Asuncion vs. National Labor Relations Commission

56
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Asuncion vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 129329. July 31, 2001.*
ESTER M. ASUNCION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, Second Division, MABINI MEDICAL CLINIC and DR.
WILFRIDO JUCO, respondents.
Labor Law; Appeals; A disharmony between the factual findings of
the Labor Arbiter and those of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) opens the door to a review thereof by the
Supreme Court.—Although, it is a legal tenet that factual
findings of administrative bodies are entitled to great weight
and respect, we are constrained to take a second look at the
facts before us because of the diversity in the opinions of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. A disharmony between the factual
findings of the Labor Arbiter and those of the NLRC opens the
door to a review thereof by this Court.
Same; Illegal Dismissal; Due Process; A worker’s employment is

property in the constitutional sense—he cannot be deprived of his
work without due process.—It bears stressing that a worker’s
employment is property in the constitutional sense. He cannot be
deprived of his work
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
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VOL. 362, JULY 31, 2001
57
without due process. In order for the dismissal to be valid, not

only must it be based on just cause supported by clear and
convincing evidence, the employee must also be given an
opportunity to be heard and defend himself. It is the employer
who has the burden of proving that the dismissal was with just or
authorized cause. The failure of the employer to discharge this
burden means that the dismissal is not justified and that the
employee is entitled to reinstatement and backwages.
Same; Same; Evidence; Administrative Law; Absenteeism and

Tardiness; Handwritten listing and unsigned computer print-outs
which are unauthenticated are unreliable to establish alleged
absenteeism and tardiness of an employee—mere self-serving
evidence should be rejected as evidence without any rational
probative value even in administrative proceedings.—In the case
at bar, there is a paucity of evidence to establish the charges
of absenteeism and tardiness. We note that the employer company
submitted mere handwritten listing and computer print-outs. The
handwritten listing was not signed by the one who made the same.
As regards the print-outs, while the listing was computer
generated, the entries of time and other annotations were again
handwritten and unsigned. We find that the handwritten listing
and unsigned computer print-outs were unauthenticated and, hence,
unreliable. Mere self-serving evidence of which the listing and
print-outs are of that nature should be rejected as evidence
without any rational probative value even in administrative
proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence without any rational

probative value may not be made the basis of order or decision of
administrative bodies.—In IBM Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, this
Court clarified that the liberality of procedure in
administrative actions is not absolute and does not justify the
total disregard of certain fundamental rules of evidence. Such
that evidence without any rational probative value may not be
made the basis of order or decision of administrative bodies. The
Court’s ratiocination in that case is relevant to the propriety
of rejecting the unsigned handwritten listings and computer
print-outs submitted by private respondents which we quote, to
wit: However, the liberality of procedure in administrative
actions is subject to limitations imposed by basic requirements
of due process. As this Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, the
provision for flexibility in administrative procedure “does not
go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative value.”
58
58

Same; Same; Same; Same; The purpose of the rule requiring the
production of the best evidence is the prevention of fraud,
because if a party is in possession of such evidence and
withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its
place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence
is withheld for fraudulent purposes which its production would
expose and defeat.—Ironically, in the memorandum charging
petitioner and notice of termination, private respondents
referred to the record book as its basis for petitioner’s alleged
absenteeism and tardiness. Interestingly, however, the record
book was never presented in evidence. Private respondents had
possession thereof and the opportunity to present the same. Being
the basis of the charges against the petitioner, it is without
doubt the best evidence available to substantiate the
allegations. The purpose of the rule requiring the production of
the best evidence is the prevention of fraud, because if a party
is in possession of such evidence and withholds it, and seeks to
substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption
naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for
fraudulent purposes which its production would expose and defeat.
Thus, private respondents’ unexplained and unjustified non-
presentation of the record book, which is the best evidence in
its possession and control of the charges against the petitioner,
casts serious doubts on the factual basis of the charges of
absenteeism and tardiness.
Same; Same; Due Process; What would qualify as sufficient or

“ample opportunity,” for an employee to enable him to prepare
adequately for his defense, would be “every kind of assistance
that management must accord to the employee to enable him to
prepare adequately for his defense.”—The law mandates that every
opportunity and assistance must be accorded to the employee by
the management to enable him to prepare adequately for his
defense. In Ruffy v. NLRC, the Court held that what would qualify
as sufficient or “ample opportunity,” as required by law, would
be “every kind of assistance that management must accord to the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense.” In
the case at bar, private respondents cannot be gainsaid to have
given petitioner the ample opportunity to answer the charges
leveled against her.
Same; Same; Same; If doubts exist between the evidence presented

by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be
tilted in favor of the latter—the employer must affirmatively
show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a
justifiable cause.—From the foregoing, there are serious doubts
in the evidence on record as to the factual basis of the charges
against petitioner. These doubts shall be resolved in her favor
in line with the policy under the Labor Code to afford protection
to labor and construe doubts in favor of labor. The consistent
rule is that if
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VOL. 362, JULY 31, 2001
59
doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and

the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of
the latter. The employer must affirmatively show rationally
adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.
Not having satisfied its burden of proof, we conclude that the
employer dismissed the petitioner without any just cause. Hence,
the termination is illegal.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Philip A. Paredes for petitioner.
Jose C. Evangelista for private respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In her petition filed before this Court, Ester Asuncion prays

that the Decision, dated November 29, 1996, and the Resolution,
dated February 20, 1997, of the public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, Second Division, in NLRC CA 011188 which
reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated May 15, 1996 be
set aside.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On August 16, 1993, petitioner Ester M. Asuncion was employed as

an accountant/bookkeeper by the respondent Mabini Medical Clinic.
Sometime in May 1994, certain officials of the NCR-Industrial
Relations Division of the Department of Labor and Employment
conducted a routine inspection of the premises of the respondent
company and discovered upon the disclosure of the petitioner of
(documents) violations of the labor standards law such as the
non-coverage from the SSS of the employees. Consequently,
respondent Company was made to correct these violations.
On August 9, 1994, the private respondent, Medical Director

Wilfrido Juco, issued a memorandum to petitioner charging her
with the following offenses:
1.Chronic Absentism (sic)—You have incurred since Aug. 1993 up to

the present 35 absences and 23 half-days.
2.Habitual tardiness—You have late (sic) for 108 times. As shown
on the record book.
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60
3.Loitering and wasting of company time—on several occasions and

witnessed by several employees.
4.Getting salary of an absent employee without acknowledging or
signing for it.
5.Disobedience and insubordination—continued refusal to sign
memos given to you.1
Petitioner was required to explain within two (2) days why she
should not be terminated based on the above charges.
Three days later, in the morning of August 12, 1994, petitioner

submitted her response to the memorandum. On the same day,
respondent Dr. Juco, through a letter dated August 12, 1994,
dismissed the petitioner on the ground of disobedience of lawful
orders and for her failure to submit her reply within the two-day
period.
This prompted petitioner to file a case for illegal termination

before the NLRC.
In a Decision, dated May 15, 1996, Labor Arbiter Manuel Caday

rendered judgment declaring that the petitioner was illegally
dismissed. The Labor Arbiter found that the private respondents
were unable to prove the allegation of chronic absenteeism as it
failed to present in evidence the time cards, logbooks or record
book which complainant signed recording her time in reporting for
work. These documents, according to the Labor Arbiter, were in
the possession of the private respondents. In fact, the record
book was mentioned in the notice of termination. Hence, the non-
presentation of these documents gives rise to the presumption
that these documents were intentionally suppressed since they
would be adverse to private respondent’s claim. Moreover, the
Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioner’s absences were with the
conformity of the private respondents as both parties had agreed
beforehand that petitioner would not report to work on Saturdays.
The handwritten listing of the days when complainant was absent
from work or late in reporting for work and even the computerized
print-out, do not suffice to prove that petitioner’s absences
were unauthorized as they
_______________
1Letter from Medical Director Wilfrido S. Juco to herein

petitioner, dated August 9, 1994; Rollo, p. 104.
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VOL. 362, JULY 31, 2001
61
could easily be manufactured.2 Accordingly, the dispositive

portion of the decision states, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

declaring the dismissal of the complainant as illegal and
ordering the respondent company to immediately reinstate her to
her former position without loss of seniority rights and to pay
the complainant’s backwages and other benefits, as follows:
1)P73,500.00 representing backwages as of the date of this

decision until she is actually reinstated in the service;
2)P20.000.00 by way of moral damages and another P20,000.00
representing exemplary damages; and
3)10% of the recoverable award in this case representing
attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.3
On appeal, public respondent NLRC rendered the assailed decision

which set aside the Labor Arbiter’s ruling. Insofar as finding
the private respondents as having failed to present evidence
relative to petitioner’s absences and tardiness, the NLRC agrees
with the Labor Arbiter. However, the NLRC ruled that petitioner
had admitted the tardiness and absences though offering
justifications for the infractions. The decretal portion of the
assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby

VACATED and SET ASIDE and a NEW ONE entered dismissing the
complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.
However, respondents Mabini Medical Clinic and Dr. Wilfrido Juco

are jointly and solidarily ordered to pay complainant Ester
Asuncion the equivalent of her three (3) months salary for and as
a penalty for respondents’ non-observance of complainant’s right
to due process.
SO ORDERED.4
_______________
2 Decision, Labor Arbiter p. 19; Id., at 78.
3Id., at 24-25; Id., at 83-84.
4NLRC Decision, p. 17; Id., at 55.
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62
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the public

respondent denied in its Resolution, dated February 19, 1997.
Hence, petitioner through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeks recourse to this Court and raises the
following issue:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS

DISMISSED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR A JUST OR AUTHORIZED
CAUSE.
The petition is impressed with merit.

Although, it is a legal tenet that factual findings of
administrative bodies are entitled to great weight and respect,
we are constrained to take a second look at the facts before us
because of the diversity in the opinions of the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC.5 A disharmony between the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter and those of the NLRC opens the door to a review thereof
by this Court.6
It bears stressing that a worker’s employment is property in the

constitutional sense. He cannot be deprived of his work without
due process. In order for the dismissal to be valid, not only
must it be based on just cause supported by clear and convincing
evidence,7 the employee must also be given an opportunity to be
heard and defend himself.8 It is the employer who has the burden
of proving that the dismissal was with just or authorized cause.9
The failure
_______________
5 Manila Electric Company v. NLRC and Jeremias Cortez, 263 SCRA

531 (1996).
6 Manila Mandarin Employees Union v. NLRC, 264 SCRA 320 (1996).
7 Nagusara v. National Labor Relations Commission, 290 SCRA 245,

254 (1998) citing Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC,
276 SCRA 462, July 31, 1997.
8 RDS Trucking v. National Labor Relations Commission, 294 SCRA

623, 629 (1998); Maneja v. National Labor Relations Commission,
290 SCRA 603, 620 (1998); Santos v. National Labor Relations
Commission 287 SCRA 117, 122 (1998).
9 Id., at 623; Lopez v. National Labor Relations Commission, 297

SCRA 508, 516 (1998); Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union v.
Laguesma,
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VOL. 362, JULY 31, 2001
63

of the employer to discharge this burden means that the dismissal
is not justified and that the employee is entitled to
reinstatement and backwages.10
In the case at bar, there is a paucity of evidence to establish

the charges of absenteeism and tardiness. We note that the
employer company submitted mere handwritten listing and computer
printouts. The handwritten listing was not signed by the one who
made the same. As regards the print-outs, while the listing was
computer generated, the entries of time and other annotations
were again handwritten and unsigned.11
We find that the handwritten listing and unsigned computer print-

outs were unauthenticated and, hence, unreliable. Mere self-
serving evidence of which the listing and print-outs are of that
nature should be rejected as evidence without any rational
probative value even in administrative proceedings. For this
reason, we find the findings of the Labor Arbiter to be correct.
On this point, the Labor Arbiter ruled, to wit:
x x x In the instant case, while the Notice of Termination served

on the complainant clearly mentions the record book upon which
her tardiness (and absences) was based, the respondent (company)
failed to establish (through) any of these documents and the
handwritten listing, notwithstanding, of (sic) the days when
complainant was absent from work or late in reporting for work
and even the computerized print-outs, do not suffice to prove the
complainant’s absences were unauthorized as they could easily be
manufactured, x x x12
In IBM Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC,13 this Court clarified that the

liberality of procedure in administrative actions is not absolute
and does not justify the total disregard of certain fundamental
rules of evidence. Such that evidence without any rational
probative value may not be made the basis of order or decision of
administrative
_______________
286 SCRA 401, 434 (1998); Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC,
287 SCRA 71, 77 (1998).
10 Paguio Transport Corporation v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 294 SCRA 657, 665-666 (1998).
11 Rollo, p. 322.
12 Id., at 78.
13 305 SCRA 592 (1999).
64
64
bodies. The Court’s ratiocination in that case is relevant to the

propriety of rejecting the unsigned handwritten listings and
computer print-outs submitted by private respondents which we
quote, to wit:
However, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is

subject to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due
process. As this Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, the provision
for flexibility in administrative procedure “does not go so far
as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative value.” More specifically, as held Uichico v. NLRC:
“It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like

the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the
adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule should not
be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental
evidentiary rules. While the rules of evidence prevailing in the
courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before
the NLRC, the evidence presented before it must at least have a
modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value.
The Statement of Profit and Losses submitted by Crispa, Inc. to
prove its alleged losses, without the accompanying signature of a
certified public accountant or audited by an independent auditor,
are nothing but self-serving documents which ought to be treated
as a mere scrap of paper devoid of any probative value.”
The computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence of

petitioners, afford no assurance of their authenticity because
they are unsigned. The decisions of this Court, while adhering to
a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before
administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required
some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition for the
admission of documents.
In Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. NLRC,14 this
Court held as incompetent unsigned daily time records presented
to prove that the employee was neglectful of his duties:
Indeed, the DTRs annexed to the present petition would tend to

establish private respondent’s neglectful attitude towards his
work duties as shown by repeated and habitual absences and
tardiness and propensity for working undertime for the year 1992.
But the problem with these
_______________
14 266 SCRA 97 (1997); Ibid.
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VOL. 362, JULY 31, 2001
65
DTRs is that they are neither originals nor certified true

copies. They are plain photocopies of the originals, if the
latter do exist. More importantly, they are not even signed by
private respondent nor by any of the employer’s representatives,
x x x.
In the case at bar, both the handwritten listing and computer

print-outs being unsigned, the authenticity thereof is highly
suspect and devoid of any rational probative value especially in
the light of the existence of the official record book of the
petitioner’s alleged absences and tardiness in the possession of
the employer company.
Ironically, in the memorandum charging petitioner and notice of

termination, private respondents referred to the record book as
its basis for petitioner’s alleged absenteeism and tardiness.
Interestingly, however, the record book was never presented in
evidence. Private respondents had possession thereof and the
opportunity to present the same. Being the basis of the charges
against the petitioner, it is without doubt the best evidence
available to substantiate the allegations. The purpose of the
rule requiring the production of the best evidence is the
prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such
evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior
evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the
better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes which its
production would expose and defeat.15 Thus, private respondents’
unexplained and unjustified non-presentation of the record book,
which is the best evidence in its possession and control of the
charges against the petitioner, casts serious doubts on the
factual basis of the charges of absenteeism and tardiness.
We find that private respondents failed to present a single piece

of credible evidence to serve as the basis for their charges
against petitioner and consequently, failed to fulfill their
burden of proving the facts which constitute the just cause for
the dismissal of the petitioner. However, the NLRC ruled that
despite such absence of evidence, there was an admission on the
part of petitioner in her Letter dated August 11, 1994 wherein
she wrote:
_______________
15 IBM, Inc. v. NLRC, supra.
66
66
I am quite surprised why I have incurred 35 absences since August

1993 up to the present. I can only surmise that Saturdays were
not included in my work week at your clinic. If you will please
recall, per agreement with you, my work days at your clinic is
from Monday to Friday without Saturday work. As to my other
supposed absences, I believe that said absences were authorized
and therefore cannot be considered as absences which need not be
explained (sic). It is also extremely difficult to understand why
it is only now that I am charged to explain alleged absences
incurred way back August 1993.16
In reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, public respondent

NLRC relied upon the supposed admission of the petitioner of her
habitual absenteeism and chronic tardiness.
We do not subscribe to the findings of the NLRC that the above

quoted letter of petitioner amounted to an admission of her
alleged absences. As explained by petitioner, her alleged
absences were incurred on Saturdays. According to petitioner,
these should not be considered as absences as there was an
arrangement between her and the private respondents that she
would not be required to work on Saturdays. Private respondents
have failed to deny the existence of this arrangement. Hence, the
decision of the NLRC that private respondent had sufficient
grounds to terminate petitioner as she admitted the charges of
habitual absences has no leg to stand on.
Neither have the private respondents shown by competent evidence

that the petitioner was given any warning or reprimanded for her
alleged absences and tardiness. Private respondents claimed that
they sent several notices to the petitioner warning her of her
absences, however, petitioner refused to receive the same. On
this point, the Labor Arbiter succinctly observed:
The record is bereft of any showing that complainant was ever

warned of her absences prior to her dismissal on August 9, 1994.
The alleged notices of her absences from August 17, until
September 30, 1993, from October until November 27, 1993, from
December 1, 1993 up to February 26, 1994 and the notice dated 31
May 1994 reminding complainant of her five (5) days absences,
four (4) half-days and tardiness for 582
_______________
16 Rollo, p. 105.
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VOL. 362, JULY 31, 2001
67
minutes (Annex “1” to “1-D” attached to respondent’ Rejoinder),

fail to show that the notices were received by the complainant.
The allegation of the respondents that the complainant refused to
received (sic) the same is self-serving and merits scant
consideration. x x x17
The Court, likewise, takes note of the fact that the two-day
period given to petitioner to explain and answer the charges
against her was most unreasonable, considering that she was
charged with several offenses and infractions (35 absences, 23
half-days and 108 tardiness), some of which were allegedly
committed almost a year before, not to mention the fact that the
charges leveled against her lacked particularity.
Apart from chronic absenteeism and habitual tardiness, petitioner

was also made to answer for loitering and wasting of company
time, getting salary of an absent employee without acknowledging
or signing for it and disobedience and insubordination.18 Thus,
the Labor Arbiter found that actually petitioner tried to submit
her explanation on August 11, 1994 or within the two-day period
given her, but private respondents prevented her from doing so by
instructing their staff not to accept complainant’s explanation,
which was the reason why her explanation was submitted a day
later.19
The law mandates that every opportunity and assistance must be

accorded to the employee by the management to enable him to
prepare adequately for his defense.20 In Ruffy v. NLRC,21 the
Court held that what would qualify as sufficient or “ample
opportunity,” as required by law, would be “every kind of
assistance that management must accord to the employee to enable
him to prepare adequately for his defense.” In the case at bar,
private respondents cannot be gainsaid to have given petitioner
the ample opportunity to answer the charges leveled against her.
_______________
17 Id., at 75-76,
18 Rollo, p. 124
19 See note 3.
20 IBM Inc. v. NLRC, supra; Maneja v. National Labor Relations

Commission, supra.
21 182 SCRA 365, 369-370 (1990).
68
68
From the foregoing, there are serious doubts in the evidence on

record as to the factual basis of the charges against petitioner.
These doubts shall be resolved in her favor in line with the
policy under the Labor Code to afford protection to labor and
construe doubts in favor of labor.22 The consistent rule is that
if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer
and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor
of the latter. The employer must affirmatively show rationally
adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable
cause.23 Not having satisfied its burden of proof, we conclude
that the employer dismissed the petitioner without any just
cause. Hence, the termination is illegal.
Having found that the petitioner has been illegally terminated,

she is necessarily entitled to reinstatement to her former
previous position without loss of seniority and the payment of
backwages.24
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the National Labor Relations

Commission, dated November 29, 1996 and the Resolution, dated
February 20, 1997 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated May 15, 1996 REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), C.J., On official leave.
_______________
22 These policies are embodied in Articles 3 and 4 of the Labor

Code, which read:
ART. 3. Declaration of basic policy.—The State shall afford

protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. x x x [Emphasis
supplied].
ART. 4. Construction in favor of labor.—All doubts in the

implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be
resolved in favor of labor.
23 Dizon v. NLRC, 180 SCRA 52 (1989).
24 LABOR CODE, Art. 279.

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VOL. 362, JULY 31, 2001
69
Roble vs. Arbasa
Judgment and resolution set aside, that of the Labor Arbiter

reinstated.
Notes.—The filing by a dismissed employee of a criminal action

for libel during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case does
not constitute forum-shopping. (Equitable Banking Corporation vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 273 SCRA 352 [1997])
The bare, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated denial of an

employee regarding her participation in anomalies does not prove
her innocence nor disprove her alleged guilt—such denial or
failure jto rebut the serious accusations hurled against her
militates against her innocence and strengthens the adverse
averments of the employer. (Nokom vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 336 SCRA 97 [2000])
Absent an express stipulation in the CBA, the phrase “all dis-

putes” should be construed as limited to the areas of conflict
traditionally within the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators,
i.e., disputes relating to contract-interpretation, contract-
implementation, or interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies—illegal termination disputes do not fall
within any of three categories, within a special class of
disputes that are generally within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters by express provision of law.
(Vivero vs. Court of Appeals, 344 SCRA 268 [2000])
——o0o—— Asuncion vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 362

SCRA 56, G.R. No. 129329 July 31, 2001

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56

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED