mpyo-article-p137_6

chapter 5
unscr 1325 and Maritime Security

Advancing Women’s Empowerment at Sea
Marianthi Pappa
Abstract
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325/2000 on Women, Peace and Security
(‘unscr 1325’) has been hailed by States, scholars, and organisations concerned with
gender equality. It was a major step towards the recognition of the nexus between gen-
der, violence, and security and a beacon of women’s empowerment. Notwithstanding,
it is not without contextual limitations. The security sector is faced with challenges
that are not covered by the Resolution. These include non-war situations, such as secu-
rity crises at sea. The rise of threats at sea (such as piracy, maritime terrorism, and
irregular migration) has caused a rapid evolution of maritime security strategies. Still,
important aspects are missing therefrom. Such is the treatment of gender – and more
specifically, women. Despite their increasing presence in the maritime domain, women
are not explicitly mentioned in the maritime affairs agenda. An analysis of some of the
world’s most progressive maritime security frameworks (national, regional, and organ-
isational) demonstrates that these are primarily concerned with state (rather than
human) security and pay little or no attention to gender aspects. What is more, the
international laws (the law of the sea, safety and security laws, human rights instru-
ments, and humanitarian law conventions) that might fill this gap take a fragmented
and ineffective approach towards women’s interests in the maritime domain. The
gender blindness of the maritime sector may ultimately lead to bias against women,
threatening gender equality. This article argues that unscr 1325 should be extended to
maritime security contexts in order to advance women’s empowerment at sea.
Keywords
Women – women’s empowerment – gender equality – gender blindness – maritime

security – unscr 1325
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138 Pappa
1 Introduction
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (unscr 1325, or Resolution)

is dedicated to women, peace, and security.1 Its dual scope is to protect women
during conflict and to increase women’s participation in peace processes.
Through eighteen points, it calls for the prosecution of crimes against women
and the increased representation of women at all decision-making levels of
conflict resolution. It also outlines the actions which the Security Council, the
Secretary General, UN departments, and Member States should take in order
to ‘mainstream gender’2 into the peace and security agenda. The Resolution
was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 31 October 2000.
unscr 1325 has been a landmark for women’s empowerment and gender
equality. Before its adoption, women’s experience was largely disregarded by
security policies.3 The issue of women in relation to conflict and peace was
debated intensely at the Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi in
1985.4 Following that, the Resolution was the definitive step towards the devel-
opment of the women, peace, and security agenda.5 This was the first time
that the Security Council had reflected on women in conflict and post-con-
flict situations, stressing the nexus between gender, violence, and security.6
In its preamble, the Resolution reaffirms ‘the important role of women in the
1 s/r es/1325, adopted on 31 October 2000.

2 ‘Gender mainstreaming’ was formulated in the Beijing Platform and Declaration for Action.
The term was defined by the Economic and Social Council (agreed conclusions 1997/2)
as: ‘the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action,
including legislation, policies or programs, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for
making the concerns and experiences of women as well as of men an integral part of the
design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political,
economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not
perpetuated. The ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality.’ See C. Cohn
et al, ‘Women, Peace and Security Resolution 1325’ (2004) 6 (1) International Feminist Journal
of Politics 130, at 134; see also A. Barrow, ‘It’s Like a Rubber Band: Assessing UNSCR 1325 as a
Gender Mainstreaming Process’ (2009) 5 (1) International Journal of Law in Context 51.
3 Barrow, ‘It’s Like a Rubber Band’, at 51.
4 C. Cockburn, From Where We Stand: War, Women’s Activism and Feminist Analysis (Zed Books
2007), at 139.
5 The Women, Peace and Security Agenda consists of ten resolutions: 1325 (2000); 1820 (2009);
1888 (2009); 1889 (2010); 1960 (2011); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013); 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), and
2493 (2019). This paper is focused on unscr 1325.
6 ‘Previous UN resolutions had treated women as victims of war, in need of protection.
However, 1325 also recognized women as agents in building peace and guaranteeing secu-
rity.’ N. Pratt and S. Richter-Devroe, ‘Critically Examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and
Security’ (2011) 13 (4) International Feminist Journal of Politics 489, at 490.
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of the CC BY 4.0 license.
UNSCR 1325 and Maritime Security 139
prevention and resolution of conflicts and peace-keeping’ and the ‘importance

of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the mainte-
nance and promotion of peace and security.’ It also expands the meaning of
security in order to include sexual abuse and other forms of violence against
women and girls.7 This is why the Resolution has been hailed by States, schol-
ars, and non-governmental organisations concerned with gender equality.8
Despite its significance, unscr 1325 has been criticised on various grounds.
One subject of debate is the Resolution’s legal status. Those who argue that
unscr 1325 is binding rely on Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations
(UN Charter) and the Resolution’s unanimous adoption.9 However, this
assertion does not stand up to scrutiny. There was no ‘decision’ taken in the
Resolution, as the application of Art. 25 UN Charter would require. Also, the
Resolution does not address a specific threat to peace which would render it
binding under Ch. vii (Art. 39) UN Charter. Instead, resolutions made under
Ch. vi (including thematic resolutions, such as unscr 1325) are non-coercive.10
The Resolution’s language (‘urges’, ‘encourages’, ‘invites’) seems to affirm this.11
Of course, this does not mean that the Resolution has no persuasive character
or that it is merely cosmetic. Non-coercive resolutions still ‘carry a normative
imperative that is intended to influence behaviour’ at the national and inter-
national levels.12 unscr 1325 has also attracted criticism for its efficacy. On the
face of it, the Resolution appears to be an influential tool for the promotion of
gender empowerment. In practice, however, it has not achieved satisfactory
advancement of the gender mainstream.13 In addition, the Resolution’s pace of
implementation has been quite slow.14 At the local level, unscr 1325 is often
7 Arts. 10–11.
8 E. Rehn and E. Sirleaf, Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the
Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peacebuilding (United Nations
Development Fund for Women 2002); R. Santos et al, ‘Missed Connections: Representations
of Gender (Armed) Violence and Security in Resolution 1325’ (2013) 5 (3) rccs Annual
Review, at 3–4; C. Cohn, ‘Feminist Peacemaking: In Resolution 1325, the United Nations
Requires the Inclusion of Women in all Peace Planning and Negotiation’ (2004) 21 (5) The
Women’s Review of Books, at 8–9.
9 T. Tryggestad, ‘Trick or Treat? The UN and Implementation of Security Council Resolution
1325 on Women, Peace and Security’ (2009) 15 (4) Global Governance 539, at 544.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Barrow, ‘It’s Like a Rubber Band’, at 51–68; Pratt and Devroe, ‘Critically Examining UNSCR
1325’, at 496; N. George and L. Shepherd, ‘Women, Peace and Security: Exploring the
Implementation and Integration of UNSCR 1325’ (2016) 37 (3) International Political
Science Review, at 297–304.
14 Tryggestad, ‘Trick or Treat?’, at 549.

140 Pappa
perceived as another extraneous (‘top-down’) instrument or as a product of

women’s organisations.15 Finally, in terms of scope and content, the Resolution
only refers to situations related to war, without considering broader (non-war)
contexts in which violence may arise.16 This demonstrates that future improve-
ments may enhance the Resolution’s efficacy.
This article seeks to advance the conversation on improving the Resolution
by referring to women in maritime security –a context which is not explic-
itly covered by the Resolution. In doing so, the study will follow a two-step
approach. First, it will expose the gender blindness of current maritime secu-
rity frameworks and the inefficacy of international laws to secure women’s
interests in maritime crises. Then, it will outline the ways in which unscr 1325
could extend to maritime security, advancing women’s empowerment at sea.
2 Maritime Security and Women
2.1 The Rise of the Maritime Security Agenda

Maritime security is a relatively new area of international security. It emerged
in the 1990s but has grown significantly during the past two decades following
the rise of new maritime crimes (such as maritime terrorism) and the advance
of the ‘blue economy’, which is concerned with resource management and pro-
tection against disasters.17
Still, the exact meaning of maritime security is far from definite.18 Absent
a fixed definition, maritime security is often described in literature as the
area of national and international strategy which is concerned with threats
at sea against States, humans, economic development, and the marine envi-
ronment.19 More accurately, the term describes freedom from those threats.20
15 Barrow, ‘It’s Like a Rubber Band’, at 60–65.

16 Santos et al., ‘Missed Connections’, at 3–26.
17 C. Bueger and T. Edmunds, ‘Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security
Studies’ (2017) 93 (6) International Affairs, at 1293.
18 ‘Maritime security is a buzzword. It has no definite meaning. It achieves its meaning by
actors relating the concept to others (…)’. C. Bueger, ‘What is Maritime Security?’ (2015) 53
Marine Policy, at 163.
19 R. Barnes and M. Rosello, ‘Fisheries and Maritime Security: Understanding and Enhancing
the Connection’, in M. Evans and S. Galani (eds.), Maritime Security and Law of the
Sea: Help or Hindrance? (Edward Elgar 2020), at 48. Bueger, ‘What is Maritime Security?’,
at 161.
20 Barnes and Rosello ‘Fisheries and Maritime Security’, at 48.

Maritime security is one of the most dynamic areas of law and policy. The
sea has always been associated with physical dangers, political tension, and
insecurity.21 It is a place of inter-State disputes and warfare; it also hosts crimes
similar to those on land.22 Consequently, ‘good order at sea’ has been the sub-
ject of local policy and global governance for a long time.23 During recent years,
however, maritime security has climbed to the top of the security agenda. The
rise of new threats related to the sea (such as transnational organized crime)
and the marine environment (such as environmental crimes or the illegal
exploitation of marine resources) has caused a rapid evolution of maritime
security frameworks.24 States (whether individually or as groups, such as the
European Union (EU) and the African Union) as well as organisations (such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato)) have developed sophisticated
and often interconnected strategies to prevent or address situations of mari-
time security.25
Despite the expansion of the meaning and scope of maritime security,
important aspects are missing from the current legal and political frameworks.
For example, land and maritime crimes are not only similar but often rein-
force each other.26 However, maritime security seems to pay little attention
to this interconnection. Likewise, human security is an important pillar of
the maritime security agenda, protecting the livelihoods of coastal popula-
tions.27 Significant attention is paid to issues of food security, shelter, and safe
21 Bueger and Edmunds, ‘Beyond Seablindness’, at 1295.

22 See P. Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge University Press 2001).
23 ‘Doctrines and practices of global maritime security (have existed) since c. 1450’: S.E.
Amirell, ‘Global Maritime Security Studies: The Rise of a Geopolitical Area of Policy and
Research’ (2013) 29 Security Journal, at 276. See also J.I. Bekkevold and G. Till, ‘International
Order at Sea: What It Is. How it is Challenged. How It Is Maintained’, in J.I. Bekkevold and
G. Till (eds.), International Order (Palgrave Macmillan 2016), at 7.
24 Bueger and Edmunds, ‘Beyond Seablindness’, at 1296. See also B. Buzan, O. Waever and
J. Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner 1998).
25 See US National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005); UK National Strategy for Maritime
Security (2014); Spanish National Maritime Security Strategy (2013); EU Maritime Security
Strategy (2014); nato, Alliance Maritime Security Strategy (2011); G7 Declaration of
Maritime Security (2015); African Union’s 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy
(2012); African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development (2016).
26 Bueger and Edmunds, ‘Beyond Seablindness’, at 1311. As Ioannis Chapsos put it, ‘[a]‌ll mar-
itime security challenges are born, developed, sustained and nurtured on land.’ Oxford
Research Group, ‘Maritime Security: An Interview with Ioannis Chapsos’ (14 August
2019) https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/maritime-security-an-interview-
with-ioannis-chapsos accessed 6 January 2021.

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employment.28 However, gender issues seem to be overlooked by the existing

strategies.
2.2 Women in the Maritime Domain

Traditionally, the maritime sector (including trade, shipping, and other off-
shore operations) has been male dominated. The main reason is its harshness.
The sea is a challenging environment and its workers are exposed to ‘adverse
physical, psychological and social conditions’.29 However, the rise of technol-
ogy has improved working conditions at sea. Also, national and international
initiatives promote equal opportunities for men and women in maritime
careers.30 This has increased the presence of women in maritime professions.
Women now work on merchant, naval, and scientific research vessels and
petroleum exploration platforms.
Despite this progress, women remain a minority in the maritime sector.
According to the International Maritime Organization (imo) ‘today, women
represent only two percent of the world’s 1.2 million seafarers.’31 What is worse,
female seafarers face discrimination and other gender-based challenges. The
majority of women are involved in leisure-related activities (e.g. as attendants
or members of crews of passenger and cruise ships) and only a few hold lead-
ership posts (e.g. as officers or ship masters).32 Also, female seafarers are often
victims of harassment in the workplace.33 Complaints are rarely filed or offi-
cially examined, which only perpetuates the gender imbalance in the mari-
time industry.34
The situation is not much different in the maritime law enforcement sector.
The majority of coast guard officers are male. The few women who manage to
enter this ‘masculine’ sector are often victims of tokenism, discrimination, and
the lack of inclusive facilities (e.g. women’s washrooms at ports or on vessels),
28 Bueger ‘What is Maritime Security?’, at 161.

29 I. Stribis, ‘The 2006 Maritime Labour Convention: A Cautious Step towards Gender
Awareness?’, in I. Papanicolopulu (ed.), Gender and the Law of the Sea (Brill 2019), at 279.
30 See I. Papanicolopulu, ‘Introduction: Gender and the Law of the Sea -Oceans Apart?’, in
I. Papanicolopulu (ed.), Gender and the Law of the Sea, at 1–6.
31 Source: https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/TechnicalCooperation/Pages/WomenInMarit
ime.aspx accessed 06 January 2021.
32 Stribis, ‘The 2006 Maritime Labour Convention’, at 284.
33 Ibid., at 285.
34 Stribis, ‘The 2006 Maritime Labour Convention’, at 285; A. MacNeil and S. Gosh, ‘Gender
Imbalance in the Maritime Industry: Impediments, Initiatives and Recommendations’
(2017) 9 Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs, at 42–55.

or may never climb higher in the hierarchy.35 This adds challenges for women
in maritime security. It also has an impact on operations: for example, when
searching for or rescuing a vessel, officers may encounter women and children.
The presence of female officers is essential, as the searching of women and
girls by men may be inappropriate or unlawful.36
Another context of maritime security which involves women is irregular
migration. International migration is one of the most important and develop-
ing global issues.37 The rise of conflict and the economic crises of the past years
have forced millions of people to seek refuge in other places. Many of those
have followed sea routes, such as the Mediterranean, the English Channel, and
the Caribbean. Half (or sometimes more) of the world’s migrants are women.38
They flee their countries to escape conflict, poverty, gender-based abuse, or
climate-change disasters. Migration poses significant challenges to women.
At all stages of their journey, women face discrimination, violence, or other
forms of exploitation.39 They are often forced to provide transactional sex
in exchange for travel documents or their sea journey.40 In worse situations,
they are thrown overboard by their traffickers before they reach land.41 This
increased vulnerability affects women’s human rights, well-being, and safety. It
ultimately poses threats to human security.
Women are also involved in cases of organized and transnational maritime
crime. These include human trafficking, slavery, smuggling of drugs or goods
35 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Gender at the Core of the 7th Maritime
Law Enforcement Dialogue in Southeast Asia’ https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/gen
der/news/gender-at-the-core-of-the-7th-maritime-law-enforcement-dialogue-mled-in-
southeast-asia.html accessed 06 January 2021.
36 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘UNODC Empowers Female Officers in
Maritime Law Enforcement Across Eastern Africa’ <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
frontpage/2020/December/unodc-empowers-female-officers-in-maritime-law-enforcem
ent-across-eastern-africa.html accessed 06 January 2021>.
37 F. Mussi, ‘Migration at Sea: Some Gender-Related Remarks on the United Nations
Protocols on Smuggling and Trafficking’, in Papanicolopulu (ed.), Gender and the Law of
the Sea, at 260.
38 UN Women, How Migration is A Gender Equality Issue https://www.unwomen.org/en/digi
tal-library/multimedia/2020/12/explainer-migration-is-gender-equality-issue accessed 6
January 2021. ‘In 2017, two-thirds of Syrian, Iraqi, and Afghan nationals arriving via sea or
land in Greece were women’: Papanicolopulu, Gender and the Law of the Sea, at 9.
39 ‘The vast majority of victims –some 71% –are women and girls, and one third overall are
children.’ Mussi, ‘Migration at Sea’, at 261.
40 G. Goettsche- Wanli, ‘Gender and the Law of the Sea: A Global Perspective’, in
Papanicolopulu (ed.), Gender and the Law of the Sea, at 36.
41 K. Genevieve-Lynes, ‘Drowned at Sea: What Haunts the Stories of Trafficked Women?’
(2018) 18 (6) Feminist Media Studies, at 1126–1129.

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(e.g. counterfeit or stolen goods), and trading of exotic animals. In contrast to

national crime, transnational crime extends among numerous jurisdictions,
which makes its prevention and control more difficult. Organized and trans-
national crime occurs in both developed and developing countries. It is highly
profitable and is facilitated by corruption and bribery. Quite often, organized
transnational crime is linked with conflicts and financial crises on land as well
as migration.42 Many migrants and refugees are victims of smugglers or traf-
fickers who take advantage of their need to escape from poverty or war. The
most vulnerable of those (such as women and children) are often abused and
exploited even upon arrival in another country.43
Another criminal activity is illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing
(iuuf), which takes place in many parts of the world. Women and young
children are subject to forced or unpaid labour on fishing vessels or markets.
What is more, iuuf is often associated with human trafficking. Many women
and girls who are forced to work in fishing are also victims of sexual abuse
and exploitation.44 This constitutes a modern-day case of slavery, threatening
human security.45 On some occasions, women are forced to engage in sexual
activities with fishers in exchange for fish which they later sell in order to sup-
port their families (a situation known as ‘fish-for-sex’).46
Women are also involved in piracy and acts of maritime terrorism. This area
has not yet received much academic or legal attention. However, women are
not only victims of these acts but are also perpetrators thereof.47 On some
occasions, women engage in unlawful acts by exercising violence against other
42 V. Becker-Weinberg, ‘Human Trafficking & IUUF: Legal and Gender Implications’, in

Papanicolopulu (ed.), Gender and the Law of the Sea, at 235; P. Mallia, Migrant Smuggling
by Sea: Combating a Current Threat to Maritime Security through the Creation of a
Cooperative Framework (Martinus Nijhoff 2020), at 11.
43 Becker-Weinberg, ‘Human Trafficking & IUUF’, at 235.
44 Ibid., at 229–259. See also V. Becker-Weinberg, ‘The Protection of Women in Illegal,
Unregulated, and Unreported Fishing’ (2019) 18 (4) wmu Journal of Maritime Affairs, at
531–535.
45 For an analysis of slavery in the fishing and seafood industry, see Z. Mutaqin, ‘Modern-day
Slavery at Sea: Human Trafficking in the Thai Fishing Industry’ (2018) 11(1) Journal of East
Asia and International Law, at 75–97.
46 Becker-Weinberg, ‘Human Trafficking & IUUF’, at 230.
47 See J. Tucker, ‘She would rather Perish: Piracy and Gendered Violence in the
Mediterranean’ (2014) Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, at 8–39; J. Appleby, Women
and English Piracy: 1540–1720 (Boydell Press 2013); B. Gilmer, ‘Invisible Pirates: Women
and the Gendered Roles of Somali Piracy’ (2019) 14 (3) Feminist Criminology, at 371–388;
M. Rediker, ‘When Women Pirates Sailed the Seas’ (1993) 17 (4) The Wilson Quarterly, at
102–110.

women or children on vessels. On others, they support those activities from

land as relationship facilitators, resource dealers, care workers, and financial
investors.48
Overall, women are increasingly involved in the maritime domain and in sit-
uations which affect their safety, well-being, and rights (human security). This
raises concerns about gender in maritime affairs: what is the place of gender
in the maritime security agenda? To what extent, if at all, is women’s experi-
ence considered in the policy-making processes? To address these questions,
this study will examine some of the current maritime security frameworks of
States and organisations, as well as the rules of international law (the law of
the sea, security and safety laws, human rights instruments, and humanitarian
law conventions) which apply in maritime security contexts.
3 The Gender Blindness of Maritime Security Frameworks
3.1 State Policies and Action Plans

An analysis of the maritime security policies and action plans of all States
and organizations across the world is beyond the limits of the present study.
Instead, the article will examine some of the world’s latest and most devel-
oped maritime security frameworks. These are the United States’ National
Strategy for Maritime Security (2005); the United Kingdom’s National Strategy
for Maritime Security (2014); the French National Strategy for the Security
of Maritime Areas (2015); the Spanish National Maritime Security Strategy
(2013); the EU’s Maritime Security Strategy (2014); the African Union’s 2050
Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2012) together with the African Charter
on Maritime Security, Safety and Development (2016); the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (asean) Regional Forum Work Plan for Maritime
Security 2018–2020; nato’s Alliance Maritime Security Strategy (2011); and the
Group of Seven (G7) Declaration of Maritime Security (2015). For a more com-
prehensive analysis, these will be classified into national frameworks, regional
frameworks, and organizational frameworks.
3.1.1 National Frameworks

The latest and most developed national maritime security frameworks come
from the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Spain.
48 Gilmer, ‘Invisible Pirates’, at 371–388.

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Each of these emphasises different aspects, but they all seek to secure the
State’s interests internally and externally.
The US National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005)49 largely draws on the
post-September 11 era. The 2001 terrorist attacks forced authorities to review and
strengthen their security strategies, including at sea. The new National Strategy
for Maritime Security ‘aligns all Federal maritime security programs and initia-
tives into a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate
Federal, State, local, and private sector entities.’50 It seeks (inter alia) to prevent
hostile acts at sea, protect maritime-related populations, safeguard the ocean
and its resources, promote international co-operation, and maximize domain
awareness. Particular attention is paid to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
and threats from non-State armed groups. The US framework refers to humans
involved in piracy; the smuggling of people, drugs, and weapons; armed robbery;
and illegal seaborne immigration. However, the gender dimension is absent. The
Strategy adopts gender-neutral language (‘humans’, ‘human life’, and ‘persons’)
with no explicit reference to women.
The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security (2014)51 draws on recent fac-
tors (such as globalisation, resource competition, population growth, and climate
change) which have changed the maritime domain and affect maritime security.
The framework is self-described as ‘ambitious’ but ‘pragmatic’.52 It emphasises
‘maritime surveillance, information gathering, and decision making, enhanced
by regional and multinational cooperation, and supported by ongoing scrutiny.’53
In doing so, the Strategy is committed to upholding the rules of international law
(particularly the law of the sea) for freedom of the seas and the peaceful settlement
of disputes. The maritime threats on which it focuses are terrorism, disruption of
trade, attacks on UK infrastructure (including cyber-attack), transportation of ille-
gal items, people smuggling, and human trafficking. Like the US one, the UK mari-
time security framework makes no reference to women.
The French National Strategy for the Security of Maritime Areas (2015)54
supplements that of the European Union adopted in 2014. It aims to secure the
49 Available at https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/homeland/maritime-security.
html accessed 26 January 2021.
50 Foreword.
51 Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-strategy-for-marit
ime-security accessed 26 January 2021.
52 Foreword.
53 Ibid.
54 Available at <https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/
2016/01/strategie_nationale_de_surete_des_espaces_maritimes_en_national_strategy_
for_the_security_of_maritime_areas.pdf> accessed 26 January 2021.

‘free, peaceful and controlled use of the seas’ against piracy, terrorism, cyber-
attacks, trafficking of all kinds, illegal fishing, and pollution.55 The framework
highlights the importance of maritime security for the country’s defence and
sovereignty.56 It promotes an integrated approach and advances international
co-operation. The strategy identifies the maritime security risks in different
regions. These include wars and terrorism in the Mediterranean; pollution,
drug trafficking, and the use of force in the Atlantic; inter-State rivalries, piracy,
illegal fishing, and trafficking of migrants in the Indian Ocean and East Asia;
natural disasters and the illegal exploitation of marine resources in the Pacific;
conflicting State sovereignty claims and the rise of military activities in the
Arctic; and the challenges associated with the access of scientific researchers
to the Antarctic. The framework does refer to the protection of humans. For
example, it acknowledges the risk where ‘traffickers deliberately put migrants
in a situation of distress’ and requires that ‘the rescue and assistance oper-
ations (for migrants) are carried out according to the fundamental rights of
persons.’57 However, no reference is made to women –who systematically face
this challenge.
The Spanish National Maritime Security Strategy (2013)58 is a revised ver-
sion of the 2011 strategy. It draws on the changing risks that threaten the
country’s maritime interests. These are classified into two categories: the first
comprises risks arising from ‘deliberate acts of a criminal nature’ (illicit traf-
ficking, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, seaborne
illegal immigration, unregulated exploitation of marine resources, intentional
harm to the marine environment, acts against the underwater cultural herit-
age, and cyber threats), and the second concerns ‘accidental or fortuitous risks
and threats which are explained by the behaviour and natural conditions of
the environment’ (maritime accidents or natural disasters, pollution, threats
to navigation, and human life).59 In addition to those categories, the Strategy
refers to factors which act as ‘risk multipliers’: poverty, inequality, ideological
extremism, demographic imbalances, climate change, and the harmful use
of new technologies.60 In response to these threats, the Strategy outlines five
55 Foreword.
56 ‘The guidance relies on the concept of the State action at sea (action de l’ État en mer –
aem) and the Coast Guard Function, the cornerstone of this strategy.’ Page 1.
57 Page 30.
58 Available at file:///C:/Users/MARIAN~1/AppData/Local/Temp/20131333estrategiadesegu-
ridadmartima_ingls-5.pdf accessed 26 January 2021.
59 Page 19.
60 Page 20.

148 Pappa
detailed lines of action, which promote co-operation and knowledge sharing

among different authorities; the adoption of effective and efficient measures;
fostering international co-operation; collaboration with the private sector; and
improvement of cyber security in the maritime domain.61 However, once again
the gender dimension is absent. Although the framework acknowledges that
seaborne migration and the smuggling of migrants may have ‘dramatic human
consequences’ to ‘minors and other vulnerable groups’, it does not specify
what these groups are and how women are affected by this threat.62 That is
particularly striking, considering that a more sensitive and inclusive approach
is adopted on land. In particular, the Spanish National Security Strategy of 2017
(which applies on land) makes explicit reference to equality in the context of
migration.63 Its lines of action include ‘combating discrimination’ and ensur-
ing ‘that the principle of equality is upheld, with a special focus on the most
vulnerable sectors of society.’64 Again, though, the framework does not provide
more detail about these groups and their needs.
3.1.2 Regional Frameworks

The most important regional maritime security developments are those of
the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (asean). Most of these frameworks are characterised
by their ‘breadth and ambition’.65 They aspire to deal with maritime security in
a holistic manner, covering as many threats as possible.
The EU Maritime Security Strategy (2014)66 covers both internal and exter-
nal aspects of the EU’s maritime security. It seeks to enhance co-operation
between different sectors, bodies, and authorities and Member States for the
security of navigation and transport, infrastructure, the environment, and nat-
ural resources.67 The framework covers the global maritime domain.68 The
maritime security risks that it identifies include threats or the use of force
61 Chapter 3.
62 Page 25. See also I. Lirola- Delgado, ‘Maritime Security Strategies from a Gender
Perspective: Implications for United Nations SDG 5 Implementation’ (2019) 18 wmu
Journal of Maritime Affairs 537, at 545.
63 Available at <https://www.dsn.gob.es/sites/dsn/files/2017_Spanish_National_Security_Str
ategy_0.pdf accessed 26 January 2021>.
64 Page 111.
66 Available at <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST%2011205%202
014%20INIT/EN/pdf accessed 26 January 2021>.
67 Page 3.
68 Page 4.

against Member States, threats to the security of European citizens, cross-bor-

der and organized crime, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, obstruction
of sea lanes, environmental risks, natural or man-made disasters, as well as
illegal and unregulated archaeological research and pillage of archaeological
objects.69 The Strategy’s language favours state-centrism and gender-blind-
ness. The framework mainly focuses on national security aspects. Even the
brief references to EU citizens are in relation to the Member States’ sovereign
rights and economic interests.70 Also, although the Strategy is based on the
EU’s founding values and respects international law, human rights, and dem-
ocratic values (which include gender equality), it makes no explicit reference
to women.71 The EU Maritime Security Strategy was followed by two action
plans (in 2014 and 2018). Yet these suffer from the same weakness of ‘bypassing’
the human aspect and gender experience.72 An interesting comparison can
be made with the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and
Security Policy (eugs), which applies on land.73 This Strategy undertakes to
‘mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institu-
tions.’74 It also adopts a comprehensive approach to conflicts, recognizing that
these have an impact on gender.75 This entails
promoting the role of women in peace efforts –from implementing the

unsc Resolution on Women, Peace and Security to improving the EU’s
internal gender balance.76
This demonstrates that the 2016 eugs is more gender-sensitive than the EU
Maritime Security Strategy.77 It remains unclear why this inclusiveness does
not extend to the maritime security framework.
The African Union’s 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2012)78 can
be discussed together with the African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety
69 Page 8.
70 Page 7.
71 Page 3. See also Lirola-Delgado, ‘Maritime Security Strategies’, at 544.
72 Lirola-Delgado, ‘Maritime Security Strategies’, at 547.
73 Available at <https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.
pdf> accessed 26 January 2021.
74 Page 11.
75 Page 28.
76 Page 31.
78 Available at <https://cggrps.com/wp-content/uploads/2050-AIM-Strategy_EN.pdf>
accessed 26 January 2021.

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and Development (2016).79 Both seek to establish a comprehensive and coher-

ent strategy in order to address the common maritime security challenges and
opportunities for the Union’s Member States.80 The maritime security threats
which they identify include transnational organized crime, iuuf and overfish-
ing, natural disasters and environmental risks, risks to strategic communica-
tion systems, a vulnerable legal framework, and navigation risks.81 The AU’s
maritime security framework presents some differences from the frameworks
of other unions or States. For instance, particular attention is paid to the blue
economy and the ecological dimensions of maritime security.82 Also, the AU’s
Strategy appears to be more human-centric than other (national or regional)
frameworks. It aims to ensure the well-being of African people by developing
a secure maritime domain and a thriving maritime economy.83 Reference is
made to gender equality. The 2050 Strategy affirms
the need to have an integrated human resources strategy for the maritime
sector to support the provision of skills taking into account gender balance
in the entire maritime value chain which includes shipping and logistics,
offshore activities, fishing, tourism and recreation, and safety and security.84
The AU also engages in ‘assist[ing] Member States with the development and
implementation of sound migration policies aimed at addressing trafficking
in human beings, especially women and children.’85 This is definitely a step
towards battling gender blindness and promoting women’s empowerment in
the maritime security sector. However, it looks more like a political declaration
or promise. Instead of offering the means to advance gender equality at sea,
the AU’s framework provides that these will be developed by Member States.
That is particularly challenging, as it requires individual action plans from
States and co-ordination among them.
The asean Regional Forum Work Plan for Maritime Security 2018–202086 is
the latest maritime security framework in the Southeast Asian region, following
79 Available at <https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-maritime-security-and-safety-
and-development-africa-lome-charter> accessed 26 January 2021.
80 2050 Strategy, at 7 and 9.
81 2050 Strategy, at 11; Arts. 3 and 4 African Charter.
82 2050 Strategy, at 9; Ch. v African Charter.
83 2050 Strategy, at 10.
84 2050 Strategy, at 20; Art. 22 African Charter.
85 2050 Strategy, at 26; Art. 16 African Charter.
86 Available at <https://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ARF-
Maritime-Security-Work-Plan-2018-2020.pdf> accessed 26 January 2021.

two previous plans of 2011 and 2015. The purpose of this guiding plan is to cre-
ate a ‘practical, long-term, coordinated and comprehensive’ maritime security
framework for the asean Member States.87 It seeks to strengthen inter-State
relationships, promote information sharing and the compilation of shared
experiences and lessons to be learned, encourage best practices, and enhance
capacity-building efforts.88 The main themes (or maritime security threats) on
which the plan focuses are maritime security and co-operation, safety of navi-
gation, and the marine environment and sustainable development.89 Although
not as comprehensive as other regional frameworks (e.g. those of the EU and
the AU), the asean plan identifies both traditional maritime security issues
(such as military threats and State sovereignty concerns) and non-traditional
challenges (such as piracy and armed robbery against ships, people smuggling,
terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing, illicit drugs and illicit
small arms trafficking, and human trafficking).90 It also refers to iuuf, natu-
ral disasters, climate change, and the protection of the marine environment.91
However, like most of the examined frameworks, the asean maritime security
plan makes no reference to gender equality or to women.
3.1.3 Organisational Frameworks

Maritime security frameworks are not only developed by States. Organizations
concerned with military or economic issues are also concerned with maritime
security issues. The most prominent examples are nato and the G7.
nato’s Alliance Maritime Strategy (2011)92 draws on the growing interde-
pendence between States, international organizations, and non-governmental
organizations, and the rise of new and complex threats from both State and
non-State actors.93 In response to this emerging context, the Strategy seeks
to contribute to collective defence, crisis management, co-operative security,
and the maritime security of its allies.94 The maritime security threats which
it identifies include terrorism, transport and deployment of weapons of mass
destruction, piracy, and the illegal trafficking of humans and narcotics.95
87 Asean Strategy, at 1.
88 Ibid., at 1–2.
89 Ibid., at 7.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Available at <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm> accessed 26
January 2021.
93 nato Strategy, Introduction.
94 Ibid.
95 nato Strategy, at para 6.

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Although the Strategy was welcomed at the time of its making, it is now quite
outdated as it does not reflect contemporary maritime security challenges,
such as climate change.96 Similarly, issues of gender equality and the place of
women in maritime security contexts are absent. On 25 November 2020, nato
published an experts’ commentary report on its organizational strategies.97
The report outlines the main trends that will shape nato’s vision between
now and 2030 and makes recommendations that will strengthen nato’s poli-
cies.98 With regard to maritime security, it stresses that nato should enhance
its collaboration with other regional organizations, such as the EU and the AU,
in order to establish a co-operative security network.99 It also recommends
that the 2011 Maritime Strategy be updated in order to address new maritime
security threats, such as climate change, irregular migration, and tensions in
the Arctic region.100 The report makes special reference to human security and
the role of women. Echoing unscr 1325, it recommends the incorporation
of the human element in nato’s future strategies and the promotion of ‘female
role models from countries where nato has made a positive contribution.’101
However, this concerns land, not maritime security contexts. While reference
is made to conflicts on land (such as Afghanistan), the report disregards the
challenges that women face at sea (e.g. in the contexts of irregular migration,
human trafficking, or iuuf).
The G7 Declaration of Maritime Security (2015)102 was jointly made by
the foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and the High Representative of the European
Union. It seeks to promote ‘a cooperative, rules-based cross-sector approach’
to counter national, regional, and global maritime security threats.103 The
threats it identifies include
acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, transnational organised crime

and terrorism in the maritime domain, contraband trade, trafficking
of human beings, smuggling of migrants, trafficking of weapons and
96 See S. Horrell et al, ‘Updating NATO’s Maritime Strategy’ (2016) Atlantic Council, at 1.
97 Available at <https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Ref
lection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf> accessed 26 January 2021.
98 nato Strategy, at 3.
99 Ibid., at 35.
100 Ibid., at 41.
101 Ibid., at 43.
102 Available at <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/150415-G7_maritime_safety.pdf> accessed
26 January 2021.
103 G7 Strategy, at 1.

narcotics, iuuf, trafficking in protected species of wild fauna and flora,

and other illegal maritime activities.104
Apart from national security, economic development, and the blue economy,
the Declaration pays heed to human security as well. It aims to advance the
‘security of seafarers and passengers’105 but without specifying the risks that
women face at sea. Also, while the Declaration repeats the signatories’ com-
mitment to international law, it mainly insists on the principle of the peaceful
settlement of disputes, with no explicit reference to other fundamental prin-
ciples, such as non-discrimination and gender equality.106 At best, these are
promoted indirectly, through the encouraging of
all States to ratify or accede to and implement the United Nations

Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols
on trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants and international
instruments protecting the human rights of all persons.107
Similarly, respect for human rights is promoted in the fight against piracy
and in the maritime employment sector.108 But while the G7 Declaration of
Maritime Security is far more human-centric than other frameworks, it is gen-
der blind. It simply refers to ‘humans’ or ‘persons’ instead of spelling out the
challenges that women face in the maritime domain and how gender equality
can be advanced in this male-dominated sector.
4 Synthesis
The examined frameworks of individual States, regional state unions, and

other organizations treat maritime security as a multifaceted aspect consisting
of different –yet interconnecting –issues. Each strategy bears its own features.
However, two common observations can be made.
First, maritime security frameworks tend to focus more on national than
human security. Most of the examined strategies stress the impact that mar-
itime security threats may have on States’ sovereignty, national stability,
104 Ibid., at 2.
105 Ibid., at 1.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid., at 4.
108 Ibid., at 5–6.

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economic prosperity, and defence. While humans are heavily involved in mari-
time security contexts (whether as victims or as perpetrators of unlawful acts),
they are not explicitly considered as relevant actors. Even the protection of
human life at sea is mainly perceived in relation to the national interest. Most
frameworks focus on the actions of governmental authorities and other organs
instead of the people to whom these are addressed.109
Second, despite the detailed and progressive content of the examined mar-
itime security frameworks, the gender dimension is almost completely absent.
On the few occasions where the human aspect is considered, the maritime
security sector prefers to be gender neutral. In order to eliminate discrimina-
tion, most frameworks only refer to ‘persons’, without acknowledging that the
same threats affect men and women differently. However, the ‘neutrality’ of
those strategies is in fact gender blindness. Despite their increasing presence
at sea, women remain a minority therein. This makes women vulnerable to
challenges and excludes them from decision-making processes. The failure to
recognise the different roles and the diverse needs of women at sea can create
bias against them, threatening gender equality.
The AU’s framework and the G7’s Declaration of Maritime Security can be
considered as exceptions –but they are not absolved of weaknesses, either.
The AU’s framework is human-centric and also promotes women’s empow-
erment. However, its main disadvantage is that it expects Member States to
take measures and create action plans in order to achieve these targets. This
creates practical difficulties for individual governments with regard to the
co-ordination and implementation of this goal. Hence, while on its face the
African framework looks promising, it may not be so efficient in practice.
The G7 Declaration is also human-centric but fails to stipulate the gender
inequality issues of the maritime domain. Therefore, it makes no significant
contribution to women’s empowerment.
4.1 International Law

Having examined some of the most comprehensive national, regional, and
organizational maritime security frameworks, this study will now discuss
the international laws that apply in ocean-related matters. These include the
conventions of the sea; the conventions on safety and security; human rights
instruments; and humanitarian law conventions.

4.1.1 Law of the Sea Conventions

Broadly speaking, the ocean is primarily regulated by the international law of
the sea. This is one of the oldest and most dynamic areas of international law.
It is concerned with the peaceful use of oceans and all issues related thereto.
Hence any conversation about the maritime domain (including maritime
security) should start from this area of law.110
For centuries, the international law of the sea was not a concrete body of
law but a cluster of scattered principles and State behaviours of a customary
nature.111 It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that the
international community codified those pre-existing norms into conventions
that would be applied by as many States as possible.112
The first set of the conventions of the sea were drafted by the International
Law Commission (ilc) in Geneva in 1958.113 These conventions sought to
address various aspects, the most important being the division of the ocean
into maritime zones and the rights and duties of States therein. More complex
legal issues, such as the presence of non-State actors (particularly individu-
als) in the ocean and the protection of their interests at sea, were completely
absent from those instruments.
The subsequent (and most comprehensive) development was the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) of 1982.114 To this day, it
is considered as ‘the constitution for the oceans’, regulating all issues which
relate to the sea. The new instrument was signed by almost every State, which
grants it a quasi-universal character.115 The majority of its provisions are now
110 See N. Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (oup 2010).
111 H. Caminos (ed.), Law of the Sea (Ashgate Publishing 2001), at 226–227; Y. Tanaka, The
International Law of the Sea (cup 2015), at 20–29.
112 Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of the Codification of International Law,
Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General, Doc a/c n.4/1/Rev.1, 10 February 1949,
at 8, 61.
113 Namely, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; the Convention
on the High Seas; the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas; and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. It must be noted, how-
ever, that a previous codification attempt was undertaken by the ilc at the 1930 Hague
Conference but this was eventually unsuccessful. The conflict of views with regard to
the delimitation of territorial waters expressed at this Conference made the conclusion
of a treaty impossible. S. Rosenne , League of Nations Conference for the Codification of
International Law (1930) Vol. 4 (Oceana Publications 1975), at 210.
114 Signed 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994.
115 To this day, 168 state entities have signed the unclos (including the European Union and
Palestine). By contrast, only 16 States are non-parties (including the United States, Turkey,
and Israel). Source: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_
ratifications.htm> accessed 20 March 2020.

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known to have a customary effect, which means that they bind all States –
including the Convention’s non-signatories.116
The unclos has literally transformed the law of the sea.117 It has success-
fully dealt with issues which had remained unaddressed by the previous con-
ventions (e.g. the maximum breadth of maritime zones, the delimitation of
overlapping maritime zones between States with opposite or adjacent coasts,
and the mechanisms which are available to States for the peaceful settlement
of their boundary disputes). Still, some important aspects are absent from this
current framework. Despite its volume and progressive context, the unclos
is heavily State-centric. With very few exceptions (danger at sea or dis-
tress,118 piracy on the high seas,119 and exploration of the deep seabed),120 the
Convention does not regulate the status of private actors. On most occasions,
persons are considered as attachments to ships or their flag states, bearing no
116 These include the provisions that establish the nature, the breadth, and the delimitation
of the territorial sea, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, and freedom
of the high seas. On the other hand, a customary character is lacking for the provisions
that regulate the exploration of the deep seabed (the Area) in Part xi of the unclos
and the mechanisms for the settlement of interstate disputes in Part xv of the unclos.
See H. Caminos and M. Molitor, ‘Progressive Development of International Law and the
Package Deal’ (1985) 79 American Journal of International Law 871, at 887; A. Roach,
‘Today’s Customary International Law of the Sea’ (2014) 45 Ocean Development and
International Law, at 239–259.
117 The contribution of the unclos to the international law of the sea is well-summarized
in the words of Dupuy and Vignes. For them, the unclos has managed to transform the
law of the sea from ‘a law of movement’ (which was originally concerned with maritime
transport and navigation) to ‘a law of emprise’ (which allowed States to take physical con-
trol of the ocean), from ‘a surface law’ (which concerned only State activities on the ocean
surface) to ‘a multidimensional law’ (covering the exploitation of the seabed), and from
‘a functional law’ (which paid little attention to the sovereignty of States) to a law where
‘sovereignty has been extended to match the extension of the new uses of the sea.’ R.J.
Dupuy and D. Vignes (eds.), A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea Vol. I (Martinus Nijhoff
1991), at 248.
118 Art. 98.
119 Art. 105, which provides that ‘[o]‌n the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdic-
tion of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken
by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property
on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the
penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the
ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.’
120 E,g. Arts. 137, 153, 168 (3), 187 (c), and 190, which refer to the right of physical or juridical
persons to request permission from an international body (the Authority) in order to con-
duct exploratory activities in the Area and their procedural capacity to appear before the
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (itlos) in order to settle any disputes which
may arise with the Authority in relation to these activities.

rights or duties of their own.121 That is at least striking, considering the long
and ever-increasing presence of humans at sea.
The contribution of the unclos to maritime security is also raising concerns.
It can be argued that while the Convention has the power to assist in the achieve-
ment of maritime security, it does little in practice.122 For instance, reference is
made to some maritime security aspects: piracy,123 the prohibition of transport of
slaves at sea,124 the duty of States to render assistance to those in danger or in dis-
tress,125 the suppression of drug trafficking,126 and the peaceful settlement of mar-
itime disputes.127 However, this is limited to a few descriptive or vague provisions,
and only to traditional threats of maritime security. Contemporary threats such
as maritime terrorism, iuuf, and environmental disasters are not covered by the
Convention. Also, the gender dimension is completely absent. The unclos adopts
the gender-neutral term ‘persons’, disregarding women who might be involved in
maritime security contexts.
The stance of the conventions of the sea towards maritime security and gender
can only be partly justified. Firstly, these conventions are not stricto sensu mari-
time security instruments. Yet this does not mean that broader maritime security
aspects (such as issues of human security) should be excluded from their realm.
Among others, these instruments regulate the utilization of the ocean by means
of navigation, fishing, and petroleum exploration. Throughout history, these
activities have been largely conducted by private actors. Hence, even if the con-
ventions were not designed to promote maritime security, they should at least
acknowledge the presence of humans at sea and the challenges that they face
therein. For example, the conventions could refer to the legal status of private
actors during the conduct of economic activities at sea, stipulating those actors’
rights and duties inter se and towards States.
Secondly, the conventions of the sea deal with matters which were critical at
the time of their making. These matters concern mainly the acts and interests
of States (coastal States, landlocked or geographically disadvantaged States,
121 For example, when a vessel with its crew is detained, the application for release can only
be made by or on behalf of the flag state. Art. 292 unclos.
122 For a discussion, see M. Evans and S. Galani (eds.), Maritime Security and the Law of
the Sea.
123 Arts. 100 ff.
124 Art. 99.
125 Art. 98.
126 Art. 108.
127 Arts.74 (1), 83 (1), 301, Part xv.

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fishing States, and archipelagic States) in the ocean.128 Although crucial, these
topics do not necessarily align with the issues that concern the international
community today. A series of different aspects have arisen since then, which
are not addressed in these conventions. These include the presence of pri-
vate actors in the coastal States’ maritime zones (e.g. migrants and refugees
fleeing on boats, and terrorists committing internationally prohibited acts at
sea), the conduct of private activities in contested waters (e.g. international oil
companies operating in areas of maritime boundary disputes) and, of course,
the increasing presence of women at sea, which raises concerns about gender
equality in maritime affairs.
Finally, the gender-blindness of the law of the sea conventions contra-
dicts the international initiatives that promote gender equality and women’s
empowerment. For example, the unclos advances the concept of sustain-
able development. However, this is mainly restricted to the use of marine
resources. Although this view was accurate when the Convention was drafted
in the 1970s, it does not comport with the sustainability aim of the 2030 UN
Agenda.129 This new Agenda identifies three dimensions of sustainable devel-
opment: the economic, the social, and the environmental.130 These dimen-
sions are inter-related and indivisible. Against this background, the Agenda
is a plan of action for people, the planet, and prosperity. It seeks ‘to realize
the human rights of all and to achieve gender equality and the empower-
ment of all women and girls.’131 As a UN instrument, the unclos should be
128 The agenda of the Conference of unclos included 25 subjects: the international
regime of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction; the Territorial
Sea; the contiguous zone; straits for international navigation; the Continental Shelf; the
Exclusive Economic Zone beyond the territorial sea; coastal state preferential rights or
other non-exclusive jurisdiction over resources beyond the Territorial Sea; the high seas;
land-locked countries; the rights and interests of shelf-locked States and States with nar-
row shelves or short coastlines; the rights and interests of States with broad shelves; the
preservation of the marine environment; scientific research; development and transfer
of technology; regional arrangements; archipelagos; enclosed and semi-enclosed seas;
artificial islands and installations; the regime of islands; responsibility and liability
for damage resulting from the use of the marine environment; settlement of disputes;
peaceful uses of the ocean space: zones of peace and security; archaeological and histor-
ical treasures on the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;
transmission from the high seas; and enhancing the universal participation of States in
multilateral conventions relating to the law of the sea.
129 Available at <https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda> accessed 26 January 2021.
130 Preamble.
131 Ibid. See also para 20: ‘The achievement of full human potential and of sustainable devel-
opment is not possible if one half of humanity continues to be denied its full human

amended132 or interpreted in an evolutionary way133 in order to align with this

approach.
4.1.2 Security and Safety Instruments

It might be presumed that despite the gap left by the conventions of the sea on
maritime security aspects, the issue is addressed by other international instru-
ments. A number of conventions and protocols are concerned with particular
aspects of maritime security, such as human trafficking and other unlawful
acts. The most important of these are examined below.
The 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime134 is the main international instrument fighting transnational organ-
ized crime. It highlights the seriousness of this crime and the need to address
this through state co-operation.135 States that ratify this instrument commit to
taking measures against transnational organized crime at the domestic level,
by adopting new frameworks for extradition, engaging in mutual legal assis-
tance and law enforcement co-operation, and offering training and technical
assistance to national authorities.136
Despite its adoption by 190 parties, the Convention does not deal with spe-
cific aspects of organised crime, nor with human-related issues. Therefore, it
has been supplemented by three protocols: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children;137 the
rights and opportunities. Women and girls must enjoy equal access to quality education,
economic resources and political participation as well as equal opportunities with men
and boys for employment, leadership and decision-making at all levels. We will work for
a significant increase in investments to close the gender gap and strengthen support for
institutions in relation to gender equality and the empowerment of women at the global,
regional and national levels. All forms of discrimination and violence against women and
girls will be eliminated, including through the engagement of men and boys. The sys-
tematic mainstreaming of a gender perspective in the implementation of the Agenda is
crucial.’
132 For amendment of the unclos see Arts. 312 and 313 unclos. See also A. Boyle, ‘Further
Development of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea: Mechanisms for Change’,
in D. Freestone et al., The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (Oxford University Press
2006), at 41–42; J. Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the Development of
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2011), at 64–70.
133 For the evolutionary interpretation of conventions see Art. 31 (1) Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. See also S.T. Helmersen, ‘Evolutive Treaty interpretation: Legality,
Semantics and Distinctions’ (2013) 6 European Journal of Legal Studies, at 127–148.
134 Adopted by the UN General Assembly 15 November 2000, entered into force 29
September 2003.
135 Preamble and Art. 1.
136 Art. 5 ff.
137 Adopted by unga Res. 55/25, entered into force 25 December 2003.

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Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air;138 and
the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
their Parts and Components and Ammunition.139 The first and second of these
Protocols relate to human security.
In particular, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children is the first instrument with an agreed
definition on trafficking of persons.140 Its aim is to facilitate national govern-
ance and international co-operation on the investigation and prosecution of
trafficking crimes.141 Particular attention is paid to the protection and provi-
sion of assistance to the victims of trafficking with full respect for their human
rights.142 In doing so, State parties shall take into account the age, gender, and
special needs of the victims of these unlawful acts.143
The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air offers
a comprehensive international response to the growing problem of organized
criminal groups that smuggle migrants.144 This is the first instrument with an
agreed definition of smuggling of migrants.145 Its aim is to prevent and combat
this crime and to promote co-operation among State parties, while protecting
the rights of smuggled persons.146
Both Protocols are human-centric. But while the Protocol on human traf-
ficking makes specific reference to women, the Protocol on migrants’ smug-
gling refers to ‘persons’ in general, echoing the gender-blind approach of most
international law instruments. This demonstrates a fragmented and incon-
sistent approach to gender. Another weakness is that these instruments apply
only in the specific contexts for which they were designed. The problems of
human trafficking or migrant smuggling are indeed serious and increasing.
However, women are involved in all sorts of contexts at sea –from economic
to criminal activities –and can be either victims or perpetrators of unlawful
acts. Unfortunately, this is not reflected in the above instruments.
The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation147 was concluded by the imo in response to
138 Adopted by unga Res. 55/25, entered into force 28 January 2004.
139 Adopted by unga Res. 55/25, entered into force on 3 July 2005.
140 Art. 3.
141 Art. 2.
142 Arts. 2; 6–8.
143 Art. 6 (4).
144 Preamble.
145 Art. 3.
146 Arts. 2, 16–18.
147 Signed 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992.

state proposals for the comprehensive suppression of threats against ships and
people.148 Among others, it stipulates the conditions under which a person
may be held liable for those crimes and the measures that State parties must
take in response to those actions.149 Although relatively human-centric, as it
provides that persons prosecuted for the said offences shall be entitled to fair
treatment and enjoyment of all their rights and guarantees,150 the Convention
makes no reference to women. Given the era of the Convention’s conclusion,
this is justifiable or at least to be expected.
The Convention was supplemented by the 1988 Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf151 and the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.152
These Protocols make some additions or amendments to the Convention’s
text. In line with the Convention’s spirit, both instruments adopt gender-neu-
tral language (by referring to ‘persons’). Interestingly though, the 2005 Protocol
provides that States should not extradite persons for reasons related to ‘race,
nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion or gender’.153 Although this safe-
guards human rights and equality in the context of prosecution, it does not say
much about the challenges that women face in maritime navigation.
4.1.3 Human Rights Instruments

Gender equality is enshrined in human rights instruments. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights154 is the fundamental recognition of ‘inherent
dignity’ and ‘the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human fam-
ily’ as ‘the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.’155 In doing
so, it provides that all humans are born free and equal and everyone is entitled
to human rights (including liberty, security, freedom of movement, seeking
asylum, employment, health, and education) irrespective of their race, colour,
sex, language, religion, social origin, property, birth, or status.156 Despite its
significance, the Declaration is a non-legally binding instrument. However, its
principles are preserved in other (legally binding) international instruments,
148 Preamble.
149 Arts. 3, 6.
150 Art. 10 (2).
151 Signed 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992.
152 Signed 14 October 2005, entered into force 28 July 2010.
153 Art. 3 added as Art. 11ter.
154 Adopted 10 December 1948.
155 Preamble.
156 Arts. 1 and 2.

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such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.157 The latter
obliges State parties to respect human rights without any kind of distinction,
such as race, sex, language, religion, origin, or status.158 Particular reference
is made to the equality ‘of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and
political rights’.159 However, the Covenant does not point out the challenges
that women face and how these can be addressed.
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Women (cedaw)160 is often described as an ‘international bill of rights for
women’.161 It defines what constitutes discrimination against women and sets
up an agenda for national action against such discrimination.162 The great
importance of this Convention is that it establishes the foundations for equal-
ity between women and men through ensuring women’s equal access to, and
equal opportunities in, political and public life, education, health, and employ-
ment. Apart from civil rights issues, the cedaw is also concerned with wom-
en’s reproductive rights, as well as with the impact of cultural factors on gender
relations.163 States parties are bound to take all appropriate measures so that
women can enjoy all of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.164 They
also agree to take measures against all forms of trafficking or exploitation of
women.165 Forty-two years after its making, the Convention remains relevant.
Its generic framework (which covers multiple aspects of women’s lives) and
its wide acceptability (by 189 state parties) make it one of the most important
instruments of international human rights law. And yet, certain aspects are
missing. For example, no explicit reference is made to gender-based violence
and the killing of women.166 This situation is increasing globally (including in
the maritime domain), and as observed by the cedaw Committee, the legisla-
tion addressing it is ‘non-existent, inadequate and/or poorly implemented.’167
Other issues that also relate to maritime security and are not directly addressed
by the Convention include the impact of climate change and natural disasters
157 Signed 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976.

158 Art. 2.
159 Art. 3.
160 Signed 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981.
161 UN Women, <https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/> accessed 26 January 2021.
162 Arts. 1, 2–16.
163 Introduction.
164 Arts. 2–16.
165 Art. 6.
166 C. Chinkin and K. Yoshida, 40 Years of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women (Centre for Women, Peace and Security, lse 2020), at 5.
167 Ibid., at 7.

on women, enforcement in the context of national security, and food security.

These call for further action and future legal development to eradicate gen-
der inequalities at sea. Also, in terms of effectiveness, it can be argued that
many States that have adopted the cedaw hold poor records on women’s
rights in practice. This is commonly advanced by States that refuse to ratify the
Convention, such as the United States.168
4.1.4 Humanitarian Law Conventions

A final category of international law instruments that will be examined in
this study derive from humanitarian law. These apply in the context of armed
conflict and war. In general, the rules of humanitarian law are intended to be
‘abstract, objective and value free’.169 Little attention is paid to gender aspects,
although some references to women are made. For instance, the Fourth Geneva
Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War170 provides
that women ‘shall be the object of special respect and must be protected
against any form of indecent assault.’171 They shall also be ‘especially protected
against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced pros-
titution or any form of indecent assault.’172 In the same spirit, the Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol i)173 provides
that the death penalty shall not be carried out on pregnant women or mothers
of dependant infants.174
Despite their significance in the protection of human rights, the above legal
instruments suffer from three important weaknesses. First, they seem only to
apply on land. Typically, this is where most conflicts take place. However, this
approach disregards the fact that the impact of land-based conflicts extends
to the maritime domain, such as in cases of migration. Second, international
humanitarian law instruments are ‘supposed to be gender-neutral’.175 But
168 Every crs Report, ‘The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW): Issues in the U.S. Ratification Debate’ <https://www.everycr
sreport.com/reports/R40750.html> accessed 26 January 2021.
169 J. Gardam, ‘A Feminist Analysis of Certain Aspects of International Humanitarian Law’
(1992) 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 265, at 267.
170 Signed 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950.
171 Art. 2 (c).
172 Art. 3 (a).
173 Signed 8 June 1977.
174 Art. 76 (3).
175 International Humanitarian Law and Gender, a report by the International Expert
Meeting on Gender Perspectives in International Humanitarian Law (Report Summary,
4–5 October 2007), at 7.

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ultimately, they promote the stereotypical (patriarchal) perception about

men and women. Based on the presumption that only men are protagonists in
hostilities, humanitarian law instruments treat women as victims, disregard-
ing their potential roles as combatants or perpetrators.176 Likewise, most of
the humanitarian law provisions that refer to women deal with their roles as
expectant or nursing mothers.177 As one scholar has observed, ‘the law sees
and treats women the way men see and treat women.’178 However, this does
not reflect real situations. The ‘traditional’ roles of men and women have
changed –in times of both peace and war.179 This should be mirrored in legal
developments. Third, a practical problem is the lack of observance of interna-
tional humanitarian law principles.180 Even if the provisions of the existing
instruments had been adequate for securing gender equality, they would still
have remained under-enforced within the current system.
5 Synthesis
The analysis of developments in international law has shown that they cannot
effectively advance women’s empowerment in the maritime security sector.
The conventions of the sea have a restricted scope, in that they deal mainly
with state interests. Clearly, these instruments were made by States for States.
However, the increasing presence of private actors, and particularly women on
the ocean, does not justify the disregarding of private interests by the law of
the sea. The gender blindness of those conventions might have been justified
when they were drafted. However, the position of the law of the sea towards
women does not reflect the world’s current attempts at gender equality.
The international instruments on security and safety look more promising.
Attempting to eliminate unlawful acts (including at sea), they prohibit human
abuses and women’s exploitation. However, their approach to gender is either
176 Ibid., Foreword.

177 J. Gardam and M. Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict and International Law (Kluwer Law
International 2001), at 93; H. Durham and K. O’Byrne, ‘The Dialogue of Difference: Gender
Perspectives on International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 92 (877) International Review of
the Red Cross, at 34.
178 C. MacKinnon, ‘Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Towards Feminist
Jurisprudence’ (1983) 8 Signs: Journal of Women in Society 625, at 644.
179 International Humanitarian Law and Gender, at 3.
180 For an analysis, see V. Oosterveld, ‘Feminist Debates on Civilian Women and International
Humanitarian Law’ (2009) Law Publications, at 385–402.

too narrow (i.e., limited to a single context) or inconsistent (i.e., some refer to
‘women’ whereas others refer to ‘persons’).
Gender equality is also enshrined in human rights instruments. Although
these were established to respond to situations on land, their generic frame-
work seems to allow for application in maritime contexts too. Still, a weakness
is that most of these instruments are too vague or avoid spelling out the chal-
lenges that women face. The cedaw seems to be the most comprehensive,
as it is explicitly concerned with women’s empowerment. And yet it does not
cover some of the current threats to gender equality.
Finally, humanitarian law instruments include provisions for the protection
of women in the context of armed conflict. However, they generally reproduce
stereotyped perceptions about men and women, and fail to address systematic
gender inequalities. Also, they were mainly designed to address land-based sit-
uations, disregarding that the impact of those situations may extend to sea.
The above demonstrates that the current rules of international law are
inconsistent or fragmented towards gender issues and suffer from under-
enforcement of women’s rights. In addition, they all fail to mainstream gen-
der in decision-making processes. Against this background, the study will now
revisit unscr 1325 and explain why this should also apply in maritime security
contexts.
6 Extending unscr 1325 to Maritime Security
Maritime security is complex and diverse. It concerns multiple issues in dif-

ferent sectors (national security, human security, economic development,
and the marine environment). Individual policies (as adopted by States, State
groups, and organizations) are necessary and should address each aspect of
maritime affairs (e.g. commercial activities, maritime crime, and migration)
with due sensitivity and care. But as this study has shown, the current frame-
works are unable to respond to certain challenges, such as those that women
face at sea. It is important that the national, regional, and international rules
of maritime security adopt a gender-sensitive approach. This would require
co-ordination among policy makers and the promotion of holistic reform in all
maritime security sectors.
unscr 1325 can contribute to that in three ways. First, by acting as an
‘umbrella’ framework, the Resolution can extend the principles of gender
equality (as they exist for land contexts) in maritime settings and enhance
harmonization among the relevant (national, international, and organiza-
tional) developments in the maritime domain. Second, it can offer a collective

166 Pappa
response to gender inequalities in land and maritime security and encourage

the development of good practices in individual sectors (e.g, transnational
organized crime, iuuf, and human trafficking). Third, it can promote the gen-
der mainstream in the decision-making processes of maritime security, as it
does on land. Attaining these goals is feasible, but not easy. For this to happen,
the following linguistic and normative weaknesses of the Resolution should be
overcome.
To begin with, the term ‘security’ must be re-introduced in order to include
all contexts. Although not explicit, it seems that unscr 1325 refers only to sit-
uations occurring on land. Land may be the main field of war and conflict but
those incidents can also happen at sea. Furthermore, the impact of conflict on
land extends to sea when civilians (mainly women) flee their country through
sea routes in order to survive. Therefore, the Resolution should cover both land
and sea.
Also, the dichotomy between war and peace that the Resolution promotes is
over-simplified and problematic. In fact, there is a whole spectrum of non-war
situations that can threaten human life. Many relate to maritime security. As
explained above, women are often victims of violence (physical or sexual) in
cases of illicit maritime activities, such as drug smuggling, human trafficking,
and iuuf. Also, gender-based bias and abuse against displaced women migrat-
ing through sea routes is widely reported. Therefore, unscr 1325 should not
be marginalized to war but extended to non-war contexts and situations of
violence which do not involve the use of weapons.
A final point can be made about the victimization of women in the
Resolution. As a vulnerable group (together with children), women are the
most common casualties of violence and aggression. However, the fact that
the Resolution only depicts women as pacificist-victims (instead of actors)
promotes an inaccurate and stereotypical representation of gender.181 As seen
above, women can also be perpetrators of unlawful acts or of violence. In many
situations, such as those of maritime crimes and piracy, women abuse other
women or young children. It is important that the Resolution raises awareness
about the different roles of women and offers opportunities (e.g. education,
181 Santos et al., ‘Missed Connections’, at 19–20; H. Charlesworth, ‘Are Women Peaceful?
Reflections on the Role of Women in Peace-building’ (2008) 16 (3) Feminist Legal
Studies, at 347–361; N. Puechguirbal, ‘Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution
1325: A Textual Analysis of UN Documents’ (2010) 17 (2) International Peacekeeping, at
172–187. See also S.L. Gibbings, ‘No Angry Women at the United Nations: Political Dreams
and the Cultural Politics of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325’ (2011) 13
(4) International Feminist Journal of Politics, at 522–538.

employment) to all women, not only to those who might be victims of security
challenges. The treatment of women as ‘actors’ would enable them to contrib-
ute to maritime security as ‘1) agents for change, 2) key partners with exist-
ing governance structures, and 3) mitigators of risk in the prevention of social
unrest and instability.’182
It might be counter-argued that the Security Council is not the most ade-
quate forum to address the issue of women’s security at sea. One of the main
points of criticism is that it is highly unrepresentative, which could argue for
its reform and an urgent expansion of its permanent seats.183 Such a radical
change in the Council’s structure and procedures would require amendment
of the UN Charter under Art. 108, which is not likely to occur in the fore-
seeable future.184 Still, with or without reform, the Security Council remains
an important legal and political organ with significant influence over the
development of international law.185 Another counter-point is that the
Security Council’s main task is to address threats to international peace and
security, not to fix all issues of world injustice. However, it must be acknowl-
edged that maritime security threats (including those against women) are as
important as (and often interlinked with) security threats on land. They can
undermine States’ security and challenge international peace.186 Preventing
and countering maritime security threats can contribute to the prevention
of international conflicts and the maintenance of peace in post-conflict
environments.187
182 S. Dharmapuri, P. Tansey, and L. Van Buskirk, Charting a New Course: Women, Peace and
Security, and the Maritime Domain (Our Secure Future 2020), at 4.
183 As suggested by the General Assembly delegates. General Assembly, Plenary Seventy-
Fifth Session of 16 November 2020 https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/ga12288.doc.htm
accessed 19 April 2021. See also A. Fitzgerald, ‘Security Council Reform: Creating a More
Representative Body of the Entire U.N Membership’ (2000) 12 (2) Pace International Law
Review, at 319–365.
184 T. Eitel, ‘The UN Security Council and its Future Contribution in the Field of International
Law: What may we expect?’ (2000) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 53, at 54.
185 Ibid., at 60.
186 See M. Pugh (ed.), Security and the Military Dimension –Maritime Security and
Peacekeeping: A Framework of United Nations Operations (Manchester University Press
1994); F. Vreÿ, ‘Securitising Piracy: A Maritime Peace Mission off the Horn of Africa?’ (2011)
20 (3) African Security Review 54–66.
187 Security Council Report, Maritime Crime as a Threat to International Peace and
Security: Arria-Formula Meeting (12 June 2018) <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/
whatsinblue/2018/06/maritime-crime-as-a-threat-to-international-peace-and-security-
arria-formula-meeting.php> accessed 19 April 2021.

168 Pappa
7 Conclusions
unscr 1325 has been quite unique in its reception. Twenty-one years since
its adoption, it remains at the centre of a heated debate. Very few legal
developments have attracted as much enthusiasm as criticism. In scholarly
writings, policy briefs, and official reports, unscr 1325 is characterized by
the terms ‘landmark’, ‘historic’, or ‘novel’. It is irrefutable that this instru-
ment has been a milestone in the fight for women’s empowerment. At the
same time, the Resolution attracts criticism for victimizing women and
for its debatable nature, which has caused institutional resistance. unscr
1325 is also challenged by contextual weaknesses. Its contribution to gender
equality is significant, but it is limited to situations of war or conflict occur-
ring on land. However, these are not the only occasions when women’s lives
are affected.
Women are increasingly present in the maritime domain and are threat-
ened by maritime security challenges. However, this seems to have been dis-
regarded by the current maritime regimes. As this study has shown, the gen-
der dimension –and more specifically, women’s experience –is not captured
in the strategies and policies of maritime security. Most of the existing frame-
works of States, State unions, and organisations fail to reflect on the realities
of the maritime domain, where women are treated with bias and discrim-
ination. The same occurs in international law. The analysis of instruments
on the law of the sea, safety and security, human rights, and humanitarian
law has unearthed an imbalance towards gender issues. Some instruments are
religiously state-centric, while those that make reference to human security
or gender equality fail to spell out the challenges that women face in the rel-
evant contexts and the roles they can play in decision-making processes. The
existence of legislative and political frameworks of maritime security is cer-
tainly positive. However, they lack co-ordination among the concerned bod-
ies, cohesion in the treatment of maritime security challenges, and sensitivity
towards gender aspects.
Against this background, this article has argued that unscr 1325 should
extend to maritime security. The Resolution already promotes women’s
empowerment in land security contexts. Its extension to the maritime domain
could further dispel the gender blindness of this sector. Although non-bind-
ing, the Resolution could influence State actions and instigate legal and polit-
ical improvements. It could inspire good practices (at the national, regional,
and international levels) for the protection of women in challenging mari-
time contexts and increase their visibility and participation in decision-mak-
ing processes. By calling on all Member States to respond to these issues, the

Resolution could contribute towards the harmonization of respective develop-

ments and offer a collective response to gender inequalities in land and mari-
time security.
The successful extension of unscr 1325 into the maritime domain would
require some changes to the Resolution’s substance. At present, the Resolution’s
scope is relatively narrow, while its stance towards women is rather stereotyp-
ical. This study proposes a different interpretation or reconfiguration of the
Resolution’s subject matter in order to cover both land and sea; to include war
and non-war situations; and to consider women as actors, rather than as mere
victims of conflict.
unscr 1325 itself is not a cure for the disease. The change towards a gender-
sensitive maritime sector can only be effected by governments, decision cen-
tres, and policy-makers. Furthermore, the Resolution was primarily designed
to mitigate the impact of war on women and to reaffirm the important role
that women can play in peace processes. However, in the bigger picture, it has
the power to mainstream gender in the global security agenda in all contexts
(war, non-war, land, and sea). Therefore, the Resolution could act as a norma-
tive guide for the improvement of current maritime security strategies and the
development of new ones in the future.
In conclusion, the expansion of unscr 1325 into maritime security could
contribute to the empowerment of women at sea and facilitate the achieve-
ment of gender equality as envisaged by human rights activists and the UN
machinery.


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chapter 5

unscr 1325 and Maritime Security

Women – women’s empowerment – gender equality – gender blindness – maritime

© Marianthi Pappa, 2022 | doi:10.1163/18757413_02401006 Downloaded from Brill.com 05/15/2024 02:52:18PM

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (unscr 1325, or Resolution)

1 s/​r es/​1325, adopted on 31 October 2000.

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prevention and resolution of conflicts and peace-​keeping’ and the ‘importance

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perceived as another extraneous (‘top-​down’) instrument or as a product of

2 Maritime Security and Women

2.1 The Rise of the Maritime Security Agenda

15 Barrow, ‘It’s Like a Rubber Band’, at 60–​65.

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21 Bueger and Edmunds, ‘Beyond Seablindness’, at 1295.

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employment.28 However, gender issues seem to be overlooked by the existing

2.2 Women in the Maritime Domain

28 Bueger ‘What is Maritime Security?’, at 161.

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(e.g. counterfeit or stolen goods), and trading of exotic animals. In contrast to

42 V. Becker-​Weinberg, ‘Human Trafficking & IUUF: Legal and Gender Implications’, in

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women or children on vessels. On others, they support those activities from

3 The Gender Blindness of Maritime Security Frameworks

3.1 State Policies and Action Plans

3.1.1 National Frameworks

48 Gilmer, ‘Invisible Pirates’, at 371–​388.

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detailed lines of action, which promote co-​operation and knowledge sharing

3.1.2 Regional Frameworks

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against Member States, threats to the security of European citizens, cross-​bor-

promoting the role of women in peace efforts –​from implementing the

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and Development (2016).79 Both seek to establish a comprehensive and coher-

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3.1.3 Organisational Frameworks

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acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, transnational organised crime

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narcotics, iuuf, trafficking in protected species of wild fauna and flora,

all States to ratify or accede to and implement the United Nations

The examined frameworks of individual States, regional state unions, and

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4.1 International Law

109 Lirola-​Delgado, ‘Maritime Security Strategies’, at 538.

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4.1.1 Law of the Sea Conventions

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amended132 or interpreted in an evolutionary way133 in order to align with this

4.1.2 Security and Safety Instruments

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1 s/r es/1325, adopted on 31 October 2000.

prevention and resolution of conflicts and peace-keeping’ and the ‘importance

perceived as another extraneous (‘top-down’) instrument or as a product of

15 Barrow, ‘It’s Like a Rubber Band’, at 60–65.

42 V. Becker-Weinberg, ‘Human Trafficking & IUUF: Legal and Gender Implications’, in

48 Gilmer, ‘Invisible Pirates’, at 371–388.

detailed lines of action, which promote co-operation and knowledge sharing

against Member States, threats to the security of European citizens, cross-bor-

promoting the role of women in peace efforts –from implementing the

109 Lirola-Delgado, ‘Maritime Security Strategies’, at 538.