Issue: Whether or not a violation of the Ordinance is classified under 

mala prohibita.

Ruling: No. The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality.
Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral
man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men.
The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but
not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of
democracy.

The City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna
baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first
clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such other events or
activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or
annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to
protect the social and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the second and third clauses,
respectively of the same Section.  The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458
(a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which
indicates that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit
closely related to justify being put together in a single enumeration or paragraph. These powers,
111 

therefore, should not be confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and

unified power of regulation, suppression and prohibition. 1

The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit"sumed power to prohibit"
"Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to
disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of
the community."

Duty of the Court in Connection with Acts Which Should Be Repressed but Which are Not Covered by
the Law, and in Cases of Excessive Penalties.

Is criminal negligence or imprudence punished under Article

365 subject to the rule on complex crimes under Article 48?

The answer is in the negative; quasi-crimes under Article 365 cannot be

"complexed" under Article 48. The Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro (G.R. No.
172716; November 17, 2010) case has settled this and Justice Carpio
wrote it with magisterial dexterity.

Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple

felonies falling under either of two categories. The first category is when
a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
excluding from its operation light felonies). The second category is when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. Article 48 as a
procedural tool was created by the Legislative Branch to benefit the
accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the
maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

On the other hand, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the
mental attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight," a single mental
attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime
resulting in one or more consequences. Remember, Article 365 is a crime.

In the ordinary course of things, Article 48 and Article 365 do not collide. They operate in different
spheres. However, the problem arises when a single act of criminal negligence results in damages to
persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. It must
be remembered that under Article 38, light felonies cannot be "complexed."

What should the prosecutor do in such a situation when one act punishable under Article 365 results in
death, damage to property and slight physical injuries? Should she file an two (2) information: one for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property and another for reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries?

To settle this, it must be remember that Article 365 punished the negligent or imprudent act, not the
results. The resulting injury or damage is only material in the determination of the proper imposable
penalty. (See "Is culpa a crime?" [http://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2017/06/is-culpa-crime.html]
for more details.)

According to the Supreme Court, jurisprudence adopts two (2) approaches in the resolution of this
dilemma. Either:

[1] First, the prosecutor allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into
separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime and treat the multiple
consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under the RPC;

[2] Or, the prosecutor treat Article 48 inapplicable in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes,
requiring a single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity but,
thereafter, separately penalizing each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept
of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365.
In making a choice between the two (2) options, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy. Justice Carpio, not losing any ounce of poetic bliss, ends his
ponencia thus:

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article
365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are
conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of
the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply
the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level
court.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection
of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the
beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying
as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article
48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of
quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling. THE COURT GRANTED
IVLER'S PETITION.

Due to a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivlerwas charged before the MeTC of Pasig,
with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case
No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded
guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure.
Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC
refused quashal. Petitioner elevated the matter to the RTC. Petitioner also sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005,
invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC
proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his
arrest.Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but
as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered
his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment.

HELD:

No. Petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of
personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803

The protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366 Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms
of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1,
Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to
"also, upon motion of the appellee or motuproprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence.

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of
Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section
21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his
bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce
the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be
tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto
convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Issues: (1) Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when
the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and (2) Whether petitioner’s
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband.
Ruling: On Petition for Certiorari The RTC dismissed Ivler’s petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its
ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain said petition arising from the MeTC’s order to
arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in the second offense. Thus, without
reaching the merits of the said petition, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing. Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb
the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits,
respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal
Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and
damage to property. In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, the Court granted the Office of the Solicitor
General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a
nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel. Dismissals of appeals grounded on the
appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second
paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124
is a suit to review judgments of convictions. On Double Jeopardy The accused’s negative constitutional
right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among
others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that
the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not." The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same
facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The provisions contained in this article shall not be
applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of
crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. The
doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365. These cases uniformly
barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection
of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the
beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying
as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article
48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of
quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling. WHEREFORE, we GRANT
the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner
Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of
double jeopardy.