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HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF

Article  in  African Security Review · January 2003

DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2003.9627250

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 ESSAY

HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF

The DRC and the UN Security Council
VIRGIL HAWKINS

The response of the UN Security Council to the massive world war in the DRC is characterised
by an abundance of rhetoric and a deficit of concrete action. When it has acted, its actions have
often been clearly inappropriate, with the token deployment of lightly armed peacekeepers into
a volatile area of ongoing conflict. In choosing such an option, it has shown how little political
will there is for serious engagement, but also how little the Council has learnt from its own his-
tory. This paper seeks to analyse the Council’s response to the conflict in the DRC, separating
the rhetoric and the appearance of action from concrete measures designed at realising some
form of conflict resolution.

Introduction them to do a peace enforcer’s job. They are in

serious trouble, and the unwilling but able
The history books are full of lessons that have
developed world is baulking at the pleas of the
not been learned, and history not learned is
UN Secretary-General to intervene.
history waiting to be repeated. It is certainly
Despite its unfortunate status as the dead-
repeating itself in more ways than one in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). liest recorded conflict since the Second World
For the second time in recent years, rebels, War, and the disastrous implications for
together with their foreign backers, have swept human and regional security (with the direct
across large parts of the country in a massive military involvement of as many as eight
military offensive, sparking a humanitarian countries), the DRC is an issue generally
catastrophe unparalleled in recent history. found on the periphery of Council’s field of
Once again, the UN Security Council has cov- vision. The body entrusted with the task of
ered its inaction with rhetoric, and by sending restoring and maintaining international peace
a token number of peacekeepers into a situa- and security, is essentially a political body, and
tion where there is no peace to keep—asking its actions generally reflect a convergence of

VIRGIL HAWKINS is currently a technical adviser with the Japanese NGO, Association of Medical Doctors of Asia (AMDA)
International, and is based in Cambodia.
48 African Security Review 12(4) • 2003

the national interests of its powerful members, the Council’s monthly agenda. Council mis-
rather than genuine humanitarian priorities. sions have visited the region four times, and
With next to no political will among its mem- Council-sanctioned peacekeeping and peace
bers to become seriously involved, it has enforcement forces have been deployed on
taken but token steps to ‘let off steam’—reduc- DRC soil. So how can the rhetoric be separat-
ing any pressure there may be to intervene in ed from the action, and the ‘seriousness’ of
a more meaningful way. In the almost total the Council in fulfilling its duty to restore
absence of media coverage, political interest international peace and security be measured?
and powerful lobby groups, however, there is This article uses a previously introduced
very little pressure to bolster sincere involve- 10-level scale of response system as the basis
ment anyway. to evaluate the Council’s performance.1 The
This paper examines the performance of scale rates the levels of Council expression
the Security Council in its handling (or lack and response in the following manner:
thereof) of the conflict in the DRC, by 0 No discussion
analysing (1) the Council’s involvement, from 1 Procedural discussion
the outbreak of conflict, through the painful- 2 Discussion
ly slow and token deployment of peacekeep- 3 Press statement
ers (MONUC) to the arrival and departure of 4 Presidential statement
the Interim Emergency Multinational Force in 5 Resolution: Measures under Chapter VI
Bunia, and (2) the lack of genuine interest of the Charter
among Council members in bringing the con- 6 Resolution: Provisional measures (deter-
flict to a halt, which has led the Council to mination of threat/breach of the peace)2
repeat its past mistakes—by taking action that 7 Resolution: Sanctions (targeted at leader-
is both irresponsible and dangerous. It con- ship)
cludes with a mixed assessment on what the 8 Resolution: Sanctions (targeted at general
future may hold for the Security Council and population)
its dealings with the troubled DRC. 9 Resolution: Passive enforcement (primari-
ly enforcing the status quo)3
10 Resolution: Active enforcement (enforc-
Evaluating Council response
ing a major change in the status quo)
The DRC conflict has arguably been margin- Using this scale, it is possible to chronologi-
alized by the UN Security Council. Yet, cally examine the Council’s response to the
almost every month for the past five years, the conflict in the DRC by plotting the response
DRC has been given a place for discussion on levels on a graph as follows.4

The DRC in the UN Security Council (August 1998 – July 2003)

10
9

8
Actual Response
7 Intervention level
Resolution level
Level of response

5
4

3
2

0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Hawkins 49

Another world war in the DRC after the war in the DRC had begun, that the
Council adopted its first resolution on the
The DRC conflict did not creep up on any- matter, and recognised the existence of a threat
one, gradually escalating in a manner in which to the peace (level 6).7 While the resolution
it might escape the notice of the international was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN
community.5 Its opening was sudden and dra- Charter and the Council expressed its readi-
matic. Fighting broke out simultaneously in ness to assist in the implementation of a cease-
the east and the west on 2 August 1998, and fire, the operational paragraphs of the resolu-
while Rwanda’s attempt to deal a decisive tion contained no concrete measures for any
blow to Kabila’s government with an airborne particular action. In any case, any political sig-
assault in the west was foiled by Angolan nificance its adoption may have had was
intervention, anti-government forces and their drowned out by NATO’s bombardment of
foreign backers gained ground rapidly in the Kosovo and Serbia, and the Council made it
east. Within the month it had developed into clear that it was going to wait for a ceasefire in
a full-scale war, with anti-government forces the DRC before getting involved in conflict
penetrating hundreds of kilometres deep into resolution.
DRC territory, and several countries joining
the fray on both sides.
The huge escalation of hostilities was not ‘Doing something’: Peacekeeping on
matched by an escalation in Council the cheap
response. The DRC government lodged a The Lusaka Peace Accords and following
number of complaints with the UN Security developments provided an opportunity for
Council, which proceeded to discuss (in infor- the Council (and its powerful members) to
mal consultations) the issue on a number of move to attempt to ward off accusations of
occasions, with the president addressing the double standards in responding to humanitar-
press following the discussion (level 3). It took ian emergencies in the aftermath of NATO’s
a full month for the Council to formally war. In August 1999, the Council adopted its
express itself on the issue, calling for a cease- second resolution on the DRC and cautious-
fire and the withdrawal of foreign forces in a ly authorised the deployment of up to 90 mil-
presidential statement—one rank lower than a itary liaison personnel for a period of up to
resolution (level 4).6 This was to become the three months.8 Half a year later, small teams
Council’s characteristic way of ‘dealing’ with (of up to four members) were deployed in
the conflict in the DRC in the years to come. only nine locations in the DRC.
It would discuss the issue, after which it would Notwithstanding the mission’s obvious inabil-
express its concern, call for an end to the vio- ity to carry out its mandate (largely due to
lence, the withdrawal of the foreign forces and uncertain battle lines and lack of security guar-
respect for the territorial integrity of the DRC, antees), in a resolution extending the deploy-
without proceeding to take any further action ment, the UN Secretary General was asked to
when its calls were ignored by the parties con- prepare for the deployment of up to 500 mil-
cerned. itary observers with a view to future ‘rapid’
Little progress was made in the Council deployments.9
regarding the DRC for several months to The Security Council’s next move came in
come. Africa’s world war was being upstaged February 2000. By this time, one and a half
by a comparatively minor low-intensity con- years (and at the cost of one and a half million
flict in Kosovo, Yugoslavia, and by the break- lives)10 after the outbreak of the war, the Lusaka
down of weapons inspections in Iraq. The next Peace Accords were increasingly looking like a
six months would see powerful Council mem- dead letter, and the Council had little (if any-
bers and their allies waging large-scale bomb- thing) to show for its deliberations. Like the liai-
ing campaigns against both countries, which son officers before them, the observers were
would dominate the world’s attention. It was unable to function under such precarious secu-
not until 9 April 1999, more than 8 months rity conditions, and the Council, acting on the
50 African Security Review 12(4) • 2003

recommendations of the UN Secretary- more forceful action ignores the motives of

General, decided to send peacekeepers into the the participating states and, perhaps worse,
DRC.11 assumes the belligerents will ignore these
With Kosovo still fresh in the international motives too”.15 Although written of peace-
community’s memory, and the Security keeping in Bosnia, the same can be said of
Council’s record-breaking response time in grey area peacekeeping attempts in Somalia,
approving a peace enforcement operation in Sierra Leone and the DRC. Grey area (or
East Timor, there was a certain amount of robust) peacekeeping only works where a rela-
pressure on Council members to present the tively stable peace has been achieved, in which
image that African conflicts had not been the threat is primarily from small remnants of
completely forgotten by the Council. What beaten armies or spoilers.16
followed was a classic example of the adop- It also demonstrated how entrenched the
tion of one of the most inadvisable courses of division of labour in the use of ground forces
action that the Council can take in such a in conflict resolution has become. The power-
volatile situation—grey area peacekeeping ful members, fully aware of how inappropriate
(level 8 and a half).12 (not to mention downright dangerous) the
In resolution 1291 of 2000, the Council proposed operation was, approved mandates
authorised MONUC to “take the necessary and force structures for the troops of develop-
action…to protect United Nations…person- ing countries that they would not dare
nel, facilities, installations and equipment, approve for their own troops.17 Furthermore,
ensure the security and freedom of movement by using a UN Secretariat-led blue-helmet
of its personnel, and protect civilians under operation (rather than a multinational opera-
imminent threat of physical violence”. In the- tion led by a powerful developed country),
ory, such a mandate is not very far from the they set up the UN Secretariat as a convenient
right of self-defence of regular peacekeepers. scapegoat for when things started to go
In practice, however, the actual use of “neces- wrong—an escape technique used (to great
sary action” to ensure freedom of movement effect) by Western politicians during and after
and to protect civilians is more often than not operations in Somalia and Bosnia.18
seen as a provocation (to be met with a mili-
tary response) by the parties to the conflict,
Other Measures: The rhetoric and
particularly when the mandate is adopted
the reality
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In
authorising the deployment of up to 5,537 Naturally, the mission did not get off the
lightly armed peacekeepers, the resolution ground. It would be another full year before
provided neither the numbers nor the force the conditions allowed peacekeepers to be
structure necessary to even attempt to imple- fielded in the DRC, and even then it was a
ment the mandate it provided.13 token and largely impotent force. But the
The decision showed how little the Security Council should not necessarily be
Council had chosen to learn from the lessons judged by whether or not it was able to field a
of its own experiences, and was a clear exam- peacekeeping force or by how big the force is.
ple of the ‘do something syndrome’.14 Similar Besides the fact that peacekeepers should
unrealistic mandates had been given to blue- never have been deployed in the first place,19
helmet peacekeepers in conflict situations in the Council has several other tools at its dis-
Bosnia, Somalia, and Sierra Leone, and each posal, not least of all the application of sanc-
case had convincingly shown the dangers of tions (level 7 or 8). Some form of targeted
deploying lightly-armed peacekeepers where sanctions, or other action short of the deploy-
there is clearly no peace to keep. As Timothy ment of ground troops, may have been effec-
Wallace Crawford points out, such a response tive in curbing the illegal occupation, illicit
may be chosen precisely because it is one of flows of arms, illegal exploitation of natural
the least costly alternatives, and “to argue that resources, massacres and other factors that
a peacekeeping mission is an implicit threat of have served to exacerbate and perpetuate the
Hawkins 51

conflict.20 Unfortunately, however, such actions to put an end to this exploitation”.28

measures were notably absent from the Two years later, the Council had very little to
Council’s response over the past five years, show for its demands and deliberations, with
despite its repeated (and unanswered) the exception of the final report of its panel of
demands to stop the aforementioned actions. experts and some recommendations.29
The Council quickly recognised the differ- Deploring and demanding a stop to mas-
ence between invited (acting under legitimate sacres, and violations of international human-
collective self-defence) and uninvited forces in itarian law and human rights also featured
the DRC, deplored the presence of the latter frequently in Council resolutions. As early as
and called on states that had deployed such April 1999, the Council, condemning the
forces to bring an “immediate end” to their massacres, called for an investigation “with a
presence, to little effect.21 In all 20 of the view to bringing to justice those responsi-
Council’s resolutions on the DRC it expressed ble”.30 It explicitly condemned the massacres
its firm commitment to preserving the nation- in the DRC in 7 resolutions over the years, at
al sovereignty, territorial integrity and political times calling for investigations, at other times
independence of the DRC. Moreover, no less stressing that there would be no impunity for
than 11 resolutions repeatedly demanded that the perpetrators. The Council did not set up
uninvited foreign forces be withdrawn.22 The any ad hoc tribunals, however, and it was only
Council also demanded that states cease their after five years of massacres and massive
support for armed groups in the DRC in a human rights violations that the international
total of nine resolutions. Unfortunately, there community began to consider concrete action
were no consequences for non-compliance in (through the International Criminal Court—
either instance. which can only deal with crimes committed
The Council stated in April 1999 that it after July 2002) aimed at bringing some of
was “Deeply concerned at the illicit flow of those responsible to justice.
arms and military material in the Great Lakes Numerous other demands were made by
region”.23 In February 2000 it called upon “all the Council that were not heeded, including
concerned to halt such flows, and expresses its the abstention from offensive action, cooper-
intention to consider this issue further”.24 This ation with MONUC and humanitarian oper-
‘concern’ did not translate into action. ations, the demilitarisation of Kisangani, and
Despite the continuous and abundant flow of an end to the use of child soldiers. The
illicit arms into the DRC that have made the Council explicitly expressed in its resolutions
continuation of conflict possible, a ban on on numerous occasions “its readiness to con-
arms sales to the parties to the conflict would sider possible measures which could be
not be applied until a full five years after the imposed in accordance with its responsibility
start of the conflict.25 under the Charter of the United Nations in
The illegal exploitation of natural resources case of failure by parties to comply fully with
—one of the greatest driving forces behind the this resolution”.31 Yet, concrete measures sim-
entire conflict—was another topic of concern ply did not eventuate, despite an almost com-
in Council rhetoric that did not translate into plete failure to comply with the Council’s
action. The Council expressed its concern demands by the parties to the conflict.
about such exploitation at an early stage in the A number of other measures were consid-
conflict, recognised the link between exploita- ered by the Council that were not followed
tion and the continuation of conflict,26 and through. One example was the proposed
set up a panel to investigate. In response to a deployment of a “curtain of troops” along the
damning report by the panel,27 the Council, DRC’s eastern borders (particularly during the
in June 2001, reaffirmed “that it attaches the withdrawal of foreign forces) to prevent cross-
highest importance to the cessation of the ille- border incursions, to build confidence, and to
gal exploitation of the natural resources of the enhance the stability of the region. Although
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and reaf- a peace enforcement mission capable of
firms that it is ready to consider the necessary restoring and maintaining peace throughout
52 African Security Review 12(4) • 2003

the DRC is a practical impossibility (given the ground, had begun pushing the limits of
numbers of troops, costs and logistics peacekeeping. MONUC was expanded to
required), the idea for a less demanding “cur- 8,700 military personnel (despite the fact that
tain of troops” was raised during a Council 3 years after MONUC had been authorised, it
mission to the DRC and considered in a sub- had not been fully deployed),36 and peace-
sequent resolution in June 2002.32 It keepers began to expand their operations.
remained, however, simply an idea. The vio- It was a recipe for disaster especially evi-
lence in the wake of the Ugandan withdrawal dent in the small town of Bunia, where
in 2003 showed the potential necessity of such MONUC soon ran into trouble. The limits of
a force. peacekeeping were again pushed too far as 700
It can be argued that the failure of the Uruguayan peacekeepers found themselves
Council to take concrete measures to become barely able to protect themselves (let alone the
seriously involved in conflict resolution in the thousands of civilians who had sought their
DRC is largely a reflection of the apathy of protection). Caught in the middle of fierce
the Council’s powerful members towards a battles, with as many as 20,000 militia vying
conflict that does not have a significant affect for control of the town, two peacekeepers
on their economic or political interests. With were killed, and the situation was increasingly
a media industry utterly blind to its existence, beginning to look like a repeat of bitter past
and given the complexity and scale of the experiences of peacekeeping in Bosnia,
conflict, there remains very little incentive to Somalia, and Sierra Leone.
become involved at all. For a brief moment the Western media
Still, there may well be more than pure industry, seeing white peacekeepers in trouble
apathy at work here. Reluctance to intervene and parallels with the Rwandan genocide,
may also be a reflection of the economic ben- picked up the story and ran with it. The
efits (for powerful Council members) of the Secretary-General lobbied frantically for
continuation of conflict, as seen in the damn- stronger assistance, and, after considerable
ing report on the involvement of numerous delay, France agreed to lead a small stopgap
Western multinationals in the exploitation of peace enforcement force in Bunia until UN
natural resources.33 Politically, there are other reinforcements could arrive. Although it is the
issues involved, such as the mutual back- first time in seven years that the Council has
scratching by the US and Uganda on the issue authorised a peace enforcement mission in
of terrorism (with US training for Uganda’s Africa (ironically the most recent was a force
armed forces and Ugandan support for US for Eastern Zaire that never deployed),37 there
military operations). Allegations of covert would appear to be little hope for a solution
involvement in the hostilities,37 and the block- that can be derived from such a move.
ing of peacekeeping reinforcements also serve The tiny force, with a mandate that did not
to support such theories.35 go beyond contributing to the security of the
town and its airport, was incapable of control-
ling the whole town, let alone the broader
Bunia 2003: A glimmer of hope?
conflict zone of Ituri or the Kivus. Further-
At the beginning of 2003, after four and a half more, it was to be replaced by an expanded
years of conflict, the death toll was standing at blue-helmet peacekeeping force in just three
over 3.3 million people (making it the world’s months. Such a small and momentary deploy-
deadliest recorded conflict since World War ment could well be interpreted as being
II). Yet, the Council had neither attempted, another display of the ‘do something’ syn-
nor achieved much of any substance, and the drome. As expected, media attention was
world at large still had very little idea that fleeting at best. The authority for ground
there was even a war going on at all. With lit- troops in Bunia was to be quietly handed back
tle political will for anything else, the Council to the peacekeepers, and while this bolstered
and the UN Secretary-General, taking advan- force may now be somewhat closer to being
tage of some very limited progress on the able to stabilise that particular town, the peace
Hawkins 53

and stability of the wider region has yet to be the most obvious mistakes of its recent histo-
adequately addressed. ry. Any deployment would have been much
Still, it would appear that the involvement more appropriate in the form of peace
in this tiny town in the DRC has served at enforcement with a strong force structure,
least to jump-start, or give some momentum probably following the curtain of troops idea,
to a number of other developments. For and/or in a number of strategic cities and
example, the interest of the International towns. If we maintain a healthy dose of real-
Criminal Court in war crimes in the DRC was ism and acknowledge the almost non-existent
largely inspired by the attention given to political will among powerful Council mem-
Bunia. Moreover, the Council agreed for the bers to send in an effective number of troops,
first time to ban the supply, sale or transfer of however, there still remains the equally impor-
arms to parties to the conflict. In the same res- tant issue of measures short of troop deploy-
olution, it authorised the increase in military ment. Measures such as targeted sanctions,
strength of MONUC to 10,800, and autho- legal proceedings against war criminals (or
rised MONUC “to contribute to the im- measures that would at least give war crimi-
provement of the security conditions in which nals some cause to be concerned and refrain
humanitarian assistance is provided”.38 How from future crimes), and sustained pressure on
effective these measures will be in nurturing the parties to the conflict (and their backers)
sustained political interest among Council by the Council, were never properly explored.
members, facilitating an end to the conflict Bunia appears to have provided a window
and contributing to a political solution, how- of opportunity for the Council to acknowl-
ever, remains to be seen. edge its mistakes, attempt to correct them,
and finally become seriously involved in the
resolution of the conflict. Unlike similar situ-
Conclusion
ations in Somalia and Bosnia, however, the
In terms of armed conflict, the DRC can be conflict in the DRC is still hopelessly far from
considered as one of the greatest tragedies the spotlight of international concern, and
since World War II. This is not only because hence, the willingness to act by the Council
of the death toll, but also because its victims and its powerful members may well rapidly
have suffered and died in an almost complete lose its momentum. Thus the question
silence, made possible by apathetic policy remains, how much did the Council learn
makers, media corporations, and academics from its close call in Bunia? Are its latest
outside the region. This has provided the measures merely slightly more elaborate
cover behind which the UN Security Council examples of the ‘do something’ syndrome?
has hidden for the past five years. The Peace enforcement mandates have been given
Council has not necessarily been silent: it has once again to lightly armed (albeit larger num-
made numerous demands, adopted numerous bers of) peacekeepers. Compliance with, and
resolutions, and taken a number of steps, the effectiveness of, the prohibition of the
including the authorisation of a peace-keeping supply of arms to the parties to the conflict
and peace enforcement force. But the deploy- can be considered questionable. Steps to con-
ment of forces has been largely ineffective and trol the exploitation of natural resources have
inappropriate, and its demands have been yet to be taken.
almost invariably ignored, to which it has gen- The UN Security Council is a political
erally responded by repeating the same body, and political will is not something that
demands, without attaching consequences to will develop and grow in a vacuum. Bunia has
the failure to comply. provided some momentum to the peace
In choosing the use of peacekeeping in process, but Council interest can only be
response to ongoing conflict (the cheap maintained with the attention, support and
option that would not directly involve pressure of policy makers, the media, civil
Western troops) and through dangerous mis- society and academia. The DRC appears to be
sion creep, the Council was repeating some of edging towards something that resembles a
54 African Security Review 12(4) • 2003

political settlement. The time for the Council self protection), but the mandate is adopted under
and the international community as a whole Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The level of eight
and a half is used to reflect the odd and somewhat
to collectively make amends and begin serious half-hearted nature of this response.
and sustained engagement is ripe. With a 13. For more detailed discussion on the difficulties
death toll that may well be approaching four and delays of peacekeeping in the DRC, see Jakkie
million, it is an opportunity that must not be Cilliers and Mark Malan, Peacekeeping in the DRC,
missed. MONUC and the Road to Peace, ISS Monograph
No. 66, October 2001.
14. Donald M. Snow uses this term to refer to inap-
propriate or ineffective responses to conflict situ-
Notes ations used to project the image (usually in
1. Virgil Hawkins, ‘Measuring UN Security Council response to pressure to act) of being seriously
action and inaction in the 1990s: Lessons for involved in conflict resolution, when little intent
Africa?’, African Security Review, 12 (2), 2003, pp exists. See Donald M. Snow Distant Thunder:
61–71. Patterns of Conflict in the Developing World (second
2. All measures at level 6 to 10 are those adopted edition), Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997, p. 193.
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 15. Timothy Crawford Wallace, ‘Why Minimum
3. Not to be confused with peacekeeping, this refers Force Won’t Work: Doctrine and Deterrence in
to the authorisation to use force to ensure compli- Bosnia and Beyond’, Global Governance, Vol. 4,
ance with a peace agreement, Council resolutions No. 2, April–June 1998, p. 239.
or other measures above and beyond self-defence. 16. E-mail interview with member of the UN
4. The spike at the beginning of 2000 (level 8.5) rep- Secretariat, Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
resents the authorisation of MONUC. As the tions, November 2001.
level of force authorised essentially did not change 17. Developing countries (with higher casualty toler-
until July 2003, other extensions, expansions and ances) go along with this division of labour
adjustments are treated here simply as resolutions, because of the level of reimbursement for partici-
rather than the authorisation of a new force. The pation and the opportunity for experience and
first and second spikes in mid-2003 (level 9) repre- training for their troops.
sent the authorisation of the French-led multina- 18. ‘UN-bashing’ was an effective component of the
tional force, and the adjustment of MONUC’s then US President Clinton’s successful re-election
mandate, respectively. See endnote 38. campaign.
5. Nor was the conflict unprecedented. Were it not 19. See, for example, Mark Malan, ‘The UN ‘Month
for Angola choosing to join the government the of Africa’: A Push for Actual Peace Efforts or a Fig
second time around (as opposed to the rebels), Leaf on the DRC?’, Institute for Security Studies
one could almost be forgiven for confusing the Occasional Paper, No. 44, 2000.
two world wars that occurred within a span of just 20. Angola is one example where targeted sanctions
two years in Zaire/DRC. appear to have had some effect in curbing the
6. See S/PRST/1998/26. actions of the rebel armed forces (although the
7. UN Security Council Resolution 1234 (1999). evidence is inconclusive).
8. UN Security Council Resolution 1258 (1999). 21. UN Security Council Resolution 1234 (1999).
9. UN Security Council Resolution 1279 (1999). 22. This does not include calls for withdrawal in pres-
10. The International Rescue Committee estimated idential statements or statements to the press.
that there had been 1.7 million conflict-related 23. UN Security Council Resolution 1234 (1999).
deaths in the DRC between August 1998 and May 24. UN Security Council Resolution 1291 (2000).
2000. See International Rescue Committee, 25. UN Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003). It is
Mortality in Eastern DRC: Results from Five unclear how serious the Council is about enforc-
Mortality Surveys, May 2000, <www.theirc.org>. ing this embargo – it did not set up a sanctions
11. The Secretary General did not envision a role committee as it usually does when applying sanc-
beyond that of the observers already authorised. It tions, stating instead that it will consider the pos-
was simply a matter of fact that the security condi- sible establishment of a monitoring mechanism.
tions on the ground necessitated an armed force 26. UN Security Council Resolution 1332 (2000).
even for the purposes of observation. See UN 27. UN Security Council document S/2001/357.
Security Council, Sixth Report of the Secretary-General 28. UN Security Council Resolution 1355 (2001).
on the United Nations Mission in the Democratic 29. See UN Security Council document S/2002/
Republic of Congo, S/1999/790, paragraph 67. 1146, and Resolution 1457 (2003).
12. Grey area peacekeeping refers to an operation 30. UN Security Council Resolution 1234 (1999).
occupying the area between peacekeeping and 31. See, for example, UN Security Council Resolu-
peace enforcement – lightly armed ‘peacekeepers’ tions 1304 (2000), 1332 (2000), 1341 (2001) and
are deployed in an area of ongoing conflict with a 1355 (2001).
mandate similar to that of traditional peacekeep- 32. UN Security Council Resolution 1417 (2002).
ing forces (primarily allowing the use of force for 33. See UN Security Council document S/2002/1146.
 Hawkins 55

34. See Wayne Madsen, ‘America’s Covert Opera- 36. UN Security Council Resolution 1445 (2002).
tions in the Great Lakes’, Testimony before the 37. The Council did deploy grey area peacekeeping
Subcommittee on International Operations and missions in the Central African Republic and
Human Rights and Human Rights and Com- Sierra Leone during this time.
mittee on International Relations, United States 38. UN Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003).
House of Representatives, Washington D.C., 17 Under this resolution, the addition of this ele-
May 2001, <www2.minorisa.es/inshuti/madsen2>, ment indicates the crossing of the fine line from
and John Kamau, ‘Is the Congo facing a second grey area peacekeeping into peace enforcement.
betrayal?’, The Nation, 6 June 2003. Until that time, MONUC had been authorised
35. See Francois Grignon, ‘There will be no excuses only to protect itself and civilians under immi-
for not knowing’, Observer, 25 May 2003. nent threat of danger.

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