Belgica vs. Executive Secretary

1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No.
208566
Today is Wednesday, January 25, 2023
Constitution Statutes Executive Issuances Judicial Issuances Other Issuances Jurisprudence International Legal Resources AUSL Exclusive
Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica v. Hon. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013
♦ Decision, Perlas-Bernabe [J]

♦ Concurring Opinion, Sereno [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Carpio [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonen [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Brion [J]
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.

GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO,
Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR.
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE
PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO
S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA,

Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT
and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html 1/87
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former

Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY
FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE,
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity
of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the system‘s conceptual
underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its

usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork
to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine
feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-
fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators
in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of
refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to
political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents.6
In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government
spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representative's district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to
refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum,

discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later
discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the

earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the
utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-
enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release,
Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works
projects13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The
committee from each House may also authorize one of its members to
approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same
section provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint
committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of
said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of
appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator

participation broadened from the areas of fund release and realignment to
the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the
public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing
projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of
projects selected by Members of Congress, they ‘being the representatives
of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local
officials or civil leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel process
commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals
appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were
accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s allocation, and the amount
each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened
by the majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration
bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and Communications.
Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own
provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President – the
Public Works Act.17 In the 1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation
reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of
Representatives and the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently

discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when "one
man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By
1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local

Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the
practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began,
with each assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen
would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget
and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the
allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in
turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the
assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported that "Congressional
Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public
works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",21 or
non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the
categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of
Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the
form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas
Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of
₱480 Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of
development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has
been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon
legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the
"Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the
1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local
infrastructure and other priority community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with
the approval of the President, to be released directly to the implementing
agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects and
activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the
amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their
participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported26 that by
1992, Representatives were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without any limitation or
qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft
projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the
release of CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of
projects and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators.
For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the
Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million
each in CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each, and the Vice-President,
₱20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions
on project identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF
Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made
from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-
President, in consultation with the implementing agency concerned, were
directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded
from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a)
the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in
the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the
House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be
submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated
that the project list, which would be published by the DBM,35 "shall be
the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein
shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list herein required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the

required lists and endorsements were reproduced, except that the
publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself
sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel"
at that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly
fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or
"CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political agenda.37 It
has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets
of executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus
harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the
finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the
DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are
the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño

Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School
Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior consultation with
the representative of the legislative district concerned.”40 Similarly, the
legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3)
separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the
"Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44 and the "Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a
special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of
Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund"
(PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with
the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were
directly released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly
stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any
expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no
amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel
benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view
of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely

contained a single special provision ordering the release of the funds
directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned,
without further qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same single
provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express
authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of
the Department of Public Works and Highways51 (DPWH) and the
DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on the
aspects of implementation delegation and project list submission,
respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to
fund priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
national government and shall be released directly to the implementing

agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept,55 which is
essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from
which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence,
operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept
was consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060
GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect
to the specific amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well as
their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to
be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under
the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its
predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned
Member of Congress61 anent certain aspects of project implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal
participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the
implementation of government projects were introduced. In the
Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for
school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such
purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at least ₱250 Million of the
₱500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of school
buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of
Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its
"Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and proven track
records in the construction of public school buildings x x x."62 The same
allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under
the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government
Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007
dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the
implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government
Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated
procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the
implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of agreement with
an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an
amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles,
the 201170 PDAF Article included an express statement on lump-sum
amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President:
Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken down into ₱40
Million for "hard projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200
Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a
₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a
provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification
that it may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the
Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development,
Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources,
Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the
further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing
unit and same project category as the original project, for infrastructure
projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original
scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence
of the legislator concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the

"identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall
conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each
implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as
practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and
identify the project from the said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were

included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the
Vice-President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had
been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be
identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to
implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify
programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the
written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district,
endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of
PDAF funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as
requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by
the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent
controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term‘s usage has
expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section
880 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized
the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate
government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related
activities of the government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the
"Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special fund created under
PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title
IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983.
More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993
on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the
Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed
and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President
provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the
regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89
owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel"
in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy
surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo
Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of
government money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of
kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating
procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent
of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping,
sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings."92 "Other sources of
kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds intended for medicines and
textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about
congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a
Congressman, sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the

PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for
lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress,"
the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
began its probe into allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some
₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The
investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) –
had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no
fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly
the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money
was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the
Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some
of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of
three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-
year audit investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009,
or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the
audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the
Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the
application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate
implementing agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled corporations
(GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in
PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the
total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during
the audit period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its Report No.
2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and
Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the
highlights of which are as follows:103
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of

legislators significantly exceeded their respective allocations.
● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of

sponsoring members of the Lower House.
● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated
under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having

been turned over to the government.
● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the

latter‘s endorsement and without considering their mandated functions,
administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.
● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the

implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent
legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any
appropriation law or ordinance.
● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred

seventy two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found
questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to
liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.
● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods

and services reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900
Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan
(CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one
consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the
"Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant
procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social
Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents
Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the
incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further
taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in
whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further
releases pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez,

Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr.
(Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition),
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the
GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,107
be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their
respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to
immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the
Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the
complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the
years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the
recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations
with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including,
but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a

Petition dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be
declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President
Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing
such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority
projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with
the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the
Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
National Economic Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed

as UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all
cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c)
issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the
Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1)
the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2)
Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government‖
under the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on
October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated
Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the
alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical assistance purposes,
of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed
for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners
to reply to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the
Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September
27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated
September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply
dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be
observed by the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of
the technicality of the issues material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General
Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral
Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to
competently and completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting
process and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus
curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7)
days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the
main issues for the Court‘s resolution:
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of
policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the
Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and
113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and
Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly
and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n
of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res
judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and
(f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition,
the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the

constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by
the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,117
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important119
and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.120 This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.121 In
other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement
of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the
questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,
and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself
as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon
constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic

positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the
questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds
and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF,
PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of
these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been
rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes
moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose
can be served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court
observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the
controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared
towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject
matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because
the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its
legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be
done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through
a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following exchange
between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General
during the Oral Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General
Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example
of the PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage
over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of the
soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he
has the power to stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38
of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the
President can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional,
can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case
of the PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this
Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the
report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty ….
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies,
you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF
has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress
passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases
supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot
and academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of
petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to,
inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power,
checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests
involved
– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public
funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a
situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The
present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never
before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the
accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that
reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF"130 demonstrates a
prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is
also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized,
speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings
made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In
Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance
of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit
power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance
system inherent in our form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of
the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they
are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only
respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x
x x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be
sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need
for a definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral
Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances
will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In
this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed
out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there
is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised
herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious
resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the
government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with
constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the
preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair
of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease
with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork
Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a
semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a
different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the government had already
backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition
but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re-
emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of
issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at
this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial
review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries
the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches
of government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political
question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,139 applies when
there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light,
respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to
perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands
of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this
stage."140
The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal
questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom
of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution
itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system
along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable
of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the
present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power
but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept
of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question
doctrine was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed
against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given
a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing
nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments;
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great
extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches
of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its
duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would
not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact,
help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all,
it is in the best interest of the people that each great branch of government, within its own
sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the
problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for
judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers
and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National
Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the
validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been
and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to
suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably,
taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in
these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given
that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."148
The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy
involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls"149
amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues
involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi
to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere
(or simply, stare decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has
been settled") are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of
previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the
Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in
Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the
merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a
subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not,
however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas
the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel
System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural
technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein
failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct
releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to
their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse
of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of the presumption of
constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to
review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing
reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are
concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle,
entrenched under Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake
of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that
follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar
to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel
provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand
its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the Members of Congress
to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation
act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the
projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only
function given to the Congress by the Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing
submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to

Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project
or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members
of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa
resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the
propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress.
On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-
relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of
the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment
measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those
related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and
realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein
warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a
wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with
inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to
stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s
fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of
projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of
appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the
contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of
appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby
lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such
authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the
prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA
has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of
law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion
in the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be
objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it
may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in
whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now
largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA
Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it
validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the
guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious
constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such
mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the
recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively
overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the
separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule
will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural
technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current
application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first
define the terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential
Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the
Legislative and Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds
in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution as
political largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel
System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process to an
individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how
the funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in
the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are
intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help
the political careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage benefits.157
They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of
discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently
known as the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel,
specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal
history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and
practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the
Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork
Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-
sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized
into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization
through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners
consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel
since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield
a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-
sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to
refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive
issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara
v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government,
through Congress,164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the
judicial branch of government, through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret
laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this
respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within
its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no
authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law."168 The
principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem
from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of
these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch
from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this
purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are
equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of
independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the
arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one
branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court
decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2)
ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its
constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated
when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In
other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a)
interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is

indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the
Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.),
the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various operational
aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other
related activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle.174 This is rooted in the
principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a
grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and
prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under
the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its
members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as
earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr.,
the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget
proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and
wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by
the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in
accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA,
Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s
role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional
boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for
implementation by the Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the
Court held that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains
to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still
exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the
Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined
to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond
oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and

investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
1âwphi1
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the

power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by
the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the
2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political
branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it
should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They state that the
findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how
absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in
complete violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers."180 Further,
they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the
condition that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if
they actually dictate their implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been
violated since the President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the
GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators‘ proposals.182
They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of
members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and
identification are recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the
Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework, and
hence, remains constitutional."184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-
enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or

program menus187 – have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to
identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel
allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well
as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1
embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls
under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides
that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to
Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by
implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same
provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for
as long as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile,
Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by
legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of
projects identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires
that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to the
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the
foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been
accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-
enactment authority in the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund release
through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly
states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents
prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee
on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be"; while their
statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first ,
paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any
realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and
the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special
Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior
and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social
Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from
one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to
among others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification,
fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight
and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in
one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various
operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans
for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the
separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in
Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely

recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition,
to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this
end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the
conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory
and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate
their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory
import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the statements of the Solicitor General
during the Oral Arguments – have admitted that the identification of the legislator
constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source,
thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution
process:192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can
the PDAF of the legislator be utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the
individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then
there is no identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was
implemented without the identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no
specific examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is
a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an
identification from the legislator.
xxxx
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were

replying to a question, "How can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF
Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your Honor.
Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district
would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases
supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as
well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of
post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated
to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have
effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence,
accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and
have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially
disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice
Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of
Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this
research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the
question of constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process.
In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both
Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are
now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in
one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we
should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through
formal measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in
government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution
has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be

exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In
particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a
bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may
constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions
thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by
immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters;196 and (b)
constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law,
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of
war or other national emergency,197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to

delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either
filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199 The
conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case
of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the

principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative
powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the
public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to

details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers
post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of
non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That
the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and
Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the
setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal
lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would
go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these
two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon,
and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the
same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as
well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and
distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances
to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to
veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by
Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The President‘s
item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may
exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the
Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the
"submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law
after the required publication."205
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the
legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief
Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly
known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of
the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in
passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the
government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The
Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative
power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It
follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in
exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or
hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every
intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will
presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases
supplied)
The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals
such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature,
as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary process.208 In
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized
the President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to
guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body";
phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against
the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a
proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of
appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of
the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the
Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as
follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific

appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into
an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the
President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific
appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters
of appropriation.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item

characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular
amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This
treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific
appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the
same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund
and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a
specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are
rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may
be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that
each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such
component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly
pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by
accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance
and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed
sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special
purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional
mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as
herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall
specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding
revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2
5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only
for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely

provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple
purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the
actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still
be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the
appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence,
without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the
President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire
appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the
entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may
not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering
that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual
amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing
determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the
implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in
violation of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a
lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of
the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on."212 Accordingly, they
submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt
line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a
process which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such,
lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are barely
foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create
some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed
and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which
subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system
forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not
be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment
of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013
PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a
prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-
sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for
multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc.
This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of
the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA
Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information
that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds."216
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per
proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as
well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional.
That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for
future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires.
Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not
justify even commendable ends.218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of
checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork
Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of
the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested
partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF
excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs
the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate
the decisions of senators.‘"220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states
that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality
of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the
principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The
notion of a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the
Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public
funds may be checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in
Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny
based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted
in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard
by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws
pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on
congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment
roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the

implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight
would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would,
in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be
pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear
as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation

– a matter before another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking
undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority
and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to
perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a
legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-
election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a
case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity
between legislators and the Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment
participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the
domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic
constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the
2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are
deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are
members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in
contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-
executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said
provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right
but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since
there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely
speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System
would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and
Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local

Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more
specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this
end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government
units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental
and people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any
project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the
State to empower local government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-
sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by the Court
in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the
policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and
encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant
communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics
from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will
enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them
with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic.
This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in
purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such
political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the
pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the
constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who
are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it
is also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President
and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of
their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project."231 Drawing
strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating
that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel
complement and link the national development goals to the countryside and grassroots as
well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are
preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the
"abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which is to
enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the
system which actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In
particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is
based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division
limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district
representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a
district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
"underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that
even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-
President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional
Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s
original intent which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had
become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them
on the sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and
PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs)
which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the
direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts
within its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose
functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs,
policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators,
who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a
body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority
conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate
projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of
personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall
development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure
planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters
and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to
the substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now,

amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the
"primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the
National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law
since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy
Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental
thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a
valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely
incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of
the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose
that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public
purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very
definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to
a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the
legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe
any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an
appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as Congress
wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As
held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form
of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress
shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or
appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time
horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations)
as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present
Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms.
The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general
appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly

appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272),
whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the

designated purpose. The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a
particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the
setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of
words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested.
(Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the
appropriation must be the "primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid
appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or
determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular public purpose,
then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient
to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the
Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts
from service contracts and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature
bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires,
representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of
1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on
service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation
of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross
earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings
be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be
concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all
fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all sources"
(a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%)
percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less
than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations
under Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly
deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because,
as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of
intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators
after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the
real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated
for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual
legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013
PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest
sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-
delegability principle as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue

delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine
for what purpose the funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the
Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to
refer only to other purposes related "to energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public

purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain
adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the
Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the

law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2)
fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are
indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law
is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient
standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative
policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said
phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under
the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the
phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a
statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase "for such other
purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents,
namely energy development programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive
department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes
under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is
limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness
test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the
same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This
notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for
the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains legally effective and
subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is
but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be used – only
in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section
12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘
submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be
readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to
resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential

Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects
and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails
the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration
purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him
carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so
determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in
frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline
to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is
too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. This
may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework
of a system, especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges,
sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as economic and
residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to the
above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by
any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions
of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and
subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the
Court did so in the context of its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners
equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the
CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of
their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the
project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"
(PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and
remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or
activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255
(Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II
and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a
petition for mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation
by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of
public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part
of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the
discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be
rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional
duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus
in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right
to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the
Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this
case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the
constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified
that the right to information does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that
the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and
that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the
foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The
pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled
to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their
desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant
has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the
respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R.
No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344,
August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part
of respondent to prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of
mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or
the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report.
Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the
bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners
pray that said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the
CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before
the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document
relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes that the
information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to ensure
that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the
equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer
on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA,
may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to
be furnished with such schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the
general public, access to official documents which are already existing and of public
record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access
to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied
the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners
therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject,
however, to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the
GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the
manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be
avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be
prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be
insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta,
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be
done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging
to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before
the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with
the Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not
limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and
the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which
is generally left to the prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the
Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this score.
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the
concept of released funds. In response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that
enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued
Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which
pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been
obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may
continually be implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies
concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation
and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and,
second, that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior
to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO
does not yet involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by
the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements,
even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and
unobligated allotments." They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated
by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already
"beyond the reach of the TRO because they cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘"
They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September
10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential
effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the
promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among
others, is now permanently enjoined.
The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless,
be resolved as it has a practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In
particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by
obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed
following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that
funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation.
A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to
identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified
period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is
subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval
or clearance by competent authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an
obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the
direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing
authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which
will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is
brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a
SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the
Oral Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies
to obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal
to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO;
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the
authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the
projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the
SAROs issued are withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which
have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds
which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs
issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently
reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto
cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing
of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which
have been obligated but not released – meaning, those merely covered by a SARO –
under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential
Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether
declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to
the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special
purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the
unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other
Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section
12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in
view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in
an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such
act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be
properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects
awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the
final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time
may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice
then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In
the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘"268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles
of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To
recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-
oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has
violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators
the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they
are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly
violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a
system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has
flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President
the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional
oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of
governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally
impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national
officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable
local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as
it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for
energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public
funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it
has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious
unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never
again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance
or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so
constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its
co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change and the
awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate, the
Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of
society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its
course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and no other‘s.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional

violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of
past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF
Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether
individually or collectively organized into committees – to intervene, assume or
participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as
but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project
identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of
congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional
Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which
they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal
practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1)
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section
8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of
the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby
declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF
funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced
from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910,
and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No.
1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision
is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special
Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED.
The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be
disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund,
while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall
remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared
as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court
hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the
Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the
Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the
availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to
official documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable
regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without
prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may
choose to pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of
these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the
prerogative of the political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within
the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government
officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular,
improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel
System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
See Concurring Opinion

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
See Concurring Opinion NO PART

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
I concur and also join the concurring I join the Opinion of Justice Carpio,
opinion of Justice Carpio. subject to my Concurring &
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE Dissenting Opinion.
CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

I join the concurring opinion of J.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO A.T. Carpio of the ponencia
Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

See Concurring Opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I CAT I O N
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
*Dropped as a party per Memorandum dated October 17, 2013 filed by counsel for
petitioners Atty. Alfredo B. Molo III, et al. Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 388.
** No part.
1 The Federalist Papers, Federalist No. 20.
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 3-51; rollo (G.R. No. 208493), pp. 3-11; and rollo
(G.R. No. 209251), pp. 2-8.
3 "’Pork barrel spending,‘ a term that traces its origins back to the era of slavery
before the U.S. Civil War, when slave owners occasionally would present a barrel of
salt pork as a gift to their slaves. In the modern usage, the term refers to
congressmen scrambling to set aside money for pet projects in their districts."
(Drudge, Michael W. "’Pork Barrel‘ Spending Emerging as Presidential Campaign
Issue," August 1, 2008
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2008/08/20080801181504lcnirellep
0.1261713.html#axzz2iQrI8mHM> [visited October 17, 2013].)
4 Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines:
A Commentary, 2003 Edition, p. 786, citing Bernas, "From Pork Barrel to Bronze
Caskets," Today, January 30, 1994.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
5 Heaser, Jason, "Pulled Pork: The Three Part Attack on Non-Statutory Earmarks,"
Journal of Legislation, 35 J. Legis. 32 (2009).
<http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=&handle
=hein.journals/jleg35&div=6&id=&page=> (visited October 17, 2013).
6 Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C., House of Representatives of the

Philippines, "Understanding the ‘Pork Barrel,‘" p. 2.
<http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/14th/pork_barrel.pdf> (visited October 17,
2013).
7 Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork is a Political, Not A Developmental,
Tool." <http://pcij.org/stories/2004/pork.html> [visited October 22, 2013].) See also
rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 328-329.
8 Morton, Jean, "What is a Pork Barrel?" Global Granary, Lifestyle Magazine and
Common Place Book Online: Something for Everyone, August 19, 2013.
<http://www.globalgranary.org/2013/08/19/what-is-a-pork-barrel/#.UnrnhFNavcw >
(visited October 17, 2013).
9 Jison, John Raymond, "What does the 'pork barrel' scam suggest about the
Philippine government?" International Association for Political Science Students,
September 10, 2013. <http://www.iapss.org/ index.php/articles/item/93-what-does-
the-pork-barrel-scam-suggest-about-the-philippine-government> (visited October
17, 2013). See also Llanes, Jonathan, "Pork barrel – Knowing the issue," Sunstar
Baguio, October 23, 2013. <http://www.sunstar.com.ph/
baguio/opinion/2013/09/05/llanes-pork- barrel-knowing-issue-301598> (visited
October 17, 2013).
10 Entitled "AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR PUBLIC WORKS,"

approved on March 10, 1922.
11 "Act 3044, the first pork barrel appropriation, essentially divided public works
projects into two types. The first type—national and other buildings, roads and
bridges in provinces, and lighthouses, buoys and beacons, and necessary mechanical
equipment of lighthouses—fell directly under the jurisdiction of the director of
public works, for which his office received appropriations. The second group—
police barracks, normal school and other public buildings, and certain types of roads
and bridges, artesian wells, wharves, piers and other shore protection works, and
cable, telegraph, and telephone lines—is the forerunner of the infamous pork barrel.
Although the projects falling under the second type were to be distributed at the
discretion of the secretary of commerce and communications, he needed prior
approval from a joint committee elected by the Senate and House of
Representatives. The nod of either the joint committee or a committee member it
had authorized was also required before the commerce and communications
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
secretary could transfer unspent portions of one item to another item." (Emphases
supplied) (Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork by any name," VERA Files,
August 23, 2013. <http://verafiles.org/pork-by-any-name/> [visited October 14,
2013]).
12 Sec. 3. The sums appropriated in paragraphs (c), (g), (l), and (s) of this Act shall
be available for immediate expenditure by the Director of Public Works, but those
appropriated in the other paragraphs shall be distributed in the discretion of the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications, subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. The committee
from each House may authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made
by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, who with the approval of said
joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof may, for the purposes of said
distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation. (Emphases
supplied)
13 Those Section 1 (c), (g), (l), and (s) of Act 3044 "shall be available for immediate
expenditure by the Director of Public Works."
14 Section 3, Act 3044.
15 Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork by any name," VERA Files, August
23, 2013. <http://verafiles.org/pork-by-any-name/> (visited October 14, 2013).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.

Philippines, "Understanding the ‘Pork Barrel,‘"
<http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ 14th/pork_barrel.pdf > (visited October 17,
2013).
21 Id.
22 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures

including Local Projects (VILP), Special Audits Office Report No. 2012-03, August
14, 2013 (CoA Report), p. 2.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
23 Ilagan, Karol, "Data A Day; CIA, CDF, PDAF? Pork is pork is pork,"
Moneypolitics, A Date Journalism Project for the Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism, August 1, 2013 <http://moneypolitics.pcij.org/data-a-day/cia-cdf-pdaf-
pork-is-pork-is-pork/> (visited October 14, 2013).
24 Republic Act No. (RA) 6831.
25 Special Provision 1, Article XLIV, RA 7078 (1991 CDF Article), and Special
Provision 1, Article XLII (1992), RA 7180 (1992 CDF Article) are similarly worded
as follows: Special Provision 1.
Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein appropriated shall be used for
infrastructure and other priority projects and activities upon approval by the
President of the Philippines and shall be released directly to the appropriate
implementing agency [(x x x for 1991)], subject to the submission of the
required list of projects and activities. (Emphases supplied)
27 Id.
28 Special Provision 1, Article XXXVIII, RA 7645 (1993 CDF Article) provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Funds.
The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure and other
priority projects and activities as proposed and identified by officials concerned
according to the following allocations: Representatives, ₱12,500,000 each;
Senators ₱18,000,000 each; Vice-President, ₱20,000,000. The fund shall be
automatically released quarterly by way of Advice of Allotment and Notice of
Cash Allocation directly to the assigned implementing agency not later than
five (5) days after the beginning of each quarter upon submission of the list of
projects and activities by the officials concerned. (Emphases supplied)
29 See Special Provision 1, 1993 CDF Article; id.
30 Special Provision 1, Article XLI, RA 7663 (1994 CDF Article) provides:
Special Provisions
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure, purchase of

ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities, and credit
facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by officials
concerned according to the following allocations: Representatives, ₱12,500,000
each; Senators ₱18,000,000 each; Vice-President, ₱20,000,000; PROVIDED,
That, the said credit facilities shall be constituted as a revolving fund to be
administered by a government financial institution (GFI) as a trust fund for
lending operations. Prior years releases to local government units and national
government agencies for this purpose shall be turned over to the government
financial institution which shall be the sole administrator of credit facilities
released from this fund.
The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way of Advice of

Allotments and Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the assigned
implementing agency not later than five (5) days after the beginning of each
quarter upon submission of the list of projects and activities by the officials
concerned. (Emphases supplied)
31 Special Provision 1, Article XLII, RA 7845 (1995 CDF Article) provides:
Special Provisions

equipment and other priority projects and activities as proposed and identified
by officials concerned according to the following allocations: Representatives,
₱12,500,000 each; Senators ₱18,000,000 each; Vice-President, ₱20,000,000.
The fund shall be automatically released semi-annually by way of Advice of

Allotment and Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the designated
implementing agency not later than five (5) days after the beginning of each
semester upon submission of the list of projects and activities by the officials
concerned. (Emphases supplied)
Special Provisions
1. Use and Release of Fund.

equipment and other priority projects and activities, including current operating
expenditures, except creation of new plantilla positions, as proposed and
identified by officials concerned according to the following allocations:
Representatives, Twelve Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱12,500,000)
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
each; Senators, Eighteen Million Pesos (₱18,000,000) each; Vice-President,

Twenty Million Pesos (₱20,000,000).
The Fund shall be released semi-annually by way of Special Allotment Release

Order and Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the designated implementing
agency not later than thirty (30) days after the beginning of each semester upon
submission of the list of projects and activities by the officials concerned.
(Emphases supplied)
33 Special Provision 2 of the 1994 CDF Article, Special Provision 2 of the 1995
CDF Article and Special Provision 2 of the 1996 CDF Article are similarly worded
as follows:
2. Submission of [Quarterly (1994)/Semi-Annual (1995 and 1996)] Reports.

The Department of Budget and Management shall submit within thirty (30)
days after the end of each [quarter (1994)/semester (1995 and 1996)] a report to
the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance
on the releases made from this Fund. The report shall include the listing of the
projects, locations, implementing agencies [stated (order of committees
interchanged in 1994 and 1996)] and the endorsing officials. (Emphases
supplied)
Special Provisions
xxxx
2. Publication of Countrywide Development Fund Projects. Within thirty (30)

days after the signing of this Act into law, the Members of Congress and the
Vice-President shall, in consultation with the implementing agency concerned,
submit to the Department of Budget and Management the list of fifty percent
(50%) of projects to be funded from the allocation from the Countrywide
Development Fund which shall be duly endorsed by the Senate President and
the Chairman of the Committee on Finance in the case of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee
on Appropriations in the case of the House of Representatives, and the
remaining fifty percent (50%) within six (6) months thereafter. The list shall
identify the specific projects, location, implementing agencies, and target
beneficiaries and shall be the basis for the release of funds. The said list shall
be published in a newspaper of general circulation by the Department of
Budget and Management. No funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for
projects not included in the list herein required. (Emphases supplied)
35 See Special Provision 2, 1997 CDF Article; id.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Special Provisions
xxxx
2. Publication of Countrywide Development Fund Projects. x x x PROVIDED,

That said publication is not a requirement for the release of funds. x x x x
(Emphases supplied)
38 Id.
49 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 335-336, citing Parreño, Earl, "Perils of Pork,"
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, June 3-4, 1998. Available at
<http://pcij.org/stories/1998/pork.html>
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 RA 8745 entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE

OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE,
NINETEEN HUNDRED NINETY NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
43 Special Provision 1, Article XLII, Food Security Program Fund, RA 8745

provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Fund. The amount herein authorized shall be used to
support the Food Security Program of the government, which shall include
farm-to-market roads, post harvest facilities and other agricultural related
infrastructures. Releases from this fund shall be made directly to the
implementing agency subject to prior consultation with the Members of
Congress concerned. (Emphases supplied)
44 Special Provision 1, Article XLIX,
Lingap Para sa Mahihirap
Program Fund, RA 8745 provides:

1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Fund. The amount herein appropriated for the Lingap
Para sa Mahihirap Program Fund shall be used exclusively to satisfy the
minimum basic needs of poor communities and disadvantaged sectors:
PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the implementing
agency upon prior consultation with the Members of Congress concerned.
(Emphases supplied)
45 Special Provision 1, Article L, Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program

Fund, RA 8745 provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Fund. The amount herein authorized shall be used to
fund infrastructure requirements of the rural/urban areas which shall be
released directly to the implementing agency upon prior consultation with the
respective Members of Congress. (Emphases supplied)
46 Special Provision 1, Article XLIX, RA 8760 (2000 PDAF Article) provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to
fund priority programs and projects as indicated under Purpose 1: PROVIDED,
That such amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency
concerned upon prior consultation with the respective Representative of the
District: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the herein allocation may be realigned
as necessary to any expense category: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That no amount
shall be used to fund personal services and other personal benefits. (Emphases
supplied)
47 See Special Provision 1, 2000 PDAF Article; id.
48 Section 25 (7), Article VI, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (1987

Constitution) provides that
"if, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the
general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and
shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by
the Congress." (Emphasis supplied)
49 Special Provision 1, Article L, RA 9162 (2002 PDAF Article) provides:
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used
to fund priority programs and projects or to fund counterpart for foreign-
assisted programs and projects:
PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the implementing

agency or Local Government Unit concerned. (Emphases supplied)
50 Special Provision 1, Article XLVII, RA 9206, 2003 GAA (2003 PDAF Article)
provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used
to fund priority programs and projects or to fund the required counterpart for
foreign-assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall
be released directly to the implementing agency or Local Government Unit
concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein
may be realigned to any expense class, if deemed necessary: PROVIDED,
FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized
allocations by district may be used for the procurement of rice and other basic
commodities which shall be purchased from the National Food Authority.
51 Special Provision 1, Article XVIII, RA 9206 provides:
Special Provision No. 1 – Restriction on the Delegation of Project

Implementation The implementation of the projects funded herein shall not be
delegated to other agencies, except those projects to be implemented by the
Engineering Brigades of the AFP and inter-department projects undertaken by
other offices and agencies including local government units with demonstrated
capability to actually implement the projects by themselves upon consultation
with the Members of Congress concerned. In all cases the DPWH shall exercise
technical supervision over projects. (Emphasis supplied)
52 Special Provision 3, Article XLII, RA 9206 provides:
Special Provision No. 3 – Submission of the List of School Buildings Within 30

days after the signing of this Act into law, (DepEd) after consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned, shall submit to DBM the list
of 50% of school buildings to be constructed every municipality x x x. The list
as submitted shall be the basis for the release of funds. (Emphasis supplied)
53 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 557.
54 Special Provision 1, Article L, RA 9336 (2005 PDAF Article) provides:
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Special Provision(s)
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount appropriated herein shall be used
to fund priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the
national government and shall be released directly to the implementing
agencies as indicated hereunder, to wit:
PARTICULARS PROGRAM/PROJECT IMPLEMENTING

AGENCY
A. Education Purchase of IT Equipment DepEd/TESDA/
CHED/SUCs/LGUs
Scholarship TESDA/CHED/
SUCs/LGUs
B. Health Assistance to Indigent DOH/Specialty
Patients Confined at the Hospitals
Hospitals Under DOH
Including Specialty Hospitals
Assistance to Indigent LGUs
Patients at the Hospitals
Devolved to LGUs and RHUs
Insurance Premium Philhealth
C. Livelihood/ Small & Medium DTI/TLRC/DA/CDA
CIDSS Enterprise/Livelihood
Comprehensive Integrated DSWD
Delivery of Social Services
D. Rural Barangay/Rural DOE/NEA
Electrification Electrification
E. Water Supply Construction of Water System DPWH
Installation of LGUs
Pipes/Pumps/Tanks
F. Financial Specific Programs and LGUs
Assistance Projects to Address the Pro-
Poor Programs of
Government
G. Public Work Construction/Repair/ DPWH
Rehabilitation of the
following: Roads and
Bridges/Flood Control/School
buildings Hospitals Health
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Facilities/Public
Markets/Multi-Purpose
Buildings/Multi-Purpose
Pavements
H. Irrigation Construction/Repair/ DA-NIA
Rehabilitation of Irrigation
Facilities
(Emphasis supplied)
55 Id.
56 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 558.
57 See Special Provision 1, Article XLVII, RA 9401.
58 See Special Provision 1, Article XLVI, RA 9498.
59 See Special Provision 1, Article XLIX, RA 9524.
60 See Special Provision 1, Article XLVII, RA 9970.
61 For instance, Special Provisions 2 and 3, Article XLIII, RA 9336 providing for
the 2005 DepEd School Building Program, and Special Provisions 1 and 16, Article
XVIII, RA 9401 providing for the 2007 DPWH Regular Budget respectively state:
2005 DepEd School Building Program Special Provision No. 2 – Allocation of
School Buildings: The amount allotted under Purpose 1 shall be apportioned as
follows: (1) fifty percent (50%) to be allocated pro-rata according to each legislative
districts student population x x x; (2) forty percent (40%) to be allocated only among
those legislative districts with classroom shortages x x x; (3) ten percent (10%) to be
allocated in accordance x x x.
Special Provision No. 3 – Submission of the List of School Buildings: Within

30 days after the signing of this Act into law, the DepEd after consultation with
the representative of the legislative districts concerned, shall submit to DBM
the list of fifty percent (50%) of school buildings to be constructed in every
municipality x x x. The list as submitted shall be the basis for the release of
funds x x x. (Emphases supplied)
2007 DPWH Regular Budget
Special Provision No. 1 – Restriction on Delegation of Project Implementation:

The implementation of the project funded herein shall not be delegated to other
agencies, except those projects to be implemented by the AFP Corps of
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Engineers, and inter-department projects to be undertaken by other offices and

agencies, including local government units (LGUs) with demonstrated
capability to actually implement the project by themselves upon consultation
with the representative of the legislative district concerned x x x.
Special Provision No. 16 – Realignment of Funds: The Secretary of Public

Works and Highways is authorized to realign funds released from
appropriations x x x from one project/scope of work to another: PROVIDED,
that x x x (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
62 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566) , p. 559, citing Section 2.A of RA 9358, otherwise
known as the "Supplemental Budget for 2006."
63 Id. at 559-560.
64 "As a primary aspect of the Philippine Government's public procurement reform

agenda, the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) was established by
virtue of Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. 9184) as an independent inter-agency body
that is impartial, transparent and effective, with private sector representation. As
established in Section 63 of R.A. 9184, the GPPB shall have the following duties
and responsibilities: 1. To protect national interest in all matters affecting public
procurement, having due regard to the country's regional and international
obligations; 2. To formulate and amend public procurement policies, rules and
regulations, and amend, whenever necessary, the implementing rules and regulations
Part A (IRR-A); 3. To prepare a generic procurement manual and standard bidding
forms for procurement; 4. To ensure the proper implementation by the procuring
entities of the Act, its IRR-A and all other relevant rules and regulations pertaining
to public procurement; 5. To establish a sustainable training program to develop the
capacity of Government procurement officers and employees, and to ensure the
conduct of regular procurement training programs by the procuring entities; and 6.
To conduct an annual review of the effectiveness of the Act and recommend any
amendments thereto, as may be necessary.
x x x x" <http://www.gppb.gov.ph/about_us/gppb.html> (visited October 23, 2013).
65 Entitled "AMENDMENT OF SECTION 53 OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES

AND REGULATIONS PART A OF REPUBLIC ACT 9184 AND PRESCRIBING
GUIDELINES ON PARTICIPATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT," approved June 29, 2007.
66 Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MODERNIZATION,

STANDARDIZATION AND REGULATION OF THE PROCUREMENT
ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
67 Sec. 48. Alternative Methods. - Subject to the prior approval of the Head of the
Procuring Entity or his duly authorized representative, and whenever justified by the
conditions provided in this Act, the Procuring Entity may, in order to promote
economy and efficiency, resort to any of the following alternative methods of
Procurement:
xxxx
(e) Negotiated Procurement - a method of Procurement that may be resorted

under the extraordinary circumstances provided for in Section 53 of this Act
and other instances that shall be specified in the IRR, whereby the Procuring
Entity directly negotiates a contract with a technically, legally and financially
capable supplier, contractor or consultant.
xxxx
68 As defined in Section 5(o) of RA 9184, the term "Procuring Entity" refers to any
branch, department, office, agency, or instrumentality of the government, including
state universities and colleges, government-owned and/or - controlled corporations,
government financial institutions, and local government units procuring Goods,
Consulting Services and Infrastructure Projects.
69 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 564, citing GPPB Resolution 12-2007.
70 Special Provision 2, Article XLIV, RA 10147 (2011 PDAF Article) provides:
2. Allocation of Funds. The total projects to be identified by legislators and the

Vice-President shall not exceed the following amounts:
a. Total of Seventy Million Pesos (₱70,000,000) broken down into Forty

Million Pesos (₱40,000,000) for Infrastructure Projects and Thirty Million
Pesos (₱30,000,000) for soft projects of Congressional Districts or Party List
Representatives;
b. Total of Two Hundred Million Pesos (₱200,000,000) broken down into One
Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000) for Infrastructure Projects and One
Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000) for soft projects of Senators and the
Vice President.
71 See Special Provision 4, 2011 PDAF Article.
72 Special Provision 2, Article XLIV, RA 10155 (2012 PDAF Article) provides: 2.

Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries
shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing
agency. Furthermore, preference shall be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
class municipalities or indigents identified under the National Household Targeting

System for Poverty Reduction by the DSWD.
For this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said
priority list, standard or design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this
Act. (Emphasis supplied)
73 RA 10352, passed and approved by Congress on December 19, 2012 and signed
into law by the President on December 19, 2012. Special Provision 2, Article XLIV,
RA 10352 (2013 PDAF Article) provides:
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of

beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by
each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to
projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified
under the NHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the implementing agency
shall submit to Congress said priority list, standard or design within ninety (90)
days from effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
74 The permissive treatment of the priority list requirement in practice was revealed
during the Oral Arguments (TSN, October 10, 2013, p. 143):
Justice Leonen: x x x In Section 2 meaning, Special Provision 2, it mentions

priority list of implementing agencies. Have the implementing agencies indeed
presented priority list to the Members of Congress before disbursement?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: My understanding is, is not really, Your Honor.

Justice Leonen: So, in other words, the PDAF was expended without the
priority list requirements of the implementing agencies?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: That is so much in the CoA Report, Your Honor.
75 See Special Provision 3 of the 2012 PDAF Article and Special Provision 3 of the
2013 PDAF Article.
76 Special Provision 6 of the 2012 PDAF Article provides:
6. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed

once. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Environment and
Natural Resources, Health, Interior and Local Government, Public Works and
Highways, and Social Welfare and Development are also authorized to approve
realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received
from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects,
realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as
the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the
original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
legislator concerned. The DBM must be informed in writing of any realignment

approved within five (5) calendar days from its approval.
Special Provision 4 of the 2013 PDAF Article provides:
4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed

once. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social
Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to
approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment
received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects,
realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as
the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the
original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the
legislator concerned. The DBM must be informed in writing of any realignment
approved within five (5) calendar days from approval thereof: PROVIDED,
That any realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the same
classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1
hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications
and revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall
certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been
deposited back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall

be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be. (Emphases supplied)
Special Provision(s) 1. Use of Fund. The amount appropriated herein shall be

used to fund the following priority programs and projects to be implemented by
the corresponding agencies:
xxxx
PROVIDED, That this Fund shall not be used for the payment of Personal
Services expenditures: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That all procurement shall
comply with the provisions of R.A. No. 9184 and its Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That for infrastructure
projects, LGUs may only be identified as implementing agencies if they have
the technical capability to implement the same. (Emphasis supplied)
2. Project Identification. x x x.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
xxxx
All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and

scholarships, identified by a member of the House of Representatives outside of
his/her legislative district shall have the written concurrence of the member of
the House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary legislative district,
endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
79 See Special Provision 4 of the 2013 PDAF Article; supra note 76.
80 Sec. 8.
Appropriations. The sum of Five Million Pesos out of any available funds from
the National Treasury is hereby appropriated and authorized to be released for
the organization of the Board and its initial operations. Henceforth, funds
sufficient to fully carry out the functions and objectives of the Board shall be
appropriated every fiscal year in the General Appropriations Act.
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including
receipts from service contracts and agreements such as application and
processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money
collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines
and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share
representing royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and similar
payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy
resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President. (Emphasis supplied)
81 Entitled "CREATING AN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT BOARD, DEFINING

ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS, THEREFOR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
82 See First Whereas Clause of PD 910.
83 See <http://malampaya.com/> (visited October 17, 2013).
84 Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate
gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise shall be immediately set aside
and allocated to fund the following infrastructure and socio-civil projects within the
Metropolitan Manila Area:
(a) Flood Control

1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
(b) Sewerage and Sewage
(c) Nutritional Control
(d) Population Control
(e) Tulungan ng Bayan Centers
(f) Beautification
(g) Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) projects; provided, that should

the aggregate gross earning be less than ₱150,000,000.00, the amount to be
allocated to fund the above-mentioned project shall be equivalent to sixty
(60%) percent of the aggregate gross earning.
In addition to the priority infrastructure and socio-civic projects with the

Metropolitan Manila specifically enumerated above, the share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings derived by the Corporate from this
Franchise may also be appropriated and allocated to fund and finance
infrastructure and/or socio-civic projects throughout the Philippines as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
85 Entitled "CONSOLIDATING AND AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE

NOS. 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 AND 1632, RELATIVE TO THE
FRANCHISE AND POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)."
86 Entitled "AMENDING SECTION TWELVE OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE

NO. 1869-CONSOLIDATING AND AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NOS. 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 AND 1632, R ELATIVE TO THE F
RANCHISE AND POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND G
AMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)." While the parties have confined their
discussion to Section 12 of PD 1869, the Court takes judicial notice of its
amendment and perforce deems it apt to resolve the constitutionality of the
amendatory provision.
87 Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, now reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent
as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the government in the
aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the
aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall immediately be set
aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of
the President of the Philippines.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
88 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 301.
89 CDF/PDAF ALLOCATION FROM 1990 -2013.
1990…………… ₱2,300,000,000.00
1991…………… P 2,300,000,000.00
1992…………… P 2,480,000,000.00
1993…………… P 2,952,000,000.00
1994…………… P 2,977,000,000.00
1995…………… P 3,002,000,000.00
1996…………… P 3,014,500,000.00
1997…………… P 2,583,450,000.00
1998…………… P 2,324,250,000.00
1999…………… P 1,517,800,000.00 (Food Security Program Fund)
…………… P 2,500,000,000.00 (Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund)
…………… P 5,458,277,000.00 (Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure

Program Fund)
2000…………… P 3,330,000,000.00
2001…………… 2000 GAA re-enacted
2002…………… P 5,677,500,000.00
2003…………… P 8,327,000,000.00
2005…………… P 6,100,000,000.00
2007…………… P 11,445,645,000.00
2008…………… P 7,892,500,000.00
2009…………… P 9,665,027,000.00
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
2010…………… P 10,861,211,000.00
2011…………… P 24,620,000,000.00
2012…………… P 24,890,000,000.00
2013…………… P 24,790,000,000.00
90 "Pork as a tool for political patronage, however, can extend as far as the
executive branch. It is no accident, for instance, that the release of the allocations
often coincides with the passage of a Palace-sponsored bill.
That pork funds have grown by leaps and bounds in the last decade can be
traced to presidents in need of Congress support. The rise in pork was
particularly notable during the Ramos administration, when the president and
House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. used generous fund releases to convince
congressmen to support Malacañang-initiated legislation. The Ramos era, in
fact, became known as the ‘golden age of pork.‘
Through the years, though, congressmen have also taken care to look after their
very own. More often than not, pork-barrel funds are funneled to projects in
towns and cities where the lawmakers' own relatives have been elected to
public office; thus, pork is a tool for building family power as well. COA has
come across many instances where pork-funded projects ended up directly
benefiting no less than the lawmaker or his or her relatives."(CHUA, YVONNE
T. and CRUZ, BOOMA, "Pork is a Political, Not A Developmental, Tool."
<http://pcij.org/stories/2004/pork.html> [visited October 22, 2013].)
91 With reports from Inquirer Research and Salaverria, Leila, "Candazo, first
whistle-blower on pork barrel scam, dies; 61," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 20,
2013, <http://newsinfo. inquirer.net/469439/candazo-first-whistle-blower-on-pork-
barrel-scam-dies-61> (visited October 21, 2013.)
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and

Management, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373, 387.
96 Carvajal, Nancy, " NBI probes ₱10-B scam," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 12,
2013 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/443297/nbi-probes-p10-b-scam> (visited October
21, 2013).
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
97 Id.
98 See NBI Executive Summary. <http://www.gov.ph/2013/09/16/executive-

summary-by-the-nbi-on-the- pdaf-complaints-filed-against-janet-lim-napoles-et-al/>
(visited October 22, 2013).
99 Pursuant to Office Order No. 2010-309 dated May 13, 2010.
100 During the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson referred to the VILP as "the
source of the so called HARD project, hard portion x x x "under the title the Budget
of the DPWH." TSN, October 8, 2013, p. 69.
101 These implementing agencies included the Department of Agriculture, DPWH

and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The GOCCs
included Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC)/Technology
Resource Center (TRC), National Livelihood Development Corporation (NLDC),
National Agribusiness Corporation (NABCOR), and the Zamboanga del Norte
Agricultural College (ZNAC) Rubber Estate Corporation (ZREC). CoA
Chairperson‘s Memorandum. Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 546. See also CoA
Report, p. 14.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 546-547.
104 Carvajal, Nancy, ―Malampaya fund lost ₱900M in JLN racket‖, Philippine
Daily Inquirer, July 16, 2013 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/445585/malampaya-fund-
lost-p900m-in-jln-racket> (visited October 21, 2013.)
105 TSN, October 8, 2013, p. 119.
106 Rollo (G.R. No. 208493), pp. 9 and 341.
107 The Court observes that petitioners have not presented sufficient averments on
the remittances from the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office‖ nor have defined
the scope of "the Executive‘s Lump Sum Discretionary Funds" (See rollo [G.R. No.
208566], pp. 47-49) which appears to be too broad and all-encompassing. Also,
while Villegas filed a Supplemental Petition dated October 1, 2013 (Supplemental
Petition, see rollo [G.R. No. 208566], pp. 213-220, and pp. 462-464) particularly
presenting their arguments on the Disbursement Acceleration Program, the same is
the main subject of G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164, 209260, 209287,
209442, 209517, and 209569 and thus, must be properly resolved therein. Hence, for
these reasons, insofar as the Presidential Pork Barrel is concerned, the Court is
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
constrained not to delve on any issue related to the above-mentioned funds and
consequently confine its discussion only with respect to the issues pertaining to the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
108 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 48-49.
109 Id. at 48.
110 To note, Villegas‘ Supplemental Petition was filed on October 2, 2013.
111 Rollo, (G.R. No. 208566), p. 342; and rollo (G.R. No. 209251), pp. 6-7.
112 Re-docketed as G.R. No. 209251 upon Nepomuceno‘s payment of docket fees
on October 16, 2013 as reflected on the Official Receipt No. 0079340. Rollo (G.R.
No. 209251) p. 409.
113 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566) p. 97.
114 G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 & 113888, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506.
115 Supra note 95.
116 Entitled "CREATING AN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT BOARD, DEFINING

ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS, THEREFOR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
117 Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, August
24, 1993, 225 SCRA 568, 575.
118 Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December
7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 148.
119 Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, supra note 117, at 575.
120 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council,

G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, and 179461, October 5, 2010,
632 SCRA 146, 175.
121 Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines

Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893,
183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 450.
122 Id. at 450-451.

1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
123 Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, and
183599, October 19, 2010, 633 SCRA 470, 493, citing Province of North Cotabato
v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
(GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008,
568 SCRA 402, 405.
124 Id. at 492, citing Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346 (1913).
125 Baldo, Jr. v. Commision on Elections, G.R. No. 176135, June 16, 2009, 589
SCRA 306, 310.
126 TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 79-81.
127 Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 17. The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
128 Sec. 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. – Except as otherwise

provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the public
interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is
authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any
agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act,
except for personal services appropriations used for permanent officials and
employees.
129 Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, G.R. No. 166886, July 30, 2008, 560 SCRA 504, 514,
citing Constantino v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 140656 and
154482, September 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 205, 219-220.
130 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 292.
131 G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013.
132 TSN, October 10, 2013, p. 134.
133 Section 22, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the
opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill,
a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from
existing and proposed revenue measures.
134 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 294.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
135 Id. at 5.
136 G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.
137 Id. at 665.
138 See Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, supra note 123, at 492.
139 369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962].
140 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 295-296.
141 Tañada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 1101 (1957) unreported case.
142 406 Phil. 1 (2001).
143 Id. at 42-43.
144 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
145 La Bugal- B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 890
(2004).
146 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 349.
147 Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Honorable Vicente Q. Roxas, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 227, G.R. No. 125509, January 31,
2007, 513 SCRA 457, 470.
148 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870,
November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 421.
149 TSN, October 8, 2013, pp. 184-185.
150 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937).
151 See Lanuza v. CA, G.R. No. 131394, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 54, 61-62.
152 ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
153 Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association o f the Philippine Islands v.

Remington Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 159422, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 180,
197-198.
154 Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra note 114, at 522.
155 G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.
156 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 325.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 329.
159 Id. at 339.
160 Id. at 338.
161 See note 107.
162 Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra note 144, at 139.
163 Id. at 157.
164 Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
165 Section 1, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
166 Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
168 Government of the Philippine Islands v. Springer, 277 U.S. 189, 203 (1928).
169 Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties
Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No.
11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, 678 SCRA 1, 9-10, citing Carl Baar, Separate But
Subservient: Court Budgeting In The American States 149-52 (1975), cited in
Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent
Judicial Powers, 52 Md. L. Rev. 217 (1993).
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
170 Id. at 10, citing Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court
Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 Md. L. Rev. 217 (1993).
171 See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 441-446 and
451-452 (1977) and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), cited in Justice
Powell‘s concurring opinion in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
172 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952),
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 203 (1928) cited in Justice Powell’s
concurring opinion in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983).
173 273 Phil. 443 (1991).
174 Id. at 461. "3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the
budget process covers the various operational aspects of budgeting. The
establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities, the continuing review of government fiscal position,
the regulation of funds releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and
other related activities comprise this phase of the budget cycle."
175 Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note 118, at 158.
176 Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, supra note 173, at 460-461.
177 Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at 294-296.
178 Id. at 287.
179 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 179.
180 Id. at 29.
181 Id. at 24.
182 Id. at 86.
183 Id. at 308.
184 Id.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
185 See CDF Articles for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and
1998.
186 See PDAF Article for the year 2000 which was re-enacted in 2001. See also the
following 1999 CIAs: "Food Security Program Fund," the " Lingap Para Sa
Mahihirap Program Fund," and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure
Program Fund." See further the 1997 DepEd School Building Fund.
187 See PDAF Article for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and
2013.
188 Also, in Section 2.1 of DBM Circular No. 547 dated January 18, 2013 (DBM
Circular 547-13), or the "Guidelines on the Release of Funds Chargeable Against the
Priority Development Assistance Fund for FY 2013," it is explicitly stated that the
"PDAF shall be used to fund priority programs and projects identified by the
Legislators from the Project Menu." (Emphasis supplied)
189 To note, Special Provision 4 cannot – as respondents submit – refer to

realignment of projects since the same provision subjects the realignment to the
condition that the "allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original
project/scope of work". The foregoing proviso should be read as a textual reference
to the savings requirement stated under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which pertinently provides that "x x x the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. In addition,
Sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 of DBM Circular 547-13, the implementing rules of
the 2013 PDAF Article, respectively require that: (a) "the allotment is still valid or
has not yet lapsed"; (b) "requests for realignment of unobligated allotment as of
December 31, 2012 treated as continuing appropriations in FY 2013 shall be
submitted to the DBM not later than June 30, 2013"; and (c) requests for
realignment shall be supported with, among others, a "certification of availability of
funds." As the letter of the law and the guidelines related thereto evoke the legal
concept of savings, Special Provision 4 must be construed to be a provision on
realignment of PDAF funds, which would necessarily but only incidentally include
the projects for which the funds have been allotted to. To construe it otherwise
would effectively allow PDAF funds to be realigned outside the ambit of the
foregoing provision, thereby sanctioning a constitutional aberration.
190 Aside from the sharing of the executive‘s realignment authority with legislators
in violation of the separation of powers principle, it must be pointed out that Special
Provision 4, insofar as it confers fund realignment authority to department
secretaries, is already unconstitutional by itself. As recently held in Nazareth v.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Villar (Nazareth), G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 385, 403-404,
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, limiting the authority to augment,
is "strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive" in favor of the high officials
named therein. As such, the authority to realign funds allocated to the implementing
agencies is exclusively vested in the President, viz.:
It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer
savings only to augment another item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably
construed as exclusive. As the Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections:
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the
general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The
exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions.
Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the
enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the
latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all
others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule
to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something

from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the
scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an
exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases
not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence,
any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the
exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in
many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is
limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The cogence of the Nazareth dictum is not enfeebled by an invocation of the

doctrine of qualified political agency (otherwise known as the "alter ego
doctrine") for the bare reason that the same is not applicable when the
Constitution itself requires the President himself to act on a particular matter,
such as that instructed under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. As
held in the landmark case of Villena v. Secretary of Interior (67 Phil. 451
[1987]), constitutional imprimatur is precisely one of the exceptions to the
application of the alter ego doctrine, viz.:
After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the

government in this case on the board proposition, albeit not suggested, that
under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and
considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
191 Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at 294-296.
192 TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 16, 17, 18, and 23.
193 TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 72-73.
194 Aside from its conceptual origins related to the separation of powers principle,
Corwin, in his commentary on Constitution of the United States made the following
observations:
At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the

principle that legislative power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of
separation of powers: Why go to the trouble of separating the three powers of
government if they can straightway remerge on their own motion? The second
is the concept of due process of law, which precludes the transfer of regulatory
functions to private persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of agency "Delegata
potestas non potest delegari," which John Locke borrowed and formulated as a
dogma of political science . . . Chief Justice Taft offered the following
explanation of the origin and limitations of this idea as a postulate of
constitutional law: "The well-known maxim ‘delegata potestas non potest
delefari,‘ applicable to the law of agency in the general common law, is well
understood and has had wider application in the construction of our Federal and
State Constitutions than it has in private law . . . The Federal and State
Constitutions than it has in private law . . . The Federal Constitution and State
Constitutions of this country divide the governmental power into three branches
. . . In carrying out that constitutional division . . . it is a breach of the National
fundamental law if Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to
the President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it attempts to invest itself or
its members with either executive power of judicial power. This is not to say
that the three branches are not co-ordinate parts of one government and that
each in the field of its duties may not invoke government and that each in the
field of its duties may not invoke the action of the two other branches in so far
as the action invoked shall not be an assumption of the constitutional field of
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
action of another branch. In determining what it may do in seeking assistance

from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed
according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental
coordination. (Emphases supplied)
195 Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
196 See Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 702 (1919).
197 See Section 23(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
198 See Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
199 Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at 288.
200 169 Phil. 437, 447-448 (1977).
201 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra note 114, at 522.
202 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, 62 Phil. 912, 916 (1936).
204 Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at 287.
205 Id. at 292.
206 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, supra note 202, at 916-917.
207 "Log-rolling legislation refers to the process in which several provisions

supported by an individual legislator or minority of legislators are combined into a
single piece of legislation supported by a majority of legislators on a quid pro quo
basis: no one provision may command majority support, but the total package will.”
See Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 420, citing Briffault, Richard, ―The Item Veto in
State Courts,‖ 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1171, 1177 (1993).
208 Passarello, Nicholas, "The Item Veto and the Threat of Appropriations Bundling
in Alaska," 30 Alaska Law Review 128 (2013), citing Black‘s Law Dictionary 1700
(9th ed. 2009). <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/alr/vol30/iss1/5> (visited October
23, 2013).
209 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
210 299 U.S. 410 (1937).
211 To note, in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. (G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990, 191
SCRA 452, 465), citing Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 S.E., 2d 120, 176 Va. 281),
the Court defined an item of appropriation as "an indivisible sum of money
dedicated to a stated purpose." In this relation, Justice Carpio astutely explained that
an "item" is indivisible because the amount cannot be divided for any purpose other
than the specific purpose stated in the item.
212 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 421.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 316.
215 Id. at 421.
216 Id. at 566.
217 Id. at 567.
218 "It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble
intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then
again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: ‘The end does not justify
the means.‘ No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act,
but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. The Court cannot just turn
a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its
enshrined principles. ‘The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to
the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor
greed for power debase its rectitude.‘" (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of
2010, supra note 118, 177; citations omitted)
219 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 406.
220 Id. at 407.
221 Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 2003 Edition, p. 1108.
222 Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155.
223 See Section 22, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
224 See Section 21, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
225 Rollo (G.R. No. 208493), p. 9.
226 See Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004,
427 SCRA 96, 100-101.
227 Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF

1991."
228 230 Phil. 379, 387-388 (1986).
229 Id.
230 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 95-96.
231 Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra note 114, at 523.
Philippines, "Understanding the ‘Pork Barrel,‘"
<http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ 14th/pork_barrel.pdf > (visited October 17,
2013).
233 <http://www.gov.ph/2013/08/23/english-statement-of-president-aquino-on-the-
abolition-of-pdaf-august-23-2013/> (visited October 22, 2013).
234 Section 106 of the LGC provides:
Sec. 106. Local Development Councils. – (a) Each local government unit shall
have a comprehensive multi-sectoral development plan to be initiated by its
development council and approved by its sanggunian. For this purpose, the
development council at the provincial, city, municipal, or barangal level, shall
assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and
social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction.
235 See Section 109 of the LGC.
236 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 423.
237 Id. at 427.
238 Id. at 439-440.

1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
239 Id. at 434 and 441.
240 See Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, supra note 173, where the Court upheld the
constitutionality of certain automatic appropriation laws for debt servicing although
said laws did not readily indicate the exact amounts to be paid considering that "the
amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the
decrees"; hence, "the Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be
disbursed for debt servicing." To note, such laws vary in great degree with the way
the 2013 PDAF Article works considering that: (a) individual legislators and not the
executive make the determinations; (b) the choice of both the amount and the project
are to be subsequently made after the law is passed and upon the sole discretion of
the legislator, unlike in Guingona, Jr. where the amount to be appropriated is
dictated by the contingency external to the discretion of the disbursing authority; and
(c) in Guingona, Jr. there is no effective control of the funds since as long as the
contingency arises money shall be automatically appropriated therefor, hence what
is left is merely law execution and not legislative discretion.
241 Id. at 462.
242 23 Nev. 25 (1895).
243 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 438.
244 Id. at 300.
245 The project identifications made by the Executive should always be in the
nature of law enforcement and, hence, for the sole purpose of enforcing an existing
appropriation law. In relation thereto, it may exercise its rule-making authority to
greater particularize the guidelines for such identifications which, in all cases,
should not go beyond what the delegating law provides. Also, in all cases, the
Executive‘s identification or rule-making authority, insofar as the field of
appropriations is concerned, may only arise if there is a valid appropriation law
under the parameters as above-discussed.
246 Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155.
247 See Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Edition, pp. 686-687, citing Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 15 SCRA 569, 576-577 (1965).
248 Id. at 277.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
249 § 438 Ejusdem Generis ("of the same kind"); specific words; 82 C.J.S. Statutes
§ 438.
250 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 437, citing § 438 Ejusdem Generis ("of the same
kind"); specific words; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 438.
251 Based on a July 5, 2011 posting in the government’s website

<http://www.gov.ph/2011/07/05/budget-secretary-abad-clarifies-nature-of-
malampaya-fund/>; attached as Annex "A" to the Petitioners‘ Memorandum), the
Malampaya Funds were also used for non-energy related projects, to wit:
The rest of the 98.73 percent or ₱19.39 billion was released for non-energy
related projects: 1) in 2006, ₱1 billion for the Armed Forces Modernization
Fund; 2) in 2008, ₱4 billion for the Department of Agriculture; 3) in 2009, a
total of ₱14.39 billion to various agencies, including: ₱7.07 billion for the
Department of Public Works and Highways; ₱2.14 billion for the Philippine
National Police; ₱1.82 billion for [the Department of Agriculture]; ₱1.4 billion
for the National Housing Authority; and ₱900 million for the Department of
Agrarian Reform.
252 For academic purposes, the Court expresses its disagreement with petitioners‘
argument that the previous version of Section 12 of PD 1869 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power since it allows the President to broadly determine the
purpose of the Presidential Social Fund‘s use and perforce must be declared
unconstitutional. Quite the contrary, the 1st paragraph of the said provision clearly
indicates that the Presidential Social Fund shall be used to finance specified types of
priority infrastructure and socio-civic projects, namely, Flood Control, Sewerage and
Sewage, Nutritional Control, Population Control, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers,
Beautification and Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) projects located within
the Metropolitan Manila area. However, with regard to the stated geographical-
operational limitation, the 2nd paragraph of the same provision nevertheless allows
the Presidential Social Fund to finance "priority infrastructure and socio-civic
projects throughout the Philippines as may be directed and authorized by the Office
of the President of the Philippines." It must, however, be qualified that the 2nd
paragraph should not be construed to mean that the Office of the President may
direct and authorize the use of the Presidential Social Fund to any kind of
infrastructure and socio-civic project throughout the Philippines. Pursuant to the
maxim of noscitur a sociis , (meaning, that a word or phrase‘s "correct construction
may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is
founded or with which it is associated"; see Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,
G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579, 598-599) the 2nd paragraph should
be construed only as an expansion of the geographical-operational limitation stated
in the 1st paragraph of the same provision and not a grant of carte blanche authority
to the President to veer away from the project types specified thereunder. In other
words, what the 2nd paragraph merely allows is the use of the Presidential Social
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
Fund for Flood Control, Sewerage and Sewage, Nutritional Control, Population
Control, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Beautification and Kilusang Kabuhayan at
Kaunlaran (KKK) projects even though the same would be located outside the
Metropolitan Manila area. To deem it otherwise would be tantamount to unduly
expanding the rule-making authority of the President in violation of the sufficient
standard test and, ultimately, the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
253 Black‘s Law Dictionary (7th Ed., 1999), p. 784.
254 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 48-49.
255 Id.
256 234 Phil. 521, 533-534 (1987).
257 252 Phil. 264 (1989).
258 Id. at 279
259 Id. at 278.
260 Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 463.
261 Id. at 459-462.
262 Id. at 304-305.
263 <http://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/BESE/BESE2013/Glossary.pdf>
(visited November 4, 2013).
264 Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA). Cash authority issued by the DBM to central,
regional and provincial offices and operating units through the authorized
government servicing banks of the MDS,* to cover the cash requirements of the
agencies.
*MDS stands for Modified Disbursement Scheme. It is a procedure

whereby disbursements by NG agencies chargeable against the account of
the Treasurer of the Philippines are effected through GSBs.**
** GSB stands for Government Servicing Banks. (Id.)
265 TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 35-36.
1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No. 208566
266 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, G.R. No.
187485, October 8, 2013, citing Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank,
148 Phil. 443, 447-448 (1971).
267 Id.
268 Id.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Belgica vs. Executive Secretary

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Belgica vs. Executive Secretary

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Belgica vs. Executive Secretary

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1/25/23, 11:30 PM G.R. No.

Today is Wednesday, January 25, 2023

♦ Decision, Perlas-Bernabe [J]

♦ Concurring Opinion, Carpio [J]

♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonen [J]

♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Brion [J]

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA,

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former

"Experience is the oracle of truth."1

I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.

"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum,

II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the

In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).

While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently

Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).

D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).

The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the

Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).

F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).

The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely

national government and shall be released directly to the implementing

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the

Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the

● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of

● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of

● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having

● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the

● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the

● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred

● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods

V. The Procedural Antecedents.

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez,

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a

National Economic Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed

The Issues Before the Court

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.