1.

a criminal conviction is not necessary to find just cause for employment

termination. Otherwise stated, an employee’s acquittal in a criminal case,
especially one that is grounded on the existence of reasonable doubt, will not
preclude a determination in a labor case that he is guilty of acts inimical to the
employer’s interests. In the reverse, the finding of probable cause is not followed
by automatic adoption of such finding by the labor tribunals. In other words,
whichever way the public prosecutor disposes of a complaint, the finding does
not bind the labor tribunal. (Copy Central Digital Copy Solution vs. Domrique
et al., (G.R. No. 193219, July 27, 2015)

2. Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this ground, the employer's
orders, regulations, or instructions must be: (1) reasonable and lawful, (2)
sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) in connection with the duties which
the employee has been engaged to discharge."

Tested against the foregoing, the Court finds that Sanchez was validly dismissed by
SLMC for her willful disregard and disobedience of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code
of Discipline, which reasonably punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e., "theft, pilferage of
hospital or co-employee property, x x x or its attempt in any form or manner from the
hospital, co-employees, doctors, visitors, [and] customers (external and internal)" with
termination from employment. Such act is obviously connected with Sanchez's work,
who, as a staff nurse, is tasked with the proper stewardship of medical supplies.
Significantly, records show that Sanchez made a categorical admission61 in her
handwritten letter - i.e., "[k]ahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong [makapag-uwi] ng
gamit" - that despite her knowledge of its express prohibition under the SLMC Code of
Discipline, she still knowingly brought out the subject medical items with her. It is apt to
clarify that SLMC cannot be faulted in construing the taking of the questioned items as
an act of dishonesty (particularly, as theft, pilferage, or its attempt in any form or
manner) considering that the intent to gain may be reasonably presumed from the
furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another. Note that Section 1, Rule 1 of
the SLMC Code of Discipline is further supplemented by the company policy requiring
the turn-over of excess medical supplies/items for proper handling and providing a
restriction on taking and bringing such items out of the SLMC premises without the
proper authorization or "pass" from the official concerned, which Sanchez was equally
aware thereof. Nevertheless, Sanchez failed to turn-over the questioned items and,
instead, "hoarded" them, as purportedly practiced by the other staff members in the
Pediatric Unit. As it is clear that the company policies subject of this case are
reasonable and lawful, sufficiently known to the employee, and evidently connected with
the latter's work, the Court concludes that SLMC dismissed Sanchez for a just cause.
(St. Luke’s Medical Center Inc. v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 212054, March 11, 2015)
3. The criminal case for estafa and the complaint for illegal dismissal deal with two
different issues cognizable by two different tribunals. Indeed, these two cases
respectively require distinct and well delineated degrees of proof. Under the law,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to sustain a criminal conviction, an
inapplicable requirement in a labor complaint. In fact, and as correctly ruled by
the NLRC, the judgement in a criminal case has no binding or conclusive effect in
a labor case. Conviction of an employee in a criminal case is not indispensible to
warrant an employees dismissal. Thus, we feel that the Labor Arbiter erred in
basing his decision exclusively on the outcome of the criminal case. The Labor
Arbiter is duly bound to make his findings of facts after the presentation and due
consideration of all the pertinent circumstances and evidence of the case. And
this is precisely what Rule V, Section 16 of the NLRC Rules of Procedures
requires. We thus find the NLRC's order remanding the case to the Arbitration
Branch of origin to thresh out pertinent factual matter no usually renewable in a
special civil action for certiorari, as in this case, to be untainted with grave abuse
of discretion. (Nicolas vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113948 July 5, 1996)

4. Conviction in a criminal case is not necessary to find just cause for termination of
employment.

On the date that the appellate court issued its Decision, Capor filed a
Manifestation14 informing the CA of her acquittal in the charge of qualified theft.
The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting
Nenita Capor of the crime charged against her in this case on the ground of
reasonable doubt with costs de oficio.

Capor thus claims that her acquittal in the criminal case proves that petitioners
failed to present substantial evidence to justify her termination from the company.
She therefore asks for a finding of illegal dismissal and an award of separation
pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service. On the other hand,
petitioners argue that the dismissal of a criminal action should not carry a
corresponding dismissal of the labor action since a criminal conviction is
unnecessary in warranting a valid dismissal for employment.

Petitioners further maintain that the ruling in Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company v. National Labor Relations Commission regarding the disallowance of
separation pay for those dismissed due to serious misconduct or moral turpitude
is mandatory. Petitioners likewise argue that in Zenco Sales, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission,16 the Supreme Court found grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC when it ignored the principles laid down in the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations
 Commission. Thus, petitioners pray for the reversal of the CA Decision and
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter's Decision dated November 16, 1999.

Capor was acquitted in Criminal Case No. 207-58-MN based on reasonable

doubt. In his Decision, the trial judge entertained doubts regarding the guilt of
Capor because of two circumstances: (1) an ensuing labor dispute (though it
omitted to state the parties involved), and (2) the upcoming retirement of Capor.
The trial judge made room for the possibility that these circumstances could have
motivated petitioners to plant evidence against Capor so as to avoid paying her
retirement benefits. The trial court did not categorically rule that the acts imputed
to Capor did not occur. It did not find petitioners' version of the event as
fabricated, baseless, or unreliable. It merely acknowledged that seeds of doubt
have been planted in the juror's mind which, in a criminal case, is enough to
acquit an accused based on reasonable doubt.
xxx
In Nicolas v. National Labor Relations Commission, we held that a criminal
conviction is not necessary to find just cause for employment termination.
Otherwise stated, an employee's acquittal in a criminal case, especially one that
is grounded on the existence of reasonable doubt, will not preclude a
determination in a labor case that he is guilty of acts inimical to the employer's
interests.

Criminal cases require proof beyond reasonable doubt while labor disputes
require only substantial evidence, which means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The evidence
in this case was reviewed by the appellate court and two labor tribunals endowed
with expertise on the matter - the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. They all found
substantial evidence to conclude that Capor had been validly dismissed for
dishonesty or serious misconduct. It is settled that factual findings of quasi-
judicial agencies are generally accorded respect and finality so long as these are
supported by substantial evidence. In the instant case, we find no compelling
reason to doubt the common findings of the three reviewing bodies. (Reno
Foods Inc. and/or Vicente Khu vs. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa
G.R. No. 164016 : March 15, 2010 )

5. “In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that
the dismissal is for just and valid cause; failure to do so would necessarily mean
that the dismissal was illegal. The employer’s case succeeds or fails on the
strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s defense. If
doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee,
the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. Moreover, the quantum of
proof required in determining the legality of an employee’s dismissal is only
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
 evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably
opine otherwise.” (Agusan Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.
Cagampang, G.R. No. 167627, 10 October 2008)

6. Ma. Flora M. Episcope was a waitress at Westin Hotel and was responsible for
bringing discount cards to the cashier and presenting the discounted bill to the
guests.

Instead of presenting the discounted bill to the guests, she gave them the original
bill and pocketed the discount.

The Supreme Court supported her dismissal.

“Being therefore involved in the handling of company funds, Episcope is

undeniably considered an employee occupying a position of trust and confidence
and as such, was expected to act with utmost honesty and fidelity.” (Philippine
Plaza Holdings vs. Ma. Flora M. Episcope, G.R. 192826, Feb 27, 2013)

7. Matis alleges that he may not be removed on the ground of breach of trust and
confidence as he was not a managerial employee or an employee primarily
entrusted with the handling of company funds or property.

We are not persuaded. Loss of confidence applies to: (1) employees occupying
positions of trust and confidence, the managerial employees; and (2) employees
who are routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or
property which may include rank-and-file employees, e.g., cashiers, auditors,
property custodians, or those who, in the normal routine exercise of their
functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.[25]

It is established that Matis was a foreman with a monthly salary of P57,000.00 at

the time of his dismissal.[26] The vehicles being utilized in the repair and
maintenance of Meralco's distribution lines ordinarily carried necessary
equipment, tools, supplies and materials. Thus, Matis, as the foreman, is
routinely entrusted with the care and custody of Meralco's properties in the
exercise of his function.

The established fact that Llanes, a non-Meralco employee, was often seen
during company operations, conversing with the foremen, for reason or reasons
connected with the ongoing company operations, gives rise to the question:
what was he doing there? Apparently, he had been visiting Meralco worksites, at
least in the Valenzuela Sector, not simply to socialize, but to do something else.
As testified to by witnesses, he was picking up unused supplies and materials
that were not returned to the company. From these factual premises, it is not
hard to conclude that this activity was for the mutual pecuniary benefit of himself
and the crew who tolerated the practice. For one working at the scene who had
seen or who had shown familiarity with Llanes (a non-Meralco employee), not to
have known the reason for his presence is to disregard the obvious, or at least
the very suspicious.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not needed to justify the loss of confidence as
long as the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is
responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy
of the trust and confidence demanded of his position. Meralco was able to
establish through substantial evidence that it has reasonable ground to believe
that Matis's involvement in the incident rendered him unworthy of the trust and
confidence reposed upon him as a foreman of Meralco. (Matis vs. Manila
Electric Company, G.R. No. 206629, September 14, 2016)