Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) : Fundamental Principles of The Metaphysics of Morals

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals
Part I
Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former

represent the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed (or
at least which one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which
represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e. as objectively
necessary.
Since every practical law represents a possible action as good, and on this account, for a
subject who is practically determinable by reason, necessary, all imperatives are formulæ
determining an action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good in some
respects. If now the action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is
hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the
principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical.
There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only on that maxim
whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of them into duties to
ourselves and to others, and into perfect and imperfect duties.
1. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in
possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to
himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a
universal law of nature. His maxim is: From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life
when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction. It is asked then simply
whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at
once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very
feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself, and
therefore could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a
universal law of nature, and consequently would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme
principle of all duty.
2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able
to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to him, unless he promises stoutly to repay it in
a definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask
himself: Is it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?
Suppose however that he resolves to do so, then the maxim of his action would be expressed
thus: When I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it,
although I know that I never can do so. Now this principle of self-love or of one’s own
advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the question now is, Is it
right? I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the question thus:
How would it be if my maxim were a universal law? Then I see at once that it could never hold
as a universal law of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a
universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise
whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would
become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would
consider that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain
pretences.
3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a useful
man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances, and prefers to indulge
in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He
asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his
inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of
nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders)
should let their talents rust, and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and
propagation of their species—in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this
should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a
rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him, and have
been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.
4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with great
wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be
as happy as heaven pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even
envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!
Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well
subsist, and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-
will, or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but on the other side, also cheats
when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible
that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will
that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which
resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would
have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung
from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.

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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals

Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former

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