A.

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal
spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his
Republic of the Philippines second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
SUPREME COURT conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or
Manila less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be
liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
THIRD DIVISION
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
G.R. No. 133743             February 6, 2007 children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters
vs. of administration should have been filed in the Province of
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior
to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
x ---------------------------------------------------- x personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee.
G.R. No. 134029             February 6, 2007
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the
vs. petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
LUIS, Respondent.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent
DECISION filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted
documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP.
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of
Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying
the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Romillo, Jr. 14

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6 the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as
widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the
petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad
motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was
Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no
resolution of said motion.
children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,
1992. Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion
for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
on which it was based.
On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an
Branch 146 thereof. Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-
raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that,
at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to
Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of
venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a
May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the bigamous marriage.
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner
Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for
20, 25 1995, respectively. the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident
of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant
ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the granted. 36
decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to
Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be administration was improperly laid because at the time of his
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They
of Felicisimo’s legitimate children. contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They
denied. 28 claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given
time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed Laguna.
and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of
which states: Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to
Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively
January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the
the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no
the trial court for further proceedings. 29 legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid,
Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, subject petition for letters of administration.
refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from
legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo The petition lacks merit.
discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition
administration was properly filed in Makati City. for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should
be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v.
capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, determining the residence – as contradistinguished from
Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by the settlement of his estate:
virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under [T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence"
paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus – "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application
Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute
sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected.
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
though; however, the residence must be more than acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs.
and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a
distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws "The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond
and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the
election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus
which when absent, one has the intention of severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and marriage."
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have
his residence in one place and domicile in another.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to
was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine property. 53
Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period
August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo
at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court
also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the
Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform
Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the her marital duties and obligations. It held:
deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. private respondent and still subject to a wife's
Cruz, Laguna." obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial should not be discriminated against in her own country if
Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17,
1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-
branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien
Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against
Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the
was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses
from each other,  hence the actuations of one would not affect
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to or cast obloquy on the other." 56
file the petition for letters of administration, we must first
resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse,
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was the ruling in Van Dorn  applies. 58 Although decided on
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained
effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative. limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be
denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn  stating that "if the foreigner obtains a commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to productive of any good to the society where one is considered
remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the released from the marital bond while the other remains bound
Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains
Article 26. 61 a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this
case.
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical
background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in
26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit: stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as
Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s
Brief Historical Background rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family
Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states: But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
38. intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws
it now provides: that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in
a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), balance between the word and the will, that justice may be
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. done even as the law is obeyed.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the literal command without regard to its cause and
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied) the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes
again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
x x x x them."
Legislative Intent
xxxx
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as
to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due."
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
Dorn  case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen justice. 69
and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
added) with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It
held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a
its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive writing or document may be proven as a public or official
of no possible good to the community, relief in some way record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the regime under this provision as follows:
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
his office. 71 applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their presumed to be equal.
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia,  however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of xxxx
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry essential. x x x
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength
of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of opponent’s defense. x x x 81
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal
in part: capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an 148 of the Family Code.
interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28,
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75 AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by
virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not
denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce
and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her
marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint
labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie  presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-
owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the

divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be
Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
property relations of couples living together as husband and
wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
Republic of the Philippines Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should
SUPREME COURT have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In
Manila addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to
SECOND DIVISION be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

G.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013 In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the
issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby
MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners, discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s
vs. last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no
DECISION showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as
administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the
PEREZ, J.: decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner,
Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28
November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589, 1 the decretal the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of
portion of which states: Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of
the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and
DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting
the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to
Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2 the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of
Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the
The Facts decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein
respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The Issues
The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-
Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was
joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer). Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A
RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS
a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional PIÑAS;
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed
as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural
child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON
Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO
Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE
Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as OF ADMINISTRATION.12
her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left
real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties The Court’s Ruling
worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo
and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate. We find the petition bereft of merit.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be
opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted the time of his death:
that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident
of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally.
Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code,
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms,
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from voidable marriages, to wit:
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied). Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after
the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather interested party may attack a void marriage.24
than domicile is the significant factor. 13 Even where the statute
uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no
and not domicile in the technical sense. 14 Some cases make a marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights,
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly
as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
"inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose
abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s
stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage
thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the
means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
consistency.19 spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of
the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the extinguish such cause of action.
venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly
laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during
his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s
5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or
the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city. not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being
bigamous.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the
petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence
he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was
should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of
be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the
his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in
courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent
Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as evidence of marriage and the certification from the National
husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists
1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein.
Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a
ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. 20 That record of marriage can no longer be found in the National
Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote.
before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such
that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s
and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that
submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’
must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21 contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition
for Letters of Administration.
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court
of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as
void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s
letters of administration, thus: estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. —
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc
AFFIRMED in toto.
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may

be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow,
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing

to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a

petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A

petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs,

and the names and residences of the creditors, of the
decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property

of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of

administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of

letters of administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would

be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose
relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to
share in the estate as distributees.28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to

be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to
be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on
record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate
attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court
of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is
founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law,
Republic of the Philippines to receive and enter into possession those parts of the estate
SUPREME COURT individually awarded to them.
Manila
On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the
SECOND DIVISION petition for initial hearing and directing Eduardo to cause its
publication.
G.R. No. 177099               June 8, 2011
On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment,
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, generally admitting the allegations in the petition, and
vs. conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA administrator.
AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO
DAGORO, Respondents. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They
alleged that the two subject lots belong to the conjugal
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death
in April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the
subject properties. They said that their residence was built with
G.R. No. 177192 the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the
expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant)
vs. was built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA partner. They opposed the appointment of Eduardo as
AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically
DAGORO, Respondents. and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots is minimal;
and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed
DECISION that the best interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be
appointed as special or regular administrator.

NACHURA, J.:
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing
Eduardo as regular administrator of Joaquin’s estate.
Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari Consequently, it issued him letters of administration.
of petitioners Sebastian G. Agtarap (Sebastian)1 and Eduardo
G. Agtarap (Eduardo),2 assailing the Decision dated November
21, 20063 and the Resolution dated March 27, 20074 of the On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73916. intervention, alleging that Mercedes is survived not only by her
daughter Cecile, but also by him as her husband. He also
averred that there is a need to appoint a special administrator
The antecedent facts and proceedings— to the estate, but claimed that Eduardo is not the person best
qualified for the task.
On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 114, Pasay City, a verified petition for the After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to
judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin submit their respective proposed projects of partition, the RTC,
Agtarap (Joaquin). It was docketed as Special Proceedings on October 23, 2000, issued an Order of Partition, 8 with the
No. 94-4055. following disposition—

The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November In the light of the filing by the heirs of their respective proposed
21, 1964 in Pasay City without any known debts or obligations. projects of partition and the payment of inheritance taxes due
During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with the estate as early as 1965, and there being no claim in Court
Lucia Garcia (Lucia),5 and second with Caridad Garcia against the estate of the deceased, the estate of JOAQUIN
(Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin and Lucia had AGTARAP is now consequently – ripe – for distribution among
three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose the heirs minus the surviving spouse Caridad Garcia who died
(survived by three children, namely, Gloria, 6 Joseph, and on August 25, 1999.
Teresa7). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926. They
also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes
(survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time of his death, Considering that the bulk of the estate property were acquired
Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay during the existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873- No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face
(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had that decedent was married to Caridad Garcia, which fact
been leasing and improving the said realties and had been oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other than their
appropriating for himself ₱26,000.00 per month since April negative allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce
1994. accounted by the second marriage and the compulsory heirs
thereunder.

Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to

appoint him as special administrator to take possession and The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true and just
charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the accounting of his administration from his date of assumption
appointment of a regular administrator. In addition, he prayed up to the year ending December 31, 1996 per Financial and
that an order be issued (a) confirming and declaring the Accounting Report dated June 2, 1997 which was approved by
named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be entitled to the Court. The accounting report included the income earned
participate in the estate; (b) apportioning and allocating unto and received for the period and the expenses incurred in the
the named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in administration, sustenance and allowance of the widow. In
accordance with law; and (c) entitling the distributees the right accordance with said Financial and Accounting Report which
was duly approved by this Court in its Resolution dated July
3) MERCEDES (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.3
28, 1998 – the deceased JOAQUIN AGTARAP left real
properties consisting of the following:
4) SEBASTIAN - ₱1,181,548.3

I LAND: 5) EDUARDO - ₱1,181,548.3

Two lots and two buildings with one garage quarter located at 6) CARIDAD - ₱1,181,548.3
#3030 Agtarap St., Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title Nos. 38254 and 38255 and registered with the Registry
The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the
of Deeds of Pasay City, Metro Manila, described as follows:
amount of ₱1,181,548.30 and who died in 1996 will go to
Teresa Agtarap and Joseph Agtarap, Walter de Santos and
LO half brothers Eduardo and Sebastian Agtarap in equal
TCT T AREA/ ZONAL proportions.
AMOUNT
NO. NO SQ.M. VALUE
.
TERESA AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66
3825 745 1,335 sq. ₱5,000. ₱6,675,000.
JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66
4 -B- m. 00 00
1
WALTER DE SANTOS - ₱236,291.66
3825 745 1,331 sq. ₱5,000. ₱6,655,000.
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66
5 -B- m. 00 00
2
EDUARDO AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66
TOTAL-------------------------------------- ₱13,330,000
----------------------- .00 Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as
follows:
II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS:
COMPULSORY HEIRS:

BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1)

₱350,000.00 1) GLORIA – (deceased) – represented by Walter de Santos –
------------------------------

BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) 320,000.00 - ₱295,364.57

-----------------------------
2) JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57
Building Improvements 97,500.00
-------------------------------------- 3) TERESA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57

Restaurant 80,000.00 4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57

-------------------------------------------
-----------
Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit ₱295,364.57.
TOTAL ₱847,500.00
------------------------------------------- Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs
-------------- of the first marriage stand to receive the total amount of:

TOTAL NET WORTH ₱14,177,500.00 HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:

-----------------------------------------
1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the late 1) JOSEPH ₱236,291.66 – share from
JOAQUIN AGTARAP with a total value of ₱14,177,500.00, AGTARAP - Milagros Agtarap
together with whatever interest from bank deposits and all
other incomes or increments thereof accruing after the
Accounting Report of December 31, 1996, after deducting ₱295,364.57 – as
therefrom the compensation of the administrator and other compulsory heir of
expenses allowed by the Court, are hereby ordered distributed
as follows: ₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

2) TERESA ₱236,291.66 – share from

TOTAL ESTATE – ₱14,177,500.00
AGTARAP - Milagros Agtarap

CARIDAD AGTARAP – ½ of the estate as her conjugal share

₱295,364.57 – as
– ₱7,088,750.00, the other half of ₱7,088,750.00 – to be
compulsory heir of
divided among the compulsory heirs as follows:

₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

1) JOSE (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30
3) WALTER DE ₱236,291.66 – share from
2) MILAGROS (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30 SANTOS - Milagros Agtarap
 ₱5,522,854.0 y heir
₱295,364.57 – as 6 – share
compulsory heir of from
Milagros
₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
SO ORDERED.9
HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed
their respective motions for reconsideration.
a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999
On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution 10 denying
₱7,088,750.00 - as conjugal the motions for reconsideration of Eduardo and Sebastian, and
share granting that of Joseph and Teresa. It also declared that the
real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of
₱1,181,458.30 - as Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification of the
compulsory October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct
heir sharing of the heirs. However, before the RTC could issue a
new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed
Total of ₱8,270,208.30 to the CA.
b) SEBASTIAN ₱1,181,458.38 – as
AGTARAP - compulsory On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the
heir dispositive portion of which reads—

₱ 236,291.66 – share from WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are
Milagros DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated
August 27, 2001 is AFFIRMED and pursuant thereto, the
c) EDUARDO ₱1,181,458.38 – as subject properties (Lot No. 745-B-1 [TCT No. 38254] and Lot
AGTARAP - compulsory No. 745-B-2 [TCT No. 38255]) and the estate of the late
heir Joaquin Agtarap are hereby partitioned as follows:

₱ 236,291.66 – share from

The two (2) properties, together with their improvements,
Milagros
embraced by TCT No. 38254 and TCT No. 38255,
respectively, are first to be distributed among the following:
d) MERCEDES as represented by Abelardo
- Dagoro as the
surviving spouse of a Lucia Mendietta - ½ of the property. But since she is
compulsory heir deceased, her share shall be inherited by Joaquin, Jesus,
Milagros and Jose in equal shares.
₱1,181,458.38
Joaquin Agtarap - ½ of the property and ¼ of the other half of
the property which pertains to Lucia Mendietta’s share.
REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP:

Jesus Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since he is

1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP already deceased (and died without issue), his inheritance
shall, in turn, be acquired by Joaquin Agtarap.
2) EDUARDO AGTARAP
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Milagros Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since she
Agtarap) died in 1996 without issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be
inherited by Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de
In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and
stand to inherit: Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of Milagros’ brother Jose
Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by Mercedes
(represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
SEBASTIA ₱4,135,104.1 – share daughter Cecile), Sebastian Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
N– 0 from
₱1,181,458.3 Caridad
Jose Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since he died
0 Garcia
in 1967, his inheritance shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla,
₱ 236,291.66 - as
and children Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de
compulsor
Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and
₱5,522,854.0 y heir
Teresa in equal shares.
6 - share
from
Milagros Then, Joaquin Agtarap’s estate, comprising three-fourths (3/4)
of the subject properties and its improvements, shall be
EDUARDO ₱4,135,104.1 – share distributed as follows:
– 0 from
₱1,181,458.3 Caridad Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1999,
0 Garcia her share shall be inherited by her children namely Mercedes
₱ 236,291.66 – as Agtarap (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and
compulsor
her daughter Cecilia), Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF PASAY
in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN
AGTARAP MARRIED TO LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA
Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR REGISTRATION UNDER
1996 without issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by THEIR EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AS
Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP,
daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in CASADO CON CARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER EXISTING
representation of Milagros’ brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each JURISPRUDENCE, THE PROBATE COURT HAS NO
shall be inherited by Mercedes (represented by her husband POWER TO DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE
Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile), Sebastian and PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE CERTIFICATES OF
Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap. TITLE WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN AN
APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION FOR A TORRENS
TITLE UNDER THE LAW IS ENDOWED WITH
Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died in 1967, his INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN
inheritance shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children THE MANNER INDICATED IN THE LAW ITSELF.14
Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her
daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap in
equal shares. As regards his first and second assignments of error,
Sebastian contends that Joseph and Teresa failed to establish
by competent evidence that they are the legitimate heirs of
Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in their father Jose, and thus of their grandfather Joaquin. He
1984, her inheritance shall be acquired by her husband draws attention to the certificate of title (TCT No. 8026) they
Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile in equal shares. submitted, stating that the wife of their father Jose is
Presentacion Garcia, while they claim that their mother is
Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. Priscilla. He avers that the marriage contracts proffered by
Joseph and Teresa do not qualify as the best evidence of
Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. Jose’s marriage with Priscilla, inasmuch as they were not
authenticated and formally offered in evidence. Sebastian also
asseverates that he actually questioned the legitimacy of
SO ORDERED.11 Joseph and Teresa as heirs of Joaquin in his motion to
exclude them as heirs, and in his reply to their opposition to
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective the said motion. He further claims that the failure of Abelardo
motions for reconsideration. Dagoro and Walter de Santos to oppose his motion to exclude
them as heirs had the effect of admitting the allegations
therein. He points out that his motion was denied by the RTC
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both
without a hearing.
motions. Hence, these petitions ascribing to the appellate court
the following errors:
With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian maintains
that the certificates of title of real estate properties subject of
G.R. No. 177192
the controversy are in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to
Caridad Garcia, and as such are conclusive proof of their
1. – The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the ownership thereof, and thus, they are not subject to collateral
aforementioned important facts12 which alter its attack, but should be threshed out in a separate proceeding for
Decision; that purpose. He likewise argues that estoppel applies against
the children of the first marriage, since none of them registered
2. – The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the any objection to the issuance of the TCTs in the name of
necessity of hearing the issue of legitimacy of Caridad and Joaquin only. He avers that the estate must have
respondents as heirs; already been settled in light of the payment of the estate and
inheritance tax by Milagros, Joseph, and Teresa, resulting to
the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in Milagros’ name and of TCT
3. – The Court of Appeals erred in allowing violation
No. 8026 in the names of Milagros and Jose. He also alleges
of the law and in not applying the doctrines of
that res judicata is applicable as the court order directing the
collateral attack, estoppel, and res judicata.13
deletion of the name of Lucia, and replacing it with the name of
Caridad, in the TCTs had long become final and executory.
G.R. No. 177099
In his own petition, with respect to his first assignment of error,
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) Eduardo alleges that the CA erroneously settled, together with
DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE OF the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia,
MILAGROS G. AGTARAP AND ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in contravention
HER INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF JOAQUIN of the principle of settling only one estate in one proceeding.
AGTARAP NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF HER He particularly questions the distribution of the estate of
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE Milagros in the intestate proceedings despite the fact that a
DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE OF TESTATE proceeding was conducted in another court for the probate of
PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share
that she would receive from Joaquin’s estate. He states that
II. this violated the rule on precedence of testate over intestate
proceedings.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION)
ERRED IN DISMISSING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo contends that
FOR LACK OF MERIT AND IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED the CA gravely erred when it affirmed that the bulk of the
RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE LOWER realties subject of this case belong to the first marriage of
COURT HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title
COVERED BY TCT NO. 38254 AND TCT (NO.) 38255 OF were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con
("married to") Caridad Garcia. According to him, the RTC, BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero casado con
acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, was not Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Lucia Garcia Mendietta
vested with the power and authority to determine questions of (FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the
ownership, which properly belongs to another court with first married to Emilia Muscat, and the second married to Lucia
general jurisdiction. Garcia Mendietta).21 When TCT No. 5239 was divided between
Francisco Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the
The Court’s Ruling name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta,
was issued for a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 745 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case No. 23, G.L.R.O.
As to Sebastian’s and Eduardo’s common issue on the Cadastral Record No. 1368, consisting of 8,872 square
ownership of the subject real properties, we hold that the RTC, meters. This same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577
as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same. (32184)22 issued on April 23, 1937, also in the name of
Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either
as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on
having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of April 24, 1924, and subsequently, on February 9, 1926,
the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the Joaquin married Caridad. It is worthy to note that TCT No.
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the 5577 (32184) contained an annotation, which reads—
proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such
court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction.16 As
held in several cases,17 a probate court or one in charge of Ap-4966 – NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de
estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot titulo, tal como aparece, tanchando las palabras "con Lucia
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part Garcia Mendiet[t]a" y poniendo en su lugar, entre lineas y en
of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside tinta encarnada, las palabras "en segundas nupcias con
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the Caridad Garcia", en complimiento de un orden de fecha 28 de
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his abril de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto de la Costa, juez del
estate. All that the said court could do as regards said Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente
properties is to determine whether or not they should be cadastal No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 1368; copia de
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by cual orden has sido presentada con el No. 4966 del Libro
the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo T-No. 32184.
problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and
the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.23
a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination
of the conflicting claims of title. Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la
Costa, presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified the phrase con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and
by expediency and convenience. replaced by en segundas nuptias con Caridad Garcia, referring
to the second marriage of Joaquin to Caridad. It cannot be
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of Caridad’s
intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon her demise, already left,
exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without as her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal share in TCT No. 32184.
prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate Lucia’s share in the property covered by the said TCT was
action.18 Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the carried over to the properties covered by the certificates of title
estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255.
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the And as found by both the RTC and the CA, Lucia was survived
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, by her compulsory heirs – Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.
then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership.19 Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when
or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the
such as the determination of the status of each heir and wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the
property of the deceased spouse.20 testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if
both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.
case considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the
that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal
of the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In fact,
whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to should Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement proceeding
the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should be
Joaquin.1auuphi1 consolidated with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being
Lucia’s spouse.24 Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the
estate of Lucia, with respect to the properties covered by TCT
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of this case, to her compulsory
petition for judicial settlement of Joaquin’s estate, he alleged heirs.
that the subject properties were owned by Joaquin and
Caridad since the TCTs state that the lots were registered in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia. He Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found
also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to contracting by the RTC and the CA, the claim of Sebastian and Eduardo
marriage with Caridad, contracted a first marriage with Lucia. that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 conclusively show that the
Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were owners of the properties covered therein were Joaquin and
able to present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and Caridad by virtue of the registration in the name of Joaquin
38255 were derived from a mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves
March 17, 1920, in the name of FRANCISCO VICTOR scant consideration. This cannot be said to be a collateral
attack on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a
certificate of title is not necessarily conclusive of a holder’s true 18, 1995.31 The CA also noted that, during the hearing of the
ownership of property.25 A certificate of title under the Torrens motion to intervene on October 18, 1995, Sebastian and
system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an Eduardo did not interpose any objection when the intervention
instrument for the deprivation of ownership.26 Thus, the fact was submitted to the RTC for resolution.32
that the properties were registered in the name of Joaquin
Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no
the properties were acquired during the spouses’ compelling reason to hold that both courts erred in ruling that
coverture.27 The phrase "married to Caridad Garcia" in the Joseph, Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro
TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as the rightfully participated in the estate of Joaquin. It was incumbent
registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the upon Sebastian to present competent evidence to refute his
realties are their conjugal properties.28 and Eduardo’s admissions that Joseph and Teresa were heirs
of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object
Neither can Sebastian’s claim that Joaquin’s estate could have to the participation of Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro.
already been settled in 1965 after the payment of the Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do so. Nevertheless, Walter
inheritance tax be upheld. Payment of the inheritance tax, per de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to participate in
se, does not settle the estate of a deceased person. As the estate in representation of the Joaquin’s compulsory heirs,
provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court— Gloria and Mercedes, respectively.33

SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. -- This Court also differs from Eduardo’s asseveration that the
When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of CA erred in settling, together with Joaquin’s estate, the
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance respective estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, Gloria. A perusal of the November 21, 2006 CA Decision
have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or would readily show that the disposition of the properties
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after related only to the settlement of the estate of Joaquin.
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as cited
the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the above, the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well as their
persons may demand and recover their respective shares from respective shares after the payment of the obligations of the
the executor or administrator, or any other person having the estate, as enumerated in the said provision. The inclusion of
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria in the distribution of
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or the shares was merely a necessary consequence of the
as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled settlement of Joaquin’s estate, they being his legal heirs.
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
in ordinary cases. However, we agree with Eduardo’s position that the CA erred
in distributing Joaquin’s estate pertinent to the share allotted in
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the favor of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a separate
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, proceeding was instituted for the probate of the will allegedly
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum executed by Milagros before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay
to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said City.34 While there has been no showing that the alleged will of
obligations within such time as the court directs. Milagros, bequeathing all of her share from Joaquin’s estate in
favor of Eduardo, has already been probated and approved,
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only prudence dictates that this Court refrain from distributing
after the payment of the debts of the estate, funeral charges, Milagros’ share in Joaquin’s estate.
expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax. The records of these cases do not show that It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January 15,
these were complied with in 1965. 2010, per his Certificate of Death.35 He is survived by his wife
Teresita B. Agtarap (Teresita) and his children Joaquin Julian
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of B. Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio (Ana
Joseph and Teresa, suffice it to say that both the RTC and the Ma.).
CA found them to be the legitimate children of Jose. The RTC
found that Sebastian did not present clear and convincing Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November
evidence to support his averments in his motion to exclude 21, 2006 Decision and the March 27, 2007 Resolution of the
them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative allegations. CA should be affirmed with modifications such that the share
The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and Teresa being the of Milagros shall not yet be distributed until after the final
children of Jose was never questioned by Sebastian and determination of the probate of her purported will, and that
Eduardo, and the latter two even admitted this in their Sebastian shall be represented by his compulsory heirs.
petitions, as well as in the stipulation of facts in the August 21,
1995 hearing.29 Furthermore, the CA affirmed this finding of WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is DENIED for
fact in its November 21, 2006 Decision.30 lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No. 177099 is
PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that the Decision dated
Also, Sebastian’s insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter November 21, 2006 and the Resolution dated March 27, 2007
de Santos are not heirs to the estate of Joaquin cannot be of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the following
sustained. Per its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the RTC MODIFICATIONS: that the share awarded in favor of Milagros
found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died on May 4, 1995, and Agtarap shall not be distributed until the final determination of
was later substituted in the proceedings below by her husband the probate of her will, and that petitioner Sebastian G.
Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with Walter de Agtarap, in view of his demise on January 15, 2010, shall be
Santos, Georgina Samantha de Santos. The RTC likewise represented by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap and his children
noted that, on September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.
motion for leave of court to intervene, alleging that he is the
surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the father of Cecilia These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court,
Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in intervention. The RTC later Branch 114, Pasay City, for further proceedings in the
granted the motion, thereby admitting his answer on October
settlement of the estate of Joaquin Agtarap. No In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation
pronouncement as to costs. against his wife, charging her among others with infidelity. The
trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the
marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on the finding that:

Republic of the Philippines From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was
SUPREME COURT confined in the Veterans memorial Hospital. Although at the
Manila time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the
patient was already out of the hospital, he continued to be
under observation and treatment.
SECOND SPECIAL DIVISION
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs
G.R. No. 183053               October 10, 2012 mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made
themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed
vs. under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent. subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of
adequate understanding of right and wrong.
RESOLUTION
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties
PEREZ, J.: was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental
illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity
of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much- provides:
stretched imbroglio over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute as
in Inter Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace the decision. Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage:

Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent

Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our xxxx
Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing
the issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner (3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party,
Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent. The after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
dispositive portion thereof reads: husband or wife.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and defendant knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and
SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to
petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in indication of schizophernia (sic).4
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren,
make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Federico and Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same
milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in
legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their prayer for one hour a
the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to
dispatch. No costs.3 thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent
Isabel’s testimony in court that her grandparents’ visits caused
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the her and her siblings stress and anxiety.5
parties.
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died death, Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio
intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, III and Nenita.
Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three
legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the
and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the
III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate
(Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.
Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed
reared from infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. administrator of the decedent’s estate; (2) as part owner of the
Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be
Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel accorded preference in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel
Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s parents, Emilio and her siblings had been alienated from their grandparents
I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in
paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic relations the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other
cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the
against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted. death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal
properties, and thus, is better situated to protect the integrity of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be
the decedent’s estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of
stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s Two Hundred Thousand (₱ 200,000.00) Pesos.7
allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of
usurpers is untrue. As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed
and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving
administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of weight to his interest in Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-
representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an administration between Emilio III and
illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s
parents’ marriage being declared null and void. However, in Isabel, we considered that:
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that
Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable
marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent,
3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both
Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their acknowledged him as their grandchild;
legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of
administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event their conjugal partnership of gains during the
letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, subsistence of their marriage;
Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the
allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that 3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are
Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than still commingled with those of her husband, Federico,
respondent to administer and manage the estate of the because her share in the conjugal partnership
decedent, Cristina. remains undetermined and unliquidated; and

On 13 November 2000, Federico died. 4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico,
entitled to share in the distribution of the latter’s
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and
rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of not simply in representation of his deceased
decedent Cristina’s intestate estate: illegitimate father, Emilio I.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of
DENIED and the Opposition-in-Intervention is GRANTED. Appeals’ Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based
on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose
estate she seeks to administer.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is
hereby appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule
of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱ 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of preference for the
200,000.00, conditioned as follows: issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that
Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further
asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests and
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a
complete inventory; co-administrator thereof.

(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate
debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends grandchild and therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2)
thereon; corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the
decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations
at any other time when required by the court, and since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9
November 2001 emphatically demonstrate the validity and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court. wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint administration
as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of represented."
Administration be issued in his favor.6
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who,
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the as between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as
decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration administrator of the decedent’s estate. We did not choose.
issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix Considering merely his demonstrable interest in the subject
of the subject estate: estate, we ruled that Emilio III should likewise administer the
estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a
decision dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial choice and therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.
Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the
issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the
consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is Rules of Court:
hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors the court exercising the power of appointment.14
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-
settled in Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the
next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, different interests represented;15 (2) where justice and equity
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or one to settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of
for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the administration of
administration or to request that administration be granted to an estate desires to have another competent person
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the associated with him in the office.18
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, appointment of special co-administrators during the pendency
it may be granted to such other person as the court may of the appeal for the probate of the decedent’s will. Pending
select. the probate thereof, we recognized Matias’ special interest in
the decedent’s estate as universal heir and executrix
designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of the administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and
preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order equity demands that the two (2) factions among the non-
of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving compulsory heirs of the decedent, consisting of an instituted
spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of heir (Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should
an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.8 be represented in the management of the decedent’s estate.19

The paramount consideration in the appointment of an Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we
administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective held that "inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the
administrator’s interest in the estate.9 This is the same conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of
consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is her proprietary interests."20
that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and
economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential Ventura v. Ventura21 where we allowed the appointment of the
motive to administer the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent as
rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be co-administrators. However, we drew a distinction between the
appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must heirs categorized as next of kin, the nearest of kin in the
demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest category being preferred, thus:
therein greater than any other candidate.
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are:
spouse in the administration of a decedent’s estate Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel
presupposes the surviving spouse’s interest in the conjugal Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons
partnership or community property forming part of the who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the
decedent’s estate.11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a decedent’s property (citations omitted). It is generally said that
compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more
more, interest in administering the entire estate of a decedent, preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.
aside from her share in the conjugal partnership or absolute ‘Among members of a class the strongest ground for
community property. preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As
between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.’"
(citations omitted)
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of
preference in the appointment of administrator of a decedent’s
estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme
allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states that children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio
spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can Ventura, they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate
refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
that "x x x when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in
is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed
administer the trust alone, x x x." administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana
Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of of the Court, in order to represent both interests. 22 (Emphasis
more than one administrator for the benefit of the estate and supplied)
those interested therein.13 We recognized that the appointment
of administrator of the estate of a decedent or the
determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 we maintained that the next of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate
order of preference in the appointment of an administrator since she possesses not only the right of succession over a
depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In that portion of the exclusive property of the decedent but also a
case, we affirmed the legitimate child’s appointment as special share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad
administrator, and eventually as regular administrator, of the administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but
decedent’s estate as against the surviving spouse who the more critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v.
lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as Court of Appeals we recognized the distinctive status of a
good law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment surviving spouse applying as regular administrator of the
as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind deceased spouse's estate when we counseled the probate
or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. court that "there must be a very strong case to justify the
exclusion of the widow from the administration."
In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running
theme of heirs squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias,
found no reason to set aside the probate court’s refusal to Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent
appoint as special co-administrator Diaz, even if he had a proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee
demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent and that were not necessarily related to the demand for
represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence representation being repeatedly urged by
weighed by the probate court pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in respondents.26 (Emphasis supplied)
his previous duty as co-administrator of the estatein the early
part of his administration. Surveying the previously discussed In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the
cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, mandatory character of the rule on the order of preference for
thus: the issuance of letters of administration:

Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the
Gonzales, Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration,
Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin
claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed
demandable from the probate court to appoint special co- in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of
administrators who would represent the respective interests of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and
squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and
the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but sufficient reason therefor.27
also two or more special co-administrators for a single estate.
Now whether the probate court exercises such prerogative
when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we
entirely to its sound discretion. expounded on the legal contemplation of a "next of kin," thus:

Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of
hinge upon factual circumstances other than the incompatible administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving
interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent from the spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When
instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who
special co-administrator because of the applicant's status as are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's
the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to
we considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In
during the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for
the lower court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the
more than one special administrator, we found grave abuse of decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and
discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only
applicant's distinctive status in the selection of another special result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial
administrator. court acted within bounds when it looked into and passed upon
the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco
Angeles.29
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's
choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability
to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration
testatrix in her will," for this Court to compel her appointment the size of, and benefits to, the estate should respondent
as special co-administrator. It is also manifest from the therein be appointed as co-administrator. We emphasized that
decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and
among the heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-administrators
designation of a second special administrator as this fact was may be sanctioned by law.
taken into account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona,
to "overshadow" the objections to the appointment on grounds In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio
of "impracticality and lack of kinship." III’s demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the
order of preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate and
of the decedent as special co-administrator because it was without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts and
"our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led
one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a to a review of such position by the foregoing survey of cases.
compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in
the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in
would be unfair to her proprietary interests." The special status the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested
of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an estate person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling
was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the
held that the widow would have more interest than any other discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6,
Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the 1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until
estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration November 14, 2002;
reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed as administrator.31 Given Isabel’s unassailable 2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several
interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate properties of the decedent;
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the
appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same
estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely 3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their
to the sound discretion of the Court32 and depends on the facts way to different individuals or persons; several properties to
and the attendant circumstances of the case.33 Federico Suntay himself; and

Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and 4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by
circumstances of this case even as we reiterate Isabel’s and reason of falsified documents;38
her sibling’s apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the in assuming and performing the functions of administrator of
order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Cristina’s estate:
Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one
over the other. 1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio
III as administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings before the
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption
animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and of that office, arguing that "the decision of the RTC
Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their dated 9 November 2001 is not among the judgments
paternal grandparents were alive, which can be authorized by the Rules of Court which may be
characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or immediately implemented or executed;"
hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately
interested in the estate; 2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was
due to Isabel’s vociferous objections to Emilio III’s
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of attempts to act as administrator while the RTC
Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as co- decision was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;
administrators may result in prejudice to the
decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying settlement 3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory,
thereof; and inherent in the nature thereof, and one of the first
steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the decedent’s estate, such that it cannot constitute a
management of Cristina’s estate, has not looked after complete and total listing of the decedent’s
the estate’s welfare and has acted to the damage and properties; and
prejudice thereof.
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio charges where Isabel, as private complainant, has
III’s demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable been unwilling to appear and testify, leading the
co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of
has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the
Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio III’s appointment prosecutor of a possible motu propio dismissal of the
as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not cases.
looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually
acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for
the following: the blamed delay in the filing of an inventory and his exposition
on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate course of the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we do not find
court for a complete inventory, omitted in the partial any clarification on Isabel’s accusation that Emilio III had
inventories34 he filed therewith properties of the deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which
estate35 including several parcels of land, cash, bank properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to
deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, be knowledgeable about.
and other personal properties, contrary to Section
1,36 paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his
unsuitability as administrator rooted in his failure to "make and
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions return x x x a true and complete inventory" which became
against Federico’s settlement of the decedent’s proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the
estate which adjudicated to himself a number of probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of
properties properly belonging to said estate (whether Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs,
wholly or partially), and which contained a declaration herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.
that the decedent did not leave any descendants or
heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed to her As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond
estate.37 and executes an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of
settling the decedent’s estate with the end in view of
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The
Emilio III to respond to the following imputations of Isabel that: foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission and inaction
become even more significant and speak volume of his
unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his interest
adverse to those immediately interested in the estate of the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of
decedent, Cristina. the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in
resolving the issue of who is better qualified to administer the
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the estate of the decedent.
pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact
that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
each other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes highly
impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co- Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint
administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship
Emilio III, the testimony of Federico and the other witnesses and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the
for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question
estranged from their grandparents further drive home the point on who will administer the properties of the long deceased
that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, couple has yet to be settled.
it appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate to appoint a co-
administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of
some kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue
Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate. remains good law:

Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature,
simply a preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to
decedent’s estate, we here point out that Emilio III is not succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially
without remedies to protect his interests in the estate of the opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage
decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals, 39 we mapped out as of distribution of the estate which must come after the
among the allowable participation of "any interested persons" inheritance is liquidated.
or "any persons interested in the estate" in either testate or
intestate proceedings: Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from
the foregoing admonition:
xxxx
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x.
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
therein;"
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
5. Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time
41  obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
and place of the examination and allowance of the unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum
Administrator’s account "to persons interested;" to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.45
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give
notice "to the persons interested" before it may hear and grant Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the
a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the Supplemental Comment46 of Emilio III questioning the Special
properties of the estate; and Second Division which issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution.
Emilio III asseverates that "the operation of the Special
Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and void" as the
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its
the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the Decision on 16 June 2010 on the petition filed by him:
residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are
either satisfied or provided for.44
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in
Baguio, acting separately from the Second Division of the
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be two Second
remedy found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to Divisions of the Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme
wit: Court in Manila, and another Special Second Division acting
independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or Manila.47
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or
removal. – If an executor or administrator neglects to render For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second
his account and settle the estate according to law, or to Division in Baguio is not a different division created by the
perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly Supreme Court.
provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or
otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the
court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this
resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is case on 16 June 2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
removed, the remaining executor or administrator may Nachura, now has a different composition, with the advent of
administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to Justice Nachura’s retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule
someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable
person. Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or
clarification of decisions or signed resolutions and all other
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special
judicial restraint: we uphold that the question of who are the Division. – Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a
decision or of a signed resolution and all other motions and
incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by
the ponente and the other Members of the Division who
participated in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution.

If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court,

is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on
the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall
be replaced through raffle by a new ponente who shall be
chosen among the new Members of the Division who
participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution
and who concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court
who participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision
or signed resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as
the new ponente.

If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered

the decision or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a
Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or
herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or
clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a
replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other
Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for
the retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a new Justice, he
or she shall replace the designated Justice as replacement
Member of the Special Division.

Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled

by raffle from among the other Members of the Court to
constitute a Special Division of five (5) Members.

If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that

rendered the Decision or signed Resolution are no longer
Members of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member
of the Court and the motion shall be acted upon by him or her
with the participation of the other Members of the Division to
which he or she belongs.

If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the

denial of the motion for reconsideration or clarification, the
case shall be acted upon by the ponente on record with the
participation of the other Members of the Division to which he
or she belongs at the time said pleading, motion or incident is
to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)

As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply

a change in venue for the Supreme Court's summer session
held last April.48

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June
2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond
to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise
directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
THIRD DIVISION (hereafter Philinterlife), representing 50.725% of the
company’s outstanding capital stock.
G.R. No. 146006             February 23, 2004
On April 15, 1989, the decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortañez,
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as claiming that she owned 1,0144 Philinterlife shares of stock as
President and Corporate Secretary, respectively, of her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with right to
Philippines International Life Insurance Company, and repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan
FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its president, herein
vs. petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortañez failed to repurchase
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 the shares of stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership
presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name.
OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS
ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortañez,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. acting in his personal capacity and claiming that he owned the
DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be Special Administratrix, remaining 1,0115 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his
and other persons/ public officers acting for and in their inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares with right to
behalf, respondents. repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG,
represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee.
DECISION After one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the
ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose
Ortañez failed to repurchase the same.
CORONA, J.:
It appears that several years before (but already during the
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pendency of the intestate proceedings at the Regional Trial
seeking to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Court of Quezon City, Branch 85), Juliana Ortañez and her two
Appeals, First Division, dated July 26, 2000, in CA G.R. 59736, children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez,
which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners entered into a memorandum of agreement dated March 4,
Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao (in their capacities as 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr.
president and secretary, respectively, of Philippine Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the estate (including the
International Life Insurance Company) and Filipino Loan Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. This was the
Assistance Group. basis of the number of shares separately sold by Juliana
Ortañez on April 15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortañez
The antecedent facts follow. on October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein
petitioner FLAG.
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine
International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina
the time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned Ortañez–Enderes and her siblings (hereafter referred to as
ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock. private respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for
appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife shares of
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind a wife stock. This move was opposed by Special Administrator Jose
(Juliana Salgado Ortañez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Ortañez.
Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate children by
Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez- On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion
Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and of private respondents Enderes et al. and appointed private
Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez).2 respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife
shares of stock.
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortañez filed before the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch (now Regional On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed
Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the memorandum of
administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortañez, docketed agreement dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed
as SP Proc. Q-30884 (which petition to date remains pending a motion to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial
at Branch 85 thereof). settlement of the decedent’s estate. These motions were
opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her
siblings filed an opposition to the petition for letters of On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an
administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that urgent motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of
the intestate court appoint a special administrator. Philinterlife shares of stock, which move was again opposed
by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, then presiding
judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose Ortañez joint On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortañez filed an omnibus motion
special administrators of their father’s estate. Hearings for (1) the approval of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife
continued for the appointment of a regular administrator (up to shares of stock and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-
now no regular administrator has been appointed). Enderes as special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of
stock on the ground that there were no longer any shares of
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael stock for her to administer.
and Jose Ortañez submitted an inventory of the estate of their
father which included, among other properties, 2,0293 shares On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus
of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company motion of Special Administrator Jose Ortañez for the approval
of the deeds of sale for the reason that:
Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in substance that a sale of decedent Dr. Ortañez’s Philinterlife shares of stock to
sale of a property of the estate without an Order of the probate petitioner FLAG, represented by its president, herein petitioner
court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. Since the Jose Lee who later became the president of Philinterlife after
sales in question were entered into by Juliana S. Ortañez and the controversial sale.
Jose S. Ortañez in their personal capacity without prior
approval of the Court, the same is not binding upon the Estate. On May 2, 2000, private respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes and her siblings filed a motion for execution of the
WHEREFORE, the OMNIBUS MOTION for the approval of the Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29,
sale of Philinterlife shares of stock and release of Ma. Divina 1997 because the orders of the intestate court nullifying the
Ortañez-Enderes as Special Administratrix is hereby denied.6 sale (upheld by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court)
had long became final. Respondent-Special Administratrix
On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued another order Enderes served a copy of the motion to petitioners Jose Lee
granting the motion of Special Administratrix Enderes for the and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary, respectively, of
annulment of the March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement Philinterlife,11 but petitioners ignored the same.
or extrajudicial partition of estate. The court reasoned that:
On July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for
In consonance with the Order of this Court dated August 11, execution, the dispositive portion of which read:
1997 DENYING the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares
of stocks and release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of execution
Special Administratrix, the "Urgent Motion to Declare Void Ab issue as follows:
Initio  Memorandum of Agreement" dated December 19,
1995. . . is hereby impliedly partially resolved insofar as the 1. Confirming the nullity of the sale of the 2,029
transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of stock Philinterlife shares in the name of the Estate of Dr.
are concerned, in particular, No. 5, 9(c), 10(b) and 11(d)(ii) of Juvencio Ortañez to Filipino Loan Assistance Group
the Memorandum of Agreement. (FLAG);

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares the Memorandum 2. Commanding the President and the Corporate
of Agreement dated March 4, 1982 executed by Juliana S. Secretary of Philinterlife to reinstate in the stock and
Ortañez, Rafael S. Ortañez and Jose S. Ortañez as partially transfer book of Philinterlife the 2,029 Philinterlife
void ab initio insofar as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the shares of stock in the name of the Estate of Dr.
Philinterlife shares of stocks are concerned.7 Juvencio P. Ortañez as the owner thereof without
prejudice to other claims for violation of pre-emptive
Aggrieved by the above-stated orders of the intestate court, rights pertaining to the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares;
Jose Ortañez filed, on December 22, 1997, a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied 3. Directing the President and the Corporate
his petition, however, ruling that there was no legal justification Secretary of Philinterlife to issue stock certificates of
whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose Philinterlife for 2,029 shares in the name of the Estate
Ortañez, his brother Rafael Ortañez and mother Juliana of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez as the owner thereof
Ortañez during the pendency of the settlement of the estate of without prejudice to other claims for violations of pre-
Dr. Ortañez, without the requisite approval of the intestate emptive rights pertaining to the said 2,029 Philinterlife
court, when it was clear that there were other heirs to the shares and,
estate who stood to be prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the
sale made by Jose Ortañez and his mother Juliana Ortañez to
FLAG of the shares of stock they invalidly appropriated for 4. Confirming that only the Special Administratrix, Ma.
themselves, without approval of the intestate court, was void.8 Divina Ortañez-Enderes, has the power to exercise
all the rights appurtenant to the said shares, including
the right to vote and to receive dividends.
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was
denied. He elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition 5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other person or
for review under Rule 45 which the Supreme Court dismissed persons claiming to represent it or otherwise, to
on October 5, 1998, on a technicality. His motion for acknowledge and allow the said Special
reconsideration was denied with finality on January 13, 1999. Administratrix to exercise all the aforesaid rights on
On February 23, 1999, the resolution of the Supreme Court the said shares and to refrain from resorting to any
dismissing the petition of Special Administrator Jose Ortañez action which may tend directly or indirectly to impede,
became final and was subsequently recorded in the book of obstruct or bar the free exercise thereof under pain of
entries of judgments. contempt.

Meanwhile, herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, 6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any
with the rest of the FLAG-controlled board of directors, responsible officer/s of Philinterlife, or any other
increased the authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in person or persons claiming to represent it or
the process the 50.725% controlling interest of the decedent, otherwise, are hereby directed to comply with this
Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, in the insurance company.9 This order within three (3) days from receipt hereof under
became the subject of a separate action at the Securities and pain of contempt.
Exchange Commission filed by private respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes against petitioner Jose Lee and other 7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro
members of the FLAG-controlled board of Philinterlife on Borja are hereby directed to implement the writ of
November 7, 1994. Thereafter, various cases were filed by execution with dispatch to forestall any and/or further
Jose Lee as president of Philinterlife and Juliana Ortañez and damage to the Estate.
her sons against private respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes in the SEC and civil courts.10 Somehow, all these SO ORDERED.12
cases were connected to the core dispute on the legality of the
In the several occasions that the sheriff went to the office of However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners
petitioners to execute the writ of execution, he was barred by Lee and Aggabao, the Supreme Court granted the motion and
the security guard upon petitioners’ instructions. Thus, private reinstated their petition on September 5, 2001. The parties
respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes filed a motion to were then required to submit their respective memoranda.
cite herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president
and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife) in contempt.13 Meanwhile, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes,
on July 19, 2000, filed a motion to direct the branch clerk of
Petitioners Lee and Aggabao subsequently filed before the court in lieu of herein petitioners Lee and Aggabao to reinstate
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA G.R. the name of Dr. Ortañez in the stock and transfer book of
SP No. 59736. Petitioners alleged that the intestate court Philinterlife and issue the corresponding stock certificate
gravely abused its discretion in (1) declaring that the pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of stock was provides that "the court may direct the act to be done at the
null and void; (2) ordering the execution of its order declaring cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed
such nullity and (3) depriving the petitioners of their right to by the court and the act when so done shall have the effect as
due process. if done by the party." Petitioners Lee and Aggabao opposed
the motion on the ground that the intestate court should refrain
On July 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition from acting on the motion because the issues raised therein
outright: were directly related to the issues raised by them in their
petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 59736. On October 30, 2000, the intestate court
We are constrained to DISMISS OUTRIGHT the present granted the motion, ruling that there was no prohibition for the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a intestate court to execute its orders inasmuch as the appellate
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction court did not issue any TRO or writ of preliminary injunction.
in the light of the following considerations:
On December 3, 2000, petitioners Lee and Aggabao filed a
1. The assailed Order dated August 11, 1997 of the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
respondent judge had long become final and G.R. SP No. 62461, questioning this time the October 30,
executory; 2000 order of the intestate court directing the branch clerk of
court to issue the stock certificates. They also questioned in
2. The certification on non-forum shopping is signed the Court of Appeals the order of the intestate court nullifying
by only one (1) of the three (3) petitioners in violation the sale made in their favor by Juliana Ortañez and Jose
of the Rules; and Ortañez. On November 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied
their petition and upheld the power of the intestate court to
3. Except for the assailed orders and writ of execute its order. Petitioners Lee and Aggabao then filed
execution, deed of sale with right to repurchase, deed motion for reconsideration which at present is still pending
of sale of shares of stocks and omnibus motion, the resolution by the Court of Appeals.
petition is not accompanied by such pleadings,
documents and other material portions of the record Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president and
as would support the allegations therein in violation of secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife) and FLAG now raise
the second paragraph, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of the following errors for our consideration:
Civil Procedure, as amended.
The Court of Appeals committed grave reversible ERROR:
Petition is DISMISSED.
A. In failing to reconsider its previous resolution
SO ORDERED.14 denying the petition despite the fact that the appellate
court’s mistake in apprehending the facts had
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee and become patent and evident from the motion for
Aggabao of the above decision was denied by the Court of reconsideration and the comment of respondent
Appeals on October 30, 2000: Enderes which had admitted the factual allegations of
petitioners in the petition as well as in the motion for
reconsideration. Moreover, the resolution of the
This resolves the "urgent motion for reconsideration" filed by appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration
the petitioners of our resolution of July 26, 2000 dismissing was contained in only one page without even
outrightly the above-entitled petition for the reason, among touching on the substantive merits of the exhaustive
others, that the assailed Order dated August 11, 1997 of the discussion of facts and supporting law in the motion
respondent Judge had long become final and executory. for reconsideration in violation of the Rule on
administrative due process;
Dura lex, sed lex.
B. in failing to set aside the void orders of the
WHEREFORE, the urgent motion for reconsideration is hereby intestate court on the erroneous ground that the
DENIED, for lack of merit. orders were final and executory with regard to
petitioners even as the latter were never notified of
the proceedings or order canceling its ownership;
SO ORDERED.15

C. in not finding that the intestate court committed

On December 4, 2000, petitioners elevated the case to the
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
Supreme Court through a petition for review under Rule 45 but
jurisdiction (1) when it issued the Omnibus Order
on December 13, 2000, we denied the petition because there
nullifying the ownership of petitioner FLAG over
was no showing that the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
shares of stock which were alleged to be part of the
59736 committed any reversible error to warrant the exercise
estate and (2) when it issued a void writ of execution
by the Supreme Court of its discretionary appellate
against petitioner FLAG as present owner to
jurisdiction.16
 implement merely provisional orders, thereby Counsel for petitioner, when the Memorandum of
violating FLAG’s constitutional right against Agreement was executed, did the children of Juliana
deprivation of property without due process; Salgado know already that there was a claim for
share in the inheritance of the children of Novicio?
D. In failing to declare null and void the orders of the
intestate court which nullified the sale of shares of ATTY. CALIMAG:
stock between the legitimate heir Jose S. Ortañez
and petitioner FLAG because of settled law and Your Honor please, at that time, Your Honor, it is
jurisprudence, i.e., that an heir has the right to already known to them.
dispose of the decedent’s property even if the same
is under administration pursuant to Civil Code
provision that possession of hereditary property is JUSTICE AQUINO:
transmitted to the heir the moment of death of the
decedent (Acedebo vs. Abesamis, 217 SCRA 194); What can be your legal justification for extrajudicial
settlement of a property subject of intestate
E. In disregarding the final decision of the Supreme proceedings when there is an adverse claim of
Court in G.R. No. 128525 dated December 17, 1999 another set of heirs, alleged heirs? What would be
involving substantially the same parties, to wit, the legal justification for extra-judicially settling a
petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao were property under administration without the approval of
respondents in that case while respondent Ma. Divina the intestate court?
Enderes was the petitioner therein. That decision,
which can be considered law of the case, ruled that ATTY. CALIMAG:
petitioners cannot be enjoined by respondent
Enderes from exercising their power as directors and Well, Your Honor please, in that extra-judicial
officers of Philinterlife and that the intestate court in settlement there is an approval of the honorable court
charge of the intestate proceedings cannot adjudicate as to the property’s partition x x x. There were as
title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and mentioned by the respondents’ counsel, Your Honor.
which are equally CLAIMED BY petitioner FLAG.17

ATTY. BUYCO:
The petition has no merit.

No…
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing
Philinterlife and FLAG, assail before us not only the validity of
the writ of execution issued by the intestate court dated July 7, JUSTICE AQUINO:
2000 but also the validity of the August 11, 1997 order of the
intestate court nullifying the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife The point is, there can be no adjudication of a
shares of stock made by Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, in property under intestate proceedings without the
their personal capacities and without court approval, in favor of approval of the court. That is basic unless you can
petitioner FLAG. present justification on that. In fact, there are two
steps: first, you ask leave and then execute the
We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of nullity of the document and then ask for approval of the document
sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock in their favor because executed. Now, is there any legal justification to
this was already settled a long time ago by the Court of exclude this particular transaction from those steps?
Appeals in its decision dated June 23, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No.
46342. This decision was effectively upheld by us in our ATTY. CALIMAG:
resolution dated October 9, 1998 in G.R. No. 135177
dismissing the petition for review on a technicality and
None, Your Honor.
thereafter denying the motion for reconsideration on January
13, 1999 on the ground that there was no compelling reason to
reconsider said denial.18 Our decision became final on ATTY. BUYCO:
February 23, 1999 and was accordingly entered in the book of
entry of judgments. For all intents and purposes therefore, the With that admission that there is no legal justification,
nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock made by Your Honor, we rest the case for the private
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez in favor of petitioner FLAG respondent. How can the lower court be accused of
is already a closed case. To reopen said issue would set a bad abusing its discretion? (pages 33-35, TSN of January
precedent, opening the door wide open for dissatisfied parties 29, 1998).
to relitigate unfavorable decisions no end. This is completely
inimical to the orderly and efficient administration of justice.
Thus, We find merit in the following postulation by private
respondent:
The said decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
46342 affirming the nullity of the sale made by Jose Ortañez
What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of
and his mother Juliana Ortañez of the Philinterlife shares of
the decedent without securing court approval have
stock read:
appropriated as their own personal property the properties of
[the] Estate, to the exclusion and the extreme prejudice of the
Petitioner’s asseverations relative to said [memorandum] other claimant/heirs. In other words, these heirs, without court
agreement were scuttled during the hearing before this Court approval, have distributed the asset of the estate among
thus: themselves and proceeded to dispose the same to third parties
even in the absence of an order of distribution by the Estate
JUSTICE AQUINO: Court. As admitted by petitioner’s counsel, there was
absolutely no legal justification for this action by the heirs.
There being no legal justification, petitioner has no basis for
demanding that public respondent [the intestate court] approve Herrera on November 14, 1974. Private respondent was
the sale of the Philinterlife shares of the Estate by Juliana and appointed as administratrix of the estate on March 3, 1976 in
Jose Ortañez in favor of the Filipino Loan Assistance Group. lieu of Fausta Carreon Herrera. On November 1, 1978, the
questioned deed of sale of the fishponds was executed
It is an undisputed fact that the parties to the Memorandum of between petitioner and private respondent without notice and
Agreement dated March 4, 1982 (see Annex 7 of the approval of the probate court. Even after the sale,
Comment). . . are not the only heirs claiming an interest in the administratrix Aurora Carreon still included the three fishponds
estate left by Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez. The records of this as among the real properties of the estate in her inventory
case. . . clearly show that as early as March 3, 1981 an submitted on August 13, 1981. In fact, as stated by the Court
Opposition to the Application for Issuance of Letters of of Appeals, petitioner, at the time of the sale of the fishponds
Administration was filed by the acknowledged natural children in question, knew that the same were part of the estate under
of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez with Ligaya Novicio. . . This claim administration.
by the acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P.
Ortañez is admittedly known to the parties to the Memorandum x x x           x x x          x x x
of Agreement before they executed the same. This much was
admitted by petitioner’s counsel during the oral argument. xxx The subject properties therefore are under the jurisdiction of
the probate court which according to our settled jurisprudence
Given the foregoing facts, and the applicable jurisprudence, has the authority to approve any disposition regarding
public respondent can never be faulted for not approving. . . properties under administration. . . More emphatic is the
the subsequent sale by the petitioner [Jose Ortañez] and his declaration We made in Estate of Olave vs. Reyes (123 SCRA
mother [Juliana Ortañez] of the Philinterlife shares belonging 767) where We stated that when the estate of the deceased
to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez." (pages 3-4 of Private person is already the subject of a testate or intestate
Respondent’s Memorandum; pages 243-244 of the Rollo) proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction
involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
Amidst the foregoing, We found no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction committed by Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
respondent judge.19 (149 SCRA 174), We held that the sale of an immovable
property belonging to the estate of a decedent, in a special
From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and proceedings, needs court approval. . . This pronouncement
her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed finds support in the previous case of Dolores Vda. De Gil vs.
Ortañez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797) wherein We emphasized that it
extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among is within the jurisdiction of a probate court to approve the sale
themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs
heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of before final adjudication. x x x
the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the
estate properties by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose, It being settled that property under administration needs the
Rafael and Antonio Ortañez) was invalid, the subsequent sale approval of the probate court before it can be disposed of, any
thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null
court approval, was likewise void. and void. As early as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano
(42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the administrator of property of the deceased, which is not
property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code authorized by the probate court is null and void and title does
which provides that possession of hereditary property is not pass to the purchaser.
deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the
moment of death of the decedent.20 However, an heir can only There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare
alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him null and void the disposition of the property under
in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court administration, made by private respondent, the same having
after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been been effected without authority from said court. It is the
paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve
shares.21 This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said
undivided share  in the estate, not any specific property court that can declare it null and void for as long as the
therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez proceedings had not been closed or terminated.  To uphold
sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares petitioner’s contention that the probate court cannot annul the
of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power
could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755).
estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it (emphasis ours)
would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what
happened in the present case. Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of
estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any
the estate, without court approval. It is well-settled that court unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by
approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the the probate court, there being no need for a separate action to
decedent’s estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. annul the unauthorized disposition.
Orellano,22 we laid down the rule that the sale of the property
of the estate by an administrator without the order of the The question now is: can the intestate or probate court
probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. And execute its order nullifying the invalid sale?
in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals,23 we ruled that:
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the
[I]t must be emphasized that the questioned properties power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an
(fishpond) were included in the inventory of properties of the unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to
estate submitted by then Administratrix Fausta Carreon annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate
property would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is the probate or intestate court is void and passes no title to
a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s power the purchaser. Thus, in Juan Lao et al. vs. Hon. Melencio
to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the Geneto, G.R. No. 56451, June 19, 1985, we ordered the
dissipation of estate property before final adjudication. probate court to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued to
the vendees at the instance of the administrator after finding
Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate court nullifying that the sale of real property under probate proceedings was
the sale was affirmed by the appellate courts (the Court of made without the prior approval of the court. The dispositive
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342 dated June 23, 1998 and portion of our decision read:
subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135177 dated
October 9, 1998). The finality of the decision of the Supreme IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
Court was entered in the book of entry of judgments on assailed Order dated February 18, 1981 of the respondent
February 23, 1999. Considering the finality of the order of the Judge approving the questioned Amicable Settlement is
intestate court nullifying the sale, as affirmed by the appellate declared NULL and VOID and hereby SET ASIDE.
courts, it was correct for private respondent-Special Consequently, the sale in favor of Sotero Dioniosio III and by
Administratrix Enderes to thereafter move for a writ of the latter to William Go is likewise declared NULL and VOID.
execution and for the intestate court to grant it. The Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the latter is hereby
ordered cancelled.
Petitioners Jose Lee, Alma Aggabao and FLAG, however,
contend that the probate court could not issue a writ of It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlife’s
execution with regard to its order nullifying the sale because authorized capital stock, approved on the vote of petitioners’
said order was merely provisional: non-existent shareholdings and obviously calculated to make it
difficult for Dr. Ortañez’s estate to reassume its controlling
The only authority given by law is for respondent judge to interest in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab initio.
determine provisionally whether said shares are included or
excluded in the inventory… In ordering the execution of the Petitioners next argue that they were denied due process.
orders, respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction
and grossly violated settled law and jurisprudence, i.e., that We do not think so.
the determination by a probate or intestate court of whether a
property is included or excluded in the inventory of the estate
being provisional in nature, cannot be the subject of The facts show that petitioners, for reasons known only to
execution.24 (emphasis ours) them, did not appeal the decision of the intestate court
nullifying the sale of shares of stock in their favor. Only the
vendor, Jose Ortañez, appealed the case. A careful review of
Petitioners’ argument is misplaced. There is no question, the records shows that petitioners had actual knowledge of the
based on the facts of this case, that the Philinterlife shares of estate settlement proceedings and that they knew private
stock were part of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez from the respondent Enderes was questioning therein the sale to them
very start as in fact these shares were included in the of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
inventory of the properties of the estate submitted by Rafael
Ortañez after he and his brother, Jose Ortañez, were
appointed special administrators by the intestate court.25 It must be noted that private respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes filed before the intestate court (RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 85) a "Motion to Declare Void Ab Initio Deeds of Sale
The controversy here actually started when, during the of Philinterlife Shares of Stock" on March 22, 1996. But as
pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez, his early as 1994, petitioners already knew of the pending
wife Juliana Ortañez sold the 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock settlement proceedings and that the shares they bought were
in favor petitioner FLAG without the approval of the intestate under the administration by the intestate court because private
court. Her son Jose Ortañez later sold the remaining 1,011 respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her mother
Philinterlife shares also in favor of FLAG without the approval Ligaya Novicio had filed a case against them at the Securities
of the intestate court. and Exchange Commission on November 7, 1994, docketed
as SEC No. 11-94-4909, for annulment of transfer of shares of
We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or stock, annulment of sale of corporate properties, annulment of
exclusion of properties in the inventory of the estate because subscriptions on increased capital stocks, accounting,
there is no question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife inspection of corporate books and records and damages with
shares of stock were owned by the decedent, Dr. Juvencio prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
Ortañez. Rather, we are concerned here with the effect of restraining order.27 In said case, Enderes and her mother
the sale made by the decedent’s heirs, Juliana Ortañez questioned the sale of the aforesaid shares of stock to
and Jose Ortañez, without the required approval of the petitioners. The SEC hearing officer in fact, in his resolution
intestate court. This being so, the contention of petitioners dated March 24, 1995, deferred to the jurisdiction of the
that the determination of the intestate court was merely intestate court to rule on the validity of the sale of shares of
provisional and should have been threshed out in a separate stock sold to petitioners by Jose Ortañez and Juliana Ortañez:
proceeding is incorrect.
Petitioners also averred that. . . the Philinterlife shares of Dr.
The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao next contend that Juvencio Ortañez who died, in 1980, are part of his estate
the writ of execution should not be executed against them which is presently the subject matter of an intestate
because they were not notified, nor they were aware, of the proceeding of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85. Although,
proceedings nullifying the sale of the shares of stock. private respondents [Jose Lee et al.] presented the documents
of partition whereby the foregoing share of stocks were
We are not persuaded. The title of the purchaser like herein allegedly partitioned and conveyed to Jose S. Ortañez who
petitioner FLAG can be struck down by the intestate court after allegedly assigned the same to the other private respondents,
a clear showing of the nullity of the alienation. This is the approval of the Court was not presented. Thus, the
logical consequence of our ruling in Godoy and in several assignments to the private respondents [Jose Lee et al.] of the
subsequent cases.26 The sale of any property of the estate subject shares of stocks are void.
by an administrator or prospective heir without order of
x x x           x x x          x x x Considering these circumstances, we cannot accept
petitioners’ claim of denial of due process. The essence of due
With respect to the alleged extrajudicial partition of the shares process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard. Where the
of stock owned by the late Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, we rule that opportunity to be heard has been accorded, there is no denial
the matter properly belongs to the jurisdiction of the regular of due process.32 In this case, petitioners knew of the pending
court where the intestate proceedings are currently pending.28 instestate proceedings for the settlement of Dr. Juvencio
Ortañez’s estate but for reasons they alone knew, they never
intervened. When the court declared the nullity of the sale,
With this resolution of the SEC hearing officer dated as early they did not bother to appeal. And when they were notified of
as March 24, 1995 recognizing the jurisdiction of the intestate the motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate court,
court to determine the validity of the extrajudicial partition of they ignored the same. Clearly, petitioners alone should bear
the estate of Dr. Ortañez and the subsequent sale by the heirs the blame.
of the decedent of the Philinterlife shares of stock to
petitioners, how can petitioners claim that they were not aware
of the intestate proceedings? Petitioners next contend that we are bound by our ruling in
G.R. No. 128525 entitled Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes vs.
Court of Appeals, dated December 17, 1999, where we
Furthermore, when the resolution of the SEC hearing officer allegedly ruled that the intestate court "may not pass upon the
reached the Supreme Court in 1996 (docketed as G.R. title to a certain property for the purpose of determining
128525), herein petitioners who were respondents therein filed whether the same should or should not be included in the
their answer which contained statements showing that they inventory but such determination is not conclusive and is
knew of the pending intestate proceedings: subject to final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be constituted by the parties."
[T]he subject matter of the complaint is not within the
jurisdiction of the SEC but with the Regional Trial Court; We are not unaware of our decision in G.R. No. 128525. The
Ligaya Novicio and children represented themselves to be the issue therein was whether the Court of Appeals erred in
common law wife and illegitimate children of the late Ortañez; affirming the resolution of the SEC that Enderes et al. were not
that on March 4, 1982, the surviving spouse Juliana Ortañez, entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. We
on her behalf and for her minor son Antonio, executed a ruled that the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the
Memorandum of Agreement with her other sons Rafael and resolution of the SEC denying the issuance of the writ of
Jose, both surnamed Ortañez, dividing the estate of the preliminary injunction because injunction is not designed to
deceased composed of his one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal protect contingent rights. Said case did not rule on the issue of
properties; that in the said Memorandum of Agreement, Jose the validity of the sale of shares of stock belonging to the
S. Ortañez acquired as his share of the estate the 1,329 decedent’s estate without court approval nor of the validity of
shares of stock in Philinterlife; that on March 4, 1982, Juliana the writ of execution issued by the intestate court. G.R. No.
and Rafael assigned their respective shares of stock in 128525 clearly involved a different issue and it does not
Philinterlife to Jose; that contrary to the contentions of therefore apply to the present case.
petitioners, private respondents Jose Lee, Carlos Lee,
Benjamin Lee and Alma Aggabao became stockholders of
Philinterlife on March 23, 1983 when Jose S. Ortañez, the Petitioners and all parties claiming rights under them are
principal stockholder at that time, executed a deed of sale of hereby warned not to further delay the execution of the Orders
his shares of stock to private respondents; and that the right of of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997.
petitioners to question the Memorandum of Agreement and the
acquisition of shares of stock of private respondent is barred WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
by prescription.29 the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 59736 dated July 26,
2000, dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari and affirming
Also, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes the July 6, 2000 order of the trial court which ordered the
offered additional proof of actual knowledge of the settlement execution of its (trial court’s) August 11 and 29, 1997 orders, is
proceedings by petitioners which petitioners never denied: (1) hereby AFFIRMED.
that petitioners were represented by Atty. Ricardo Calimag
previously hired by the mother of private respondent Enderes
to initiate cases against petitioners Jose Lee and Alma
Aggabao for the nullification of the sale of the shares of stock
but said counsel made a conflicting turn-around and appeared
instead as counsel of petitioners, and (2) that the deeds of sale
executed between petitioners and the heirs of the decedent
(vendors Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez) were
acknowledged before Atty. Ramon Carpio who, during the
pendency of the settlement proceedings, filed a motion for the
approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stock to the
Knights of Columbus Fraternal Association, Inc. (which motion
was, however, later abandoned).30 All this sufficiently proves
that petitioners, through their counsels, knew of the pending
settlement proceedings.

Finally, petitioners filed several criminal cases such as libel

(Criminal Case No. 97-7179-81), grave coercion (Criminal
Case No. 84624) and robbery (Criminal Case No. Q-96-67919)
against private respondent’s mother Ligaya Novicio who was a
director of Philinterlife,31 all of which criminal cases were
related to the questionable sale to petitioners of the Philinterlife
shares of stock.
Republic of the Philippines On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the
SUPREME COURT probate of the will. Consequently, the probate court, on May
Manila 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the
issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon
SECOND DIVISION the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The letters
testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
G.R. No. 118671             January 29, 1996
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with
Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent
Executor, petitioner, payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court.
vs. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion
MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will."
CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to
THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for
COURT OF PASIG, respondents. the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle
Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance
DECISION with the provisions of the holographic will.

PUNO, J.: On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's

motion for release of funds but granted respondent Montes'
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered
aside the decision dated November 10, 1994 and the the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three
resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to
CA-G.R. SP No. 33045. and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three
granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a
bond of P50,000.00.
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M.
Ruiz1 executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only
son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually
Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private filed his opposition to respondent Montes's motion for release
respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider.
Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous motion for release of
bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real funds.
properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.2
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel,
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for release of
the cash component of his estate was distributed among funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over the Valle
Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the Verde property had been renewed for another year.7
decedent's will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named
executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on
holographic will. December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to
Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of
private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court,
probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to
of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz,3 Surprisingly, Edmond respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the
opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the
under undue influence. notice to creditors.8 The court stated thus:

On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — xxx       xxx       xxx
the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig
which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon
Albertine and Maria Angeline4 — was leased out by Edmond by the parties the court resolves to allow
Ruiz to third persons. Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to take possession of
the rental payments deposited with the Clerk of Court,
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such amount as
deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and may be necessary to cover the expenses of
payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year administration and allowances for support of Maria
lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, on January Cathryn Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria
25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56, Angeli, which are subject to collation and deductible
representing the balance of the rent after deducting from the share in the inheritance of said heirs and
P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the insofar as they exceed the fruits or rents pertaining to
estate.5 them.

In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner
to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. Maria Pilar Ruiz-Montes and the above-named heirs,
The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00.6 the same is hereby reconsidered and held in
 abeyance until the lapse of six (6) months from the It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule
date of first publication of Notice to Creditors. 83 should not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated"
children of the deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the
hereby ordered to submit an accounting of the testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the
expenses necessary for administration including conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and
provisions for the support Of Maria Cathryn children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds
Angeli Ruiz before the amount required can be of the estate.14 The law is rooted on the fact that the right and
withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even
creditors with reasonable dispatch.9 beyond the age of majority.15

Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law
judge, the appellate court dismissed the petition and sustained clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does
the probate court's order in a decision dated November 10, not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of
199410 and a resolution dated January 5, 1995.11 their minority or incapacity.16 It was error, therefore, for the
appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an
allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending
Hence, this petition. settlement of his estate.

Petitioner claims that: Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release
of the titles of the bequeathed properties to private
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS respondents six months after the date of first publication of
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which
JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING is allowed only under the following conditions:
THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, DATED Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings.
DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE — Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal
COURSE AND IS EFFECTED WOULD: (1) in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the
DISALLOW THE EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO may deem proper and just, permit that such part of
TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL AND the estate as may not be affected by the controversy
PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE; (2) or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees,
GRANT SUPPORT, DURING THE PENDENCY OF upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule
THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE, TO CERTAIN 90 of these Rules.17
PERSONS NOT ENTITLED THERETO; AND (3)
PREMATURELY PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE
THE ESTATE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS And Rule 90 provides that:
OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS
INTRINSIC VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED, Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made.
AND DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF UNPAID — When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12 administration the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax if any, chargeable to the estate in
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on
admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's the application of the executor or administrator, or of
debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an a person interested in the estate, and after hearing
allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the upon notice shall assign the residue of the estate to
testator's grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and
certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and
the estate to the executor of the will. such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator,
or any other person having the same in his
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the possession. If there is a controversy before the court
Revised Rules of Court provides: as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
or as to the distributive shares to which each person
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
person, during the settlement of the estate, shall
receive therefrom under the direction of the court, No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of
such allowance as are provided by law. the obligations above-mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased the right to conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate such time as the court directs.18
proceedings. He contends that the testator's three
granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because they In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the
are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts,
age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the provision funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
expressly states "children" of the deceased which excludes the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment
latter's grandchildren. of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives
a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had
payment of said obligations within such time as the court deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income
directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.19 from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its
succeeding rents after renewal of the lease.29 Neither did he
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the render an accounting of such funds.
titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over
months from the date of first publication of the notice to the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the
creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors, estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. 30 As executor,
not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the
no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties
hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.31 He
one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his
the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting
post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the of the deceased, rendering a true account of his
inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued the administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of
properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a
appraised. determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and
justness.32
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order
the release of the titles six months after admitting the will to IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court
probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming the order dated
execution and extrinsic validity21 and settles only the question December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with the modification
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by that those portions of the order granting an allowance to the
law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the testator's grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may the private respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled
be raised even after the will has been authenticated.23 and set aside.

The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the
controverted by petitioner before the probate court in his Reply proceedings below.
to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds 24 and
his motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of
the said court.25 Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive
shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's
will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired
his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules
provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful
heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate,
the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same
as in ordinary cases.26

Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed
order deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real
and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor
or administrator to the possession and management of the real
and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and
can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of
administration,"27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of
Court explicitly provides:

Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole

estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not
willed. — An executor or administrator shall have the
right to the possession and management of the real
as well as the personal estate of the deceased so
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts
and expenses for administration.28

When petitioner moved for further release of the funds

deposited with the clerk of court, he had been previously
granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and
maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and
payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved
again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons
he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to
require him to submit an accounting of the necessary
expenses for administration before releasing any further
money in his favor.
SECOND DIVISION Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150,
docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued
G.R. No. 149926             February 23, 2005 against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served
since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to the
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Philippines.12 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to
vs. respondent Florence S. Ariola.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ
ARIOLA, respondents.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her
Answer13 and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her
DECISION since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint
agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not
CALLEJO, SR., J.: approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she
was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA- the RTC of Makati City, Branch 63. 14 Consequently, trial on the
G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal 2 of the petitioner’s merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by
complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63. decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:

The antecedent facts are as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
complaint for lack of merit.15
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation
(FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez entered into a loan The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should
agreement3 in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The amount was have been filed with the probate court before which the testate
intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending, as the sum
Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said
thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement
note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on
equal annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May 31, July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the
1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985. decedent. However, the said agreement was void, considering
that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into there can be no valid partition until after the will has been
another loan agreement,4 this time in the amount of probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed
₱123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and
purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All- Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets
Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit and liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and
Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and
favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedent’s account.
signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null
December 13, 1980. and void, the trial court held that the petitioner’s cause of
action against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily
fail.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a
holographic will.6 Subsequently in March 1981, testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated
7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, its case to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following
1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the as errors of the trial court:
special administrator of the estate of the decedent. 7 During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, 1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT
Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE
Joint Agreement8 dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
divide between themselves and take possession of the three
(3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) 2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT
tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN
tractor respectively taken by them. PROBATED.

On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption 3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING
of Liabilities9 was executed by and between FCCC and Union THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT
Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE
assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to ESTATE PROCEEDING.16
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the
Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by deceased had passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of
the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on the joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A" estopped
February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint 11 for sum of respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her
money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and
liability under the said document; as the agreement had been THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH
signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ IN FAVOR OF
necessary to present the same before the probate court for PETITIONER UNION BANK.19
approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not
one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by the The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were
deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil
respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to approve
action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors
estate proceedings. owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations related
thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from
that the money claim of the petitioner should have been asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner also
presented before the probate court.17 points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not
include nor mention any of the tractors subject of the
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will.
and held that the petitioner should have filed its claim with the The active participation and resistance of respondent Florence
probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioner’s
the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim
agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of
had until after the will has been probated. According to the CA, the heirs who executed the joint agreement to escape liability
page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the to pay the value of the tractors under consideration would be
subject properties (tractors) in generic terms when the equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to
deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
the active participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the
case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the
RTC decision, viz.: trial and appellate courts failed to consider the fact that
respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibañez and his
AFFIRMED in toto. heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore,
the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13,
1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibañez, together with his
SO ORDERED.18 heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation
solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned. The petitioner
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the
errors to the CA: continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes
executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held
I. liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no
need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the
probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal
FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola
II. maintains that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of
money from the deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT should have been filed with the probate court. She points out
THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there
OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ UNTIL AFTER THE was already an existing probate proceedings of which the
WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED. petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the
probate court which might delay payment of the obligation, the
petitioner opted to require them to execute the said
III.
agreement.1a\^/phi1.net

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT

According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not
THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE
err in declaring that the agreement was null and void. She
THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by
her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been
IV. subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the
estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE court a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate
LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is
CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN in estoppel.
FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not
V. signed any continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any
document presented as evidence to show that she had caused
herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE
SUM OF ₱128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE
AMOUNT OF ₱123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED The petition is bereft of merit.
THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and
or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may
valid; b) whether or not the heirs’ assumption of the have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the
petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’
deceased.1awphi1.nét assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We
rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide
the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, between themselves and take possession and use the above-
to determine whether they should or should not be included in described chattel and each of them to assume the
the inventory or list of properties to be administered. 20 The said indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein
court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit
and distribution of the estate.21 Corp."29 The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the
happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition possession and use of their respective share under the
among the heirs until after the will has been probated: agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive.
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in
the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the
the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world,
the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the
other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the decedent.l^vvphi1.net The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of
testator and the compliance with those requirements or the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.22 claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule
86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be
partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will.23 In Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not
the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañez, left a filed barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the
holographic will24 which contained, inter alia, the provision decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether
which reads as follows: the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment
for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except
be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that
proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants.
favor of Edmund and Florence, my children. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or
prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he
all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if
thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among amount so determined shall be considered the true balance
the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement 25 executed by against the estate, as though the claim had been presented
Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among directly before the court in the administration proceedings.
themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the present value.
probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said
tractors. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in
the probate court is mandatory.30 As we held in the vintage
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:31
acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased,
including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way … This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate
without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of
it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.26 Every act the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery
any other transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law
which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the
as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the
heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and
part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the distribute the residue.32
probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the
decedent.28 In the instant case, there is no showing that the
signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold
decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any
still pending before the court and the latter had yet to liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence
determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing
Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the
late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner
failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it
may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under
the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course,
subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the
petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the
matter further.

We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner
had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of
the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC
assigned its assets and liabilities.33 The petitioner in its
complaint alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of Assignment
dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First
Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the
Philippines…"34 However, the documentary evidence35 clearly
reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with
assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom
Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioner’s
participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no
documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during
trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in
fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court
declared in its decision:

… [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant

that plaintiff failed to prove or did not present evidence to
prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union
Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here.
"The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by the
courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be promptly resolved in the negative." (Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36

This being the case, the petitioner’s personality to file the

complaint is wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its
cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing
the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby

DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
Republic of the Philippines In view of the issuance of letters of administration, the probate
SUPREME COURT court, on August 30, 1977, issued a Notice to Creditors16 for
Manila the filing of money claims against Flaviano’s estate.
Accordingly, as one of the creditors of Flaviano, respondent
SECOND DIVISION notified17 the probate court of its claim in the amount of
₱382,753.19 as of October 11, 1978, exclusive of interests
and charges.
G.R. No. 171206               September 23, 2013
During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Edgar and
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES FLA VIANO MAGLASANG Oscar were able to obtain several loans from respondent,
and SALUD ADAZA-MAGLASANG, namely, OSCAR A. secured by promissory notes18 which they signed.
MAGLASANG, EDGAR A. MAGLASANG, CONCEPCION
CHONA A. MAGLASANG, GLENDA A. MAGLASANG-
ARNAIZ, LERMA A. MAGLASANG, FELMA A. · In an Order19 dated December 14, 1978 (December 14, 1978
MAGLASANG, FE DORIS A. MAGLASANG, LEOLINO A. Order),the probate court terminated the proceedings with the
MAGLASANG, MARGIE LEILA A. MAGLASANG,MA. surviving heirs executing an extra-judicial partition of the
MILALIE A. MAGLASANG, SALUD A. MAGLASANG, and properties of Flaviano’s estate. The loan obligations owed by
MA. FLASALIE A. MAGLASANG, REPRESENTING THE the estate to respondent, however, remained unsatisfied due
ESTATES OF THEIR AFORE-NAMEDDECEASED to respondent’s certification that Flaviano’s account was
PARENTS, Petitioners, undergoing a restructuring. Nonetheless, the probate court
vs. expressly recognized the rights of respondent under the
MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, now substituted by mortgage and promissory notes executed by the Sps.
FIRST SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT SPV-AMC, INC. Maglasang, specifically, its "right to foreclose the same within
FSAMI, Respondent. the statutory period."20

DECISION In this light, respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose

the mortgage covering the Sps. Maglasang’s properties and
emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction for the
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: amount of ₱350,000.00.21 There, however, remained a
deficiency on Sps. Maglasang’s obligation to respondent.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Thus, on June 24, 1981, respondent filed a suit to recover the
Decision2 dated July 20, 2005 and Resolution 3 dated January deficiency amount of ₱250,601.05 as of May 31, 1981 against
4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50410 the estate of Flaviano, his widow Salud and petitioners,
which dismissed petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the docketed as Civil Case No. 1998-0.22
Decision4 dated April 6, 1987 of the Regional Trial Court of
Ormoc City, Branch 12 (RTC) directing petitioners to jointly The RTC Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings
and severally pay respondent Manila Banking Corporation the
amount of ₱434,742.36, with applicable interests, representing
the deficiency of the former’s total loan obligation to the latter After trial on the merits, the RTC (formerly, the probate
after the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage court)23 rendered a Decision24 on April 6, 1987 directing the
subject of this case, including attorney’s fees and costs of suit. petitioners to pay respondent, jointly and severally, the amount
of ₱434,742.36 with interest at the rate of 12% p.a., plus a 4%
penalty charge, reckoned from September 5,1984 until fully
The Facts paid.25 The RTC found that it was shown, by a preponderance
of evidence, that petitioners, after the extra-judicial foreclosure
On June 16, 1975, spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang of all the properties mortgaged, still have an outstanding
(Sps.Maglasang) obtained a credit line from respondent5 in the obligation in the amount and as of the date as above-stated.
amount of ₱350,000.00 which was secured by a real estate The RTC also found in order the payment of interests and
mortgage6 executed over seven of their properties7 located in penalty charges as above-mentioned as well as attorney’s fees
Ormoc City and the Municipality of Kananga, Province of equivalent to 10% of the outstanding obligation.26
Leyte.8 They availed of their credit line by securing loans in the
amounts of ₱209,790.50 and ₱139,805.83 on October 24, Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the case to the CA on appeal,
1975and March 15, 1976, respectively,9 both of which contending,27 inter alia, that the remedies available to
becoming due and demandable within a period of one year. respondent under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
Further, the parties agreed that the said loans would earn (Rules) are alternative and exclusive, such that the election of
interest at 12% per annum (p.a.) and an additional 4% penalty one operates as a waiver or abandonment of the others. Thus,
would be charged upon default.10 when respondent filed its claim against the estate of Flaviano
in the proceedings before the probate court, it effectively
After Flaviano Maglasang (Flaviano) died intestate on abandoned its right to foreclose on the mortgage. Moreover,
February 14,1977, his widow Salud Maglasang (Salud) and even on the assumption that it has not so waived its right to
their surviving children, herein petitioners Oscar (Oscar), foreclose, it is nonetheless barred from filing any claim for any
Concepcion Chona, Lerma, Felma, FeDoris, Leolino, Margie deficiency amount.
Leila, Ma. Milalie, Salud and Ma. Flasalie, all surnamed
Maglasang, and Glenda Maglasang-Arnaiz, appointed11 their During the pendency of the appeal, Flaviano’s widow, Salud,
brother petitioner Edgar Maglasang (Edgar) as their attorney- passed away on July 25, 1997.28
in-fact.12 Thus, on March 30, 1977, Edgar filed a verified
petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Flaviano before the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, The CA Ruling
Ormoc City, Branch 5 (probate court), docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 1604-0.13 On August 9, 1977, the probate court issued an In a Decision29 dated July 20, 2005, the CA denied the
Order14 granting the petition, thereby appointing Edgar as the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC’s Decision. At the
administrator15 of Flaviano’s estate. outset, it pointed out that the probate court erred when it,
through the December 14, 1978 Order, closed and terminated receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the
the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 1604-0 without first satisfying estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor
the claims of the creditors of the estate – in particular, or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or
respondent – in violation of Section 1, Rule 90 of the pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security,
Rules.30 As a consequence, respondent was not able to collect under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it to
from the petitioners and thereby was left with the option of be for the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall
foreclosing the real estate mortgage.31 Further, the CA held be made. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
that Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules does not apply to the
present case since the same does not involve a mortgage As the foregoing generally speaks of "a creditor holding a
made by the administrator over any property belonging to the claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other
estate of the decedent.32 According to the CA, what should collateral security" as above-highlighted, it may be reasonably
apply is Act No. 313533 which entitles respondent to claim the concluded that the aforementioned section covers all secured
deficiency amount after the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real claims, whether by mortgage or any other form of collateral,
estate mortgage of Sps. Maglasang’s properties.34 which a creditor may enforce against the estate of the
deceased debtor. On the contrary, nowhere from its language
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was subsequently can it be fairly deducible that the said section would – as the
denied in a Resolution35 dated January 4, 2006. Hence, the CA interpreted – narrowly apply only to mortgages made by
present recourse. the administrator over any property belonging to the estate of
the decedent. To note, mortgages of estate property executed
The Issue Before the Court by the administrator, are also governed by Rule 89 of the
Rules, captioned as "Sales, Mortgages, and Other
Encumbrances of Property of Decedent."
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred
in affirming the RTC’s award of the deficiency amount in favor
of respondent. In this accord, it bears to stress that the CA’s reliance on
Philippine National Bank v. CA43 (PNB) was misplaced as the
said case did not, in any manner, limit the scope of Section 7,
Petitioners assert36 that it is not Act No. 3135 but Section 7, Rule 86. It only stated that the aforesaid section equally
Rule 86of the Rules which applies in this case. The latter applies to cases where the administrator mortgages the
provision provides alternative and exclusive remedies for the property of the estate to secure the loan he obtained.44 Clearly,
satisfaction of respondent’s claim against the estate of the pronouncement was a ruling of inclusion and not one
Flaviano.37 Corollarily, having filed its claim against the estate which created a distinction. It cannot, therefore, be doubted
during the intestate proceedings, petitioners argue that that it is Section 7, Rule 86which remains applicable in dealing
respondent had effectively waived the remedy of foreclosure with a creditor’s claim against the mortgaged property of the
and, even assuming that it still had the right to do so, it was deceased debtor, as in this case, as well as mortgages made
precluded from filing a suit for the recovery of the deficiency by the administrator, as that in the PNB case.
obligation.38
Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86
Likewise, petitioners maintain that the extra-judicial foreclosure and explains that the secured creditor has three
of the subject properties was null and void, not having been remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the
conducted in the capital of the Province of Leyte in violation of satisfaction of his indebtedness. In particular, he may choose
the stipulations in the real estate mortgage contract. 39 They to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the
likewise deny any personal liability for the loans taken by their estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the
deceased parents.40 mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary
claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other
The Court’s Ruling security and foreclose the same before it is barred by
prescription, without the right to file a claim for any
The petition is partly meritorious. deficiency.45 It must, however, be emphasized that these
remedies are distinct, independent and mutually exclusive
from each other; thus, the election of one effectively bars the
Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the exercise of the others. With respect to real properties, the
settlement proceedings of their estate.41 Such proceedings are Court in Bank of America v. American Realty
primarily governed by special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 Corporation46 pronounced:
of the Rules, although rules governing ordinary actions may,
as far as practicable, apply suppletorily.42 Among these special
rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section 7, Rule86) In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage
provides the rule in dealing with secured claims against the creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably,
estate: an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other.
For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing
of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an
SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. – A creditor holding a action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of
claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to
collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by
his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any
general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province
foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action where the sale is to be made, in accordance with the
in court, making the executor or administrator a party provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the No.4118.47 (Emphasis supplied)
sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in
the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the
security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner Anent the third remedy, it must be mentioned that the same
provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his includes the option of extra-judicially foreclosing the mortgage
mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at under Act No. 3135,as availed of by respondent in this case.
any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in However, the plain result of adopting the last mode of
that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to recover any
deficiency from the estate.48 These precepts were discussed in manner of availing of the third option – such as the place
the PNB case, citing Perez v. Philippine National Bank 49 which where the application for extra-judicial foreclosure is filed, the
overturned the earlier Pasno v. Ravina ruling:50 requirements of publication and posting and the place of sale –
must be governed by Act No. 3135.
Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee
three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the
that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps.
the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of
them: the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise
the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt petitioners assert, since it merely notified52 the probate court of
from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of
Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the
account.53 Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule
deficiency as an ordinary claim; and 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover
any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing
the same at anytime before it is barred by prescription As a final point, petitioners maintain that the extra-judicial
without right to file a claim for any deficiency foreclosure of the subject properties was null and void since
the same was conducted in violation of the stipulation in the
In Perez v. Philippine National Bank, reversing Pasno vs. real estate mortgage contract stating that the auction sale
Ravina, we held: should be held in the capital of the province where the
properties are located, i.e., the Province of Leyte.
The ruling in Pasno v. Ravina not having been reiterated in
any other case, we have carefully reexamined the same, and The Court disagrees.
after mature deliberation have reached the conclusion that the
dissenting opinion is more in conformity with reason and law. As may be gleaned from the records, the stipulation under the
Of the three alternative courses that section 7, Rule 87 (now real estate mortgage54 executed by Sps. Maglasang which
Rule 86), offers the mortgage creditor, to wit, (1) to waive the fixed the place of the foreclosure sale at Tacloban City lacks
mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the words of exclusivity which would bar any other acceptable for
mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) foreclose the mortgage a wherein the said sale may be conducted, to wit:
judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at
any time before it is barred by prescription, without right to file It is hereby agreed that in case of foreclosure of this mortgage
a claim for any deficiency, the majority opinion in Pasno v. under Act 3135, the auction sale shall be held at the capital of
Ravina, in requiring a judicial foreclosure, virtually wipes out the province if the property is within the territorial jurisdiction of
the third alternative conceded by the Rules to the mortgage the province concerned, or shall be held in the city if the
creditor, and which would precisely include extra-judicial property is within the territorial jurisdiction of the city
foreclosures by contrast with the second alternative. concerned; x x x.55

The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that Case law states that absent such qualifying or restrictive words
the creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the to indicate the exclusivity of the agreed forum, the stipulated
estate. Following the Perez ruling that the third mode includes place should only be as an additional, not a limiting
venue.56 As a consequence, the stipulated venue and that
provided under Act No. 3135 can be applied alternatively.
extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the result of extrajudicial
foreclosure is that the creditor waives any further deficiency
claim. x x x.51 (Emphases and underscoring supplied; italics in In particular, Section 2 of Act No. 3135 allows the foreclosure
the original) sale to be done within the province where the property to be
sold is situated, viz.:
To obviate any confusion, the Court observes that the
operation of Act No. 3135 does not entirely discount the SEC. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the
application of Section 7, Rule 86, or vice-versa. Rather, the province which the property sold is situated; and in case the
two complement each other within their respective spheres of place within said province in which the sale is to be made is
operation. On the one hand, Section 7, Rule 86 lays down the subject to stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or
options for the secured creditor to claim against the estate in the municipal building of the municipality in which the
and, according to jurisprudence, the availment of the third property or part thereof is situated. (Italics supplied) ..
option bars him from claiming any deficiency amount. On the
other hand, after the third option is chosen, the procedure In this regard, since the auction sale was conducted in Ormoc
governing the manner in which the extra-judicial foreclosure City, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Province of
should proceed would still be governed by the provisions of Leyte, then the Court finds sufficient compliance with the
Act No. 3135.Simply put, Section 7, Rule 86 governs the above-cited requirement.
parameters and the extent to which a claim may be advanced
against the estate, whereas Act No. 3135sets out the specific All told, finding that the extra-judicial foreclosure subject of this
procedure to be followed when the creditor subsequently case was properly conducted in accordance with the
chooses the third option – specifically, that of extra-judicially formalities of Act No. 3135,the Court upholds the same as a
foreclosing real property belonging to the estate. The valid exercise of respondent's third option under Section 7,
application of the procedure under Act No. 3135 must be Rule 86. To reiterate, respondent cannot, however, file any suit
concordant with Section 7, Rule 86 as the latter is a special to recover any deficiency amount since it effectively waived its
rule applicable to claims against the estate, and at the same right thereto when it chose to avail of extra-judicial foreclosure
time, since Section 7, Rule 86 does not detail the procedure as jurisprudence instructs.
for extra-judicial foreclosures, the formalities governing the
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The xxxx
complaint for the recovery of the deficiency amount after extra-
judicial foreclosure filed by respondent Manila Banking Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not
Corporation is hereby DISMISSED. The extra-judicial produce any children. When Maximino died on 1 May 1952,
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, however, stands. Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s
estate with the Cebu City Court of First Instance (CFI), 14th
Republic of the Philippines Judicial District, designated as Special Proceedings No. 928-
SUPREME COURT R. On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued Letters of Administration
Manila appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximino’s estate.
She submitted an Inventory of Maximino’s properties, which
THIRD DIVISION included, among other things, the following parcels of land x x
x.
G.R. No. 150175             February 5, 2007
xxxx
ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ
BRIONES, namely: ESTELA, ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO The CFI would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2 October
SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA SANTOS 1952, awarding ownership of the aforementioned real
INOCENTES, ERNESTO MENDOZA, RIZALINA SANTOS, properties to Donata. On 27 June 1960, Donata had the said
ADOLFO MENDOZA and PACITA MENDOZA, Petitioners, CFI Order recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register
vs. of Deeds, and by virtue thereof, received new TCTs, covering
HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, namely: SILVERIO S. the said properties, now in her name.
BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES, BONIFACIO CABAHUG, JR.,
ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA FORTUNA, CRESENCIA Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata’s
BRIONES, FUGURACION MEDALLE and MERCEDES nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration
LAGBAS, Respondents. of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband,
Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of
RESOLUTION Donata’s intestate estate. Controversy arose among Donata’s
heirs when Erlinda claimed exclusive ownership of three
parcels of land, covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21545, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 58684, based on two Deeds of Donation, both dated 15
September 1977, allegedly executed in her favor by her aunt
On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its Decision 1 in the Donata. The other heirs of Donata opposed Erlinda’s claim.
above-entitled case, ruling in favor of the petitioners. The This Court, however, was no longer informed of the
dispositive portion2 reads as follows: subsequent development in the intestate proceedings of the
estate of Donata; and as far as this Petition is concerned, all
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the the heirs of Donata, including Erlinda, appear to be on the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194, dated 31 August same side.
2001, affirming the Decision of the Cebu City RTC in Civil
Case No. CEB-5794, dated 28 September 1986, is hereby On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the Complaint for partition, Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of
annulment, and recovery of possession filed by the heirs of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was
Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 is hereby DISMISSED. initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order,
dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio to collect rentals
On 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration 3 of the from Maximino’s properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the
foregoing Decision was filed by Atty. Celso C. Reales of the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order, dated 5 December
Reales Law Office on behalf of the respondents, heirs of 1985, claiming that the said properties were already under his
Maximino R. Briones. On 19 May 2006, petitioners Erlinda and his wife’s administration as part of the intestate estate of
Pilapil and the other co-heirs of Donata Ortiz Vda. de Briones, Donata. Silverio’s Letters of Administration for the intestate
through counsel, filed an Opposition to Respondents’ Motion estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
for Reconsideration,4 to which the respondents filed a
Rejoinder5 on 23 May 2006. Thereafter, Atty. Amador F. On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with
Brioso, Jr. of the Canto Brioso Arnedo Law Office entered his the RTC against the heirs of Donata for the partition,
appearance as collaborating counsel for the annulment, and recovery of possession of real property,
respondents.6 Atty. Brioso then filed on 11 June 2006 and 16 docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-5794. They later filed an
June 2006, respectively, a Reply7 and Supplemental Reply8 to Amended Complaint, on 11 December 1992. They alleged that
the petitioners’ Opposition to respondents’ Motion for Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through
Reconsideration. Finally, petitioners filed a Rejoinder 9 to the fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the
respondents’ Reply and Supplemental Reply on 5 July 2006. knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her
name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of
The facts of the case, as recounted in the Decision, 10 are as Maximino.
follows –
xxxx
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones
(Donata), consisting of her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz- After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated
Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalina’s daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); 8 April 1986, in favor of the heirs of Maximino x x x.
and the other nephews and nieces of Donata, in
representation of her two other sisters who had also passed xxxx
away. Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the
late Maximino Briones (Maximino), composed of his nephews
and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in x x x[T]he RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were
representation of the deceased siblings of Maximino. entitled to ½ of the real properties covered by TCTs No.
21542, 21543, 21544, 21545, 21546, and 58684. It also As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any
ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs of Maximino the said trust relations between petitioners and respondents shall be
properties and to render an accounting of the fruits thereof. examined in the light of Article 1456 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that, "[i]f property is acquired through mistake
The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision, dated 8 April or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered
1986, to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
Decision, promulgated on 31 August 2001, affirmed the RTC whom the property comes." Hence, the foremost question to
Decision, x x x. be answered is still whether an implied trust under Article 1456
of the New Civil Code had been sufficiently established in the
present case.
xxxx
In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since there
Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of was insufficient evidence to establish that Donata committed
Appeals, the heirs of Donata filed the present Petition, x x x. fraud. It should be remembered that Donata was able to
secure certificates of title to the disputed properties by virtue of
In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court found the the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (the
Petition meritorious and, reversing the Decisions of the Court proceedings she instituted to settle Maximino’s intestate
of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dismissed the estate), which declared her as Maximino’s sole heir. In the
Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession absence of proof to the contrary, the Court accorded to Special
of real property filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. Proceedings No. 928-R the presumptions of regularity and
CEB-5794. This Court summed up its findings,11 thus – validity. Reproduced below are the relevant portions15 of the
Decision –
In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able to
have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of secure the TCTs covering the real properties belonging to the
Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no estate of Maximino by virtue of a CFI Order, dated 2 October
implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of 1952. It is undisputed that the said CFI Order was issued by
Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, instituted by
was able to register the real properties in her name, not Donata herself, to settle the intestate estate of Maximino. The
through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 petitioners, heirs of Donata, were unable to present a copy of
October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. the CFI Order, but this is not surprising considering that it was
928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued 35 years prior to the filing by the heirs of Maximino of
issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive their Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 on 3 March 1987.
heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of The existence of such CFI Order, nonetheless, cannot be
the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties, denied. It was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the
and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her Register of Deeds on 27 June 1960, at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No.
deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of 1714. It was annotated on the TCTs covering the real
the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same properties as having declared Donata the sole, absolute, and
should have been dismissed. exclusive heir of Maximino. The non-presentation of the actual
CFI Order was not fatal to the cause of the heirs of Donata
Respondents move for the reconsideration of the Decision of considering that its authenticity and contents were never
this Court raising still the arguments that Donata committed questioned. The allegation of fraud by the heirs of Maximino
fraud in securing the Court of First Instance Order, dated 2 did not pertain to the CFI Order, but to the manner or
October 1952, which declared her as the sole heir of her procedure by which it was issued in favor of Donata.
deceased husband Maximino and authorized her to have Moreover, the non-presentation of the CFI Order, contrary to
Maximino’s properties registered exclusively in her name; that the declaration by the RTC, does not amount to a willful
respondents’ right to succession to the disputed properties suppression of evidence that would give rise to the
was transmitted or vested from the moment of Maximino’s presumption that it would be adverse to the heirs of Donata if
death and which they could no longer be deprived of; that produced. x x x.
Donata merely possessed and held the properties in trust for
her co-heirs/owners; and that, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in xxxx
Quion v. Claridad12 and Sevilla, et al. v. De Los
Angeles,13 respondents’ action to recover title to and The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special
possession of their shares in Maximino’s estate, held in trust Proceedings No. 928-R, effectively settled the intestate estate
for their benefit by Donata, and eventually, by petitioners as of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole, absolute, and
the latter’s successors-in-interest, is imprescriptible. exclusive heir of her deceased husband. The issuance by the
Respondents also advance a fresh contention that the CFI CFI of the said Order, as well as its conduct of the entire
Order, dated 2 October 1952, being based on the fraudulent Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy the presumption of
misrepresentation of Donata that she was Maximino’s sole validity pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of the
heir, was a void order, which produced no legal effect. Lastly, Revised Rules of Court, reproduced below –
respondents asseverate that, by relying on certain procedural
presumptions in its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court
has sacrificed their substantive right to succession, thus, SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following
making justice "subservient to the dictates of mere procedural presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
fiats."14 contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

While this Court is persuaded to reexamine and clarify some xxxx

points in its previous Decision in this case, it does not find any
new evidence or argument that would adequately justify a (m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
change in its previous position.

On the finding of fraud

(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the present case, this Court is compelled to consider the same as
Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of part of the evidence on record.
jurisdiction.
The CFI Order17 in question reads in full as –
By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must
presume, in the absence of any clear and convincing proof to ORDER
the contrary, that the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R
had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, and to
have rendered a judgment valid in every respect; and it could This is with reference to the Motion of the Administratrix, dated
not give credence to the following statements made by the January 5, 1960, that she be declared the sole heir of her
Court of Appeals in its Decision. deceased husband, Maximino Suico Briones, the latter having
died without any legitimate ascendant nor descendant, nor any
legitimate brother or sister, nephews or nieces.
xxxx
At the hearing of this incident today, nobody appeared to resist
There was totally no evidentiary basis for the foregoing the motion, and based on the uncontradicted testimony of
pronouncements. First of all, the Petition filed by Donata for Donata G. Ortiz that she was the nearest surviving relative of
Letters of Administration in Special Proceedings No. 928-R the deceased Maximino Suico Briones at the time of the
before the CFI was not even referred to nor presented during latter’s death, and pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the
the course of the trial of Civil Case No. CEB-5794 before the new Civil Code of the Philippines, the Court hereby declares
RTC. How then could the Court of Appeals make a finding that the aforesaid Donata G. Ortiz the sole, absolute and exclusive
Donata willfully excluded from the said Petition the names, heir of the estate of the deceased Maximino Suico Briones,
ages, and residences of the other heirs of Maximino? Second, and she is hereby entitled to inherit all the residue of this
there was also no evidence showing that the CFI actually estate after paying all the obligations thereof, which properties
failed to send notices of Special Proceedings No. 928-R to the are those contained in the Inventory, dated October 2,
heirs of Maximino or that it did not require presentation of proof 1952.1awphi1.net
of service of such notices. It should be remembered that there
stands a presumption that the CFI Judge had regularly
performed his duties in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, which Cebu City, January 15, 1960.
included sending out of notices and requiring the presentation
of proof of service of such notices; and, the heirs of Maximino From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this Court is able
did not propound sufficient evidence to debunk such to deduce that the CFI Order was in fact issued on 15 January
presumption. They only made a general denial of knowledge of 1960 and not 2 October 1952, as earlier stated in the Decision.
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least until 1985. There was It was the inventory of properties, submitted by Donata as
no testimony or document presented in which the heirs of administratrix of Maximino’s intestate estate, which was dated
Maximino categorically denied receipt of notice from the CFI of 2 October 1952.18 Other than such observation, this Court finds
the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The only nothing in the CFI Order which could change its original
evidence on record in reference to the absence of notice of position in the Decision under consideration.
such proceedings was the testimony of Aurelia Briones
(Aurelia), one of the heirs of Maximino, x x x. While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that
Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was not
xxxx able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of
the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the
Aurelia’s testimony deserves scant credit considering that she settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a
was not testifying on matters within her personal knowledge. proceeding in rem,19 and that the publication in the
The phrase "I don’t think" is a clear indication that she is newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set
merely voicing out her opinion on how she believed her uncles for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law,
and aunts would have acted had they received notice of is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated
in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in
newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all
It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, the Court interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the
was proceeding from an evaluation of the evidence on record, existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those
which did not include an actual copy of the CFI Order in who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition,
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. Respondents only submitted regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or
a certified true copy thereof on 15 June 2006, annexed to their involuntarily made.
Supplemental Reply to petitioners’ opposition to their motion
for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision. Respondents did
not offer any explanation as to why they belatedly produced a This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the
copy of the said Order, but merely claimed to have been result of the intestate proceedings instituted by Donata before
"fortunate enough to obtain a copy" thereof from the Register the trial court. As this Court pointed out in its earlier Decision,
of Deeds of Cebu.16 the manner by which the CFI judge conducted the proceedings
enjoys the presumption of regularity, and encompassed in
such presumption is the order of publication of the notice of the
Respondents should be taken to task for springing new intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails to show
evidence so late into the proceedings of this case. Parties any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also failed to
should present all their available evidence at the courts below order the publication in newspapers of the notice of the
so as to give the opposing party the opportunity to scrutinize intestate proceedings and to require proof from Donata of
and challenge such evidence during the course of the trial. compliance therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason
However, given that the existence of the CFI Order in Special or explanation as to why Maximino’s siblings could have
Proceedings No. 928-R was never in issue and was, in fact, missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of
admitted by the petitioners; that the copy submitted is a their brother.
certified true copy of the said Order; and that the said Order
may provide new information vital to a just resolution of the
In relying on the presumptions of the regular performance of here to answer for themselves, it would be the height of
official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate
rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, this the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be
Court is not, as counsel for respondents allege, sacrificing the clear, beyond a reasonable doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6
substantive right of respondents to their share in the Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498).
inheritance in favor of mere procedural fiats. There is a
rationale for the establishment of rules of procedure, as amply Moreover, even if Donata’s allegation that she was Maximino’s
explained by this Court in De Dios v. Court of Appeals20 – sole heir does constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify
abandonment of the CFI Order, dated 15 January
Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and 1960,22 considering the nature of intestate proceedings as
expeditious administration of justice by providing for a practical being in rem and the disputable presumptions of the regular
system by which the parties to a litigation may be accorded a performance of official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction
full and fair opportunity to present their respective positions by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15
and refute each other's submissions under the prescribed January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
requirements, conditions and limitations. Adjective law is not
the counterfoil of substantive law. In fact, there is a symbiotic On prescription of the right to recover based on implied trust
relationship between them. By complying faithfully with the
Rules of Court, the bench and the bar are better able to
discuss, analyze and understand substantive rights and duties Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donata’s
and consequently to more effectively protect and enforce misrepresentation constitutes fraud that would impose upon
them. The other alternative is judicial anarchy. her the implied trust provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code,
this Court still cannot sustain respondents’ contention that their
right to recover their shares in Maximino’s estate is
Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general rule, imprescriptible. It is already settled in jurisprudence that an
and abandonment thereof should only be done in the most implied trust, as opposed to an express trust, is subject to
exceptional circumstances. The presumptions relied upon by prescription and laches.
this Court in the instant case are disputable presumptions,
which are satisfactory, unless contradicted or overcome by
evidence. This Court finds that the evidence presented by The case of Ramos v. Ramos23 already provides an elucidating
respondents failed to overcome the given presumptions. discourse on the matter, to wit –

Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI that she "Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are
was her husband’s sole heir, it was not established that she created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied
did so knowingly, maliciously and in bad faith, so as for this trusts come into being by operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil
Court to conclude that she indeed committed fraud. This Court Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any
again brings to the fore the delay by which respondents filed interest therein may be proven by oral evidence. An implied
the present case, when the principal actors involved, trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid; Arts. 1443 and
particularly, Donata and Maximino’s siblings, have already 1457).
passed away and their lips forever sealed as to what truly
transpired between them. On the other hand, Special "No particular words are required for the creation of an express
Proceedings No. 928-R took place when all these principal trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid;
actors were still alive and each would have been capable to Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs.
act to protect his or her own right to Maximino’s estate. Letters Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546).
of Administration of Maximino’s estate were issued in favor of "Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and
Donata as early as 8 July 1952, and the CFI Order in question positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or
was issued only on 15 January 1960. The intestate by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to
proceedings for the settlement of Maximino’s estate were thus create a trust" (89 C.J. S. 122).
pending for almost eight years, and it is the burden of the
respondents to establish that their parents or grandparents, "Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are
Maximino’s surviving siblings, had absolutely no knowledge of deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of
the said proceedings all these years. As established in Ramos intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by
v. Ramos,21 the degree of proof to establish fraud in a case operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the
where the principal actors to the transaction have already particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are
passed away is proof beyond reasonable doubt, to wit – ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts (89
C.J.S. 722).
"x x x But length of time necessarily obscures all human
evidence; and as it thus removes from the parties all the "A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or
immediate means to verify the nature of the original created by the act or construction of law, but in its more
transactions, it operates by way of presumption, in favor restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and
of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It would be presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties,
unreasonable, after a great length of time, to require exact the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their
proof of all the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument of
expect a satisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real or conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are
apparent, with which it may be encumbered. The most that can found in Article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. See Padilla vs.
fairly be expected, in such cases, if the parties are living, from Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA
the frailty of memory, and human infirmity, is, that the material 168, 179).
facts can be given with certainty to a common intent; and, if
the parties are dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and in
parol agreements, the most that we can hope is to arrive at On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by
probable conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions construction of law, or arising by operation of law." In a more
of law, for exact knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought restricted sense and as contradistinguished from a resulting
not lightly to be imputed to the living; for, the legal trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words,
presumption is the other way; as to the dead, who are not either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to
create a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to
satisfy the demands of justice. It does not arise by agreement And whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its
or intention but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727). "If a enforcement may be barred by laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54
person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, supra;
courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called Compare with Mejia vs. Gampona, 100 Phil. 277). [Emphases
constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party." A supplied.]
constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense
(Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See Art. A present reading of the Quion 24 and Sevilla25 cases, invoked
1456, Civil Code). by respondents, must be made in conjunction with and guided
accordingly by the principles established in the afore-quoted
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the case. Thus, while respondents’ right to inheritance was
ownership of property entrusted to him (Palma vs. Cristobal, transferred or vested upon them at the time of Maximino’s
77 Phil. 712), or that an action to compel a trustee to convey death, their enforcement of said right by appropriate legal
property registered in his name in trust for the benefit of the action may be barred by the prescription of the action.
cestui qui trust does not prescribe (Manalang vs. Canlas, 94
Phil. 776; Cristobal vs. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810), or that the Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the disputed
defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action to properties based on implied trust is governed by Article 1144
recover property held by a person in trust for the benefit of of the New Civil Code, which reads –
another (Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or that
property held in trust can be recovered by the beneficiary
regardless of the lapse of time (Marabilles vs. Quito, 100 Phil. ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
64; Bancairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126; Juan vs. Zuñiga, years from the time the right of action accrues:
62 O.G. 1351; 4 SCRA 1221; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957,
May 31, 1962. See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147 Phil. 31, 37). (1) Upon a written contract;

That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the (2) Upon an obligation created by law;
rule is that the possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not
being adverse, he does not acquire by prescription the (3) Upon a judgment.
property held in trust. Thus, Section 38 of Act 190 provides
that the law of prescription does not apply "in the case of a
continuing and subsisting trust" (Diaz vs. Gorricho and Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law
Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266; Laguna vs. Levantino, 71 Phil. (specifically, in this case, by Article 1456 of the New Civil
566; Sumira vs. Vistan, 74 Phil. 138; Golfeo vs. Court of Code), then respondents had 10 years within which to bring an
Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12 SCRA 199; Caladiao vs. Santos, action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximino’s
63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691). properties. The next question now is when should the ten-year
prescriptive period be reckoned from. The general rule is that
an action for reconveyance of real property based on implied
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property trust prescribes ten years from registration and/or issuance of
held in trust may possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the title to the property,26 not only because registration under
the trustee has not repudiated the trust (Heirs of Candelaria the Torrens system is a constructive notice of title, 27 but also
vs. Romero, 109 Phil. 500, 502-3; Martinez vs. Graño, 42 Phil. because by registering the disputed properties exclusively in
35; Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O. G. 11033, 16 SCRA 849). her name, Donata had already unequivocally repudiated any
other claim to the same.
The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to constructive
trusts (Geronimo and Isidoro vs. Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil. By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special
145, 153. Compare with Cuison vs. Fernandez and Bengzon, Proceedings No. 928-R, Donata was able to register and
105 Phil. 135, 139; De Pasion vs. De Pasion, 112 Phil. 403, secure certificates of title over the disputed properties in her
407). name on 27 June 1960. The respondents filed with the RTC
their Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary possession of the disputed real properties, docketed as Civil
against the trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the Case No. CEB-5794, only on 3 March 1987, almost 27 years
property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed after the registration of the said properties in the name of
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the Donata. Therefore, respondents’ action for recovery of
cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been possession of the disputed properties had clearly prescribed.
made known to the cestui qui trust and (c) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive (Laguna vs. Levantino, supra; Moreover, even though respondents’ Complaint before the
Salinas vs. Tuason, 55 Phil. 729. Compare with the rule RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 also prays for partition of the
regarding co-owners found in the last paragraph of Article 494, disputed properties, it does not make their action to enforce
Civil Code; Casañas vs. Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona vs. De their right to the said properties imprescriptible. While as a
Guzman, L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153, 157). general rule, the action for partition among co-owners does not
prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly
With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is different. The recognized, as provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil
prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on Code, it bears to emphasize that Donata had never recognized
constructive trust is now settled (Alzona vs. Capunitan, L- respondents as co-owners or co-heirs, either expressly or
10228, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450; Gerona vs. De impliedly.28 Her assertion before the CFI in Special
Guzman, supra; Claridad vs. Henares, 97 Phil. 973; Gonzales Proceedings No. 928-R that she was Maximino’s sole heir
vs. Jimenez, L-19073, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80; necessarily excludes recognition of some other co-owner or
Boñaga vs. Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason & Co., vs. co-heir to the inherited properties; Consequently, the rule on
Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in
84). Prescription may supervene in an implied trust (Bueno vs. common does not apply to the case at bar.
Reyes, L-22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1179; Fabian vs.
Fabian, L-20449, January 29, 1968; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L- On laches as bar to recovery
17957, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 371).
Other than prescription of action, respondents’ right to recover On void judgment or order
possession of the disputed properties, based on implied trust,
is also barred by laches. The defense of laches, which is a Respondents presented only in their Reply and Supplemental
question of inequity in permitting a claim to be enforced, Reply to the petitioners’ Opposition to their Motion for
applies independently of prescription, which is a question of Reconsideration the argument that the CFI Order, dated 15
time. Prescription is statutory; laches is equitable.29 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R is void and,
thus, it cannot have any legal effect. Consequently, the
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an registration of the disputed properties in the name of Donata
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a pursuant to such Order was likewise void.
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is This Court is unconvinced.
based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the
discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.30
In the jurisprudence referred to by the respondents,33 an order
or judgment is considered void when rendered by the court
This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its Decision the without or in excess of its jurisdiction or in violation of a
basis for barring respondents’ action for recovery of the mandatory duty, circumstances which are not present in the
disputed properties because of laches. This Court pointed out case at bar.
therein31 that –
Distinction must be made between a void judgment and a
In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the voidable one, thus –
heirs of Maximino even emphasized that Donata lived along
the same street as some of the siblings of Maximino and, yet,
she failed to inform them of the CFI Order, dated [15 January "* * * A voidable judgment is one which, though not a mere
1960], in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and the issuance in nullity, is liable to be made void when a person who has a right
her name of new TCTs covering the real properties which to proceed in the matter takes the proper steps to have its
belonged to the estate of Maximino. This Court, however, invalidity declared. It always contains some defect which may
appreciates such information differently. It actually works become fatal. It carries within it the means of its own
against the heirs of Maximino. Since they only lived nearby, overthrow. But unless and until it is duly annulled, it is attended
Maximino’s siblings had ample opportunity to inquire or with all the ordinary consequences of a legal judgment. The
discuss with Donata the status of the estate of their deceased party against whom it is given may escape its effect as a bar or
brother. Some of the real properties, which belonged to the an obligation, but only by a proper application to have it
estate of Maximino, were also located within the same area as vacated or reversed. Until that is done, it will be efficacious as
their residences in Cebu City, and Maximino’s siblings could a claim, an estoppel, or a source of title. If no proceedings are
have regularly observed the actions and behavior of Donata ever taken against it, it will continue throughout its life to all
with regard to the said real properties. It is uncontested that intents a valid sentence. If emanating from a court of general
from the time of Maximino’s death on 1 May 1952, Donata had jurisdiction, it will be sustained by the ordinary presumptions of
possession of the real properties. She managed the real regularity, and it is not open to impeachment in any collateral
properties and even collected rental fees on some of them until action. * * *"
her own death on 1 November 1977. After Donata’s death,
Erlinda took possession of the real properties, and continued But it is otherwise when the judgment is void. "A void judgment
to manage the same and collect the rental fees thereon. is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested.
Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all
exercising rights of ownership over the real properties, in proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither
exclusion of all others, which must have already put the heirs binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all
of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still had claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to
rights thereto. enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. The purchaser
at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself without title and
The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They without redress." (Freeman on Judgments, sec. 117, citing
even attended his wake. They did not offer any explanation as Campbell vs. McCahan, 41 Ill., 45; Roberts vs. Stowers, 7
to why they had waited 33 years from Maximino’s death before Bush, 295, Huls vs. Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell vs. Goodrum,
one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of 3 Humph., 418; Andrews vs. State, 2 Sneed, 549;
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino on 21 Hollingsworth vs. Bagley, 35 Tex., 345; Morton vs. Root, 2
January 1985. After learning that the intestate estate of Dill., 312; Commercial Bank of Manchester vs. Martin, 9
Maximino was already settled in Special Proceedings No. 928- Smedes & M., 613; Hargis vs. Morse, 7 Kan., 259. See also
R, they waited another two years, before instituting, on 3 Cornell vs. Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dawson and Another vs. Wells,
March 1987, Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the Complaint for 3 Ind., 399; Meyer vs. Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414; Olson vs.
partition, annulment and recovery of the real property Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391; White vs. Foote L. & M. Co., 29 W.
belonging to the estate of Maximino. x x x Va., 385.)

Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted It is not always easy to draw the line of demarcation between a
paragraphs, as well as respondents’ conduct before this Court, void judgment and a voidable one, but all authorities agree that
particularly the belated submission of evidence and argument jurisdiction over the subject-matter is essential to the validity of
of new issues, respondents are consistently displaying a a judgment and that want of such jurisdiction renders it void
penchant for delayed action, without any proffered reason or and a mere nullity. In the eye of the law it is non-existent.
justification for such delay. (Fisher vs. Harnden, 1 Paine, 55; Towns vs. Springer, 9 Ga.,
130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga., 247; Beverly and McBride vs.
Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central Bank of Georgia vs. Gibson, 11
It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant Ga., 453; Johnson vs. Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and
and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. vs. Sandoval Coal and Mining
them to act. The law does not encourage laches, indifference, Co., 111 Ill., 32; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 Scam., 364; Miller vs.
negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3 Greene [Iowa], 374.)34
deserve the considerations of the courts, he must show that he
is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.32
The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by Donata on the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R did not
January 7, 1986, the Administratrix of the Hodges Estate
deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case, namely, the intestate estate of
rejected respondent’s offer in view of an application to
Maximino. Donata’s fraud and misrepresentation may have rendered the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960,
purchase already filed by the actual occupant of Lot 12, "in line
voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the said Order, which already became final and executory, can only
with the policy of the Probate Court to give priority to the actual
be set aside by direct action to annul and enjoin its enforcement. 35 It cannot be the subject of a collateral
occupants in awarding approval of Offers". While the check for
attack as is being done in this case. Note that respondents’ Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No.
initial down payment tendered by respondent was returned to
CEB-5794 was one for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed properties. The
him, he was nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to
annulment sought in the Complaint was not that of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, but of the
purchase Lot 11 and that if he could put up a sufficient down
certificates of title over the properties issued in Donata’s name. So until and unless respondents bring a
payment, the Estate could immediately endorse it for approval
direct action to nullify the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and attain a
of the Probate Court so that the property can be awarded to
favorable judgment therein, the assailed Order remains valid and binding.
him "should the occupant fail to avail of the priority given to
them."4
Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an action to annul an order or judgment based on fraud must be
brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.36 If it is conceded that the respondents came to
The following day, January 8, 1986, respondent again
know of Donata’s fraudulent acts only in 1985, during the course of the RTC proceedings which they
submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234
instituted for the settlement of Maximino’s estate, then their right to file an action to annul the CFI Order,
square meters for the amount of ₱35,100. Under the Order
dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (earlier instituted by Donata for the settlement of
dated November 18, 1986 issued by the probate court
Maximino’s estate), has likewise prescribed by present time.
(Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special
Proceedings No. 1672 ("Testate Estate of the Late Charles
In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Newton Hodges, Rosita R. Natividad, Administratrix"),
respondent’s Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was approved upon the
court’s observation that the occupants of the subject lots "have
not manifested their desire to purchase the lots they are
occupying up to this date and considering time restraint and
Republic of the Philippines considering further, that the sales in favor of the x x x offerors
SUPREME COURT are most beneficial to the estate x x x". On January 21, 1987,
Manila the probate court issued another Order granting respondent’s
motion for issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. The
EN BANC writ of possession over Lot 11 was eventually issued on June
27, 1989.5

A.M. No. P-01-1448               June 25, 2013

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-664-P) On November 21, 1994, a Deed of Sale With Mortgage
covering Lot 11 was executed between respondent and the
Hodges Estate represented by its Administratrix, Mrs. Ruth R.
RODOLFO C. SABIDONG, Complainant, Diocares. Lot 11 was thereby conveyed to respondent on
vs. installment for the total purchase price of ₱50,000.
NICOLASITO S. SOLAS (Clerk of Court IV), Respondent.
Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11836
DECISION in the name of C. N. Hodges was cancelled and a new
certificate of title, TCT No. T-107519 in the name of
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: respondent was issued on December 5, 1994. Lot 11 was later
subdivided into two lots, Lots 11-A and 11-B for which the
corresponding titles (TCT Nos. T-116467 and T-116468), also
The present administrative case stemmed from a sworn letter-
in the name of respondent, were issued on February 28,
complaint1 dated May 29, 1999 filed before this Court by
1997.6
Rodolfo C. Sabidong (complainant) charging respondent
Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Iloilo City with grave and serious misconduct, On motion of Ernesto Pe Benito, Administrator of the Hodges
dishonesty, oppression and abuse of authority. Estate, a writ of demolition was issued on March 3, 1998 by
the probate court in favor of respondent and against all
adverse occupants of Lot 11.7
The Facts

On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-

Trinidad Sabidong, complainant’s mother, is one of the
complaint asserting that as court employee respondent cannot
longtime occupants of a parcel of land, designated as Lot 11
buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in
(Lot 1280-D-4-11 of consolidation-subdivision plan [LRC] Pcs-
good faith), commit deception, dishonesty, oppression and
483) originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and
grave abuse of authority. Complainant specifically alleged the
situated at Barangay San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City. 2 The
following:
Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of
the said Estate (Hodges Estate), as the other half-portion was
occupied by Priscila Saplagio. Lot 11 was the subject of an 3. Complainant and his siblings, are possessors and
ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate, docketed as Civil occupants of a parcel of land situated at Brgy. San
Case No. 14706 of the MTCC Iloilo City, Branch 4 ("Rosita R. Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City, then identified as Lot No.
Natividad in her capacity as Administratrix of C.N. Hodges 1280-D-4-11, later consolidated and subdivided and
Estate, plaintiff vs. Priscila Saplagio, defendant"). On May 31, became known as Lot 11, then registered and titled in
1983, a decision was rendered in said case ordering the the name of Charles Newton Hodges. The Sabidong
defendant to immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased family started occupying this lot in 1948 and paid their
to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorney’s fees, monthly rentals until sometime in 1979 when the
expenses and costs.3 At the time, respondent was the Clerk of Estate of Hodges stopped accepting rentals. x x x
Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
4. Upon knowing sometime in 1987 that the property
Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to over which their house is standing, was being offered
Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. In a letter dated for sale by the Estate, the mother of complainant,
TRINIDAD CLAVERIO SABIDONG (now deceased), of Two Thousand (₱2,000.00) Pesos, allegedly for
took interest in buying said property, Lot 11; the expenses of the documentation of sale and
transfer of title, and again respondent promised that
5. TRINIDAD CLAVERIO SABIDONG, was then an the Sabidong family will not be ejected;
ordinary housekeeper and a laundrywoman, who
never received any formal education, and did not 12. To the prejudice and surprise of the complainant
even know how to read and write. When Trinidad and his family, respondent was able to secure an
Claverio Sabidong, together with her children and the order for the approval of his offer to purchase x x x in
complainant in this case, tried to negotiate with the Special Proceedings No. 1672 x x x;
Estate for the sale of the subject property, they were
informed that all papers for transaction must pass 13. Worse, respondent moved for the issuance of a
through the respondent in this case, Nicolasito Solas. Writ of Possession in his favor, which the probate
This is unusual, so they made inquiries and they court acted favorably x x x. A writ of possession was
learned that, Nicolasito Solas was then the Clerk of issued on June 27, 1989 x x x;
Court 111, Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Iloilo City and presently, the City Sheriff of Iloilo City;
14. x x x respondent took advantage of the trust and
confidence which the Sabidong family has shown,
6. The respondent Nicolasito Solas, then Clerk of considering that respondent was an officer of the
Court III, MTCC, Iloilo City, has knowledge, by reason court and a City Sheriff at that. The complainant and
of his position that in 1983 Hodges Estate was his family thought that respondent, being a City
ejecting occupants of its land. x x x Taking advantage Sheriff, could help them in the transfer of the title in
of this inside information that the land subject of an their favor. Never had they ever imagined that while
ejectment case in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, respondent had been receiving from them hard-
Iloilo City, whom respondent is a Clerk of Court III, earned monies purportedly for the sale of the subject
the respondent surreptitiously offered to buy the said property, respondent was also exercising acts of
lot in litigation. x x x ownership adverse to the interest of the complainant
and his family;
7. Complainant nor any member of his family did not
know that as early as 1984, the respondent had 15. Being an officer of the court and supposed to be
offered to purchase the subject lot from the estate x x an embodiment of fairness and justice, respondent
x. After receiving the notice of denial of his offer to acted with malice, with grave abuse of confidence
purchase, dated January 7, 1986, respondent made a and deceit when he represented that he can facilitate
second offer to purchase the subject property the the sale and titling of the subject property in favor of
following day, January 8, 1986, knowing fully well that the complainant and his family;
the subject property was being occupied. x x x
16. That when several thousands of pesos were
8. Because of this denial, respondent met with the given to the respondent as payment for the same and
family of the complainant and negotiated for the sale incidental expenses relative thereto, he was able to
of the property and transfer of the title in favor of the cause the transfer of the title in his favor. x x x;
latter. Respondent made the complainant and his
family believed that he is the representative of the
estate and that he needed a downpayment right 17. After the death of Trinidad Claverio Sabidong x x
away. All the while, the Sabidong family (who were x the respondent received from the complainant the
carpenters, laundrywomen, a janitor, persons who amount of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos x x x
belong to the underprivileged) relied on the When a receipt was demanded, respondent refused
representations of the respondent that he was to issue one, and instead promised and assured the
authorized to facilitate the sale, with more reason that complainant that they will not be ejected;
respondent represented himself as the City Sheriff;
xxxx
9. That between 1992-1993, a sister of the
complainant who was fortunate to have worked 19. The complainant again, through his sister-in-law,
abroad, sent the amount of Ten Thousand Socorro Sabidong, delivered and gave to the
(₱10,000.00) Pesos to complainant’s mother, to be respondent the amount of Three Thousand
given to respondent Nicolasito Solas. x x x After (₱3,000.00) Pesos as expenses for the subdivision of
receiving the money, respondent assured the the subject lot. The respondent facilitated the
Sabidong family that they will not be ejected from the subdivision and after the same was approved, the
lot, he being the City Sheriff will take care of complainant did not know that two (2) titles were
everything, and taking advantage of the illiteracy of issued in the name of the respondent. x x x;
Trinidad Claverio Sabidong, he did not issue any
receipt; 20. Meanwhile, respondent prepared a Contract to
Sell, for the complainant and his neighbor Norberto
10. True enough, they were not ejected instead it took Saplagio to affix their signatures, pursuant to their
the respondent some time to see them again and previous agreement for the buyers to avail of a
demanded additional payment. In the meanwhile, the housing loan with the Home Development Mutual
complainant waited for the papers of the supposed Fund (PAG-IBIG). Complainant attended the seminar
sale and transfer of title, which respondent had of the HDMF for seven (7) times, in his desire to
promised after receiving the downpayment of consummate the sale. However, when the
₱10,000.00; complainant affixed his signature in the contract, he
was surprised that the owner of the subject property
11. That sometime again in 1995, respondent again was the respondent. When complainant raised a
received from the mother of complainant the amount question about this, respondent assured complainant
that everything was alright and that sooner
 complainant will be the owner of the property. prohibits the purchase by certain court officers of property and
Complainant and his family, all these years, had rights in litigation within their jurisdiction. Court Administrator
believed and continued to believe that the owner was Benipayo recommended that:
the estate of Hodges and that respondent was only
the representative of the estate; 1. this administrative complaint be treated as an
administrative matter;
21. The Contract to Sell, appeared to have been
notarized on June 3, 1996, however, no copy thereof 2. respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV,
was given to the complainant by the respondent. OCC, MTCC, Iloilo City be SUSPENDED for six (6)
Respondent then, took the papers and documents months, with warning that a repetition of the same
required by the HDMF to be completed, from the offense in the future will be dealt with more severely;
complainant allegedly for the purpose of personally
filing the same with the HDMF. Complainant freely
and voluntarily delivered all pertinent documents to 3. inasmuch as there are factual issues regarding the
the respondent, thinking that respondent was helping delivery of substantial amounts which complainant
in the fast and easy release of the loan. While the alleged and which defendant denied, this issue
said documents were in the possession of the should be investigated and the Executive Judge of
respondent, he never made any transaction with the the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City should be
HDMF, worse, when complainant tried to secure a designated to hear the evidence and to make a report
copy of the Contract to Sell, the copy given was not and recommendation within sixty (60) days from
signed by the Notary Public, x x x; receipt.14

22. The complainant [was] shocked to learn that In a Resolution15 dated January 22, 2001, this Court adopted
respondent had canceled the sale and that the recommendation of the Court Administrator to treat the
respondent refused to return the documents required present administrative action as a regular administrative matter
by the HDMF. Respondent claimed that as Sheriff, he and to designate the Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City
can cause the demolition of the house of the to hear the evidence of the parties.
complainant and of his family. Respondent
threatened the complainant and he is capable of The Court, however, noted without action the Court
pursuing a demolition order and serve the same with Administrator’s recommendation to suspend respondent for six
the assistance of the military. x x x; months.

23. After learning of the demolition order, complainant On March 13, 2001, Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N.
attempted to settle the matter with the respondent, Elepaño forwarded the records of this case to Executive Judge
however, the same proved futile as respondent Tito G. Gustilo of the Iloilo City RTC.16 In a Resolution17 dated
boasted that the property would now cost at Four July 18, 2001, the Court referred this case to the Executive
Thousand Five Hundred (₱4,500.00) Pesos; Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City for investigation, report and
recommendation within 60 days from notice. By Order18 dated
24. The threats of demolition is imminent. Clearly, August 30, 2001, Executive Judge Gustilo set the case for
complainant and his family were duped by the reception of evidence.
respondent and are helpless victims of an officer of
the court who took advantage of their good faith and On March 19, 2004, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 37, dismissed
trust. Complainant later was informed that the subject the case for annulment of title, damages and injunction against
property was awarded to the respondent as his respondent for lack of merit.19
Sheriff’s Fees, considering that respondent executed
the decisions in ejectment cases filed by the Hodges In a Resolution20 dated June 15, 2005, the Court resolved to
estate against the adverse occupants of its vast reassign the instant administrative case to Executive Judge
properties; Rene S. Hortillo for investigation, report and recommendation
within 60 days from notice. In a Letter21 dated September 15,
25. A civil case for the Annulment of Title of the 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo informed the Court that per the
respondent over the subject property is pending records, the parties have presented their testimonial and
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 37 documentary evidence before retired Executive Judge Tito G.
and a criminal complaint for Estafa is also pending Gustilo.
preliminary investigation before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iloilo City, known as I.S. No. 1559-99, On September 12, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo required the
both filed [by] the complainant against the parties to file their respective memoranda within 60 days from
respondent.8 notice, upon submission of which the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution.22
Acting on the complaint, Court Administrator Alfredo L.
Benipayo issued a 1st Indorsement9 dated July 8, 1999, In his Memorandum,23 respondent maintained that his
requiring respondent to file his comment on the Complaint purchase of the subject land is not covered by the prohibition
dated May 29, 1999. On October 21, 1999, respondent in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. He pointed out
submitted his Comment.10 that he bought Lot 11-A a decade after the MTCC of Iloilo,
Branch 3, had ordered the ejectment of Priscila Saplagio and
In a Resolution11 dated July 19, 1999, Public Prosecutor Trinidad Sabidong from the subject lot. He insisted that public
Constantino C. Tubilleja dismissed the Estafa charge against trust was observed when complainant was accorded his right
respondent for insufficiency of evidence. of first refusal in the purchase of Lot 11-A, albeit the latter
failed to avail said right. Asserting that he is a buyer in good
On November 29, 2000, Court Administrator Benipayo issued faith and for value, respondent cited the dismissal of the cases
an Evaluation and Recommendation12 finding respondent for Estafa and annulment of title and damages which
guilty of violating Article 149113 of the Civil Code. Said rule complainant filed against him.
On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily retired from On February 11, 2009, the Court issued a
service. Prior to this, he wrote then Senior Deputy Court Resolution30 requiring the parties to manifest whether they are
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño, requesting for the release willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the
of his retirement benefits pending resolution of the pleadings and records already filed with the Court. However,
administrative cases against him.24 In a Memorandum25 dated the copy of the Resolution dated February 11, 2009 which was
September 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator sent to complainant was returned unserved with the postal
Elepaño made the following recommendations: carrier’s notation "RTS-Deceased." Meanwhile, in a
Compliance31 dated August 24, 2009, respondent expressed
a) The request of Nicolasito S. Solas, former Clerk of his willingness to submit the case for decision and prayed for
Court, MTCC, Iloilo City for partial release of his an early resolution of the case.
retirement benefits be GRANTED; and
Our Ruling
b) Atty. Lilian Barribal Co, Chief, Financial
Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court
be DIRECTED to (1) WITHHOLD the amount of Two officers such as clerks of court from acquiring property
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) from the involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their
retirement benefits of Nicolasito S. Solas to answer courts. Said provision reads:
for any administrative liability that the Court may find
against him in A.M. No. P-01-1448 (Formerly Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 99-664-P); OCA purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person
IPI No. 99-659-P; OCA IPI No. 99-670-P; and OCA or through the mediation of another:
IPI No. 99-753-P; and (2) RELEASE the balance of
his retirement benefits.26
xxxx
Eventually, the case was assigned to Judge Roger B. Patricio,
the new Executive Judge of the Iloilo City RTC for (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior
investigation, report and recommendation. and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
On June 2, 2008, Judge Patricio submitted his final Report and within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
Recommendation27 finding respondent liable for grave respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
misconduct and dishonesty under A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC or acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. Based on the respect to the property and rights which may be the object of
evidence presented, Judge Patricio concluded that respondent any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
misappropriated the money which he received for the filing of profession.
complainant’s loan application. Such money could not have
been used for the partition of Lot No. 1280-D-4-11 since the
same was already subdivided into Lots 11-A and 11-B when x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
respondent presented the Contract to Sell to complainant. And
despite respondent’s promise to keep complainant and his The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy
family in peaceful possession of the subject property, disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship
respondent caused the issuance of a writ of demolition against involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the
them. Thus, Judge Patricio recommended the forfeiture of peculiar control exercised by these persons.32 "In so providing,
respondent’s salary for six months to be deducted from his the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not
retirement benefits. to give occasion for fraud, which is what can and must be
done."33
In a Resolution28 dated September 29, 2008, the Court noted
Judge Patricio’s Investigation Report and referred the same to For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, property must take place during the pendency of the litigation
report and recommendation. involving the property.34 Where the property is acquired after
the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article
Findings and Recommendation of the OCA 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.35

In a Memorandum29 dated January 16, 2009, then Court In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on
Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent liable for November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706
serious and grave misconduct and dishonesty and which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become
recommended the forfeiture of respondent’s salary for six final. Be that as it may, it can not be said that the property is
months, which shall be deducted from his retirement benefits. no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was part
of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings (Sp.
Proc. No. 1672).
The Court Administrator held that by his unilateral acts of
extinguishing the contract to sell and forfeiting the amounts he
received from complainant and Saplagio without due notice, A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some
respondent failed to act with justice and equity. He found contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment
respondent’s denial to be anchored merely on the fact that he that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. 36 A
had not issued receipts which was belied by his admission that property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement
he had asked money for the expenses of partitioning Lot 11 continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court
from complainant and Saplagio. Since their PAG-IBIG loan issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and
applications did not materialize, complainant should have terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the
returned the amounts given to him by complainant and distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
Saplagio. probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated.37 The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all the debts
and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to Finally, in 1995, respondent received the amount of ₱2,000 to
receive the same.38 Since there is no evidence to show that defray the expenses for documentation and transfer of title in
Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already complainant’s name. In the latter instance, while it may be
been closed and terminated at the time of the execution of the argued that respondent already had the capacity to sell the
Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 subject property, the sum of all the circumstances belie an
is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of honest intention on his part to convey Lot 11-A to complainant.
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. We note the inscription in TCT No. T-11836 43 in the name of
C.N. Hodges that respondent executed a Request dated
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of February 19, 1997 "for the issuance of separate titles in the
respondent did not violate the rule on disqualification to name of the registered owner."44 Soon after, TCT No. T-
purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then 11646745 covering Lot 11-A and TCT No. T-116468 46 covering
pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he Lot 11-B were issued in the name of respondent on February
was Clerk of Court. 28, 1997 – only eight months after he executed the Contract to
Sell47 in favor of complainant on June 3, 1996.
On the charges against the respondent, we find him liable for
dishonesty and grave misconduct. Respondent’s bare denials were correctly disregarded by the
Court Administrator in the light of his own admission that he
indeed asked money from both complainant and Saplagio. The
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite evidence on record clearly established that by misrepresenting
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior as well as himself as the estate’s representative and as a court officer
gross negligence by a public officer. To warrant dismissal from having the power to protect complainant’s family from eviction,
service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, respondent was able to collect sums totaling ₱20,000 from
weighty, momentous and not trifling. The misconduct must complainant’s family. Even after the latter realized they were
imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The duped since respondent was already the owner of Lot 11, they
misconduct must also have a direct relation to and be still offered to buy the property from him. Respondent,
connected with the performance of the public officer’s official however, changed his mind and no longer wanted to sell the
duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, property after nothing happened to the loan applications of
intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the complainant and Saplagio. This subsequent unilateral
office.39 cancellation by respondent of the contract to sell with
complainant may have been an afterthought, and plainly
Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or unjustified, based merely on his own assumption that
betray; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, complainant could not make full payment. But it did not negate
probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and the deception and fraudulent acts perpetrated against
straightforwardness."40 complainant’s family who were forced into submission by the
constant threat of eviction. Such acts constitute grave
In this case, respondent deceived complainant’s family who misconduct for which respondent should be held answerable.
were led to believe that he is the legal representative of the
Hodges Estate, or at least possessed of such power to In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna
intercede for overstaying occupants of the estate’s properties Magallanes, Court Stenographer III, RTC Br. 28 and Bonifacio
like complainant. Boasting of his position as a court officer, a G. Magallanes, Process Server, RTC Br. 30, Bayombong,
City Sheriff at that, complainant’s family completely relied on Nueva Vizcaya,48 the Court stressed that to preserve decency
his repeated assurance that they will not be ejected from the within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just
premises. Upon learning that the lot they were occupying was contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical
for sale and that they had to negotiate for it through standards. In that case, we said that court employees are
respondent, complainant’s family readily gave the amounts he expected to be paragons of uprightness, fairness and honesty
demanded and, along with Saplagio, complied with the not only in their official conduct but also in their personal
requirements for a loan application with PAG-IBIG. All the dealings, including business and commercial transactions to
while and unknown to complainant’s family, respondent was avoid becoming the court’s albatross of infamy.49
actually working to acquire Lot 11 for himself.
More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 6713 50 or
Thus, while respondent was negotiating with the Hodges the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
Estate for the sale of the property to him, he collected as down and Employees mandates that public officials and employees
payment ₱5,000 from complainant’s family in July 1986. Four shall remain true to the people at all times. They must act with
months later, on November 18, 1986, the probate court justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against
approved respondent’s offer to purchase Lot 11. The latter anyone, especially the poor and the
received further down payment from complainant in the underprivileged.1âwphi1 They shall at all times respect the
amount of ₱10,000 between 1992 and 1993, or before the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to
Deed of Sale with Mortgage41 dated November 21, 1994 could law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
be executed in respondent’s favor. public safety and public interest.

Thereafter, respondent demanded ₱3,000 from complainant Under Section 52,51 Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
supposedly for the subdivision of Lot 11 between the latter and Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty and
the Saplagios. Yet, it was not until respondent obtained title grave misconduct are classified as grave offenses with the
over said lot that the same was subdivided into Lots 11-A and corresponding penalty of dismissal for the first offense. Section
11-B. The records42 of the case show that the Subdivision Plan 58(a) states that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the
dated April 25, 1996, duly approved by the Land Management cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and
Services (DENR) subdividing Lot 11 into sublots 11-A and 11- the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
B, was inscribed on February 28, 1997 – two years after TCT government service.
No. T-107519 covering Lot 11 was issued in respondent’s
name on December 5, 1994. Section 53 further provides that mitigating circumstances
attendant to the commission of the offense should be
considered in the determination of the penalty to be imposed
on the erring government employee. However, no such Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
mitigating circumstance had been shown. On the contrary,
respondent had been previously held administratively liable for Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his
irregularities in the performance of his duties as Clerk of Court. lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty
In A.M. No. P-01-1484,52 this Court imposed on respondent a Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation
fine of ₱5,000 for acting imprudently in notarizing documents Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties
and administering oath on matters alien to his official duties. in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his
And in A.M. Nos. P-08-2567 (formerly OCA IPI No. 99-670-P) real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer
and P-08-2568 (formerly OCA IPI No. 99-753-P),53 respondent Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
was found liable for simple misconduct and ordered to pay a
fine equivalent to his three (3) months salary to be deducted On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court
from his retirement benefits. (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita
as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings
Since respondent had compulsorily retired from service on No. 3094–CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition considering
September 10, 2007, for this additional administrative case he that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in
should be fined in an amount equivalent to his salary for six favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.
months which shall likewise be deducted from his retirement
benefits. As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the
estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration
and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but
retired Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo only personal properties” worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting
City, LIABLE FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00;
DISHONESTY. Respondent is FINED in an amount equivalent pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock
to his salary for six (6) months to be deducted from his of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock
retirement benefits. of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.2

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were

excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC
direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined
regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion through the
order of January 8, 1993.

On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the

order of January 8, 1993,3 supporting her inventory with copies
of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir
Realty shares of stock;4 the deed of assignment executed by
Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the
FIRST DIVISION
market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir
Realty shares of stock with total par value of
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014 P4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock issued on January
30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v. TERESITA V. P30,000.00.6
MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M.
SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita
ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents. to be examined under oath on the inventory, and that she
(Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal
opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting
DECISION
documents Teresita had submitted.

BERSAMIN, J.: On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the

need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for
ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or approval of the inventory.7cralawred
exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the
unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties inventory.
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set
status of each heir and whether property included in the dates for the hearing on that issue.8cralawlawlibrary
inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse. Ruling of the RTC

Antecedents After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the
RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded
1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado properties that should be included, and accordingly ruled:
(Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado,
Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and
Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two considerations, the Court hereby denies the administratrix’s
children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. motion for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders the
said administratrix to re–do the inventory of properties which INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE
are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.12
Mercado by including therein the properties mentioned in the
last five immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and then On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for
submit the revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice certiorari, disposing as follows:13
of this order.
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an petition is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders dated
account of her administration of the estate of the late Emigdio March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and
S. Mercado which had come to her possession. She must set aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels of land known as
render such accounting within sixty (60) days from notice Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301
hereof. square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land
SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17,
1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, submitted by the administratrix is concerned and affirmed in
timely sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14, all other respects.
2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot
No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to SO ORDERED.
Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed
of assignment had already come into the possession of and The CA opined that Teresita, et al.  had properly filed the
registered in the name of Mervir Realty. 10 Thelma opposed the petition for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a
motion. new inventory of properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to
Article 1477 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the ownership
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for of the thing sold “shall be transferred to the vendee” upon its
reconsideration,11 stating that there was no cogent reason for “actual and constructive delivery,” and to Article 1498 of
the reconsideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made through a
to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be public instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the object of
included or excluded from the inventory already estopped the sale, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the
them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue. ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty because the deed
of absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989 had been
Decision of the CA notarized; that Emigdio had thereby ceased to have any more
interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of land to Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 “for the
discretion in refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference that
her as administrator to include real properties that had been in the Deed of Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional
transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four seven (7) parcels of land were included”; that as to the
children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse orders January 10, 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been
of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 “even at the losing end considering that such parcels of land,
by petition for certiorari, stating: subject matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated February
12, 1989, were again given monetary consideration through
I shares of stock”; that even if the assignment had been based
on the deed of assignment dated January 10, 1991, the
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS parcels of land could not be included in the inventory
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) “considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable about
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN the estate planning scheme”; that the RTC, as an intestate
HOLDING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD court, also had no power to take cognizance of and determine
BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS the issue of title to property registered in the name of third
LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR persons or corporation; that a property covered by the Torrens
REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE system should be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. title; that the RTC, by disregarding the presumption, had
MERCADO. transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled
jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also gravely
II abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were
estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because of their
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) should be included in the inventory.
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE The CA further opined as follows:
POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE
NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled
CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF that petitioners are estopped from questioning its jurisdiction
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO. considering that they have already agreed to submit
themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what properties
III are to be included in or excluded from the inventory to be
submitted by the administratrix, because actually, a reading of
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION filed before public respondent court clearly shows that
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in
HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED which it was exercised for which they are not estopped, since
FROM QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of
UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE discretion amounting to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction
when it issued the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001
denying the administratrix’s motion for approval of the
inventory of properties which were already titled and in action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision
possession of a third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals.
a private corporation, which under the law possessed a Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on
personality distinct and separate from its stockholders, and in the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and
the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses,
fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there
of Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed. are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only
no authority to determine the applicability of the doctrine of after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for
piercing the veil of corporate fiction and even if public appealing the order being included in the appeal of the
respondent court was not merely acting in a limited capacity as judgment itself.
a probate court, private respondent nonetheless failed to
adjudge competent evidence that would have justified the The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an
court to impale the veil of corporate fiction because to appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65,
disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of a provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then
established since it cannot be presumed.14 is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s
reconsideration of Teresita, et al.15 motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated
May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were
Issue interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in
the inventory was not yet a final determination of their
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave ownership.  Hence, the approval of the inventory and the
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for
in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and
notwithstanding that such properties had been either subject to revision at anytime during the course of the
transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in administration proceedings.
Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court,
Ruling of the Court in affirming the decision of the CA to the effect that the order of
the intestate court excluding certain real properties from the
The appeal is meritorious. inventory was interlocutory and could be changed or modified
at anytime during the course of the administration
proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a final
but an interlocutory order “in the sense that it did not settle
I
once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots.” The
Court observed there that:
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends whether a certain property should or should not be included in
that the resort to the special civil action for certiorari  to assail the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title
the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co–respondents thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
was not proper. subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained. Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages
448–9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L–42257, June 14, 1976,
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a 71 SCRA 262, 266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)
remedy depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC
were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila–Garrido v. To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where
Tortogo,16 the Court distinguished the Court declared that a “probate court, whether in a testate
between final and interlocutory orders as follows: or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally,” and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of
Appeals, that the “patent reason is the probate court’s limited
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order
jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate
nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what
action.” Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of
the court has determined, but the latter does not completely
Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided
upon.  An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters
and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment All that the said court could do as regards the said properties
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a is determine whether they should or should not be included in
judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then
the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)
application for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an
interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct
of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders.
interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,21 which also governs
appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the of administration may be granted at the discretion of the court
judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law “that to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable” may administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes
be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule duty–bound to direct the preparation and submission of the
states that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving
because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to
the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of
expressly made non–appealable. letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of
Court, viz:
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a
practical recognition of the possibility that material issues may Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three
be finally determined at various stages of the special months. – Within three (3) months after his appointment every
proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of executor or administrator shall return to the court a true
Court  enumerates the specific instances in which multiple inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate
appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz: of the deceased which has come into his possession or
knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his
taken. – An interested person may appeal in special or their assistance.
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of
First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the
where such order or judgment: inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the decedent
in the inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the
(a) Allows or disallows a will; phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge,
which signifies that the properties must be known to the
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her
or the distributive share of the estate to which such person is possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no
entitled; exception, for the phrase  true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on possession of another person or entity.
behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is “to aid the court
guardian; in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the
executor or the administrator, and in making a final and
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to
estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee facilitate the administration of the estate.”23 Hence, the RTC
or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the that presides over the administration of an estate is vested
rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be with wide discretion on the question of what properties should
allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v.
Peralta,24 the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are
affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of
be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the administration of the
reconsideration. estates of deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample
discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them,
not come under any of the instances in which multiple appeals unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of
are permitted. discretion.”25 As long as the RTC commits no patently grave
abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the
regular performance of its judicial duty.
II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an
in directing the inclusion of the properties intestate court is special and limited. The trial court cannot
in the estate of the decedent? adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to
that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do
committed grave abuse of discretion for including properties in regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they
the inventory notwithstanding their having been transferred to should be included in the inventory of properties to be
Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for administered by the administrator. Such determination is
disregarding the registration of the properties in the name of provisional and may be still revised. As the Court said
Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of piercing in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26
the veil of corporate fiction.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either
Was the CA correct in its conclusion? as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters
having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the
CA, in reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the facts determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC. proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such
court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now. When
and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB–12690 which was
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title decided on October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the late
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner thereof.
said court could do as regards said properties is to determine Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the said case in
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of order to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is Richard Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So
no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the the said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to in the inventory in this case.
resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general
jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several
title. parcels of land by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir
Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified of Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N for the
by expediency and convenience. petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a transfer in
contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of
intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion death is one prompted by the thought that the transferor has
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property not long to live and made in place of a testamentary
without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78 of the
separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the
to the estate, or the question is one of collation or gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of the value at the time of his death of all property to the extent of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is made a transfer in contemplation of death. So, the inventory to
competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its be approved in this case should still include the said properties
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the of Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties actually
determination of the status of each heir and whether the appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S.
property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property Mercado at least ten (10) months after his death, as shown by
of the deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold the certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on
emphasis supplied) October 31, 1991 (Exhibit O).28

It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules
bases for its directive for the inclusion of the properties in of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for
question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz: preparing the inventory by the administrator. The aforequoted
explanations indicated that the directive to include the
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that properties in question in the inventory rested on good and valid
Emigdio Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina Mercado reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or
who, upon her death, left several properties as listed in the capricious.
inventory of properties submitted in Court in Special
Proceedings No. 306–R which are supposed to be divided Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from
among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory because
examined in Court by the counsel for the petitioner, that she Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the shares being
did not include in the inventory submitted by her in this case inherited by Emigdio.
the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina
Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting Emigdio Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior
Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina Mercado should be to the effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their
included in the inventory of properties required to be submitted property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains.29 For
to the Court in this particular case. purposes of the settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it was
unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific property
Mercado also admitted in Court that she did not include in the acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the
inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and
are in her name and which were paid by her from money that party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them
derived from the taxicab business which she and her husband by clear, categorical, and convincing evidence.30 In the
had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these shares of absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the
stock partake of being conjugal in character, one–half thereof conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be
or of the value thereof should be included in the inventory of provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the
the estate of her husband. affected properties were,31 and which of the properties should
form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the inventory.
Mercado admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank account
in her name at Union Bank which she opened when her Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already
husband was still alive. Again, the money in said bank account registered in the name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made
partakes of being conjugal in character, and so, one–half findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB–
thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties 12692, a dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot 3353,
constituting as estate of her husband. was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing Emigdio’s name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March
in this case that Lot No. 3353 of Pls–657–D located in Badian, 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had
Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters as remained registered in the name of Emigdio.
described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu is still Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case
No. CEB–12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB– to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.”37
12692 was susceptible of various interpretations, including one
to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could have already Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared
threshed out their differences with the assistance of the trial and submitted for the important purpose of resolving the
court. This interpretation was probable considering that Mervir difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs.
Realty, whose business was managed by respondent Richard, Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir
was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In other and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to “bring into
words, Mervir Realty appeared to be a family corporation. the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she)
may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument order that it may be computed in the determination of the
did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.”
the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any
the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir “may
notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon
to be. The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on
and convincing evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has the heir.” Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited
observed in Suntay v. Court of Appeals:33 jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters
relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or
vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the
intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and decedent.38
make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended
to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The The determination of which properties should be excluded
intention of the parties still and always is the primary from or included in the inventory of estate properties was well
consideration in determining the true nature of a within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate
contract. (Bold emphasis supplied) court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with
circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares was best to include all properties in the possession of the
of stock of Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to
Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in
executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his death the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC
was a circumstance that should put any interested party on his commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must
guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was a be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial
finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial
pancreas at the time.34 In this regard, whether the CA correctly or quasi–judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
characterized the exchange as a form of an estate planning despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
scheme remained to be validated by the facts to be that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
established in court. duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act
in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens board exercising judicial or quasi–judicial powers acted in a
titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the jurisdiction.39
circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the
deed of assignment. This is because: In light of the foregoing, the CA’s conclusion of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it erroneous.
is merely a system of registration of titles to lands. However,
justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders
complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in
and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No.
title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time 3094–CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio
of registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case;
Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of
sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration suit.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.35

Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the
deed of assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should still
be included in the inventory to enable the parties, by
themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test
and resolve the issue on the validity of the assignment. The
limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might have
constricted the determination of the rights to the properties
arising from that deed,36 but it does not prevent the RTC as
intestate court from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of
the properties subject of that deed. This is because the RTC
as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and limited
jurisdiction, was still “deemed to have all the necessary powers
Republic of the Philippines In an Order dated 3 January 2005, SILVERIO SR. was
SUPREME COURT removed as administrator and in his stead, SILVERIO, JR. was
Manila designated as the new administrator. A motion for
reconsideration was separately filed by SILVERIO SR. and
FIRST DIVISION Nelia Silverio-Dee ("SILVERIO-DEE") and on 31 May 2005,
the intestate court issued an Omnibus Order affirming among
others, the Order of 3 January 2005. Inthe same Order, the
G.R. Nos. 208828-29               August 13, 2014 intestate court also granted the motion of SILVERIO JR. to
take his oath as administrator effective upon receipt of the
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner, order and expunged the inventory report filed by SILVERIO
vs. SR.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC.,
MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2 RESOURCES, On 12 December 2005 the intestate court acting on the motion
INC., Respondents. filed by SILVERIO SR. recalled the Order granting letters of
administration to SILVERIO JR. and reinstated SILVERIO SR.
DECISION as administrator. Then again, the intestate court acting on the
motion for partial consideration to the Order dated 12
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: December 2005 filed by SILVERIO JR. issued an Omnibus
Order dated 31 October 2006 upholding the grant of Letters of
Administration to SILVERIO JR. and removed SILVERIO SR.,
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the ad administrator for gross violation of his duties and functions
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to reverse and set under Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
aside the Decision1 dated March 8, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) insofar as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 121173 and 122024
are concerned, and Resolution2 dated July 4, 2013 denying SILVERIO SR. moved for reconsideration of the above Order
petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The CA nullified whereas SILVERIO-DEE on the other hand, filed a Petition for
the preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court Certiorari before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R.
(RTC) of Makati City ("intestate court"), Branch 57 in Sp. Proc. SP No. 97196. On 28 August 2008, the Court of Appeals
No. M-2629 and reversed said court's Order dated August 18, (Seventh Division) rendered a decision reinstating SILVERIO,
2011 declaring the sales and derivative titles over two SR. as administrator, the decretal portion of the Order reads:
properties subject of intestate proceedings as null and void.
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of the
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration
summarized by the CA, are as follows: The late Beatriz S. to and the taking of an oath of administration by Ricardo
Silverio died without leaving a will on October 7, 1987. She Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as
was survived by her legal heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio, are declared
Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo S. Silverio NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier
(son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia S.Silverio-Dee issued is MADE PERMANENT in regard to the said portions.
(daughter), and Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter). Subsequently, Respondent RTC is ORDERED to reinstate Ricardo Silverio,
an intestate proceeding (SP PROC. NO. M-2629) for the Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs
settlement of her estate was filed by SILVERIO, SR. against the Private Respondents.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different SO ORDERED."

petitions and appeal challenging several orders ofthe intestate
court that went all the way up to the Supreme Court. To better SILVERIO JR. filed a Petition for review on Certioraribefore the
understand the myriad of factual and procedural antecedents Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 185619 challenging the
leading to the instant consolidated case, this court will resolve 28 Augsut 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals. On 11
the petitions in seriatim. February 2009, the Supreme Court issued a resolution
denying the petition for failure to sufficiently show any
The Petitions reversible error inthe assailed judgment to warrant the
exercise by the Court of discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
Acting on SILVERIO JR.’s motion for reconsideration, the
CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 Supreme Court on 11 February 2011, denied the motion with
finality. An entry of judgment was made on 29 March 2011.
The first petition of the three consolidated petitions is CA-G.R.
SP No. 121172 wherein petitioner, RICARDO S. SILVERIO On 25 April 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed before the intestate
JR. ("SILVERIO JR.") assails the Order ofthe intestate court court, an urgent motion to be reinstated as administrator of the
dated 16 June 2011 reinstating RICARDO SILVERIO SR. estate. Acting on the motion, the intestate court issued the now
("SILVERIO SR.") as administrator to the estate of the late challenged Order dated 16 June 2011, the pertinent portion of
Beatriz Silverio. the Order reads:

The administrator first appointed by the Court was EDGARDO xxxx

SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by virtue of a Joint
Manifestation dated 3 November 1999 filed by the heirs of
BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO, the motion to withdraw as "WHEREFORE, upon posting of a bond in the sum of TEN
administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved by the MILLION PESOS, the same to be approved by this Court, Mr.
intestate court and in his stead, SILVERIO SR. was appointed Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. is hereby ordered reinstated as the
as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active exchange of Administrator to the estate of the late Beatriz Silverio and to
pleadings to remove and appoint a new administrator ensued immediately take his oath as such, and exercise his duties and
between SILVERIO SR. and SILVERIO JR. The flip-flopping functions as are incumbent under the law upon the said
appointment of administrator is summarized below: position. xxx."
xxxx SO ORDERED."

CA-G.R. SP No. 121173 By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO, JR. on 16 October
2007 executed a Deed of Absolute Salein favor of CITRINE
xxxx HOLDINGS, Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property located at No.
3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. CITRINE became the
registered owner thereof on 06 September 2010 as evidenced
On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and by TCT No. 006-201000063.
LIGAYA represented by her legal guardian moved for the
disqualification and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO, JR.
based on the following grounds: (1) Absence of the written A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of
consent of all parties in interest allowing JUDGE GUANLAO, Monica P. Ocampo (notarized on September 16, 2010) for the
JR. to continue hearing the case considering that he appeared lot located at No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati
once as counsel in the intestate proceedings; (2) JUDGE City. On 23 December 2010, TCT No. 006-2011000050 was
GUANLAO, JR. has shown bias and partiality in favor of issued toMonica P. Ocampo. The latter subsequently sold said
SILVERIO SR. by allowing the latter to pursue several motions property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc. (ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-
and even issued a TRO in violation of the rules against forum 2011000190 was issued on 11 February 2011 under its name.
shopping; (3) Heir LIGAYA’s Petition for Support and Release
of Funds for Medical Support has not been resolved; and (4) It In the interim, or on 12 December 2006 SILVERIO-DEE filed a
is in the best interest of all the heirs that the proceedings be petition for certioraribefore the Court of Appeals docketed as
presided and decided by the cold neutrality of an impartial CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 with prayer for injunctive relief. As
judge. prayed for, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on 5 February 2007. On 4 July 2007,
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. issued an order the Court issueda Writ of Preliminary Injunction conditioned
denying the Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition. The upon the posting of the bond in the amount of two million
movants filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was pesos (Php2,000,000.00). SILVERIO-DEE posted the required
denied in an order dated 14 June 2011. Hence, the instant bond on February 5, 2007 but in an order dated 3 January
petition. 2008, the Court ruled that the bond posted by SILVERIO-DEE
failed to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court,
however, did not reverse the ruling granting the injunction but
xxxx instead ordered SILVERIO-DEE to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-
02-SC. The Court also increased the bond from two million to
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024 ten million. On 29 February 2008, the Court issued a
Resolution approving the ten million bond and issued the Writ
xxxx of Preliminary Injunction. Eventually, on 28 August 2008 the
Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) issued a decision
reinstating SILVERIO SR. as administrator and declaring the
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October Writ of Preliminary Injunction permanent in regard to the
2006, ordered among others, the sale of certain properties appointment of administrator.
belonging to the estate. The portion of the order which is
pertinent to the present petition reads:
On 04 February 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent
Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
"WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court for the Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (With Motion For the
foregoing reasons resolves to grant the following: Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces
Tecum) praying among others, that a TRO be issued
(1) xxx restraining and/or preventing SILVERIO, JR., MONICA
OCAMPO, CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and their successors-
in-interest from committing any act that would affect the titles
(2) xxx
to the three properties.

(3) Allowing the sale of the properties located at (1)

On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Omnibus
No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City,
Motion (a) To Declare as Null and Void the Deed of Absolute
covered by T.C.T. No. 137155 issued by Register of
Sale dated 16 September 2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer
Deeds of Makati City; (2) No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes
Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c) To reinstate
Park, Makati City covered by T.C.T. No. 4137154
the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the name of
issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City; and
Ricardo C. SilverioSr. and the Intestate Estate of the late
(3) No. 19 Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd. Makati City
Beatriz S. Silverio.
covered by TCT No. 137156 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Makati City to partially settle the intestate
estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, and authorizing On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued an Order
the Administrator to undertake the proper procedure granting a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining SILVERIO
or transferring the titles involved to the name of the JR., their agent or anybody acting in their behalf from
estate; and committing any act that would affect the titles to the properties
and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati City from
accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in
(4) To apply the proceeds of the sale mentioned in
any way giving due course to whatever deeds, instruments or
Number 3 above to the payment of taxes, interests,
any other documents involving voluntary or involuntary
penalties and other charges, if any, and todistribute
dealings which may have the effect of transferring, conveying,
the residue among the heirs Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.,
encumbering, ceding, waiving, alienating, or disposing in favor
Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S. Silverio represented
of any individual or any entity of the subject properties.
by Legal Guardian Nestor S. Dela Merced II,
Subpoena ad testificandumand duces tecumwas also issued
Edmundo S. Silverio and Nelia S. SilverioDee in
by the intestate court requiring SILVERIO, JR., MONICA
accordance with the law on intestacy.
OCAMPO and ALEXANDRA GARCIA of CITRINE to testify
and bring with them any books and documents under their
control to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision, the falloof
transaction involving the properties in question. which reads:

On 9 March 2011, SILVERIO Sr. filed a Supplement to the WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Court
Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 14 February 2011. On 18 hereby disposes and orders the following:
August 2011, the intestate court rendered the now assailed
Order the decretal portion of the Order is quoted hereunder: 1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No. 121172is
DENIEDfor lack of merit. Accordingly, the 16 June
"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that: 2011 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 57 reinstating MR. RICARDO C. SILVERIO,
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September SR. as Administrator is AFFIRMED.
2010 as VOID:
2. The petition in CA GR. S.P. No. 121173is partly
2. The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006- DENIEDfor lack of merit insofar as it questions the 23
2011000050 in the name of defendant MONICA March 2011 Order denying RICARDO SILVERIO,
OCAMPO or any of her successors-in- JR’s Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition of
interestincluding all derivative titles, as NULL AND Judge Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr. The petition is partly
VOID; GRANTEDin that the Preliminary Injunction issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 is
herebydeclared NULL and VOID for being issued with
3. The Transfer Certificate of Title TCT No. 006- grave abuse of discretion.
2011000190 in the name of ZEE2 RESOURCES,
INC. or any of its successors-in-interest including all
derivative titles, as NULL AND VOID; 3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No. 122024is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the 18 August 2011 Order
declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer
4. (T)he Register of Deeds of Makati City to CANCEL Certificate of Title and all derivative titles over the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050, Cambridge and Intsia Property null and void is hereby
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000190 and REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
all of its derivative titles; and 5. Reinstating the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the name
of RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. AND THE SO ORDERED.4
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE BEATRIZ
SILVERIO, and AS TO THE INTSIA PROPERTY: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (petitioner) filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration5 "insofar as its ruling in CA-G.R. SP No.
1. The Register of Deeds ofMakati City to 122024" praying that the August 18, 2011 Order of the
CANCEL Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. intestate court be affirmed. By Resolution dated July 4, 2013,
006-2010000063, in the name of CITRINE the CA denied his motion for partial reconsideration.
HOLDINGS, INC. and all of its derivative
titles; and Hence, this petition contending thatthe CA committed a
reversible error in upholding the validity of the Intsia and
2. The reinstatement of Transfer Certificate Cambridgeproperties upon the ground that the intestate court
of Title No. 223612 in the name of cannotannul the sales as it has a limited jurisdiction only and
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. and the which does not includeresolving issues of ownership. It is
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE asserted that the CA should nothave stopped there and looked
BEATRIZ SILVERIO. into the nature of the properties sold, which formed part of the
conjugal partnership of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and Beatriz S.
Silverio.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the order of the intestate
x x x x3 court annulling the sales of the Cambridge and Intsia
properties. In the alternative, should the said sales be upheld,
The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by respondent petitioner prays that this Court (1) declare the sales to be valid
Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. ("Silverio, Jr.") before the CA only to the extent of 50% net remainder share of the late
questioned the following issuances of the intestate court: CA- Beatriz less the corresponding shares therefrom of petitioner
G.R. SP No. 121172 – Order dated June 16, 2011 reinstating and the other legal compulsory heirs, and (2) order respondent
Silverio, Sr. as Administrator; CA-G.R. SP No. 121173 – (1) Silverio, Jr. to account for the proceeds of sales for distribution
Order dated March 23,2011 granting Silverio, Sr.’s application of the residue among the legal/compulsory heirs.
for preliminary injunction enjoining Silverio, Jr. or anyone
acting on their behalf from committing any act that would affect In their Comment, respondents Silverio, Jr., Monica Ocampo
the titles to the subject properties and enjoining the Register of and Citrine Holdings, Inc. argued that the intestate court
Deeds of Makati City from accepting, admitting, approving, should not have ruled on the validity of the sale of the subject
registering, annotating or in any way giving due course to properties to third parties after it itself had authorized their
whatever deeds, instruments or any other documents involving disposal in partial settlementof the estate, especially so when
the Cambridge and Intsia properties, (2) Order dated March separate actions assailing the new titles issued to said third
23, 2011 which denied Silverio, Jr.’s motion or disqualification parties were already instituted by petitioner.
and/or inhibition of Judge Guanlao, Jr., and (3) Order dated
June 14, 2011 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
March 23, 2011 Order (granting application for preliminary As to the issue of alleged lack ofprior consent of petitioner to
injunction); and in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024 – Order dated the aforesaid sales as the surviving spouses with a 50%
August 18, 2011 declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT conjugal share in the subject properties, respondents point out
and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and that such is belied by the October 31, 2006 Order of the
Intsiaproperties as null and void. intestate court, which clearly showed that counsels of all the
heirs were present at the hearing of June 16, 2006 and no been effected without authority from said court. It is the
objection was made by them to the sale of the properties and probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve
the partial settlement of the Estate of Beatriz S. Silverio, the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said
together with the transfer of titles of these properties in the court that can declare it null and void for as long as the
name of the Estate as prayed for in petitioner’s Manifestation proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold
and Motion dated April 19, 2006. Petitioner had not challenged petitioner’s contention that the probate court cannot annul the
or appealed the said order authorizing the sale of the subject unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power
properties. Thus, it is too late in the day for petitioner to raise pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755).
this factual issue before this Court, not to mention that it (italics ours) Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any
cannot be ventilated in the present appeal by certiorari as disposition of estate property by an administrator or
thisCourt is not a trier of facts. prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court
approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate
Respondent ZEE2 Resources Corporation filed its Comment property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no
contending that the intestate court improperly nullified the titles need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
despite the fact that the present registered owners, who are disposition. (Emphasis supplied.)
indispensable parties, were not impleaded. Indeed, a Torrens
title cannot be collaterally attacked and may be cancelled only In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by
in a direct proceeding brought for the purpose. Respondent respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the intestate
points out that petitioner himself recognized thata direct action court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006.
is required to annul a Torrens title ashe initially instituted two Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled by the said
civil complaints before the RTC of Makati City seeking to court on motion by petitioner.
annul, among others, the TCT’s issued to respondent Ocampo
for the Cambridge property. After failing to secure restraining In reversing the intestate court’s order annulling the sale of the
orders in these two civil cases, petitioner filed in the intestate subject properties, the CA noted that said ruling is anchored
court his Urgent OmnibusMotion dated February 14, 2011 to on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time
annul the said titles, including that of ZEE2. In any case, when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-
respondent maintains that it is a buyer of good faith and for G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect. It then concluded that
value, of which the intestate court never made a determination the eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of
nor did the aforesaid Urgent Omnibus Motion and Supplement preliminary injunction permanent only with respect to the
to the Omnibus Motion dated March 4, 2011 contain appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to the grant
allegations indicating that respondent ZEE2 was not a buyer in of authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale was
good faith and for value. executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction were in effect.
According to respondent ZEE2, petitioner’s act of filing a
separate complaint with application for a temporary restraining The CA’s ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:
order (TRO) and preliminary injunction on January 31, 2011 in
another court (Civil Case Nos. 11-084 of the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 143) constitutes willful and deliberate forum The more crucial question that needs to be addressed is:
shopping asthe former also prayedsimilar primary reliefs and Whether the authority to sell the properties in question granted
setting up the alleged nullity of the subject deeds of absolute under the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was nullified by
sale as those raised in the Urgent Omnibus Motion and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196.
Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed in the intestate A look at the dispositive portion of the decision in CA-G.R. SP
court. No. 97196 would lead us to reasonably conclude that the grant
of authority to sell is still good and valid. The fallo of the
decision reads:
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having
jurisdiction over properties under administration has the
authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, "WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of the
but also to annul an unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration
or administrator. Thus we held in Lee v. Regional Trial Court of to and the taking of an oath of administration by Ricardo
Quezon City, Branch 856: Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as
administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio, are declared
NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of issued is made permanent in regard to the said portions.
the estate, without court approval. It is well-settled that court Respondent RTC is ORDERED to reinstate Ricardo Silverio,
approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the Sr. as administrator of the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs
decedent’s estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano, we against the Private Respondents.
laid down the rule that the sale of the property of the estate by
an administrator without the order of the probate court is void
and passes no title to the purchaser. And in the case of Dillena SO ORDERED."
vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that: x x x x
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court
It being settled that property under administration needs the in so far as it authorizes the saleof the three properties in
approval of the probate court before it can be disposed of, any question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh
unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null Division as null and void.It is axiomatic that it is the dispositive
and void. Asearly as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. portion of the decision that finally invests rights upon the
Orellano(42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and
administrator of property of the deceased, which is not imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.
authorized by the probate court is null and void and title does
not pass to the purchaser. From all the foregoing, We declare that it was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the intestate court when it ordered the
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare sale of the Cambridge Property and Intsia Property as NULL
null and void the disposition of the property under and VOID citing as justification the decision of the Court of
administration, made by private respondent, the same having Appeals, Seventh Division in CAG.R. SP No. 97196. To
reiterate, the injunction order which was made permanent by WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) was declared to be March 8, 2013 and Resolution dated July 4, 2013 of the Court
limited only to the portion ofthe Omnibus Order that upheld the of Appeals in CAG.R. SP Nos. 121173 and 122024 are
grant of letters of administrationby SILVERIO, JR. and the AFFIRMED.
removal of SILVERIO, SR. as administrator and nothing else.
With costs against the petitioner.
Anent the preliminary injunction issued by the intestate court in
its Order dated 23 March 2011 and challenged by SILVERIO
JR. in CA-G.R. SP No. 121173, we find that it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion as it was directed against acts which
were already [fait]accompli. The preliminary injunction sought
to: 1) restrain SILVERIO JR., their agents, or anybody acting in
their behalf or any person from committing any act that would
affect the titles to the subject properties belonging to the
Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio and (2) enjoining
the Register of Deeds of Makati City from accepting, admitting,
approving, registering, annotating or in any giving due course
to whatever deeds, instruments or any other documents
involving voluntary or involuntary dealings which may have the
effect of transferring, conveying, encumbering, ceding,
waiving, alienating or disposing in favor of any individual or
any entity the above-enumerated properties belonging to the
Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio. However, the
records show that when the preliminary injunction was issued
on 23 March 2011 new titles over the disputed properties were
already issued to CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and ZEE2
RESOURCES INC.7 (Emphasis supplied.)

We affirm the CA.

It bears to stress that the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order

was issued by the intestate court acting upon pending motions
filed by petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., father and son,
respectively, who are the central figures in the now decade-old
controversy over the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S.
Silverio. The intestate court flip-flopped in appointing as
administrator of the estate petitioner and respondent Silverio,
Jr., their personal conflicts becoming more evident to the
intestate court as the proceedings suffered delays. At the
hearing of the urgent motion filed by Edmundo Silverio to sell
the subject properties and partially settle the estate, the much
awaited opportunity came when the heirs represented by their
respective counsels interposed no objection to the same.

While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as

Administrator pursuant to the August 28, 2008 decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia
Silverio-Dee), weagree with the CA that the permanent
injunction issued under the said decision, as explicitly stated in
its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the October 31, 2006
Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration
to and taking of an oath of administration by respondent
Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have expressly set
aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing
the sale of the subject properties. Moreover, the CA Decision
attained finality only on February 11, 2011 when this Court
denied with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.’s motion for
reconsideration of the February 11, 2009 Resolution
denyinghis petition for review (G.R. No. 185619).1âwphi1

The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011
Order of the intestate court annulling the sale of the subject
properties grounded solely on the injunction issued in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97196. Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2
should not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of
Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good faith
that the sale was authorized and with prior approval of the
intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31,
2006 which remained valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed
the aforesaid sale.
THIRD DIVISION also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation,
Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides,
G.R. No. 187524, August 05, 2015 among others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the family home
to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million
as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG AND FRANCISCO VILLAFRIA, petitioners for P650,000.00.11redarclaw
SUBSTITUTED BY DR. RUEL B.
VILLAFRIA, Petitioners, v. MA. GRACIA RIÑOZA PLAZO On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the
AND MA. FE RIÑOZA ALARAS, Respondents. subject properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to
irregularities in the documents of conveyance offered by
DECISION petitioners.as well as the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial
PERALTA, J.: Settlement was notarized by a notary public who was not duly
commissioned as such on the date it was executed.12 The
Deed of Sale was undated, the date of the acknowledgment
Before the-Court is a petition for review on certiorari under therein was left blank, and the typewritten name "Pedro
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside Riñoza, Husband" on the left side of the document was not
the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated March 13, 2009 and April signed.13 The trial court also observed that both documents
23, 2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. were never presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for
SP No. 107347, which affirmed the Judgment3 dated October registration and that the titles to the subject properties were
1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, still in the names of Pedro and his second wife Benita. In
Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217. addition, the supposed notaries and buyers of the subject
properties were not even presented as witnesses who
The antecedent facts are as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw supposedly witnessed the signing and execution of the
documents of conveyance.14 On the basis thereof, the trial
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, court ruled in favor of respondents, in its Judgment, the
leaving several heirs, including his children with his first wife, pertinent portions of its fallo provide:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well
as several properties including a resort covered by Transfer WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is
Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No. 51355, each with hereby rendered as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on
which it stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both x x x x
located in Nasugbu, Batangas.4redarclaw
4. a) Declaring as a nullity the Extra-Judicial Settlement with
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Renunciation, Repudiation and Waiver of Rights and Sale"
Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession5 dated (Exh. "1", Villafria) notarized on December 23, 1991 by Notary
September 15, 1993, respondents alleged that sometime in Public Antonio G. Malonzo of Manila, Doc. No. 190, Page No.
March 1991, they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro's 20, Book No. IXII, Series of 1991.
second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold the
subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "2",
and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by Villafria), purportedly executed by Benita T. Riñoza in favor of
their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, purportedly
consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita notarized by one Alfredo de Guzman, marked Doc. No. 1136,
acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document Page No. 141, Book No. XXX, Series of 1991.
she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which,
however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan c) Ordering the forfeiture of any and all improvements
obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.6 The document introduced by defendants Francisco Villafria dnd Maria Butiong
actually evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount in the properties covered by TCT No. 40807, 40808, 51354
of P87,352.62 releasing her and her late husband's and 51355 of the Register of Deeds for Nasugbu, Batangas.
indebtedness therefrom.7 Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds
of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any 5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons,
transaction involving the subject properties, giving them whose occupancy within the premises of the four (4) parcels of
certified true copies of the titles to the same. When land described in par. 4-c above is derived from the rights and
respondents went to the subject properties, they discovered interest of defendant Villafria, to vacate its premises and to
that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been demolished. deliver possession thereof, and all improvements existing
They were not, however, able to enter as the premises were thereon to plaintiffs, for and in behalf of the estate of decedent
padlocked. Pedro L. Riñoza.

Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a 6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the defendants-heirs in the
notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late Amended Complaint to be the legitimate heirs of decedent
father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, Pedro L. RifSoza, each in the capacity and degree
they caused the annotation of their adverse claims over the established, as well as their direct successors-in-interest, and
subject properties before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu ordering the defendant Registrar of Deeds to issue the
and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the corresponding titles in their names in the proportion
annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties established by law, pro indiviso, in TCT Nos. 40807, 40808,
to the petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant 51354, 51355 and 40353 (after restoration) within ten (10)
thereto.8redarclaw days from finality of this Decision, upon payment of lawful fees,
except TCT No. 40353, which shall be exempt from all
In their Answer,9 petitioners denied the allegations of the expenses for its restoration.
complaint on the ground of lack of personal knowledge and
good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of With no costs.
his testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further
contended that what they purchased was only the resort. 10 He SO ORDERED.15
 Villafrias failed in this regard.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's Judgment in its
Decision16 dated October 31, 2006 in the following As aforestated, the Villafrias did not present as witnesses
wise:LawlibraryofCRAlaw (a) the notary public who purportedly notarized the
questioned instrument, (b) the witnesses who appeared]
The person before whom the resort deed was in the instruments as eyewitnesses to the signing, or (c)
acknowledged, Alfredo de Guzman, was not an expert to prove the authenticity and genuineness of all
commissioned as a notary public from 1989 to July 3, the signatures appearing o,n the said instruments. Verily,
1991, the date the certification was issued. Such being the the rule that, proper foundation must be laid for the
case, the resort deed is not a public document and the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity
presumption of- regularity accorded to public documents and authenticity of the document must be reasonably
will not apply to the same. As laid down in Tigno, el al. v. established as a prerequisite to its admission, was
Aquino, et al.:LawlibraryofCRAlaw prudently observed by the lower court when it refused to
admit the settlement/family home and the resort deeds as
The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from their veracity are doubtful.17
the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public does Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria,
net have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 2006
anyway, then the document should be treated as raising the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that
unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps when the Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of
may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on Title and Recovery of Possession was filed, there was yet no
the proferred authority of the notary public or the person settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to the nature
pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render thereof, nor was there an identification of the number of
merely officious the elaborate process devised by this Court in legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the settlement
order that a lawyer may receive a notarial of the intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary jurisdiction when
commission. Without such a rule, the notarization of a the action filed was for Judicial Partition. Considering that the
document by a duly-appointed notary public will have the instant action is really one for settlement of intestate estate,
same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer the trial court, sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction,
engaged in pretense. exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the issues of
forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that said ruling
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal is void and has no effect for having been rendered without
effect. Notarization of a private document converts such jurisdiction. The Motion for Reconsideration was, however,
document into a public one, and renders it admissible in denied by the appellate court on February 26, 2007.
court without further proof of its authenticity. Thus,
notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's
public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that Petition for Review on Certiorari for submitting a verification of
interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or the petition, a certificate of non-forum shopping and an
authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the affidavit of service that failed to comply with the 2004 Rules on
public and the courts and administrative offices Notarial Practice regarding competent evidence of affiant's
generally.Parenthetically, the settlement/family home deed identities.18 In its Resolution19 dated September 26, 2007, this
cannot be considered a public document. This is because Court also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in the
the following cast doubt on the document's authenticity, absence of any compelling reason to warrant a modification of
to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw the previous denial. Thus, the June 20, 2007 Resolution
became final and executory on October 31, 2007 as certified
1.) The date of its execution was not indicated; by the Entry of Judgment issued by the Court.20redarclaw
2.) The amount of consideration was superimposed;
3.) It was not presented to the Registry of Deeds of On January 16, 2008, the Court further denied petitioner's
Nasugbu, Batangas for annotation; and motion for leave to admit a second motion for reconsideration
4.) Not even the supposed notary public," Alfredo de of its September 26, 2007 Resolution, considering that the
Guzman, or the purported buyer, the Spouses Rolando same is a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52, in
and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc, were presented as witnesses. relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. Furthermore, petitioner's letter dated
Concededly, the absence of notarization in the resort deed December 18, 2007 pleading the Court to take a second, look
and/or the lacking details in the settlement/family home deed at his petition for review on certiorari and that a decision
did not necessarily invalidate the transactions evidenced by thereon be rendered based purely on its merits was noted
the said documents. However, since the said deeds are without action.21redarclaw
private documents, perforce, their due execution and
authenticity becomes subject to the requirement of proof Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008
under the Rules on Evidence, Section 20, Rule 132 of which addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno praying that
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw a decision on the case be rendered based on the .merits and
Sec. 20.  Proof of private document. - Before any private not on formal requirements "as he stands to lose everything
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due his parents had left him just because the verification against
execution aijd .authenticity must be proved non-forum shopping is formally defective." However, in view of
either:LawlibraryofCRAlaw the Entry of Judgment having been made on October 31,
2007, the Court likewise noted said letter without
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or action.22redarclaw
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.The Complaining Heirs insist that the On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a
settlement/family home and the resort deed are void as their Partial Writ of Execution of its October 1, 2001 Decision with
signatures thereon are forgeries as opposed to the Villafrias respect to the portions disposing of petitioner's claims as
who profess the deeds' enforceability. After the Complaining affirmed by the CA.
Heirs presented proofs in support of their claim that their
signatures were forged, the burden then fell upon the The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11,
Villafrias to disprove the same, or conversely, to prove the 2009, a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Order before
authenticity and due execution of the said deeds. The the CA assailing the October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the
November 27, 2008 Order of the RTC on the grounds of x x x x
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In its Decision dated
March 13, 2009, however, the CA dismissed the petition and It maybe that the doctrine of finality of judgments permits
affirmed the rulings of the trial court in the following certain equitable remedies such as a petition for
wise:LawlibraryofCRAlaw annulment. But the rules are clear. The annulment by the
Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
Although the assailed Decision of the Court a quo has already resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial Courts is
become final and executory and in fact entry of judgment was resorted to only where the ordinary remedies of new trial,
issued on 31 October 2007, supra, nevertheless, to put the appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
issues to rest, We deem it apropos to tackle the same. are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner,
supra.
The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of
the Court a quo, supra, should be annulled and set aside on If Petitioners lost their chance to avail themselves of the
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. appropriate remedies or appeal before the Supreme Court,
that is their own look out. The High Tribunal has
We are not persuaded, emphatically pointed out in Mercado, et al. v. Security Bank
Corporation,  thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x x A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for
annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the
Section 2 of the Rules as stated above provides that the lost remedy of-appeal." A party must have first availed of
annulment of a judgment may "be based only on grounds of appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief before
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction." In RP v. The Heirs of an action for annulment can prosper. Its obvious rationale
Sancho Magdato, the High Tribunal stressed is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw negligence. Also, the action for annulment of judgment
There is extrinsic fraud when "the unsuccessful party had must be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of
been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or jurisdiction or denial of due process. Having failed to avail
deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by of the remedies and there being a clear showing that
keeping him away from court, ... or where the defendant neither of the grounds was present, the petition must be
never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance dismissed. Only a disgruntled litigant would find such
by the acts of the plaintiff; ..."Otherwise put, extrinsic or legal disposition unacceptable.23When the appellate court
collateral fraud pertains to such fraud which prevents the denied Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution
aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to dated April 23, 2009, petitioner filed the instant Petition for
the court, or is used to procure the judgment without fair Review on Certiorari on June 10, 2009, invoking the following
submission of the controversy. This refers to acts intended to ground:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
keep the unsuccessful party away from the courts as when
there is a false promise of compromise or when one is kept in I.
ignorance of the suit.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
The pivotal issues before Us are: (1) whether there was a ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
time during the proceedings below that the Petitioners COURT, BRANCH 14, NASUGBU, BATANGAS, ACTED
ever prevented from exhibiting fully their case, by fraud or WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ENTERTAINING THE SPECIAL
deception, practiced on them by Respondents, and (2) PROCEEDING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF
whether the Petitioners were kept away from the court or PEDRO RIÑOZA AND THE CIVIL ACTION FOR
kept in ignorance by the acts of the Respondent? ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE HEIRS AND THIRD
PERSONS IN ONE PROCEEDING.24
We find nothing of that sort. Instead, what We deduced as Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents
We carefully delved into the evidentiary facts surrounding was captioned as "Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title
the instant case as well as the proceedings below as and Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show
shown in the 36-page Decision of the Court a quo, is that that the cause of action is actually one for settlement of estate
the Petitioners were given ample time to rebut the of decedent Pedro. Considering that settlement of estate is a
allegations of the Respondents and had in fact addressed special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited
every detail of Respondent's cause of action against them. jurisdiction while judicial partition with annulment of title and
Thus, Petitioners' allegation of the Court a quo's lack of recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by
jurisdiction is misplaced. a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction in entertaining the latter while it was sitting merely
Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the explicit in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the prohibition
ruling of the Supreme Court in  Sps. Santos, et al. v. Sps. found in the Rules on the joinder of special civil actions and
Lumbao, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw ordinary civil actions.25 Thus, petitioner argued that the ruling
It is elementary that the active participation of a party in a of the trial court is void and has no effect for having been
case pending against him before a court is tantamount to rendered in without jurisdiction.
recognition of that court's jurisdiction and willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case which will bar said Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the
party from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction.In appellate court that since the finding of forgery relates only to
fine, under the circumstances obtaining in this case the the signature of respondents and not to their co-heirs who
Petitioners are stopped from assailing the Court a quo's lack of assented to the conveyance, the transaction should be
jurisdiction. considered valid as to them. Petitioner also denies the findings
of the courts below that his parents are builders in bad faith for
Too, We do not find merit in the Petitioners' second issue, they only took possession of the subject properties after the
supra. execution of the transfer documents and after they paid the
consideration on the sale.
As mentioned earlier, entry of judgment had already been
made on the assailed Decision and Order as early as 31 The petition is bereft of merit.
October 2007.
Petitioner maintains that since respondents' complaint alleged
the following causes of action, the same is actually one for the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for
settlement of estate and not of judicial letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of
partition:LawlibraryofCRAlaw the decedent.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall
be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
1. That Pedro L. Riñoza, Filipino and resident of Nasugbu, manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
Batangas at the time of his death, died intestate on November extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
16, 1989. Copy of his death certificate is hereto attached as has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.27
Annex "A";
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants enumerated provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
from paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the only known heirs of the
above-mentioned decedent. The plaintiffs and the Defendants Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A
Rolando, Rafael, Antonio, Angelito, Lorna all surnamed person having the right to compel the partition of real estate
Riñoza, and Myrna R. Limon or Myrna R. Rogador, Epifanio may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his
Belo and Ma. Theresa R. Demafelix are the decedent's complaint the nature and extent of his title and an
legitimate children with his first wife, while Benita Tenorio adequate description of the real estate of which partition
Rifioza, is the decedent's widow and Bernadette Riñoza, the is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons
decedent's daughter with said widow. As such, said parties interested in the property.28
are co-owners by virtue of an intestate inheritance from
the decedent, of the properties enumerated in the succeeding As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the
paragraph; allegations of respondents in their complaint are but
customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of
3. That the decedent left the following real properties all real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro
located in Nasugbu, Batangas:LawlibraryofCRAlaw died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-
heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is
x x x x represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the
purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Riñoza has no heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of
known legal indebtedness; all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate has no
known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful
17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and heirs to the decedent's estate, pray for the partition of the
it will be to the best interest of all heirs that same be same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear,
partitioned judicially.26 therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the
case is one for judicial partition. That the complaint alleged
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action identifying the heirs of the decedent,
causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind by the properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not
decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
their interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement
of estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person
readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his
allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the
clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and trust, or. fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of
recovery of possession. Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw of the Rules of Court.29 An exception to this rule, however, is
found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the
RULE 74 heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from his
Summary Settlement of Estate estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an
ordinary action for partition without submitting the same for
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an
heirs.  — If the decedent left no will and no debts and the administrator by the court.30 The reason is that where the
heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer
purpose, the parties may without securing letters of the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they possession to which they are immediately entitled.31redarclaw
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was
in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he not disputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate
may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner'.s
affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to
to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or submit me subject properties of the estate to a special
by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact,
who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or
affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition extrajudicially, by Pereira v. Court of Appeals:32redarclaw
precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in
the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however,
register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration
amount equivalent to the value of the personal property proceedings, even if the estate has no" debts or obligations, if
involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary
and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide
be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort
to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not ownership although both are interchangeably used.
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a (Emphases supplied)
different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to
an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner's petition
sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not for annulment of sale on the ground that it constituted a
resorting to an action for partition. Where' partition is collateral attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio
possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be and Orlando's title to the subject lands and not any
burdened with an administration proceeding without good Torrens certificate of title over the same.
and compelling reasons.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies of the issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as to the
without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, existence of the same is necessary in the resolution of an
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the action for partition, as held in Municipality of Biñan v.
property to a judicial administration, which is always long Garcia:40redarclaw
and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is
in such case the judicial administration and the taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not
unnecessary proceedings.33 otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to
judicial partition instead of a special proceeding for the have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist,
settlement of estate as the same is expressly permitted by law. or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on ¦ the other
That the complaint contained allegations inherent in an action hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth
for settlement of estate does not mean that there was a exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of
prohibited joinder of causes of action for questions as to the rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate
estate's properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their in question is in order, x x x
status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to the
estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings The second phase commences when it appears that "the
alone.34 In fact, a complete inventory of the estate may parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the
likewise be done during the partition proceedings, especially court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by
since the estate has no debts.35 Indeed, where the more the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3)
expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
they may not be compelled to submit to administration rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [cjourt
proceedings, dispensing of the risks of delay and of the after the- parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard
properties being dissipated.36redarclaw thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties
thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint al$o prayed for real estate in question, x x x.41redarclaw
the annulment of title and recovery of possession does not
strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence
case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property or non-existence of co-ownership between the
could very well be achieved in an action for partition, 37 as can parties.42 Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is
be seen in cases where courts determine the parties' rights definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition
arising from complaints asking not only for the partition of of an estate.43redarclaw
estates but also for the annulment of titles and recovery of
ownership and possession of property.38 In fact, in Bagayas v. In view of the foregoing, petitioner's argument that the trial
Bagayas,39 wherein a complaint for annulment of sale and court acted without jurisdiction in entertaining -the action of
partition was dismissed by the trial court due to the impropriety settlement of estate and annulment of title in a single
of an action for annulment as it constituted a collateral attack proceeding is clearly erroneous for the instant complaint is
on the certificates of title of the respondents therein, this Court precisely one for judicial partition with annulment of title and
found the dismissal to be improper in the following recovery of possession, filed within the confines of applicable
manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw law and jurisprudence. Under Section 144 of Republic Act No.
7691 (RA 7691),45 amending Batas Pambansa Big. 129, the
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
for partition premised on the existence or non-existence actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
of co-ownership between the parties, the Court pecuniary estimation. Since the action herein was not merely
categorically pronounced that a resolution on the issue of for partition and recovery of ownership but also for annulment
ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over of title and documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary
the disputed realties to a collateral attack. It must be estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence,
borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is considering that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in
the certificate of title and not the title itself. As pronounced rendering its decision, the instant petition for annulment Sf
in Lacbayan:LawlibraryofCRAlaw judgment must necessarily fail.

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of
collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at title alone, without the prayer for judicial partition, the
bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate requirement of instituting a separate special proceeding for the
of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is determination of the status and rights of the respondents as
that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as putative heirs may be dispensed with, in light of the fact that
the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court
ownership which is, more often than not, represented by and had already presented evidence regarding the issue of
that document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the heirship.46 In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,47 the Court
certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be explained:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly transactions alleged herein are concerned. First, they were
that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed seemingly uncertain as to the number and/or identity of the
on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of properties bought by them.49 In their Answer, they gave the
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, impression that" they bought both the resort and the family
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an home and yet, during trial, Francisco Villafria claimed they only
exception to the general rule that when a person dies bought the resort. In fact, it was only then that they presented
leaving a property, it should be judicially administered the subject Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of
and the competent court should appoint a qualified Sale.50Second, they never presented any other document
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in which would evidence their actual payment of consideration to
case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to the selling heirs.51Third, in spite of the blatant legal infirmities
name an executor therein. of the subject documents of conveyance, petitioners still took
possession of the properties, demolished several cottages,
x x x x and introduced permanent improvements thereon.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court that petitioners
property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan failed to adequately substantiate, with convincing, credible and
parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances independently verifiable proof, their claim that they had, in fact,
of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, purchased the subject properties. The circumstances
hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of surrounding the purported transfers cast doubt on whether
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is they actually took place. In substantiating their claim,
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of petitioners relied solely on the Extra-Judicial Settlement and
an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in Deed of Sale, who utterly failed to prove their authenticity and
light of the fact that the parties to the civil case - subject due execution. They cannot, therefore, be permitted to claim
of the present case, could and had already in fact absolute ownership of the subject lands based on the same.
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed
jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for
during pre-trial. value and builders in good faith. Good faith consists in the
belief of the builder that the land the latter is building on is
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there one's own without knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's
being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal's title.52 However, in view of the manifest defects in the
estate to administration proceedings since a instruments conveying their titles, petitioners should have been
determination of petitioners' status as heirs could be placed on guard. Yet, they still demolished several cottages
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial and constructed improvement on the properties. Thus, their
court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented claim of good faith cannot be given credence.
by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon
upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x.48 Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified
Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the in any respect except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all
causes of action alleged therein, as well as the fact that the the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and.
trial court, in arriving at its decision, gave petitioner more than laid to rest.53 It is a fundamental principle in our judicial system
ample opportunity to advance his claims, petitioner cannot now and essential to an effective and efficient administration of
be permitted to allege lack of jurisdiction just because the justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning
judgment rendered was adverse to them. To repeat, the action party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits
filed herein is one for judicial partition and not for settlement of of the verdict.54 Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment
intestate estate. Consequently, that respondents also prayed are allowed only under the most extraordinary of
for the annulment of title and recovery of possession in the circumstances.55 Yet, when petitioner is given more than ample
same proceeding does not strip the court off of its jurisdiction opportunity to be heard, unbridled access to the appellate
for asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property courts, as well as unbiased judgments rendered after a
could very well be achieved in an action for partition. consideration of evidence presented by the parties, as in the
case at hand, the Court shall refrain from reversing the rulings
As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be considered of the courts below in the absence of any showing that the
valid as to the heirs who assented to the conveyance as well same were rendered with fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
as their allegation of good faith, this Court does not find any
Compelling reason to deviate from the ruling of the appellate WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
court. As sufficiently found by both courts below, the is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated March 13,
authenticity and due execution of the documents on which 2009 and April 23, 2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals in
petitioner's claims are based were inadequately proven. They CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, which affirmed the Judgment dated
were undated, forged, and acknowledged before a notary October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu,
public who was not commissioned as such on the date they Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217, insofar as it
were executed. They were never presented to the Register of concerns the resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Deeds for registration. Neither were the supposed notaries and No. 51354 and No. 51355, and family home covered by TCT
buyers of the subject properties presented as witnesses. No. 40807 and 40808, are AFFIRMED.

While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the

estate, actually acknowledged the sale of the resort, the
circumstances surrounding the same militate against the fact
of its occurrence. Not only was the Deed of Sale supposedly
executed by Benita undated and unsigned by Pedro, but the
document she presented purportedly evidencing her receipt of
her share in the sale, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a
previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.

Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate court's

observations as to petitioners' actuations insofar as the