Republic of the Philippines been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and

SUPREME COURT subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal
Manila properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are
under the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June
THIRD DIVISION 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was
cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been
disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she
  confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R.
Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993 refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to
her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,  possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition
vs. prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and
Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents. ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and
of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive
owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner. properties be placed under the proper management and administration of
the attorney-in-fact.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no
cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the
declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added
ROMERO, J.: that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.

The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying
grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property. Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a
first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza,
1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no
at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract dispute that the second marriage contracted by
Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with
Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether
Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; or not the second marriage should first be judicially
she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case
Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled
present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the in explicit terms, thus:
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation
leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has
 And with respect to the right of the distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the
second wife, this Court observed that Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of
although the second marriage can be absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents
presumed to be void ab initio as it was of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted
celebrated while the first marriage was that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the
still subsisting, still there is need for motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would
judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse
SCRA 316, 326) decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5

The above ruling which is of later

vintage deviated from the previous Hence, this petition.
rulings of the Supreme Court in the
aforecited cases of Aragon and The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the
Mendoza. following.

Finally, the contention of respondent First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
movant that petitioner has no property in necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for
his possession is an issue that may be purposes of remarriage.
determined only after trial on the merits. 1

Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private

A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly
of Vda.  de Consuegra v.  GSIS  and the absence of justiciable controversy
2
belonging to her exclusively.
as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria
denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days
from receipt within which to file his answer. Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon  and People
6

v.  Mendoza,  contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of
7

Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be

Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of
motion to dismiss. remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of
private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals  dismissed the petition. It
3
dismissed.
explained that the case of Yap v.  CA  cited by petitioner and that
4

of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial
in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage,
with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the
for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. properties acquired during coverture.
It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties
acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the
status of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz
avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. Petitioner
8

marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. 9
The cases of People v.  Aragon and People v.  Mendoza relied upon by Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these defense.  Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
14

occasions stating that: invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a
Though the logician may say that where the former final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.  15

marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still

it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the Committee   which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines
16

courts. . . . 
10
took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana,   the Court
11
to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint
abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present
the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the
nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article B. Article 39. —
1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course
contemplates an action for that purpose." The absolute nullity of a marriage may
be invoked only on the basis of a final
Citing Gomez v.  Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra judgment declaring the marriage void,
v.  Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second except as provided in Article 41.
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the
first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should
such nullity." include not only void but also voidable marriages. He then
suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
In Tolentino v. Paras,  however, the Court turned around and applied
12

the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first The validity of a marriage may be
wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the invoked only . . .
correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that
"(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the
lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that
and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a they say:
void marriage."
The validity or invalidity of a marriage
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v.  Sempio-Diy   the Court
13 may be invoked 
reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of only . . .
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman The invalidity of a marriage may be
at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel." invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away
determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid with collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice
and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that
accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage
read: void and a party should not declare for himself whether or
not the marriage is void, while the other members
The invalidity of a marriage may be affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore,
invoked only on the basis of a final trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof.
judgment annulling the marriage or Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on
declaring the marriage void, except as the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked:
provided in Article 41. Are they depriving one of the right to raise the defense
that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is
void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the
question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if marriage because it will be taken up in the same
it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a
the judgment. void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof.
Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say: remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded
as follows:
The invalidity of a marriage may be
invoked only on the basis of a final The absolute nullity of a marriage for
judgment declaring the marriage invalid, purposes of remarriage may be invoked
except as provided in Article 41. only on the basis of final judgment . . .

Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as
declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a follows:
marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void?
Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit The absolute nullity of a previous
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is marriage may be invoked for purposes
annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that of establishing the validity of a
this matter be made clear in the provision. subsequent marriage only on the basis
of a final judgment declaring such
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the previous marriage void, except as
provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void provided in Article 41.
marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the
other members concurred. Judge Diy added that Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct
action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the For the purpose of establishing the
phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in validity of a subsequent marriage, the
confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what absolute nullity of a previous marriage
they are referring to in the provision is the declaration that may only be invoked on the basis of a
the marriage is void.
 final judgment declaring such nullity, living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage
except as provided in Article 41. with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista.
He proposed that they say: As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for
For the purpose of entering into a the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
subsequent marriage, the absolute petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
nullity of a previous marriage may only
be invoked on the basis of a final Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
judgment declaring such nullity, except
as provided in Article 41. Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the
previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is
initio. meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged,
they go back to the original wording of the provision as did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
follows: invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would
clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology
The absolute nullity of a previous been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that
marriage may be invoked for purposes is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for
of remarriage only on the basis of a final purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis
judgment declaring such previous solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41. 17
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes
that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a
is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
with bigamy.  18
between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive
legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v.  Terre.   The Court,
19
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in
in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which
grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term
absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
declaring such previous marriage void.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage."
purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable? that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only,"
which the Committee approved.   (Emphasis supplied)
24

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an

"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of
be protected by the State."  In more explicit terms, the Family Code
20
marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent should
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower
conjugal, and family life."   So crucial are marriage and the family to the
21
court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with
stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ."   As a
22
pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the money.
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the
void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their
very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage properties."
would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could
conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state
pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of
courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone. children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters
had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings."   Other specific
25

effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:

That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a
second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from
new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved and annulled."  23
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in
Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable community property or conjugal partnership property shall
her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
 (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, Feliciano, J., is on leave.
except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad
faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by  
operation of law;
 
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of
the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in
any insurance policy, even if such designation be  
stipulated as irrevocable; and
Separate Opinions
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage
in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the  
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
VITUG, J.,  concurring:
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted
in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P.
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
Romero. I should like, however, to put in a modest observation.
disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked
by operation of law. (n) 26

Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no
judicial decree is required to establish their nullity, except in the following
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for
instances:
separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil (a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the
action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has Family Code; viz.:
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the regime of property The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's
properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error
in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in (b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in case a
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J. party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where an action or
defense for the declaration of nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of Family Code took effect (Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is
respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March deemed unaffected by the Family Code.
20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the
SO ORDERED. preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of,
such a declaration, will not give it the status or the consequences of a valid
Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur. marriage, saving only specific instances where certain effects of a valid
marriage can still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are
children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or born
before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law (b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in case a
deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code). party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where an action or
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered defense for the declaration of nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the
extant per se. Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under the old regime Family Code took effect (Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is
nor the absolute community of property under the new Code (absent a deemed unaffected by the Family Code.
marriage settlement), will apply; instead, their property relations shall be
governed by the co-ownership rules under either Article 147 or Article 148 of A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the
the Family Code. I must hasten to add as a personal view, however, that the preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of,
exceptional effects on children of a void marriage because of the such a declaration, will not give it the status or the consequences of a valid
psychological incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended to marriage, saving only specific instances where certain effects of a valid
cover even the personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike the marriage can still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are
other cases of void marriages where the grounds therefor may be children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity)
established by hard facts and with little uncertainty, the term "psychological and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of
incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
nullity is made its interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or born
not only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also as before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law
regards third persons with whom the spouses deal. deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).

  In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered

extant per se. Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under the old regime
  nor the absolute community of property under the new Code (absent a
marriage settlement), will apply; instead, their property relations shall be
# Separate Opinions governed by the co-ownership rules under either Article 147 or Article 148 of
the Family Code. I must hasten to add as a personal view, however, that the
exceptional effects on children of a void marriage because of the
VITUG, J.,  concurring: psychological incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended to
cover even the personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike the
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. other cases of void marriages where the grounds therefor may be
Romero. I should like, however, to put in a modest observation. established by hard facts and with little uncertainty, the term "psychological
incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no nullity is made its interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance
judicial decree is required to establish their nullity, except in the following not only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also as
instances: regards third persons with whom the spouses deal.

(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the Republic of the Philippines
Family Code; viz.: SUPREME COURT
Manila
 FIRST DIVISION Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of
their mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
 
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996 children who are in the custody of the other.

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,  (3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start
vs. proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents. provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty
(30) days from notice of this decision.
 
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of
VITUG, J.:p marriages.  (Emphasis ours.)
2

The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil
Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern the Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision
disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity
on the part of either or both parties in the contract. directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She
asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for
the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdez,
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. herein petitioner.
Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June
1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following
Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539,
clarification:
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing the
parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court,  in its decision of 29 July 1

1994, granted the petition, viz: Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during
their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will
be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal
Consuelo Gomez-Valdez is hereby declared null and void under shares.
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by
obligations;
the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the
Civil Code shall apply.  (Emphasis supplied.)
3

(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and
Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family
with.
dwelling, the trial court said:
 Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the
between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such
respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership. as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article
144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases;  it
6

The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no provides:
application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
community of property. 4
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
on 30 October 1995. shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
the Family Code should be held controlling: he argues that: they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
I participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
parties are psychologically incapacitated. family and of the household.

II Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or

her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases of their cohabitation.
where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage
declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
spouses. share of the party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
III any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared
void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a
spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129. This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
IV marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of
the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of
children wish to stay.5 the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"  of the Code.
7
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52,
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have in relation to Articles 102 and 129,   of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
12

been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or
the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid
thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are
the family household."  Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of
8
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership. law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43,   relates only, by its explicit
13

Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under
has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly Article 40   of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
14

provides that — marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes
the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their
in co-ownership property, without consent of the other, during the period of nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity
cohabitation; and by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law
aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to
her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default Articles 41   and 42,   of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of
15 16

thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to
thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property
termination of the cohabitation  or declaration of nullity of the marriage. 
9 10 relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages
(before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary
when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the
only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the
proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and spouses.
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The
share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already Padilla, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
heretofore expressed.  11

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the
parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, 
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their vs.
common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
 DECISION Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took
place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage
and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that
“death benefits” is now the subject of the controversy between the two the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the
Susans whom he married.  1âwphi1.nêt

same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support

thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila, which reads –
Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested
Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of
offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on this archives.
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred
to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for
cohabitation starting way back in 1982. whatever legal purpose it may serve.  6

In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee,
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, holding as follows:
1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death
P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag- benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s
ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
“GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
IT IS SO ORDERED.  7
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the
alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as
“death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI, I.
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons,
petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in
default. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT
VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE
AT BAR.
 II. In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity
APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE. contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of
III. Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar
NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to
declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence,
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. 10 In such
instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death
declaring such previous marriage void. 11 benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee.
To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death
benefits” of the deceased.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14 void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
the property of the spouses according to the applicable property reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family
regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the Code reads -
applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
Marriage.” benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of ownership.
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 - In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
common in proportion to their respective contributions ...” party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through maintenance of the family and of the household.
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, xxx
contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18 When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of
the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common
a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order. share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association,
Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries
renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties
by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one
proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, party earned the wages and the other did not contribute
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by
they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-
to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half
same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half
deceased is not one of them. of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children
Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of with Susan Nicdao.
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus,
case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the
deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that: [T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the
husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40
death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained
a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the only for purpose of remarriage.
husband’s share in the property here in dispute....” And with respect to the
right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the
first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent
such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is
second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632,
only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her
1âwphi1.nêt

and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage.”  21 SO ORDERED.

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the Puno J., on official leave.
rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
G.R. No. 137110               August 1, 2000
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40
of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, 
a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of vs.
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a CONSUELO TAN, respondent.
second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the
first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if DECISION
the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to
determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, PANGANIBAN, J.:
for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum
of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty
marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the
of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the
statute as "void."
status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the
 The Case "On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant
through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its
1
accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated
January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision January 22, 1993.
affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in
Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as "On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was
follows: lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City,
"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G.
a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, [the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a "Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
prison term of three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma.
correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united
and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City,
penalties provided by law. without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown by the
evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime
Costs against accused." 2
are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally
married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case
the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
The Facts according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial court’s essential requisites for validity. x x x
judgment, as follows: "From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no
dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo "While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited
Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and
Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of
executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status accused.
of accused was ‘single’. There is no dispute either that at the time of the
celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married
man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage "It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with
ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accused’s prior marriage with Ma.
CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated
therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage
on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first
City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear
complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 that accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage
officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to
City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium, his first wife."
3

Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr.
was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan. Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:

"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a Code, which provides:
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final
judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not "The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally proceedings."
dissolved."4

The elements of this crime are as follows:

Hence, this Petition. 5

"1. That the offender has been legally married;

The Issues
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues: or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
"A
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in
order to convict petitioner. 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity."
7

"B
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article bigamy were present. It is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G.
349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting,
Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of he contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo
petitioner. Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.

"C Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity

of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of void  ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set
reasonable doubt." 6
aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never
to have taken place at all. Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage
8 

to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries of former Justice Luis
9 

The Court’s Ruling Reyes that "it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the
beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is
The Petition is not meritorious. voidable, it is not a defense."

Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that
declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then,
the crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained before a his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior
person can marry for a subsequent time. existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present
evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been
We agree with the respondent. married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such
evidence, the Court ruled: "x x x There is likewise no need of introducing
evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs,
nullity of the previous marriage has been characterized as according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal
"conflicting." In People v. Mendoza, a bigamy case involving an accused
10  11 
intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x."
declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during
the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the third
time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Subsequently, in Yap v. CA, the Court reverted to the ruling in People v.
16 

Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had been Mendoza, holding that there was no need for such declaration of nullity.
contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second
marriage was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of
17 

need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not nullity was still necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of
commit bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family
by the Court in People v. Aragon, which involved substantially the same
12 
Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
facts. matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v. GSIS, Jose Consuegra
13 
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and
married for the second time while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her
his death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with
benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her bigamy." 18

children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held:

"And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observes that Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was cited was not a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of
judicial declaration of such nullity." nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the Family Code,
which came into effect several years after the promulgation
In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court again held that judicial declaration
14 
of Mendoza and Aragon.
of nullity of a void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married
twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613
spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the (Marriage Law), which provided:
Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that "the
second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the "Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a performance, unless:
void marriage."
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, the Court stressed the need for such declaration.
15 

In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of
 (b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v.
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present Terre, which involved an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for
21 

having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyer’s argument that he was free to enter
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse into a second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the ruled: "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
marriage as contracted being valid in either case until declared null contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
and void by a competent court." null and void ab initio is essential." The Court further noted that the said rule
was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code." Significantly,
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first declaration that the first marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in
spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is character."
necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable
marriages." 19
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work
was cited by petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a
the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a
of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration subsequent marriage: 22

of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:

"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage,
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before
such marriage void." contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x
x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they
such marriage void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code should be allowed to marry again. x x x."
and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority
and member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there
was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he
"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after
that the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By
judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he
otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA
315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and
void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been
1033)."20
consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in
the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to
declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza  and  Aragon – a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
that there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage --
has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is
now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge
declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy. against him.
Damages NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of
DECISION
the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied her claim of damages and
attorney’s fees.23

LEONEN, J.:

Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her;
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial
hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court. In any event, we
24 
declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage
find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of
point, which we quote hereunder: the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals

"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case Decision2 dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution3 dated June 3, 2013. The Court of
that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be; she was Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision4 of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial
well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted Court of Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy
punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.5 Norberto was sentenced to
matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies. correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum.6
x x x           x x x          x x x In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila
charged Norberto with bigamy.7 The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous
marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the accused, being then legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return contract a second or subsequent marriage with ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which
to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already living with another man. second marriage has all the legal requisites for its validity with the said accused
NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing fully well prior to and at the time of the
celebration of the second marriage he was already married to the said GINA M.
"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was GAERLAN.
fully conscious of the consequences of her act. She should have known that
she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did Contrary to law.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.9
damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful making." 25

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G.

Eduardo (Alice) at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed three (3) children.10
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously
married to another womanf.]"11 She eventually discovered that Norberto was
SO ORDERED. previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced
by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice
subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.12
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion. On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved
sometime in 1987.13 "After much prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and
Alice] decided to get married in 1994."14
G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016
Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had
a "fake marriage"15 with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.16 Nevertheless, "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused[,]"31 Norberto prays
despite Norberto's revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the for his acquittal.32
wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were married on December 4, 1994 and,
thereafter, had three children.17 The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto's prior valid
marriage with Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they had executed. The
Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice prosecution likewise proved that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not
was having an affair with a married man. He was able to confirm the affair after legally dissolved; that while his first marriage was subsisting, Norberto contracted a
hearing Alice in a phone conversation with her paramour.18 second marriage with Alice; and that the second marriage would have been valid had
it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto, therefore, should be convicted of
Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to bigamy.33
end the affair. The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may
incur if she continued seeing her paramour.19 The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A.
Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner's first marriage and
criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.20 exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the
valid marriage with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove
Norberto of bigamy. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010 that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through
reads: mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years before his
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious first marriage
Abella Vitangcol GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any decision
penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.
to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
imprisonment to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum imprisonment. I
SO ORDERED. 21
Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
modified the penalty imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads: marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the
MODIFICATION of the penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced. following elements:
Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and [first,] that the offender has been legally married;
four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum. [second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
SO ORDERED.22 Civil Code;
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,23 which the Court of Appeals denied in the
Resolution dated June 3, 2013.24 [third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the [lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment25 to which validity.34
Norberto filed a Reply.26
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina
because the civil registrar of the municipality where they were married had no record
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.27 He presents of the marriage license allegedly issued in their favor.
as evidence a Certification 28 from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite,
which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in Contrary to petitioner's claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case.
his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court
essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails to correctly convicted him of the crime charged.
establish the legality of his first marriage.29
Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner's first marriage was
In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an solemnized on July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines
element of the crime of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the became effective on August 3, 1988.35 Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of
Revised Penal Code that punishes bigamy mentions that requirement.30 Stating that
the Philippines36 govern the validity of his first marriage. there being no prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case
involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of
Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction
of which renders the marriage void from the beginning:37 for bigamy.
Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from
the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the
(1)  Legal capacity of the contracting parties; presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the
case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage
(2) Their consent, freely given; license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license
existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite
(3)  Authority of the person performing the marriage; and should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now
cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.
(4)  A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.38 The marriage license are concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or
represents the state's "involvement and participation in every marriage, in the consideration. The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to
maintenance of which the general public is interested."39 evade prosecution.

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño. In Cariño,51 the
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage marriage contract between Santiago Cariño and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar marriage license number.52 In addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no
that no such marriage license was issued to the parties."40 record of any marriage license issued to Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.53 This
court declared Santiago Cariño's first marriage void for having been solemnized
Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, without a marriage license.54
Cavite, which states:
[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license
License and License Issuance available in this office, no record could be found on the number freely and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as
alleged issuance of this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. well as by their solemnizing officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17,
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.41 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary 1987. The second marriage was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of
This Certification does not prove that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure
without a marriage license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage. Even while the bigamy case
8683519 does not exist.42 was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented. In
other words, petitioner's belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue
Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the by his own actuations.
marriage contract between him and his first wife, Gina.43 The marriage contract
between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of
petitioner's first marriage.44 This "should be given greater credence than documents the Civil Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of
testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of the marriage[.]"45 a valid first marriage, petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent
marriage. The admission of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity and due
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro46 was originally an action for the declaration execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a
of nullity of a marriage.47 As part of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification prior marriage exists. The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to the defense. Mere
that states that the marriage license "cannot be located as said license . . . does not presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license cannot
appear from [the local civil registrar's] records."48 be found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage
license was issued.
This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil
registrar] being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage
to the issuance of a marriage license." 49 This court further said that "[u]naccompanied contract.55 There is no evidence to show that the number series of that license is
by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of spurious or is not likely to have been issued from its source. There is no proof as to
Court, a certificate of 'due search and inability to find' sufficiently proved that [the whether the licenses issued before or after the document in question still exists in the
local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license ... to the contracting parties."50 custody of the civil registrar. There is no evidence that relates to the procedures for
safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have shown whether there was
The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have
for declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. contributed to the proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil
The certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, registrar implies.
 subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of
This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the the first."60 Further, "[a] party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence
performance of official functions to the civil registrar for the purposes sought by of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent
petitioner. In other words, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the
functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion that there is no marriage license. assumption that the first marriage is void."61

At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar's For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by
function without the context just discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good this court En Banc as petitioner insists.62
faith could not find the marriage license in his office. This presumption does not mean
that the marriage license did not exist. Nor does it mean that the marriage license The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that
was issued. he subsequently married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994.63 As for the last
element of bigamy, that the subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage validity, it is presumed. The crime of bigamy was consummated when petitioner
contract duly executed by petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing subsequently married Alice without his first marriage to Gina having been judicially
officer. The marriage contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption declared void.64
of regularity in the performance of official functions by a public officer should likewise
be applicable to infer a conclusion that the marriage license mentioned in that With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly
contract exists. convicted of the crime charged.

Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty III

amounting to a deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched conclusion—although this
is not always the case—that a well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may
to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases can turn on documentary evidence the be imposed on petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
issuance of which is within the discretion of a government employee. The temptations be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum
for the employee to issue a document, which may be accurate but which he knows term of the penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by an prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court then has the
accused. Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower to
evaluates the demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to that discretion as much as the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are
to make our own judgment based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by considered.65
the trial court. Using both, we have no reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial
court. The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.66 The penalty next lower to that
is prision correccional. Prision correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1)
II day to six (6) years;67hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this
range.
Assuming without conceding that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner's first marriage was As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its
not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared medium period, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prision
presumptively dead under the Civil Code.56 The second element of the crime of mayor in its medium period ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.
bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.
Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four
As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day
parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only of prision mayor as maximum. The ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the are within the ranges as previously computed. The indeterminate penalty imposed
validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second was proper.
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.58 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence
wording Article 40 of the Family Code:59 Law 'to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness[,]'"68 we lower the
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
void. correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and
the crime of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
an adventurous bigamist has to do is to ... contract a subsequent marriage and
escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
33936 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition  for declaration of nullity of
8

mayor as maximum. her marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-07-0155with the RTC of Las
Piñas City, Branch 254. The Office of the Solicitor General representing the
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur. chanrobleslaw

On January 4, 2010, the RTC issued its Decision dismissing the petition on
the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to adequately prove respondent's
G.R. No. 209031 alleged psychological incapacity. It held, thus:

ABIGAEL AN EPINA-DAN, Petitioner  Testifying thru her Judicial Affidavit x x x petitioner stated that sometime in
vs May 2005, she chanced upon the respondent, an Italian, in the internet xxx
MARCO DAN, Respondent and they became regular chatmates. x x x In their exchanges of chat
messages and letters, she found respondent to be sweet, kind and jolly. He
made her feel that he really cared for her. He was romantic. X X X [A]lthough
DECISION
at times, respondent was impatient and easily got irritated, X X X.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
xxxx

This Petition for Review on Certiorari  seeks to set aside the December 14,
1

On 9 January 2006, respondent flew in to the Philippines and x x x they got

2012 Decision  and August 29, 2013 Resolution  of the Court of Appeals
2 3

married on 23 January 2006 X X X. During their honeymoon, petitioner

(CA) denying the Petition in CA-G.R. CV No.95112 and herein petitioner's
noticed that the respondent was not circumcised, x x x [R]espondent (also)
Motion for Reconsideration,  respectively, thus affirming the January 4, 2010
4

asked her where to find marijuana since he had to sniff some. This made
Decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 254, in
5

petitioner angry and she quarrelled with him. Respondent apologized later.
Civil Case No. LP07-0155.

On 29 January 2006, X X X respondent flew back to Italy and on 26

Factual Antecedents
February 2006, xxx petitioner left to join respondent in Italy. Xxx After a few
days, respondent started displaying traits, character and attitude different
Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan and respondent Marco Dan - an Italian from that of Marco whom she had known thru the internet. He was immature,
national - met "in a chatroom [o]n the internet"  sometime in May, 2005. They
6
childish, irresponsible and dependent. He depended on his mother to do or
soon became "chatmates" and "began exchanging letters which further drew to decide things for him. It was even his mother who decided where they
them emotionally closer to each other"  even though petitioner was in the
7
lived and how the house should be arranged. When they transferred to a
Philippines while respondent lived in Italy. separate house. it was respondent's mother who managed the household.

In November, 2005, respondent proposed marriage. The following year, he Respondent was also addicted to video games. During work days, playing
flew in from Italy and tied the knot with petitioner on January 23, 2006. video games was always the first thing he does when he wakes up and the
last thing he does before retiring. During rest days, he would play video
Soon after the wedding, respondent returned to Italy. Petitioner followed games the whole day. There was never a quality time he spent with her, the
thereafter, or on February 23, 2006. The couple lived together in Italy. kind of time that a responsible husband would spend with his wife.

On April 18, 2007, petitioner left respondent and flew back into the country.
Respondent was also addicted to video games. During work days, playing psychological tests, written and oral form. She likewise subjected the mother
video games was always the first thing he does when he wakes up and the of the petitioner to clarificatory analysis x x x.
last thing he does before retiring. During rest days, he would play video
games the whole day. There was never a quality time he spent with her, the In her evaluation, she found no sign or symptom of major psychological
kind of time that a responsible husband would spend with his wife. incapacity of the petitioner, while respondent is suffering from a xxx
Dependent Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait, by his
Respondent was extremely lazy that he never helped her in doing all the parasitic attitude, allowing other people to be the handler of his own personal
household chores. He also has extremely poor hygiene. He seldom takes a sustenance, even hygienic wise, which somehow distorted the notion on
bath and brushes his teeth. For him to be able to take a bath, petitioner how to handle marital obligations in terms of mutual understanding,
would literally push him to the bathroom or hand him his toothbrush with communication and emotional intent. She was able to arrive at these
toothpaste to brush his teeth. She had to put deodorant on his underarms for findings on respondent although he did not submit himself for the same
he would not do it himself. He refused circumcision. psychological tests, through the clinical assessments and information
supplied by the petitioner, and the description of the petitioner's mother
Sometime in May 2006, she caught him in their house while using regarding how she perceived the respondent.
marijuana. When confronted, he get mad and pushed her [hard] and hit her
in the arm, [and told] her to go back to the Philippines. X X X On cross-examination, x x x she described respondent x x x as "Mama's
Boy", which attitude can be narcissistic because of his attachment to the
In October 2006, x x x they transferred to another house. Living in a mother. He can do whatever he wants because the mother will always be at
separate house from his mother did not improve their marital relationship. his back. She likewise stated that the respondent is an unhygienic person
His addiction to video games worsened. They seldom talk to each other as and the reason why he opted to lure herein petitioner to be his wife was
he did not want to be disturbed while playing games. His addiction to drugs because he wanted her to be an extension of his maternal needs to sustain
likewise worsened. He would often invite his friends to their house for pot his own desire.
sessions, X X X to her extreme fright and discomfort.
On clarificatory questions of the Court x x x Ms. Tayag testified that she was
xxxx able to describe the respondent xxx because of the description made by the
petitioner and her mother. She however, admitted that as disclosed to her by
the petitioner, she (petitioner) was not able to have a bonding or to know
On 18 April 2007. she flew back to the Philippines. XXX Since then, there well the respondent because more often than not the respondent was
was no communication between them. XX x Petitioner took this as lack of always in the company of the mother that a pathological symbiotic
interest on his part to save their marriage, reason why she decided to file relationship developed between the mother and son.
this petition (TSN, August 11, 2008, pp. 6-10).
Last witness presented was MS. VIOLETA G. ESPINA, the mother of herein
xxxx petitioner. Her Judicial Affidavit x x x was adopted as her direct-testimony,
which was entirely in corroboration of the testimony of petitioner Abigael An
She further stated that respondent x x x only gave her moncy for food. He Espina-Dan.
spent most of his income for video games. If they ran out of food, it was her
mother-in-law who supported them. On cross-examiration x x x. She testified that respondent had not assumed
his responsibilities as a married man, his dependency on drugs, his
xxxx dependency on his mother with regard to their finances were just toid by her
daughter, petitioner herein, during their conversations in the internet and
Next presented was NEDY TAYAG, a clinical psychologist, who testified x x therefore she has no personal knowledge to what happened to her daughter,
x in her direct-examination that petitioner xxx was subjected to a series of petitioner herein.
 xxxx messages and funny jokes x x x which revealed the harmonious relationship
of the couple before their marriage. From this, it can be inferred how
Article 36 of the Family Code x x x provides: responsible respondent was to faithfully comply with his obligations as a
boyfriend. During marriage, respondent was working and giving her money
though not enough as she said (TSN, August 11, 2008, p. 15). With this
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration of premise, it is therefore safe to conclude that no matter how hard respondent
marriage, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential would try to show his best, to show his capability as husband to petitioner,
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity she would always find reason to say otherwise.
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As to her allegation that respondent was unhygienic; x x x it was admitted by
The Supreme Court in the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, (240 SCRA no less than the psychologist, Nedy Tayag that in a country like Italy wherein
20, 24) declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) the weather is different from the Philippines, the people there do not bathe
gravity, (6) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must regularly x x x. With respect to circumcision, we all know that circumcision is
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out not common in European countries. You cannot compel respondent to
the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of undergo circumcision since it is against their culture. However, respondent
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may expressed his willingness to be circumcised, but later on, changed his mind.
emerge only after the marriage, and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
As to her allegation that respondent was a drug dependent, petitioner never
showed that she exerted effort to seek medical help for her husband.
In the instant case, the clinical psychologist found respondent to be suffering Undeniably, drug addiction is curable and therefore it can hardly be
from x x x Dependent Personality Disorder with underlying Antisocial considered as a manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity
traits, x x x which x x x is 'grave, severe, long lasting and incurable by any contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
treatment'. x x x
With regard to the dependency of respondent to his mother, it was not well
XXXX established by the petitioner. X X X What is clear was that respondent's
mother was all out in helping them since the salary of the respondent was
The clinical psychologist['s] findings and conclusion were derived from her not sufficient to sustain their needs.
interviews of petitioner and her mother. However, from petitioner's Judicial
Affidavit xxx, it was gathered that respondent's failure to establish a common All told, the Court cannot see how the personality disorder of respondent
life with her stems from his refusal, not incapacity to do so. It is downright would render him unaware of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, which renders must be assumed and discharged by him, At the most, the psychological
a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. How she arrived evaluation of the parties proved only incompatibility and irreconcilable
at the conclusion that respondent was totally dependent (on] his mother, his differences, considering also their culture differences, which cannot be
propensity [with] illegal substance, his instability to maintain even his equated with psychological incapacity. Along this line, the aforesaid
personal hygiene, and his neglect to assume his responsibilities as a psychological evaluation made by Ms. Tayag is unfortunately one sided
husband, Nedy Tayag failed to explain. It bears recalling that petitioner and (and) based only on the narrations made by petitioner who had known
respondent were chatmates in 2005 and contracted marriage in 2006 when respondent only for a short period of time and too general to notice these
respondent was already 35 years old, far removed from adolescent years. specific facts thereby failing to serve its purpose in aiding the Court in
arriving at a just resolution of this case.
Noteworthy is petitioner's admission that she and respondent met in a chat
room in the internet. Respondent was very sweet, kind and jolly. He was In sum, inasmuch as the evidence adduced by petitioner in support of her
romantic. He made her feel that he cared even if they were apart. He petition is miserably wanting in force to convince this Court that her marriage
remembered important occasions and he would always send her sweet with respondent comes and qualifies under the provision of Article 36 of the
Family Code and hence unable to discharge completely her burden of xxxx
overcoming the legal presumption of validity and the continuance of her
marriage with respondent, declaration of nullity of same marriage is not in Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic
order. guidelines to varying factual situations, thus confirming the continuing
doctrinal validity of Santos. Insofar as the present factual situation is
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for declaration of nullity of concerned, what should not be lost in reading and applying our established
marriage is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit and accordingly, the same rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the
petition is hereby DISMISSED. Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are
the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted.
Prosecutor, Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance. 9
Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must have been
there from the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the
concept that Article 36 xxx does not really dissolve a marriage: it simply
Petitioner moved to reconsider,  but in an April 28, 2010 Order,  the RTC
10 11
recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because the
held its ground. affliction - already then existing - was so grave and permanent as to deprive
the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
Ruling of the Court of Appeals matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. In the present case, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's evidence
95112. In its assailed December 14, 2012 Decision, however, the CA denied insufficient to prove respondent-appellee was psychologically incapacitated
the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision, declaring thus: to perform his marital obligations. Petitioner-appellant's depiction of
respondent-appellee as irresponsible, childish, overly dependent on his
x x x There is no ground to declare the marriage xxx null and void on the mother, addicted to video games, addicted to drugs, lazy, had poor hygiene,
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
Thus, the court a quo correctly denied the petition for annulment of marriage marriage, are not enough. These traits do not equate to an inability to
x x x. perform marital obligations due to a psychological illness present at the time
the marriage was solemnized. Psychological incapacity must be more than
just a "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
XXXX obligations. It is not enough the respondent-appellee, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
In Toring v. Toring, the Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or
under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) supervening disabling factor - an adverse integral element in the
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a respordent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental complying with his essential marital obligations - must be shown.
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and Mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations,
discharged by the parties to the marriage. or ill will on the part of the spouse, is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,
It further expounded on Article 36 x x x in Republic v. Court of Appeals and sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and
Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the interpretation and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity x
application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic x x, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to
requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability established in assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is essential that the spouse
the Santos case, as follows: must be shown to be incapable of performing marital obligations, due to
some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Respondent-appellee's condition or personality disorder has not in this case, the only proof which bears on the claim that respondent-
been shown to be a malady rooted on some incapacitating psychological appellee is psychologically incapacitated, is his allegedly being irresponsible,
condition. childish, overly dependent on his mother, addicted to video games, addicted
to drugs, lazy, had poor hygiene, and his refusal or unwillingness to assume
It will be noted [that] Ms. Tayag did not administer psychological tests on the essential obligations of marriage. It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36
respondent-appellee. The conclusion in the psychological report of Ms. X X X contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
Tayag that respondent-appellee was suffering from Dependent Personality and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or
Disorder, with underlying Anti-Social traits, was based merely on information difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
supplied by petitioner-appellant and Violeta (mother of the petitioner-
appellant). This Court finds the totality of evidence presented by petitioner-appellant
failed to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband x x x.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely Therefore, there is no basis to declare their marriage null and void x x x.
advisory in character. The court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the
opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family
set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in- as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be
conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe, and dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity
incurable. Thus, We cannot credit Ms. Tayag's findings as conclusive, as of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies on the
she did not conduct an actual psychological examination on respondent- plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
appellee. The information relied upon by Ms. Tayag could not have secured continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an
objective opinion or diagnosis of respondent-appellee's psychological WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. "The Decision of the Regional
condition. The methodology employed (i.e., gathering information regarding Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City dated 4 January 2010, in Civil Case
respondent-appellee from petitioner-appellant and Violeta, without No. LP-07-0155, is AFFIRMED.
interviewing respondent-appelles himself), simply cannot satisfy the required
depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. SO ORDERED.  (Citations omitted)
12

Plaintiff-appellant failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 29, 2013
incapacity, and to establish the requirements of gravity, juridical Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition.
antecedence, and incurability. The psychological report, was based entirely
on petitioner-appellant's assumed knowledge of respondent-appellee's Issue
family background and upbringing, Ms. Tayag was not able to establish with
certainty that respondert-appellee's alleged psychological incapacity was Petitioner mainly contends that –
grave enough to bring about the inability of the respondent-appellee to
assume the essential obligations of marriage, so that the same was
medically permanent or incurable. Also, it did not fully explain the details of THE TOTALITY OF PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THE
respondent-appellee's alleged disorder and its root cause; how Ms. Tayag PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT AND SATISFIED THE
came to the conclusion that respondent-appeliee's condition was incurable; STANDARDS OF REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA
and how it related to the essential marital obligations that respondent- AND OTHER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE IN POINT. 13

appellee failed to assume.

Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner argues that the root cause of respondent's psychological In its Comment  praying for denial, the State calls for affirmance of the CA
20

incapacity was clinically identified, sufficiently alleged in the petition, and dispositions, arguing that no new issues that merit reversal have been raised
proved by adequate evidence; that respondent's psychological incapacity in the Petition. It contends that petitioner failed to prove the elements of
was shown to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability; that quite the contrary,
that the same is medically permanent, incurable, and grave enough as to petitioner even admitted that incipiently, respondent was romantic, funny,
bring about the inability of respondent to assume his obligations in marriage, responsible, working, and giving money to her; that petitioner's allegations of
and that as a consequence, respondent is incapable of fulfilling his duties as video game and drug addiction are uncorroborated, and her failure to seek
a husband under the obligation to live together, observe mutual love, respect medical treatment therefor in behalf of her husband must be considered
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support to her. against her, that such addictions are curable and could not be the basis for a
declaration of psychological incapacity; that respondent's irresponsibility,
Petitioner adds that her allegations in the petition for declaration of nullity are immaturity, and over-dependence on his mother do not automatically justify
specifically linked to medical and clinical causes as diagnosed by Dr. Tayag, a conclusion of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code;
which diagnosis is contained in the latter's report which forms part of the that the intent of the law is to confine the meaning of psychological
evidence in the case; that such diagnosis is backed by scientific tests and incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders - existing at the
expert determination, which sufficiently prove respondent's psychological time of the marriage -- clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability
incapacity; that Dr. Tayag has adequately determined that respondent's to give meaning and significance to the marriage, and depriving the spouse
condition is grave, incurable, and existed prior to and at the time of his of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the marital bond one is
marriage to petitioner; that respondent has been suffering from Dependent about to assume; that the psychological evaluation of respondent was based
Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait which deterred him on one-sided information supplied by petitioner and her mother - which
from appropriately discharging his duties and responsibilities as a married renders the same of doubtful credibility; and that while personal examination
man; that despite considerable efforts exerted by petitioner, respondent of respondent is indeed not mandatory, there are instances where it is
remained true to his propensities and even defiant, to the point of exhibiting required - such as in this case, where the information supplied to the
violence; that no amount of therapy - no matter how intensive - can possibly psychologist unilaterally comes from the side of the petitioner, which renders
change respondent, but rather he would always be in denial of his own such information biased and partial as would materially affect the
condition and resist any form of treatment; and that respondent's condition is psychologist's assessment.
deep-rooted and stems from his formative years - a product of faulty child-
rearing practices and unhealthy familial constellation that altered his Our Ruling
emotional and moral development.
The Court denies the petition.
Finally, petitioner argues that it is not necessary that personal examination of
respondent be conducted in order that he may be diagnosed or declared as Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No.
psychologically incapacitated. She cites the cases of Marcos v. Marcos and 14
LP-07-0155 on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently
Antonio v. Reyes,  as well as the case of Suazo v. Suazo,  in which latter
15 16
prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to enter marriage at
case it was held that a personal examination of the party alleged to be the time. They held that while petitioner alleged such condition, she was
psychologically incapacitated is not necessarily mandatory, bụt merely unable to establish its existence, gravity, juridical antecedence, and
desirable, as it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes incurability based solely on her testimony, which is insufficient, self-serving,
estranged relations between the partics. She suggests instead that pursuant unreliable, and uncorroborated, as she did not know respondent very well
to the ruling in Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu-Te,  "each case must be judged, not
17
enough - having been with him only for a short period of time; Dr. Tayag's
on the basis of a priori presumptions, predilections or generalizations, but psychological report - which is practically onesided for the latter's failure to
according to its own facts"  and that courts "should interpret the provision on
18
include respondent in the study; and the account of petitioner's mother,
a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and which is deemed biased and thus of doubtful credibility.
researchers in psychological disciplines x x x." 19

The Court agrees.

The State's Arguments
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and testimony; With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of petitioner and her
the judicial affidavits and testimonies of hermother and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. witness, the weight of proving psychological incapacity shifts to Dr. Tayag's
Tayag's psychological evaluation report on the psychological condition of expert findings. However, her determinations were not based on actual tests
both petitioner and respondent. The deterınination of respondent's alleged or interviews conducted on respondent himself - but on personal accounts of
psychological incapacity was based solely on petitioner's account and that of petitioner alone. This will not do as well.
her mother, since respondent was presumably in Italy and did not participate
in the proceedings. x x x Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate
the testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the
This is insufficient. declaration of nullity of marriage, viz.:

At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and during We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the
their marriage, respondent was working and giving money to her; that respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to
respondent was romantic, sweet, thoughtful, responsible, and caring; and her by only one side --- the petitioner -- whose bias in favor of her cause
that she and respondent enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the
claim that petitioner was psychologically unfit for marriage. As correctly psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions
observed by the trial and appellate courts, the couple simply drifted apart as deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the
a result of irreconcilable differences and basic incompatibility owing to manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the
differences in culture and upbringing, and the very short period that they respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear,
spent together prior to their tying the knot. As for respondent's claimed see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and
addiction to video games and cannabis, the trial and appellate courts are responded to the doctor's probes.
correct in their ruling that these are not an incurable condition, and petitioner
has not shown that she helped her husband overcome them - as part of her Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and
marital obligation to render support and aid to respondent. on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric,
and unremorseful person who believes that the world revolves around him';
"What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish and who 'used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence
the party's psychological condition. "[T]he complete facts should allege the
21
[petitioner) extended towards him.'. . .
physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity
at the time of the celebration of the marriage"  such that "[i]f the totality of
22
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential
not be resorted to." 23
obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's
narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged
of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental -- not merely disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus,
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report --
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 38 of the Family i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable’-
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be
meaning and significance to the marriage. 24
made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting Associate Justice
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence. 25
WE CONCUR:

Concomitantly, the rulings of the trial and appellate courts - identical in most (On leave)
respects -are entitled to respect and finality.  The same being correct, this
1âwphi1

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Court finds no need to disturb them. Chief Justice

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case

calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
the law, on the facts of the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DE CASTRO
province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze Associate Justice
Associate Justice
or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination. It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
for the most compelling and cogent reasons x x x. 26
Associate Justice

To reiterate, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code ATTESTATION

must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability, "The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
Court’s Division.
the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage, and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved."  Finally, the burden of proving psychological
27 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
incapacity is on the petitioner. Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
X X X Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of
evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to CERTIFICATION
sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity.  28

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
With petitioner's failure to prove her case, her petition for declaration of Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
nullity of her marriage was correctly dismissed by the courts below. had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 14, 2012 Decision
and August 29, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV ANTONIO T. CARPIO
No.95112 are AFFIRMED. Acting Chief Justice

SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 210766

MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. Based on history, mental status examination and observation, he is
SINGSON, Petitioner  diagnosed to be suffering from Pathological Gambling as manifested by:
vs.
BENJAMIN L. SINGSON, Respondent a. preoccupation with gambling, thinking of ways to get
money with which to gamble as seen in his stealing and
DECISION pawning jewelries and appliances[;]

DEL CASTILLO, J.: b. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in

order to achieve the desired effect[;]
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari  are the August 29, 2013
1

Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its January 6, 2014 Resolution  in
2 3
c. lies to family members or others to conceal the extent of
CA-G.R. CV No. 96662, which reversed and set aside the November 12, [his] involvement with gambling[;]
2010 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch
4

260, in Civil Case No. 07-0070. d. committed illegal acts such as forging the signature of
his wife, issuing bouncing checks in order to finance his
Factual Antecedents gambling[;]

On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. e. has jeopardized his relationship with his wife, lost the
Singson (petitioner) filed a Petition  for declaration of nullity of marriage
5
respect of his children, lost a good career in banking
based on Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines  (Family Code).
6
because of gambling[;]
This was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0070.
f. [relies] on his parents, his wife, and siblings to provide
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. money to relieve a desperate fmancial situation caused by
Singson (respondent) were married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at gambling[;]
St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said marriage produced four
children, all of whom are now of legal age; that when they started living While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in] behavioral changes
together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably as a young boy, it would be difficult to say that the psychotic episodes he
extravagant at the expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically manifested in 2003 and 2006 [are] etiologically related to the general
and spiritually,"  and a compulsive gambler; that respondent was immature,
7
medical condition that occurred in his childhood.
and was w1ab1e to perform his paternal duties; that respondent was also
irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's
abnormal behavior made him completely unable to render any help, support, Furthermore, [respondent] manifests an enduring pattern of behavior that
or assistance to her; and that because she could expect no help or deviates markedly from the expectations of our culture as manifested in the
assistance at all from respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to following areas:
support her family as the sole breadwinner.
a. his ways of perceiving and interpreting [his own] self,
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was other people, and events[;]
confined at Metro Psych Facility,  a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and
8

that respondent's attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. b. his emotional response[;]
Ana-Ponio), made the following diagnosis on respondent:
c. his poor impulse control[;]
Such pattern is inflexible and pervasive and has led to significant impairment degree in business administration, and is a bank employee, and, that it was
in social, occupational and interpersonal relationship. In [respondent's] case, money problem, and not his alleged personality disorder, that is the wall that
this has persisted for several years, and can be traced back [to] his divided him and petitioner.
adolescence since he started gambling while in high school. He is therefore
diagnosed to be suffering from Personality Disorder. Respondent also claimed that petitioner failed to lay the basis for the
conclusions of the psychiatrist to the effect that he is suffering from
All these[,] put together, [hinder respondent] from performing his marital pathological gambling and personality disorder; that petitioner's allegation
obligations.
9
that he came from a distraught family and that he suffered emotional
devastation is vague, and bereft of particular details, and even slanderous;
Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a "distraught" and that assuming that he had not acted the way petitioner expected him to
family and had a "dysfunctional" childhood;  that respondent had all the love,
10
conduct himself, his actions and behavior are not psychological illnesses or
care, and protection of his parents as the youngest child for some time; but personality disorders, but simply physical illnesses of the body, akin to
that these parental love, care and protection were, however, transferred to hypertension and allied sicknesses, and that these physical illnesses are not
his youngest brother who was born when respondent was almost five years at all incurable psychiatric disorders that were present at the time of his
old; and that these factors caused respondent emotional devastation from marriage with petitioner.
which he never recovered.
Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets
Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a high school and debts; that the land where their family home is built came from his
student, was already betting on jai alai. She also claimed that she tried to earnings, hence the family home is their conjugal property; that he and
adjust to respondent's personality disorders, but that she did not attain her petitioner also have a house and lot in Tagaytay City, as well as bank
goal. accounts that are in petitioner's name only; and he and petitioner also have
investments in shares of stocks, cars, household appliances, furniture, and
jewelry; and that these are conjugal assets because they came from
Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any petitioner's salaries and his (respondent's) own inheritance money.
ante-nuptial agreement to govern their prope1ty relations as husband and
wife and that they had no conjugal assets or debts.
Respondent moreover alleged that before the filing of the present Petition,
petitioner had caused him to be admitted into the Metro Psych Facility for
On June 19, 2007, respondent filed his Answer. 11
treatment; that on account of his confinement and treatment in this
psychiatric facility, he has incurred medical expenses and professional
Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that "psychological medical fees; and that since it is petitioner who manages all their finances
incapacity" must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and and conjugal assets it stands to reason that he should be awarded '"spousal
incurability, which are not present in the instant case because petitioner's support."
allegations are not supported by facts.
On July 25, 2007, the RTC issued its Pre-Trial Order. 12

Respondent further averred that it was not true that he failed to render any
help, support or assistance to petitioner and their family; that the family Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included herself, her son,
home where petitioner and their children are living was in fact his own capital Jose Angelo Singson (Jose), and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio.
property; that his shortcomings as mentioned by petitioner do not pertain to
the most grave or serious cases of personality disorders that would satisfy
the standards required to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage; that On February 23, 2010, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which
petitioner's complaint is nothing more than a complaint of a woman with an included a photocopy of the marriage contract; the birth certificates of their
unsatisfactory marriage who wants to get out of it; that contrary to four children; her son Jose’s Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a
petitioner's claim that he is a good-for-nothing fellow, he has a college photocopy of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Judicial Affidavit dated June 25, 2008;
Clinical Summary of respondent issued by Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio dated
February 11, 2007 (Clinical Summary); her (petitioner's) own Judicial 2.  ORDERING the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City and the
Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Transfer Certificate of Title National Statistics Office to cancel the marriage between the petitioner and
(TCT) No. 179751 registered in the names of the parties' four children:, and the respondent as appearing in the Registry of Marriage.
a notarized document entitled "Summary of Sources and Uses of Funds for
tJ1e period November 1999 to March 31, 2008" executed by petitioner and There are no other issues in this case.
described as a detailed summary of expenses paid for with the proceeds of
respondent's share in the sale of the latter's house in Magallanes Village.13

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars

ofMandaluyong City and Parañaque City, the Office of the Solicitor General,
Respondent filed his Comment thereon. 14
the Office of the Civil Register General (National Statistics Office) and the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Parañaque City.
On March 29, 2010, the RTC admitted petitioner’s exhibits. 15

SO ORDERED. 22

On May 13, 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss  "on the ground that
16

the totality of evidence presented by petitioner did not establish [his] The RTC ruled that the requisites warranting a finding of psychological
psychological incapacity x x x to comply with the essential martial obligations incapacity under Article 36 of the family Code are present in the instant case
x x x".  Petitioner filed her Opposition  thereto, and respondent tendered his
17 18
because the totality of evidence showed that respondent is suffering from a
Comment thereon. 19
psychological condition that is grave, incurable, and has juridical
antecedence.
On May 17, 2010, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and
stood pat on its March 29, 2010 Order. 20
The RTC also found that the combined testimonies of petitioner and Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio convincingly showed that respondent is psychologically
During the September 30, 2010 hearing, respondent’s counsel manifested incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations; that respondent's
that his client was waiving the right to present countervailing evidence. inability to perform his marital obligations as set out in Articles 68 to 71 of
Respondent’s counsel also moved that the Petition at bar be submitted for the Family Code, was essentially due to a psychological abnormality arising
decision on the basis of the evidence already on the record. The RTC thus from a pathological and utterly irresistible urge to gamble.
declared the case submitted for decision. 21

The RTC cited "[Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's] findings [which] reveal that
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court respondent is suffering from  Personality  Disorder known as Pathological
Gambling."  It ruled that it has been shown that this personality disorder
23

In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and was present at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only
declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on later; that because of this personality disorder respondent had already
the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC disposed thus- jeopardized his relationship with his family; and that respondent's
psychological disorder hinders the performance of his obligations as a
husband and as a father.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is
GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered[:]
Lastly, the RTC found that the only property owned in common by spouses
was donated in favor of the parties' children as evidenced by TCT No.
1. DECLARING null and void ab initio the marriage between  MARIA
CONCEPCION  v. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N.
SINGSON  and  BENJAMIN L SINGSON solemnized on JULY 6, 1974 in Respondent moved for reconsideration of this verdict.
Mandaluyong City or any other marriage between them on the ground of
psychological' incapacity of the respondent. But in its older dated January 6, 2011,   the RTC denied respondent's motion
24

for reconsideration. It reiterated that the expert witness had adequately

established that respondent is suffering from "Pathological Gambling likewise provided the land on which the family home was built, and he also
Personality Disorder'' which is grave, permanent, and has juridical lives in the family home with petitioner and their children.
antecedence. On February 4, 2011, respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal   which was given due course by the RTC in its order  dated
25 26
On top of these, the CA ruled that it is settled that mere difficulty, refusal or
February 28, 2011. neglect in the performance of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of a
spouse, is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
Ruling of the Court of Appeals condition or illness; that the evidence at bar showed that respondent's
alleged pathological gambling arose after the marriage; that in fact petitioner
In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC, and admitted that she was not aware of any gambling by respondent before they
disposed as follows: got married; that petitioner moreover acknowledged that respondent was a
kind and a caring person when he was courting her; that petitioner likewise
admitted that respondent also brought petitioner to the hospital during all
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 November four instances when she gave birth to their four children.
2010 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City in
Civil Case No. 07-0070, declaring the marriage between Maria Concepcion
N. Singson and Benjamin L. Singson null and void  ab initio, is REVERSED In other words, the CA found that respondent's purported pathological
AND SET ASIDE. Instead, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage gambling was not proven to be incurable or permanent since respondent has
is DISMISSED. been undergoing treatment since 2003 and has been responding to the
treatment.
SO ORDERED. 27

Petitioner moved for reconsideration  of the CA's Decision. But her motion
28

was denied by the CA in its Resolution of January 6, 2014. 29

The CA held that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to

establish respondent's alleged psychological incapacity to perform the
essential marital obligations, which in this case, was not at all proven to be Issue
grave or serious, much less incurable, and furthermore was not existing at
the time of the marriage. What is more, the CA declared that any doubt Hence, the instant recourse with petitioner raising the following question –
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage, and against its dissolution and nullity, in obedience to the mandate [WHETHER] THE [CA] ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
of the Constitution and statutory laws; and that in this case, petitioner failed [RTC]. 30

to discharge the burden of proving that respondent is suffering from a

serious or grave psychological disorder that completely disables or
incapacitates him from understanding and discharging the essential Petitioner's Arguments
obligations of the marital union.
In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution, and
According to the CA, psychological incapacity is the downright or utter in asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, petitioner argues in her
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital Petition,  Reply,  and Memorandum  that respondent's psychological
31 32 33

obligations. The CA did not go along with the RTC, which placed heavy incapacity had been duly proved in court, including its juridical antecedence,
reliance on Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's finding that respondent was psychologically incurability, and gravity.
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations due to a personality
disorder known as pathological gambling. The CA held that, contrary to First, petitioner maintains that respondent failed to perform the marital duties
petitioner's claim that respondent's pathological gambling was grave or of mutual love, respect, and support; that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's expert
serious, the evidence in fact showed that the latter was truly capable of findings are corroborated by the testimonies of petitioner end her son Jose
carrying out the ordinary duties of a married man because he had a job, had both of whom demonstrated that respondent’s psychological incapacity is
provided money for the family from the sale of his own property, and he grave or serious rendering him incapable to perform the essential marital
obligations; that for his pan, respondent had adduced no proof that he the same are to be resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of the
(respondent) is capable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of the same rests at all
marriage for the reason that everything that the family had saved and built times upon the petitioner.  "The policy of the Constitution is to protect and
36

had been squandered by respondent; and that respondent's confinement at strengthen the family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the
the rehabilitation facility is itself proof of the gravity or seriousness of his foundation of the family. Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage
psychological incapacity. as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties."37

Second, petitioner contends that respondent’s psychological incapacity

preceded the marriage, as shown in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio’s Clinical Summary, Article 1 of the Family Code describes marriage as "a special contract of
which pointed out that such psychological incapacity, which included permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
pathological gambling, can be traced back when respondents was already with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life" and as "the
betting on jai alai even in high school, and this was not known to his family; foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution."
that the Clinical Summary was based on information provided not only by
petitioner, but by respondent’s sister, and by respondent himself; that such In the instant case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of this social institution
juridical antecedence was neither questioned nor overthrown by by suing out pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which provides that:
countervailing evidence; and that the root cause could be traced back to
respondent’s flawed relationship with his parents which developed into a
psychological disorder that existed before the marriage. Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
Third, petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive
personality disorders are generally incurable and permanent, and must Order 227)
continuously be treated medically; that in this case the Clinical Summary;
had pointed out that respondent's understanding of his gambling problem is
only at the surface level; and that in point of fact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had Petitioner's case will thus be examined in light of the well-entrenched case
affirmed that personality disorders are incurable. law rulings interpreting and construing the quoted Article, to wit:

Respondent’s Arguments 'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36

of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental - not merely
physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
In his Comment  and Memorandum,  respondent counters that the assailed
34 35
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
CA Decision should be affirmed. He argues that the grounds cited by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
petitioner are the self-same grounds raised by petitioner before the RTC and Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together,
the CA; that petitioner's evidence indeed failed to prove convincingly that he observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
(respondent) is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
marital obligations, hence there is no basis to declare the parties' marriage meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
void ab initio. personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In Santos v. CA
Our Ruling (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the
The Petition will not succeed. party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be
enshrined in our Constitution and statutory laws, hence any doubts attending incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved). The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the education, the payments for association dues, and for electric bills came
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of from this money.
the Phils. v. CA, x x x [also known as the Molina guidelines]. These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the Court established And no less significant is petitioner's admission that respondent provided the
in Santos.38
land upon which the family home was built, thus -

In setting aside the RTC's ruling, the CA in this case held that petitioner [Respondent's counsel to the witness, petitioner]
failed to prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations because she failed to establish that
such incapacity was grave and serious, and that it existed at the time of the Q: Does [respondent] [own] any real property?
marriage, and that it is incurable. We agree.
A: No.
At the outset, this Court is constrained to peruse the records because of the
conflicting findings between the trial court and the appellate court.  We thus
39
Q: He does not [own] any real property?
did peruse and review the records, and we are satisfied that the CA correctly
found that respondent has the capability and ability to perform his duties as A: No.
a husband and father as against the RTC' s rather general statement that
respondent's psychological or personality disorder hinders the performance
of his basic obligations as a husband and a father. Q: Showing to you Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413513 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal which has been transferred with the Register of Deeds of
Paranaque and is now re-numbered as S-25470, which is in the name of
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that [respondent], Filipino, of legal age, single.
respondent's psychological incapacity was grave and serious as defined by
jurisprudential parameters since "[respondent] had a job; provided money for
the family from the sale of his property; provided the land where the family xxxx
home was built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and
their children."
40
[COURT to the witness, petitioner]

Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as Q: Who owned this property?
the latter "was working at a certain point."  This is consistent with the
41

information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary and testimony, which

A: Based on the document, it's Benjamin Singson.
were both included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence, respecting the
parties' relationship history that petitioner and respondent met at the bank
where petitioner was applying for a job and where respondent was employed Q: Where is this property located?
as a credit investigator prior to their courtship and their marriage.
42

A: It is located in United Paranaque.

It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her
evidence a notarized summary dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated Q: Where in United Paranaque?
expenses paid for by the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of his
parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City which amounted to around ₱2.9
A: No. 2822 Daang Hari.
million. Although petitioner was insinuating that this amount was insufficient
to cover the family expenses from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted
under oath that the items for their family budget, such as their children's Q: Are you staying in that property?
A: We are staying in that property. perform the essential marital obligations. It is settled that "[p]sychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or
xxxx inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and
is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will."  "[I]t is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
45

[Respondent's counsel to the Witiress, petitioner] meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or
she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some
Q: How about the house there, in the United Parañaque [property], who psychological, not physical, illness."46

owns it?
Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony in open court and her Clinical
A: It was donated to the children. Summary be taken for gospel truth in regard to the charge that respondent is
afflicted with utter inability to appreciate his marital obligations. That much is
xxxx clear from the following testimony –

[COURT to the witness, petitioner] [Petitioner's counsel to the witness, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio]

Q: Based on the document, who is the registered owner? Q: Madam Witness, do you know the respondent in this case, Benjamin
Singson?

A: It says there, [respondent], Your Honor.

A: Yes. [S]ir, [respondent] has been my patient since 2003, during his first
admission and again [in] 2006, [S]ir.
Q: Who owns it now?
Q: So, he was confined twice in your facility, [M]adam witness?
A: The children because it was donated [to them]. 43

A: Yes, [S]ir.
What's more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as husband
and wife since their marriage on July 6, 1974 (and in the company of their
four children, too). In fact, shunting aside the time that respondent was Q: Why was he confined, Madam witness?
under treatment at the Metro Psych Facility, petitioner did not allege any
instance when respondent failed to live with them. A: He was initially confined because of problems with gambling and
subsequently because of [behavioral] problem, [S]ir.
To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself admitted,
that respondent likewise brought her to the hospital during all four instances xxxx
that she gave birth to their children.44

Q: What was the cause of his second confinement, Madam [W]itness?

By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that respondent’s
mere confinement at the rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity of the A: Initially, he was able to cope after discharged. However, [in] September of
latter’s psychological incapacity. 2006, he knocked on the doors of the maids in the middle of the night. And
in one occasion, he got his car in the garage and drove out bumping the car
Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological parked right across the garage and he [also kept] takfr1g things out from his
gambler, is irresponsible, and is unable to keep a job, necessarily translate cabinet. And if the maids would clean [these], he [would] immediately take
into unassailable proof that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
them out again. So, he was brought to the facility in October because of his A: I made the examination, [S]ir, and also the psychologist did the
uncontrolled behavior, [S]ir. psychological testing, [S]ir.

xxxx Q: Now, in your opinion as an expert witness, Madam witness, which we

would like to request [from] this Honorable Court, later on, that you present
Q: So, what [were] your clinical findings on the state of the respondent, your credentials as expert witness, you concluded that the respondent is
Benjamin Singson, Madam witness? suffering from personality disorder?

A: Based on history, mental status examination and observations during his A: Yes,[S]ir.
stay, I found that [respondent] is suffering from pathological gambling. Also,
with his history of typhoid fever when he was younger, it is difficult to Q: What does this mean in layman’s language, [M]adam witness?
attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006. Aside
from pathological gambling, [respondent] is suffering from a personality A: Personality disorder is a maladaptive pattern of behavior that has
disorder, [S]ir. distracted his ability to perform his functions as a married man to his wife as
a father to his children and as a person who is supposed to be employed
Q: What are the results or symptoms of this personality disorder with productively, [S]ir.
47

[regard] to [respondent's dealings] with other people, with his wife and his
family, [M]adam witness? Futhermore, "[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job,
[while undoubtedly negative traits are nowhere nearly the equivalent of
A: Your Honor, may I read from my report to refresh my memory. ‘psychological incapacity’], in the absence of [incontrovertible] proof that
these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
COURT: Go ahead. psychological condition or illness."48

A: Because of his maladaptive behavior, [respondent] sees [sic] his We now turn to the second point. Again, in view of the contrasting findings of
problems which [makes] his personal[,] family[,] and social life[,] and even the trial court and appellate court, we take recourse to the records to assist
49

his vocational pleasure [suffer]. He was pre-occupied with gambling, thinking us in evaluating the perspective postures taken by the parties.
of ways to get money with which to gamble as seen in his stealing and
pawning jewelries and appliances. He needs to amble with increasing Here again, well-entrenched is the rule that "there must be proof of a natal or
amounts of money in order achieve his desired effects into gambling, [S]ir. supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent
spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations x x x."  "A cause
50

COURT: Your findings, Dr., are incorporated in your report? has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological
incapacity."51

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Again we agree with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or correctly lay
down the bases or premises for this particular finding relative to respondent's
xxxx psychological incapacity, thus:

[Cross-examination of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio by respondent’s counsel] Second, there is also sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent's
inabilities to perform his marital obligations was a result of not mere
Q: Who were the ones who made the examination, Madam witness? intentional refusal on his part but are caused by psychological
abnormality. Such psychological incapacity of the respondent has been
shown as already present at the time of celebration of marriage but became their marriage.  If anything, petitioner failed to successfully dispute the CA's
57

manifest only after the solemnization. x x x.52

finding that she was not aware of any gan1b1ing by respondent before they
got married and that respondent was a kind and caring person when he was
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the courting her. 58

RTC did not specifically identify the root cause of respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity. In fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not point to a Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA's declaration that petitioner
definite or a definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid fever when he failed to prove that respondents alleged psychological incapacity is serious
was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he or grave and that it is incurable or permanent.
manifested in 2003 and 2006."  Besides, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it
53

was not she herself, but another psychologist who conducted the tests.  And
54
To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that
this psychologist was not presented by petitioner. More than that, Dr. Sta. "personality disorders are generally incurable" as this is not a matter that
Ana-Ponio's testimony regarding respondent's alleged admission that he courts are mandated to take judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the
was allegedly betting on jai alai when he was still in high school is essentially Rules of Court. 59

hearsay as no witness having personal knowledge of that fact was called to

the witness stand. And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio claimed to have
interviewed respondent's sister in connection therewith, the latter did testify "'Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties
in court. And we are taught that "[t]he stringency by which the Court or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness
assesses the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports is necessitated existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill
by the pronouncement in our Constitution that marriage is an inviolable the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered
institution protected by the State." 55 into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the
marital tie."  This is the situation here.
60

Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged

psychological incapacity could be attributed to the latter's family or WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013 Decision and
childhood, which are circumstances prior to the parties' marriage; no January 6, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
evidence has been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for 96662 are AFFIRMED.
upholding petitioner's contention that respondent's family was "distraught"
and that respondent's conduct was "dysfunctional"; again, there is no SO ORDERED.
evidence to attest to this. These are very serious charges which must be
substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner did not at all MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific finding that this Associate Justice
was the origin of respondent's alleged inability to appreciate marital
obligations.
WE CONCUR:
Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that
his father's psychological incapacity existed before or at the time of MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
marriage.  It has been held that the parties' child is not a very reliable
1âwphi1
Chief Justice
witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have been there when the Chairperson
spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was
happening between his parents until long after his birth." 56

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
DE CASTRO
To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have adduced Associate Justice
Associate Justice
convincing, competent and trustworthy evidence to establish the cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity and that the same antedated
 NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice