The Authenticity Inventory
The Authenticity Inventory
The Authenticity Inventory
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
AUTHENTICITY: THEORY
AND RESEARCH
Michael H. Kernis
Brian M. Goldman
And if by chance I wake at night and I ask you who I am, oh take me to the
slaughterhouse I will wait there with the lamb.
—Leonard Cohen
I prefer to be true to myself, even at the hazard of incurring the ridicule of others,
rather than to be false, and to incur my own abhorrence.
—Frederick Douglass
283
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL ‘‘Authenticity Inventory’’ Copyright ß 2006
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 38 Brain M. Goldman and Michael H. Kernis
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284 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
one’s true calling. Such activities do not have happiness or pleasure as their
desired end; instead, pleasure is a consequence of a life in which one success-
fully manages to perform these activities well. This view seems akin to exis-
tential philosophers like Nietzsche and Kierkegaard (May, 1960, p. 22), who
described man as ‘‘the organism who makes certain values—prestige, power,
tenderness, love—more important than pleasure and even more important
than survival itself. ’’ The similarity among these perspectives, and many of
the subsequent perspectives discussed in this section, is the portrayal of people
in a manner that transcends measuring success primarily via hedonic qualities
(e.g., happiness), or even basic evolutionary success (e.g., survival). What
emerges in its place is a broad depiction of people as being rich in complexity,
actively and intentionally pursuing a life in accord with their deepest poten-
tials.
Aristotle also discussed how people’s pursuit of the higher good involves
diVerent virtues (e.g., continence, pleasure, friendship, and theoretical wis-
dom). Whereas the highest good refers to the end that people pursue for its
sake only, every other good is pursued for the sake of the highest good
(Hutchinson, 1995). As such, the described relationship between pursuit of
the good and highest good seems to underscore a sense of unity or integration
among people’s pursuits—a perspective that contemporary self‐theorists
would suggest reflects self‐organization (e.g., Donahue, Robins, Roberts, &
John, 1993; Showers & Ziegler‐Hill, 2003), integrated self‐regulation (e.g.,
Deci & Ryan, 2000), or self‐concordance (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). Aristotle’s
contribution to conceptualizing authenticity is in having paved a connection
between people’s self‐knowledge and behavioral self‐regulation. In his view,
knowledge of the highest good significantly aVects peoples’ lives because it
allows them to organize their lives well ‘‘like an archer with a target to aim at’’
(Irwin, 2003). Thus, from this perspective, authentic functioning is the result
of sustained activity in concert with a deeply informed sense of purpose.
Renee Descartes’ Meditations oVers a variety of concepts and insights
relevant to conceptualizing authenticity. Descartes’ perspective demon-
strated a radical departure from his predecessors. According to Groscholz
(2003), prior to Descartes, philosophers asked: What must the world be like
for it to be intelligible? Following Descartes, they asked: What must the mind
be like for the world to be intelligible to it? This shift in focus demonstrates the
centrality of cognitive processes in directing and interpreting experience.
While such a view clearly advances the role of psychological functioning
in experience, perhaps Descartes’ greatest contribution to conceptualizing
authenticity lies in his emphasis on subjectivity in mental processes.
Descartes’ proclamation ‘‘I think, therefore I am’’ suggests that what ‘‘I
am’’ is a thing that thinks; a thing that doubts, understands, aYrms, denies,
is willing, unwilling, imagines, and has sensory perceptions. In contrast to
286 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
actions reflect the intrapsychic resolve that emerges from the choices
found among the operative self‐schemas governing individuals’ situated
freedom (cf., involving the actual self and the possible self, Markus & Nurius,
1986).
For Sartre, ‘‘Bad faith’’ emerges when individuals lie or deceive them-
selves about their ontological duality. Such deceptions occur when people
either dissolve the possibilities of transcendence in the throws of ‘‘facticity,’’
or conversely when they act with only sheer ‘‘transcendent’’ will, and ignore
the facts of the situation. Thus, authentic functioning from this perspective
emerges when individuals openly embrace the ontological duality of their
situated freedom when deciding on how they will behave.
Self‐determination theory (SDT) (Deci, 1980; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan &
Deci, 2000, 2002) holds that people are authentic when their actions reflect
their true‐ or core‐self, that is, when they are autonomous and self‐determining.
Our multicomponent framework of authentic functioning owes a great deal to
this conceptualization. Hodgins and Knee (2002) capture many aspects of
this convergence in their description of autonomously functioning individuals.
For example, they suggest that autonomously functioning individuals
‘‘will meet the continually changing stream of consciousness experience with
openness. By ‘openness’ we mean a readiness to perceive ongoing experience
accurately, without distorting or attempting to avoid the experience, and a
willingness to assimilate novel experiences into self‐structures’’ (p. 88). They
further suggest that autonomously functioning individuals ‘‘grow toward
greater unity in understanding and functioning’’ (p. 88), ‘‘have a high tolerance
for encountering experience without being threatened or defending against it’’
(p. 88–89), ‘‘feel choiceful and endorsing of their behavior’’ (p. 90), and exhibit
‘‘greater honesty in interactions of all types’’ (p. 90). According to SDT, self‐
determination is one of three basic psychological needs (the others being
competence and relatedness), the satisfaction of which is critical for optimal
psychological health and well‐being. Considerable research supports this claim
(Deci & Ryan, 2000).
294 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
We have seen that most perspectives on authenticity stress the extent to which
one’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors reflect one’s true‐ or core‐self. More-
over, most perspectives emphasize a nondefensive stance toward evaluative
information, openness toward, and trust in, internal experiences, and fulfilling
interpersonal relationships. In line with these perspectives, we (Goldman &
Kernis, 2002; Kernis, 2003; Kernis & Goldman, 2005a,b) define authenticity as
the unobstructed operation of one’s true‐ or core‐self in one’s daily enterprise.
However, instead of viewing authenticity as a single unitary process, we suggest
that authenticity can be broken down into four separate, but interrelated,
components. We refer to these components as awareness, unbiased processing,
behavior, and relational orientation. Each of these components focuses on an
aspect of authenticity that, while related to each of the others, is distinct. We
turn now to a description of each component.
A. AWARENESS
which ‘‘they are capable of being [insert trait] if the situation requires it,’’ ‘‘it is
diYcult for them to behave in a [insert trait] manner,’’ ‘‘how anxious they are
when they behave in a [insert trait] manner,’’ and ‘‘the extent to which they
attempt to avoid situations that require them to behave in a [insert trait] manner.’’
In Paulhus and Martin’s (1988) research, functional flexibility related to a high
sense of agency and other indices of adaptive psychological functioning.
Kernis, Goldman, Piasecki, and Brunnell (2003) (reported in Kernis &
Goldman, 2005b) administered the Functional Flexibility Inventory (Paulhus
& Martin, 1988) and the Authenticity Inventory (AI) (Version 2) to a sample
of 84 individuals. We created summary indexes of capable, diYculty, anxiety,
and avoidance scores by summing responses to the 16 traits (Paulhus &
Martin, 1988). Total authenticity scale scores correlated significantly posi-
tively with capability, and negatively with diYculty, anxiety, and avoidance
(Kernis & Goldman, 2005b). These findings support our contention that
authenticity relates to a multifaceted and integrated self that is anchored in
strong self‐beliefs, self‐confidence, self‐acceptance, and agency rather than
self‐doubt, confusion, and conflict. Later in this chapter, we report additional
findings linking authenticity to a ‘‘stronger sense of self ’’ (Kernis, Paradise,
Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000).
One of the premises underlying our conceptualization is that awareness of
self is a component of healthy functioning. Awareness is really just a first step,
however. Also important is that this awareness fosters self‐integration and
acceptance of self. As integration and acceptance of self‐aspects increase, more
information about them will become accessible. An important issue, therefore,
is how individuals attain self‐knowledge in ways that foster integration and
acceptance of self. A number of techniques are available, some of which stem
from the Gestalt therapy framework developed by Fritz Perls and his colleagues
(Perls et al., 1951). These techniques emphasize deliberately attending to
aspects of self without evaluating their implications. A similar principle under-
lies the use of techniques or strategies designed to enhance individuals’ mind-
fulness. Through these exercises, people can become aware of currently ignored
or unexamined self‐aspects with which they often are uncomfortable. Other
techniques can then be applied to understand and resolve the basis of the
uncomfortableness, thereby fostering self‐integration and acceptance.
B. UNBIASED PROCESSING
C. BEHAVIOR
D. RELATIONAL ORIENTATION
attached people were more accurate in assessing self–other similarity than were
insecurely attached people. In short, substantive intimate relationship adjust-
ment is likely to involve feeling understood or ‘‘known’’ to intimates, and
accuracy in such appraisals is likely to occur when authenticity is operative.
Authentic relationships involve a reciprocal process of self‐disclosure and
of mutual intimacy and trust (Reis & Patrick, 1996). Thus, relational au-
thenticity involves developing and achieving secure attachments with inti-
mates that further promotes the genuine expression of core self‐aspects
without threat of reprisal or criticism. In support of this contention, Kernis
and Goldman reported that higher relational orientation related to higher
secure attachment styles and lower preoccupied and fearful attachment
styles (2005a), as well lower rejection sensitivity (2005b). In short, we expect
that people high in relational authenticity will be involved in healthier, more
satisfying, and fully functioning relationships than people low in relational
authenticity. Later in the chapter, we report additional data relevant to
examining these claims.
In other research, Harter, Waters, Pettit, Whitesell, Kofkin, and Jordan
(1997) found that relationship partners who each viewed themselves as
‘‘mutual’’ (e.g., exhibiting a balance between one’s personal needs and one’s
partner’s needs) reported the highest levels of validation and authentic beha-
viors, whereas ‘‘self‐focused autonomy’’ partners were perceived as least
validating. In terms of well‐being, Harter et al. (1997) found evidence for a
process model. Specifically, the relationship between individuals’ perceived
validation from their partners and their own well‐being (i.e., self‐esteem and
cheerfulness) depended on the extent to which they exhibited authentic self‐
behavior within their romantic relationship. Taken as a whole, Harter et al.’s
(1997) findings demonstrate that behavioral authenticity within one’s inti-
mate relationships involves adopting a relationship orientation that fosters
mutuality. Furthermore, their findings suggest that how a person’s intimate
relationships influence his or her well‐being is aVected by the extent to which
one acts in accord with one’s true‐self within those relationships.
TABLE I
AUTHENTICITY COMPONENTS
Awareness
Awareness and knowledge of, and trust in, one’s motives, feelings, desires, and self‐relevant
cognitions
Includes awareness of one’s strengths and weaknesses, dominant–recessive aspects of person-
ality, powerful emotions, and their roles in behavior
Unbiased Processing
Minimal, if any, denial, distortion, exaggeration, or ignoring of private knowledge, internal
experiences, and externally based self‐evaluative information
Objectivity and acceptance with respect to one’s strengths and weaknesses
Behavior
Acting in ways congruent with one’s values, preferences, and needs
Rather than acting merely to please others or to attain rewards or avoid punishments
Relational Orientation
Value and make eVorts to achieve openness and truthfulness in close relationships
Important for close others to see the real you, those deep, dark, or potentially shadowy self‐
aspects that are not routinely discussed
Relational authenticity means being genuine and not ‘‘fake’’ in one’s relationships with others
We started with a large pool of items that we believed would tap into these four
components, and we administered them to several samples of male and female
college students. We eliminated items based on interitem correlations and
exploratory factor analyses. In the research reported in this chapter, we used
three successive versions of the scale. The final scale (AI‐3, Goldman & Kernis,
2004) consists of 45 items (Awareness—12 items, Unbiased Processing—10
items, Behavior—11 items, and Relational Orientation—12 items). We include
the scale items, along with instructions for its administration and scoring, in the
Appendix. CoeYcient alphas for the scale as a whole (.90) and for each of the
subscales (Awareness ¼ .79, Unbiased Processing ¼ .64, Behavior ¼ .80, and
Relational Orientation ¼ .78) are acceptable. Test retest reliabilities (over
approximately 4 weeks, N ¼ 120) were high (Total ¼ .87, Awareness ¼ .80,
Unbiased Processing ¼ .69, Behavior ¼ .73, and Relational Orientation ¼ .80).
How do these proposed authenticity components relate to the construct of
authenticity? One possibility is that these four components of authenticity
reflect conceptually distinct but interrelated aspects of authenticity. Stated
diVerently, authenticity may be a multifaceted construct that consists of four
distinct components. In factor analytic terminology, this would equate to a
four‐factor model.
A second possibility is that authenticity is a unidimensional rather than
multidimensional construct. That is, while the components we introduced
may be conceptually distinct, empirically they may be so highly interrelated
304 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
that they are not distinguishable and, therefore, represent a single broad
authenticity construct. In factor analytic terminology, each component may
load very highly on a single factor.
A third possibility combines aspects of the two previous possibilities. That
is, on the one hand, authenticity may reflect four conceptually distinct facets
as in the first possibility. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to suppose that these
four aspects are going to be completely unrelated to one another. However,
it is also unrealistic to expect that they would be completely redundant with
one another. Consequently, there may be value in conceiving of a broad
authenticity construct at a higher level of abstraction that subsumes each of
the four facets of authenticity. In this instance, while the four components
are distinct, they may also measure a single latent construct of authentic
functioning. Thus, parsimony exists, but at a higher level of abstraction than
with a single‐factor model. In other words, a hierarchical structure exists in
which overall authenticity exerts its eVects through the four separable, but
interrelated, components of awareness, unbiased processing, behavior, and
relational orientation.
We anticipated finding the greatest support for the third possibility—a
second‐order factor model in which interrelations among the authenticity
components are not so high that they are redundant with one another, but
are high enough so that they are summarized adequately with a single
second‐order authenticity factor. If supported, this model would provide
evidence for a broad latent construct of authenticity, while simultaneously
providing support for treating the components as valid indicators of distinct,
but interrelated, aspects of authentic functioning.
We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test these alternative
conceptions of authenticity. When developing measurement models for
theoretical constructs, one faces a number of options for operationalizing
them, ranging from (a) a total disaggregation model in which individual
elements (e.g., questionnaire items) are used as manifest indicators of the
latent constructs, to (b) some intermediate level of aggregation, such as
creating item parcels (‘‘testlets’’), for use as manifest indicators in latent
variable models, to (c) a total aggregation model in which a single composite
indicator is used to represent the latent construct (Bagozzi & Phillips, 1991;
Edwards, 2000). We opted for a meso‐level of aggregation by creating
multiple‐item parcels for each authenticity dimension. Use of item parcels
poses several advantages over use of individual items as manifest indicators.
Specifically, as compared to individual items, item parcels are more reliable,
have smaller ratios of unique to common variance, are less likely to violate
distributional assumptions, are more parsimonious, are less likely to have
unmeasured correlated disturbances, are less subject to sampling fluctua-
tions, and usually result in less biased CFA solutions (Bandalos, 2002; Little,
AUTHENTICITY 305
TABLE II
CFA MODEL GOODNESS‐OF‐FIT INDICES
*p < .01.
Note: df ¼ degrees of freedom, 2 ¼ model chi‐squared statistic, SRMSR ¼ standardized
root mean squared error, RMSEA ¼ root mean squared error or approximation,
CFI ¼ Bentler’s (1990) comparative fit index, TLI ¼ the Tucker‐Lewis index.
AUTHENTICITY 307
and greater psychological health and well‐being (Brown & Ryan, 2003).
Moreover, the capacity for mindfulness is an aspect of being fully function-
ing, so we expected that it would be associated with greater authenticity. The
mindfulness measure we used in our earlier research was the Mindful Atten-
tion Awareness Scale (MAAS) (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Greater mindfulness,
as assessed by the MAAS, relates to greater psychological well‐being and
positive aVect and lower stress (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Sample items, en-
dorsement of which reflects low mindfulness, include: ‘‘I could be experien-
cing some emotion and not be conscious of it until some time later’’; ‘‘I do
jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I am doing’’; ‘‘I
find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing something else at the
same time.’’ Kernis and Goldman (2005) reported that MAAS mindfulness
scores correlated significantly with total authenticity scores, as well as with
each subscale score.
In more recent research, Lakey, Kernis, Heppner, and Davis (2005) adminis-
tered both the MAAS and the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills
(KIMS), which measures the specific mindfulness components of observing (OB-
SERVE), describing (DESCRIBE), acting with awareness (AWARENESS),
and accepting or allowing without judgment (ACCEPTANCE). Observing refers
to ‘‘observing, noticing, or attending to a variety of stimuli, including internal
phenomena, such as bodily sensations, cognitions, and emotions, and exter-
nal phenomena, such as sounds and smells’’ (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004, p,
193). Sample items include ‘‘I pay attention to whether my muscles are tense
or relaxed’’ and ‘‘I notice the smells and aromas of things.’’ Describing refers
to ‘‘describing, labeling, or noting of observed phenomena by covertly
applying words. . . . This type of describing is done nonjudgmentally and
without conceptual analysis’’ (Baer et al., 2004, p. 193). Sample items
include ‘‘I’m good at finding the words to describe my feelings’’ and ‘‘Even
when I am feeling terribly upset, I can find a way to put it into words.’’
Acting with awareness refers to ‘‘Engaging fully in one’s current activity with
undivided attention or focusing with awareness on one thing at a time. . ..’’
(Baer et al., 2004, p. 193). Sample items include ‘‘When I’m doing
something, I’m only focused on what I am doing, nothing else’’ and
‘‘I’ll get completely absorbed in what I’m doing, so that all my attention
is focused on it.’’ Accepting or allowing without judgment refers to
‘‘. . .accepting, allowing, or being nonjudgmental or nonevaluative
about present moment experience . . . to refrain from applying evaluative
labels such as good/bad, right/wrong, or worthwhile/worthless . . ..’’
(Baer et al., 2004, p. 194). Sample items include ‘‘I make judgments about
whether my thoughts are good or bad (reverse‐scored)’’ and ‘‘I tend to
make judgments about how worthwhile or worthless my experiences are
(reverse‐scored).’’
312 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
TABLE III
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AUTHENTICITY, MINDFULNESS, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
FUNCTIONING MEASURES
Unbiased Relational
Measure Total Awareness processing Behavior orientation
As shown in Table III, the findings obtained by Lakey et al. (2005) for the
MAAS scale replicated those reported by Kernis and Goldman (2005).
Specifically, total authenticity scores, as well as each authenticity subscale
score correlated significantly with total MAAS scores. In addition (and new
to this study), total authenticity and authenticity subscale scores correlated
positively with total KIMS scores as well as its subscales. Specifically,
awareness correlated with each KIMS subscale, relational orientation corre-
lated with each KIMS subscale with the exception of KIMS‐Acceptance,
unbiased processing correlated significantly with KIMS‐Describe and
KIMS‐Acceptance, and behavior correlated significantly with KIMS‐
Describe and KIMS‐Awareness. Most of these relationships were moderate
in strength. The relationships that emerged between the subscales of the two
measures have many interesting theoretical implications. For example, the
awareness authenticity subscale, which reflects a basic awareness of, trust in,
and openness toward, self‐knowledge, correlated with each of the KIMS
subscales. These relationships suggest that an open and trusting stance
toward one’s self‐aspects goes hand‐in‐hand with tendencies to observe
internal and external stimuli, competence in describing one’s internal states,
ability to focus one’s attention on the task at hand, and a nonjudg-
mental stance in general. In addition, the significant correlations between
our unbiased processing subscale and the KIMS describe and awareness
subscales suggests that engaging in biased processing may reflect a more
general tendency to engage in evaluative judgments. Finally, the fact that
AUTHENTICITY 313
TABLE IV
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AUTHENTICITY AND COPING STYLES
Unbiased Relational
Coping scale Total Awareness processing Behavior orientation
Problem‐Focused Coping
Active coping .48** .37** .27* .49** .26*
Planning .31** .32** .10 .37** .09
Suppress .14 .11 .05 .21* .12
Instrumental support .15 .03 .01 .11 .32**
Emotion‐Focused Coping
Emotional support .19 .03 .08 .09 .38**
Suboptimal Coping
Mental disengage .21a .13 .23* .17 .07
Behavior disengage .21a .22* .11 .10 .18a
Emotion venting .12 .25* .15 .03 .13
Denial .22* .23* .10 .07 .24*
Substance use .25* .22* .09 .29** .30**
with scores on the active coping subscale. Thus, greater authentic function-
ing involves ‘‘taking the bull by the horns’’ and directly tackling the problem
at hand. Second, higher awareness and behavioral authenticity, as well as
total authenticity, related to greater use of planning. This makes sense, as
thinking through stressors and how best to deal with them often involves a
thorough assessment of one’s qualities relevant to the situation and a will-
ingness to act on one’s values. Third, greater behavioral authenticity related
to greater suppression of competing activities. This finding suggests that
behavioral authenticity involves the capability to self‐regulate one’s actions
with respect to task relevant demands. Fourth, greater relational authentici-
ty related to greater seeking of emotional and instrumental social support.
Thus, the more people value and achieve honesty and sincerity with their
intimates, the more they are willing to rely on them in times of stress by
seeking their informational and emotional support.
Authenticity also related inversely to the use of mostly dysfunctional or
maladaptive strategies. For example, substance use related to lower overall
authenticity, as well as lower awareness, behavior, and relational orientation
scores. These findings indicate that authentic functioning relates to construc-
tive and active eVorts to deal with problems and stressors, rather than shying
away from them or simply venting one’s emotions. Interestingly, the fact that
awareness subscale scores related to lower emotional venting suggests that the
desire to know one’s self does not include becoming fixated on one’s emo-
tional distress in times of stress. Instead, becoming fixated on one’s distress
appears to signal a relative lack of self‐knowledge. We would argue that
authentic self‐knowledge involves knowledge about one’s sensitivities that
interact with stressors to produce certain emotions and that such knowledge
reflects a level of mature self‐understanding antithetical to the notion of
venting one’s emotions, either to self or to others. Finally, total authenticity
scores, as well as awareness and relational orientation scores, related to less
denial of a stressor. As we have suggested, these aspects of authenticity
involve a desire for accuracy in self‐knowledge and comfortableness with
close others, each of which would seem to mitigate the need to deny the
existence of a stressor.
We conducted additional analyses to examine whether overall authenticity
predicted coping styles independent of self‐esteem level. Overall authen-
ticity uniquely predicted a number of coping styles, namely, active coping,
planning, emotional support, and substance abuse. These data provide impor-
tant support for considering dispositional authenticity to be an important
construct that cannot be reducible to self‐esteem level. Later in the chapter,
we report additional findings regarding the independent predictive utility
of dispositional authenticity, and we consider in detail the interrelation
between self‐esteem and authenticity.
316 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
TABLE V
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AUTHENTICITY AND SELF‐CONCEPT
VARIABLES (GOLDMAN, 2004)
happiness enacting social roles even when their objective performance may
not meet others’ standards (as in a marathon runner who finishes in over
5 hours). In sum, we presumed that dispositional authenticity reflects a wide
range of important psychological characteristics that diVerentiate how indi-
viduals experience their social environment and social roles. The correlations
are displayed in Table VI in which it can be seen that dispositional authen-
ticity related consistently to the role functioning variables as we anticipated.
Higher dispositional authenticity related to healthy role functioning
across a range of commonly enacted social roles (i.e., being a son/daughter,
a student, a romantic partner, a friend, and an employee). For instance,
higher dispositional authenticity related to positive aspects of general role
functioning including greater satisfaction and positive aVectivity experienced
within one’s social roles, as well as greater ‘‘balance’’ of one’s total role‐
system. In addition, higher dispositional authenticity related to less negative
aspects of general role functioning as reflected in less stress within their
commonly enacted social roles, and less ‘‘overload’’ in their social roles in
general. Finally, heightened levels of dispositional authenticity also reflected
authentic aspects of role functioning. Specifically, greater dispositional au-
thenticity relates to role experiences that were: (1) reflective of greater
expressiveness of their true beliefs and opinions (role‐voice), (2) more fully
involved the enactment of their true‐selves (greater true‐self role enactment),
(3) subjectively deemed to be authentic (role authenticity), and (4) regulated
TABLE VI
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AUTHENTICITY AND ROLE FUNCTIONING
VARIABLES (GOLDMAN, 2004)
Role Variable
Balance .35** .29* .17 .25* .33**
Overload .06 .03 .17 .06 .05
Satisfaction .42** .44** .36** .21a .23*
Stress .23a .16 .14 .23* .13
Strain .25* .16 .30** .13 .16
Voice .55** .51** .28** .36** .45**
Authenticity .46** .40** .25* .29* .43**
Net positive aVect .44** .45** .28** .27* .30**
True‐self .43** .36** .29** .28* .35**
Self‐determination .24* .20a .18 .20a .10
TABLE VII
PREDICTING WELL‐BEING FROM DISPOSITIONAL AUTHENTICITY AND
PROJECT NEED‐FULFILLMENT
Life Satisfaction
Authenticity .24 2.60 .01
Project need‐fulfillment .29 3.11 .01 .18
Net Positive AVect
Authenticity .26 3.18 .01
Project need‐fulfillment .45 5.44 .01 .34
Autonomy
Authenticity .50 5.90 .01
Project need‐fulfillment .11 1.31 .19 .29
Environmental Mastery
Authenticity .30 3.49 .01
Project need‐fulfillment .32 3.71 .01 .25
Personal Growth
Authenticity .35 3.85 .01
Project need‐fulfillment .21 2.32 .02 .20
Positive Relationships
Authenticity .32 3.46 .01
Project need‐fulfillment .17 1.79 .08 .16
Purpose in Life
Authenticity .29 3.08 .01
Project need‐fulfillment .14 1.43 .16 .13
Self‐Acceptance
Authenticity .24 2.57 .01
Project need‐fulfillment .25 2.71 .01 .15
Eudaimonic Well‐Being Composite
Authenticity .49 6.28 .01
Project need‐fulfillment .29 3.78 .01 .41
Hedonic Well‐Being Composite
Authenticity .27 3.24 .01
Project need‐fulfillment .40 4.75 .01 .39
B. PARTNER VALIDATION
(a) Think that you must not be important enough to him/her (Personalize)
(b) Enjoy the present you got (Minimize)
(c) Think that circumstances beyond his/her control must have prevented
it (Benign)
(d) In the future give him/her a present other than what you know he/she
clearly wants (Reciprocating)
Consistent with these hypotheses, Kernis et al. (2004) found that whereas
unstable high self‐esteem individuals reported being most likely to engage in
personalizing and get even reactions, stable high self‐esteem individuals
reported being least likely (low self‐esteem individuals fell between). Con-
versely, whereas stable high self‐esteem individuals reported being most
likely to engage in benign and minimizing reactions, unstable high self‐esteem
individuals reported being least likely (again, low self‐esteem individuals fell
between). These findings are important because they point to the operation
of dynamics associated with fragile high self‐esteem that until now have been
ascribed to low self‐esteem individuals (Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, &
Ellsworth, 1998) or to those highly sensitive to rejection (Downey, Freitas,
Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998).
Elsewhere (Kernis, 2003; Kernis & Goldman, 2004, 2005), we theorized that
complementary processes may be operative in authenticity and secure high
self‐esteem development, and thus, we reasoned that high authenticity would
similarly be related to low ego‐involved reactions (i.e., greater minimizing
and benign reactions and less personalizing, and reciprocating reactions).
We anticipated these findings for several reasons. First, high authenticity
relates to secure forms of high self‐esteem, which Kernis et al. (2004) showed
related to this pattern of reactions. Second, high authenticity (particularly
the unbiased processing component) reflects objective, nondefensive proces-
sing of evaluative information. Third, correlations between authenticity
and mindfulness reported in this chapter suggest that authenticity relates
to non‐ego‐involved attentiveness and awareness of internal and external
stimuli.
Whereas the RRI asks respondents to indicate how they would respond to
hypothetical partner transgressions, other work has examined various
responses that people have when experiencing relationship problems. Specif-
ically, Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, and Lipkus (1991) developed a
self‐report measure of accommodation tendencies. Participants respond
to four separate stems (e.g., ‘‘When my partner is unintentionally unpleasant
or thoughtless’’), each of which is followed by four response options.
Specifically, participants indicate the extent to which they engage in con-
structive reactions: voice (actively and constructively attempting to improve
conditions, e.g., ‘‘I talk to him or her about what’s going on, trying to work
330 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
out a solution’’) and loyalty (passively but optimistically waiting for condi-
tions to improve, e.g., ‘‘I give my partner the benefit of the doubt and forget
about it’’), and destructive reactions—exit (actively destroying the relation-
ship, abusing one’s partner, or threatening to leave or separate, e.g., ‘‘I feel
so angry that I want to walk right out the door’’) and neglect (ignoring or
criticizing one’s partner, or avoiding spending time or discussing relevant
issues, e.g., ‘‘I sulk and try to stay away from my partner for awhile’’).
Across a variety of studies, Rusbult et al. (1991) reported that destructive
reactions predicted lower relationship satisfaction, and constructive reac-
tions predicted greater relationship satisfaction. In the present study, we
predicted that higher authenticity would relate to greater constructive and
lesser destructive conflict reactions.
D. RELATIONSHIP MOTIVES
Finally, we asked people about their motives for being in their current
relationships, using a variant of the self‐regulatory styles measure developed
by Ryan and Connell (1989) in which people are asked to report on the
reasons why they engage in a particular behavior. In this instance, respon-
dents were asked to report their reasons for their behaviors as a romantic
partner. Reasons reflect varying degrees of self‐determination. Intrinsic (e.g.,
I do things because of the pleasure and fun of doing them) and identified
(e.g., I do things because they tie into my personal values and beliefs) reasons
reflect high self‐determination, whereas introjected (e.g., I force myself to do
things to avoid feeling guilty or anxious) and external (e.g., I do things
because somebody else wants me to or because I will get something from
somebody if I do them) reasons reflect low self‐determination. Likewise,
participants completed the measure of relationship motivation reported by
Rempel et al. (1985) that taps into the extent to which individuals’ relation-
ships are intrinsically satisfying to them. Rempel et al. (1985) found that
the more individuals endorsed possessing greater intrinsic motives,
whereby relationship rewards involve mutual satisfaction, empathic concern,
and value for both partners, the more they reported feeling love and faith
in their relationship. In contrast, extrinsic motives that involved obtain-
ing rewards exclusively outside the relationship (e.g., parental approval)
were unrelated to the measures of relationship adjustment. Thus, possessing
motivations that involve rewards obtained within one’s relationship
(as opposed to gains obtained external to the couple) appears to confer
benefits to the quality of a couple’s relationship. Sample items tapping into
intrinsic motives include: (1) ‘‘We have a rewarding intellectual relation-
ship. We have meaningful discussions which are stimulating and enriching.’’
AUTHENTICITY 331
(2) ‘‘We are close and intimate. We have special ways of demonstrating
aVection and letting each other know how we feel.’’ (3) ‘‘He/she lets me be
myself. He/she doesn’t tie me down and doesn’t try to change me.’’ We
predicted that higher relationship authenticity would relate to more self‐
determined self‐regulation and intrinsic relationship motives.
In order to examine the relationship between dispositional authenticity
and relationship satisfaction, and the previously described relationship func-
tioning variables, Goldman, Brunell, Kernis, Heppner, and Davis (2005a)
administered the AI‐3 in an initial session to 61 heterosexual couples
involved in a committed relationship of 3 or more months. Participants
subsequently completed the remaining measures (except for relationship
satisfaction, to be discussed) in two additional sessions that took place over
an 8‐week period. We assessed relationship satisfaction twice, during the first
and last sessions, using Rusbult’s five‐item satisfaction measure (Rusbult,
1983; Rusbult, Martz, & Agnew, 1998). Items included were ‘‘I feel satisfied
with my relationship,’’ ‘‘My relationship is much better than others’ rela-
tionships,’’ ‘‘My relationship is close to ideal,’’ ‘‘Our relationship makes me
very happy,’’ and ‘‘Our relationship does a good job of fulfilling my needs
for intimacy, companionship, etc.’’ Each item was answered on a nine‐point
scale (0 ¼ do not agree at all, 8 ¼ agree completely). We first examined the
extent to which dispositional authenticity and participant gender predicted
Time 2 satisfaction and change in satisfaction from Time 1 to Time 2.
In both cases, significant main eVects emerged for authenticity, such that
higher authenticity related to higher subsequent satisfaction and greater
positive change in satisfaction. In neither case did gender produce any
significant eVects, either as a main eVect or as interacting with authenticity.
Consequently, we did not include gender in further analyses.
We developed composite measures for a variety of relationship processes
in order to examine more broadly based theoretical domains of close rela-
tionship functioning. Specifically, these relationship process composites in-
clude the following: self‐disclosure and relationship motives. For each
composite an overall summary score was created by first calculating z‐scores
for each measure and then adding the z‐scores. Self‐Disclosure reflected both
emotional, (i.e., Snell et al.’s measure) and intimate (i.e., Miller et al.’s
measure) forms. In addition, we included fear‐of‐intimacy scores (reverse
scored so that higher summary scores reflected less fear) to reflect people’s
tendencies to inhibit their thoughts and feelings from being shared with
their partners. Relationship motives reflected the degree to which participants
reported self‐determined reasons for relationship behaviors (i.e., self‐
determination index scores) and were motivated by rewards obtained within
their relationships (i.e., intrinsic relationship motives).
In addition, defensiveness in response to hypothetical partner transgres-
sions involved responses on the RRI. Specifically, the defensive reactions
332 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
TABLE VIII
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AUTHENTICITY AND RELATIONSHIP
PROCESS VARIABLES
Note: Relationship motives ¼ self‐regulatory styles and intrinsic relationship motive; self‐
disclosure composite ¼ Miller‐Berg’s self‐disclosure scale, emotional self‐disclosure scale,
and fear‐of‐intimacy (reversed); ego‐involved ¼ internalize and reciprocate; non‐ego‐involved ¼
minimize and benign explanation; destructive ¼ exit and neglect; constructive ¼ voice and loyalty.
AUTHENTICITY 333
variables. Consistent with our view that authentic people value openness and
intimacy in their close relationships, we find that higher authenticity relates
to more self‐disclosure. In addition, higher authenticity relates to greater
self‐determined reasons and intrinsic relationship motives. When responding
to hypothetical partner transgressions, higher authenticity relates to greater
non‐ego‐involved (benign and minimizing) and less ego‐involved reactions
(personalizing and reciprocating). In addition, higher authenticity relates to
greater constructive reactions and less destructive reactions to relationship
problems, although this was less true for passive (loyalty) than for active
(voice) constructive reactions.
Tables IX and X, respectively, report the regression analyses with overall
dispositional authenticity and each relationship process variable entered
simultaneously as predictors of subsequent relationship satisfaction and
change in satisfaction, respectively. With respect to subsequent satisfaction,
we find that the tendency to self‐disclose, intrinsic relationship motives,
and trust, each mediate the relationship between authenticity and satisfac-
tion that emerged. That is, when authenticity and disclosure tendencies,
TABLE IX
PREDICTING RELATIONSHIP SATISFACTION FROM AUTHENTICITY AND RELATIONSHIP
PROCESS VARIABLES
Note: Constructive reactions to problems did not predict relationship satisfaction and there-
fore were not included in regression models. Relationship motives ¼ self‐regulatory styles and
intrinsic relationship motives; self‐disclosure composite ¼ Miller‐Berg’s self‐disclosure scale,
emotional self‐disclosure, and fear of intimacy; ego‐involved RRI reactions ¼ personalize plus
reciprocate reactions; Non‐ego‐involved reactions ¼ benign plus minimize reactions, Destructive
reactions ¼ exit and neglect.
334 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
TABLE X
PREDICTING CHANGE IN RELATIONSHIP SATISFACTION FROM
AUTHENTICITY AND RELATIONSHIP PROCESS VARIABLES
Note: Constructive reactions to problems did not predict relationship satisfaction and there-
fore were not included in regression models. Relationship motives ¼ self‐regulatory styles and
intrinsic relationship motives; self‐disclosure composite ¼ Miller‐Berg’s self‐disclosure scale,
emotional self‐disclosure, and fear of intimacy; ego‐involved RRI reactions ¼ personalize plus
reciprocate reactions; non‐ego‐involved reactions ¼ benign plus minimize reactions, Destructive
reactions ¼ exit and neglect.
vary along a number of dimensions including the extent to which parents: establish firm
guidelines and limits; explain and justify demands and expectations; assert power and
control; and provide emotional support. Authoritative parents set clear, reasonable
guideline and they exercise reliable control in a legitimate and loving fashion. They
explain and justify their expectations and actions and they are responsive to feedback.
However, authoritative parents will assert power and control when adolescents are too
immature or self‐centered to listen to reason. . . . Authoritarian parents set definite
limits and make rules that are not open to discussion. They make unilateral demands
and use power to reinforce them. Permissive parents are responsive and indulging but
make few demands and exercise limited control (Berzonsky, 2004, p. 214).
TABLE XI
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AUTHENTICITY AND RETROSPECTIVE
ACCOUNTS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Unbiased Relational
Measure Total Awareness processing Behavior orientation
Authoritarian
Mother .04 .05 .00 .10 .01
Father .11 .14 .14 .03 .08
Combined .05 .06 .09 .07 .05
Permissiveness
Mother .22a .01 .31** .25* .10
Father .20a .02 .17 .30** .13
Combined .24* .04 .26* .31** .14
Authoritative
Mother .38** .47** .27* .20a .20a
Father .29* .36** .28* .04 .18
Combined .36** .45** .31** .13 .21a
TABLE XII
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AUTHENTICITY AND SELF‐ESTEEM VARIABLES
A. AWARENESS
B. UNBIASED PROCESSING
The major drawback associated with unbiased processing is that it makes one
susceptible to encountering negative information about the self. Although
undoubtedly true, distorting or repressing negative self‐information is costly
for a number of reasons. As we reported earlier in this chapter, defensively
processing stressful information about oneself relates to lower, not higher,
psychological functioning. Likewise, positively distorting self‐relevant infor-
mation leaves one open to the social consequences associated with an arro-
gant self‐image. In any case, distorting self‐relevant information reflects
heightened ego‐investment with its attendant rigidity and overreactivity
(Hodgins & Knee, 2002).
C. BEHAVIOR
self‐understanding. Harter (1999) notes that people’s motives for their inau-
thentic behaviors diVerentiate the consequences these actions have for their
well‐being. For instance, inauthentic actions that are motivated by self‐uncer-
tainty, or disdain for oneself, are likely to undermine well‐being more so than
inauthentic actions that reflect a process of electing to express preexisting self‐
inclinations (e.g., role‐experimentation). Furthermore, people can, and often
do, internalize social contingencies and freely adopt them as self‐guides (Ryan
& Connell, 1989). In such cases, conflict is minimal or absent and it is relatively
easy for people to behave authentically.
D. RELATIONAL ORIENTATION
Thus, it is evident that authenticity can have potential costs. For example,
accurate self‐knowledge can be painful, behaving in accord with one’s true‐
self may occasion others’ disfavor, and opening oneself up to an intimate
makes one vulnerable to rejection or betrayal. Such adverse consequences
potentially associated with authenticity are likely to undermine individuals’
hedonic, or subjective, well‐being. For instance, research on identity statuses
demonstrates that optimal well‐being occurs when individuals experience
identity achievement by resolving their identity crises through engaging in
high levels of identity exploration and then committing to ways of resolving
them (Marcia, 1966). Thus, for people to attain optimal well‐being through
identity formation, they may have to temporarily endure costs to well‐being in
the course of exploring who they can be. Similarly, authenticity may not
always be pleasurable. However, we would argue that the benefits of authentic
functioning to individuals’ eudaimonic well‐being (i.e., the extent to which
they are fully functioning, Ryan & Deci, 2000) are substantial. When func-
tioning authentically, people are likely to think, feel, and behave in ways that
promote the fulfillment of their needs and heighten the degree to which they
are fully functioning (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Rogers, 1961). Thus, people can be
faced with choosing between experiencing pleasure (or avoiding displeasure)
342 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
and maximizing the extent to which they are fully functioning. How they
resolve this dilemma has enormous implications, both short‐ and long‐term.
The findings reported in this chapter provide initial support for our multi-
component conceptualization of authenticity. The Authenticity Inventory
appears adequate psychometrically, and confirmatory factor analyses sup-
port our view that the four components, while distinct, reflect a broad latent
authenticity factor. Although we have accrued considerable validity data, we
also recognize that our work is just beginning and many questions remain
for us to address. An important avenue for future research is to obtain data
relating our measure to outcomes other than that obtained from self‐reports.
We have begun to do that (e.g., our study on verbal defensiveness), but more
research needs to be done.
We recognize that our self‐report measure of authenticity has the same
inherent diYculties as the majority of self‐report measures. Respondents
may either deliberately misrepresent themselves or have limited access to
the information needed for valid responses. One way to deal with such issues
is to obtain validity data that cannot easily be explained in terms of response
biases. In this chapter, we presented data showing that scores on two self‐
esteem fragility measures (contingent SE and unstable SE, the latter repre-
sented by high response variability across multiple assessments) related to
lower scores on the Authenticity Inventory. Likewise, we presented data
demonstrating that higher authenticity scores related to less defensiveness
while answering provocative questions during an interview. Although these
findings are informative and diYcult to explain purely in terms of response
biases, it would be beneficial to examine additional outcomes that involve
behaviors or reactions to experimental manipulations. Elsewhere (Kernis &
Goldman, 2005), we described a number of questions that we felt were
interesting and important to examine in future research. We rely on that
exposition in the discussion here.
A. AWARENESS
B. UNBIASED PROCESSING
C. BEHAVIOR
D. RELATIONAL ORIENTATION
XII. Summary
Acknowledgments
Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by support from the Department of Psychology
and the Institute for Behavioral Research at the University of Georgia and NSF Grant 0451029.
The authors thank Charles Lance for his assistance conducting and reporting statistical analyses
and Pam Riddle for her assistance in preparing the chapter.
AUTHENTICITY 345
Appendix
AUT3
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly
Disagree Nor Disagree Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly
Disagree Nor Disagree Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly
Disagree Nor Disagree Agree
Subscales
Awareness: 1R, 3, 4, 6, 9, 14R, 20, 21, 29, 34R, 36R, 38
Alpha ¼ .79
Unbiased Processing: 7R, 13R, 16R, 19R, 30R, 35R, 37R, 39R, 41R, 42R
Alpha ¼ .64
Behavioral: 2, 8R, 10R, 11R, 25, 27R, 28, 31, 32, 33R, 45
Alpha ¼ .80
Relational Orientation: 5, 12, 15, 17R, 18, 22R, 23, 24, 26R, 40, 43, 44
Alpha ¼ .78
Composite Scale Alpha ¼ .90
***NOTE: R ¼ Reverse Scored Item
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