1.

----------------** Real knowledge according to Plato is understanding the form of the particular object. In the allegory of the cave, the man that escapes goes outside and sees the real world. Justified True Belief is something that has a foundation and is a first principle that is self evident. ie, Descartes' Cogito ergo sum, because he realized that doubting his existence was impossible, the first principle of his knowledge is his existence. Belief is not true knowledge but is better than opinion.

"Socrates is still attempting to elucidate his point; Glaucon asks that Socrates continue the analogy. But Socrates introduces a new illustration, The Analogy of the Divided Line. Socrates is still making the distinction between knowledge and belief, the difference between the Forms and ordinary objects. (We should also recall here that Socrates says that objects of belief are like reflections of objects of knowledge.) At this juncture of the dialogue, Socrates argues that there exist two degrees of knowledge and two of belief. Commentary Socrates tells us now that there exist four levels of what we may call intellect (intellectual functioning, cognition) and four levels of objects that the intellect perceives. (See the illustration of the Levels of Intellect.) * The lowest level of intellect (cognition, thinking process) is called imagining. Thinking at this level seems to be the mental activity pursued by people whose state of mind might be called, in comparison to higher states of mind, unclear, or vague. (This state of mind may be manifested in the unreleased people in the Allegory of the Cave, which Socrates discusses later in the dialogue. These people in the Cave perceive only images of images.) * The next higher level of intellect is called belief, or common-sense belief. Mental activity at this level seems to be the thought processes of people who perceive tangible things, real objects, things of material substance. These people, like the young Guardians, hold moral beliefs, but they have no knowledge of the things in which they believe; they have been taught to believe. A higher education is intended for the Guardians as they mature (in order for them to escape from the Cave). The Guardians are to be educated in mathematics and then in moral philosophy. * The next higher level of intellect is called thinking. Formal training in this level of mental activity involves studying the mathematical sciences. Guardians at this level of mental activity are taught the use of visible diagrams and physical models meant to symbolize the workings of pure thought. Next, the Guardians are taught to reason from assumptions (premises) to conclusions (deductive thought). * The highest level of intellect is called Dialectic, which for Plato means a conversation (question and response) that seeks to determine, without the aid of diagrams or physical models, a conclusion about some Form, for example, the conversation about Justice in the present dialogue. This level of mental activity does not move from an assumed premise to a conclusion (deductive thinking); rather, the premise itself is analyzed through Dialectic (as in the present dialogue) to try to determine the nature of a given Form. Knowledge of the Form might then be construed as a premise, from which we can deduce conclusions proving out the whole of mathematics and moral philosophy. This level of intellect is also called intelligence or knowledge (the condition of the

prisoner who is released from the Cave in the Allegory of the Cave)." Source(s):

Protagoras, from Abdera (in Greece), most reputable sophist, many Athenian students, about 65; epistemological relativist said "man is the measure of all things, of those that are that they are, and of those that are not that they are not"; knowledge is relative to the knower, and no man can call another wrong; also religious agnosticsaid "Concerning the gods I cannot say either that they exist or that they do no, or what they are like in form; for there are many hindrances to knowledge; the obscurity of the subject and the brevity of human life." Before Protagoras's speach, Socrates claims virtue cannot be taught; two reasons: 1. All citizens can speak on issues of government (as opposed to, say, shipbuilding, which requires expertise); 2. Good men can't make their sons good. Protagoras' speach (p. 32-39); demonstrates Protagoras' teaching style (telling stories; narratives; using myths); claims the capacity for political wisdom ("virtue") is universal ("otherwise the state could not exist"); claims that it is not automatic, by "acquired by instruction and taking thought", shown by use of punishment (contrast between dwarfism and viciousness); goodness of children depends on 'natural talent' or capacity and on instruction (nature AND nurture); moral education is EVERYWHERE, like language instruction. Protagoras claims that laws are "inventions of good lawgivers of ancient times" (thus man-made, not divine). Socrates' reaction to Protagoras' story Meno's/Protagoras' view of virtue Virtue is a category or set of traits or dispositions (tendencies to behave in certain morally acceptable ways): Example: "I trust Jane; she is an honest person." Example: "If trouble comes, I hope Jim is around; he is very brave." Example: "Pericles's character is an inspiration to the moral development of young men and women." All people have some capacity for virtue An agent can have some traits and not others There is no ultimate "good"; all goods are relative to situation, goals, ends An act is "good" (and therefore virtuous) if it furthers other goals "Morality" is mainly a matter of social convention; people make the rules Political success is the ultimate "sign" of Athenian virtue; includes: reputation rhetorical skill organizational skill Virtue is taught through: punishment admonition the laws fables, stories, myths narratives Vice is result of lower capacity to learn virtue or insufficient attention to moral education Advantages to this view: does not depend upon acceptance of a rational argument

accounts for different moral rules in different societies compatible with evolutionary view of human nature appeals to our common-sense understanding of virtue validates our common attempts to teach virtue to the young provides justification for democratic forms of decision-making Problems with this view: The only way to resolve moral disagreement is moral suasion: "Let me tell you a story that will convince you that adultery is wrong"; makes rhetoric more important than logic. No acknowledgement that morality has spiritual dimension; makes religious beliefs arbitrary or facetious Seems to reward ability to manipulate and deceive Leads to "power politics", "moral relativism," and crass individualism Claims that our most heartfelt moral commitments are just "opinions" Specificity thesis (The Character Education Inquiry, 1928-1930, by Hartshorne and May): the behavioral manifestations of character are situationally specific an agent's behavior correlates more highly with situational variables than with personal attributes conceptualized in terms of traits specificity thesis is supported by the (Edward) Thorndike's notion of learning as the acquisition of specific "connections," each of which develops as a specific response to a specific stimulus (NOTE: connectionism is still a popular psychological view, but it has been enhanced; new theories do not require the same level of specificity) character as a "bag of virtues" seems to take certain moral IDEALS (such as honesty, compassion, justice, temperance), and "psychologize them" into traits or dispositions, when evidence shows that people's traits and dispositions are not as "general" as these ideals Also, studies of character education have shown that: widely practiced educational activities such as reciting inspirational passages, singing patriotic and prayerful songs, and even democratic discussions about the school's moral aims have little effect on students' "character" behaviors, especially when compared to personal and social factors outside of the classroom teacher's control

2.
Background In Book 4 of the Republic Socrates states that opposite actions, affections and states cannot be assigned to one thing in respect of the same part of it, in relation to the same object and at the same time[2]. For instance, it seems that, given each person has only one soul, it should be impossible for a person to simultaneously desire something yet also at that very moment be averse to the same thing, as when one is tempted to commit a crime but also averse to it. Both Socrates and Glaucon agree that it should not be possible for the soul to at the same time both be in one state and its opposite. From this it follows that there must be at least two aspects to soul.[3] Appetitive The appetitive aspect of soul is the one that is responsible for the base desires within people. It is responsible for the simple cravings needed to stay alive, such as thirst and hunger, and also for unnecessary cravings such as sexual excess or the desire to over-consume at meal time. The desires for necessary things (such as food and drink) should be restricted by the other parts of the soul, while unlawful desires should be restricted completely by the other aspects of soul.[4] Rational

The rational soul (mind or intellect) is the thinking portion within each of us (Logiston, from Logos), which discerns what is real and not merely apparent, judges what is true and what is false, and wisely makes the rational decisions in accordance with which human life is most properly lived. Spirited The spirited soul (thymos) is the source of the desires that love honor and victory. In the just soul, spirit acts as the enforcer of the rational soul, ensuring that the dictates of reason are followed. Emotions such as anger and indignation are the result of the frustration of the spirit.[3] Soul and social class In the Republic, Plato also indicates that the three parts of the soul also correspond to the three main classes of a just society.[5] The rational soul corresponds to the Guardian class. This class consists of the philosopher kings. All of society should listen to and follow harmoniously whatever is commanded by the philosopher kings. The spirited soul corresponds to the Auxiliary class of soldiers and enforcers. This group of people ensures that the dictates of reasons from the philosopher kings are obeyed by all of society. The appetitive soul corresponds to the worker class of merchants and simple laborers. Plato starting point for his divisions of the soul is the different classes he observed in society (Guardians, Auxiliaries and Workers). He concluded that this structure must have arisen from the individuals which make up society. Plato started with noting what motivated people desires, needs and wants. These wants could be qualified or unqualified. For example, someone who was thirsty could just want a drink or a particular type of drink. The first type was appetitive (1) whereas the second type was reflective and rational (2). Next he noted that young children showed signs of rationality despite their youth. He attributed this to the spirited (3) part of the soul which kept the appetitive (1) part of the soul in check. The spirited (3) part of the soul had an affinity to the rational (2) part of the soul but was quite distinct and separate. Plato explains this tripartite division by an allegory - a charioteer driving two horses. The charioteer represents the rational (2) part of the soul. The ugly black horse represents the appetitive (1) part of the soul which is kept in check by the white noble horse which represents the spirited (3) part of the soul. An ideal society consists of three main classes of peopleproducers (craftsmen, farmers, artisans, etc.), auxiliaries (warriors), and guardians (rulers); a society is just when relations between these three classes are right. Each group must perform its appropriate function, and only that function, and each must be in the right position of power in relation to the others. Rulers must rule, auxiliaries must uphold rulers convictions, and producers must limit themselves to exercising whatever skills nature granted them (farming, blacksmithing, painting, etc.) Justice is a principle of specialization: a principle that requires that each person fulfill the societal role to which nature fitted him and not interfere in any other business. At the end of Book IV, Plato tries to show that individual justice mirrors political justice. He claims that the soul of every individual has a three part structure analagous to the three classes of a society. There is a rational part of the soul, which seeks after truth and is responsible for our philosophical inclinations; a spirited part of the soul, which desires honor and is responsible for our feelings of anger and indignation; and an appetitive part of the soul, which lusts after all sorts of things, but money most of all (since money must be used to fulfill any other base desire). The just individual can be defined in analogy with the just society; the three parts of his soul achieve the requisite relationships of power and influence in regard to one another. In a just individual, the

rational part of the soul rules, the spirited part of the soul supports this rule, and the appetitive part of the soul submits and follows wherever reason leads. Put more plainly: in a just individual, the entire soul aims at fulfilling the desires of the rational part, much as in the just society the entire community aims at fulfilling whatever the rulers will. The parallels between the just society and the just individual run deep. Each of the three classes of society, in fact, is dominated by one of the three parts of the soul. Producers are dominated by their appetitestheir urges for money, luxury, and pleasure. Warriors are dominated by their spirits, which make them courageous. Rulers are dominated by their rational faculties and strive for wisdom. Books V through VII focus on the rulers as the philosopher kings. In a series of three analogiesthe allegories of the sun, the line, and the cavePlato explains who these individuals are while hammering out his theory of the Forms. Plato explains that the world is divided into two realms, the visible (which we grasp with our senses) and the intelligible (which we only grasp with our mind). The visible world is the universe we see around us. The intelligible world is comprised of the Formsabstract, changeless absolutes such as Goodness, Beauty, Redness, and Sweetness that exist in permanent relation to the visible realm and make it possible. (An apple is red and sweet, the theory goes, because it participates in the Forms of Redness and Sweetness.) Only the Forms are objects of knowledge, because only they possess the eternal unchanging truth that the mindnot the sensesmust apprehend. Only those whose minds are trained to grasp the Formsthe philosopherscan know anything at all. In particular, what the philosophers must know in order to become able rulers is the Form of the Goodthe source of all other Forms, and of knowledge, truth, and beauty. Plato cannot describe this Form directly, but he claims that it is to the intelligible realm what the sun is to the visible realm. Using the allegory of the cave, Plato paints an evocative portrait of the philosophers soul moving through various stages of cognition (represented by the line) through the visible realm into the intelligible, and finally grasping the Form of the Good. The aim of education is not to put knowledge into the soul, but to put the right desires into the soulto fill the soul with a lust for truth, so that it desires to move past the visible world, into the intelligible, ultimately to the Form of the Good.

3.
notes about who socrates vvisited.

4.
humility to be able to admit ___ I am the wisest man alive, for I know one thing, and that is that I know nothing. Socrates Worthless people live only to eat and drink; people of worth eat and drink only to live. Socrates Beauty is the bait which with delight allures man to enlarge his kind. Socrates

True knowledge exists in knowing that you know nothing. Socrates Wisdom begins in wonder. Socrates He is richest who is content with the least, for content is the wealth of nature. Read more at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/s/socrates101212.html#4EdyKPA50Pcducot.99

ocrates accepted the combined definition and instruction of/for WISDOM of the oracle at Delphi, which was "Know Thyself!" [an instruction] and "Wisdom is to Know Thyself" [as a definition]. Quote SOCRATES Now I quite acknowledge that these allegories are very nice, but he is not to be envied who has to invent them; much labour and ingenuity will be required of him; and when he has once begun, he must go on and rehabilitate Hippocentaurs and chimeras dire. Gorgons and winged steeds flow in apace, and numberless other inconceivable and portentous natures. And if he is sceptical about them, and would fain reduce them one after another to the rules of probability, this sort of crude philosophy will take up a great deal of time. Now I have no leisure for such enquiries; shall I tell you why? I must first KNOW MYSELF, as the DELPHIAN inscription says; To be curious about that which is not my concern, while I am still in ignorance of my own self, would be ridiculous. And therefore I bid farewell to all this; the common opinion is enough for me. For, as I was saying, I want to know not about this, but about myself: am I a monster more complicated and swollen with passion than the serpent Typho, or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort, to whom Nature has given a diviner and lowlier destiny? But let me ask you, friend: have we not reached the plane-tree to which you were conducting us? [Socrates speaking to Phaedrus in the dialogue of the same name at 229d - 230b] Anyone who knows a little logic, then, can understand why Socrates said that he was very conscious to himself that he was NOT WISE at his trial, as recounted by Plato in The Apology [at 21b]. For when you consider the "Delphian Inscription" [Wisdom is to know thyself.] as a definition and take it as the major premise of a syllogism, then from the allegation by Socrates that he does not know himself [Phaedrus; above quoted], taken as a minor premise, it logically follows that Socrates is not wise [The Apology], as the conclusion of what Aristotle called a "2nd figure" syllogism [the middle term TO KNOW THYSELF being the predicate of major and minor premises in Socrates's 2nd figure syllogism, concerning his own lack of wisdom]. Those answerers to this particular question, who consistently regurgitate a false misquote to the effect that Socrates was wise because he, in effect, "only knew that he knew nothing", get their false answer from "the net" and an entirely out of context quote (actual misquote) of Socrates concerning justice in The Republic, where as a consequence of his discussion with Thrasymachus, Socrates says, quote: SOCRATES: So that for me, the present outcome of the discussion is that I KNOW NOTHING. For if I DON'T KNOW what THE JUST is, I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, and whether its possessor is or is not happy. [Republic BK I, 354b] Socrates actually said that he never thought he knew what he actually did not know and to this small extent he was wiser than most people who often thought they knew what they actually did not

know. [Apology 21d SOCRATES: "Well I am certainly wiser than this man. It is only too likely that neither of us has any knowledge to boast of, but he thinks that he knows something which he does not know, whereas I am quite conscious of my ignorance. At any rate it seems that I am wiser to this small extent, that I DO NOT THINK THAT I KNOW what I DO NOT KNOW."] Those who constantly regurgitate that misquote of Socrates are perfect examples of those who think they know what they do not [and cannot] know. In short Socrates never "glorified" utter ignorance [I know absolutely nothing.] as wisdom. Only sceptical misquoters or sophistical "know nothings" accept that bogus "definition" of wisdom. Socrates accepted the standard definition of wisdom according to the Delphic oracle --- which is why he was so "absorbed" with the Delphic oracle's/Apollo's arguable contradiction of it/him/self --a particular Delphic oracle about himself [No one is WISER than Socrates.] and the general oracle [Wisdom is to know thyself.] which proved to himself, given his own personal experience [NOT knowing himself], that he was NOT WISE.

Humility Theory 1 (H1): S is wise iff S believes s/he is not wise. This is a tempting and popular interpretation because Socrates certainly thinks he has shown, through his questioning, that the poets, politicians, and craftsmen lacked wisdom. Socrates also states that the poets, politicians, and craftsmen all boasted of their own wisdom. Moreover, Socrates claims that he is not wise, and yet, if we trust the oracle, Socrates is actually wise. Upon careful inspection, (H1) is not a reasonable interpretation of Socrates' view. For one thing, it seems that although Socrates does not boast of his own wisdom, he does believe the oracle. If he was convinced that he was not wise, he would have rejected the oracle and gone about his business. If he did not believe the oracle, he would not find any puzzle to unravel. Clearly, he believes, on some level, that he is wise. The mystery is: what is wisdom if he has it and the others lack it? Socrates nowhere suggests that he has become unwise after believing the oracle. Thus, (H1) is not an acceptable interpretation of Socrates' own view. Moreover, (H1) is false. Many people are clear counterexamples to (H1). Many people who believe they are not wise are correct in their self-assessment. The belief that one is not wise is not a sufficient condition for wisdom. Furthermore, it seems that the belief that one is not wise is not necessary for wisdom. It seems plausible to think that a wise person could be wise enough to realize that she is wise. If one thinks Socrates was a wise person, and if one accepts that Socrates did, in fact, accept that he was wise, then Socrates is a counterexample to (H1). The belief that one is wise could be a perfectly well justified belief for a wise person. Having the belief that one is wise does not, in itself, eliminate the possibility that the person is wise. Moreover, we should hope that a wise person would have epistemic self-confidence, appreciate that she is wise, and share what she knows with the rest of us who could benefit from her wisdom. Thus, the belief that one is not wise is not necessary for wisdom. (H1) focused on believing one is not wise. Another version of the humility theory is worth considering. When Socrates demonstrates that a person is not wise, he does so by showing that the person lacks some knowledge that he or she claims to possess. Thus, one might think that Socrates' view could be better captured by focusing on the idea that wise people believe they lack knowledge (rather than lacking wisdom). That is, one might consider the following view: Humility Theory 2 (H2): S is wise iff S believes S does not know anything. Unfortunately, this interpretation is not any better than (HP1). It falls prey to problems similar to

those that refuted (H1) both as an interpretation of Socrates, and as an acceptable account of wisdom. Moreover, Socrates admits that the craftsmen do have some knowledge. Socrates may have considered them to be wise if they had restricted their confidence and claims to knowledge to what they actually did know about their craft. Their problem was that they professed to have knowledge beyond their area of expertise. The problem for them was not that they claimed to have knowledge. Humility views of wisdom are not promising. There are more promising theories to consider. 2. Wisdom as Epistemic Accuracy Socrates can be interpreted in another way. The poets, politicians, and craftsmen all believe they that have knowledge of things that they do not know. Socrates, one might argue, believes he has knowledge when, and only when, he really does have knowledge. Perhaps wise people restrict their confidence, or their belief that they possess knowledge, to propositions for which they have knowledge or, at least, to propositions for which they have excellent justification. Perhaps Socrates is better interpreted as having held an Epistemic Accuracy Theory such as: Epistemic Accuracy Theory 1 (EA1): S is wise iff for all p, (S believes S knows p iff S knows p.) According to (EA1), a wise person is accurate about what she knows and what she does not know. If she really knows p, she believes she knows p. And, if she believes she knows p, then she really does know p. (EA1) is consistent with the idea that Socrates accepts that he is wise and with the idea that Socrates does have some knowledge. (EA1) is a plausible interpretation of the view Socrates endorses, but it is not a plausible answer to our search for an understanding of wisdom. Wise people can make mistakes about what they know. Socrates, Maimonides, King Solomon, Einstein, Goethe, Gandhi, Ani DiFranco, and even Yoda have held justified, false beliefs about what they did and did not know. It is easy to imagine a wise person being justified in believing she knows p and also easy to imagine that p could be shown to be false 500 or more years after her death. If (EA1) is true, then just because S believes she had knowledge when she does not, she is not wise. That seems wrong. It is hard to imagine that anyone at all is, or ever has been, wise if (EA1) is correct. We could revise the Epistemic Accuracy Theory to get around this problem. We might only require that a wise person's belief is highly justified when she believes she has knowledge. That excuses people with bad epistemic luck. Epistemic Accuracy 2 (EA2): S is wise iff for all p, (S believes S knows p iff S's belief in p is highly justified.) (EA2) gets around the problem with (EA1). The Socratic Method challenges one to produce reasons for one's view. When Socrates' interlocutor is left dumbfounded, or reduced to absurdity, Socrates rests his case. One might argue that through his questioning, Socrates reveals not merely that his opponents lack knowledge because their beliefs are false, but he also demonstrates that his opponents are not even justified in holding the views they professed to know. Since the craftsmen, poets, and politicians questioned by Socrates all fail his interrogation, they were shown, one might argue, to have claimed to have knowledge when their beliefs were not even justified. Many philosophers would hesitate to endorse this interpretation of what is going on in The Apology. They would argue that a failure to answer Socrates' grilling session does not show that a person is not justified in believing a proposition. Many philosophers would argue that having very good evidence or forming a belief via a reliable method would be sufficient for justification (see the entries on evidence and reliabilism) and internalism vs externalism. Proving, or demonstrating to an interrogator, that one is justified is another matter, and not necessary for simply being justified. Socrates, some might argue, shows only that the craftsmen, poets, and politicians cannot defend themselves from his questions. He does not show, one might argue, that the poets, politicians, and craftsmen had unjustified beliefs. Since we gain very little insight into how the questioning

proceeded in this dialogue, it would be unfair to dismiss this interpretation on these grounds. Perhaps Socrates did show, through his intense questioning, that the craftsmen, poets, and politicians formed and held their beliefs without adequate evidence or formed and held them through unreliable belief forming processes. Socrates only reports that they did not know all that they professed to know. Since we do not get to witness the actual questioning as we do in Plato's other dialogues, we should not reject (EA2) as an interpretation of Socrates' view of wisdom in The Apology. Regardless of whether (EA2) is Socrates' view, there are problems for (EA2) as an account of what it means to be wise. Even if (EA2) is exactly what Socrates meant, some philosophers would argue that one could be justified in believing a proposition, but not realize that she is justified. If that is a possible situation for a wise person to be in, then she might be justified, but fail to believe she has knowledge. Could a wise person be in such a situation, or is it necessary that a wise person would always recognize the epistemic value of what he or she believes?[1] If this situation is impossible, then this criticism could be avoided. There is no need to resolve this issue here because (EA1) and (EA2) fall prey to another, less controversial, type of problem. (EA1) and (EA2) suffer from a similar, and very serious, problem. Imagine a person who has very little knowledge. Suppose further, that the few things she does know are of no importance. She could be the sort of person that nobody would ever go to for information or advice, because she does not know anything interesting or important. Such a person could be very cautious and believe that she knows only what she actually knows. Although she would have accurate beliefs about what she does and does not know, she would not be wise. This shows that (EA1) is flawed. As for (EA2), imagine that she believes she knows only what she is actually justified in believing. She is still not wise. It should be noted, however, that although accuracy theories do not provide an adequate account of wisdom, they may reveal an important insight. Perhaps a necessary condition for being wise is that wise people think they have knowledge only when their beliefs are highly justified. Or, even more simply, perhaps wise people have very few unjustified beliefs.

5.
notes

EXRA CREDIT
The trial of Socrates and the subsequent execution of that classical Athenian philosopher took place in 399 BC. Socrates was tried on two notoriously ambiguous charges: corrupting the youth and impiety (in Greek, asebeia). More specifically, Socrates' accusers cited two "impious" acts: "failing to acknowledge the gods that the city acknowledges" and "introducing new deities." A majority of the 501 dikasts (Athenian citizens chosen by lot to serve as jurors) voted to convict him. Consistent with common practice, the dikasts determined Socrates punishment with another vote. Socrates was ultimately sentenced to death by drinking a hemlock-based liquid. Primary sources for accounts of the trial are given by two of Socrates friends, Plato and Xenophon; well known later interpretations include those of the journalist I. F. Stone and the classics scholar Robin Waterfield. [1] The trial is one of the most famous of all time.