist mainly of wire and command-detonated munitions.
Note that unlike Canada, other nations and unconventional forces will also regularly use
pressure or tripwire-detonated explosives. They are used to block, impede and channel the
movement of infantry, as follows:
a. Streets. Anti-personnel and wire obstacles should be coordinated within the
defensive plan, and should be emplaced to channel the enemy into killing zones
or to deny them movement into streets or buildings.
b. Buildings. Obstacles in buildings are constructed to deny covered routes or
positions to the enemy. They can be developed by destroying the building with
explosives or fire, constructing wire obstacles within the building, or preparing the
building as a trap with explosives (see Figure 8–2). The roof areas of buildings
also have to be protected by obstacles, not only to counter the movement of
infantry, but also to prevent the enemy from using them to insert forces by
helicopter (see Figure 8–3).
c. Open Spaces. Obstacles in open spaces will include minefields, concealed
mines, and all types of wire obstacles (see Figure 8–4). These should be sited
as part of the defensive plan to channel or trap the enemy into killing zones, to
deny areas or routes, and to disrupt movement.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 8-1
Figure 8–1: Street Wire Obstacle
Figure 8–2: Building Obstacle
8-2 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Mobility and Counter-mobility
Figure 8–3: Roof Obstacle
Figure 8–4: Open Space Obstacles (Abbreviation: AT—anti-tank)

d. Dead Ground. Obstacles in dead ground are designed to inflict casualties and
restrict infantry movement in areas that are concealed from observation and
protected from direct fire weapons.
e. Underground Systems. Exits from underground systems that could provide the
enemy with advantageous positions within or behind the defence must be
denied. This can be done in several ways, and the method will depend upon the
requirement for friendly forces to use these routes and the need to avoid
collateral damage. The most common method is to place a wire obstacle with
early warning devices. Another, more permanent method, is to block the entry
points by filling them with gravel, sand or concrete. Methods that will not block
the flow of an underground system are be to seal the entry points by welding the
covers shut, or placing a heavy object, like a concrete road barrier, on the cover.
(see Figures 8–5 and 8–6 below).
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 8-3
Figure 8–5: Underground Obstacles
Figure 8–6: Underground Obstacles
802. ANTI-VEHI CLE OBSTACLES

1. Anti-vehicle obstacles are constructed mainly to impede the movement of vehicles that
support attacking infantry (e.g. tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and engineer vehicles), and to
force the infantry to slow down or fight without this support. Obstacles are also used to destroy
or inflict damage on vehicles. The different types of anti-vehicle obstacles are:
a. Vehicles as Obstacles. Within an urban environment there will be many civilian
and derelict military vehicles that can be employed as obstacles, as follows:
(1) Buses or tractor-trailer boxes on their sides, filled with rubble, earth, or
any other material, will give the obstacle enough weight so it could not be
easily moved.
8-4 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
(2) Two vehicles used in a “V” shape, the apex of the “V” pointing towards
the enemy. They should be linked together (e.g. with heavy chains), so
that the obstacle acts as a single wedge. In this way, the vehicles cannot
be moved independently, or just pushed aside.
(3) Blocking an alleyway with vehicles in an inverted “V” is very much like the
above method, except that the apex of the “V” is pointed away from the
enemy. When the enemy drives into the vehicles, the junction of the two
vehicles at the apex of the “V” is pushed out against the buildings,
causing the vehicles’ other end to be pushed in, trapping the enemy
vehicle and inhibiting follow-on vehicles.
(4) Vehicle cribs can be constructed by wiring or chaining vehicles together in
a triangle formation, with wheels removed and the centre filled with
rubble, earth, etc. (see Figure 8–7).
b. Log Crib. Logs approximately 20 cm in diameter, such as telephone poles, can
be placed in a triangle shape with overlapping ends. Six poles of the same
thickness, with two on each of the three sides, are placed upright in the ground to
support the weight of the crib. These poles will have to be dug into the ground
until they are solidly upright. Once the crib is filled with earth, rubble, etc., the
support poles can be lashed together to support the weight of the rubble inside
the triangle (see Figure 8–7).
Figure 8–7: Log and Vehicle Cribs

c. Steel Hedgehog. Steel supports, railway tracks, or any other thick steel material
can be used to make this obstacle. They are welded together in pairs in an A-
frame shape approximately 1.0 m in height (see Figure 8–8). This obstacle
should be sited with wire obstacles so that it will stop both vehicles and
dismounted troops.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 8-5
Figure 8–8: Steel Hedgehog

d. If unable to build a road obstacle, there is always the option to crater the road
using demolitions, or engineer digging vehicles. A quick method of blocking
roads or alleys without building obstacles is to rubble buildings in the vicinity.
Mines can be emplaced in and around to add to the effectiveness of the
roadblock.
SECTION 3
MINES, BOOBY TRAPS AND IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
2. Mines, booby traps, and command-detonated devices used in built-up areas must be
recorded using the appropriate document, on a defensive sketch, and on range cards. These
records must include the building number taken from an area map, the floor plan of each floor,
the type of mine, its location, and its firing device. Under engineer supervision, all arms may
emplace mines for local protection, but boob traps can only to be emplaced by engineers under
the direction of the formation commander or above.
3. When the tactical situation permits, mined buildings should be marked accordingly on
their friendly side.
4. Command-detonated mines are highly versatile. For example, they can be used after an
attack on likely enemy avenues of approach to provide some security during the consolidation
phase. The mines do not have to be emplaced in the street, but instead, can be emplaced on
the sides of buildings or any other sturdy structures.
5. The following points should be considered when emplacing command-detonated
munitions in built-up areas:
a. They may be used in conjunction with anti-tank mines.
b. They may be emplaced in confined areas that will cause enemy troops to bunch,
such as stairs, basements, rooftops, and behind doors.
c. They must only be established for command detonation.
d. They may be used in ambushes.
e. They may be incorporated into other obstacles.
6. The following points should be considered when emplacing anti-tank mines:
a. They may be used in conjunction with other obstacles.
b. They may be used as barriers in large minefields.
c. If desired, they may be setup for command detonation.
8-6 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
d. They may be sited in streets, alleys, or narrow defiles to block enemy routes of
advance.
803. DETECTING ENEMY BOOBY TRAPS
1. Many areas and items found in a building must be regarded as potential hiding places
for booby traps. For example, doors, windows, telephones, stairs, equipment, books, canteens,
and bodies, have all been used in the past by enemy forces. Caution must not only be used in
major combat operations (MCO), but should be used during peace support and COIN
campaigns:
a. When moving through and around buildings, soldiers must be aware that
doorways and other obvious pathways may be booby-trapped using trip wires
and pressure sensitive switches.
b. When moving through a building, soldiers must not pick anything up. Items may
be rigged with a pressure release device that explodes when the item is lifted.
Soldiers must also keep well dispersed so that if a booby trap explodes,
casualties will be kept to a minimum.
c. Good detection techniques can mean the difference between finding a booby
trap, and it finding the soldier. To detect trip wires, a 3.0 m stick with 1.5 m of
string tied on one end may be used (see Figure 8–9). By attaching a lightweight
to the loose end of the string, the lead man can find a trip wire if the string snags
on it.
Figure 8–9: Detecting Trip Wires

d. Overall, the detection of enemy booby traps is largely a matter of discipline,
patience, and training. Knowledge of the subject must be combined with keen
eyesight and a suspicious mind. Although detection and clearance is a primary
task for engineers, every soldier needs to learn to look for signs of unusual
activity that could warn of traps. These signs may include:
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 8-7
(1) absence of people in areas where congregate;

(2) attractive items;
(3) disturbed ground, floorboards, fittings, etc.;
(4) sawdust, nails, and signs of recent work;
(5) footprints;
(6) battery wrappings and wire clippings;
(7) minor obstructions and channelling; and
(8) loose floorboards.
e. Many standard anti-personnel mines, available to enemy forces, come packed in
boxes and crates. If a soldier comes across explosive storage boxes, he should
note the markings, sketch them, and pass them to his chain of command.
f. Prisoners of war (PWs) and civilians may be able to provide important
information on where and how booby traps are employed. They must be
processed swiftly if their information is to be timely and of use to the other troops.
2. Infantry soldiers must mark and report mines and booby traps, but should not be
employed in clearing booby traps. Engineers should complete this task. The standard method
of marking a booby trap while clearing an area is to place a blue flag in front of the area, mark it
with blue paint, blue chalk, or a blue glow stick. If a booby trap is found in a building that is
being cleared, the linkman at the entry must be informed so that he can warn others entering
the building. The entry point should be marked with a warning of booby traps.
804. IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
1. Enemy forces, such as insurgents and terrorists employ a wide variety of IEDs. They
may be based upon plastic explosives or rigged from chemicals or from various forms of
ordnance (e.g. artillery shells). IEDs can be initiated by a number of means including:
a. Time. These devices will be initiated by a mechanical, digital, chemical or burn
fuse, or similar mechanism.
b. Remote Control. Radio-controlled (RC) devices are remotely detonated with
either wireless means or with a command wire.
c. Victim Operated. These devices require an action by the victim to function (e.g.
disturbance, pressure, pull, etc.).
d. Suicide Operated. An enemy member or sympathizer willing to kill himself in
the operation delivers these devices to a target area. They may be carried on
the person or in a container such as a backpack. They may be used to target
military forces, the civilian population, or both.
2. There are many ways that an IED can be delivered to its intended target. These
methods will be as cunning as the imagination of the person making the device. IEDs have
become a very common aspect of COIN operations. Delivery methods include, but are not
restricted to, the following:
a. Vehicle–borne. Vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIED) are generally cars or trucks filled
with explosives and placed in areas likely to be passed by military forces. They
will often be sited in civilian areas, and will result in large a number of civilian
casualties.
8-8 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
b. Postal Bombs. These are normally delivered as letters and packages and are
victim/suicide operated.
c. Remote Control. Remote control IEDs (RCIED) includes unconventional
devices, such as containers filled with explosives, pressure cookers, etc. These
may be everyday objects.
d. Firebombs. These will normally be based upon petrol and may be timed-
delayed.
e. Nail Bombs. These are anti-personnel devices, in which a fragmenting
container is packed with a combination of explosives and suitable anti-personnel
material.
f. Walk Away Bombs. In this case, an individual “walks up” with a package,
deposits the bomb in a public place, and departs before detonation.
g. Victim Delivered. Bombs may be planted on vehicles without the knowledge of
the operator. This may include bombs placed on delivery trucks en route to
security forces bases. Additionally, a hostage may be taken and forced to deliver
an IED to a security force camp. He may be chained or tied to a vehicle and
forced to deliver the IED with his family being held captive.
3. Once an IED is discovered or suspected, the local commander must take immediate
action to clear the area of civilian and military personnel. The situation must be reported quickly
and engineers deployed to dispose of the IED. Due to the dangerous and unpredictable
hazards associated with IEDs, only qualified personnel should dispose of them.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 8-9
CHAPTER 9
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
SECTION 1
GENERAL
901. INTRODUCTION
1. During combat in built-up areas, the terrain and nature of operations creates
unique demands upon units and formations. Increased ammunition consumption, high
casualty rates, transportation restrictions, and the decentralized nature of operations all
make the normal combat service support (CSS) systems less effective. Plans to provide
effective CSS in such environments require innovative techniques and early, in-depth
planning. Often the defending force, once engaged, will be effectively under siege.
Soldiers will be fighting for protracted periods in small, often isolated, groups. An
attacking force, while less severely hampered, is also likely to encounter difficulties.
Logistic planning and preparation has to be thorough for both the attack and the
defence. Although logistic resupply will be more difficult in urban terrain, there could be
a wealth of resources available locally, particularly defence stores. Whenever possible,
proper requisitioning procedures must be observed.
2. Guidelines. Regardless of the conditions under which urban operations (UO)
are conducted, there are some general guidelines for CSS:
a. Pre-configure resupply loads and push them forward at every opportunity.
b. Provide supplies in the required quantities as close as possible to the
location where the supplies are needed.
c. Protect supplies and CSS elements from the effects of enemy fire by
seeking cover and taking steps to avoid detection.
d. Disperse and decentralize CSS elements with proper emphasis on
communications, command and control, security, and the proximity of the
main supply route (MSR).
e. Position support units as far forward as the tactical situation permits.
f. Plan for requesting and distributing special equipment, such as specific
ammunition types, toggle ropes with grappling hooks, ladders, and hand
tools.
g. To reduce surface movement, position support units near drop zones
(DZs) or landing zones (LZs) that will assist in the resupply from higher
echelons to the forward units.
h. Forces will require a high degree of self-sufficiency, and therefore,
combat supplies should be pushed forward to the greatest extent
possible. Note that for the defence the ability to push combat supplies
forward for stockpiling will be greater.
i. A balance between self-sufficiency (with echelons forward) and
dispersion will be necessary.
j. Plan for the use of carrying parties and stretcher-bearers (litter teams),
down to the lowest level. They will be come under the control of sub-unit
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 9-1
company sergeants major (CSMs), company quartermaster sergeants

(CQMSs), and platoon seconds-in-commands (2ICs).
k. Plan for and use host nation support (HNS) and civil resources when
authorized and practical.
l. Routes for CSS movement have to be identified, cleared, and secured.
m. There will be a need to blur the distinction between the traditional lines of
support. In this regard, at certain times in the operation, B echelon
elements may have to push to the F echelon areas.
SECTION 2
CONSIDERATIONS SPECIFIC TO AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT
3. The principal functions of CSS in urban areas are the same of those in any other
environment: resupply, particularly combat supplies; and maintain, in terms of
equipment, weapons, and personnel (including battle casualty replacements). In an
urban environment, the nature of the terrain, combat, and distinct operations demand
specific consideration for the various CSS responsibilities. Some considerations specific
to UO are below:
a. Ammunition. Due to the continual need for intense suppression, short
engagement ranges, and limited visibility, urban combat is characterized
by extremely high ammunition expenditure rates. Not only do individual
soldiers fire more small arms ammunition, they use more munitions such
as smoke, tracer, demolitions, breaching munitions, and various types of
grenades. The ammunition consumption rate for the first day of combat
in an urban area can be up to four times the normal rate; that is, four
times the rate expected in combat in open terrain. Even though,
historically, ammunition rates decrease during succeeding days,
consumption remains high. Commanders and staff must plan to meet
these high consumption rates. Other considerations are as follows:
(1) The plan must include how ammunition and explosives are to be
moved forward to units and sub-units. Armoured fighting vehicles
(AFVs) may have to be allocated for the defence of CSS elements
and for the movement of ammunition, particularly if there is a
danger of encountering enemy elements, or if terrain is
impassable to logistic vehicles.
(2) Carrying parties may be used if streets are blocked by rubble, or if
terrain is impassable to vehicles.
(3) Consideration should be given to having soldiers carry an
increased number of charged magazines. Likewise, in the
defence, ammunition may be stockpiled in fighting positions so
that soldiers could reload when they move into a new position in
the disruption force, and then when they fall back to the main
defensive area (MDA) strongpoints. Resupply could be done by
pre-loaded magazine.
(4) In defensive operations, ammunition and other combat supplies
may have to be stockpiled in dumps.
9-2 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Combat Service Support
(5) During intensive combat operations, ammunition carriage parties

may have to be organized.
(6) Ammunition can be conserved through good, disciplined fire
control orders. Automatic fire should only be used when ordered.
(7) Explosive charges for breaching should be prepared in assembly
areas. Additional resupply of charges should be done with
prepared charges and in accordance with current safety
precautions and practices.
(8) 2ICs must keep a close watch on ammunition consumption and be
continually aware of ammunition levels. A requirement for
resupply should be foreseen and requested in a timely manner.
(9) Ammunition is heavy and bulky, and plans must be made for its
carriage in the built-up area. The use of stretchers and ladders
are an option. Any ammunition party must have a group
dedicated to providing local protection.
(10) The supply of ammunition, and other combat supplies, can be
linked to the casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) plan. Stretchers, or
vehicles used for ammunition resupply, should be used to
transport casualties on the return journeys.
(11) Reserve forces may be tasked to carry additional ammunition.
The ammunition could be passed forward or dropped-off during a
forward passage of lines.
(12) Units mainly involved in stability operations, and limited offensive
and defensive operations, such as a peace support or counter-
insurgency (COIN) campaigns, will not require the same
ammunition amounts as for major combat operations (MCO).
However, if a switch to substantial offensive operations is
required, then ammunition holdings at the sub-unit level may have
to be increased.
b. Fuel and Lubricants. Due to the density of the terrain, the reduced
movement, and the lack of cross-country movement, the amount of bulk
fuel needed by a unit during combat in urban areas is usually reduced.
Engineer equipment and power generation equipment may consume
more fuel, but requirements are small. Even though some fuel
consumption may be reduced, vehicles will likely run longer in place,
particularly when in hides in urban areas. A unit may not use much fuel
on a daily basis, but when it does need fuel, a problem exists in delivering
bulk fuel to vehicles. An emphasis will be placed on the need for bulk
fuel, and commanders and staff must plan and provide the means of
moving bulk fuel forward to combat units.
c. Maintenance. Maintenance teams must operate well forward to support
units fighting in urban areas, and therefore, a forward repair policy should
be set in place. Some maintenance operations may be consolidated in
civilian facilities, but many vehicles may have to be fixed near the fighting
positions. Battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) procedures
allow mechanics the freedom to be inventive and make maximum use of
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 9-3
battlefield damage, analysis, and repair techniques to return damaged

vehicles to a serviceable condition. Other considerations include:
(1) Combat in urban areas generates a high demand for tires, on both
fighting and echelon vehicles.
(2) The dust and rough handling characteristic of combat in urban
areas also places greater strains on communications and night
observation devices. The need for the use of night vision aids
inside buildings even in daylight will lead to increased demand for
batteries.
(3) The unit weapons technicians and their small-arms repair kits
provide only limited maintenance. Staff should plan for increased
weapon maintenance demands and coordinate maintenance
support from higher headquarters (HQ). Based upon
recommendations from the staff, the commander may choose to
consolidate major items of equipment and weapons. Studies have
shown that in UO, a higher number rifles are rendered
unserviceable due to rounds impacting on the weapons as a result
of close combat. Consequently, CSS planners must be prepared
to replace a higher number of unserviceable weapons during
urban combat.
(4) Armoured vehicles may be equipped with extra armour, and other
vehicles may be sandbagged in order to protect against the
effects of mines and weapons. These modified vehicles will
experience increased and excessive wear on brakes, suspension,
and tires. These vehicles may also experience damage to major
assemblies such as engines and transmissions. Therefore, units
employing these additional protective measures will be required to
plan for increased maintenance time and additional demands on
spare parts.
d. Battle Casualty Replacements. Units conducting combat in built-up
areas must prepare for the possibility of high casualty rates, particularly
when undertaking offensive operations. Battle casualty replacements
(BCRs) will have to be positioned well forward and ready for quick
insertion to avoid a loss of any gained initiative. Even when undertaking
offensive operations against a light, fleeting enemy such as an insurgent
force, casualties may be surprisingly high and caused by a small number
of enemy forces. Casualties, and the possible ensuing loss to morale
may be avoided if, when a difficult position is encountered, the objective
is isolated and replacement forces and supporting elements are moved
forward.
e. Equipment. Units committed to combat in urban areas may need special
equipment such as: grappling hooks, rope, snap links, collapsible pole
ladders, rope ladders, pole-less litters, construction material, axes,
sledgehammers, pry bars, and sandbags. Protective equipment such as
knee and elbow pads, heavy gloves, and ballistic eyewear will
significantly increase the mobility of soldiers in urban combat. When
possible, those items should be stockpiled or brought forward on-call so
they are readily available. During peace support or COIN campaigns,
9-4 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
soldiers may have the additional need for other equipment, such as crowd
confrontation operations (CCO) equipment and personal restraints.
SECTION 3
SUB-UNIT RESUPPLY OPERATIONS
4. The sub-unit 2IC, CSM, and CQMS normally share the responsibility for
coordinating all resupply and maintenance requirements. As stated previously, pre-
configured tactical loads, tailor-made for the receiving sub-unit and its elements, may be
created and pushed forward as the normal method of resupply. Generally, the priorities
of resupply for infantry companies in urban combat will vary between ammunition,
medical supplies, water, and food:
a. Tactically Configured Load. Resupply operations will normally occur
once every 24 hours. Ideally, they should be conducted during periods of
limited visibility. Company resupply will be primarily a push system. This
is accomplished through the reception of a tactically configured load from
the battle group. The contents of the tactically configured load are
planned based upon mission requirements. The supplies are normally
organized and assembled by the CQMS. The tactically configured load
should provide all supplies, equipment, and personnel needed to sustain
the company for the next 24 hours or until the next scheduled resupply.
b. Conduct of Resupply. Resupply is conducted in the urban environment
in generally the same manner as for operations in other environments.
Tactically configured loads should be moved forward under the control of
the unit and sub-unit echelons. Vehicles should be used to move the
resupply as far forward as possible. Delivery points (DPs) should be sited
in covered areas, using the density of urban structures for concealment
and protection. It will be important, however, that all-round security be
established at the DP to ensure appropriate defensive measures.
Armoured vehicles and carrying parties may be used to bring the supplies
forward to the fighting positions. In the latter case, for ease of carriage,
loads should be broken down into approximately 25 kg to 35 kg loads.
When the air situation permits, helicopters may also be used to easily
insert tailored resupply bundles directly to or near fighting positions.
c. Pre-positioned Supplies. Based upon the tactical situation, supplies
may be pre-positioned in planned locations. The supplies should be
placed in covered and concealed locations, from which platoons may
draw them as planned in the scheme of manoeuvre. This system works
best when the company is moving from one location within the urban area
to another in a relatively secured area. Care should be exercised to
ensure that supplies are protected and in a position where they cannot be
pilfered by civilians. A small security detachment may be required.
d. Other Considerations. In planning the CSS for UO, various other
measures and actions may be considered:
(1) Logistic vehicles must be prepared to back-haul captured enemy
equipment and prisoners of war (PWs).
(2) Drivers and other CSS personnel should be trained in the handling
of PWs.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 9-5
(3) Supply personnel should be trained in helicopter handling and

know how to configure and rig supplies for external helicopter lift.
Units planning on helicopter support must consider deploying with
slung loads and nets, and have procedures and qualified
personnel in place to expedite resupply operations and further
helicopter support.
(4) CSS personnel should be trained to receive container delivery
system bundles from a CC-130 Hercules tactical transport aircraft.
(5) CSS echelons should consider deploying with extra clothing.
Uniforms deteriorate quickly in urban combat, especially in hot,
humid conditions.
SECTION 4
LOAD PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
5. The soldier's load is a crucial concern for leaders at all levels. Tactical level
commanders must carefully monitor the burden that soldiers are expected to carry, and
take measures to mitigate the demands that tactical operations place on troops in terms
of load carriage. This concern is especially true during UO, where the demands of
physical and mental stress are combined with the need to carry additional ammunition
and water. Generally, a soldier can carry an amount equal to thirty percent of his body
weight and retain a high percentage of his agility, stamina, alertness, and mobility. For
each kilo over thirty percent, the soldier loses a proportional amount of his functional
ability. When his load exceeds forty-five percent of his body weight, his functional ability
drops rapidly and the chance of becoming a casualty increases.
6. The following are key load management techniques that should be considered
during UO:
a. The manner in which items are carried within the unit should be
standardized.
b. Loads should be distributed throughout the unit. The assault element
should only carry the items necessary to accomplish the mission, usually
ammunition, and water. As the tactical situation permits, designated
individuals in the reserve and support elements can bring forward
additional ammunition, medical supplies, and water. Ammunition and
water carried should be replaced as soon as possible.
c. Specific individuals may be designated to perform breaches, so
ammunition loads should be modified accordingly. These individuals may
be rotated as they tire, or after they have made numerous breaches.
d. After each intermediate objective is secured, and as the tactical situation
permits, the lead assault element may be rotated with other assault
elements. Fresh assault elements should be pushed forward regularly.
e. All leaders must supervise their subordinates, and closely monitor the
soldiers’ loads to ensure soldiers carry only the necessary items.
9-6 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
SECTION 5
HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT
902. GENERAL
1. Sustained close quarter fighting, combined with the changing nature of the urban
environment, is likely to cause significant casualties. Although buildings may give cover,
the hard street and wall surfaces increase shell and grenade fragmentation effects. In
prolonged operations, the damage to water and sewage installations provides an
additional health hazard, which is aggravated by the normally poor conditions in many
developing nations. It will be difficult to evacuate casualties from the built-up area, and
more so from the forward fighting positions. Evacuation by helicopter may be possible,
but unlikely from the more forward positions.
903. MEDI CAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. General. The most critical medical functions that must be emphasized during
urban combat include preventive medicine, trauma treatment, and evacuation. In
addition, there should be a plan for treating, decontaminating, and evacuating chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) related casualties that may occur during
combat.
2. Unit-level Planning. At unit level, planning for the provision of medical support
should include the following:
a. In addition to good basic combat-oriented first aid training, a higher level
of training in resuscitation is required by all ranks.
b. The need for all ranks to carry additional field dressings, morphine and
intravenous fluids, and to have completed the respective training in their
use.
c. The requirement for water purification.
d. Additional labour to serve as litter teams. Casualties may have to be
carried for considerable distances through buildings and over rubble from
the fighting positions to casualty collection points (CCPs).
e. Special or unique equipment may be required for the CASEVAC, such as
ropes, axes, crowbars, and other such tools.
f. Helicopters may be used for evacuation. They do not need to be
specifically designated for evacuation. Aviation assets not undertaking
higher priority tasks may be temporarily assigned to conduct ad hoc
CASEVAC.
g. An ambulance shuttle system will likely need to be established. This will
allow personnel familiar with the area to remain and continue to recover
and evacuate casualties. CCPs must be pre-designated and known by
those responsible for CASEVAC.
h. As accessible, armoured vehicles will be required to safely evacuate
casualties from the forward fighting positions.
i. Standing operating procedures (SOP) should be followed in the marking
of casualties.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 9-7
j. The use of civilian medical facilities may be considered, but the Law of
Armed Conflict governs their use. If civilians are wounded in a unit’s
area, the commander is responsible for providing aid and protection
without disrupting military operations.
k. Commanders are responsible for the collection and recording of dead
persons whether they are allied, enemy or civilian.
3. Disease. Combat in urban areas exposes soldiers not only to combat wounds,
but to the diseases endemic to the area of operations (AO). Commanders must enforce
preventive measures against the spread of infectious diseases. Many third world or
developing regions have poor sewage and refuse removal, as well as low-quality water
supplies. Even cities with the most modern facilities revert quickly to sub-standard
sanitation, and experience an increase in disease when utilities are interrupted by
natural catastrophes or urban combat. Exposure to disease can decimate a unit as
quickly as combat. Normal field sanitation may be difficult due to a lack of water and the
inability to dig. Water and other utilities may not be working due to the destruction of the
water facilities, lack of power, or the lack of experienced personnel to operate the
facilities. Even if the water is running, it should not be considered properly treated.
Water supply will be a major concern for commanders and their CSS staff. Likewise, the
provision of suitable latrines and waste removal will be an ongoing concern. Medics
must constantly monitor soldiers and look for signs of common illnesses or maladies.
During operations in Haiti in 2004, sanitary conditions in the dense capital of Port au
Prince were generally non-existent. The pervasive presence of human waste and
dried fecal matter caused soldiers to routinely become ill. Some Escherichia Coli
(E. coli) infections lasted up to two weeks.
4. Medical Supplies. Critical medical supplies should be planned for all operations
and re-supplied to the forward units / sub-units as needed. Additional combat medical
supplies such as field dressings must be brought forward to the fighting positions.
5. Field Medics. Although the field medics normally attached to sub-units and rifle
platoons are well trained in the treatment of traumatic injury, they can quickly become
overwhelmed by the number of casualties. The commander must ensure that selected
soldiers within the platoons are trained to administer enhanced first aid designed
specifically for combat situations. This will not only allow medics to concentrate on the
most seriously wounded, but will save lives in this environment.
6. Unit Medical Station. The unit medical section (UMS) must plan to care for the
mass casualties inherent in urban combat. Combat medics and lifesavers should expect
a higher incidence of crushing injuries, eye injuries, burns, and fractures due to falling
debris, spall from buildings, rubble, and fire hazards. Additional effects, such as
concussive shock and hearing loss due to explosives, should also be expected.
7. Casualty/Medical Evacuation. Innovative techniques and procedures are
required to overcome the many difficulties encountered in urban combat when
conducting CASEVAC from forward positions to the CCP, and for further movement,
medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). The planning for casualty/medical evacuation in urban
terrain must include special equipment and the use of armoured vehicles to remove
casualties from the forward fighting positions.
8. Casualty Collection Point. Although litter teams are labour intensive, they are
required for the evacuation from buildings, where casualties can occur on any level.
9-8 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
Also, rubble in the streets, barricades, and the demolition of roads will impede ground
ambulances, which places additional reliance upon litter teams. Casualties are brought
to the designated CCP and evacuated from there to the UMS or beyond. Armoured
vehicles will be required to safely remove casualties from forward fighting positions and
forward CCPs. The CCP is placed in a covered and concealed location that has
overhead cover (i.e. usually a heavy-clad building that has not collapsed). The CCP
should be located at a point where the field ambulances can reach, yet close enough to
the combat area so that casualties do not have to be carried great distances. It must be
marked well enough that it is easy to find.
9. Helicopter Evacuation. Tactical CSS planning should include pre-designated
evacuation LZs, crossover points, and the assignment of resources for evacuation.
Even if no helicopters are allocated for CASEVAC, those not occupied with their primary
tasks may be called upon for casualty evacuation. Threats of enemy engagement of
aviation assets must be carefully considered when siting LZs and allocating evacuation
tasks to aviation assets.
10. Communications. Communications present one of the principal obstacles to
efficient CASEVAC. Due to the terrain, use of line-of-sight radios is problematic.
Furthermore, not all soldiers will have access to a radio. Therefore, it may be difficult to
find and evacuate wounded soldiers. The unit SOP should be exercised to mark
casualty locations and assist evacuation. In addition, a systematic search of the area
may be required after the battle to recover casualties. As buildings and streets can
create confusion and disorient individuals trying to evacuate the wounded, CCPs should
be visibly.
SECTION 6
PSYCHOLOGICAL HAZARDS
11. Prolonged combat in built-up areas generates significant stress. Soldiers
conducting combat operations must perform complex collective and individual tasks
without adequate sleep and under stress. Some soldiers show signs of inability to cope
with such stress. Stress management is the responsibility of commanders at all levels.
Trained medical personnel should be available to support units when such situations
dictate, and there must be a procedure in place to evacuate adversely affected
personnel to a safe area for treatment.
12. Notwithstanding the possible presence and reliance upon personnel specially
trained in dealing with psychological hazards, the best treatment and support for a
person undergoing psychological stress comes from his immediate commanders and
peers, many of whom the affected individual would have known for years and
experienced the same stressful incidents. In this sense, commanders cannot relegate
their responsibilities for supporting and motivating their subordinates to outside technical
experts. Technical experts can, however, offer valuable advice and assistance to
commanders and their subordinates.
SECTION 7
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE MEDIC AND EVACUATION
13. The onerous duties expected of a medic remain extant for UO. In considering
the role of the medic, the following is offered:
a. Ideally, the medic would have undergone extensive training with the sub-
unit he is supporting.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 9-9
b. The medic will require similar urban skills training and development as the
infantry and other combat arms soldiers. In particular, training must
replicate the difficulties in evacuation that will be experienced in urban
areas. He must also be prepared to defend himself and his patients in
sudden, short-range engagements.
c. The medic and UMS must be prepared for a higher than normal casualty
rate.
d. The medic and UMS must be prepared to render first aid to civilians of all
ages.
e. Medics may be allocated support from armoured vehicles in order to
assist with casualty extraction.
f. The medic must guard against exhausting or seriously depleting his
medical supplies on the initial casualties. The duration of the battle and
the number of patients may increase. Having each soldier carry his
personal medical supplies for initial treatment enhances the medic's
ability to conserve his medical supplies.
14. Commanders and soldiers must keep in mind that casualties gained during an
offensive operation must await the end of the tactical mission or the arrival of medics
before receiving treatment. Soldiers undergoing an assault cannot stop to give aid until
they secure the next tactical bound. They must continue with the assault and leave the
casualty treatment to medics or reserve troops.
15. During the clearing of a building, soldiers ordered to withdraw from a room or
building (i.e. likely due to enemy pressure) must ensure that they extract any casualties
as they withdraw. Soldiers committing themselves to assaulting a room must be
assured that they will not be left behind if wounded.
16. Medics have a role to play in preventative medicine. Numerous hazards exist in
UO that do not exist in open terrain. It is the duty of medics to advise commanders of
any materials or practices that should be avoided, and recommend when technical
specialists in medical prevention should be requested.
17. Smooth casualty evacuation by aviation assets requires the timely siting and
recording of suitable LZs. As UO are planned and proceed, LZs should be sited in
suitable areas and their locations passed to higher echelons. During peace support and
COIN campaigns, LZs will have to be sited and recorded near all base locations, and
additional temporary LZs should be sited to support specific deliberate operations as
they may occur.
18. In the urban areas of developing nations, it will be difficult to find suitable LZs due
to the closeness of the urban structures and the lack of stable rooftops.
19. Vehicles being used for CASEVAC should be as far forward in the battle as
possible. Line units that call ambulances forward must use linkmen to guide the medics
and ambulances into location. Although many framework patrols during peace support
(PSO) or COIN operations will be conducted on foot, it is advisable to initially deploy the
patrols by vehicle so that it is readily available to extract any casualties.
9-10 B-GL-322-008/FP-001
SECTION 8
PRISONERS OF WAR
20. PWs have to be handled in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions and the Law of Armed Conflict. Soldiers and commanders must
understand that poor treatment of PWs will undermine the legitimacy of the force and its
mission, and will undermine the public support for the military force.
21. PWs, if handled humanely, and processed effectively and quickly, can provide
valuable information regarding terrain and enemy forces. Indeed, past campaigns have
shown that PWs who were properly handled during COIN campaigns have aided
security forces in operations against insurgents.
22. Care must be taken to ensure that enemy forces do not attempt to take cover
amongst civilians to avoid capture. If civilians are found in an objective area, the area
should be secured, and civilians detained until any enemy have been identified and
removed.
B-GL-322-008/FP-001 9-11

A Tactical Guide To Urban Operations

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B-GL-322-008/FP-001

A TACTICAL GUIDE TO URBAN

Published under the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff

A TACTICAL GUIDE TO URBAN

Published under the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff

OPI: DAD ACT 2010-12-01

1. B-GL-322-008/FP-001 A Tactical Guide to Urban Operations is issued on the authority of

306. Using Doorways .....................................................................................................3-6

533. Isolation of the Objective ......................................................................................5-74

Figure 3–16: Two-man Lift Supported .................................................................................... 3-17

Figure 5–64: Isolating an Urban Objective.............................................................................. 5-75

104. URBAN OPERATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Figure 1–1: Full-spectrum Operations Breakdown

the problems associated with non-contiguous AOs will apply

e. High Expenditure of Ammunition. Units conducting UO use large quantities of

Figure 1–2: Typical Urban Area

Figure 1–3: Example of a City Core

Figure 1–4: Outlying High-rise Area

Figure 1–5: Commercial Ribbon

Figure 1–6: Residential Sprawl

Figure 1–7: Outlying Industrial Areas

Shape Street Pattern Effect

Rectangular or Streets are grid-like, with parallel streets intersected

Rayed Streets that fan out at various angles from a given

Radial Primary thoroughfares radiate out from a central

Radial-ring Successively larger loops and rings surround loops

Contour forming Pronounced terrain relief influences construction of

Irregular pattern Irregular street patterns have either occurred

Combined pattern Any combination of the above and is best

Linear pattern A primary thoroughfare radiates down the centre

Figure 1–8: Street Patterns

(3) Supporting weapons must be further forward to support operations, again

consideration of such threats, including the possible requirement to treat civilian

proficiency and confidence. Maximum use should be made of any technological

Figure 2–1: Mass Construction Buildings

Figure 2–2: Brick Buildings

Figure 2–3: Brick Built Shop

Figure 2–4: Warehouse

Figure 2–5: Public Gathering Places

Figure 2–6: Public Places

Figure 2–7: Box Wall Principle Building

Figure 2–8: Box Wall Principle Building Floor Plan

203. FRAMED BUILDING

Figure 2–9: Light Structured Framed Buildings

Figure 2–10: Heavy Clad Framed Building

Figure 2–11: Heavy Clad Framed Department Store

Figure 2–12: Lightly Clad Framed Building

Figure 2–13: Multi-story Car Park

204. FLOOR PLANS

Figure 2–14: Building Shapes and Sizes

Figure 2–15: Middle East Style Enclosed Courtyard.

206. STRUCTURES IN THE THIRD WORLD AND DEVELOPING NATIONS

4. Careful consideration must be given to the employment of support weapons in such

209. NON-COMBATANTS AS AN INFORMATION / INTELLIGENCE SOURCE

(2) shine or shadows;