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    Ivler vs. Hon. Modesto

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    1) Petitioner Jason Ivler was charged with two offenses stemming from a vehicular collision: reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. 2) Ivler pleaded guilty to the first charge and was convicted, then argued this conviction barred prosecution for the second charge under double jeopardy protections. 3) The Supreme Court agreed, finding reckless imprudence to be a single crime where consequences are only relevant to determining penalty, so Ivler's prior conviction prevented subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

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    Ivler vs. Hon. Modesto

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    1) Petitioner Jason Ivler was charged with two offenses stemming from a vehicular collision: reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. 2) Ivler pleaded guilty to the first charge and was convicted, then argued this conviction barred prosecution for the second charge under double jeopardy protections. 3) The Supreme Court agreed, finding reckless imprudence to be a single crime where consequences are only relevant to determining penalty, so Ivler's prior conviction prevented subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

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    1) Petitioner Jason Ivler was charged with two offenses stemming from a vehicular collision: reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. 2) Ivler pleaded guilty to the first charge and was convicted, then argued this conviction barred prosecution for the second charge under double jeopardy protections. 3) The Supreme Court agreed, finding reckless imprudence to be a single crime where consequences are only relevant to determining penalty, so Ivler's prior conviction prevented subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    18 views3 pages

    Ivler vs. Hon. Modesto

    Uploaded by

    bumble
    1) Petitioner Jason Ivler was charged with two offenses stemming from a vehicular collision: reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. 2) Ivler pleaded guilty to the first charge and was convicted, then argued this conviction barred prosecution for the second charge under double jeopardy protections. 3) The Supreme Court agreed, finding reckless imprudence to be a single crime where consequences are only relevant to determining penalty, so Ivler's prior conviction prevented subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    of 3

    IVLER vs. HON.

    MODESTO

    January 25, 2017


    G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010

    FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the
    Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) reckless imprudence
    resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2)
    reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for the death of respondent Ponce’s
    husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.

    Crimes charged: 1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries; and 2) reckless imprudence
    resulting in homicide and damage to property

    On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in slight
    physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved
    to quash the Information of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for
    placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

    MeTC: denied the motion to quash

    RTC: denied Ivler’s Petition for Certiorari in dismissing his Motion to Quash

    ISSUE: Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
    proceedings in the information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
    damage to property (YES)

    Defense: Ivler argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for
    the same offense bars his prosecution in reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
    property having been previously convicted in reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for
    injuries for the same offense. Ivler submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material
    only to determine his penalty
    HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s conviction in the case of reckless
    imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries bars his prosecution in criminal reckless imprudence
    resulting in homicide and damage to property

    1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only
    to Determine the Penalty

    Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
    lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional
    criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of
    intentional crimes.

    2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
    Quasi-offense

    Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
    prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under
    Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
    intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
    not the result thereof.

    The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify
    the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect
    one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot
    be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

    3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

    Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of
    two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding
    from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
    other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple
    penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
    In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the mental
    attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, a single mental attitude
    regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in
    one or more consequences. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crime resulting in one or
    more consequences.

    Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for
    a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2)
    an offense which is a necessary means for committing another.

    Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity
    of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under
    Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges
    under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

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