*

G.R. No. 125303. June 16, 2000.

DANILO LEONARDO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION and REYNALDO’S MARKETING
CORPORATION, ET AL., respondents.
*

G.R. No. 126937. June 16, 2000.

AURELIO FUERTE and DANILO LEONARDO, petitioners, vs.

RAUL T. AQUINO, VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY and ROGELIO
I. RALAYA, as Chairman and Members of the NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION and
REYNALDO’S MARKETING and/or REYNALDO PADUA,
respondents.

Labor Law; Management Prerogatives; Transfers; An employer acts

well within its rights in transferring an employee as it sees fit provided that
there is no demotion in rank or diminution in pay.—FUERTE nonetheless
decries his transfer as being violative of his security of tenure, the clear
implication being that he was constructively dismissed. We have held that
an employer acts well within its rights in transferring an employee as it sees
fit provided that there is no demotion in rank or diminution in pay. The two
circumstances are deemed badges of bad faith, and thus constitutive of
constructive dismissal.
Same; Same; Demotion; Words and Phrases; “Constructive
Dismissal,” Defined; The right to demote an employee also falls within the
category of management prerogatives.—In this regard, constructive
dismissal is defined in the following manner: an involuntary resignation
resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable,
or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when
a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee. Yet here, the transfer was undertaken beyond
the parameters as aforesaid. The instinctive conclusion would be that his
transfer is actually a constructive dismissal, but oddly, private respondent
never denies that it was really demoting FUERTE for cause. It

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.
 590

590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission

should be borne in mind, however, that the right to demote an employee also
falls within the category of management prerogatives.
Same; Same; Same; Productivity Standards; An employer is entitled to
impose productivity standards for its workers, and noncompliance may be
visited with penalty even more severe than demotion.—This arrangement
appears to us to be an allowable exercise of company rights. An employer is
entitled to impose productivity standards for its workers, and in fact, non-
compliance may be visited with a penalty even more severe than demotion.
Thus, [t]he practice of a company in laying off workers because they failed
to make the work quota has been recognized in this jurisdiction. (Philippine
American Embroideries vs. Embroidery and Garment Workers, 26 SCRA
634, 639). In the case at bar, the petitioners’ failure to meet the sales quota
assigned to each of them constitute a just cause of their dismissal, regardless
of the permanent or probationary status of their employment. Failure to
observe prescribed standards of work, or to fulfill reasonable work
assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just cause for dismissal.
Such inefficiency is understood to mean failure to attain work goals or work
quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the allotted reasonable
period, or by producing unsatisfactory results. This management prerogative
of requiring standards may be availed of so long as they are exercised in
good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest.
Same; Abandonment; Requisites.—Neither can we say that FUERTE’s
actions are indicative of abandonment. To constitute such a ground for
dismissal, there must be (1) failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention, as manifested by some
overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship. We have
accordingly held that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, as in this
case, is inconsistent with a charge of abandonment.
Same; Demotions; Due Process; While due process required by law is
applied on dismissals, the same is also applicable to demotions as
demotions likewise affect the employment of a worker whose right to
continued employment, under the same terms and conditions, is also
protected by law.—There remains a question regarding the manner of
demotion. In Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, we ruled that: “Besides,

591
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Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission

even assuming arguendo that there was some basis for the demotion, as
alleged by petitioner, the case records are bereft of any showing that private
respondent was notified in advance of his impending transfer and demotion.
Nor was he given an opportunity to refute the employer’s grounds or
reasons for said transfer and demotion. In Gaco v. National Labor Relations
Commission, it was noted that: “While due process required by law is
applied on dismissals, the same is also applicable to demotions as demotions
likewise affect the employment of a worker whose right to continued
employment, under the same terms and conditions, is also protected by law.
Moreover, considering that demotion is, like dismissal, also a punitive
action, the employee being demoted should as in cases of dismissals, be
given a chance to contest the same.”
Same; Dismissals; Abandonment; Where the employee’s failure to work
was occasioned neither by his abandonment nor by a termination, the
burden of economic loss is not rightfully shifted to the employer—each party
must bear his own loss.—Given that FUERTE may not be deemed to have
abandoned his job, and neither was he constructively dismissed by private
respondent, the Commission did not err in ordering his reinstatement but
without backwages. In a case where the employee’s failure to work was
occasioned neither by his abandonment nor by a termination, the burden of
economic loss is not rightfully shifted to the employer; each party must bear
his own loss.
Same; Due Process; Witnesses; An employee’s refusal to receive a
memorandum asking him to explain the incident cannot negate the fact that
he was accorded due process; It is not for the Supreme Court to re-examine
conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, nor substitute
the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained expertise
in its special field.—LEONARDO protests that he was never accorded due
process. This begs the question, for he was never terminated; he only
became the subject of an investigation in which he was apparently loath to
participate. As testified to by Merlin P. Orallo, the personnel manager, he
was given a memorandum asking him to explain the incident in question,
but he refused to receive it. In an analogous instance, we held that an
employee’s refusal to sign the minutes of an investigation cannot negate the
fact that he was accorded due process. So should it be here. We find no
reason to disturb the Commission’s ruling that LEONARDO had abandoned
his position, the instant case being a

592

592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission

petition for certiorari where questions of fact are not entertained. Whether a
worker has abandoned his employment is essentially a question of fact. We
reiterate that it is not for us “to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate
the credibility of witnesses, nor substitute the findings of fact of an
administrative tribunal which has gained expertise in its special field.”
Certiorari; A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is intended to rectify
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.—In concluding, we feel
that it will not be amiss to point out that a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 is intended to rectify errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
As we held in Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, The well-settled rule confines the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the review of decisions of the
NLRC under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court only to the issue of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the judgment is rendered in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. An abuse of discretion
does not necessarily follow just because there is a reversal by the NLRC of
the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Neither does the mere variance in the
evidentiary assessment of the NLRC and that of the Labor Arbiter would, as
a matter of course, so warrant another full review of the facts. The NLRC’s
decision, so long as it is not bereft of support from the records, deserves
respect from the Court.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner in G.R. No. 125303.
Samuel Padilla for petitioner in G.R. No. 126937.
Ceferino Padua Law Office for private respondents in both
cases.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a consolidation of G.R. Nos. 125303 and 126937, both

petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997

593

VOL. 333, JUNE 16, 2000 593

Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission
1

Rules of Civil
2 Procedure, seeking the annulment of a Decision and
Resolution dated March 28, 1996 and May 29, 1996, respectively,
of the public respondent in NLRC NCR 00-02-01024-92.
The facts are:
 Petitioner AURELIO FUERTE was originally employed by
private respondent REYNALDO’S MARKETING CORPORATION
on August 11, 1981 as a muffler specialist, receiving P45.00 per day.
When he was appointed supervisor in 1988, his compensation was
increased to P122.00 a day, augmented by a weekly supervisor’s
allowance of P600.00. On the other hand, DANILO LEONARDO
was hired by private respondent on March 4, 1988 as an auto-aircon
mechanic at a salary rate of P35.00 per day. His pay was increased to
P90.00 a day when he attained regular status six months later. From
such time until he was allegedly terminated, he claims to have also
received a monthly allowance equal to P2,500.00 as his share in the
profits of the auto-aircon division.
FUERTE alleges that on January 3, 1992, he was instructed to
report at private respondent’s main office where he was informed by
the company’s personnel manager that he would be transferred to its
Sucat plant due to his failure to meet his sales quota, and for that
reason, his supervisor’s allowance would be withdrawn. For a short
time, FUERTE reported for work at the Sucat plant; however, he
protested his transfer, subsequently filing a complaint for illegal
termination.
On his part, LEONARDO alleges that on April 22, 1991, private
respondent was approached by the same personnel manager who
informed him that his services were no longer needed. He, too, filed
a complaint for illegal termination.
The case was heard by Labor Arbiter Jesus N. Rodriguez, Jr. On
December 15, 1994, Labor Arbiter Emerson C. Tumanon, to whom
the case was subsequently assigned, rendered

_______________

1 Record, pp. 707-729.

2 Annex “B” of Petition in G.R. No. 126937, Rollo, p. 42.

594

594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission

judgment in favor 3 of petitioners. The dispositive portion of the

arbiter’s decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby ordered:

1. To reinstate complainant Aurelio Fuerte, to the position he was

holding before the demotion, and to reinstate likewise complainant
Danilo Leogardo to his former position or in lieu thereof, they be
reinstated through payroll reinstatement without any of them losing
 their seniority rights and other privileges, inclusive of allowance
and to their other benefits;
2. To pay AURELIO FUERTE, the sum of TWO HUNDRED
EIGHTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY-SIX PESOS
and 72/100 (P280,896.72);
3. To pay DANILO LEOGARDO, the sum of TWO HUNDRED
FORTY ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHT PESOS and
67/100 (P241,908.67).

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the respondent Commission modified the aforesaid

decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of December 15, 1994 is

hereby modified as follows:

1. Ordering the reinstatement of complainant Aurelio Fuerte to his

former position without loss of his seniority rights but without
backwages;
2. Dismissing the complaint of Danilo Leonardo for lack of merit; and
3. Deleting the rests [sic] of the monetary award as well as the award
of moral damages and attorney’s fees in favor of the complainants
also for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
4

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on April 30, 1996,

which the Commission denied in its Resolution dated May 29, 1996.

_______________

3 Record, pp. 531-545.

4 Record, pp. 732-735.

595

VOL. 333, JUNE 16, 2000 595

Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission

On July 1, 1996, LEONARDO, represented by the Public Attorney’s

Office, filed G.R. No. 125303, a special civil action for certiorari
assailing the Commission’s decision and resolution. However, on
November 15, 1996, FUERTE, again joined by LEONARDO, filed
G.R. No. 126937, a similar action praying for the annulment of the
same decision and resolution. 5

On October 7, 1997, private respondent filed its Comment to the6

petition in G.R. No. 125303. On April 2, 1997, it filed its Comment
to the petition in G.R. No. 126937 with a motion to drop petitioner
LEONARDO and consolidate G.R. No. 126937 with G.R. No.
125303. We granted7 private respondent’s motion in our Resolution
dated June 16, 1997. 8

The petition in G.R. No. 126937 raises the following issues:

I. RESPONDENT COMMISSIONERS GRAVELY ABUSED

THEIR DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY GRANTED
RESPONDENTS APPEAL.
II. RESPONDENT COMMISSIONERS GRAVELY ABUSED
THEIR DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY FOUND
FOR RESPONDENT REYNALDO’S MARKETING
PRONOUNCING THAT THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL DESPITE CONTRARY FINDINGS MADE
BY THE LABOR ARBITER CONTRARY TO LAW AND
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.

Private respondent contends that it never terminated petitioners’

services. In FUERTE’s case, private respondent claims that the latter
was demoted pursuant to a company policy intended to foster
competition among its employees. Under this scheme, private
respondent’s employees are required to comply with a monthly sales
quota. Should a supervisor such as FUERTE fail to meet his quota
for a certain

_______________

5 Rollo of G.R. No. 125303, pp. 73-77.

6 Rollo of G.R. No. 126937, pp. 166-168.
7 Rollo of G.R. No. 126937, pp. 176-a to 176-b.
8 Petition, Rollo, pp. 8-9.

596

596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission

number of consecutive months, he will be demoted, whereupon his

supervisor’s allowance will be withdrawn and be given to the
individual who takes his place. When the employee concerned
succeeds in meeting the quota 9 again, he is re-appointed supervisor
and his allowance is restored.
With regard to LEONARDO, private respondent likewise insists
that it never severed the former’s employment. On the contrary, the
company claims that it was LEONARDO who abandoned his post
following an investigation wherein he was asked to explain an
incident of alleged “sideline” work which occurred on April 22,
1991. It would appear that late in the evening of the day in question,
the driver of a red Corolla arrived at the shop looking for
LEONARDO. The driver said that, as prearranged, he was to pick
up LEONARDO who would perform a private service on the
vehicle. When reports of the “sideline” work reached management,
it confronted LEONARDO and asked for an explanation. According
to private respondent, LEONARDO gave contradictory excuses,
eventually claiming that the unauthorized service was for an aunt.
When pressed to present his aunt, it was then that LEONARDO
stopped reporting for work, filing his complaint for illegal dismissal
some ten months after his alleged termination.
Insofar as the action taken against FUERTE is concerned, private
respondent’s justification is well-illustrated in the record. He was
unable to meet his quota 10 for five months in 1991, from July to
November of that year. Yet he insists that it could not possibly be
so. He argues that he must have met his quota considering that he
received his supervisor’s allowance for the period aforesaid. The
Commission, however, negated this view, finding the alleged
inconsistency to be adequately explained in the record. We quite
agree. As found by the Commission, placing special emphasis on the
reasoning of the labor arbiter—

_______________

9 Exhibit 6, Record, pp. 17-22. TSN, January 25, 1994, pp. 5-23.
10 Exhibit 4, Record, p. 15.

597

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Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission

We find otherwise. Complainant Fuerte’s failure to meet his sales quota

which caused his demotion and the subsequent withdrawal of his allowance
is fully supported by Exhibit “4” of respon-dents’ position paper showing
that his performance for the months of July 1991 to November 1991 is
below par. While it is the policy of the respondent company that an
employee who fails to meet his sales quota for three (3) consecutive months,
he is stripped of his supervisor’s designation and allowance. In the case of
Fuerte, the respondents went beyond the three (3) months period before
withdrawing his allowance. On this basis, the Labor Arbiter sweepingly
concluded that the withdrawal of Fuerte’s allowance is illegal since the
respondents should have withdrawn the same after Fuerte failed to meet his
sales quota for three consecutive months. However, the apparent flaw had
been sufficiently reconciled by the respondents when they state that a
supervisor like Fuerte, continues to receive his allowance until he is
officially stripped of his supervisor’s designation and assigned to another
job as ordinary employee. This is precisely the reason why complainant
Fuerte continued to receive his allowance even beyond the three (3)
consecutive months period to meet his sales quota considering that it was
only on the fifth consecutive months when the respondent company decided
to strip him of his designation as supervisor. This is corroborated by the
“Sinumpaang Salaysay” (Exh. “A”—respondents’ position paper) of some
employees of the respondent company who had been previously demoted
for failure to meet their sales quota when they unformably stated:

“5. Na alam naming kapagka hindi namin maabot and quotang nabanggit na may
ilang buwan, kami’y maaring mademote at kapagka nagkaganoon ang supervisor
allowance sampu ng, may mataas na parte sa profit sharing at winnings ay maalis sa
amin at maibibigay sa hahalili sa amin.

Surprisingly, the Labor Arbiter failed to take into consideration this

material allegations of the respondents in his assailed decision except his
sweeping statement that the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” was purposely done
with malice to justify respondents’ withdrawal of Fuerte’s supervisor’s
allowance, [italics supplied]

FUERTE nonetheless decries his transfer as being violative of his

security of tenure, the clear implication being that he was
constructively dismissed. We have held that an employer acts well
within its rights in transferring an employee as it sees fit provided
that there is no demotion in rank or diminu-

598

598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission
11

tion in pay. The two circumstances are deemed badges of bad faith,
and thus constitutive of constructive dismissal. In this regard,
constructive dismissal is defined in the following manner:

an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes

impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or
diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, 12insensibility or disdain by
an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.

Yet here, the transfer was undertaken beyond the parameters as

aforesaid. The instinctive conclusion would be that his transfer is
actually a constructive dismissal, but oddly, private respondent never
denies that it was really demoting FUERTE for cause. It should be
borne in mind, however, that the right to demote an 13employee also
falls within the category of management prerogatives.
This arrangement appears to us to be an allowable exercise of
company rights. An employer is entitled to impose productivity
standards for its workers, and in fact, non-compliance may be visited
with a penalty even more severe than demotion. Thus,

[t]he practice of a company in laying off workers because they failed to

make the work quota has been recognized in this jurisdiction. (Philippine
American Embroideries vs. Embroidery and Garment Workers, 26 SCRA
634, 639). In the case at bar, the petitioners’ failure to meet the sales quota
assigned to each of them constitute a just cause of their dismissal, regardless
of the permanent or probationary status of their employment. Failure to
observe prescribed standards of work, or to fulfill reasonable work
assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just cause for dismissal.
Such

_______________

11 Asis. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 252 SCRA 379, 384 (1996).
12 Escobin v. National Labor Relations Commission, 289 SCRA 48, 72 (1998).
13 See Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 175 SCRA 450,
456 (1989).

599

VOL. 333, JUNE 16, 2000 599

Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission

inefficiency is understood to mean failure to attain work goals or work

quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the allotted reasonable
period, or by producing unsatisfactory results. This management prerogative
of requiring standards may be availed of so long as they 14 are exercised in

good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest.

Neither can we say that FUERTE’s actions are indicative of

abandonment. To constitute such a ground for dismissal, there must
be (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention, as manifested
15 by some

overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship. We have

accordingly held that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal,
16

as in this case, is inconsistent with a charge of abandonment.

There remains a question regarding the manner of demotion. In
Jarcia Machine Shop 17 and Auto Supply, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, we ruled that:

“Besides, even assuming arguendo that there was some basis for the
demotion, as alleged by petitioner, the case records are bereft of any
showing that private respondent was notified in advance of his impending
transfer and demotion. Nor was he given an opportunity to refute the
employer’s grounds or reasons for said transfer and demotion. In Gaco v.
National Labor Relations Commission, it was noted that:
“While due process required by law is applied on dismissals, the same is also
applicable to demotions as demotions

_______________

14 Buiser v. Leogardo, Jr., 131 SCRA 151, 158 (1984).

15 Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 285 SCRA 297, 308
(1998); Pure Blue Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 271 SCRA 259,
264 (1997).
16 Trendline Employees Association-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 272 SCRA 172, 177 (1997); Bontia v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 255 SCRA 167, 177 (1996); Jackson Building Condominium Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 246 SCRA 329, 332 (1995).
17 266 SCRA 97, 109-110 (1997).

600

600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission

likewise affect the employment of a worker whose right to continued employment,

under the same terms and conditions, is also protected by law. Moreover, considering
that demotion is, like dismissal, also a punitive action, the employee being demoted
should as in cases of dismissals, be given a chance to contest the same.”

After reviewing the record, we are sufficiently persuaded that

private respondent had offered
18 substantial proof of compliance with
this procedural requisite.
Accordingly, given that FUERTE may not be deemed to have
abandoned his job, and neither was he constructively dismissed by
private respondent, the Commission did not err in ordering his
reinstatement but without backwages. In a case where the
employee’s failure to work was occasioned neither by his
abandonment nor by a termination, the burden of economic loss is
not rightfully
19 shifted to the employer; each party must bear his own
loss.
Neither do we discern any grave abuse of discretion in the
Commission’s ruling dismissing LEONARDO’S complaint. On this
score, the public respondent found that:

Coming now to the case of complainant Danilo Leonardo, the evidence on

record indubitably shows that he abandoned his work with the respondents.
As sufficiently established by respondents, complainant Leonardo, after
being pressed by the respondent company to present the customer regarding
his unauthorized solicitation of sideline work from the latter and whom he
claims to be his aunt, he never reported back to work anymore. This finding
is bolstered by the fact that after he left the respondent company, he got
employed with Dennis Motors Corporation as Air-Con Mechanic from
October 12, 1992 to April 3, 1995 (Certification attached to respondents’
Manifestation filed June 5, 1996).

_______________

18 TSN, July 15, 1993, p. 34; TSN, November 15, 1993, pp. 10-16.
19 Chong Guan Trading v. National Labor Relations Commission, 172 SCRA 831,
843-844 (1989).

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VOL. 333, JUNE 16, 2000 601

Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission

It must be stressed that while Leonardo alleges that he was illegally

dismissed from his employment by the respondents, surprisingly, he never
stated any reason why the respondents would want to ease him out from his
job. Moreover, why did it take him ten (10) long months to file his case if
indeed he was aggrieved by respondents. All the above facts clearly point
that the filing of his case is a mere afterthought on the part of complainant
Leonardo. In the case of Flexo Mfg. Corp. vs. NLRC, et. al., 135 SCRA
145, the Supreme Court held, thus:

“For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there

must be a delibarate [sic] unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment. This refusal must be clearly shown, mere absence is not sufficient, it
must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fatcs [sic] that the
employee simply does not want to work anymore.”

LEONARDO protests that he was never accorded 20 due process. This

begs the question, for he was never terminated; he only became the
subject of an investigation in which he was apparently loath to
participate. As testified to by Merlin21 P. Orallo, the personnel
manager, he was given a memorandum asking him 22 to explain the
incident in question, but he refused to receive it. In an analogous
instance, we held that an employee’s refusal to sign the minutes of
an investigation
23 cannot negate the fact that he was accorded due
process. So should it be here. We find no reason to disturb the
Commission’s ruling that LEONARDO had abandoned his position,
the instant case being
24 a petition for certiorari where questions of fact

are not entertained. Whether a worker has abandoned

_______________

20 TSN, July 15, 1993, p. 49.

21 Exhibit 3, Record, p. 274.
22 TSN, July 15, 1993, p. 52.
23 Pizza Hut/Progressive Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 252 SCRA 531, 536 (1996).
 24 Premiere Development Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission, 293
SCRA 49, 60 (1998); Suarez v. National Labor Relations Commission, 293 SCRA
496, 502 (1998).

602

602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission
25

his employment is essentially a question of fact. We reiterate that it

is not for us “to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, nor substitute the findings of fact of an
administrative
26 tribunal which has gained expertise in its special
field.”
In concluding, we feel that it will not be amiss to point out that a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is intended to rectify errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. As we held in Philippine
Advertising 27Counselors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,

The well-settled rule confines the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in the review of decisions of the NLRC under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court only to the issue of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is
committed when the judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner. An abuse of discretion does not necessarily
follow just because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Neither does the mere variance in the evidentiary assessment
of the NLRC and that of the Labor Arbiter would, as a matter of course, so
warrant another full review of the facts. The NLRC’s decision, so long as it
is not bereft of support from the records, deserves respect from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari in G.R. Nos. 125303 and

126937 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Decision dated March 28, 1998 and the Resolution dated
May 29, 1996 of public respondents is AFFIRMED in toto. No
pronouncement as to costs.

_______________

25 General Textile, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 243 SCRA 232,
235 (1995).
26 Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
288 SCRA 585, (1998).
27 263 SCRA 395, 400-401 (1996).

603
 VOL. 333, JUNE 16, 2000 603
Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena,

JJ., concur.

Petitions in GR. Nos. 125303 and 127937 dismissed, while

judgment of March 28, 1998 and resolution of May 29, 1998
affirmed in toto.

Notes.—The right to transfer employees from one office to

another—provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of
salary, benefits and other privileges—is judicially recognized as a
prerogative inherent in the employer’s right to effectively control
and manage the enterprise. (Escobin vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 289 SCRA 48 [1998])
While due process required by law is applied in dismissals, the
same is also applicable to demotions as demotions likewise affect
the employment of a worker whose right to continued employment,
under the same terms and conditions, is also protected by law. (Blue
Dairy Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 314
SCRA 401 [1999])
Constructive dismissal or a constructive discharge has been
defined as a quitting because continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a
demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. (Mark Roche
International vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 313 SCRA
356 [1999])

——o0o——

604

604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Arlalejo

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