PEOPLE vs. BELTRAN- Marianne S.

Aquino

Doctrine: Direct Assault- Shooting at the mayor and a policeman in considered as direct assault.

Facts: Accused appellants in this case were Delfino Beltran (“Minong”), Rogelio Bugarin (“Boy”), Cresencio Siazon (“Ising”), Manuel Puzon (Noling),
Domingo Hernandez (“Doming”), and Ceferino Beltran (“Ebing”). They convicted by the trial court of murder for the death of Vicente Quirolgico,
the mayor’s son and double attempted murder with direct assault for injuries sustained by Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico and Patrolman Rolando
Tolentino. The trial court based its conclusion on the following facts:

Based on a report by Ernesto Alvarado that when he passed by the Puzon Compound on January 11, 1972 between 9pm-10pm he was verbally
assaulted by Delfino Beltran, Mayor Quirolgico went to the Puzon compound on that same night to talk to Beltran and his companions and to ask
them to surrender. When the Mayor’s party approached the compound, they saw appellants Delfino Beltran, Bugarin, and Hernandez followed by a
simultaneous discharge of firearm. Vicente was hit. Mayor Quirolgico and Patrolman Tolentino also suffered injuries. When the firing had stopped,
they decided to bring Vicente to the hospital but as the jeep left the compound, three other men in the persons of Siazon, Ceferino Beltran, and
Puzon fired at the fleeing vehicle. Likewise, Hernandez, Delfino, and Bugarin tried to give chase. An hour after admission, Vicente died.

Defense: Delfino Beltran claimed self-defense, explaining that he was assaulted by Mayor’s group while he was patrolling the Rural Bank whereas
the rest of the accused claim that they do not have anything to do with the incident.

Accused-appellant Siazon died during the course of the case thereby dismissing his criminal liability.

In this appeal, one of the assigned errors of the accused-appellants to the trial court was that it erred in finding them guilty of attempted murder
with direct assault.

Issue: Whether or not the Mayor and Pat. Tolentino are persons in authority and were both performing the official duties in the course of the
incident.

Held: Yes. The Court ruled that the decision of the trial court to convict them of the crime of attempted murder with direct assault is correct
because the Mayor and Pat. Tolentino are persons in authority and both were performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the
community.

Dispositive: The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification. Of significance is the modification that for the lack of necessary
votes, the penalty of death imposed upon the accused by the trial court for the death of Vicente, was reduced to Reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE v DOLLANTES (151 SCRA 592) June 30, 1987 G.R. 70639

FACTS
Marcos Gabutero at the time of his death was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental. The Barangay Captain
delivered a speech to start a dance for an approaching fiesta in the evening of April 21, 1983. While the Barangay Captain was delivering a speech,
the accused Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance movement known in the visayan as "nagkorantsa",
brandishing his knife and challenging everyone as to who was brave among the people present; the Barangay Captain approached Pedro Dollantes
and reprimanded him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead of heeding to the advice of the Barangay Captain,
stabbed the latter on the left arm. Immediately thereafter, accused Hamlet Dollantes, who rushed towards the Barangay Captain, stabbed the
Barangay Captain at the back and the other co-accused also took turns in stabbing the Barangay Captain; the Barangay Captain at that time was not
armed. When the Barangay Captain fell to the ground and died, the accused took turns in kicking the dead body of the Barangay Captain and were
dancing around said dead body. The Barangay Captain suffered eleven (11) wounds in the different parts of his body, two of which happened to be
at the back of his dead body. According to the attending physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who examined the body of the deceased, the victim died of
severe hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds.

ISSUE
WON, the accused is guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a person in authority resulting to murder

HELD
When a Barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacify a person who was making trouble in the dance hall, he is therefore killed while in the
performance of his duties. As the Barangay Captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the Barangay and if in the
enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault upon
a person in authority.

JUSTO v COURT OF APPEALS (99 PHIL 453) June 28, 1956 G.R. L-8611

FACTS
Nemesio de la Cuesta is a duly appointed District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools stationed at Sarat, Ilocos Norte. On October 16, 1950,
he went to Laoag to answer a call from the office to revise the plantilla of his district. At about 11:25 am, de la Cuesta was about to leave his office
to take his meal when he saw Severino Justo conversing with Severino Caridad, an Academic Supervisor. Justo requested de la Cuesta to go with
him and Caridad to the office of the latter. In the office, Justo asked about the possibility of accommodating a certain Miss Racela as a teacher.
Caridad said that there was no vacancy except the position of shop teacher, Justo abruptly said “shet, you are a double crosser. One who cannot
keep his promise”, Justo grabbed a lead paper weight and challenged de la Cuesta to go out. They left the office, when they’re in front of the table
of Carlos Bueno, de la Cuesta asked Justo to put down the paper weight but instead Justo grabbed the neck and collar of the polo shirt of de la
Cuesta, which was torn as a result. Carlos Bueno separated de la Cuesta, but not before de la Cuesta had boxed Justo several times. Justo argued
that when de la Cuesta accepted his challenged to fight outside and followed him out of the room of Mr. Caridad where they had a verbal clash, de
la Cuesta disrobed himself of the mantle of authority and waived the privilege of protection as a person in authority.

ISSUE
WON, the de la Cuesta is still a person in authority after accepting the challenge to “go out” and fight

HELD
The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that
the complainant is not actually performing the duties of his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon
a person in authority, so long as the impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty. Also, where there is a mutual agreement to
fight, an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and place would be unlawful since to hold otherwise would be to sanction unexpected assaults
contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play.

Alberto v. dela Cruz

In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Eligio Orbita, a Provincial guard, is prosecuted for the crime of Infedelity
in the Custody of Prisoner, defined and punished under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, committed, as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of September. 1968, in the barrio of Taculod, municipality of Canaman, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Provincial Guard of Camarines Sur and specially
charged with the duty of keeping under custody and vigilance detention prisoner Pablo Denaque, did then and there with great carelessness and
unjustifiable negligence leave the latter unguarded while in said barrio, thereby giving him the opportunity to run away and escape, as in fact said
detention prisoner Pablo Denaque did run away and escape from the custody of the said accused. 1

In the course of the trial thereof, or more particularly during the cross-examination of prosecution witness Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial
warden of Camarines Sur, the defense brought forht and confronted the witness with a note, marked as exhibit, purportedly written by Gov.
Armando Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction of a fence at his house at Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur,
then leased by the province and used as an official guest house. Jose Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could not remember who ahnded the
note for him; that he was not sure as to genuineness of the signature appearing therein and that he was not preszent when the note was made and
signed by Gov. Cledera. 2 Beleiving that the escape of Pablo Denaque was made possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda and that
Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense for which tha accused Eligio Orbita had been charged, the defense cousel filed a motion in
court seeking the amendment of the information so as to include Gov. cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants therein. 3

Acting upon said motion, as well as the opposition of the prosecution officers 4 and finding that "the court cannot grant the motion or order the
inclusion of Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda at this stage unless an investigation is made," the respondent Judge directed the Fiscals office, within
15 days from date, to cause the further investigation of the case, taking into consideration the provisions of Article 156 in relation to Articles 223
and 224 of the Revised Penal Code in order to determine once and for all whether the Governor as jailer of the Province and his assistant have any
criminatory participation in the circumstances of Pablo Denaque's escape from judicial custody. 5

In compliance with said order, the Fiscal set the reinvestigation of the case for December 19, 1969. Summonses were issued to Gov. Cledera Jose
Esmeralda, Lorenzo Padua, the provincial warden, and the accused Eligio Orbita to be present thereat. 6 Dr. went thereat But, on the date set for
the reinvestigation of the case, only Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda and Lorenzo Padua appeared. The accused Eligio Orbita did not appear. Neither
was the note (Exhibit 2) produced. Since no additional evidence was presented, the Fiscal manifested in Court on January 2, 1970 that "after
conducting a reinvestigation of the case and after a thorough and intelligent analysis of the facts and law involved, no prima facie case against
Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot be charged. 7

On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" praying "that the Order of this Honorable Court dated
December 11, 1969 be, in that instead of ordering the Fiscal to reinvestigate this case, on the basis of the evidence already adduce during the trial
of this case, he be ordered to amend the information on to include Cledera and Esmeralda it appearing the on record that their inclusion is
warranted. 8

On January 26, 1970, the respondent Court issued the order complained of, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, in the light of the facts brought about by the prosecuting fiscal let the charges be so amended by including in
the information the author or writer of Exhibit 2 and the person or persons who carried out the said orders considering the provisions of Article
156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Penal Code. 9

The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, 10 but the motion was denied on February 18, 1970. 11 Hence, the instant recourse.

From the facts of the case, We are convinced that the respondent Judge committed an error in ordering the fiscal to amend the information so as
to include Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. It is the
rule that a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has
evidence to support the allegations thereof. 12 Although this power and prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the evidence at
hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person committed an offense, is not absolute and subject to judicial review, 13 it would be
embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a case when he is in no position to do so because in his opinion, he does
not have the necessary evidence to secure a conviction, or he is not convinced of the merits of the case. The better procedure would be to appeal
the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special prosecutor.

Besides, it cannot be said that the Fiscal had capriciously and whimsically refused to prosecute Cledera and Esmeralda.

In his order directing the Fiscal's office to conduct a further reinvestigation of the case, the respondent Judge candidly ad. muted that without a
reinvestigation of the case, he cannot determine once and for all whether or not to include Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda in the information.
Pursuant thereto, a reinvestigation was conducted by the fiscals office. Summonses were issued. But, no additional fact was elicited since Eligio
Orbita did not appear thereat. Neither was the note (Exh. 2) presented and produced. Gov. Cledera could not admit nor deny the genuineness of
the signature appearing in the note since it was not on hand. Such being the case, the prosecuting officers had reason to refuse to amend the
information filed by them after a previous pre examination and investigation.

Moreover, there is no sufficient evidence in the record to show a prima facie case against Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda. The order to amend
the information is based upon the following facts:

1. Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for homicide, while working at the Guest House of Governor Cledera on September 12, 1968;

2. The Governor's evidence at that time is being rented by the province and its maintenance and upkeep is shouldered by the province of
Camarines Sur,

3. That neither Governor Cledera nor Lt. Jose Esmeralda was charged or entrusted with the duty of conveying and the detainee from the jail
to the residence of the governor.

4. That the de worked at the Governor Is by virtue of an order of the Governor (Exhibit 2) which was tsn by Lt. Esmeralda; and

5. That it was the accused Orbita who himself who handpicked the group of Prisoners to work at the Governor's on 12, 1968. 14

Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jails. — The city Of arrests mayor in its maximum period to prison correccional in its minimum Period shall be
imposed upon any person who shall remove from any jail or penal establishment t any person confined therein or shall help the escape of such
person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery.

If other means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed. If the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments
by taking the guards by surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.

The offenders may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person confined in any jail or penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a
person to escape. To remove means to take away a person from the place of his confinement, with or without the active compensation of the
person released To help in the escape of a Person confined in any jail or penal institution means to furnished that person with the material means
such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his escape. 15 The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider who
removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he
is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is
the jailer of the province, 16 and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque
under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code. There is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution under Article 223 of the Revised
Penal Code, which reads, as follows:

ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. — Any Public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall
be punished

1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and temporary disqualification in its minimum period to perpetual special
disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.

2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have been finally
convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance.

In order to be guilty under the aforequoted provisions of the Penal Code, it is necessary that the public officer had consented to, or connived in, the
escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an essential
condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him
does not connive with the fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. 17 For sure no connivance in the escape of Pablo
Denaque from the custody of the accused Eligio Orbita can be deduced from the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for five men to
work in the guest house, it appearing that the notes does not mention the names of the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was
the accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to compose the work party.

Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera and Esmeralda under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code. This article punishes
the public officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner has escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in evasion is definite amounting to
deliberate non- performance of duty. 18 In the constant case, the respondent Judge said:

We cannot, for the present be reconciled with the Idea that the escape. of Denaque was facilitated by the Governor's or . his assistants negligence.
According to law, if there is any negligence committed it must be the officer who is charged with the custody and guarding of the ... 19

We find no reason to set aside such findings.

TOPIC: Crimes Against Public Order: Evasion of Service of Sentence

Tanega v Masakayan

Doctrine: Art 157. Elements of evasion of service of sentence include: (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence. Prescription of penalties commences only if the convict escapes.

Brief: Petitioner was convicted of slander and was sentenced to arresto mayor. She failed to show up when a warrant for her arrest was issued, and
was never arrested. After a year, she claims that the prescription of the penalty has already prescribed. Respondent judge ruled otherwise. SC
concurs.

Facts:
• Petitioner was convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City.
• She was found guilty once again by the Court of First Instance where she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify the
offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs.
• The Court of First Instance of Quezon City, on January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On
petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This
prompted the respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest.
• Petitioner was never arrested.
• Petitioner moved to quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March 23, 1965. (Ground: Penalty has prescribed.)
• On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served", rejected the plea of
prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest. Hence, the present petition.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue: WON Prescription of sentence has commenced
Held: NO
Ratio:

• Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty.

• By Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code, light penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year.
• The period of prescription of penalties — so the succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit
should evade the service of his sentence".
• Elements of evasion of service of sentence are:
o the offender is a convict by final judgment;
o he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty";
o he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.
• Article 157: provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors,
windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other
convicts or employees of the penal institution, ... "
• evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking"
• Petitioner was never placed in confinement and the prescription of penalty does not run in her favor.

Dispositive:
Petition DISMISSED.
PEOPLE VS ABILONG

Facts:
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with evasion of service of sentence. The said accused, being then a convict
sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter any place within the
radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final judgment rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No.
B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits
made against him and commit vagrancy.
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofprision correccional, with the accessory
penalties of the law and to pay the costs. He is appealing from that decision with the following assignment of error:
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence of destierro is not criminally liable under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a
penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of said
article which in part reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who
shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not cover
evasion of service of "destierro."

Held:
It is the Spanish text that is controlling in case of doubt for the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish
text governs.
It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad"
used in the Spanish text.
Destierro is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived
of the liberty to enter the City of Manila.
Hence, appellant Abilong is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the
period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
The "destierro" imposed on appellant banished him from Manila alone, and he was free to stay in all the remaining parts of the country, and to go
and stay in any part of the globe outside the country. With freedom to move all over the world, it is farfetched to allege that he is in any
confinement from which he could escape.
BRIONES, J., concurring:
I concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion, because evidently the word "fugandose" in the Spanish text refers to imprisonment, not to destierro.