Eidetic Variation: A Self Correcting and Integrative Account

Axiomathes (2022) 32 (Suppl 2):S405–S434
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09611-1
ORIGINAL PAPER
Eidetic Variation: a Self‑Correcting and Integrative Account
Jaakko Belt1
Received: 17 June 2021 / Accepted: 24 November 2021 / Published online: 27 December 2021
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
Edmund Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology seeks a priori knowledge of essences
and eidetic laws pertaining to conscious experience and its objects. Husserl believes
that such eidetic knowledge has a higher epistemic status than the inherently fallible
empirical knowledge, but a closer reading of his work shows that even eidetic claims
are subject to error and open to modification. In this article, I develop a self-correct-
ing account of Husserl’s method of eidetic variation, arguing that eidetic variation
plays a critical role in both challenging and improving upon the eidetic results in
phenomenology. More specifically, I argue that the self-correcting account of eidetic
variation 1) is consistent with Husserl’s own formulations of his eidetic methodol-
ogy and epistemic principles; 2) captures the dual epistemic function of eidetic vari-
ation as means for both testing and intuitively validating eidetic claims; and 3) offers
methodological support for contemporary attempts to integrate eidetic variation
with non-eidetic methods and resources. To substantiate these claims, I first contrast
the self-correcting account with the falsificationist interpretations of eidetic varia-
tion. Then, I turn to three applications of eidetic variation in order to examine how
eidetic phenomenology could draw from real-life deviations, artificial variations,
and critical–historical reflection. The goal is to lay the methodological groundwork
for a self-correcting and integrative account of eidetic variation and illustrate its use-
fulness in research practice.
Keywords Clarification · Edmund Husserl · Eidetic knowledge · Eidetic variation ·

Fallibilism · Falsification · Integrating methods · Intuition · Justification ·
Phenomenological methodology
* Jaakko Belt
[email protected]; [email protected]
1
The History, Philosophy and Literary Studies Unit, Faculty of Social Sciences (SOC), Tampere
University, Kalevantie 4, 33014 Tampere University Tampere, Finland
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S406 Axiomathes (2022) 32 (Suppl 2):S405–S434
1 Introduction
In Ideen I and III, Husserl introduces phenomenology as an eidetic science by

opposing it to empirical or factual sciences. In Husserl’s view, eidetic phenomenol-
ogy differs from empirical sciences both methodologically and in the kind of knowl-
edge it seeks. In short, eidetic phenomenology strives for a priori eidetic knowl-
edge (Wesenserkenntnis), i.e., knowledge of essences and eidetic laws. By contrast,
empirical sciences yield a posteriori factual knowledge (Tatsachenerkenntnis) of
actually existing particulars, empirical generalities, and their contingent regulari-
ties.1 In order to change the perspective from particular facts and empirical gener-
alities to pure essences and essential structures, Husserl proposes a methodological
reorientation called “eidetic reduction”. In the ensuing eidetic attitude the individual
cases or particulars under study are treated as pure possibilities, i.e. conceivable
instances of the investigated kind of phenomena. This entails excluding the question
of their factual existence. (Hua III/1, 6–7, 20; Hua V, 40, 142; Hua IX, 284–285,
321–322; EU, §89) Eidetic inquiry, then, sets out to determine what is universally
and necessarily valid for all conceivable (i.e. imaginable) cases of certain kinds of
phenomena, that is, what belongs to their pure essence or eidos (Hua V, 40, 42, 47;
cf. Hua III/1, §2, §3, §7, §34). Husserl believes eidetic phenomenology opens up an
“endless field” of such eidetic truths, which can be brought to immediate insight and
described systematically in eidetic investigations (Hua V, 43–45).
To cement the apparent dichotomy between empirical-factual and eidetic sci-
ences, Husserl further emphasizes the methodological differences in their respective
ways of acquiring knowledge. Whereas empirical sciences rely on observation and
inductive generalization, eidetic phenomenology utilizes imagination and resorts
to what Husserl in Ideen I calls ideation or “seeing” essences. In short, ideation is
a complex cognitive act in which consciousness of something particular is trans-
formed into an intuitive grasp of its essence. (Hua III/1, §§3–4, §7, §23; cf. Hua IX,
76) Husserl continued to refine and rearticulate the methodic form of ideational pro-
cess in terms of eidetic variation (see Lohmar 2019). Simply put, eidetic variation is
a procedure that starts with an exemplary instance of the investigated phenomenon
and varies its features freely in imagination in order to retain an intuitive grasp of
what stays invariant throughout the series of variations. Husserl believes the method
of ideation (and eidetic variation as its refined form) allows the eidetic researcher
to intuitively discern pure essences, whose essential features and connections can
then be grasped conceptually, further analyzed and stated in eidetic judgments as
eidetic laws (Wesensgesetze) (Hua XXIV, 226, 230–233, 326; cf. Hua III/1, §5,
§34, §§65–66, §75, §135). Given the wide scope of eidetic investigations in Hus-
serl’s transcendental phenomenology, ideation is instrumental in establishing eidetic
knowledge of the essential structures of consciousness and different kinds of lived
1
See Hua III/1, 6, 8, §2, §4, §7, §18; Hua V, 42. Cf. Hua XXIV, 230–231; EU, §86. Throughout the arti-
cle, I use the abbreviation Hua (followed by the volume number) to refer to the Husserliana volumes and
EU to refer to Erfahrung und Urteil (1939); references to the English translations of Husserl’s work are
provided only when they are quoted.
13
Axiomathes (2022) 32 (Suppl 2):S405–S434 S407
experience, as well as eidetic laws concerning reality and different kinds of objec-
tivities constituted in conscious experience (Hua III/1, §75, §135; Hua XXIV, 326,
333).
According to Husserl, the empirical and eidetic methods differ not only in how
knowledge is acquired but also in how it can be challenged and validated or verified.
The stark contrast between the two modes of knowledge is captured in a passage in
Ideen III:
“Eidetic truths are absolutely binding, intransgressible [unüberschreitbare],
not to be confirmed or refuted by any experience [Erfahrung]. Empirical truths
[Erfahrungswahrheiten] […] are accidental truths, which are modified and
annulled through experience just as they are established through experience.
They are only presumptively valid, subject to further experiential confirma-
tion.” (Hua V, 47–48; Husserl 1980, 41, translation modified)
Husserl maintains that even the strongest empirical truths based on experience
(Erfahrung), including the laws of nature, are revisable. Empirical claims can
always be challenged and revoked by further experience, because experience (rang-
ing from simple sensory experience and everyday perception to experiential obser-
vation) yields only incomplete, imperfect or inadequate evidence, whose epistemic
value can be increased and decreased. (Hua III/1, §19, §138; Hua XXIV, §51a,d)
Therefore, empirical knowledge has only relative validity and justification as some-
thing probable (Hua XXIV, 343, 347). By contrast, Husserl believes ideation can,
at least in certain domains, afford perfect, complete or adequate evidence, which
cannot be gradually strengthened or weakened by further evidence (Hua III/1, §138,
§§3–4).2 In this ideal case, the object of knowledge is given in fulfilling intuition
“as it is by itself, once and for all” (Hua XXIV, 341). According to Husserl, not only
pure essences, but also their essential connections and eidetic laws can be given ade-
quately, making their denial “absurd” (Hua XXIV, 231, 235, 336–337, 341). Hence,
ideation enables acquiring a priori knowledge of eidetic laws, “whose validity in
pure intuition is absolutely certain and indubitable” (Hua XXIV, 234–235).
The long-standing debate concerning the nature and function of eidetic varia-
tion challenges such a clear-cut distinction between eidetic knowledge and empirical
knowledge. Many commentators argue for a fallibilistic reading of eidetic variation,
according to which eidetic variation does not secure infallible knowledge but rather
yields corrigible results. Such readings can be divided into three groups according
to the main lines of argument they offer to motivate fallibilism. The discussion has
long revolved around 1) inductionist arguments and 2) arguments from preknowl-
edge. What I propose to call 3) falsificationist arguments, however, pose the most
direct challenge to reconsider how eidetic knowledge can be established in phenom-
enology as an eidetic science.
The inductionist line of argument holds that eidetic variation and induction are
more closely related than Husserl acknowledged. Already in 1947, Merleau-Ponty
2
Already in Ideen, Husserl acknowledged that ideation does not always, let alone in every domain, guar-
antee adequate evidence (see Hua III/1, 13–15, 344–345; Hua V, 86).
13
(1964, 70–72) proclaimed that essential and inductive modes of knowledge are fun-
damentally homogenous: both are based on particular facts, even if induction uses
effective variations of actually realized cases and eidetic variation relies on imagina-
tive variation of example cases. The knowledge of essences is, therefore, experien-
tial and essences are ultimately as contingent as facts. Less sweepingly, David Levin
has argued that eidetic variation builds on the associative typifications and induc-
tively grounded empirical types already operative in our experience of the world. In
his reading, eidetic variation utilizes types as resources and tries to rearticulate them
in a more refined and controlled way. Because of their common origin in facticity
and typifying experience, pure essences differ from empirical-inductive types only
in degree, and eidetic variation should be viewed as continuous with and comple-
mentary to inductive processes.3 Moreover, Levin argues that eidetic variation, like
inductive generalization, effectively operates with a limited series of variations and
is hence necessarily incomplete. Even if it could in principle go on indefinitely, it
must be terminated before the full range of experience has been covered. Levin thus
questions whether eidetic variation could ever provide the kind of complete or ade-
quate evidence, which leaves no room for perfection. (Levin 1968, 1970, 176–177,
189–192).
The inductionist arguments based on similarities between eidetic variation and
the inductive method can be challenged by accentuating their methodological dif-
ferences (Kasmier 2010; cf. Sect. 4.2). The more basic claim that eidetic variation
relies on prior (everyday or scientific) typification can be refined without adopting
such a problematic analogy. The arguments from preknowledge maintain that eidetic
variation presupposes some knowledge of the essences it seeks to study, no matter
how prereflective, implicit, or vague it may be. Schütz (1959) already asked whether
the process of ideation qua eidetic variation can free itself of our habitualized
ways of knowing and what we deem typical in the natural attitude. The objection
has since been restated as a direct charge of circularity, but the gist stays the same:
eidetic variation demands preacquaintance with the subject matter in order to oper-
ate.4 If the argument stands, the implication is that eidetic variation can never com-
pletely purify or liberate itself from its factual and historical origins, as Husserl had
arguably hoped (see Hua IX, §8; EU, §§89–90). Neither can eidetic knowledge be
fully separated from our everyday and empirical knowledge. This has pushed many
commentators to reconceive the function of eidetic variation: its role is not discov-
ering essences but clarifying what we are already familiar with, i.e., making our
implicit knowledge of essences explicit. In other words, eidetic variation is needed
to labor through our initially vague and often confused conceptions in order to reach
a clearer and more intuitive grasp of essences. (Mohanty 1989, 33; Scanlon 1997;
Lohmar 2019, 115, 121) In line with such arguments from preknowledge, I later
3
Levin 1970, 151, 187–189; cf. Levin 1968. Levin leans heavily on Schütz’s (1959) influential reading
of Husserl’s doctrine of types and the constitution of empirical-typical generalities (see EU, §§82–83).
4
See Mohanty 1989, 32–33; Mohanty 1991. Scanlon (1997) reformulates the objection as a modern day
version of Meno’s argument:”[I]f the method is meant to achieve knowledge of eide, how can anyone
be asked, in advance, to select an instance of an eidos and then to imagine a series of arbitrarily varied
instances of the same eidos?”
13
show that eidetic variation qua intuitive clarification has a positive epistemic role in
refining eidetic claims and perfecting intuitive evidence, even though the ideals of
adequate evidence and infallible knowledge were unattainable in practice.
Finally, the falsificationist arguments emphasize the usefulness of eidetic varia-
tion in critically assessing and testing our presumptive eidetic claims. Such approach
has been defended by Richard M. Zaner and more recently Rochus Sowa. Zaner
(1973b) has argued that the open-ended nature of eidetic variation and tentative-
ness of its results enable continual criticism, which he deems a defining feature of
all epistemic claims. Sowa (2007) even claims that it is the falsifiability of eidetic
claims what makes eidetic phenomenology scientific, rendering eidetic variation as a
method of (in)validation through the attempt at falsification.
In what follows, I propose a self-correcting account of eidetic variation that com-
bines the virtues of the aforementioned arguments from preknowledge and the fal-
sificationist readings introduced above. More specifically, I argue that eidetic varia-
tion has a dual epistemic function in both challenging and improving upon eidetic
knowledge in phenomenology. The article proceeds by assessing the strengths and
weaknesses of Sowa’s falsificationism (Sect. 2) and Zaner’s idea of continual criti-
cism (Sect. 3). Sowa and Zaner rightly emphasize that eidetic knowledge is always
open to criticism and correction, but they end up overplaying the negative function
of eidetic variation in falsifying or rejecting eidetic claims. Drawing from Husserl’s
own formulations of his eidetic methodology and epistemic principles, I argue that
eidetic variation has an equally important positive role in clarifying essences and
perfecting intuitive evidence for the sake of refining and validating eidetic claims. In
this way, I explicate the epistemic function of eidetic variation qua intuitive clarifi-
cation in order to further develop the arguments from preknowledge.
Having outlined the self-correcting account of eidetic variation, I evaluate its
feasibility in research practice by turning to three contemporary applications that
seek to integrate non-eidetic methods and resources with eidetic variation (Sect. 4).
I conclude that conceiving eidetic variation as a self-correcting method that is open
for integration is not only consistent with Husserl’s writings, but it also benefits phe-
nomenology in its critical pursuit of eidetic knowledge. More generally, it paves the
way for understanding eidetic phenomenology as a historically progressing science
that can accommodate and draw from the resources of other disciplines.
2 Eidetic Variation
In Phänomenologische Psychologie, Husserl articulates eidetic variation as

moments, steps or levels of ideation (Hua IX, 76; cf. EU, 416). For the systematic
purposes of this article, eidetic variation can be unpacked as a three-step procedure
(see Hua IX, §9a,c,e,f; EU, §87a,e):
Step 1 Starting from an example, i.e. choosing an actual or imagined instance
of a certain type of experience (or experienced object).
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Step 2 Freely varying the guiding example, i.e. producing an”infinitely open”
multiplicity of variants in imagination.
Step 3 Intuitive grasping of what stays the same in running through variations,
i.e. retaining the invariant.
To elaborate, the first step turns any individual case of the investigated phenom-
enon into a variant, which then serves as a “model” guiding the following varia-
tion. Its features should then be modified freely in imagination in the second step.
Once the free variation has been carried out long enough to intuitively distinguish
what coincides or overlaps throughout the series, the invariant features can be sin-
gled out in the third step. Husserl gives the retained invariant various names: eidos,
pure essence, and universal or necessary form. He believes that what is registered
intuitively or “seen” in eidetic variation as pure essences can, finally, be “grasped
conceptually and expressed in the form of general eidetic laws” (Hua XXV, 245; cf.
Hua III/1, 311–312).5
In the current debate, Sowa has challenged Husserl’s “official account” of eidetic
variation both in terms of its commitment to seeing essences and its ultimate func-
tion. He considers “essence” (Wesen) as a historically laden term, but for him “see-
ing essences” (Wesensschau) has been a particularly detrimental choice of words
for the reception of Husserl’s eidetic doctrine (Sowa 2007, 78). Due to Husserl’s
inadequate description of the method, Sowa argues, the practice of eidetic variation
has been misunderstood as “intuitively singling out a chimerical entity in common”
(Sowa 2010, 549). Sowa’s alternative reading of eidetic variation offers a straightfor-
ward way of assessing presumptive eidetic claims intersubjectively and integrating
varied resources into the eidetic process, but his account is curtailed by its commit-
ment to a restricting form of fallibilism as falsification and by its failure to provide a
positive account of validation.
2.1 Sowa’s Challenge: Eidetic Variation as Falsification
Sowa points out that especially the later Husserl preferred universal statements in
formulating descriptive eidetic laws such as:
“All imaginable acts have the moments, ‘quality’ and ‘matter.’”
“Every imaginable science departs from a life-world.”
Sowa’s key insight is that one can see from the logical form of these statements
how they can be tested: since they claim unrestricted universal validity, finding a sin-
gular possible (i.e. imaginable) case that would falsify it is enough to challenge the
eidetic law. In this way, the form of universal statements predelineates a procedure
5
Some commentators distinguish eidetic variation as a purely intuitive process of grasping essences
from eidetic variation as the full-fledged method of discovering, formulating and validating eidetic laws
(De Santis 2021; Majolino 2016). I deem it necessary to take both intuitive and predicative aspects of
eidetic variation into account in assessing its functions in establishing eidetic knowledge. For Husserl,
“all knowing is effected in judging, in predicating”, while the resulting judgments and predications are,
in turn, validated in fulfilling intuition (Hua XXIV, 214). More on this below.
13
for testing and (in)validating eidetic claims. Sowa’s falsificationist account of eidetic
variation can also be construed as a three-step procedure. The process starts from a
valid singular case of the presumptive eidetic law (step 1). Then, by varying its fea-
tures the researcher attempts to find or construe potential cases that could invalidate
the claim (step 2). If she succeeds in finding a counterexample in running through
the potential falsifying cases or falsificants, the presumed law is falsified; if it passes
the test, it is validated for the time being (step 3). Sowa calls the critical assessment
of eidetic laws expressed in universal statements by searching for counterexamples
“eidetic critique” (Sowa 2007, 100–102, 104; Sowa 2010, 549–551).6
Sowa’s suggestion has two main strengths. First, his idea of “double testability”
of eidetic claims outlines one possible and admittedly quite straightforward way
of integrating both actual findings and imaginary cases into the eidetic procedure.
Since actual and imagined experiences alike can be modalized into examples of
pure possible experience that can equally serve as potential falsificants, candidates
for falsification can be drawn from a wide variety of different sources. In Sowa’s
(2007, 106) words, these reservoirs include “the open-endless realm of imaginabili-
ties” as well as “the spheres of scientific and pre-scientific experience”. As I argue
below, one can find support for integrative elements in eidetic variation both in Hus-
serl’s own presentation of his eidetic methodology (see Sect. 2.2) and contemporary
research practice (see Sect. 4).
Second, Sowa’s interpretation delineates one potential line of assessing the valid-
ity of eidetic claims intersubjectively. Since eidetic laws are confirmed only for
the time being, “eidetic critique” is necessarily an open-ended process and eidetic
claims can always be subjected to further testing. This counters the worry that phe-
nomenological investigations tend to lead to stalemates and unresolved conflicts,
since both sides can appeal to indubitable or incorrigible evidence (or counterevi-
dence) (see Belt 2020; cf. Sowa 2007, 101, n51). Even in the face of indecision or
disagreement, we can always search for counterexamples that would exclude one of
the claims in order to adjudicate between competing descriptions.7 Sowa’s proposal
also undermines the allegation that eidetic methodology appeals to private and/or
incommensurable evidence. Eidetic variation has an inherently public dimension
not only because it can integrate empirical findings based on public observation
into the eidetic procedure as potential counterexamples. What is considered possi-
ble and thus sufficient for challenging the eidetic claim under scrutiny must also
be shown intersubjectively (Sowa 2010, 550; Mohanty 1991, 271). Consequently,
it is up to the research community to debate if something is truly imaginable and
whether a particular case or set of empirical findings presents counterevidence for
a certain eidetic-phenomenological claim. As Sowa (2010, 551) rightly insists, the
6
In Sowa’s analysis, descriptive eidetic laws have the logical form: “It is true for every imaginable x
that: if x is (an) F, then x is (a) G”. In other words, eidetic laws are instantiated by particulars (x) falling
under the essences (F, G) in question. It follows that a singular case of the form “x is (an) F, but not (a)
G” counts as a falsifying counterexample.
7
Levin (1970, 107–108) noted that Husserl was unable to provide “a method for adjudication” determin-
ing which one of the putatively apodictic but conflicting insights is legitimate.
13
intersubjective reassessibility of eidetic claims is essential to Husserl’s conception

of phenomenology as an eidetic science (see Hua III/1, §66, §87).
The weaknesses in Sowa’s interpretation concern his narrow and one-sidedly
negative understanding of the functions of eidetic variation. His revisionist reading
of Husserl downplays the intuitive basis of eidetic knowledge, while it overempha-
sizes the role of falsification in producing phenomenologically relevant results. Cru-
cially, the falsificationist account of eidetic variation falls short of accounting for
direct validation of phenomenological claims. Instead of adhering to Husserl’s own
methodological and epistemic principles, Sowa ends up adopting a Popperian style
doctrine of indirect validation through an attempt at falsification.
Husserl states repeatedly in Ideen I that phenomenology strives to be a descrip-
tive science of pure essences within the limits of immediate intuition (Hua III/1,
127, 138, 139, 156). For Husserl, the ultimate justifying and legitimizing source of
knowledge is originary giving intuition in its different forms, as stated in the famous
“principle of principles” (Hua III/1, §24; cf. §19, §141). Empirical sciences can rely
on conducting experiments and making observations, since perception is a form of
originary giving intuition and a source of justification in studying matters of fact
(Hua III/1, §1, §7). Phenomenology must turn to the method of ideation, since for
Husserl “seeing essences” (Wesenerschauung) is originary giving intuition and the
ultimate justifying act of all eidetic sciences (Hua III/1, §§3–4, §7, §23). Hence,
both empirical and eidetic knowledge draw their ultimate justification from intuition
or “seeing” in the wide sense of becoming conscious of the investigated object itself
directly “in person” (leibhaftig):
”Immediate ’seeing’, not merely sensory, experiential seeing, but seeing in
general as originary giving consciousness of whatever kind, is the ultimate
source of legitimacy [Rechstquelle] of all rational claims. […] If we see an
object with full clarity, if we have explicated and conceptualized it on the basis
of purely seeing and what is grasped within the limits of actually seeing […],
then the assertion which expresses the object faithfully has its legitimacy [hat
ihr Recht].” (Hua III/1, 43; cf. §3, §24, §136)
It follows that eidetic claims draw their validity either from direct “seeing” (direkt
“sehen”) or from its derived form, mediated insight (mittelbar “einsehen”), since
“all mediated grounding [Begründung] leads to immediate [grounding]” (Hua
III/1, 314, 326, 328, cf. 21, 42). To my knowledge, Sowa neither explicitly chal-
lenges Husserl’s epistemic principles nor attempts to reconcile them with the idea of
(in)validation through falsification.
Husserl’s later formulations of his epistemic principles diminish the role of
intuition and put more weight on critically examining current evidence. In stat-
ing his “first methodological principle” in Cartesianische Meditationen, Husserl
emphasizes the need for reflecting upon the range and perfection of the evidence
in question before claiming any final validity (Hua I, 54). Similarly, in discussing
“the most general principle of justification” in Erste Philosophie, Husserl calls for
testing (erproben) all evidence and verifying (bewähren) our judgments and beliefs
(Hua VIII, 32–33). In other words, we have to subject our cognitive operations and
their results to further critical reflection to convince ourselves that the evidence they
13
purportedly yield is really justified. This is especially true if one claims to have
obtained adequate evidence understood as ideal perfection; only reflective evidence
can tell us whether full intuitive clarity and completeness required by adequacy is
still lacking. (Hua VIII, 31, 33) In seeking apodictic evidence in the sense of abso-
lute certainty, reflective probing involves an attempt to doubt or negate the evidence
at hand (Hua VIII, 35). Absolute justification would require nullifying all conceiv-
able doubts about what is judged and convincing oneself of the impossibility of its
non-being, but testing may as well lead to restricting the scope of the purportedly
adequate or apodictic evidence (Hua VIII, 31, 36).8 Reflectively probing judgments
that claim adequacy or apodicticity comes close to Sowa’s idea of “eidetic critique”.
Indeed, I believe that any viable reading of eidetic variation should embrace its
critical potential to test our purported eidetic claims. For Husserl, eidetic variation
plays a role not only in coming to know or “winning” pure essences and eidetic laws
intuitively, but also in testing whether what seems or feels necessary actually is an
apodictic necessity (Hua IX, 70–72, 322–323). Still, Husserl holds on to the phe-
nomenological notion of direct givenness in reformulating his epistemic principles.
According to the most general principle of justification, knowledge can be accepted
as finally valid only in cases, where what is posited in our judgments is grasped and
seen exactly as it is meant – as “itself stand[ing] before our eyes” (Hua VIII, 32,
36). Even if Husserl shuns the word “intuition”, he still views self-givenness (Selb-
stgebung or Selbstgegebenheit) as the ultimate measure of justification (Hua VIII,
32–33). Furthermore, he believes that verifying our judgments involves self-grasp-
ing (Selbsterfassung) the investigated object or state of affairs (Hua VIII, 34). Falsi-
ficationist accounts of eidetic variation should either be made consistent with Hus-
serl’s epistemic principles or be supplemented with an alternative positive account
of validating eidetic claims.
Sowa’s falsificationism diverges from Husserl’s commitment to direct intuitive
givenness or self-givenness in arriving at and validating phenomenological results.
Here, Sowa bypasses textual evidence underlining the specific role Husserl gives
to eidetic variation in evoking eidetic insights and providing the intuitive basis for
eidetic claims in his later writings.9 He also presents falsification of the descrip-
tive eidetic laws as “the method of validation required by their general form” (Sowa
2007, 78). In citing the logical form of eidetic claims as universal statements and
then inferring that a single counterexample (i.e. a case ruled out by the presumptive
law) suffices to refute them, he effectively adopts the hypothetical-deductive model
of reasoning favored by Popper among others. However, indirect inferences like
deduction, analogies and other “non-intuitive procedures [Verfahrungsweisen]” have
methodological relevance for Husserl’s phenomenology only insofar as they subse-
quently allow for direct intuitive discernment of essential features and connections
(Hua III/1, 157–158). Falsification provides only indirect and mediated support for
8
As Cai (2013) has noted, Husserl even sometimes characterizes apodictic evidence as ”probe-evi-
dence” (Probe-evidenz). See Hua XXXV, 387, cf. 384–385.
9
For example, in Erfahrung und Urteil Husserl characterizes free variation as the foundation (Grund-
lage) and basis (Grund) of essential seeing (Wesenserschauung) (EU §87a,d; cf. Hua IX, 84).
13
eidetic claims in case the search for counterexamples falls short, not yet phenomeno-
logical results.
Sowa (2007, 102) does not hesitate to claim that searching for potentially invali-
dating counterexamples to the purported eidetic laws by imagining extreme and
unfamiliar cases is the “true methodological place” of eidetic variation. In this
regard, his conception of eidetic critique follows Popper’s (1968, 51) idea of criti-
cism as “an attempt to find the weak spots in a theory”, especially in its logical
consequences. Furthermore, Sowa (2007, 106) explicitly applies Popper’s criterion
of testability or falsifiability of theories to determine the scientificity of individual
eidetic statements. However, Popper (1968, 51) himself insisted that theories (and
by Sowa’s extension, singular hypothesis or universal laws) can never be proven or
justified but only refuted with counterexamples (cf. Sowa 2007, 106). If eidetic vari-
ation serves neither the discovery of eidetic laws nor intuition of essences, as Sowa
(2007, 103) insists, and if eidetic statements can only be refuted but never directly
validated, are eidetic claims no more than mere hypotheses in the Popperian sense?
How does one come up with such presumptive universal statements? What are the
phenomenological criteria for holding eidetic claims justified?
The inherent tension between the Husserlian and Popperian elements leads to
inconsistencies in Sowa’s account of validation. On the one hand, Sowa states that
eidetic laws can be considered valid only for the time being, if the candidates for
counterexamples have failed or examples taken as falsificants are in fact revealed
impossible on closer inspection. Even if no counterexamples or even promising
candidates are in view and the eidetic law can thus be considered well-proven, the
possibility for future falsification cannot be eliminated.10 On the other hand, Sowa
claims that in some cases the possibility of falsification can be ruled out (in fact,
apodictically eliminated) by insightfully showing their immunity to falsification. At
least some eidetic statements and laws in phenomenology satisfy, in his mind, this
stronger claim of apodicticity. (Sowa 2007, 104) It remains unclear, however, how
this distinction can be made without appealing to immediate intuition or degrees of
intuitive evidence in establishing an insight into “immunity of falsification”. Hus-
serl himself was adamant in claiming that the apodictic results of eidetic variation
are such that we can intuitively see the impossibility or inconceivability of their
negation, their non-being (Hua XVII, 256; cf. Hua I, 56; Hua VIII, 35; Hua XXXV,
385). Challenging this prima facie Husserlian position requires a positive account of
validation showing how “immunity of falsification” can be established. Otherwise
insisting on falsifiability as the criterion of scientificity but granting irrefutability to
some results of phenomenology as an eidetic science is to have your cake and eat it
too.
10
As a case in point, Sowa (2007, 104, n58) refers to mathematical conjectures (e.g. the Goldbachian
conjecture), which ”are indeed proven through countless positive examples” but ”for which a proof is
still lacking at this point”.
13
2.2 The Positive Functions of Eidetic Variation
Apparently, Sowa’s commitment to the Popperian negative understanding of falsi-

fication makes him hesitant to give a more positive epistemic role for eidetic vari-
ation. Following the Popperian ideal of testing as refuting, falsification via eidetic
variation leads to restricting or simply abandoning the eidetic claim in question
(Sowa 2007, 101–102, cf. 104). As the arguments from preknowledge indicate,
however, eidetic variation can also serve the function of intuitive clarification.
Developing this line of thinking further, I contend that intuitive clarification of
essences via eidetic variation can increase the legitimacy of eidetic claims under
scrutiny by enhancing the intuitive givenness of what is investigated. In fact, con-
ceiving eidetic variation as a method for incremental improvement of evidence
helps to reconcile the negative aspect of testing with the positive demands of
Husserl’s epistemic principles. This lays the epistemological basis for the self-
correcting account of eidetic variation developed below.
In §§67–70 of Ideen I, Husserl describes the eidetic procedure in terms of the
interconnected methods of clarifying essences (Wesensklärung) and grasping
essences (Wesenserfassung). Eidetic methodology aims to grasp essences in their
complete or perfect clarity, but Husserl’s emphasis on clarification demonstrates
the stepwise and gradual nature of this process. If fleeting experiences present
themselves as vaguely distant or intuitively empty to reflective investigation,
as is often the case in Husserl’s view, our determinations of the corresponding
essences based on those examples remain unclear, vague, and indefinite as well.
As Husserl puts it: “Grasping an essence has, therefore, its degrees of clarity,
in the same way as does the individual floating before us.” (Hua III/1, 141) To
press the point, Husserl presents clarity as a gradual concept, ranging from com-
plete lack of clarity, non-intuitiveness, and obscurity to “full clarity, intuitive-
ness, givenness” as its respective limits (Hua III/1, 142). He thinks that for each
essence there is so-called “absolute proximity” (absolute Nähe), in which this
ideal clarity and self-givenness has been reached. For eidetic method to attain
the goal of perfect intuitive givenness of essences and essential connections, it
is necessary to bring the corresponding moments in individual examples closer
to perfect clarity accordingly. (Hua III/1, 141) Even in cases where the original
example affords sufficient intuitive basis for attaining a fully clear apprehension
of essential generality (Wesensallgemeinheit), Husserl stresses that
“there is a lack of clarity in determining more precisely the essences that
are interwoven with it [mitverflochtenen Wesen]; hence, it is necessary to
bring the individualities serving as examples into closer proximity [Näher-
bringen] or to procure others that are better suited, in which the individual
features, first sought in confusion and obscurity, stand out from one another
and can then come to be given in the clearest possible way.” (Hua III/1,
144–145; Husserl 2014, 124)
Later on in Ideen III, Husserl writes along the same lines that the intended
object “must be brought to ever greater clarity, must be brought ever nearer,
must be brought in the process of clarification to perfect self-givenness” (Hua V,
13
103; Husserl 1980, 89). Whether or not the ideal of perfect clarity or full intui-
tive givenness, i.e. adequate evidence, is attainable in practice, Husserl clearly
embraces the possibility of incrementally improving upon intuitive evidence of
essences.
Husserl also discusses the value of empirical, historical, and fictional sources in
this context of clarifying and grasping essences. Their utility for eidetic phenom-
enology is neither in simply refuting (as counterexamples) nor confirming (as posi-
tive examples) presumed eidetic claims (see Hua III/1, §70; Hua V, 47–48, 51). Such
resources rather help to procure clear intuitions by providing stable, vivid, detailed
or otherwise useful exemplary instances of the investigated types of experience and
objects. Whatever their origin, exemplary intuitions can serve as the starting point of
ideation and eidetic analyses in general in an effort to attain a clearer and thus more
adequate grasp of the corresponding essences. (Hua III/1, §70; §4; cf. Hua V, 51–53)
If imagination by itself fails to provide clear intuitions, Husserl believes it can and
should be furnished with exemplary intuitions from other sources (Hua V, 53; Hua
III/1, 148). Furthermore, he calls for “pollinating” (Befruchtung) imagination with
“the richest and best possible observations” before engaging in free phantasy (Hua
III/1, 148). In this regard, everyday perceptions and observations in the experimen-
tal setting are valuable as originary giving intuitions, but Husserl advocates drawing
from the teachings of history and even works of fiction as well. Obviously, one has
neither (f)actual examples nor artistic creations at one’s disposal to cover every pos-
sible experience, but “pollinating” gives imagination more intuitive material to work
with to widen its range. Finally, Husserl notes how geometry utilizes models and
drawings for not only inciting exemplary intuitions but also retaining the steps and
results of the eidetic procedure executed in and by imagination. (Hua III/1, 147–148;
Hua V, 52–53) Perceptual illustrations and instrumental means can be utilized anal-
ogously in eidetic phenomenology (Hua V, 52–53; Hua III/1, 148). Husserl’s use
of two-dimensional time-diagrams to illuminate the complex structure of time-con-
sciousness is a fitting example (see Dodd 2005).
Hence, experiential “reservoirs” have a more positive and diverse role in support-
ing eidetic methodology than simply providing invalidating counterexamples for
discarding eidetic claims. To restate these supportive functions in terms of eidetic
variation, external resources and instrumental means can 1) offer intuitive starting
examples for the variation process, 2) provide illuminating material for extend-
ing its scope, and 3) retain and illustrate its results for future variation. Supportive
resources alone, though, would not be enough for attaining eidetic knowledge – not
without the methodological contribution of operating in free phantasy. According
to Husserl, it is necessary “to utilize imagination abundantly [reichlich] in the here
required complete clarification, in the free reconfiguration of what is given in phan-
tasy” (Hua III/1, 148). The point is not developed further in Ideen I, but in retro-
spect, Husserl comes close to professing the need for free imaginative variation in
intuitive clarification and grasping of essences. Given the close connection between
increasing intuitive fulfillment and the progress of knowledge examined already in
Logische Untersuchungen (see Hua XIX/2, 539–540, 597–598, 614–615, 627), the
clarificatory work opens up an important epistemic role for eidetic variation.
13
Commentators who subscribe to the arguments from preknowledge often hold

that eidetic variation provides clarification of meaning, sense or concepts (see e.g.
Mohanty 1989, 33; Mohanty 1991; Lohmar 2019). Sowa (2007, 103, n56) also
maintains that eidetic variation is useful in scrutinizing conceptual scopes, anchor-
ing concepts and making vague everyday language more precise by varying the
starting examples falling under certain concepts and especially in running through
borderline cases. Nevertheless, for him conceptual clarification plays merely a provi-
sional role, since the ultimate goal of eidetic phenomenology is the construction and
verification (or rather falsification) of synthetic law-statements. In other words, con-
cepts are intuitively “deepened” and ”calibrated” only in relation to their place and
function in formulating eidetic laws (Sowa 2010, 548). Husserl does indeed empha-
size that scientific knowledge is expressed in correct statements and he extends the
method of clarification to statements as “the element in which science lives” (Hua
III/1, 289; cf. 10–11, 140). He further links the supposed validity of scientific state-
ments to the validity of concepts with which sciences operate, predicate and relate to
their domains of possible objects. Moreover, concepts might lack epistemic validity
(Erkenntnisgeltung) because of their unclarity. (Hua V, 94–97).
For Husserl, however, clarification of concepts and their judicative use has its
basis and source of validity in eidetic intuition. In Ideen III, he speaks of “eidetic
definitions” of basic concepts “drawn purely out of intuition” (Hua V, 27–29; cf.
Hua I, 54, 180). Husserl illustrates this by clarifying the concept of material thing
through free variation of both imagined and actually perceived material bodies
(Körper), arriving at the intuitive grasp of its essence as res extensa (Hua V, §7).11
In Cartesianische Meditationen, Husserl states that intuitive consciousness of some-
thing universal based on eidetic variation, i.e. eidos as it is “seen”, is “prior to all
concepts” and that pure concepts must conform to eide (Hua I, 105). In procedural
terms, linguistic analyses of the meaning of complex concepts and equivocal words
do have a propaedeutic function in making them semantically, logically or analyti-
cally distinct (Verdeutlichung), but Husserl insists that the main work of clarification
(Klärung) in the phenomenological sense consists in making them intuitive (Hua V,
101–102; Hua I, 54; cf. Hua XLI, No. 3, 53–54). He gives a dual meaning for such
a process of intuitive clarification. On the conceptual side, it means making con-
cepts clear by recourse to intuitions fulfilling them. On the objective side, it means
bringing the meant object, i.e. the essence corresponding to the concept, progres-
sively closer to complete self-givenness as described above. (Hua V, 102–104) In
both senses, intuitive clarification has a more fundamental role in Husserl’s eidetic
11
Husserl’s other recurrent example object of eidetic clarification is decahedron (Hua V, §20; Hua XLI,
52). Contrary to what the paradigmatic examples might suggest, the scope of eidetic variation is not
restricted to intentional objects of experience (such as material thing, triangle, tone or color) and types
and forms of intentional experience (e.g. perception). For Husserl, eidetic variation is equally instrumen-
tal in analyzing the subject of experience eidetically in its embodied relation to the world. The transition
from my factual ego to eidos ego (or transcendental ego in general) is effected by what Husserl calls
self-variation (Selbstvariation). This involves running through possible variations of myself (my lived
body, my habitualities, my surrounding world etc.), i.e. imagining myself as being otherwise. (Hua I,
102, 105–106, 110, 117; De Santis 2020).
13
phenomenology than Sowa gives it credit for. Insofar as clarification is aided by

eidetic variation, the methodological function it serves exceeds the mere explication
of concepts in view of constructing eidetic statements.
The epistemic potential of any fallibilistic reading of eidetic variation ultimately
hinges on how the negative aspect of testing eidetic claims coheres with the positive
prospect of attaining and improving intuitive evidence validating them. As I argued
above, Husserl’s reformulated epistemic principles promote critical self-reflection
on the validity of judgments through weighing their supposed evidence. Husserl’s
elaborations on these principles also support the idea that there is room for incre-
mental improvement of evidence even in instances claiming adequacy or apodictic-
ity. In Erste Philosophie, Husserl entertains the possibility that perfect self-given-
ness might be a “mere idea”, which could be approximated in a continuous series of
increasing evidences but may never be attained (Hua VIII, 33–34). He further char-
acterizes adequate evidence as the ideal limit or optimum of ascending levels of evi-
dence, corresponding to a gradual scale of satisfaction of our striving for knowledge
(Hua VIII, 34–35; cf. Hua XIX/2, 614–615). Where judgments still lack perfect self-
givenness, they can only be accepted as intermediary stages (Zwischenstadium) to
final validity, to borrow a phrase from Cartesianische Meditationen (Hua I, 54).
Hence, Husserl’s reformulated epistemic principles set normative ideals or guid-
ing norms for seeking eidetic knowledge – epistemic goals that might be realized in
phenomenological practice only partially and piecemeal. I take this interpretation to
be in line with those commentators who maintain that Husserl’s epistemic principles
and ideals are consistent with fallibilism in general (see Berghofer 2018; Berghofer
2019; Heffernan 2009). More importantly, it paves the way for the particular fallibil-
istic reading of eidetic variation as a self-correcting method that I next turn to.
3 A Self‑Correcting Account of Eidetic Variation
Husserl debated the issues of fallibility and eidetic intuition with his contemporary
critics, most notably the Neo-Kantians and empirical psychologists of his time. A
case in point is a manuscript titled ”Zur Kritik an Theodor Elsenhans und August
Messer” drafted by his assistant Edith Stein on Husserl’s behalf in 1917 (Hua XXV,
226–248). The manuscript confronts the supposed infallibility and incorrigibility of
the eidetic procedure head on:
“The independence of phenomenology from all experience [Erfahrung], an
independence which precludes the possibility of a correction [Korrektur] of
eidetic knowledge through psychological experience, has always caused a
particular kind of offense. One has seen in this a claim to infallibility [Unfe-
hlbarkeit], a claim to the impossibility of error. This, however, has never been
claimed; nor is this in any way implied by our stress on the particular laws
and the particular characteristics of eidetic knowledge. There is no scientific
knowledge that is absolutely immune from error.” (Hua XXV, 246; Husserl
and Stein 2018, 466, translation modified)
13
In other words, eidetic phenomenology must be open to correction like any other
science. The manuscript cites “countless errors” in the history of mathematics and
logic to highlight that even other eidetic sciences using eidetic intuition are subject
to revision. In eidetic disciplines errors can occur for example if investigations are
cut short prematurely or previous analyses and conceptual determinations are used
vaguely or from memory without revisiting the original intuition. Even claims of
necessity might prove to be in need of modification if further investigations show
they have been accepted too hastily. But susceptibility to error does not call into
question the prospect of obtaining firm results or undermine the idea of complete
or fully intuitive evidence. (Hua XXV, 246–247) This is consistent with the inter-
pretation of Husserl’s reformulated epistemic principles as guiding norms or ideals
presented in the previous section.
If this is true, how do empirical findings in particular challenge eidetic claims?
Furthermore, how can the questioned eidetic claims reclaim justification? Consider
the following example given in the manuscript:
”Suppose that I have concluded that the essence of thing-perception implies
the seeing of things; and suppose now that I am presented with a person blind
since birth, for whom the sense of touch is sufficient for the constitution of
spatial things; in that case, I recognize that I have not pursued the free forma-
tion of possible modifications of perception far enough. But it is not the faktum
of the blind person’s perception that shows me this; it is the eidetic possibility
of such perception, which I grasp in going over from experience to the eidetic
attitude.” (Hua XXV, 248; Husserl and Stein 2018, 467)
This hypothetical case highlights how an eidetic claim (visual perception is
a necessary feature of thing-perception) can be challenged by an empirical coun-
terexample (people blind since birth manage to constitute spatial things tactually).
Importantly, the original claim is not directly invalidated or abandoned. Instead, pre-
viously unregarded findings make the phenomenologist attentive to shortcomings in
her eidetic claim, prompting her to return to eidetic variation in search of further
evidence. More specifically, the counterexample is turned into a variant (taken as a
pure possibility rather than a factum) and incorporated into a new series of variation
in imagination. The original claim can thus be reassessed and modified accordingly
only on the basis of intuitive evidence evoked by such an enriched variation whose
scope is extended by the findings (see Hua XXV, 247–248).
The picture of testing and modifying eidetic claims provided by the manuscript
is far from the Popperian idea of falsification. The kind of fallibilism defended by
Stein and Husserl proceeds by way of revisiting and refining rather than refuting
eidetic claims. This self-correcting form of fallibilism also shows how testing claims
is tightly connected to their justification in eidetic variation. In Sowa’s account,
eidetic variation provides only indirect support for eidetic claims, while the self-cor-
recting reading defended here shows how taking findings into account and integrat-
ing them into eidetic variation can actually improve intuitive evidence and directly
validate the modified eidetic claims.
The self-correcting account has some affinities with Zaner’s classic fallibilistic inter-
pretation of eidetic variation, which anticipated Sowa’s position in many ways. Drawing
13
from Formale und transzendentale Logik, Zaner (1972, 221–223) argues that for Hus-
serl degrees of clarity and perfection and possibility of deception pertain to every kind
of evidence and that “absolute evidence” is an ideal norm. Therefore, eidetic judgments
claiming apodictic evidence are open to error, modification, and rejection (as well as
confirmation) and must be subjected to continual criticism like every other epistemic
claim (Zaner 1972, 224; Zaner 1973b, 37). Echoing the Stein–Husserl manuscript,
Zaner (1973b, 37) mentions sources of error typical of eidetic knowledge, stemming
from or connected to eidetic variation: the range of examples might be insufficient and
the scope of variation too restricted or carelessly probed. There is always an element
of arbitrariness in deciding if and when eidetic variation has been taken “far enough”.
The openness of variation enables revisiting or reiterating the process and renders the
evidence in question processual (rather than acquired in a single vision). (Zaner 1973b,
33, 39–40) This is why Zaner deems certain tentativeness an essential feature of eidetic
claims (Zaner 1973b, 37, 39–40; Zaner 1973a, 218). This is broadly in line with the
account defended here.
But there are important differences as well. Considering Zaner’s insistence on ten-
tativeness and the processual and gradual nature of evidence, his views on (in)valida-
tion are strikingly rigid and categorical. Even though he explicitly avoids speaking of
“falsification”, a single instance to the contrary suffices to “reject” the supposed eidetic
claim. In his mind counterexamples show that we were mistaken to believe that the
eidetic claim was true in the first place, or rather, that it was an eidetic claim at all:”the
very notion of a “false” eidetic claim is an essential absurdity”. (Zaner 1972, 228–229;
Zaner 1973b, 39) Conversely, no amount of confirmation or verification can increase
(or diminish) the eidicity of eidetic claims (while confirmation usually increases the
likelihood of empirical claims). In other words, continuous criticism can only deter-
mine the status of a presumptive claim categorically: “It either is or is not eidetic, one
either correctly or incorrectly believes it to be eidetic” (Zaner 1972, 229).
What exactly, then, is the positive contribution of eidetic variation in epistemic
criticism? Zaner (1973b, 36–37) holds that evidence both for and against eidetic
claims is methodologically connected with reflectively assessing ever more exem-
plifications of the supposed invariancy through eidetic variation. But how does
repeating variation validate or strengthen the eidetic claims withstanding critical
assessment, that is, make them more evident or provide further evidence of their
correctness? Conversely, is rejecting the supposed eidetic claim (or denying its
“eidicity”) really the only way forward in the face of counterevidence – should not
revising it present an equally plausible and often preferable option? If indeed “truth
is an idea, lying at infinity” (Hua XVII, 284; cf. Zaner 1972, 221), how does eidetic
research approach it in practice? Ultimately, Zaner’s call for continual criticism
faces challenges similar to Sowa’s eidetic critique in accounting for direct validation
of eidetic claims. Answering the questions above requires a more detailed positive
account of eidetic variation and its epistemic functions than either Sowa or Zaner
provides. The self-correcting approach to eidetic variation as a method for clarifi-
cation of essences and incremental improvement of intuitive evidence is the way
forward.
13
4 An Integrative Account of Eidetic Variation: Three Cases
In the current research, there are several potential applications of eidetic variation,
which more or less explicitly embrace its fallibility. In explicating the prerequisites
for a fruitful exchange between eidetic phenomenology and empirical investigations,
Zahavi writes:
“For Husserl, we can obtain insights into essential a priori structures through
eidetic variation. However, such insights always possess a certain provisional-
ity, a certain presumptiveness, and necessarily remain open for future modifi-
cations in the light of new evidence. […] Our a priori knowledge is, in short,
fallible; if we come across putative empirical counterexamples to our alleged
eidetic insights, they need to be taken seriously and cannot simply be dis-
missed as irrelevant. In fact, if we want to test and probe the validity of our
eidetic claims, considering a range of more or less exceptional cases might be
quite illuminating.” (Zahavi 2017, 155; cf. 150, 153)
In short, Zahavi believes real-life deviations observed in fields like psychopathol-
ogy, social and developmental psychology, and neurosciences can support imagina-
tion in scrutinizing our tentative claims of necessity and disclosing unnoticed fea-
tures of conscious experience (see also Parnas and Zahavi 2000).
Froese and Gallagher (2010) propose another application or rather an extension
of eidetic variation by artificial means. Drawing from research methods and prac-
tices in the field of study called artificial life (Alife), they suggest computer simula-
tion can provide modern technological supplementation to eidetic variation by exter-
nalizing some of the work done by imagination. They effectively adopt a fallibilistic
position in citing the limitations of human imaginative capacities and the difficulties
in establishing the essential features of complex material and empirical phenomena,
especially the phenomenon of life and biological embodiment, as reasons for utiliz-
ing technologically induced hypothetical variation in phenomenological research.
The third methodological development seeks to reconcile eidetic variation with
Husserl’s method of critical–historical reflection. Along the lines of the arguments
from preknowledge, Aldea (2016) maintains that Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology
necessarily relies on historically embedded typifications and concepts. However,
she argues that this background guiding our epistemic practices can be turned into a
valuable resource for eidetic variation. If we succeed in drawing self-critically rather
than blindly borrowing from the sources of our traditions, the argument goes, eidetic
variation allows us to identify, circumscribe, and even overcome deeply entrenched
epistemic boundaries with the help of imagination.
These contemporary applications share with the traditional fallibilistic readings
of eidetic variation the conviction that it is impossible to fully separate the eidetic
from the empirical and historical. Rather than treating this entanglement as an insol-
uble tension at the heart of Husserl’s phenomenology or an insurmountable obstacle
for eidetic variation, they seek to turn it to the advantage of eidetic phenomenology.
They suggest ways in which eidetic variation can draw from different sources and be
supplemented by other methods or research practices. The readiness to incorporate
13
external resources into eidetic phenomenology and to integrate supportive meth-

ods with eidetic variation are the main features of what I refer to as an integrative
approach to eidetic variation.
The previous sections have already disclosed integrative elements in Husserl’s
eidetic methodology. Section 2 laid the methodological grounds for utilizing expe-
riential, historical, and fictional sources as well as instrumental means to the benefit
of eidetic phenomenology, especially in support of eidetic variation. Section 3 out-
lined a way of integrating challenging material into the eidetic procedure through
self-correcting eidetic variation. In this section, I illustrate the feasibility of an inte-
grative self-correcting account of eidetic variation in practice by examining the
potential of the three applications introduced above.
4.1 Real‑Life Deviations
Analogous to the hypothetical case of blindness in the Stein–Husserl manuscript,

Parnas and Zahavi (2000, 9–11) have suggested that eidetic phenomenology can and
should draw from documented real-life deviations. They argue that actual devia-
tions might play a role similar to thought experiments more reliably by providing a
rich source of challenging and illuminating cases. In addition to testing universalis-
tic assumptions and scrutinizing the limits of intuition, anomalous cases might, by
way of contrast, prompt us to revise and refine our analyses and elucidate elusive
or overlooked aspects of what is deemed normal experience (see also Zahavi 2017,
152–153).
In principle, real-life deviations can be captured by a variety of third-, second-
and first-person methods. Potential methods range from neuroimaging techniques
to experimental and observational methods in psychological research, interviews
and case studies in clinical settings, and autobiographical accounts.12 In practice, as
Zahavi (2017, 152–153) notes, the most natural and fruitful source of phenomeno-
logically relevant accounts of experience are disciplines offering detailed person-
level descriptions. Historically speaking, phenomenologically oriented psychology
and psychiatry have provided valuable accounts, especially on psychopathological
phenomena, such as self-disorders discussed below (see Spiegelberg 1972; Fuchs
2013). Merleau-Ponty can be considered a precursor of the integrative approach, not
only because of his engagement with developmental psychology, but also for utiliz-
ing case studies for the purpose of eidetic research.13 More recently, phenomenology
has engaged in constructive dialogue with cognitive sciences. Findings and theoreti-
cal influences travel both ways, enabling what Zahavi calls “productive cross-ferti-
lization” between transcendental-eidetic phenomenology and empirical disciplines
broadly construed (see Zahavi 2017, 151–154).
However, one must be careful in how to extract phenomenologically rel-
evant knowledge from empirical or clinical settings. Caution is equally needed in
12
For utilizing autobiographical accounts in phenomenological psychopathology, see Bortolan 2019.
13
A paradigmatic example is the famous Schneider case, see Jensen 2009.
13
integrating the obtained insights into eidetic research. Even though Zahavi empha-
sizes testing our presumptive eidetic claims and accommodating potential empiri-
cal counterexamples, he does not promote falsification as the way of incorporating
real-life deviations into eidetic phenomenology. He is particularly careful not to
claim that third-person findings about sub-personal processes, mechanisms, neural
correlates and the like would straightforwardly refute or confirm phenomenological
accounts. They can only motivate or complement further phenomenological investi-
gations that must be conducted in experiential terms. (Zahavi 2017, 152, 155–156)
Zahavi also points out problems with relying on external observation and sec-
ond-personal interpretation when it comes to clinical cases involving atypical
experience. For instance, there is an often-cited risk that medical personnel project
their own preconceptions onto patients in trying to take the perspective of other by
imagining how their experience differs from one’s own.14 To mitigate such bias, the
patient’s own perspective has to be integrated into the investigation. But as Zahavi
(2020) notes, this poses a further challenge for interviewing patients: how to elicit
answers that reflect their experience faithfully and comprehensively? The methodo-
logical issues in conducting interviews in a phenomenologically fruitful way are not
restricted to clinical cases, but rather concern second-person methods of gathering
and analyzing descriptions of experience in general.
Even when clinical and empirical studies provide reliable and phenomenologi-
cally relevant person-level descriptions, utilizing them in eidetic research is by no
means uncomplicated. Parnas and Zahavi (2000, 10) remind us that real-life devia-
tions such as pathological phenomena are always subject to interpretation, like
empirical findings more generally. The prevalence of anomalous cases, their theo-
retical impact and their significance in challenging our habitual typifications (and
ultimately, the idea of an invariant core) are all issues demanding further considera-
tion. The effects of real-life deviations on our eidetic claims are, hence, often hard to
determine conclusively. Psychopathological descriptions of self-disorders are a case
in point. Recently, the impact of schizophrenic thought insertion on the experiential
notion of minimal selfhood in particular has raised controversy. In short, there is an
ongoing debate on whether episodes of thought insertion constitute a counterexam-
ple to the claim that conscious experiences are universally and necessarily charac-
terized by for-me-ness or minimal selfhood (or its aspect called sense of ownership)
(see Henriksen et al. 2019; Zahavi 2020).
14
See Zahavi 2020. Clinical cases, such as the locked-in syndrome in Zahavi’s analysis and self-disor-
ders discussed below, raise broader methodological questions concerning eidetic variation: Does imagin-
ing and emphatically understanding how others (might) experience involve at least implicit self-variation,
i.e. imagining myself as being otherwise? To what extent is conceiving others and possible experiences in
general anchored in and limited by the embodied perspective of the researcher engaging in self-variation
and eidetic variation? Husserl’s treatment of such questions, particularly from the transcendental stand-
point, and their methodological implications are gaining some attention in Husserl scholarship (see Lobo
2013; de Santis 2020). However, their ramifications for current research practice require further consider-
ation. Acknowledging potential egocentric limitations in grasping bodily and worldly experiences differ-
ent from one’s own is crucial for self-critical application of eidetic variation, especially in investigating
topics such as gender, race, and (dis)abilities.
13
Commenting on the thought insertion debate, Henriksen et al. (2019) point out
several methodological issues with using psychopathological descriptions for phil-
osophical purposes. Sometimes patients’ subjective reports are taken at face value
or interpreted literally. Careful analyses provided by earlier psychopathological
research are ignored as well. Selective use of examples, often recycled in the lit-
erature, can also lead to both ignoring and overemphasizing certain experiential
aspects of thought insertion. The effect is only amplified if the motivation is to pro-
vide invalidating counterexamples of certain theories of selfhood or consciousness,
rather than representing the phenomenon itself comprehensively. Finally, Henriksen,
Parnas, and Zahavi argue that thought insertion should be investigated embedded in
and often arising from the altered experiential framework of schizophrenia spectrum
disorders, not as isolated and decontextualized experiences. They back their claim
with phenomenologically informed empirical studies: schizophrenia spectrum dis-
orders are not only associated with certain anomalous self-experiences but also fre-
quently accompanied by specific disturbances in the patient’s embodied experience
of the world and others (cf. Parnas and Henriksen 2019). Henriksen et al. (2019)
conclude that thought insertion involves a disturbance of for-me-ness resulting from
increased self-alienation (manifested in various anomalous self- and world-experi-
ences), rather than a complete lack of minimal self or a dissipation of first-person
perspective.
Bearing these methodological restrictions in mind, how can real-life deviations
be integrated into the eidetic procedure through eidetic variation? How does their
inclusion benefit eidetic phenomenology? It seems clear that real-life deviations can
support eidetic variation in all three ways laid out in Sect. 2.2. Using exceptional
cases (instead of typical or familiar ones) as a guiding model for variation admit-
tedly runs the aforementioned risk of overemphasizing certain features. But in their
ability to highlight what is usually taken for granted and to capture quite strikingly
what is missing, anomalous experiences can also provide an intuitive starting exam-
ple for grasping otherwise unnoticed features and separating truly essential features
from what is merely typical. Furthermore, as carefully detailed cases they are well
suited for concrete exemplifications and vivid illustrations of earlier eidetic results.
Most importantly, real-life deviations often reveal our ignorance about the range
of experiences of certain kind. Some anomalous cases can even change the whole
notion of what is conceivable for a category of experiences. By showing that the
scope of factual variation is actually wider than previously thought or deemed pos-
sible, real-life deviations also serve the third supportive function of “pollinating”
imagination.
Anomalous cases can be integrated into the eidetic procedure even more directly
along the lines suggested by the Stein–Husserl manuscript. To recap, deviances
can make us aware of potential insufficiencies in our eidetic descriptions, push us
to reiterate eidetic variation and, finally, incorporate the exceptional experiences
to the variation process. The improvement upon the evidence provided by such an
enriched eidetic variation can be further articulated as intuitive clarification of the
investigated phenomenon. In Ideen I, Husserl distinguishes between two interlinked
13
processes of “normal clarification” or making something clear to oneself. On the

one hand, one can illustrate or make something intuitive. On the other hand, one can
enhance the clarity of something already intuitive.15 To further instill this distinc-
tion, Husserl separates extending the scope of clarity from increasing the intensity
of clarity (Hua III/1, §68). He admits that we often have only “impure” intuitions at
our disposal, but they are crucial as intermediate stages or “stepping stones” in per-
fecting evidence (Hua III/1, 144).
Anomalous cases seem particularly suitable for procuring such imperfect intui-
tions, since they highlight specific features of the investigated phenomenon vividly,
even if other aspects would remain unclear. But as the thought insertion debate
shows, real-life deviances can also shed light on the wider experiential context of
the phenomenon under study. This enables intuitive differentiation of the previously
indeterminate or even obscure essences interwoven with the investigated essence,
to borrow Husserl’s expression quoted above (Hua III/1, 144–145). For instance,
phenomenologically enlightened analyses of the schizophrenia spectrum disorders
indicate that disturbances in one aspect of experience (e.g. minimal self) are often
entangled with more or less pervasive changes in other basic structures of experi-
ence (e.g. intentionality, embodiment, temporality, and intersubjectivity) (see e.g.
Fuchs 2013; Ferri and Gallese 2019; Parnas and Henriksen 2019). This can guide
further investigations into such interconnected aspects of experience and lead to
more refined analyses of their essential connections.
To restate Parnas’ and Zahavi’s suggestion in Husserlian terms: First, concrete
empirical findings and person-level descriptions pointing to real-life deviations can
bring complex, uncharted and even previously inconceivable features of experience
to the scope of intuition by extending the range of eidetic variation. Second, they
can increase or enhance the intuitive clarity of phenomenological claims by forcing
us to return to eidetic variation, in order to reconsider their correctness and modify
eidetic descriptions according to the newfound evidence. Hence, including anoma-
lous cases to eidetic variation can play a significant role in revising and refining
eidetic claims. Phenomenology can, thus, accommodate and learn from anomalous
experiences without espousing a falsificationist reading of eidetic variation or aban-
doning its eidetic ambitions.
4.2 Artificial Variation
Alife research utilizes simulation models to study complex phenomena such as

the self-constitution of living organisms, adaptive behaviour, and the emergence
of embodied cognition (Froese and Gallagher 2010, 93–94). Froese and Gallagher
(2010, 97, 100–101) assert that creating hypothetic variation by running simulations
15
The dense passage reads in German as follows: ”Das Sich-klar-machen besteht also hier in zweier-
lei miteinander sich verbindenden Prozessen: in Prozessen der Veranschaulichung und in solchen der
Steigerung der Klarheit des schon Anschaulichen. […] Damit ist aber das Wesen der normalen Klärung
beschrieben.” (Hua III/1, 144)
13
can serve the same function as eidetic variation in scrutinizing the essential features
of (possible) biological phenomena or “life-as-it-could-be”. In their view, simula-
tion models amount to “opaque thought experiments”, since they use hypothetical
cases for probing what is conceivable in order to reveal unexpected or non-intuitive
consequences. This could both challenge claims of necessity or unfounded presup-
positions and extend the scope of imagination, redirecting empirical and phenom-
enological research alike.
The initiative is admittedly bold and has some enticing potential. Simulations
could be seen as a digital extension of the supportive functions Husserl gives to the
“artificial arrangements” of experimental psychology and using models and draw-
ings in mathematical thinking (Hua V, 52–53). Froese and Gallagher (2010, 90,
92–93, 97, 102) indeed commend the pedagogical value of working with simula-
tions and the stability of computer medium for repeated test runs. For them, how-
ever, simulations serve a more ambitious goal than procuring exemplary intuitions
before eidetic variation or retaining its results after the actual work done in imagina-
tion. They argue that simulation models can produce otherwise unattainable insights
by surpassing both empirical variability and what can be performed by unaided
human imagination. In their mind, real-world phenomena like living bodies with
nervous systems in changing environments are too complex, unpredictable, and
holistic to get a grasp on by means of imaginative variation or experimental proto-
cols and empirical observation alone.
One can find some support for the last claim in Husserl’s writings. In Phänome-
nologische Psychologie, he acknowledges that some essences and their correlative
concepts (like “color” and “tone”) are quite easily intuitively grasped with ideation,
while other essences such as lived body (Leib), animate being, and human being in
general might present themselves non-intuitively in vague or empty concepts. In the
latter case, essences can only be established progressively by producing manifold of
intuitions to realize such empty meanings – it might even take “an entire infinite sci-
ence” to unfold their eidetic features. (Hua IX, 90, 92–93) Husserl would thus agree
with the quite plausible assumption that there are more and less complex essences
and levels of difficulty in grasping them in practice. Rather than proving that some
essences are categorically too complicated to grasp, however, I would argue that
complex and multifaceted essences profess the need for eidetic variation to bring
their empty, confused or equivocal meanings gradually to their intuitive fulfillment
through conceptual and intuitive clarification of their often entangled essential fea-
tures, along the lines presented in the previous sections.
Froese and Gallagher do not fully elaborate on where the difficulties with relying
on human imagination lie. However, their line of argumentation points to a general
worry in Husserl’s eidetic methodology. If eidetic variation must run through mul-
tiplicity of modifications and keep the successive earlier configurations in mind to
grasp the invariant (see EU, §87c), the task may soon prove to be insurmountable.
Our capacity to envisage possible experiences and modify them could in practice
be decisively hindered if the reflected phenomenon is too complex or detailed. The
sheer number of options might simply overwhelm our imagination, and the proce-
dure could run its course before the needed variation for clear intuition of essences
is formed. An optimistic reading of Froese and Gallagher’s proposal is that computer
13
simulations manage to exceed our imagination by relieving its cognitive burden:

externalizing imaginative variation to a more stable computer medium and control-
lable environment arguably allows for more effective and systematic variations and
their iteration (see Froese and Gallagher 2010, 97, 102).
This interpretation is problematic. It follows the inductionist line of argument in
assuming that eidetic variation suffers from incompleteness due to our practically
limited capacity to produce variants or cover the full range of possibilities (Kasmier
2010). Husserl clearly states, however, that there is obviously no need to actually run
through every option available to grasp essential features of the object under investi-
gation. Rather than requiring an exhaustive process producing final results, imagina-
tion aims at an “infinitely open” multiplicity of variants. For imaginative variation
to be free, it needs to stay open and arbitrary in the sense of acknowledging that it
could go on at will and at any time draw from whatever source at hand. This arbi-
trariness or optionality (Beliebigkeit) differentiates eidetic variation from empirical
induction (or empirical variation, in Husserl’s terms), which generalizes by running
through a certain (finite) number of actual instances. (Hua IX, 76–77; Hua XVII,
255) Computer simulations might support imagination in keeping the realm of pos-
sibilities open, but eidetic variation does not require computational efficacy to cover
the wealth of options in order to succeed.
Furthermore, the real difference between imaginative variation and computer
simulation lies in the intuitiveness and non-intuitiveness of their respective proce-
dures Froese and Gallagher (2010, 97, 101–102) admit that the biggest drawback of
variation by simulation is that its results lack intuitive (self-)evidence, acknowledg-
ing that their meaning always requires further analysis and interpretation. If varia-
tion is not produced or performed by a conscious subject, how can there be an intui-
tive grasp of essential features?
To their credit, Froese and Gallagher readily concur that this is the very opacity
characterizing the procedure. In promoting the analogy and even certain methodo-
logical continuity between imaginative variation and computer simulations, how-
ever, they seem to underestimate the scope of difficulties faced in the non-intuitive
way of proceeding. Husserl was cautious of mediated ways of proceeding in eidetic
phenomenology because retaining an intuitive grasp of not only the starting point
and the end result but also every step of the procedure was regarded as integral to
seeing what stays invariant in different configurations (Hua IX, 78). This is why
he defended operating in phantasy and using continuous series in eidetic variation.
When it comes to Alife simulations, neither the process nor the outcome is self-evi-
dent. After all, Alife tries to design simulation models in which the designer inter-
venes in its operation as little as possible, in order to reveal the implications of our
explicit premises or ingrained assumptions and to examine unforeseen consequences
of theoretical positions (Froese and Gallagher 2010, 95, 97, 102).
From the phenomenological perspective, interpreting the insights produced by
simulation in experiential terms poses the biggest challenge for integrating Alife
methodology with eidetic variation. Following Husserl, Froese and Gallagher (2010,
92–93) note that imagined, lived through, and encountered instances are in princi-
ple on the same level as potential variants, as long as they are considered as pure
possibilities. This paves the way for simulation as a potential mode of variation. To
13
be included in eidetic variation, however, pure possibilities have to be transformed

or shaped into variants, i.e. intuitively imagined by the researcher as one optional
example among other conceivabilities (Erdenklichkeiten) (Hua IX, 71, 76–77, 86;
EU, 411; Hua I, 66, 104–105). In eidetic variation, each variant alongside the pro-
cess itself appears, as Husserl puts it, “in the subjective mode of lived experience
of the ‘optional’” (Hua IX, 73). These requirements put pressure on Alife research
to convey its insights in a re-conceivable way, i.e. as possibilities actually and intui-
tively imaginable in the subjective mode of presentation, not only as theoretical or
conceptual possibilities intended merely symbolically or “emptily” in thought (see
Jansen 2020). For instance, running simulations with adaptive artificial agents in
virtual environments or evolutionary robots in laboratory settings produces behavior
whose meaning as possible embodied and embedded experience is far from clear.16
Alife might make it easier to envision simple forms of life-as-it-could-be and help to
scrutinize the essential features of living being(s) eidetically, but by itself it says lit-
tle about the experiential or conscious aspects of lived being (Froese and Gallagher
2010, 84; Froese et al. 2012). Yet phenomenologists are primarily interested in the
lived body and the first-personal aspect of biological embodiment.
A more recent call for a human-centered synthetic approach, which draws from
Alife and enactive robotics to design systems for actual human participants instead
of artificial agents, seems more promising. Froese et al. (2012) have proposed “artifi-
cial embodiment” as a method for studying “mind-as-it-could-be” from the first-per-
son perspective. The basic idea is to vary or alter person’s embodiment, and thereby
their experience, by technological means, especially human–computer interfaces.
Research done and tools developed in fields like haptics, virtual reality systems, and
prosthetic technology could be utilized in “engineering for experience”. The goal is
to technologically enlarge the domain of experiential phenomena by giving rise to
novel experiences and even modifying the structures of lived experience, in order to
analyze their essential features and conditions of possibility. Froese et al. consider
their method more empirically grounded than imaginative variation, since varia-
tions in (user) experience are brought about by controlled, systematic, and verifiable
technological changes. However, as long as the emerging experiences are described
in sufficient detail with suitable first- and second-person methods, they could well
be incorporated into and further analyzed with eidetic variation too. Technological
modulation or mediation can alter our experience by way of augmentation, substitu-
tion, and deprivation (Froese et al. 2012). Artificial embodiment could thus serve
functions similar to real-life deviations in providing eidetic variation with cases
of anomalous and unfamiliar bodily experience, fuelling the study of “mind-as-it-
could-be” unsevered from the lived body.
Notwithstanding the methodological restrictions in obtaining factual variation
from human subjects in the experimental setting, drawing from artificially generated
16
The problem of meaning concerns not only the attribution of an intrinsically meaningful perspective
for the artificial agent (see Froese and Ziemke 2009), but also the more practical difficulties in interpret-
ing the results experientially as an external observer running the simulations (let alone as someone read-
ing about them) (cf. Ziemke and Taguchi 2019).
13
but still actually lived through experiences documented in experiential terms has
clear advantages over purely hypothetical variation via computer simulation. It
seems easier to integrate eidetic variation with artificial embodiment than Alife,
when embodied human subjects are a more integral part of the “artificial variation”
process from the outset.
4.3 Critical–Historical Reflection
If eidetic variation is as dependent on habitual typifications, historically sedimented

concepts, and concealed cultural senses as the arguments from preknowledge sug-
gest (see Lohmar 2019, 112, cf. 130), there is certainly a pressing need to engage
self-critically with the historically embedded resources eidetic variation unavoidably
draws from. In this regard, Aldea’s hermeneutically oriented proposal to supplement
eidetic variation with teleological–historical reflection, as Husserl conceives it espe-
cially in the Krisis manuscripts, is particularly promising. Overcoming the appar-
ent tension between eidetic variation as an apriori transcendental-eidetic method and
Husserl’s reflective historical analyses, sometimes voiced as challenges of ahistori-
cism and Eurocentrism, further motivates this type of integration (see Aldea 2016;
Aldea 2017).
Whereas the Husserl of Ideen I deemed “the renditions of history” useful mainly
in enriching imagination before the eidetic procedure (Hua III/1, 148), later Hus-
serl eschewed the idea of philosophers simply drawing from history as something
external to them.17 He rather professed the need for a critical–historical reflection
(Besinnung) of our “historical past” and clarification of our ultimate goal or telos
in order to understand ourselves as philosophers carrying on a living tradition with
its “spiritual inheritance” and often concealed history (Hua VI, 15–16, 510–513).
Following Husserl’s turn to “our history”, Aldea (2016) argues that uncovering and
probing what already guides us and currently holds us captive as phenomenologists
doing research in a certain historical situation is crucial for the epistemic success
of the variation process itself. Aldea notes that historically sedimented types and
concepts not only bind the constitution of the guiding example as an instance of
a certain kind, but also stimulate and sustain the subsequent series of variations.
We should, therefore, survey their limits (or “modal boundaries”) and potential (or
“modal potency”) in generating conceivable possibilities. Furthermore, scrutinizing
other historically determined factors steering our imagination is decisive for imagi-
native variation to succeed in surpassing the limits of conceivability initially sug-
gested by earlier classifications and generalization.
17
In 1935, Husserl writes that history is not at philosophers’ disposal like “stocks piled up in a store-
house” (Hua VI, 511; cf. 16).
13
A more detailed exposition of Aldea’s theoretical account lies outside the scope
of this article. Assessing the full value of critical–historical reflection for eidetic
variation in research practice would also require varied example cases. Suffice to
say, Husserl’s late manuscripts lend support to the idea that supplementing eidetic
variation with teleological–historical reflection serves, besides its self-critical role,
the positive epistemic function of clarification introduced above.18 This widens the
potential uses of history in eidetic methodology from merely an illustrative source
or a reserve of falsifying counterexamples to a more integral part of self-correcting
eidetic procedure. It also opens the way for conceiving eidetic phenomenology as a
historically progressing science, perhaps even as a “rigorous science” whose idea
– sometimes expressed explicitly as the idea of attaining absolute knowledge (Hua
III/1, 8) – is “realized only in an unending historical process” (Hua V, 139).
5 Conclusion
In this article, I have defended a self-correcting account of eidetic variation. How

does it square with Husserl’s early statement, quoted in Introduction, that experience
neither refutes nor confirms the “intransgressible” eidetic truths? One option would
be to argue that Husserl simply changed his views. After all, in Formale und tran-
szendentale Logik, he famously states that every kind of evidence can turn out to be
“deception”, annulled by new evidence that future experience provides (Hua XVII,
164). Taken at face value, this would suggest eidetic knowledge is not only fallible
but also refutable by empirical evidence. Husserl hastens to add, though, that it takes
similar evidence to “shatter” what was ostensibly apodictic evidence (Hua XVII,
164). In other words, empirical observation as such does not suffice to (in)validate
eidetic claims, since the source of eidetic evidence is not perception but ideation.
As the Stein–Husserl manuscript states, experience (Erfahrung) by itself does not
correct eidetic knowledge, although empirical evidence can reveal potential errors
and prompt the phenomenologist to test the eidetic results. Only eidetic intuition
affords the required eidetic insights for correcting them.19 The more nuanced fal-
libilistic reading developed along these lines holds that eidetic claims can be revised
and perfected, but only by returning to the eidetic attitude and re-engaging in eidetic
variation. This is the self-correcting aspect of the account defended in this article.
This reading clearly contrasts with the conviction that eidetic phenomenology
secures perfect and indubitable results, valid once and for all. Still, as argued above,
18
In The Origin of Geometry, Husserl links “epistemological elucidation” and clarification with reflec-
tive historical inquiry, stating: “Every explication and every transition from making explicit [Verdeutli-
chung] to making self-evident [Evidentmachung] […] is nothing other than historical disclosure” (Hua
VI, 379; Husserl 1970, 370). The method for obtaining invariants or essences in the horizon of historical
life-world and making them evident (even apodictically evident) is eidetic variation (Hua VI, 383).
19
„Die Erfahrung kann den Wesensforscher darauf aufmerksam machen, daß in seinen Feststellungen
ein Fehler stecken muß, sie kann ihn veranlassen, diese Feststellungen in einer neuen Intuition zu prüfen
und zu berichtigen, aber sie selbst kann nicht als Berichtigung dienen: Denn nur in Wesensanschauung
kann ich Wesenseinsichten gewinnen.“ Hua XXV, 248, cf. 246.
13
it converges with Husserl’s own principles conceived as norms or ideals guiding

epistemic striving, in particular the quest for adequate and apodictic evidence. The
self-correcting account of eidetic variation reflects the practical difficulties in seek-
ing eidetic knowledge about lived experience and its objects with limited human
imagination and open-ended methodology. Concurrently, it shows how piecemeal
advancements in eidetic-phenomenological research are possible. Husserl came to
recognize that conceiving evidence as absolutely indubitable insight would render
attaining truth miraculous and prevent us from understanding the production of sci-
entific results (Hua XVII, §§59–60). This article has taken the opposite route by
examining the production of eidetic knowledge in terms of corrigible eidetic claims
grounded on gradually perfectible intuitive evidence. This enables a reconciliation
of the negative and positive functions of eidetic variation as a self-correcting method
for testing and validating eidetic claims.
Moreover, conceiving eidetic phenomenology as a progressive science that
claims no absolute immunity from error makes it easier to integrate it with other
disciplines, including empirical sciences. The integrative account of eidetic varia-
tion embraces the prospect of drawing from non-eidetic resources and supporting it
with supplementary methods. In the previous sections, I have laid out the supportive
functions of utilizing external resources before and after eidetic variation and evalu-
ated potential ways of enhancing and extending the variation process itself. The con-
temporary integrative applications examined above illustrate how non-eidetic dis-
ciplines could provide eidetic variation intuitive material to work with in clarifying
and refining eidetic descriptions, not only counterexamples for challenging eidetic
claims. In this way, the applications suggest possible ways of overcoming some of
the limitations of eidetic variation. Yet they also reveal methodological restrictions
in utilizing non-intuitive second- or third-personal methods and source material con-
veyed in non-experiential terms.
The list of potential resources for eidetic variation examined in this article is by
no means exhaustive. In fact, openness for further extensions is a built-in feature
of the integrative account defended here. Incorporating underutilized material into
the eidetic procedure and supplementing eidetic variation with previously ignored
methods is, after all, always possible and even desirable. Further integration might
not only provide support in attaining the epistemic goals of eidetic phenomenology,
but also unlock overlooked functions of eidetic variation. Once the methodological
groundwork for an integrative and self-correcting account of eidetic variation has
been laid, the benefits of utilizing different kinds of resources in eidetic phenom-
enology should be evaluated case-by-case and measured in research practice.
Acknowledgements This article was developed in presentations given at the annual NoSP conference in
Copenhagen 2019, at the “Phenomenological Perspectives on Empathy and the Significance of Empirical
Research. Women in Phenomenology: Edith Stein” conference in Graz 2019 and at the FiPhi 2020 Col-
loquium in Helsinki. Earlier versions of the manuscript were also presented at the Phenomenology Semi-
nar in Helsinki and at the Doctoral Seminar in Tampere. I wish to thank everyone who attended these
events for their helpful feedback. I am particularly grateful to Mirja Hartimo, Leila Haaparanta, Sara
Heinämaa, Smaranda Aldea, and Ilpo Hirvonen for invaluable discussions and insightful comments on
the manuscript. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for useful comments and suggestions.
13
Funding This work was supported by the Finnish Cultural Foundation (Suomen Kulttuurirahasto) and
City of Tampere’s research foundation (Tampereen kaupungin tiederahasto).
Declarations
Conflicts of interest The authors declared that they have no conflict of interest.
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directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licen
ses/by/4.0/.
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Eidetic Variation: A Self Correcting and Integrative Account

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Axiomathes (2022) 32 (Suppl 2):S405–S434

Eidetic Variation: a Self‑Correcting and Integrative Account

Keywords Clarification · Edmund Husserl · Eidetic knowledge · Eidetic variation ·

In Ideen I and III, Husserl introduces phenomenology as an eidetic science by

In Phänomenologische Psychologie, Husserl articulates eidetic variation as

2.1 Sowa’s Challenge: Eidetic Variation as Falsification

intersubjective reassessibility of eidetic claims is essential to Husserl’s conception

2.2 The Positive Functions of Eidetic Variation

Apparently, Sowa’s commitment to the Popperian negative understanding of falsi-

Commentators who subscribe to the arguments from preknowledge often hold

phenomenology than Sowa gives it credit for. Insofar as clarification is aided by

3 A Self‑Correcting Account of Eidetic Variation

4 An Integrative Account of Eidetic Variation: Three Cases

external resources into eidetic phenomenology and to integrate supportive meth-

Analogous to the hypothetical case of blindness in the Stein–Husserl manuscript,

processes of “normal clarification” or making something clear to oneself. On the

Alife research utilizes simulation models to study complex phenomena such as

simulations manage to exceed our imagination by relieving its cognitive burden:

be included in eidetic variation, however, pure possibilities have to be transformed

If eidetic variation is as dependent on habitual typifications, historically sedimented

In this article, I have defended a self-correcting account of eidetic variation. How

it converges with Husserl’s own principles conceived as norms or ideals guiding

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2.1 Sowa’s Challenge: Eidetic Variation as Falsification

2.2 The Positive Functions of Eidetic Variation

3 A Self‑Correcting Account of Eidetic Variation

4 An Integrative Account of Eidetic Variation: Three Cases