Vol 14 Issue 3

ISSN 2334-3745
Volume XIV, Issue 3

June 2020
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 14, Issue 3
Table of Contents
Welcome from the Editors………………………………………………………………..................................1
Articles
Idiosyncratic Terrorism: Disaggregating an Undertheorized Concept……………………..........................2
by Jesse J. Norris
Failed States and Terrorism: Justifiability of Transnational Interventions from a Counterterrorism
Perspective ………………………………………………..............................................................................19
by Aleksandar Pašagić
A Broad Spectrum of Signs of Islamic Radicalisation and Extremism in a Country without a Single
Terrorist Attack: The Case of Slovenia ………………………………..……….............................................29
by Iztok Prezelj & Klemen Kocjancic
Suspect Community: A Product of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts or a Product of Conflict
Dynamics?……………………………………………….……………………...............................................46
by Emma Ylitalo-James
Research Notes
COVID-19 and Terrorism ……………………………………………………..……....................................60
by Gary Ackerman and Hayley Peterson
Countering Terrorist Acts Against Christian Places of Worship ……………………….............................75
by Katalin Pethő-Kiss
Right-Wing Terror A Fifth Global Wave?……………………..……............................................................88
by Vincent A. Auger
More Grist to the Mill? Reciprocal Radicalisation and Reactions to Terrorism in the Far-Right Digital
Milieu ……………………..……………………………………....................................................................99
by Benjamin Lee and Kim Knott
Policy Notes
'Remodelling': The Need for More Robust Models and Metrics for Counterterrorism Threat Analysis..117
by Jason A. Bakas
Resources
Bibliography: Children, Youth and Terrorism………..………………..…..…….......................................126
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes
Bibliography: Internet-Driven Right-Wing Terrorism………..………………..…..……..........................169
Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 17 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism Related Subjects………....191
Reviewed by Joshua Sinai
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Book Review: Klaus Hock & Nina Käsehage (Eds.).’ Militant Islam’ vs. ‘Islamic Militancy’? Religion,
Violence, Category Formation and Applied Research. Contested Fields in the Discourses of Scholarship..198
Reviewed by Ahmet S. Yayla
Book Review: Florian Hartleb. Lone Wolf. The New Terrorism of Right-Wing Single Actors.....................200
Reviewed by José Pedro Zúquete
Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects………..............................202
Compiled and selected by Berto Jongman
Announcements
Conference Calendar………………………………….……………..……...…………….............................223
Compiled and selected by Reinier Bergema
About Perspectives on Terrorism…………………………………………………………............................231
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Welcome from the Editors
Dear Reader,
We are pleased to announce the release of Volume XIV, Issue 3 (June 2020) of Perspectives on Terrorism (ISSN
2334-3745). Our free and independent online journal is a publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative
(TRI), Vienna, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University’s Campus in The
Hague. All past and recent issues are available online at URL: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-
on-terrorism.
Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) is indexed by JSTOR, SCOPUS, and GoogleScholar. Now in its fourteenth
year, it has over 9,000 registered subscribers and many more occasional readers and website visitors worldwide.
The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer-reviewed by external referees while its Research and Policy
Notes, Special Correspondence, Resources and other content are subject to internal editorial quality control.
This issue begins with a research article by Jesse J. Norris examining four dimensions of idiosyncrasy among
terrorists: idiosyncratic ideologies, tactics, strategic thinking, and motives. Next, Aleksandar Pašagić explores
the contrasting scholarly views on using counterterrorism as a rationale for transnational interventions into
failed and fragile states. An article by Iztok Prezelj & Klemen Kocjancic looks at how a country with no
publicly known terrorist group (Slovenia) still has instances of recruiting and training local foreign fighters,
the deportation of extremists, and even a foiled terrorist attack. And in the final research article, Emma
Ylitalo-James argues that a ‘suspect community’ is formed at the initiation of conflict (through the reactions of
opposing factions, combined with public out-group perceptions of threat), and not in response to legislation
dealing with conflict.
Our Research Notes section begins with an overview of how COVID-19 might affect the state of contemporary
terrorism, by Gary Ackerman and Hayley Peterson. Then Katalin Pethő-Kiss identifies strategies for addressing
the security challenges faced by Christian places of worship. Vincent A. Auger explores the question of whether
right-wing violence might constitute a fifth global wave (drawing on David Rapoport’s concept of “waves of
terrorism”). And in the final research note, Benjamin Lee and Kim Knott examine whether the far-right digital
milieu reveals examples of reciprocal radicalisation—the theory that extremist organisations are connected
and feed on one another’s rhetoric and actions to justify violent escalation.
In a special Policy Note, Jason A. Bakas argues that we need more robust models and metrics for counterterrorism
threat analysis than currently used by a number of Western governments whose approaches he studied.
Our Resources section opens with a bibliography compiled by Judith Tinnes with books, articles, theses as
well as grey literature on the intersections of children, youth and terrorism. And a second bibliography, also
compiled by Judith Tinnes, addresses Internet-driven right-wing terrorism. Joshua Sinai, PoT’s book reviews
editor, presents 17 books on terrorism and counter-terrorism, and book reviews are provided by Ahmet S. Yayla
and José Pedro Zúquete. Finally, Berto Jongman’s regular survey of new web-based resources on terrorism and
related subjects is followed by Reinier Bergema’s overview of recent and upcoming conferences and workshops
on terrorism and related subjects.
This issue has been prepared by the principal editors of our journal, Alex Schmid and James Forest, with the
assistance of Associate Editors Jeffrey Kaplan and Leah Farrall. The technical online launch of this journal
issue has, as usual, been in the hands of Associate Editor for IT, Christine Boelema Robertus, while Editorial
Assistant Jodi Moore contributed significantly with editing and proofreading.
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Articles
Idiosyncratic Terrorism: Disaggregating an Undertheorized
Concept
by Jesse J. Norris
Abstract
It is widely recognized that some terrorism is idiosyncratic, and indeed, some define lone-actor terrorism as
inherently idiosyncratic. Yet the notion of idiosyncratic terrorism remains undefined and undertheorized. What
exactly does it mean for terrorists to be idiosyncratic, and why does it matter? To disaggregate and further develop
this undertheorized concept, this article identifies four dimensions of idiosyncrasy among terrorists, each of
which can be divided into subtypes: idiosyncratic ideologies, tactics, strategic thinking, and motives. Empirical
examples of each are provided for both lone-actor and group-based terrorism. In addition, five case studies of
idiosyncratic terrorism are presented. Potential implications for further theoretical and empirical inquiries, and
for counterterrorism policy, are explored.
Keywords: Terrorism theory, ideology, idiosyncrasy, tactics, lone-actor terrorism, group-based terrorism
Introduction
Terrorism researchers often remark, typically in passing, that a particular terrorist, terrorist group or terrorist
attack is idiosyncratic.[1] Lone-actor terrorists, in particular, are frequently described as idiosyncratic in some
way.[2] Yet what is meant by the term “idiosyncratic” varies widely, is rarely defined, and has not yet been subject
to extended theoretical elaboration or empirical examination. What exactly does it mean for terrorists to be
idiosyncratic, and why does it matter, in terms of terrorism theory and counterterrorism policy? This article’s
preliminary answers to these questions help transcend the dichotomy between lone-actor and group-based
terrorism, while developing conceptual building blocks useful for generating new hypotheses and developing
terrorism theory.
This article identifies four dimensions of idiosyncrasy: idiosyncratic ideology, idiosyncratic motives,
idiosyncratic tactics, and idiosyncratic strategic thinking. Each is also divided into distinct subtypes. This
conceptual development helps correct misconceptions about idiosyncratic terrorism, such as the idea that it
primarily applies to lone wolves and is mainly associated with mental illness.
More broadly, this article argues that idiosyncratic terrorism should not be written off as impossible to
understand, as “black swan occurrences,” but should be taken seriously and examined in depth by researchers
and practitioners alike.[3] Idiosyncrasy, in all its dimensions, is important both for analyzing the nature of
modern terrorism and for devising effective counterterrorism measures. Moreover, clarifying terms and
developing typologies are critical endeavors that can drive empirical agendas and enable theory building. After
years of debates about lone wolves, it may be useful to take terrorism theory in a new direction, focused on
characteristics of terrorism rather than the number of perpetrators involved.[4]
The importance of understanding idiosyncratic terrorism extends to policy as well, potentially informing
counterterrorism practices from plot detection to deradicalization initiatives. In particular, this study’s
highlighting of the bizarre beliefs, unusual motives, odd tactics, and hopelessly naïve strategic thinking of
many terrorists could be helpful in preventing or reversing radicalization. This parallels Lankford’s attempts to
delegitimize terrorism by arguing that group terrorists are often suicidal or mentally ill.[5]
The significance of idiosyncratic terrorism is illustrated by the fact that even the most bizarre, seemingly half-
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baked ideology can motivate mass murders that inspire numerous copycats. The example of Elliot Rodger,
whose manifesto preposterously contended that there is something inherently wrong with all women and
they therefore deserve to die, is a disturbing case in point. His attack, which killed six in 2014, inspired several
massacres, resulting in about 50 deaths so far. As argued below, strange ideologies such as Rodger’s represent
only one of four dimensions of idiosyncrasy: some terrorists espouse typical ideologies but are idiosyncratic in
other respects.
After reviewing relevant literature, this article defines idiosyncratic terrorism, its four dimensions, and their
sub-categories, while presenting examples of each for both lone-actor and group-based terrorism. In addition,
five case studies are presented to provide further insight about idiosyncratic terrorism. The conclusion outlines
several implications of idiosyncratic terrorism for future empirical work and counterterrorism policy.
Previous Literature on Idiosyncratic Terrorism

Researchers often mention that certain terrorists are idiosyncratic, but this term is typically undefined and
its usage varies widely. For example, some observe that lone terrorists tend to have idiosyncratic ideologies,
in terms of their substantive beliefs, while others label ideologies as idiosyncratic because they combine
personal and political motives.[6] As described below, these are best understood as two separate dimensions of
idiosyncrasy: ideological and motivational.
The term idiosyncratic has been used in several other ways that are not relevant to this article’s argument.
For example, Bakker and de Graaf describe lone wolves as “by definition, idiosyncratic,” but by that they
mean simply that the lone wolf category contains diverse phenomena.[7] By contrast, this article focuses on
“idiosyncrasy” in the sense of strange or unusual characteristics, as clarified with more specificity below.
An early terrorism definition by Schmid and Jongman defined terrorism as acts committed for “idiosyncratic,
criminal, or political reasons,” thus including mass attacks by non-ideological psychotics.[8] Consistent with
the trend toward defining terrorism as ideological, this sense of idiosyncratic terrorism is excluded from this
study.
Indeed, contemporary studies often exclude attackers driven solely by psychological problems.[9] Yet when
some ideology is present among psychologically disturbed offenders, there is a divergence of opinion. Turchie
and Puckett argue that for true lone wolves, the primary objective is ideological, even if they have more personal
motivations as well.[10] This article follows Spaaij’s more inclusive terrorism definition, which only requires
that a “broader political, ideological or religious cause… informs” the attack.[11]
Few studies have analyzed idiosyncratic terrorism in depth. Jeffrey Simon describes idiosyncratic lone wolves
as terrorists whose “severe personality and psychological issues” really “explain their actions,” not the cause
they adopted.[12] Simon found that idiosyncratic terrorists tend to be single-issue terrorists, and are more
dangerous when the perpetrator, like the Unabomber, is highly intelligent and lacks remorse.[13] Departing
from Simon’s framework, this article understands idiosyncratic terrorism not as a particular category of lone
terrorists, but rather as characteristic shared by many lone and group terrorists.
Marc Sageman has briefly analyzed some idiosyncratic terrorists. Sageman identifies Russian nihilists as
idiosyncratic, and observes that “mental disorder was a major contributor to” their violence.[14] Sageman
notes that the “complete scorn for society” shared by French illegalists, Aum Shinrikyo and the Rajneeshees
explains their “unprovoked violence.”[15]
Jeffrey Kaplan has documented idiosyncratic features in several terrorist groups.[16] Kaplan defined
“idiosyncratic sectarians” as type of white supremacist “whose structure more nearly approximates a cult…
characterized by a single all-powerful charismatic leader… than a political or religious movement.”[17] In the
1990s, Hoffman proposed that “idiosyncratic millenarian movements” may pose a greater threat than traditional
terrorists.[18] Going further, building on Rapoport’s four-wave theory of terrorism, Kaplan proposed a Fifth
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Wave, based on utopian movements endeavoring to create a “lost ‘Golden Age’ or an entirely new world in a
single generation.”[19] Examples include Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Janjaweed, and ISIS.
Four Dimensions of Terrorist Idiosyncrasy
Idiosyncrasy can be defined as an aspect of a terrorist perpetrator or attack that is unique, unusual, or
unexpected, given the type of terrorism and time period. Terrorism that is somewhat innovative or creative
is not idiosyncratic unless it is a significant departure from the norm or the common sense of the time.
Idiosyncratic terrorism, in turn, can be defined as a violent attack motivated in some way by ideology, and
which is idiosyncratic in at least one dimension. Some terrorists may only be idiosyncratic in one way, while
others are idiosyncratic across all dimensions. Idiosyncrasy is not a binary, either/or concept, but a matter of
degree: for each dimension, terrorists can range from not idiosyncratic at all to highly idiosyncratic.
These definitions are broad enough to encompass various meanings of idiosyncrasy, while avoiding inappropriate
breadth by clarifying that a trait shared by most terrorists cannot be idiosyncratic, and that non-ideological
violence would not qualify either. Table 1 provides examples of each dimension and its subtypes for both lone-
actor and group-based terrorists, each of which are described below.
Table 1: Dimensions and Subdimensions of Idiosyncratic Terrorism
Dimension Subdimension Lone Actor Example Dyad/Group Example

Ideology Novel Elliot Rodger Aum Shinrikyo
Hybrid Andrew Joseph Stack III DC Snipers
Motive Psychological Paul Ciancia Long Island UFO Plot
Personal/Political Chris Dorner Bundy family standoff
Opportunistic/Impulsive Joshua Cartwright Joseph & Jerry Kane
Tactics Novel or rare James Lee Rajneeshees
Faux/simulated attacks Jaromír Balda PNFE*
Strategic thinking Religious David Copeland ISIS (Islamic State)
Wishful thinking Brendon Tarrant Galleanists
Delusional Pekka-Eric Auvinen Manson Family
* Parti Nationaliste Français et Européen
Idiosyncratic Ideologies
While ideology has been called “the most elusive concept in… social science,” it can be understood broadly
as a set of normative beliefs about the world—the way it is and the way it should be.[20] When these beliefs
are unusual or strange, the ideology is idiosyncratic. Ideologies can be idiosyncratic in two principal ways: by
being novel and unusual, or by unconventionally fusing extant ideologies. Examples of novel ideologies include
the “Incel” (“involuntary celibate”) ideology elaborated by Elliot Rodger, and Aum Shinrikyo’s doomsday
prophecies. Idiosyncratic ideologies are not unique to disturbed individuals or obscure cults. As outlined in a
case study below, ISIS is idiosyncratic in several respects.[21]
An example of hybrid ideologies includes the D.C. Snipers, who killed 17 people. Their ideology combined
various influences, including the Nation of Islam, black nationalism, the film “The Matrix,” and Eastern
religion. Andrew Joseph Stack III, who flew a plane into an IRS building, is a lone-actor example, since his
manifesto (like those of anti-immigrant terrorists Brenton Tarrant and Patrick Crusius) mixed left- and right-
wing themes. Terrorists’ ideological hybridization can be understood in terms of “cultic milieu” theory, which
depicts a “generally supportive cultic milieu” that “is continually giving birth to new cults,” as seekers float
between different nodes in the milieu and innovate beliefs.[22]
While lone terrorists are probably more likely to have idiosyncratic ideologies, such ideologies appear to be
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frequent among group-based terrorists as well. For example, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an African
group known for relying on kidnapped child soldiers, integrates tribal nationalism, Christianity, and its leader’s
religious visions.[23] Terrorism perpetrated by small groups (such as the Symbionese Liberation Army and the
White Panther Party (see case studies below) have also involved idiosyncratic ideologies.
When perpetrators’ beliefs are so bizarre that they resemble an assemblage of delusions rather than an ideology,
it is a fair question whether their behavior qualifies as terrorism at all. The question of where to draw the line
need not be resolved here. Yet mental disorders are not inherently disqualifying. One might assume John Ford
and Joseph Mazzuchelli’s scheme to use radium to poison Long Island officials (who, they believed, hid evidence
of a UFO crash) arose solely from delusional thinking. However, the belief that authorities are concealing UFO
evidence has many adherents, and can be understood as an ideology.
Idiosyncratic Motives
Motives and ideologies are often conflated, but should be analytically separated. As noted above, ideology
describes a normative perspective for interpreting the world. Motives, by contrast, refer to specific motivations
behind the attack, which may relate to ideology in any number of ways. For example, instead of simply wanting
to intimidate people into acceding to their ideological demands (the assumption behind the US definition of
terrorism), some terrorists’ motives may be to express the ideology, to implement it, or to publicize it.[24] From
Timothy McVeigh’s writings, he apparently saw his attack as pure revenge for Waco and Ruby Ridge, rather
than an attempt to coerce officials to adopt particular policies. This motive is not necessarily idiosyncratic,
though it is somewhat at odds with terrorism’s US legal definition. To the extent that the motives behind an
attack are unusual, strange, or unexpected, the motives are idiosyncratic.
Many cases of idiosyncratic motives involve mixing personal and political motivations. One type of mixed
motives is psychologically influenced mixed motives, in which the perpetrator intends the attack to advance
an ideology, but simultaneously has a mental-illness-related motive. For example, a suicidal individual might
decide to commit suicide in a way that will express their ideology. As Adam Lankford has argued, this may
be true for many suicide terrorists.[25] Paul Ciancia’s right-wing attack on airport security officers is another
example. In addition, psychotic delusions or paranoia can motivate some attacks, along with an ideology. The
UFO plot noted above provides one example (the main defendant was committed to an institution).
A second subtype can be termed personal-political mixed motives. These terrorists seek to express their ideology,
but have additional objectives like personal vengeance. Christopher Dorner’s manifesto suggests his 2013 attacks
on police officers were meant primarily as personal revenge, while also indicating a desire to raise awareness
about racism and police brutality.[26] Todd Shepard, who hoped his murder of a police officer would spark a
revolution, was also avenging his girlfriend’s killing by police. The Bundy family standoff in Nevada, involving
an assortment of armed anti-government extremists, was motivated by their desire to intimidate authorities
into returning confiscated cattle (a personal economic motive), in addition to their quixotic ambition to end
federal control over grazing land. Moreover, Chechen female suicide bombers were largely motivated by
recruits’ desires to avenge murdered relatives, consistent with Chechen culture’s “strong norm of revenge,”
though jihadi ideology also played a role.[27] While mixtures of personal and political motives are widely
believed to characterize lone wolves, they may frequently appear among group terrorists as well.
A third subtype includes terrorists with opportunistic/impulsive mixed motives. Some US far-right extremists
who killed police—including Joshua Cartwright and Richard Poplawski—did so in reaction to police visits
regarding domestic disputes.[28] While they were likely influenced by their ideologies, it is possible their
main motive was suicide or anger about a domestic argument. In fact, many far-right attacks involve personal
motivations—such as killing police to avoid arrest—in addition to ideological motives.[29] These attacks often
appear unplanned and impulsive, as in the cases of “sovereign citizens” (like Joe and Jerry Kane) who shoot
officers during traffic stops. Absent manifestos or other evidence, perpetrators’ motives are often unclear. Some
murders by extremists might lack any ideological motivation, but as Singh suggests, “Violence is never totally
idiosyncratic; it always says or expresses something.”[30]
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Idiosyncratic Tactics
Sometimes, terrorists’ ideologies may not be idiosyncratic, but their choice of tactics is decidedly strange.
Idiosyncratic tactics can be defined as terrorist actions that are unusual or unexpected, given the time period
and the terrorism type. Thus, using a tactic associated with another era or a different variety of terrorism would
be idiosyncratic. Idiosyncratic tactics can be further divided into at least two categories: novel or rare tactics and
faux or simulated attacks.
As an example of novel or rare tactics, James Lee, like many environmentalists, was deeply concerned about
overpopulation and wildlife preservation. Yet his tactic for addressing these issues was somewhat bizarre: he
took hostages at the Discovery Channel headquarters, in an attempt to force them to broadcast his views.[31]
This was a tactic highly unusual for terrorists in general, at least in the current era, and unheard of for radical
environmentalists.
In another example, Luke Helder wrote a manifesto discussing such diverse concepts as astral projection,
marijuana legalization, and excessive government regulation.[32] Aside from being an example of a hybrid
ideology, his tactic was particularly unique. He placed pipe bombs in mailboxes, arranged in several locations
to make a “smiley face” on the map. It was also unexpected to use any tactic to promote astral projection, a New
Age belief already probably shared by millions of people.
The largest act of bioterrorism in US history provides another example. The Rajneeshee cult’s attempt to win
a local election by placing salmonella in numerous restaurants’ salad bars, thus disabling non-cult voters,
is unique in modern terrorism. The victims survived, but the threat of mass casualties was real. Rajneeshee
adherents later plotted to murder a federal prosecutor—a more conventional tactic, which underscores the
threat idiosyncratic terrorists pose.[33]
Another subtype involves faux (false flag) or simulated terrorist attacks, meant to be perceived as an attack by a
hated group. Such tactics are idiosyncratic, since they are quite rare, and are motivated by the atypical objective
of tricking the government into oppressing those believed to be responsible. For example, anti-immigrant
extremist Jaromír Balda disabled trains in a simulated jihadi attack near Prague.[34] In the 1990s, a neo-Nazi
group (Parti Nationaliste Français et Européen) claiming to be a (nonexistent) militant Jewish organization
attacked Arab targets, hoping to instigate Jewish-Arab conflict.[35]
A final possible subdimension, which is excluded from Table 1 due to definitional uncertainty, involves
unclaimed attacks. While such attacks, which undermine terrorism’s basic communicative function, may
seem inherently idiosyncratic, research demonstrates that many terrorist attacks are actually unclaimed, often
for strategic reasons.[36] Yet in some circumstances, perpetrators’ failure to take responsibility may well be
idiosyncratic. The Unabomber mailed bombs over a period of 17 years before publicly communicating his
motives—a perplexing strategy for changing society through violence. Moreover, Joseph Paul Franklin, who
once belonged to the cult-like American Nazi Party, committed numerous racially motivated murders, but
never publicized his motives. Kaplan thus describes this as “failed terrorism.”[37] Nevertheless, Franklin was
the model for the main protagonist in The Turner Diaries, which inspired McVeigh and other far-right terrorists.
Idiosyncratic Strategic Thinking
Idiosyncratic strategic thinking includes terrorists’ unusual expectations about the causal effects of their attacks.
To a degree, it is normal for terrorists to be unjustifiably optimistic about the chances their violence will have
its desired effects. After all, research demonstrates that terrorists nearly always fail to achieve their strategic
goals.[38] Yet any causal expectations that would appear, to an ordinary person, to be extremely unrealistic
or unusual can be reasonably described as idiosyncratic, even if this means a significant proportion of all
terrorists are idiosyncratic. (A trait shared by the majority of terrorists, by contrast, should not be considered
idiosyncratic).
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Maynard argues that many atrocities (such as genocide) are influenced by a “future-oriented moral fallacy” in
which the “known moral harms in the present—the deaths of victims” are “outweighed by massive future goods
which have not been discounted for their uncertainty.”[39] This “extraordinarily permissive logic” involves a
“consequentialist calculus” in which “the confident assertion of huge benefits multiplied into the infinite future”
justifies mass murder.[40] While previous research has noted the role of such consequentialist reasoning in
political violence, these unrealistic causal expectations have rarely been analyzed by terrorism researchers.[41]
Abrahms and Lula demonstrate that one reason for terrorists’ excessive optimism is that terrorists make invalid
historical analogies, especially to successful guerrilla campaigns, and incorrectly predict that terrorism against
civilians will also succeed.[42] For example, Osama bin Laden appears to have believed the 9/11 attacks would
prompt the US to exit the Middle East, similar to how such attacks succeeded in ending American intervention
in Lebanon and Somalia.
Yet this cannot explain all terrorists’ unrealistic beliefs about their success. A century earlier, many anarchists
thought assassinating politicians would spark a total revolution against capitalism and the state, despite any
historical precedent for such a causal sequence, and despite the fact that they soon had considerable evidence
assassinations had no such effect. Such magical thinking about the causal power of violence also characterizes
the work of some radical philosophers, such as Georges Sorel.[43]
There are three main types of idiosyncratic strategic thinking: religious (based on unusual religious beliefs),
wishful thinking (resulting from the desire to believe their goals are attainable), and delusional (based on a
distorted understanding of reality).
First, some are based on religious beliefs, such as ISIS’s conviction that terrorism will spark a ground war
against the West that will usher in the apocalypse, or Aum Shinrikyo’s doomsday prophecies. David Copeland,
who believed he had been chosen by God to commit bomb attacks that would trigger a race war in the UK, is
a lone-actor example, though he could also illustrate delusional thinking.[44]
Second, wishful thinking explains many terrorists’ idiosyncratic strategic thinking. Psychological studies have
shown that the optimism bias—the tendency to overestimate one’s likelihood of success—is pervasive among
ordinary people.[45] Yet wishful thinking should be even stronger among radicals. Given their desire for
dramatic social change, to avoid hopelessness they have every incentive to believe victory is within grasp and
achievable through some concrete action. Among nonreligious terrorists, this subtype may be most common.
The idea that a single massacre will somehow usher in a massive race war—seemingly a common neo-Nazi
belief, and the specific motivation behind Dylann Roof ’s mass shooting—is a prominent example.[46]
The third subtype, delusional strategic thinking, involves evident influences from mental illness. One possible
example is Pekka-Eric Auvinen, who implausibly saw his school shooting as the harbinger of an international
social-Darwinist revolution by “intelligent people” against everyone else.[47] (Though most school shootings
are nonideological, studies show that some have strong ideological motives and thus qualify as terrorism).[48]
The iconic serial killer Charles Manson represents an even clearer example of this subtype. Manson and his
followers were terrorists, because their murders were meant to trigger an apocalyptic race war.[49] Manson
believed in an incredible causal sequence: his group’s killings of whites would be perceived as being committed
by blacks, thus prompting reprisal killings of blacks by whites, which would lead to racist and non-racist whites
killing each other until whites were virtually eliminated. This, in turn, would somehow allow Manson’s cult
to rule society. (Manson later claimed that this was untrue and his group was instead focused on justice for
“ATWA” (Air, Trees, Water, and Animals), but this appears to be an attempt at personal reinvention).
One might think that such fanciful thinking about causality would be confined to those, like Manson, who
were clearly out of touch with reality. However, New Zealand mosque attacker Brenton Tarrant, who shows
no sign of psychosis, appeared to believe the most fantastical chain of events would result from his shooting:
it would somehow cause the US, thousands of miles away, to adopt such severe gun control policies that right-
wing extremists would rise up, starting a civil war in which they would ultimately triumph.[50] While Tarrant’s
ideology, which resembled Breivik’s, was not highly idiosyncratic, his strategic thinking surely was.
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In the case of anti-government extremists Jerad and Amanda Miller, who killed two officers and a civilian in
Las Vegas in 2014, there was nothing particularly unusual about their ideology, motive, or tactics. The only
idiosyncratic element was their strategic thinking—they seemed to believe that their attack would spark an
anti-government revolution. Their writings do not provide insight into why they believed such an unlikely
result would follow. Another dyad, the D.C. Snipers, should have realized it was impossible to leverage their
shootings to extort millions from the government to finance a utopian community in Canada, as they hoped.
Either psychological disturbance, wishful thinking, or both could explain such cases. As suggested above, a
group example of wishful thinking could include the US-based Galleanist anarchists of the interwar period,
who quite implausibly believed that assassinations and bombings would trigger a total revolution.
Stephen Paddock, the Las Vegas mass murderer who killed 58 in 2017, may have been inspired by idiosyncratic
cause-and-effect reasoning. Investigations revealed he was a classic right-wing extremist, obsessed with gun
ownership rights, conspiracy theories, and the sieges at Waco and Ruby Ridge.[51] While his motivation is
technically unknown, some information points toward an ideological motivation with idiosyncratic strategic
thinking. Paddock said shortly before the shooting that “Somebody has to wake up the American public and
get them to arm themselves,” adding ominously that, “Sometimes sacrifices have to be made.”[52] An epic mass
shooting, in his mind, might have been just the thing to accomplish this task.
As another example, Anders Breivik believed his more moderate fellow travelers would be persecuted due
to his attack and radicalize in response.[53] There is no indication this occurred, and it is hard to see why
this would seem more likely than any number of other alternative causal sequences. The narcissistic Breivik
probably believed himself to be playing three-dimensional chess, so to speak, when in reality he was simply
being foolish and deceiving himself.
Highlighting the fact that terrorists often have seemingly delusional expectations about their attacks’ causal
impacts may dissuade radicalized individuals from committing attacks, or otherwise aid in deradicalization.
Since terrorism is above all “a perception game,” shifting the framing of terrorists from stealthy “lone wolves”
or brilliant “masterminds” to hopelessly unrealistic and naïve dupes may have a salutary effect.[54] Even deeply
radicalized individuals may rethink their involvement upon realizing that likeminded terrorists often have
indefensibly bizarre expectations regarding the effects of their attacks.
Case Studies of Idiosyncratic Terrorism

Five brief case studies, which encompass various ideological motivations, are described here to provide further
insight on the nature of idiosyncratic terrorism. This parallels Spaaij’s approach in his influential article on
the “enigma of lone wolf terrorism,” which used five diverse case studies to illustrate “the main features and
patterns” of a broad terrorism category.[55] For each case study, perpetrators are evaluated for idiosyncrasy
in each of the four dimensions. The likely sources of their idiosyncrasies are discussed as well. Results are
summarized in Table 2.
The White Panther Party (1967/68–70)
The White Panther Party (WPP) was a New Left group linked to at least two bombings. The WPP’s ideology was
idiosyncratic in that it attempted to meld the ideas of Black Panther Party (whose program the WPP endorsed
in its manifesto) with a more radical, anarchistic ideology opposed to capitalism and the state. It espoused a
puerile anarchism (“Everything is free for everybody. Money sucks. Leaders suck”), while awkwardly fashioning
sex, drugs, and rock-n-roll into a political program (“Our program of rock and roll, dope and f***ing in the
streets…”).
Moreover, their manifesto was laced with drug-fueled, surrealistic stream-of-consciousness statements, like
“We are LSD driven total maniacs of the universe” and “a generation of visionary maniac white mother****er
country dope fiend rock and roll freaks who are ready to get down and kick out the jams — ALL THE JAMS
— break everything loose and free everybody from their very real and imaginary prisons.” Despite similarities
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with groups like the Yippies, the WPP were unique in their imagined alliance with the Black Panthers and
their advocacy of terrorism. (“But we will use guns if we have to—we will do anything—if we have to. We have
no illusions”). In both respects, they presaged the Weather Underground, which was founded in 1969. WPP
members were charged with bombing a CIA recruiting station in 1968, and with firebombing an army draft
office in 1970. The WPP’s tactics, motives, and strategic thinking do not appear idiosyncratic.
The source of the WPP’s idiosyncratic ideology seems to be psychedelic drugs. In fact, WPP founder John
Sinclair later attributed the rise of revolutionary 1960s activism to LSD. He said the drug prompted “a messianic
feeling of love, of brotherhood,” a “tremendously inspiring” feeling that “this would alter everything,” and they
“were going to take over the world.”[56] He added, “This was the general belief. It was the LSD…Acid was
amping everything up, driving everything into greater and greater frenzy…We thought at the time that as a
result of our LSD-inspired activities great things would happen. And, of course, it didn’t.”[57]
Symbionese Liberation Army (1973–1975)
The Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was a short-lived, but high-profile, terrorist group, known above
all for kidnapping heiress Patricia Hearst. Like some contemporaries, the SLA was inspired by Maoism and
anti-imperialism. Yet its ideology contained several peculiar elements likely arising from its leader Donald
DeFreeze’s mental illness. For example, the SLA’s first major action, assassinating Marcus Foster, a black school
superintendent, arose from DeFreeze’s paranoid, unsubstantiated belief that Foster was a CIA agent.[58] Other
violent radicals never accepted the Foster assassination, which baffled them. Given the lack of any evidence for
their suspicions, this qualifies as an idiosyncratic tactic.
Their ideology featured delusional conspiracy theories, such as their belief that authorities were planning on
murdering millions of Americans in the immediate future. As one communique stated, “warn black and poor
people that they are about to murdered down to the last man, woman, and child” by the “corporate state.”[59]
Even individuals who later joined the SLA complained that the group’s publicly communicated ideology had
made no sense.
In the same audio message, DeFreeze declared, “All corporate enemies of the people will be shot on sight at
any time and at any place. This order is permanent, until… all enemy forces have either surrendered or been
destroyed.”[60] This clearly directed sympathizers to immediately kill any policemen or other government
official. Indeed, members were obsessed with killing police, often daydreaming about high-casualty shootouts.
Before a bank robbery, one member “rubb[ed] his hands together” excitedly, saying “Oh, I hope they come…I
want to kill some pigs... yes, I want to kill some pigs.”[61] Their fervent desire to murder all their enemies was
highly unusual for militants of the time.
The Hearst kidnapping was also idiosyncratic, since atypically, they had no plan for negotiating her release.
Their demand that Hearst’s father donate millions of dollars in “quality food” to the poor was conceived as a
mere prelude to the “real” negotiations, which never transpired. They may have hoped to exchange Hearst for
imprisoned members, but this idea went nowhere.
Their strategic thinking was idiosyncratic as well. Members were overjoyed after releasing one communique,
since they “truly believed, as they repeatedly told each other, that surely this message” would “rally the people
to the SLA cause.”[62] (Their statement “declared revolutionary war” against the “fascist military-corporate
state” and invited “robbers, pimps… drug addicts[and] prostitutes” to join them)[63] Oddly enough, they
expected their bank robbery to “rally the people to our side…the oppressed masses would be heartened to join
in the fight… The revolution, led by the SLA, was on its way.”[64] Perhaps most strangely, DeFreeze “really
believed that the government… would soon declare martial law” in response to the SLA, and then “blacks and
poor people would rise up” and “spark the people’s revolution.”[65]
The group’s atmosphere was cult-like, centered around DeFreeze, who was revered as a prophet despite his
near-constant drinking, his strange pronouncements, and his periodic groping of female members.[66] For
example, DeFreeze once proclaimed, in a “subdued, mystical tone of voice” that “I really am a prophet. I am
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here on earth to lead the people.”[67] DeFreeze was known as Cinque Mtume (“Fifth Prophet”), the “General
Field Marshal” of the “United Federated Forces of the Symbionese Liberation Army.” Perhaps because the SLA’s
white members believed only black or other “Third World” people could lead the revolution, they accepted him
as their absolute leader, following his whims without question.
Apart from assassinating Foster and kidnapping (and sexually assaulting) Hearst, the SLA’s major crimes
included bank robberies, which caused the death of one customer, and several bombings. After training for
“search and destroy missions” to “shoot down and kill policemen” in Los Angeles, most members died during a
shootout with police.[68] The remaining few returned to San Francisco, where they committed bombings, and
released a communique lauding DeFreeze as a “beautiful Black genius, revolutionary warrior”, and imploring
“White Amerikkkans” to ignore the “oinking” of the “cringing pigs” and join the “war of the flea” against the
“ruling class and all its pig agents.”[69] They were arrested months later.
The main source of the SLA’s idiosyncrasies was probably its leader’s mental illness. A pre-SLA probation
report described DeFreeze as a “a schizoid personality with strong schizophrenic potential” and “a fascination
with firearms and explosives.”[70] This example illustrates that it is not only lone wolves who are influenced by
mental illness. The presence of a charismatic leader can also contribute to a group’s eccentricities.
Atomwaffen Division (2015–Present)
This neo-Nazi network has cells in the US and several European countries. Members have been involved in
several murders and terrorist plots. Atomwaffen’s ideology is extremely bizarre even by far-right standards.
Guided by neo-Nazi James Mason, it espouses a syncretistic mix of Nazi ideology and occult beliefs, including
the near-worship of Charles Manson. The group’s influences include the neo-Nazi Satanic group Order of the
Nine Angles, which encourages human sacrifice.
Though Nazi occultism has a long history,[71] Atomwaffen’s ideology merits the idiosyncratic label, as any
group revering a serial-killer cult leader and fashioning its own religion borrowing from Hinduism and black
magic is certainly bizarre. For example, this quotation is from one Atomwaffen-linked group:
“Through the Racial Holy War, the Last Battalion consisting of Charles Manson, George Lincoln
Rockwell and other Aryan heroes, and the New Reich shall return to Earth… achieving Endsieg and
Total Aryan Victory. Kalki shall bring us out of the Kali Yuga and into the Satya Yuga, and all race
traitors and race defilers shall be burned in Holy Fire under Kalki’s wrathful gaze.”[72]
The reference to Kalki, a Hindu apocalyptic figure, reflects the influence of Savitri Devi, who deified Hitler as
an avatar of Vishnu and reinterpreted Kalki as Hitler-like. In Internet “memes,” members describe themselves
as “Agents of Kalki” and proclaim that “Soldiers of God Never Die”, accompanied by the “black sun” symbol of
Nazi esotericism.
Members are fervent adherents of accelerationism, the idea—promoted by Mason’s book Siege—that racist
violence can destabilize society and ignite a race war. This “magical thinking,” as Kaplan puts it, qualifies as
idiosyncratic strategic thinking.[73] Described as “a long string of essays celebrating murder and chaos in the
name of white supremacy,” Siege is reportedly required reading for Atomwaffen members, who regard it as
“something akin to divine revelation.”[74] Mason, a convicted pedophile, was a marginal figure in the neo-Nazi
cultic milieu before Atomwaffen rediscovered his teachings.
Six deaths have been tied to Atomwaffen so far. One member murdered a gay Jewish college student, an
act praised by other members. Another member, Nicholas Giampa, killed his girlfriend’s parents after they
disapproved of their relationship—an idiosyncratic mixed-motive attack, assuming ideology played a role.
Members released at least two “memes” celebrating Giampa’s murders. Member Timothy Wilson plotted to
blow up a hospital, before dying in a shootout with the FBI.[75]
Strangely enough, another member, Devon Arthurs, converted to Islam, describing himself as a “Salafi National
Socialist”, and murdered two roommates (also Atomwaffen members). He told police he killed them because
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they taunted him for his faith, and to send a message to those who disrespect Islam, while also claiming he
prevented his roommates’ terrorist attacks. Leaving aside the question of whether this counts as terrorism, or
the perhaps thornier question of how to categorize it, this illustrates the unexpected ideological combinations
and unpredictable pathways to violence among idiosyncratic terrorists. Ironically, Brandon Russell, their cell’s
leader (another roommate), had celebrated jihadi violence as a model for Atomwaffen.
Some potential attacks by members appear to be have been narrowly thwarted. Russell was found with bomb-
making components, including radioactive elements, and was later arrested with semiautomatic weapons,
body armor, and a thousand rounds of ammunition. When members Aiden Bruce-Umbaugh and Kaleb Cole
were arrested, they were armed, wearing tactical gear and had thousands of bullets. Authorities believe their
arrest prevented an imminent mass shooting.
Several other members were suspected of preparing for attacks. To illustrate, member Jarrett Smith, a US Army
soldier obsessed with “anti-cosmic” Satanism, was arrested on explosives charges after plotting assassinations.
[76] Three members planning a mass shooting were arrested for weapon offenses and for manufacturing the
hallucinogen DMT. They are not the only members enamored of psychedelics. Another member, Andrew
Thomasberg, calling himself a “psychedelic Nazi,” claimed “There’s nothing more Aryan than entheogenic drug
use.” Thomasberg revered far-right terrorists as “saints” and was planning an attack before his arrest.[77] In
2020, the FBI simultaneously arrested several senior members in various states for “swatting” threats against
journalists, among other charges.
Members of the Atomwaffen affiliates Feuerkrieg Division and Sonnenkrieg Division carried out a bombing in
Lithuania, and were arrested for planning attacks and other terrorist offenses in Latvia, the UK, and elsewhere.
One member, described by a UK judge as a “deeply entrenched neo-Nazi with an interest in Satanism and
occult practices”, was arrested for possessing bomb-making manuals, and had been planning an attack.[78]
Members were also investigated for raping a female member and carving swastikas and occult symbols into
her skin.[79]
The primary source of Atomwaffen’s idiosyncrasies (which include idiosyncratic ideology, motives, and strategic
thinking) is neo-Nazi esotericism. Some of its idiosyncratic features, such as apocalypticism, may indicate a
greater risk of violence than can be found in other far-right groups.
Incel Terrorism (2014 – Present)
The Incel movement is a virulently misogynistic Internet subculture that has led to about 50 homicide deaths
since its founding. While the term “involuntary celibate” arose in the 1990s and had no violent connotation,
Elliot Rodger turned it into a terrorist ideology rooted in the bizarre idea that women were fundamentally
flawed and deserved death.
In his book-length manifesto, Rodger described his rationale for a massacre of women, his so-called “Day of
Retribution.” Since women’s rejection of him is a “declaration of war,” he declares a war against women that
“will result in their complete and utter annihilation,” causing a “blow” to his “enemies… so catastrophic it will
redefine the very essence of human nature.[80] He also fantasized about torturing and killing “good-looking
men” who have “pleasurable sex lives while I’ve had to suffer.”[81]
Rodger displayed clear signs of narcissism, with messianic, nearly apocalyptic features:
I am Elliot Rodger… Magnificent, glorious, supreme, eminent…Divine! I am the closest thing there is
to a living god. Humanity is a disgusting, depraved, and evil species. It is my purpose to punish them
all. I will purify the world of everything that is wrong with it.[82]
In his “ultimate and perfect ideology of… a fair and pure world,” all women should be “quarantined” in
“concentration camps,” where he could “gleefully watch them die,” though some would be kept alive and
artificially inseminated to perpetuate humanity.[83]
On his “Day of Retribution,” Rodger stabbed three college students to death, shot and killed two sorority
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members and one male college student, and attempted to run people over. He committed suicide afterwards, as
announced and planned in his manifesto.
An Internet subculture of “Incels” subsequently formed in which Rodger was lauded as a “saint.” Several related
murders ensued. These include Christopher Harper-Mercer’s mass shooting in Oregon in 2015, which killed
nine people; a murder by Sheldon Bentley in Canada in 2016; William Atchison’s double murder in New Mexico
in 2017; Scott Beierle’s 2018 murder of two women in a Florida yoga studio; and Nicholas Cruz’s murder of
17 people in Florida in 2018. In an Internet post, Cruz stated that “Elliot Rodger will not be forgotten,” and
Beierle posted numerous videos with Incel content. Moreover, Alek Minassian killed 10 pedestrians in a 2018
vehicle attack in Toronto, after tweeting, “the Incel Rebellion has already begun” and “We will overthrow all
the Chads and Stacys!”—that is, popular, sexually active men and women. He continued: “All hail the Supreme
Gentleman Elliot Rodger!” In 2019, two Incel-motivated mass shootings, by Christopher Cleary and Bryan
Clyde, were thwarted by authorities.
While some perpetrators had several ideological influences (for example, Harper-Mercer’s manifesto emphasizes
Satanism and racism), Incel ideology was the primary motive in Minassian’s and Beierle’s attacks. Personal/
political or psychological mixed motives appear typical of Incel attackers. Rodger’s mental disorders, possibly
including psychosis, psychopathy and narcissism, presumably explain the emergence of this ideology.[84]
Islamic State (ISIS) (2014–Present)
Some may be reluctant to accept the categorization of ISIS as idiosyncratic because jihadi ideology is widespread,
or due to the group’s historic successes. Yet success is by no means mutually exclusive with idiosyncrasies. (The
Rajneeshee cult, which was surely idiosyncratic, had thousands of followers at its peak) Moreover, although
ISIS shares beliefs with other jihadists, its ideology is idiosyncratic in several important respects.
First, ISIS took the doctrine of takfir, or excommunication, to the furthest possible extreme, so that essentially,
any Muslim who is not an ISIS member or supporter could be killed on the spot. Indeed, there have been
reports of ISIS summarily executing people during traffic stops because they were suspected of being Shiites.
This is a dramatic departure from Al Qaeda, which applied takfir only against the Saudi government, and
refrained from violence against minority Islamic sects. Moreover, the doctrine of takfir has been “seldom used
in Islamic history.”[85] In effect, ISIS took a doctrine with no practical application for most of history, and
interpreted it to justify killing nearly anyone in the world.
ISIS’s second idiosyncrasy relates to its heavy reliance on Dhahirism, an obscure school of Islamic jurisprudence
considered so rare many Muslims believed it to be extinct.[86] Third, ISIS’s “unilateral, contested declaration of
a caliphate” is unthinkable in traditional Islam.[87] Fourth, ISIS’s apocalyptic focus is highly unique even for
jihadists. Members truly believe their current wave of violence will somehow trigger the end of the world.[88]
(As noted above, this qualifies as idiosyncratic strategic thinking).
Fifth, as Kaplan and Costa observe, their apocalyptic fervor predictably unleashed antinomian currents “freeing
them from the normal constraints of Islamic law and simple human decency.”[89] This wide-ranging abrogation
of Islamic law includes not only a “literal declaration of the genocide of all Muslims… save for those who follow
the teachings of Al-Baghdadi”, but also “forced conversion, sexual servitude… and mass executions.”[90]
Perhaps because of ISIS’s unique acts of brutality (which themselves qualify as idiosyncratic tactics), ISIS
attracted many foreign fighters and lone wolves with psychological mixed motives, who were suicidal or
delusional.[91] ISIS thus appears idiosyncratic across all four dimensions.
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Table 2. Case Studies of Idiosyncratic Terrorism
Terrorism Dimensions of Source of Idio- Fatalities Vic- Other Terror-

Type Idiosyncrasy syncrasies tims (+Perpe- ist Offenses
trators)
White Panther Group- Ideology Psychedelic 0 Bombings
Party based drugs
Symbionese Group- Ideology, Tactics, Mental illness 2 (+6) Bombings
Liberation based Strategic Think- of leader and robberies
Army ing
Atomwaffen Group- Ideology, Motive, Occult influ- 5 (+1) Bombings
Division based, Strategic Think- ences and murder
Lone-actor ing plots
“Incel” Terror- Lone-actor Ideology, Motive Mental illness 47 (+4) Mass murder
ism of founder plots
Islamic State Group- Ideology, Tactics, Apocalyptic Thousands Rape, slavery,
(ISIS) based, Motives, Strategic antinomian- torture, geno-
Lone-actor Thinking ism cide
Conclusions from the Case Studies
Three preliminary conclusions emerge from the case studies. First, although mental illness is sometimes the
primary influence, idiosyncrasy has other sources as well, including odd religious innovations and drug use. In
addition to the role of hallucinogens in the WPP and Atomwaffen, further examples include Aum Shinrikyo’s
manufacturing of LSD (often given to members surreptitiously) and Charles Manson’s obsessive psychedelic
use. Moreover, the Brotherhood of Eternal Love, an LSD cult, paid the Weather Underground $25,000 to free
psychedelic promoter Timothy Leary from prison. Leary subsequently released a pro-terrorist manifesto,
saying, “Arm yourself and shoot to live... To shoot a genocidal robot policeman in the defense of life is a sacred
act.”[92] Other factors, such as exceptional creativity, eccentric personalities, or subclinical psychopathic or
psychotic traits (which have been shown to predict radical beliefs), also probably generate idiosyncrasies.[93]
Second, mental illness can be a primary influence on group terrorism, as illustrated by the SLA. Another
example is the New World Liberation Front (NWLF). Perhaps the most prolific terrorist cell in US history, the
NWLF committed 70 bombings against corporate and government targets in the mid-1970s, while releasing
communiques about social programs, feminism, and even Jewish conspiracies—an idiosyncratic topic for far-
left terrorists, to be sure. The cell consisted of Ronald Huffman and his girlfriend Maureen Minton (who ran
a marijuana farm together), and possibly others as well. After years of bombings, Huffman murdered Minton
with an axe, allegedly believing her to be possessed by a “demon dog,” and for some reason removed part of her
brain, which was in his possession when he was arrested hours later.[94] The NWLF often praised the SLA, and
the SLA carried out a bombing in its name.
Third, a cultish atmosphere and apocalyptic orientation may often be found among idiosyncratic terrorists, as
in Kaplan’s Fifth Wave terrorism, but this is not always the case. Idiosyncratic features are also present in groups
without these characteristics, such as the WPP and Incels.
Conclusion: The Importance of Idiosyncratic Terrorism

As argued above, idiosyncrasy can be understood as a characteristic of terrorism that exists in four dimensions,
each of which has recognizable subtypes. This preliminary theorization, which should be refined through future
research, advances terrorism studies by showing that an aspect of terrorism commonly seen as unexplainable
can in fact be analytically disaggregated, with several implications for research and policy.
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Implications for Future Research and Theoretical Development

Typologies are valued for their potential to “discover new relationships…to generate hypotheses,” to spur
“the development of theories, and to identify areas for investigation”[95] This article contributes toward these
goals by shedding light on the relationship between charisma, mental illness, drugs and violence; suggesting
several potential hypotheses; facilitating theory-building by providing conceptual building blocks applicable
to group and solo terrorists alike; and identifying idiosyncrasy in all its dimensions as a new area for empirical
investigation and theoretical development.
Based on the examples and case studies above, preliminary generalizations about idiosyncratic terrorism,
which can be developed into more specific hypotheses for future research, include the following:
1) idiosyncrasies are frequently found among group-based terrorists, even if lone terrorists are more
likely to be idiosyncratic;
2) idiosyncratic group-based terrorists often have charismatic leadership and/or apocalyptic beliefs;
3) idiosyncratic terrorism can be influenced by mental illness, although other factors, such as drug use
or eccentric personalities, also generate idiosyncrasies;
4) idiosyncratic terrorism may often involve the coercion of participants (through kidnapping, death
threats, or other means), as in the cases of ISIS, the LRA, the SLA, and Aum Shinrikyo, and;
5) solo attacks (such as Rodger’s) sometimes inspire numerous copycats attacks, even when the ideology
is extremely bizarre.
Future research can test and further refine these generalizations. For example, previous research on charisma
and terrorism found that violence tends to arise in response to a breakdown in charismatic authority.[96]
However, this does not appear to explain all cases involving charismatic leaders, such as that of the SLA.
Further research should document other pathways toward violence by idiosyncratic terrorists. For example,
studies of opportunistic/impulsive motives might identify risk factors predicting which extremists are likely
to attack. Moreover, terrorism researchers could explore the copycat effect, which is likely more dangerous
when ideology provides an additional motivation beyond mere mimetic mirroring. Notably, copycat attacks
can evolve in unanticipated directions: Breivik’s massacre inspired Tarrant’s mosque attack, which in turn was
the direct inspiration for a deadly shooting at a Poway, California synagogue. Strangely, the Poway attacker was
motivated by Christian anti-Semitism, while neither Breivik nor Tarrant identified as religious Christians or
targeted Jews.[97]
Policy Implications of Idiosyncratic Terrorism
Potential policy implications of idiosyncratic terrorism, phrased as tentative predictions, include the following:
1) publicizing information about terrorists’ frequent idiosyncrasies, such as odd beliefs and hopelessly
naïve strategic thinking, may help prevent or reverse radicalization;
2) monitoring online subcultures, and face-to-face cult-like groups, for emerging idiosyncratic terrorist
ideologies or tactics, and preemptively removing (when possible) websites where antisocial ideologies
are hatched and spread, can prevent idiosyncratic terrorism;
3) blocking the publication of attackers’ manifestos, or monitoring the Internet for discussions of past
attacks to identify potential attackers, may help prevent copycats; and
4) incorporating idiosyncratic strategic thinking into risk assessments may help predict violence by
radicalized individuals.
The first implication can be seen as building upon and broadening Lankford’s argument that publicizing
terrorists’ mental illness could decrease support for terrorism, as the concept of idiosyncrasy encompasses
far more than mental illness. Since “push factors”—in particular, disillusionment with terrorist leaders and
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tactics—tend to be the dominant factor influencing deradicalization, highlighting terrorists’ bizarre ideas and
patently ridiculous strategic thinking could be a promising strategy for counter-messaging efforts.[98]
From Loneness to Strangeness: Towards a Reorientation of Terrorism Studies
Building on recent arguments that the “lone wolf ” concept should be abandoned due to the rareness of true
isolation and stealth,[99] perhaps a reorientation away from the concept of lone-wolf terrorism toward the
concept of idiosyncrasy in its various dimensions may be a more productive direction for Terrorism Studies.
The research and theoretical focus on lone-wolf terrorism encourages misconceptions about terrorism, such as
the idea that idiosyncrasy is synonymous with lone wolves or mental illness. Such a reorientation should also
sidestep unresolvable debates on how isolated or uniquely dangerous solo terrorists allegedly are.
Indeed, the features that are said to make lone wolves so dangerous—their unpredictability, their potential
interest in weapons of mass destruction, and their creativity—apply equally to group terrorists with
idiosyncratic features. It is not only their “loneness” that makes lone terrorists dangerous; it is to a large degree
their strangeness. But this quality can often be found in dyads or groups, and is not perpetually inscrutable—
rather, it can be further understood through quantitative and qualitative investigation.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Dallas Zebrowski for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
About the Author: Dr. Jesse J. Norris is an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at the State University of
New York at Fredonia. In a series of projects, he examined terrorism sting operations in the US and elsewhere,
with a particular focus on entrapment. His research has also analyzed racial disparities in the criminal justice
system, earned release from prison, and theories of governance and accountability. His current research focuses on
unconventional types of terrorism and the use of terrorism law against right-wing terrorists.
Notes
[1] Joosse, Paul. ‘Leaderless resistance and the loneliness of lone wolves’. Terrorism and Political Violence 29, no. 1 (2017): 52-78.
[2] Hamm, Mark., Ramon Spaaij, and Simon Cottee. The age of lone wolf terrorism. New York: Columbia University, 2017.
[3] Bakker, Edwin, and Beatrice de Graaf. ‘Preventing lone wolf terrorism’. Perspectives on Terrorism 5, no. 5-6 (2011): pp. 43-50.
[4] Schuurman, Bart, Lasse Lindekilde, Stefan Malthaner, Francis O’Connor, Paul Gill, and Noémie Bouhana.
‘End of the lone wolf: The typology that should not have been’. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 8 (2019): pp. 771-778.
[5] Lankford, Adam. The Myth of Martyrdom. New York: Palgrave, 2013.
[6] Michael, George. ‘Counterinsurgency and lone wolf terrorism’. Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 1 (2014): pp. 45-57; Spaaij,
Ramon. Understanding lone wolf terrorism. Dordrecht: Springer, 2011.
[7] Bakker and de Graaf, op. cit., p. 46.
[8] Schmid, Alex and Albert Jongman. Political Terrorism. New Brunswick: Transaction, 1988, p. 179.
[9] Sageman, Marc. Misunderstanding terrorism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2017, p. 27.
[10] Turchie, Terry, and Kathleen Puckett. Hunting the American Terrorist. Palisades, NY: History Publishing Company, 2007.
[11] Ramon Spaaij, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
[12] Simon, Jeffrey. Lone Wolf Terrorism. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2013, pp. 74-75.
[13] Idem, p. 79.
[14] Sageman, Marc. Turning to Political Violence. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2017, p. 383.
ISSN 2334-3745 15 June 2020

[15] Ibid.
[16] Kaplan, Jeffrey, and Christopher P. Costa. ‘The Islamic State and the new tribalism’. Terrorism and Political Violence 27, no. 5
(2015): pp. 926-969.
[17] Kaplan, Jeffrey. Radical Religion and Violence: Theory and Case Studies. Abingdon: Routledge, p. 124.
[18] Hoffman, Bruce. ‘The confluence of international and domestic trends in terrorism,’ Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 2
(1997): pp. 1-15.
[19] Kaplan, Jeffrey. ‘Terrorism’s fifth wave: A theory, a conundrum and a dilemma,’ Perspectives on Terrorism 2, no. 2 (2008): pp.
12-24.
[20] McLellan, David. Ideology. Milton Keynes: Open University, 1986.
[21] Kaplan and Costa, op. cit.
[22] Kaplan, Jeffrey, and Heléne Lööw, (Eds.), The Cultic Milieu: Oppositional Subcultures in an Age of Globalization. Walnut Creek,
CA: Rowman Altamira, 2002, p. 14.
[23] Kaplan, ‘Fifth wave,’ op. cit.
[24] Singh, Rashmi. ‘Suicide Terrorism.’ Oxford Handbook of Terrorism. Oxford: Oxford University, 2019.
[25] Lankford, op. cit.
[26] Manifesto of Christopher Dorner, URL: https://genius.com/Christopher-dorner-manifesto-annotated
[27] Stein, Rachel. Vengeful Citizens, Violent States. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2019, p. 189.
[28] Beirich, Heidi, and Mark Potok. ‘USA: Hate groups, radical-right violence, on the rise’. Policing 3, no. 3 (2009): pp. 255-263; Mark
Hamm et al., op. cit.
[29] Gruenewald, Jeff, Kiefer Dooley, Michael Suttmoeller, Steven Chermak, and Joshua Freilich. ‘A mixed-method analysis of fatal
attacks on police by far-right extremists’. Police Quarterly 19, no. 2 (2016): pp. 216-245.
[30] Singh, op. cit., p. 429.
[31] Crenshaw, Emlyn. ‘American and foreign terrorists’. Critical Studies on Terrorism 7, no. 3 (2014): pp. 363-378.
[32] Kirn, Walter. “Luke Helder’s Bad Trip.” Time, May 12, 2002; URL: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,237036,00.
html; Luke Helder, ‘Life on Earth’; URL: http://manifestoindex.blogspot.com/2011/04/life-on-earth-2002-by-luke-helder.html
[33] McCormack, Win, (Ed.) The Rajneesh Chronicles. Portland: Tin House Books, 2010.
[34] ‘Czech pensioner jailed for terror attacks on trains’. BBC, Jan. 14, 2019; URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46862508
[35] ‘Les attentats contre les foyers Sonacotra devant la cour d’assises des Alpes-Maritimes’. Le Monde, Oct. 20, 1991; URL: https://www.
lemonde.fr/archives/article/1991/10/30/les-attentats-contre-les-foyers-sonacotra-devant-la-cour-d-assises-des-alpes-maritimes-les-
commanditaires-occultes-de-gilbert-hervochon_3543405_1819218.html
[36] Abrahms, Max, and Justin Conrad. ‘The strategic logic of credit claiming: A new theory for anonymous terrorist attacks’. Security
Studies 26, no. 2 (2017): pp. 279-304.
[37] Kaplan, Jeffrey. ‘Review of Mel Ayton, Dark Soul of the South’. Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 5: pp. 855-857.
[38] Abrahms, Max. ‘Why Terrorism does not work’. International Security 31, no. 2 (2006): pp. 42-78.
[39] Maynard, Jonathan. ‘Rethinking the role of ideology in mass atrocities’. Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 5 (2014): pp.
821-841.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.; Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality. Oxford: Clarendon, 1985.
[42] Abrahms, Max, and Karolina Lula. ‘Why Terrorists Overestimate the Odds of Victory’. Perspectives on Terrorism 6, nos. 4-5
(2012).
[43] Dodd, James. Violence and Phenomenology. London: Routledge, 2009.
[44] Vasagar, Jeevan. ‘Nail bomber ‘was sent by God to start race wars’.’ Guardian, June 14, 2000; URL: https://www.theguardian.com/
uk/2000/jun/15/uksecurity.jeevanvasagar
[45] Sharot, Tali. ‘The optimism bias’. Current Biology 21, no. 23 (2011): R941-R945.
[46] Norris, Jesse. ‘Why Dylann Roof Is a Terrorist Under Federal Law, and Why It Matters’. Harvard Journal on Legislation 54 (2017):
ISSN 2334-3745 16 June 2020

pp. 501-541; URL: https://harvardjol.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/2017/03/54.1-HLL105.pdf

[47] Malkki, Leena. ‘Political elements in post-Columbine school shootings in Europe and North America’. Terrorism and Political
Violence 26, no. 1 (2014): pp. 185-210.
[48] Ibid.; Erlandsson, Åsa, and J. Reid Meloy. ‘The Swedish school attack in Trollhättan’. Journal of Forensic Sciences 63, no. 6 (2018):
pp. 1917-1927.
[49] Kaplan, Jeffrey. ‘The post-war paths of occult national socialism: from Rockwell and Madole to Manson’. Patterns of Prejudice
35, no. 3 (2001): pp. 41-67.
[50] Steinbuch, Yaron. ‘Suspected New Zealand mosque shooter hoped to spark civil war in US’. NY Post, March 15, 2019; URL:
https://nypost.com/2019/03/15/suspected-new-zealand-mosque-shooter-hoped-to-spark-civil-war-in-us/
[51] Wilson, Jason. ‘New documents suggest Las Vegas shooter was conspiracy theorist–what we know’. Guardian (UK), May 19,
2018; URL: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/19/stephen-paddock-las-vegas-shooter-conspiracy-theories-documents-
explained
[52] SPLC, ‘Las Vegas shooter went on antigovernment rant before massacre’. Hatewatch, May 18, 2018; URL: https://www.splcenter.
org/hatewatch/2018/05/18/las-vegas-shooter-went-antigovernment-rant-massacre-sometimes-sacrifices-have-be-made
[53] Hemmingby, Cato, and Tore Bjørgo. ‘Terrorist Target Selection: The Case of Anders Behring Breivik’. Perspectives on Terrorism
12, no. 6 (2018): pp. 164-176.
[54] Schuurman et al., op. cit., p. 775.
[55] Spaaij, Ramón. ‘The enigma of lone wolf terrorism’. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 9 (2010): pp. 854-870, p. 858.
[56] Lee, Martin, and Bruce Shlain. Acid dreams. New York: Grove, 1992, p. 218.
[57] Ibid., p. 282.
[58] Hearst, Patricia. Every Secret Thing. New York: Doubleday, 1982.
[59] Ibid., p. 120.
[60] Ibid., p. 123.
[61] Ibid., p. 129.
[62] Ibid., p. 93.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid., p. 151.
[65] Ibid., pp. 165-166.
[66] Ibid., p. 132.
[67] Ibid., p. 200.
[68] Ibid., p. 186.

[69] Ibid., p. 256
[70] Parry, Albert. Terrorism. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2013, p. 27.
[71] Kaplan, “Post-war paths,” op. cit.
[72] Macklin, Graham. ‘Only Bullets will Stop Us!’–The Banning of National Action in Britain’. Perspectives on Terrorism 12, no. 6
(2018): pp. 104-122, p. 113.
[73] Thompson, A.C., Ali Winston and Jake Hanrahan. “Inside Atomwaffen.” ProPublica, Feb. 23, 2018; URL: https://www.propublica.
org/article/atomwaffen-division-inside-white-hate-group
[74] Ibid.
[75] Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Samuel Hodgson, and Colin Clarke. ‘The Growing Threat Posed by Accelerationism and Accelerationist
Groups Worldwide’. FPRI, April 20, 2020; URL: https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/04/the-growing-threat-posed-by-accelerationism-
and-accelerationist-groups-worldwide/
[76] ‘U.S. Army Specialist with Links to Neo-Nazi Group Pleads Guilty’. ADL, Feb. 11, 2020; URL: https://www.adl.org/blog/us-army-
specialist-with-links-to-neo-nazi-group-pleads-guilty
ISSN 2334-3745 17 June 2020

[77] Barakat, Matthew. ‘Gun charge yields year in prison for man with neo-Nazi ties’. Seattle Times, Feb. 27, 2020; URL: https://www.
seattletimes.com/news/feds-seek-18-months-for-virginia-man-with-neo-nazi-ties/
[78] ‘Nazi-Obsessed Teenager Who Dreamt of Planning Terrorism Jailed’. Faith Matters, Sept. 20, 2019; URL: https://www.faith-
matters.org/nazi-obsessed-teenager-who-dreamt-of-planning-terrorism-jailed/
[79] Hope Not Hate, State of Hate 2020 (2020); URL: https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/state-of-hate-
2020-final.pdf
[80] Elliot Rodger, My Twisted World (2014), p. 131; URL: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1173619/rodger-manifesto.
pdf
[81] Ibid., p. 132.
[82] Ibid., p. 135.
[83] Ibid., p. 136.
[84] Langman, Peter. ‘Elliot Rodger’. (2014); URL: https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/rodger_personality_analysis_1.1.pdf
[85] Brahimi, Alia, ‘Ideology and Terrorism’. Oxford Handbook of Terrorism. Oxford: Oxford University, 2019.
[86] Wood, Graeme. The Way of the Strangers. New York: Random House, 2019.
[87] Ibid., p. 230.
[88] Kaplan and Costa, op. cit.
[89] Ibid., p. 949.
[90] Ibid., p. 926, p. 949.
[91] Lankford, Adam. ‘A psychological re-examination of mental health problems among the 9/11 terrorists’. Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 41, no. 11 (2018): 875-898.
[92] Leary, Timothy. ‘The P.O.W. Communique’ (1970); URL: http://www.luminist.org/archives/leary_POW.htm
[93] Međedović, Janko, and Goran Knežević. ‘Dark and Peculiar: The Key Features of Militant Extremist Thinking Pattern?’ Journal
of Individual Differences 40, no. 2 (2019): pp. 92-103.
[94] Burrough, Bryan. Days of Rage. New York: Penguin, 2015.
[95] Schmid and Jongman, op. cit.
[96] Hofmann, David, and Lorne Dawson. ‘The neglected role of charismatic authority in the study of terrorist groups and
radicalization’. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 4 (2014): pp. 348-368.
[97] ‘Poway synagogue shooting captured on video, prosecutors say, as they describe attack’. LA Times, May 2, 2019; URL: https://
www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-san-diego-synagogue-shooter-camera-explainer-john-earnest-20190502-story.html
[98] Schuurman et al., op. cit.
[99] Altier, Mary Beth, Emma Boyle, Neil Shortland, and John Horgan. ‘Why they leave’. Security Studies 26, no. 2 (2017): pp. 305-332.
ISSN 2334-3745 18 June 2020

Failed States and Terrorism: Justifiability of Transnational

Interventions from a Counterterrorism Perspective
by Aleksandar Pašagić
Abstract
Failed states as a global security risk have occupied an important place in international politics for over two decades,
but it was the added threat of terrorism since 2001 that made them appear even more menacing and opened the
door for external interventions, ostensibly for the purpose of counterterrorism. The failed state – terrorism link
has often been accepted and acted upon without the in-depth critical examination it warrants, considering the
implications for both the international community and the states labeled as failed. Through presentation and
analysis of contrasting scholarly opinions on the issue, this paper argues for a high degree of caution when using
counterterrorism as a rationale for transnational interventions into failed and fragile states.
Keywords: failed states, fragile states, weak states, terrorism, interventionism, counterterrorism
Failed States as a Challenge to Global Security

Although the idea of failed states was not new in 2001, the events of September 11 pushed them up the ladder
of global security concerns, as they were widely perceived to be sources of terrorism risk.[1] The US National
Security Strategy from 2002 onward regularly cites weak and failing states as sources of a broad spectrum of
threats, with the 2002 Strategy specifically mentioning Afghanistan as a prime example.[2] Former Director of
the CIA and US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote in 2010 that the most serious terrorist threats to the
security of the United States are likely to originate from failing states and that dealing with such states presents
“the main security challenge of our time.”[3] The idea of failed states as sources of terrorism also features in
European strategic thought. The 2003 European Security Strategy cites terrorism as one of the “obvious threats”
that can be associated with state failure;[4] the Strategy from 2010 stresses the need for special attention to
weak and failed states to prevent them from becoming hubs of organized crime or terrorism.[5]
The failed state – terrorism connection appears intuitively plausible,[6] which may be one of the reasons
facilitating its acceptance without a more thorough questioning. While this often occurs in the media and
politics,[7] it is also not uncommon to find scholarly works that take as given the notion of weak and failed
states posing a serious terrorism-related risk to global security, and continue to build on that premise.[8]
This article presents arguments commonly used to prove that failed states indeed are a terrorism risk, as well
as those pointing to the contrary. It highlights a cross section of academic studies on the relationship between
terrorism and state failure, and proceeds to offer possible explanations for their often conflicting conclusions.
The data indicating that “fixing” failed states does not appear to be an optimal counterterrorism approach is
elaborated on; this is followed by the critique of securitizing state failure through the threat of terrorism for
the purpose of allowing external actors to use exceptional measures, closing with the conclusion that terrorism
should not be used to rally additional support for interventions into failed states.
Perspective I: Why Failed States Present a Terrorism Threat

Putting aside for the moment the complexities arising from the process of lumping together vastly different
states under the failed state label,[9] there appear to be a number of reasons why state failure should indeed
create an environment both attractive to international terrorist groups and susceptible to terrorism from
within. As far as international terrorist organizations are concerned, the most commonly quoted risk associated
with failed states is that they provide a form of sanctuary—a territory outside of the influence of legitimate
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government where such organizations can function with impunity. This makes it possible for them to set up
bases for planning and rehearsing attacks,[10] as well as training camps. The porousness of borders that often
accompanies state failure facilitates transnational activities,[11] thus increasing the risk of exporting terrorists
and weapons needed to commit acts of terrorism.
The rationale behind failed states as a permissive environment for domestic terrorism appears even more
compelling, as factors contributing to state failure largely overlap with those commonly considered to be root
causes of terrorism. Human insecurity conditions play an important role in creating dissent[12] and provide
terrorist recruiters with a pool of young men, often unemployed, in conditions of poverty or close to it,
disillusioned by the failure of government to provide for their basic needs. With high levels of corruption being
an important indicator of state failure, citizens may resort to acts of terrorism to bring about regime change.[13]
As law enforcement capacity is weak or nonexistent, terrorists can use drug trafficking or smuggling as sources
of income.[14] State failure is often compounded with ethnic conflict, some sort of a rebellion or an outright
civil war, possibly including actors from neighboring states or representatives of the international community.
Globally, there is a strong connection between terrorism and civil war,[15] with terrorism being the dominant
tactic of rebel groups fighting democratic governments[16]. Ongoing civil conflict degrades official security
capabilities, opens up attractive targets and increases the flow of refugees.[17] Weapons are usually readily
available in such conditions, and the range of tactics considered acceptable can easily include acts of terrorism
against a civilian population and whatever government institutions may still be functioning. Terrorism may
also be employed against foreign or international representatives within the failed state if they are viewed as
the cause or a contributor to the condition the state is in. Failed states undergoing internal conflict can also
serve as testing grounds for new terrorist tactics and provide on-the-job training for local terrorists,[18] both
of which can potentially be exported later to be used against other states. Some areas of weak and failed states
may be inaccessible to outsiders due to ethnic homogeneity,[19] creating a safe haven for local terrorist groups.
Perspective II: Why Failed States Do Not Present a Terrorism Threat

On the other hand, there are equally compelling arguments against the failed state – terrorism connection.
International terrorist organizations may find it prohibitively difficult to operate in fully failed or “collapsed”
states due to a number of reasons, and face many of the problems any organization intent on functioning in
such an environment would encounter. The presence of fewer foreigners in failed states makes foreign terrorists
more conspicuous and limits their ability to infiltrate local population for purposes of hiding or committing
attacks; they are also more exposed to direct counterterrorism action by international actors as the problems
associated with violation of state sovereignty are lessened by the failed status of the state.[20]
This fact, coupled with the threat of violence from indigenous groups contesting for power and the likelihood of
betrayal from poverty-plagued sectors of the population, forces terrorist organizations to devote considerable
resources to ensure their own survival and security.[21] While borders of failed states with immediate neighbors
might be more porous in some cases, being a citizen of a failed state or having been registered as visiting
one makes it more difficult to cross international borders, thus limiting the options of perpetrating an act of
international terrorism. Efficient financing of terrorist operations requires at least some functioning financial
infrastructure for the transfer of funds, and conditions of general state failure make many of the standard
fundraising activities almost impossible.[22] Economic and human security variables, often mentioned as root
causes of terrorism, have in fact shown little effect on increasing susceptibility of local populations to adopting
terrorist methods or joining terrorist organizations.[23] While armed groups in civil wars do use terrorist
tactics in an attempt to improve their effectiveness,[24] they appear to be detrimental to such groups in the
long term as they diminish their capacity for negotiation.[25]
The problems inherent to operating in failed states lead a number of authors to conclude that it is in fact weak
states, instead of fully failed ones, that present the most significant risk of terrorism; it is the transition periods,
especially from authoritarian regimes to democracy, coupled with violent political instability, that are most
critical.[26] In addition, weak states are sometimes ruled by power structures that are corrupt, sympathetic
ISSN 2334-3745 20 June 2020

or tolerant of the terrorist cause, making it possible for terrorist organizations to operate, using existing
infrastructures and without dedicating major resources to protecting their own security.[27] On the other
hand, when weak state structures are opposed to terrorist organizations, they themselves become the most
common target of terrorism, thus also increasing the number and likelihood of attacks.[28] Finally, it has to be
taken into consideration that the state-centric perspective in general is becoming increasingly outdated when
dealing with international terrorist organizations that demonstrate ever-diminishing dependency on territory
for the planning or execution of their operations.[29]
Contrasting Opinions in Scholarly Works

A number of scholars have undertaken qualitative analyses of the relationship between failed states and
terrorism, and there does not appear to be a clear set of conclusions all authors can agree on. Analyzing the
data on 19 states in the Middle East and North Africa from 1972 to 2003, Piazza concluded that state failure is a
“consistent positive predictor of terrorism, regardless of how terrorism is measured or how terrorist attacks are
sorted.”[30] He reinforced that claim in his 2008 article where a sample of 197 countries are tested from 1973
to 2003 to show that states experiencing intense failure are more likely to both be targeted by terrorists and to
export terrorism to other countries.[31] Tikuisis analyzed the relationship between states on the 2006 and 2007
Failed State Index and incidents of fatal terrorist attacks and arrived at the conclusion that the link between
weak states and fatal terrorism is unquestionable.[32] Newman made the argument that state weakness is only
relevant in relation to terrorism when the nominal government is not tolerant of the terrorist organization
operating within its borders. He used several different indexes of state failure to show that while the most
destructive terrorist organizations indeed are located in weak or failed states, this cannot be explained by the
conditions of weakness or failure since most weak or failed states do not exhibit significant terrorist activity.[33]
A statistical analysis of fragile states in sub-Saharan Africa concluded that factors such as the lack of security,
corrupt state authority, lack of essential public goods, and the inability to protect private property significantly
increased the likelihood of citizens supporting the use of political violence; but it also failed to show that
ungoverned territory, or the absence of the state, leads to increase in political violence.[34] In fact, it has been
argued that the prioritization of the need to exert positive control over territory leads to approaches that are
more military in nature, which in turn can cause a downward spiral of state failure.[35] Coggins analyzed the
1999–2008 period and generally concluded that counterterrorism efforts in failed states should concentrate on
those experiencing violent political instability rather than those failing due to human security or state capacity
issues.[36] Hehir paired foreign terrorist organizations with data from the Failed State Index to show that out of
the top 20 most failed states in 2006 only Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan exhibited a notable presence of foreign
terrorist organizations, while 13 states in that group contained none; also, out of 31 states that contained more
than one foreign terrorist organization, only 3 appeared in the top 20 of the 2006 Failed State Index.[37] A
quantitative analysis of 2008 using terrorism data from the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START, University of Maryland) center and the Failed State Index by Plummer voiced the opinion that root
causes of terrorism, as well as those of state failure, were complex, and other factors, country history being one
of them, needed to be taken into consideration when attempting to establish a relationship between state failure
and terrorism,[38] or we risk employing a wide range of policies based on “anecdotal evidence or isolated
examples.”[39]
Accounting for Differences in Conclusions

A persistent problem when attempting to establish a link between state failure and terrorism is the question of
what exactly qualifies a state as failed. This issue is made additionally problematic by the introduction of failure
modifiers; a state may also be labeled weak, fragile, failing or collapsed. Such choice of words implicitly suggests
a kind of a continuum of failure. However, as state failure is a complex phenomenon made up of a number of
indicators, but most often ultimately presented as a single score, the usefulness of comparing states according
to their ranking in any of the available failure indexes is questionable. The Fragile States Index (formerly Failed
ISSN 2334-3745 21 June 2020

States Index) combines social, political and economic indicators to create a list of countries categorized under
“Very High Alert” on the negative to “Very Sustainable” on the positive end of the spectrum, again suggesting a
continuum of fragility.[40] This kind of simplification can be problematic when used for drawing conclusions
about state failure and terrorism, as most failed states vary significantly with regard to levels of terrorism.[41]
The variations in definitions of terrorism, itself a contentious point, create additional points of divergence.
A very cursory comparison of the Fragile States Index (FSI) and START’s Global Terrorism Index (GTI) for
the year 2013 immediately highlights some of the problems that occur when attempting to relate fragility and
exposure to terrorism, especially in a linear fashion. The country with the worst FSI score was South Sudan,
while it took 20th place on the GTI, and even that is somewhat misleading as its GTI score was almost half the
score of Iraq, the state most affected by terrorism in 2013. India was ranked 6th on the GTI, with Philippines,
Thailand and Russia taking places from 9 to 11, respectively; the same countries ranked 81st, 52nd, 80th and
85th on the FSI.[42] Of course, the FSI and the GTI are far from being the only sources used for quantitative
research on the relationship between failed states and terrorism, and the choice of the source may have some
influence on the conclusions, along with the choice of what to focus on when performing the research and how
to weigh and present the results. In 2013, Thailand suffered 332 recorded incidents of terrorism, while Nigeria
suffered 303; but when the numbers of total fatalities are compared, the ratio is 131 in Thailand as opposed to
1,826 in Nigeria, thus creating a significantly different impression of the actual impact on terrorism on those
two countries.[43] It is left to the author to decide what indicators he/she will use, and this decision can be
another subject of contention. For example, Tikuisis criticized Newman’s choice to use the presence of major
terrorist groups in a given country when analyzing its connection to terrorism and opted for occurrences of
fatal terrorism incidents in that country as a better indicator.[44] Because of such divergencies, it is essential to
place studies on the relationship between weak states and terrorism in proper context.
The relationship between terrorism and war is one important example of a potential risk of drawing the wrong
conclusions. A state experiencing civil war, ethnic conflict, armed revolution or violent political instability
is likely to suffer acts of terrorism used as a tactical tool.[45] Approximately 72 percent of terrorist attacks
between 1970 and 2012 occurred within countries during periods of major conflict.[46] At the same time,
such states are also likely to be categorized as failed, either because of the violence itself or because of the
combination of violence and other commonly used indicators. However, if that violence is not clearly named as
the principal source of terrorism, there is a risk of coming to a conclusion that all forms of state failure increase
the risk of terrorism.
“Fixing” Failed States in Order to Counter Terrorism

How do attempts to “fix” failed states relate to counterterrorism? Existing data suggests that using nation-
building as the principal counterterrorism tool may be not only ineffective, but also counterproductive. The
idea that a hitherto fragile state can be made unappealing to terrorist organizations by transforming it into a
liberal democracy, either by physical intervention or through a strong external influence on local actors, is not
supported by evidence, and many such efforts have proven to be problematic at best.
If counterterrorism is the only or principal motive for action, costly and complex nation-building undertakings
seem to be an excessive waste of resources, even under the assumption that such an approach will eventually
accomplish the stated objective. Direct action taken against terrorists has shown to be significantly more
effective,[47] and such operations are usually made simpler by the absence of a fully sovereign state. The
unilateral action by the US during the 2011 Operation Neptune Spear caused tensions in the US-Pakistan
relations because Pakistan perceived its sovereignty to be violated.[48] On the other hand, counterterrorism
operations in failed states, especially within ungoverned territories, such as the US-targeted assassination
of Al Qaeda ringleader Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in southern Somalia, carry little risk of significant political
complications.[49]
Furthermore, as it has been mentioned previously, transitional periods from conditions of failure or
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authoritarian regimes to democracy have shown to be particularly prone to violence, including terrorism.
Fukuyama admitted that the problem with weak states is insufficient local demand for change and conceded
that in many cases interventions have made the situation worse.[50] This risk appears particularly high with
large-scale interventions, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, when the ensuing power vacuum facilitated internal
violent struggles with heavy use of terrorist tactics. There are, however, indicators that state-strengthening can
be a potentially effective counterterrorism approach in specific situations when existing government structures
are genuinely committed to and engaged in counterterrorism efforts and the threat of terrorism is obvious, but
there is a lack of operational capacity.[51]
Also, existing data indicate that, from a purely practical standpoint, cultivating liberal democratic regimes
is perhaps not the optimal course of action if counterterrorism is indeed the main objective of intervention.
Such regimes have proven to be more vulnerable to terrorism because of internal constraints on the scope
of available counterterrorism tools and present a generally more permissive environment.[52] It seems that
authoritarian states are in fact better equipped to deal with terrorism.[53] Major terrorist groups gravitate
towards weak states with a better human rights record and economic performance.[54] Piazza’s analysis of
19 states in the MENA region suggested that regimes that are more dictatorial are more resilient to terrorism
than those demonstrating greater liberalism.[55] His research on a wider set of countries also concluded that
transnational terrorism is more likely to occur in, and be produced by, newer regimes and by economically
more developed countries with higher standards of living and literacy rates.[56] This, of course, is not meant
to suggest that cultivation of or support for dictatorships is in any way justifiable for counterterrorism (or any
other) purposes.
Another unintended—although not entirely unexpected—side effect of interventions into failed states for
purposes of counterterrorism may in fact be an increased risk of terrorism at home. It seems that the very
tendency of democracies to get involved in issues of other states, particularly conflicts, increases the risk of acts
of terrorism being perpetrated against the intervening country.[57] This is mostly because intervention in a
conflict usually results in at least one side taking offence. And international partnerships against terrorism may
be double-edged swords: a military alliance with the US increased a country’s transnational terrorism incidence
rate by 179%.[58] Interventions are also used by terrorists as a tool for recruitment and as a justification for
attacks, as can be seen in the document attributed to Osama bin Laden where Somalia is used as an example
of the West attacking a Muslim land, thus supplying the cause for retaliation/defense.[59] This would suggest
that refraining from interventions into failed states experiencing violent conflict might actually be a reasonable
policy for many developed countries in terms of terrorism prevention.
At the same time, it does appear that terrorism and state failure are mutually reinforcing phenomena. The
presence of violent non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, has a snowball effect on state fragility; as a state
sinks deeper into failure, the number and influence of such groups tend to increase.[60] A large number of
refugees and high youth unemployment—common indicators of state fragility—create an environment
conducive to terrorism,[61] while terrorism reinforces state failure by making “wars more difficult to resolve
and more likely to recur.” [62] State fragility in post-invasion Iraq was arguably a key factor enabling the
creation of what would later become the Islamic State,[63] and the Islamic State has in turn become a key
contributor to the perpetuation of that fragility.
Failed States, Counterterrorism and Interventionism

As securitization of states labeled as failed takes place in politics and the media, an increasing number of
authors question not only the underlying assumptions, many of which have already been demonstrated as
problematic, but also the political motives of those doing the labeling. A major critique aimed at using the
failed state label is that it conflates being a failure and merely being different from what is envisaged as an
ideal—“the classic European state.”[64] This view of what states should look and function like is supported by
what Verhoeven calls “the Orthodox Failed States Narrative”—the idea that failed states present an unwanted
by-product of globalization and an obstacle in the path of the liberal democratic order working towards global
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peace. State failure diagnosis is generally based on a Realist framework: the state is about power, and failure is
the lack of power to exert control, be it over territory, population or instruments of coercion.[65] Non-standard
states make the international system uncomfortable, as it does not know how to deal with such entities.[66]
The failed state label, and the sometimes occurring term “collapsed state” even more so, seem to suggest that
the phenomenon in question is of local origin; it implicitly assumes that there is no blame to be assigned to
external actors.[67] It also isolates the failed state and removes its decision-making autonomy, rendering it
dependent on “functioning” states,[68] thereby providing a level of credibility to an outside intervention as a
potential remedy.
Examples of Afghanistan and Somalia are sometimes used to illustrate the flexibility with which the failed state
label is applied, as well as potential implications. Ever since the 2001 attacks on the United States, Afghanistan has
played a central role in the War on Terrorism—failed state discourse.[69] Some authors consider Afghanistan
under the Taliban both a failed state and a threat to the US, though admitting that it was a rarity as such.[70]
However, others question exactly to what extent that held true in practice, given that the US government
conducted business-related discussions with the Taliban almost until the 2001 attacks.[71] This highlights the
issue of “failed” versus “different” states, and brings to the fore the idea that the use of the failed state label may
in fact be primarily based on whether the state in question is perceived as a threat to Western security and
interests.[72] In Somalia, the failed state rhetoric “became actionable” with the emergence of a unifying Islamic
force, the Union of Islamic Courts, an actor that in fact made some progress towards establishing order. Yet it
has been suggested that, because the emerging order in Somalia resembled Afghanistan under the Taliban in
the eyes of the US, its status was elevated to that of a threat to international security.[73]
When presented as an international security threat, failed states are usually mentioned as potential breeding
grounds or sanctuaries for transnational terrorist organizations. If such reasoning is accepted by the public, a
specific failed state (or failed states in general) can be securitized to the point where an intervention, including
a preventative one, is perceived as a legitimate act of self-defense.[74] This is made easier by the fact that the
War on Terror is already securitized by the media.[75] The threat of terrorism can be used to securitize the
concept of state failure, which can then be applied to states deviating from the expected standard, effectively
providing the tool for instant securitization, as the securitizing agent is spared from having to make the “failure
as a security threat” move for every particular instance of state failure. This is additionally facilitated by the
broadness of the failure concept that allows for a very arbitrary application. As the failed states—terrorism
connection becomes more intuitively accepted by the broader public, it becomes possible to expand the range
of potential candidates for intervention to entire regions, even continents; Abrahamsen argues that the entire
continent of Africa is becoming increasingly securitized in Western political speech.[76] Many post-colonial
states have always fit the broad definition of failure: their governments were never fully in control of their
territory, had no monopoly on violence, they have failed to provide economic security for their citizens and
sometimes threatened the security of neighboring countries, but were not labelled as failed until it suited the
international community.[77] Such examples make it difficult not to raise the question whether the application
of a failed state label is sometimes merely a pretext to generate support for foreign interventions.[78]
The majority of fatalities and injuries from acts of terrorism are not a result of transnational terrorist operations
carried out by actors arriving from failed states[79]—it is states of origin that suffer most. In 2013 Iraq accounted
for 35.4% of all deaths by terrorism in that year, followed by Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria, for a
cumulative total of 82% or 14,722 lives in that year.[80] For comparison, over the same time period the total
number of fatalities due to acts of terrorism in the European Union was seven.[81] Much of the terrorism in
weak states remains confined to their territory and is perpetrated by organizations motivated by grievances of
local origin, such as FARC in Colombia.[82] Additionally, international terrorists do not come predominantly
or even significantly from failed states,[83] and it should be noted that recent developments have turned the
threat of transnational terrorism around—Western countries exported more terrorists to Syria and Iraq than
vice versa.[84] This also can be framed as a threat with roots in the failed states themselves: it is the failed state
that is the source of radicalization aimed at citizens of more stable countries, providing them with skills and
experience that could at a later time be used against their country of origin. Therefore, it could be argued that,
ISSN 2334-3745 24 June 2020

once successfully securitized, failed states can be shown as threatening instead of being threatened even in
situations when the direction of terrorism flow is clearly reversed.
Conclusion
Due caution should be exercised when presenting either counterterrorism as an additional benefit of state-
building or the inverse in an attempt to garner additional support for an intervention into a state labeled as
failed. As discussed, counterterrorism and state-building do not necessarily go hand in hand, and the optimal
effort to achieve one objective might quite possibly be to the detriment of the other. Placing countries in the
context of experiencing failure as a terrorism risk does little to contribute to the solving of their development
problems, and may make their situation worse for a number of reasons, not least of which is providing external
and internal actors with access to means normally considered unacceptable.[85] The securitized status of failed
states leaves them vulnerable not only to presumably well-intentioned international interventions gone wrong
but, as was the case with Somalia, to exploitation of that status by their immediate neighbors: Ethiopia used the
situation in Somalia to gain support for military intervention and accompanying actions that did little to make
Somalia a more secure or stable state.[86]
State failure is a complex issue, and broad generalizations of the relationship between it and terrorism should
be avoided, not least because of the policy implications that necessarily follow. The War on Terror in the context
of state failure can appear to be one of the “candidates for control of the developing world”,[87] given that it
allows the use of selective sovereignty violations for purposes of counterterrorism or terrorism prevention.
[88] Because it may appear tempting, policy-wise, to uncritically invoke the threat of terrorism to gain access
to options that would otherwise be inaccessible in dealing with certain states, it is to be expected that state
failure will continue to be conflated with terrorism risk, both in the media and in strategic documents (though
the wording itself will likely be somewhat less decisive than the one used in the first decade of the War on
Terror, as more experts continue to voice their concern and additional data highlighting the problems with
generalizations on failed states and terrorism come to the fore). But even if questionable ethics behind such
approaches are not taken into consideration, available data and experience suggests a much higher degree of
caution should be exercised when dealing with the subject of state failure and terrorism than has been the case
this far.
About the Author: Aleksandar Pašagić ([email protected]) holds an MA in International Security

Studies from the University of Leicester. He works as a Chief Security Officer in the private sector.
Notes
[1] Boas, M. and Jennings, K. M. (2005) ‘Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the “Failed State’’,’ The European Journal of
Development Research, 17:3, p. 387; Call, C. T. (2008) ‘The Fallacy of the “Failed State’’,’ Third World Quarterly, 29:8, p. 1504.
[2] White House (2002) ‘National Security Strategy 2002’, 17 September 2002; URL: http://nssarchive.us/national-security-
strategy-2002/; White House (2010) ‘National Security Strategy 2010’, 27 May 2010; URL: http://nssarchive.us/national-security-
strategy-2010/; White House (2015) ‘National Security Strategy 2015’, 6 February 2015; URL: http://nssarchive.us/national-security-
strategy-2015/
[3] Gates, R. M. (2010) ‘Helping Others Defend Themselves’, Foreign Affairs, 89:3, p. 2.
[4] European Union (2003) ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 December 2003; URL:
https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/10/11/1df262f2-260c-486f-b414-dbf8dc112b6b/publishable_en.pdf
[5] European Union (2010) ‘Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Model,’ Brussels (March
2010), p. 30; URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30753/qc3010313enc.pdf.
[6] Newman, E. (2007) ‘Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 19:4, p. 464.
ISSN 2334-3745 25 June 2020

[7] Patrick, S. (2006) ‘Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?’, The Washington Quarterly, 29:2, p. 28.
[8] Fukuyama, F. (2004) ‘The Imperative of State-Building’, Journal of Democracy, 15:2, p. 17; Krasner, S. D. and Pascual, C. (2005)
‘Addressing State Failure’, Foreign Affairs, 84:4, p. 153; Mallaby, S. (2002) ‘The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the
Case for American Empire’, Foreign Affairs, 81:2, p. 3.
[9] Call, C. T. (2008), op. cit., p. 1494.
[10] Coggins, B. L. (2015) ‘Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? An Empirical Analysis (1999–2008)’, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
59:3, p. 466.
[11] Boas, M. and Jennings, K. M. (2005), op. cit., p. 393.
[12] Boas, M. and Jennings, K. M. (2005), op. cit., p. 391.
[13] Coggins, B. L. (2015), op. cit., p. 464.
[14] Piazza, J. A. (2007) ‘Draining the Swamp: Democracy Promotion, State Failure, and Terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern Countries’,
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30:6, p. 525.
[15] Findley, M. G. and Young, J. K. (2012) ‘Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal Approach to a Conceptual Problem’,
Perspectives on Politics, 10:2, p. 300.
[16] Stanton, J. A. (2013) ‘Terrorism in the Context of Civil War’, The Journal of Politics, 75:4, p. 1015.
[17] Marineau, J., Pascoe, H., Braithwaite, A., Findley, M. and Young, J. (2020) ‘The Local Geography of Transnational Terrorism’,
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 37:3, p. 7.
[18] Simons, A. and Tucker, D. (2007) ‘The Misleading Problem of Failed States: a “socio-geography” of terrorism in the post-9/11
era’, Third World Quarterly, 28:2, p. 390.
[19] Simons, A. and Tucker, D. (2007), p. 395.
[20] Mantzikos, I. (2011) ‘Somalia and Yemen: The Links between Terrorism and State Failure’, Digest of Middle East Studies, 20:2, p.
254.
[21] Dempsey, G. T. (2002) ‘Old Folly in a New Disguise: Nation Building to Combat Terrorism’, CATO Institute, Policy Analysis, No.
429, p. 13, 21 March 2002; URL: http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa429.pdf.
[22] Simons, A. and Tucker, D. (2007), op. cit., p. 388.
[23] Abadie, A. (2006) ‘Poverty, Political Freedom and the Roots of Terrorism’, The American Economic Review, 96:2, p. 55.
[24] Polo, S. M. T. and Skrede Gleditsch, K. (2016) ‘Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist Tactics in Civil War’, Journal of
Peace Research, 53:6, p. 827.
[25] Fortna, V. P. (2015) ‘Do Terrorists Win? Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes’, International Organization, 69:03,
p. 549.
[26] Coggins, B. L. (2015), op. cit., p. 476; Abadie, A. (2006), op. cit., p. 56; Mansfield, E. D. and Snyder, J. (1995) ‘Democratization
and the Danger of War’, International Security, 20:1, p. 5; Tikuisis, P. (2009) ‘On the Relationship between Weak States and Terrorism’,
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 1:1, p. 72.
[27] Howard, T. (2010) ‘Failed States and the Spread of Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:11, p.
977; Menkhaus, K. (2010) ‘Chapter Nine: State Failure and Ungoverned Space’, Adelphi Series, 50:412-413, p. 187.
[28] Newman, E. (2007), op. cit., p. 483.
[29] Patrick, S. (2007) ‘‘Failed’ States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas’, International Studies Review,
9:4, p. 653.
[30] Piazza, J. A. (2007), op. cit., p. 536.
[31] Piazza, J. A. (2008) ‘Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?’, International Studies
Quarterly, 52:3, p. 481.
[32] Tikuisis, P. (2009), op. cit., p. 75.
[33] Newman, E. (2007), op. cit., p. 484.
[34] Howard, T. (2010), op. cit., p. 982.
ISSN 2334-3745 26 June 2020

[35] Beehner, L. (2018) ‘Fragile States and the Territory Conundrum to Countering Violent Nonstate Actors’, Democracy and Security,
14:2, p. 122.
[37] Hehir, A. (2007) ‘The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom’, Journal of
Intervention and Statebuilding, 1:3, p. 315.
[38] Plummer, C. (2012) ‘Failed States and Connections to Terrorist Activity’, International Criminal Justice Review, 22:4, p. 429.
[39] Patrick, S. (2006), op. cit., p. 29.
[40] Messner, J. J., Haken. N., Hendryy, K., Taft, P., Lawrence, K., Brisard, L. and Umana, F. (2014) ‘Fragile States Index 2014’, Fund
for Peace, 24 June 2014; URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/182267/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf
[42] Messner, J. J. et al. (2014); Institute for Economics & Peace (2015) ‘Global Terrorism Index 2014’; URL: http://economicsandpeace.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Global-Terrorism-Index-Report-2014.pdf
[43] Institute for Economics & Peace (2015), op. cit., p. 19, p. 25.
[45] Coggins, B. L. (2015), op. cit., p. 457; Findley, M. G. and Young, J. K. (2012) ‘Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal
Approach to a Conceptual Problem’, Perspectives on Politics, 10:2, p. 300; Savun, B. and Phillips, B. J. (2009) ‘Democracy, Foreign
Policy, and Terrorism’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53:6, p. 886.
[46] Institute for Economics & Peace (2015), op. cit., p. 40.
[47] Logan, J. and Preble, C. (2006) ‘Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building Office’, CATO
Institute, Policy Analysis, No. 560, p. 64; 11 January 2006; URL: http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa560.pdf.
[48] Gilliani, Y. R. (2011) ‘Pakistan PM’s Speech on Osama bin Laden Situation”, International Business Times, 09 May 2011; URL:
http://www.ibtimes.com/pakistan-pms-speech-osama-bin-laden-situation-full-text-282921
[49] Gettleman, J. and Schmitt, E. (2009) ‘U.S. Kills Top Qaeda Militant in Southern Somalia’, The New York Times, 14 September
2009; URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/world/africa/15raid.html?_r=0
[50] Fukuyama, F. (2004), op. cit., p. 30.
[51] Newman, E. (2007), op. cit., p. 484.
[52] Savun, B. and Phillips, B. J. (2009), op. cit., p. 881.
[53] Hehir, A. (2007), op. cit., p. 325.
[55] Piazza, J. A. (2007), op. cit., p. 536.
[56] Piazza, J. A. (2008), op. cit., p. 482.
[57] Braithwaite, A. (2015) ‘Transnational Terrorism as an Unintended Consequence of a Military Footprint’, Security Studies, 24:2,
p. 374.
[58] Savun, B. and Phillips, B. J. (2009), op. cit., p. 889.
[59] Bin Laden, O. (2002) ‘Full Text: bin Laden’s ‘Letter to America’’, The Guardian, 24 November 2002; URL: http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver
[60] Aliyev, H. (2017) ‘Precipitating State Failure: Do Civil Wars and Violent Non-state Actors Create Failed States?’, Third World
Quarterly, 38:9, p. 1985.
[61] Okafor, G. and Piesse, J. (2017) ‘Empirical Investigation into the Determinants of Terrorism: Evidence from Fragile States’,
Defence and Peace Economics, 29:6, p. 709.
[62] Findley, M. G. and Young, J. K. (2015) ‘Terrorism, Spoiling, and the Resolution of Civil Wars’, The Journal of Politics, 77:4, p. 1126.
[63] Ibrahimi, S. Y. (2018) ‘Violence-producing Dynamics of Fragile States: How State Fragility in Iraq Contributed to the Emergence
of Islamic State’, Terrorism and Political Violence, p. 17.
ISSN 2334-3745 27 June 2020

[64] Hill, J. (2005) ‘Beyond the Other? A Postcolonial Critique of the Failed State Thesis’, African Identities, 3:2, p. 151.
[65] Manjikan, M. (2008) ‘Diagnosis, Intervention, and Cure: The Illness Narrative in the Discourse of the Failed State’, Alternatives:
Global, Local, Political, 33:3, p. 342.
[66] Verhoeven, H. (2009) ‘The Self-fulfilling Prophecy of Failed States: Somalia, State Collapse and the Global War on Terror”,
Journal of East African Studies, 3:3, p. 408.
[67] Jones, B. G. (2008) ‘The global political economy of social crisis: Towards a critique of the ‘failed state’ ideology’, Review of
International Political Economy, 15:2, p. 184; Hill, J. (2005), op. cit., p. 149; Call, C. T. (2008), op. cit., p. 1500.
[68] Manjikan, M. (2008), op. cit., p. 336.
[69] Verhoeven, H. (2009), op. cit., p. 409.
[70] Logan, J. and Preble, C. (2006), op. cit., p. 6.
[71] Hehir, A. (2007), op. cit., p. 319; Boas, M. and Jennings, K. M. (2007) ‘‘Failed States’ and ‘State Failure’: Threats or Opportunities?’,
Globalizations, 4:4, p. 479.
[72] Manjikan, M. (2008), op. cit., p. 341; Boas, M. and Jennings, K. M. (2007), op. cit., p. 476.
[73] Verhoeven, H. (2009), op. cit., p. 411; Boas, M. and Jennings, K. M. (2007), op. cit., p. 480.
[74] Acharya, A. (2007) ‘State Sovereignty After 9/11: Disorganized Hypocrisy’, Political Studies, 55:2, p. 279.
[75] Vultee, F. (2010) ‘Securitization: A new approach to the framing of the ‘war on terror’’, Journalism Practice, 4:1, p. 40.
[76] Abrahamsen, R. (2004) ‘A Breeding Ground for Terrorists? Africa & Britain’s ‘War on Terrorism’’, Review of African Political
Economy, 31:102, p. 683.
[78] Boas, M. and Jennings, K. M. (2007), op. cit., p. 478; Logan, J. and Preble, C. (2006), op. cit., p. 6.
[79] George, J. (2018) ‘State Failure and Transnational Terrorism’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62:3, p. 492.
[80] Institute for Economics & Peace (2015), op. cit., p. 15.
[81] Europol (2014) ‘TE-SAT 2014’, p. 7, 28 May 2014; URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europol_
tsat14_web_1.pdf.
[82] Patrick, S. (2006), op. cit., p. 35.
[83] Simons, A. and Tucker, D. (2007), p. 388.
[84] Laville, S. (2014) ‘Social media used to recruit new wave of British jihadis in Syria’, The Guardian, 15 April 2014; URL: http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/15/social-media-recruit-british-jihadis-syria-twitter-facebook
[85] Abrahamsen, R. (2004), op. cit., p. 683; Boas, M. and Jennings, K. M. (2007), op. cit., p. 483.
[87] McCormack, T. (2011) ‘Human security and the separation of security and development’, Conflict, Security & Development,
11:02, p. 255.
[88] Acharya, A. (2007), op. cit., p. 287.
ISSN 2334-3745 28 June 2020

A Broad Spectrum of Signs of Islamist Radicalisation and

Extremism in a Country without a Single Terrorist Attack: The
Case of Slovenia
by Iztok Prezelj & Klemen Kocjancic
Abstract
Studies in radicalisation, extremism and terrorism generally focus on the most visible and dangerous groups or
attacks, frequently leaving smaller cases overlooked. This article looks at the case of one country that has no publicly
known terrorist group and has not experienced a single terrorist attack (Slovenia) and shows that this ‘non-case’
is actually an example of a very broad spectrum of basic and supportive forms of Islamist extremism. The article
identifies and studies instances of the transit of foreign Islamists, their finances and arms, provides examples of
local foreign fighters and their return, identifies NGOs with radical agendas and attempts at recruitment, as well
as threats made to local authorities, training under the cover of a social event, the deportation of extremists, and a
foiled terrorist attack. Most of these indicators are linked to Jihadi and Islamist sources of power based in Bosnia.
Overlooking and underestimating cases like Slovenia could have serious consequences in terms of prevention and
preparedness.
Keywords: Islamist radicalisation, extremism, jihadism, recruitment, terrorism, foreign fighters, training,
foiled attack, Slovenia, Balkans
Introduction
The goal of this article is to explore the forms and the spectrum of Islamist radicalisation faced by an EU
member state that has not had a single successful terrorist attack on its soil and where no officially recognised
terrorist group is actively working against the country. Researchers and analysts normally study cases with the
most visible problems (terrorism and radicalisation in our case), yet it sometimes makes sense to look at—and
perhaps learn also from—cases where the problem is less apparent.
Why is such an approach relevant? The existing literature generally focuses on big and better-known terrorist
attacks or countries associated with a confirmed and long-standing threat by terrorist and radical groups.
Academic and policy communities are thus learning from the worst examples, while forgetting that they
might only represent the extreme edge of the overall problem. There is a gap in the literature with respect to
less-developed cases and smaller European countries that do not have terrorist groups or large-scale terrorist
attacks. This gap is problematic because the threat brought by Islamist radicalisation and terrorism is a global
phenomenon that is able to migrate from places with tougher counter-radicalisation and counterterrorism
measures to places with fewer obstacles. Such a shift has already been seen with organised criminal groups in
Europe (for example from Italy to Slovenia). Another problem is that such countries might be less prepared to
face threats from Islamist terrorism and thereby become the weakest link in a preventive chain of measures.
The risk of terrorism and radicalisation is unevenly spread across Europe. Our overview of all Europol’s TE-
SAT reports between 2007 and 2019 suggests they chiefly concentrate on countries with significant numbers of
successful, failed or foiled terrorist attacks, such as France, the UK, Spain and also countries with smaller yet
still considerable numbers like Ireland, Germany, Greece, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Slovenia
is clearly one of the countries mentioned the least in the TE-SAT reports, it is mostly associated with zeros in
tables, while two reports do not even mention it at all (TE-SAT 2012 and TE-SAT 2013).[1]. However, this does
not mean that Islamist radicalisation is not present or increasing in Slovenia. It does exist. If this seemingly
‘non-case’ is actually a case and this can be proven, then we have a problem with counterterrorism. In this
article, we argue that the spectrum of Islamist radicalisation and related activities can be surprisingly broad
ISSN 2334-3745 29 June 2020

in a state without a single active Islamist terrorist group or a completed terrorist attack. For countries with a
fully developed extremist and terrorist threat, one could expect numerous indicators such as the existence of
organised terrorist groups, terrorist attacks on people and infrastructure, kidnappings or hostage-takings, the
manufacture, possession, transport, supply or use of explosives and weapons, including chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear weapons, the release of dangerous substances, or illegal data interference and seizures
of aircraft, ships or other forms of transport. One could also expect instances of recruitment for terrorism,
providing and receiving training, travelling and organising travelling for the purpose of terrorism (e.g. foreign
fighters), public provocations to commit a terrorist offence, financing of extremist and terrorist activities and
other support activities.[2] In addition, mature radicalisation towards the use of violence may be anticipated
to include several cases of individuals or groups undergoing the complex process of transforming their beliefs,
feelings and behaviours, [3] examples of dangerous converts to Islam and of aggressive civilian Islamists who
make political arguments to impose their radical vision on the political regime and society.[4] The whole
situation becomes even more complicated with indicators of foreign fighters returning to their home countries.
[5]
In order to assess the example of Slovenia, we used the case study method while also strongly relying on media
analysis. The following methodological steps were used in the article’s empirical part. First, we conducted a pilot
scan of various national media sources and created an initial list of cases of Islamist radicalisation (such as those
associated with the aforementioned indicators). This list was sent to the Slovenian Criminal Police Directorate
and its Counterterrorism and Extreme Violence Section for confirmation or to suggest other cases. The final
list of cases was reduced to basic key words, such as the names of key actors, events and institutions that were
used as search words in the database of the Slovenian Press Agency (STA) and two national newspapers—Delo
and Dnevnik. In most cases, other media were also searched.
We analysed all cases with respect to the following variables (if feasible due to the specific nature of cases): 1.
Radicalisation actors (identification of individuals or groups in the process of radicalisation); 2. Description of
key events that indicate radicalisation, including the time framework (chronology); 3. Goals of actors; 4. The
content of radicalisation (description of the transformation of perceptions, norms, deeds/actions); 5. Contacts
of the radicalising/radicalised actor with other relevant actors in the home country or abroad; 6. The broader
social context of radicalisation (does the case reflect broader polarisation in society, anything relevant for
understanding the case).
Terrorist Threats and Islamist Radicalisation in an ‘Overlooked’ Country

Some countries are not only ignored by scholars writing on terrorism and extremism, but are obviously also
largely ignored by Islamist terrorists and extremists. Slovenia is such a country. This is not surprising; the
terrorist threat in general and more specifically the Islamist terrorist threat has developed unevenly across
Europe. While serious terrorist attacks have taken place in some European countries and other indicators have
been rising, Slovenia has not been mentioned much in international political and media circles. The country
has only seen bizarre situations like the European parliamentary debate on Slovenia’s accession to the EU
during 2003 and 2004 when one Spanish MEP stressed that Slovenia could not become a member whilst it
appeared to be harbouring elements of the ETA terrorist organisation. A well-established, successful Slovenian
food producer called “Eta” had started selling goods in the EU market and the Spanish were unable to digest
this name. Accordingly, the company Eta was forced to change the brand name of all products to “Natureta”
before Slovenia joined the EU in 2004.[6]
The official terrorist threat level in Slovenia has always been low, with the general security situation in the
country since its independence in 1991 being very stable. Slovenia’s national security strategies suggest the
biggest threat to national security in the 1990s was military in nature (due to unresolved national, political,
military and economic problems among the states of former Yugoslavia, potential retaliatory attempts to restore
borders and the revival of crises in wider Europe).[7] The perception then shifted to ‘new’ and ‘dynamic’ non-
military threats and risks. After 2000, decision-makers perceived military threats in South-East Europe (SEE)
ISSN 2334-3745 30 June 2020

as only indirectly affecting Slovenian national security.[8] In 2010, a broad spectrum of nonmilitary threats,
such as climate change, terrorism and challenges to public safety etc., was well recognised by the government
[9], whereas hybrid threats related to Russia are stressed in a recently adopted document.[10] Crime levels
have always been low in Slovenia relative to other countries. Consequently, the public has also never seen
terrorism as a great threat. In fact, public opinion polls conducted by the University of Ljubljana before and
after 9/11 show that the Slovenian public regarded terrorism as one of the smallest threats, somewhere close to
the military threat from other states.[11]
As suggested by the above text, Slovenia is not simply overlooked by analysts, but even by terrorists themselves.
One question arises: why has there been no terrorism (terrorist groups and attacks) in Slovenia? First, some
terrorism is associated with colonial and post-colonial relations, like is the case with the UK and France.
Slovenia has neither been a coloniser nor been violently colonised, for example by the Austro-Hungarian
empire. Secondly, the country is ethnically and religiously relatively homogenous. According to the last census
from 2002, the population consists of 83,04% Slovenes, 1,98% Serbians, 1.81% Croatians, 0.53% Muslims, etc.
In terms of religious composition, 69.1% of the population was Catholic, 1.1% Evangelical, 0.6% Orthodox
Christian and 0.6% Muslim.[12]. Interreligious relations mostly occur without any serious conflicts. The
Muslim minority in Slovenia has never been considerable. Bosniak immigrants are regarded as relatively
moderate Muslims due to the impact of the former socialist Yugoslavia. The influx of Muslim migrants into
Europe in recent years also reveals that upon arriving they mostly do not want to remain in Slovenia and wish
to move on to other Western countries. At last, but not at least, Slovenia is not really exposed in any conflict
with a Muslim country abroad (although it has soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq). Al Qaeda and ISIS have had
more attractive targets in Europe than Slovenia.
Still, our careful examination of several smaller events shows the country is in fact not any kind of safe harbour
protected from Islamist and other extremists. After Slovenia achieved its independence in 1991, some plans
were uncovered of the Yugoslav People’s Army to conduct a few terrorist attacks on the electrical infrastructure
with the aim to create instability in Slovenia as a pretext for some retaliatory military intervention in Slovenia.
Our overview of Europol TE-SAT reports finds Slovenia being mentioned a couple of times. It was mentioned
as a potential logistical base for Islamist terrorists (together with Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Finland) and
as a transit country for terrorists trying to enter EU countries (along with Romania and Estonia).[13] With the
emergence of the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Syria, Slovenia was mentioned (together with Germany,
Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Romania, BiH, Serbia, Bulgaria, Italy and Greece) as a popular land route for fighters
going from the EU to Turkey.[14] A branch of the Sharia 4 movement was reported to exist in Slovenia (also
in Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands and Spain) in 2012, 2013 and 2014.
[15] Slovenia was also mentioned in relation to two arrested terrorist suspects in 2018 and two court verdicts
(one in 2015, the other in 2016).[16] Europol also mentioned Slovenia in terms of a new trend of converting
marginalised individuals from the Roma community, although it was believed the Roma’s main motivation has
been financial (they were allegedly given money to convert).[17]
This all suggests that Slovenia might not be that different from other smaller European countries. It is necessary
to place this case in the context of other smaller European countries. Europe in general was the target of
terrorists of Muslim origin in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. the attack by Black September on Israeli athletes at
the Summer Olympic Games in 1972 in Munich or Libya’s state-sponsored terrorism in 1988 by exploding
a bomb on Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie). A series of Islamist terrorist bomb attacks was launched in
1995 in the French capital of Paris by the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Al Qaeda’s attack on 11
September 2001 in the United States was followed by deadly attacks in Spain (the 2004 Madrid train bombing
that caused 193 deaths) and in the United Kingdom (the 2005 London bombings that killed 52 people). After
the Islamic State was established in Syria and Iraq, a new wave of Islamist terrorism swept over Europe: France,
the UK, Belgium, Germany, Russia, Spain, and Turkey were, among others, targeted. As a result, most Islamist
terrorism-related studies have considered these countries and not other European countries facing a lower
level of threat, such as the Czech Republic and Finland.[18] In Bulgaria, which has the highest share of Muslims
among all European Union countries, research has focused on the threat brought by religious extremism, based
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on “ideas of Islamization, which come straight from Turkey.”[19] The lack of Islamist extremism in Bulgaria is
also connected to both the absence of factors like a colonial past and high immigration as well as the successful
integration of Bulgarian Muslims into the mainly Orthodox Christian society.[20] Nevertheless, there was a
case of 13 imams preaching radical Islam in illegal mosques.[21] On the other hand, some smaller countries in
South-East Europe face quite substantial radicalisation. Bosnia was exposed to a strong wave of radicalisation
during and especially after the war in the 1990s.[22] Kosovo witnessed a considerable number of radicals
travelling as foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq. The local literature has largely focused on the problem of foreign
fighters and the drivers of violent extremism.[23]
Immigration appeared as a very important factor in studies of radicalisation and terrorism, especially following
the Syria-induced migration crisis of 2015. In Norway, a study was conducted on a typology of Jihadi militant
networks, entailing five different archetypes: “militant exiles”, “diasporic support networks”, “militant visitors”,
“attack cells” and “homegrown extremists”.[24] Homegrown terrorism and extremism also became a popular
research subject when more and more European-born Muslims accepted the Jihadi ideology and became
radicalised. For example, the Danish Ministry of Justice identified both background factors (Muslim identity
crisis, discrimination and deprivation, segregation and parallel society, lack of Muslim public debate on
terrorism), and trigger factors (foreign policy, myth of Jihadism and activism, a charismatic leader or advisor)
which, combined with opportunity factors (social media, prisons, mosques, schools and other establishments),
had led to radicalisation in Denmark. This could then lead to further radicalisation abroad and exacerbate
the problem of European “foreign fighters”.[25] Converts to Islam (also to Islamism or Islamist radicalism)
are a special group of homegrown terrorists. Belgian and Dutch research suggests that their converts were all
in their teens or twenties, came from lower- or lower-middle-class socioeconomic backgrounds with a low or
medium level of education, combined with a problematic childhood and adolescence, the use of alcohol and
drugs and some involvement with criminal activity.[26] After the decline/defeat of the Islamic State, Europe
has had to deal with the major security problem of returning foreign fighters and how to treat them, which
de-radicalisation programmes to use, etc.[27] Some research has also attempted to differentiate violent and
nonviolent Salafism, as in the case of the Netherlands, and examined the connection between terrorists and
diasporas.[28] In other countries (like Portugal), the presence of Jihadists without specific terrorist activities
was detected, etc.[29] All signs from the Slovenian case, however weak they might be, should, directly or
indirectly, relate to the European context described above.
The Spectrum of Islamist Radicalisation and Extremism in Slovenia

In the empirical part of our research, we were looking for all indicators of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism
(as described in the introduction) in Slovenia. We established that the forms of Islamist radicalisation and
extremism and associated activities in Slovenia arise from it being: (1) a transit country for foreign Islamists,
their finances and arms; (2) a place for the radicalisation of certain Slovenian citizens and their departure
for Syria, including their return; (3) a place in which some NGOs are active in defending, promoting and
supporting extremist Islam(ism) and introducing Sharia law into Slovenia; (4) an area where members of the
Roma minority have been recruited for Jihad; (5) a place of unattributed threats to a local mayor to force him
to build a mosque and convert to Islam; (6) a place where social events were likely used as a cover for the
training of Islamists; (7) an area in which an attempted terrorist attack in the capital city was foiled; and (8) a
country from where Islamist extremists have been deported. All of these forms are reflected in relatively weak
indicators that were collected by the authors of this article. These indicators appeared in isolation and we seek
to connect them here to provide a more comprehensive overview of the situation facing the country.
A Transit Country for Islamists, Funding and Arms

Terrorist groups fulfil their transnational agenda by moving people, money and weapons across land, air and
maritime borders. Slovenia has been used as a transit country by various Islamist groups in this regard.
ISSN 2334-3745 32 June 2020

After 9-11, Slovenian authorities arrested a suspected terrorist travelling from France to the Balkans.[30]
In November 2016, during a routine check on a train, Slovenian police came across three people without
identification documents. The three men provided false information and it was later revealed that all three had
been involved in terrorist activities in France and that European warrants for them had been issued. According
to French media, the three men were on their way to Syria. Perhaps the best-known case came with the migrant
crisis in 2015. In early September 2016, CNN reported that at least four Islamic state attackers in the Paris
attacks in 2015 had travelled along the Balkan route to Austria.[31] In late September 2016, the president of
the Slovenian parliamentary committee on intelligence and security services confirmed that during the mass
migration crisis (in 2015) eight terrorists had crossed Slovenian territory. Two of them were directly involved
in the 2015 Paris attacks, while others were arrested in Austria or Germany.[32] Subsequently, the European
Union adopted more resolute measures to manage the migration flows.[33]
On 21 October 2010, Slovenian police officers in Dobrovnik encountered two foreign citizens (a 25-year-old
man and a 24-year-old woman) dressed in typical Muslim clothes and without any identification documents.
They were detained and escorted to the police station where it was revealed they were both German citizens
and that a European search warrant had been issued for the man. He was Gabriel Kruse, a German professional
soldier who had converted to Islam just before his planned departure on a German mission in Afghanistan.
Kruse was sought for his involvement in recruiting for terrorist organisations. He was brought before a judge
who ordered him to be detained for 30 days, while the woman (who had a machete in her possession) was
released and directed to leave for Austria. On 26 October 2010, this woman was once again spotted in Slovenia.
During the ensuing police procedure, she attacked police officers with an axe and damaged a police vehicle.
She was arrested and put in prison. During these two encounters, both were wearing traditional Muslim garb
and had a Quran in their possession. The man was later turned over to German authorities. In July 2012,
Slovenian police again arrested the same woman and the following week also the man. While being arrested,
Kruse attacked several police officers with a knife. The Slovenian police had been informed of their presence
in Slovenia by the Austrian police, which was investigating a string of robberies/burglaries in Austria. The pair
had been hiding in forests in Slovenia while trying to obtain funds to travel to Bosnia and Herzegovina where
they wished to join a Salafi group. This couple was using Slovenia as a transit and logistical space on their way
to Bosnia. Their movement was obviously financed from burglaries and robberies. This case did not receive
much media attention.[34]
Slovenia has been used as a transit country for supplies of weapons and explosives, especially after the end
of the Balkan wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia. It was initially believed that the explosives
used in the two largest terrorist attacks in Europe (Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005) had a Balkan origin
and, knowing the modus operandi of the Balkan smuggling route, it was likely they were smuggled through
Slovenia.[35] Yet these hypotheses were later rejected by investigators in both cases. It was, however, confirmed
based on their serial numbers that the M-70 rifles used in the November 2015 Paris attack had been smuggled
from Slovenia (or from Bosnia or Macedonia via Slovenia) and that weapons and some ammunition used in
the Charlie Hebdo attack came from Croatia, Republika Srpska and Serbia.[36]
Slovenia has also been used as a transit country for financial transactions. In October 2001, Slovenian media
reported that a Tunisian citizen Shafik Ayadi had received US $500,000 in April 1996 in a private bank account
set up with SAB Banka in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina). The money originated from Salem bin Mahfuz,
a representative of the International Islamic Relief Organisation, and his bank account with the Slovenian bank
SKB. Ayadi was running an organisation called Moafak, which was actually a front company for Osama bin
Laden. Ayadi was put on the list of persons and companies with frozen assets in the UK and the USA for having
alleged connections with Al Qaida.[37] In March 2015, the Slovenian police in Maribor found an excavator
that had been stolen on 20 February in Croatia and then transported to Slovenia. Two suspects, caught by the
Croatian police, admitted they were planning to sell the excavator “in the area controlled by the Islamic State
extremists.”[38]
Between 2008 and 2010, another case, most likely connected with the financing of terrorism, occurred in
Slovenia. In December 2008, an Iranian businessman with ties to Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts opened a
ISSN 2334-3745 33 June 2020

bank account with Slovenia’s largest bank (NLB). Soon, large sums of money started to arrive in this account
(up to 50 transfers per day); monthly deposits reached up to EUR 70 million and, by the end of 2010, up
to EUR 900 million. In March 2009, bank employees notified their superiors of suspicious transactions and
several foreign banks started to decline money transfers from this NLB account. It was only in December 2010
that NLB shut the account down after the central bank (Bank of Slovenia) demanded immediate action due to
a suspicion of money laundering and financing of terrorism. The money in the NLB account came from two
Iranian banks (via another Iranian company) which at the time were both already under a US and EU embargo,
while the money was sent on to over 9,000 accounts around the world. A special parliamentary investigation
committee found that this could have not taken place without the knowledge of certain high-level officials in
Slovenia. One interpretation was that in this way somebody had been supporting terrorism.[39]
Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq

The number of Slovenian foreign fighters in Syria was small in comparison with other, larger European
countries. It is believed that around 10 people from Slovenia have fought for ISIS. Some basic elements of their
stories are provided below. Slovenian foreign fighters were connected to a recruiting network based in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
On 24 September 2014, Slovenian media reported that the police had carried out two search operations on
properties in Ljubljana and Vrhnika. The subject of the search warrants was Bostjan Skubic, one of several
Slovenian citizens who had joined Islamist extremists in the fight in Syria. The police found and seized
automatic weapons, ammunition and a rocket launcher. While Skubic was charged with the illegal possessions
of weapons, he was released. The media later reported that the cause of the searches in Slovenia was Operation
Damascus in Bosnia and Herzegovina that led to the arrest of Bilal Bosnic, one of the main recruiters and
ideological heads of Islamist extremism in the area of former Yugoslavia. Among the seized evidence, Bosnian
police had discovered information related to Skubic, which was turned over to the Slovenian police. Reporters
also noted that the Slovenian Security and Intelligence Agency (SOVA) was monitoring around 15 people at
that time, including Slovenian converts to Islam and Slovenian citizens with roots in the former Yugoslavia.[40]
Another reason for the search warrants was that Skubic was an employee of the Fenolit chemical factory
located in Breg pri Borovnici. It was here that police officers from Vrhnika handcuffed him and searched his
automobile. The search then continued in the neighbourhood, where they seized a rocket launcher. Under a
pillow they also found two envelopes containing a significant sum of money. While searching his garden shed,
an automatic assault rifle and six full magazines were discovered. He apparently gave the excuse that he had
bought the weapon several years before when the black market was awash with cheap weapons from the Balkan
wars.[41]
On the next day the media reported that, along with two previously identified Slovenian foreign fighters (Skubic
and Rok Zavbi), at least three others (Jure Korelec, Rok Sogoric and Matevz Cvetkovic) had been recruited by
or through Bosniak Bilal Bosnic. An important role in their recruitment was also supposedly played by Senad
Celakovic, who frequently visited Slovenia. Celakovic was apparently subordinated to Nusret Imamovic, who
had a supervisory role over the recruiting.[42]
On 29 September, Zavbi denied that he had fought on the side of Islamic State extremists and claimed that
he went to Syria “with the intention of helping as a medic in the resistance against the cruel regime of Syrian
president Bashar al Assad.” At that time, he was an unemployed medical technician. He also stated that he had
travelled to Syria at his own expense and on his own initiative and that he had not been recruited by Bosnic. He
claimed he had met Bosnic “coincidently, as a tourist” while visiting Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was in Syria
between June and September 2013 and then left the country due to disagreements and fighting among the rebel
groups: “The thing became somewhat too ridiculous”, he added.[43]
On 30 September 2014, the media reported on the first Slovenian casualty during the war in Syria and Iraq.
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A 29-year-old Slovenian convert, Jure Korelec from Zgornja Senica near Medvode, had been killed while
fighting alongside Islamist extremists. After his conversion, he apparently used the name Yusuf (Slovenian:
Jusuf). Three years before his death, Korelec had left home and limited all contacts with his family and friends.
Reporters discovered that in July 2013 Korelec and four other Slovenian Islamist extremists had left Slovenia
for Syria through Turkey. The group comprised Korelec, Rok Zavbi, Bostjan Skubic, Rok Sogoric and Matevz
Cvetkovic. The four others came home after one month in Syria. Sogoric told media 24ur.com that he had
only been once in Syria (in 2012) after he had converted and had never fought.[44] Another media company
reported that Sogoric had established the Nur Foundation for Culture, Education and Training from Ljubljana,
which strongly supported the ideology of the Islamic State.[45]
Reporters also claimed that their departure had been arranged by Nusret Imamovic from Bosnia and
Herzegovina, considered to be one of the most dangerous foreign fighters and recruiters for Islamist terrorist
groups. Imamovic was in the position to assign to which Islamist groups Slovenians would be included. At first,
the Slovenian group was sent to the Al Nusra Front but was then relocated to the Islamic State. Korelec was
involved in fighting for the Syrian city of Raqqa, where Dora Bilic (a Muslim woman from Zagreb, Croatia)
was seriously wounded and Fatima Mahmutovic (a Muslim woman from BiH) was killed.[46] The case of Jure
Korelec shows that he was searching for a new meaning in life after considerable problems with (unrequited)
love. He found it in Islam. Where exactly the radicalisation occurred is unknown. However, the speed of his
radicalisation was surprising because in the course of one year he found and accepted a new religion, was
radicalised and died while fighting for an Islamist terrorist organisation.
In October 2014, Zavbi gave a long interview for the weekly magazine Mladina. He stated: “I fought in Syria.
If this had been revealed last September, when I returned, I would be a hero, a freedom fighter. Now I’m a
terrorist. I’m being connected to the Islamic State.” While raised as a Christian, he had converted to Islam in
2011. His interest in world events increased and he then decided to travel to Syria to help Muslims: “Wherever
there is Islam, it’s better.” He still claimed that he and Skubic had left for Syria on their own and established their
own contacts with the rebels. During the entire interview, he defended the ideology of the Islamic State. He
confirmed he had been given a weapon in Syria and that he had fought: “Of course I got a weapon, of course I
fought and shot. I also completed basic training.” He declared that all groups had committed atrocities (mass
killings): “Killings are done by everyone, the Geneva conventions aren’t followed, prisoners aren’t left to live.” In
September, he and Skubic decided to return home. He claimed he had no contacts with his former colleagues
(fighters), except immediately after returning to Slovenia.[47]
In May 2015, reporters obtained a photograph of Zavbi and Skubic dressed in military camouflage and each
holding an automatic rifle. This was sufficient proof that both had been armed and had fought on the battlefield
for the Islamic State. In early 2016, Skubic pleaded guilty and was sentenced.[48] On 6 May 2016, Zavbi was
arrested by the Slovenian police in Ljubljana at a halal butcher shop where he had been working after returning
from Syria. Italian authorities issued a European arrest warrant for him because investigators had proven that
Zavbi had been communicating with Bosnic before, during and after the Syrian adventure.[49]
The website Kamnik.info reported that the 26-year-old Zavbi had grown up in an atheist family in the village
of Psajnovica near Tuhinjska dolina. He was not particularly sociable; after vocational high school he studied
in Jesenice (a place in Slovenia with a large immigrant community from the Balkans). It was here that he
began to lose his way and started to associate with radical Islamists. His family was surprised by the speed of
his conversion and the fact he was socialising with “weird and suspicious people from the circle of religious
extremists.”[50] He left for Syria without telling his family. After coming back, he lived at home and occasionally
travelled abroad for a few days. He did not share the destinations of his trips with anyone. In April 2018, he was
married but only under Islamic law in an unregistered Islamic prayer room located somewhere in Ljubljana.
He had been introduced to his wife Mirza (from BiH) only one month before the wedding; they had only met
in person three times.[51]
Despite objecting to the extradition, the Slovenian authorities turned him over to Italy where he was charged
with the recruitment of fighters for the Islamic State. While waiting for the trial, he revealed that Bosnic trusted
ISSN 2334-3745 35 June 2020

him and had convinced him to go to Syria. He stated that in October 2012 he had begun to attend Islamist
meetings, including some in the home of Nusret Imamovic, a leader of the Al Nusra Front. He also revealed
that he had been in contact with Admir Abduloadi, a driver for Bosnic and Imamovic during their travels in
Italy. Abduloadi also served as an intermediary for people wanting to go to Syria. Upon returning from Syria,
he was once again contacted by Bosnic who sent him to the Italian province of Belluno. There he trained two
fighters (Ismar Mesinovic and Minfer Karamalski) who later left for Syria; Mesinovic was killed in 2014, while
Karamalski’s whereabouts are unknown.[52]
On 11 April 2017, Zavbi was sent to prison for three years and four months by a court in Venice for recruiting
fighters for the Islamic State. He was convicted alongside a 39-year-old Macedonian citizen, Ajhan Veapi, for
the same crime. In March 2018, an appeals court reduced Zavbi’s sentence to two years, two months and 12
days because he had pleaded guilty and distanced himself from his actions. On 25 July 2018, he was released
from prison and immediately expelled to Slovenia.[53] One day later, he and his father became involved in a
physical conflict in front of their house with reporters from Planet TV who were trying to report on his return.
The above cases confirm that the network of Bosniak Bilal Bosnic was important in the process of radicalisation
and recruitment. This network was chiefly composed of Bosniak extremists recruiting for different Islamist
organisations in the countries of former Yugoslavia and other countries with a larger concentration of Muslims
(Italy and Austria). Their main goal was to provide new recruits for the Islamic State and Al Nusra to fight in
Syria or Iraq, while an auxiliary goal was to have returned fighters give training to new recruits. It is obvious
that Korelec had converted to Islam prior to leaving for Syria due to “unrequited love”. Before leaving, he
trained with Bilal Bosnic in Buzim and then left for Syria via Turkey. Similar drivers (unrequited love, rejection
by a woman) and unemployment were established for Zavbi, who had become radicalised after meeting local
Islamist extremists.
Activities of certain NGOs to Promote and Support Extremism

Several Slovenian media reports have covered the activities of some societies or NGOs that were promoting
the introduction of sharia law in Slovenia, defending and promoting radical Islam, while not being affiliated
with recognised Islamist religious groups. The most mentioned NGOs were El Iman and Ensarud-Din, which
organised preaching by people “with personal connections with people in the Balkans who promoted violence
against the West.”[54] These reports mostly refer to a network of Islamists existing between Austria and Bosnia
and Herzegovina. These societies mostly operate(-d) in Jesenice in North Slovenia (close to the Austrian
border) and in Ljubljana, the capital city. While their official purpose was to promote Islam and Arabic culture,
the media linked them to the support and promotion of Islamist terrorism. How precisely they were operating
was not revealed, but we may assume they have acted as a gatekeeper for the possible recruitment of extremists.
Connections were documented between these organisations and known terrorists or terrorist supporters in
Bosnia, Austria, and Italy. The most important is once again the connection with Husein Bilal Bosnic, who
was convicted in BiH for publicly promoting terrorist activities and recruiting for a terrorist organisation. In
January 2011, Bosnic was invited to Ljubljana to give a sermon upon the opening of an Islamic prayer room.
Bosnic is considered one of the leaders, if not the highest leader, of an extreme Wahhabi community based in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.[55]1
The third-mentioned NGO was the Nur Society whose declared task is to inform the public about Arabic
culture and the problems facing Muslims. Through their members, all three NGOs were connected to several
(alleged) terrorist activities (foreign fighters, the ‘picnic of radicals’—see below). For example, Rok Sogoric, one
of the founders of the Nur Society, had been fighting in Syria.
1. In November 2015, Bilal Bosnic was found guilty by a Bosnian court of several terrorism-related activities: promoting jihad, recruiting
Bosnians to join and fight for the Islamic State in Syria and organising their trips to Syria (or Iraq). The court also found that at least six of
Bosnic’s recruits from Bosnia had already died, while altogether at least 97 had left to fight. Bosnic, who was a musician in his early life and has
four wives and 18 children, was sentenced to seven years in prison (while the prosecution wanted the maximum 20-year sentence). During the
trial, it was revealed (by a former Bosnian foreign fighter in the ranks of the IS) that Bosnic was the only one who could approve a person to be
sent to the battlefield. He financed his activities with money received from Arab countries (Spaic 2015).
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Finally, Europol reported on the existence of a branch of the Sharia4 movement in Slovenia in 2012, 2013 and
2014.[56] The only publicly known case involving this movement concerns the desecration of a Catholic chapel
at Smarna Gora hill, a popular hiking destination near Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia. In early January 2017,
three sides of the small chapel had writings in Arabic script, plus two more Latin-script messages, written on
them: “Sharia 4 Slovenia” and “Allahu Akhbar”.[57]
The Recruitment of Roma

Europol released a report stating that the Slovenian police had “noted a new trend of attempted radicalisation
of members of the Roma community.”[58] Indeed, a very unusual recruiting attempt was being conducted by
Islamist radicals. Some members of the Roma community in north-eastern Slovenia were being paid by some
Islamist extremists to convert to Islam and join the jihad. The very few Slovenian media reports that exist on
this do not reveal who the recruiters were. However, it is clear that they were targeting the most vulnerable
ethnic minority (Roma) in Slovenia who live in difficult economic and social circumstances. The recruiters
may have wanted to exploit either their Slovenian (EU) passport that allows them unrestrained movement
within the EU or their criminal ties. This attempt may be associated with a more general trend of increasing
recruitment for the Islamic State’s purposes in Europe.[59]
Threats to the Local Authorities

Since there is in Slovenia no terrorist group active against the government, we also do not know about any
terrorist threats. However, some threats did emerge in a small provincial town. In 2015 and 2016, Bojan
Kontic, the mayor of the Slovenian town of Velenje received three threatening letters. An anonymous writer
(or writers) had sent the letters from Italy. All these letters contained a demand to build a mosque in Velenje
with a 35-metre-high minaret and required that the mayor convert to Islam or otherwise be killed. The writer
also stated that Slovenia would become an Islamic state in ten to 15 years. The letters were sent during the peak
of the Islamic State’s power in Syria and Iraq.[60] All of these letters were turned over to the police and Kontic
did not view them as any real threat. The police investigation did not discover the culprit(s).
This case may be attributed to the forceful Islamisation and conversion to Islam that became a standard operating
procedure for the Islamic State. It might also be connected to a large influx of foreign Muslims (particularly
from Albania and Macedonia) in Velenje. As an industrial town, Velenje traditionally had an immigrant
population, especially miners from Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the past ten years, a considerable number of
ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia have settled there. This group does not integrate well in terms
of learning the Slovenian language, causing extra pressure on the local authorities, kindergartens, schools and
health institutions. In 2018, the mayor wrote a letter to the president of Slovenia, the prime minister and the
president of the parliament in which he stressed the town’s serious social, political and economic situation.[61]
A ‘Picnic’ as a Possible Cover for Training

In 2016, Slovenian media reported that on 19 April 2014 several radical Islamist extremists had met for a ‘picnic’
at the Korant Sport Centre in the village of Dol near Ljubljana. It was said that Salafist extremists had also come
from the Austrian cities of Vienna and Graz. The centre was supposedly booked by the El Iman Society for the
promotion of Islamic culture in Slovenia, which later denied having any connection with the ‘picnic’.
Media reports described the attendees as: Selman Omerovic, a friend with several members of the El Iman
Society and the brother of Mirsad Omerovic (also known as Abu Tejma from Sandjak, BiH, a known recruiter of
jihadists in Europe with contacts with Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and Bilal Bosnic), Halil Kasimoglu, Selman Tajroski,
Arif Ademovski, Suad Racevic, members of the Durkan Islamic society from Graz, the Islamic theologian Alim
Hasangic (from the Slovenian town of Jesenice). Salafists from Germany, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Austria
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were also present, including women and children. According to the manager of the Korant Sport Centre, about
60–70 people were present, and this was just one of several such meetings. He stated that he had several times
rented this property out to large Muslim groups and had no problems with them.[62]
This may have only been a meeting of a large group of Muslims to celebrate their children’s birthdays with
accompanying sports activities. However, as the Austrian newspaper Die Presse argued, this was likely a cover
for covert ideological and shooting training of Islamist extremists in Slovenia.[63] Accordingly, the attendees
used weapons hidden in the nearby woods and restricted uninvited people’s access to the property. The
Austrian investigators intercepted the phone conversation of one attendee who talked about using weapons at
the ‘picnic’. The Austrian authorities had their attention drawn to this event when persons under surveillance
started moving in three vehicles towards Slovenia.
Europol claimed in one report that Islamic State terrorists do not only conduct training in Syria, but also across
the European Union and in the Balkans.[64] Such a ‘picnic’ may have been a cover for terrorist training. Die
Presse also stated that this event had links with Wahhabis operating from the notorious Bosnian village of
Gornja Maoca.
The Slovenian public was surprised to discover that foreign media were the first to report on this ‘picnic’ based
on a story from Austrian intelligence service sources. The Slovenian parliamentary committee on intelligence
and security services met and discussed the event and the committee president stated that the Slovenian police
had not received any information or had not confirmed terrorist activities at the ‘picnic’.[65]
Foiled Terrorist Attack in the Capital City of Ljubljana (The Lone Wolf Brljafa)
On 25 January 2018, the Slovenian border police at the Dragonja border crossing on the Slovenian-Croatian
border searched an incoming bus. During their search, they found a black leather belt with tubular rolls and a
large knife in the possession of one person. They arrested a 21-year-old Croatian citizen named Loris Brljafa.
He claimed that the belt contained explosives. The police later found that this was untrue and that he had been
travelling to the Slovenian capital of Ljubljana where he planned to attack local targets. The prosecutor charged
him with attempting to threaten the population in the capital city using the belt and large knife. On 17 July
2018, he was found guilty of travelling abroad with the intention to commit terrorist activity and sent to prison
for three years and two months and subsequently expelled from Slovenia for another three years.
With the help of Croatian authorities, his home, computer and phone were searched. The investigation showed
he had converted to Islam after being quite a pious Christian, was religiously radicalised while following
extremist propaganda online and that he considered himself to be an Islamic State follower. His online searches
had focused on different extremist groups and on how to make a bomb; he also possessed access codes for
terrorist websites. In Ljubljana, he had planned to attack several embassies (American, German and British),
the parliament and the governmental palace. He had also looked at the webpages of several weapons stores
in Ljubljana. In court, his attorney pointed out that the explosive belt/vest was not real and that Brljafa’s main
intention was merely to gain attention.
Brljafa was a loner with several personal problems. His father revealed that before the attack Loris had changed
significantly, distancing himself from society and spending most of his time online and praying. The police
inquiry showed that he had no connections with other extremists and was thus considered to be a ‘lone wolf ’
attacker. He was planning to commit a terrorist attack in Ljubljana in the name of the Islamic State. While
searching his home, they also found extremist literature, a black flag of the Islamic State, a green prayer rug and
an Arab-Bosnian dictionary.[66]
This attempted attack may have been linked to the Islamic State’s calls to its followers to carry out terrorist
attacks at home (e.g. outside of Syria and Iraq). Despite this being the first case of such criminal activity by an
Islamist extremist in Slovenia, it is surprising that the related media reporting was very limited.
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Deportation of Three Islamist Extremists

On 14 March 2019, three citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were expelled from Slovenia for a period of five
years. All three held a permanent residency permit in Slovenia and were working as long-haul truck drivers for
two Slovenian companies. The police and Slovenia’s external intelligence service (SOVA), using information
also obtained through international exchange, confirmed that all three were actively supporting religiously
motivated violent extremism and terrorism, and intended to use violence to achieve their political, religious
and ideological goals. They had been in contact with people convicted for terrorist activities and with some
men who had fought in Syria and Iraq. Two of them even visited Bilal Bosnic in prison. Bosnic had sent
a letter, smuggled out of prison by a supporter, to all three containing explicit instructions regarding their
activities among supporters in Slovenia. The Slovenian police became aware of this group’s activities in 2017
and 2018. After their residency permits were cancelled in December 2018, they appealed and managed to delay
the procedure for some time but were eventually deported.
Two brothers Selvir (37) and Nelvir Durakovic (40) along with Selim Ljubijankic (39) were at first employed
by the same truck company, but in 2017 Ljubijankic took a job at another company. At the time of his arrest,
he had been unemployed. All three had enforced an extremist ideology in their families, they had told their
wives and children “not to respect Slovenian law” or else they would be killed without hesitation by having
their throats cut. One of them announced to his son that he was looking forward to the day when they would
kill unbelievers together.[67]
Their tasks in Slovenia included collecting financial support for imprisoned Islamists and their families and
acting as couriers between Bosnic and his followers in Slovenia. SOVA described this group as a “typical,
outwardly inactive cell, that uses covert communication.”[68]
This example once again confirmed that Bosnia and Herzegovina is home to an ideological and logistical core of
Islamist radicalisation in both South-East Europe and Central Europe. Their expulsion also reveals a problem
with the current system of issuing work and residency permits for foreigners who come from countries with a
strong Islamist extremist presence.
Conclusion
This article has shown that what might at first blush be seen as a non-case of radicalisation and extremism can
actually be regarded as a case. Our argument that the spectrum of Islamist radicalisation and related activities
can be surprisingly broad in a state without a single active Islamist terrorist group or without a single terrorist
attack is confirmed in this article. The forms of Islamist radicalisation and extremism identified above are very
wide and range from transfers of people, weapons and money, foreign fighters, dangerous NGOs, recruitment,
training, threats through to an attempted attack. All of this happened while Slovenia never raised its official
terrorism threat level above the minimum (small threat). All of this also occurred without affecting the opinion
of a public that does not perceive terrorism as a pressing threat. The fact is that the country has already faced
certain basic forms (e.g. attempted attack, foreign fighters, threats) and supportive forms of Islamist terrorism
such as recruitment, training and the transfer of people, money and arms. If we compare this with the full
scope of possible Islamist threat expressions described in the introduction to this article, the unusually high
number of indicators present in a country without any previous terrorist attack becomes obvious. Indicators
not observed in Slovenia are: the existence of a terrorist group acting against the government or its people
and infrastructure, a successful terrorist attack, instances of illegal data interference, examples of aggressive
political Islamists openly arguing in the political process for changes to the political and democratic regime.
No case related to smuggling, possessing or producing radiological, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons
was found either.
It should be stressed that in this case of weak radicalisation the primary stimulus is not located in the country.
It comes from abroad, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina. Slovenia is geopolitically on the path between
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Bosnia and other European sources of Jihadi thought from Austria (Vienna) and Northern Italy (Milano).
The radicalisation of Muslim communities in the Balkans (especially Sarajevo) and in Vienna and Milano
more or less affects radicalisation in Slovenia. It would appear that for these sources of power Slovenia is as
an interesting transit country that will increasingly appear on their agenda. It is a place to meet and not draw
too much attention of the authorities, an area to hide, a space for recruitment and one where their agenda will
become increasingly clear through threats and other forms of realisation. Most of our cases show that Slovenia
is more like a logistical space for Islamist groups in support for their more relevant goals in key battlefields like
the Middle East and Western Europe. This corresponds with the Plan Balkan 2020 publicised by Al-Qaeda,
where the Western Balkans was described as a logistical hub for spreading terrorism into Western Europe. This
means that here one should expect more indicators related to training, financing and supplying than attacks.
[69] Respectively, Slovenia has been a pool for the recruitment of foreign fighters and certain individuals from
the most vulnerable ethnic group, a transit country for weapons, people and money, a place for meetings
and the training of Islamists from neighbouring countries and a venue for debate and the relatively narrow
promotion of Islamist ideas within certain small NGOs. Even the threats to the local community identified
above were sent from Italy and the self-radicalised individual who tried to carry out an attack in Slovenia came
from Croatia. Gravitation towards sources of Islamist power in Bosnia is also confirmed by the indicator of
instructions being given by Bilal Bosnic from his prison cell on how to operate and collect money.
The broader picture in the Western Balkans suggests that these Slovenian examples might be connected with
the Muslim Brotherhood, a pan-Islamic religious, social and political movement. It should be remembered that
members of the Muslim Brotherhood fought in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that some Muslims
from Kosovo and Albania might have links with the Brotherhood. Yet we did not find any direct links with
the Muslim Brotherhood for the cases identified in this article. After no direct contacts could be found, we
focused on the key organiser of recruitment for ISIS and Al Nusra in Slovenia, Bilal Bosnic from Bosnia, and
his potential links. No contacts were detected for him, also after checking numerous media records and the
2015 verdict against him.
The question arises: how does political Islam spread in an environment like Slovenia? Political Islam as a way of
articulating political positions about the transformation of society and politics according to Islamic principles
is not present in the country’s open political scene. No political parties are openly calling for Islamisation,
the rule of Sharia law, etc. However, our results suggest that these ideas may in fact be found in closed circles
of certain smaller non-governmental organisations or in the minds of some individuals, and could act as a
compass for future actions, perhaps waiting for a window of opportunity to evolve. Such ideas appear to spread
in these circles by means of Internet use as general radical ideas are published on relevant websites and by
reading and following radical foreign websites and media, travelling abroad or hosting foreign preachers.
Cases like Slovenia should not be overlooked by international counterterrorist authorities and by the academic
community. The modest presence of radicals and extremists in a country like Slovenia has led to milder control
mechanisms and less attention from the authorities. This can turn out to be counterproductive. Most threats
are easier to identify when plotters are not working under the radar. The weakest links in the international
surveillance net have already been exploited by Islamist extremists who will no doubt continue to do so in the
future.
Acknowledgement: This research was enabled with financial assistance of the Slovenian Research Agency
(grant no. CRP V5-1735; project title: Radicalisation and Comprehensive Countermeasures in Slovenia).
About the Authors:

Iztok Prezelj, Ph.D., is a Professor and Vice-Dean for Scientific Research at the Faculty of Social Sciences,
University of Ljubljana. He was a member of Slovenian governmental interagency working groups in the fields
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of counterterrorism and crisis management. He was also an Adjunct Professor in the program on terrorism
(PTSS) at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen (Germany). Prezelj is the author of (1)
Improving Interorganisational Cooperation in Counterterrorism based on a Quantitative SWOT Assessment,
Public Management Review, 2015; (2) Inter-organizational Cooperation and Coordination in the Fight against
Terrorism: From Undisputable Necessity to Paradoxical Challenges, Comparative Strategy, 2014 and editor of (3)
The Fight against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans, Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008.
Klemen Kocjancic has a BA in theology, MA in defense studies and a Ph.D. in history from the University of
Ljubljana. He works as a Research Assistant at the Defence Research Centre (Faculty of Social Sciences, University
of Ljubljana). His research interests are military history, insurgency and counterinsurgency, religiously motivated
crime and terrorism, military sociology (military families, military chaplaincy), etc. He has written articles for
several Slovenian and foreign journals, while also working as a journalist for ten years.
Notes
[1] Europol, (2012) ‘TE-SAT 2012: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’; URL https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/documents/europoltsat.pdf; Europol, (2013) ‘TE-SAT 2013: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’; URL: https://www.
europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/europol_te-sat2013_lr_0.pdf.
[2] See the spectrum of these offences in the Directive 2017/541 of the European Parliament and the Council on Combating Terrorism
and Replacing the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and Amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, March 31st, (2017),
Official Journal of the European Union; URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017L0541.
[3] Randy Borum (2001), ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism: A Review of Social Science Theories’, Journal of Strategic Security,
4:4, pp. 7-36; Marc Sageman (2008), Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:
University of Pennsylvania Press; Alex P. Schmid (2013), Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual
Discussion and Literature Review. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. ICCT Research Paper: March, Hague.
[4] Neven Bondokji, Kim Wilkinson, in Leen Aghabi (2017), Understanding Radicalization: A Literature Review of Models and
Drivers. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands; Amin Saikal (2007), ‘Radical Islamism and the ‘War on Terror’’;
in: Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri (Eds.), Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West.
London: Tauris Academic Studies, pp. 13-26; Fawaz A. Gerges (2005), The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global. New York: Cambridge
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[5] Peter Neumann (2013), ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’, International Affairs, 89:4, pp. 873–893; Rem Korteweg, Sajjan Gohel,
Francois Heisbourg, Magnus Ranstorp, and Rob de Wijk (2010), ‘Background Contributing Factors to Terrorism’; in Ranstorp
Magnus (Ed.), Understanding Violent Radicalization: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe. London: Routledge.
[6] See URL: http://natureta.si/en/.
[7] Resolucija o izhodiščih zasnove nacionalne varnosti RS (1993), Uradni list, no. 71, December 30th.
[8] Resolucija o strategiji nacionalne varnosti RS (2001), Uradni list, no. 56, July 6th.
[9] Resolucija o strategiji nacionalne varnosti RS (2010), Uradni list, no. 27, April 2nd.
[10] Resolucija o strategiji nacionalne varnosti RS, (2019): Uradni list RS, no. 92/07, September 26, 2019.
[11] For more see: Iztok Prezelj (2006), ‘Terrorist Threats to the National Security of the Republic of Slovenia’, Ujma, 20, pp. 177–181.
[12] Statistični urad Republike Slovenije (2002), ‘7. Prebivalstvo po narodni pripadnosti, Slovenija, popisi 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981,
1991 in 2002’, 2002; URL: https://www.stat.si/popis2002/si/rezultati/rezultati_red.asp?ter=SLO&st=7; Statistični urad Republike
Slovenije (2002), ‘8. Prebivalstvo po veroizpovedi in tipu naselja, Slovenija, popisa 1991 in 2002’, 2002; URL: https://www.stat.si/
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[13] Europol (2008), ‘TE-SAT 2008: EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report’; URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/documents/tesat2008_1.pdf.
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files/documents/europol_tsat14_web_1%20%281%29.pdf; Europol (2015), ‘European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
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[15] Ibid.
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novice/slovenija/je-jure-korelec-v-dzihadu-izgubljeni-slovenec.
[47] ‘Planet TV: V Siriji je na strani islamistov umrl Slovenec (video)’. SiOL.net, September 30, 2014; URL: https://siol.net/novice/
slovenija/planet-tv-v-siriji-je-na-strani-islamistov-umrl-slovenec-video-377901.
[48] ‘Boril sem se za islam’. Mladina, October 10, 2014; URL: https://www.mladina.si/161035/boril-sem-se-za-islam/.
[49] ‘Terorista aretirali v ljubljanski mesnici’. Slovenske novice, May 11, 2016; URL: https://www.slovenskenovice.si/novice/slovenija/
terorista-aretirali-v-ljubljanski-mesnici; ‘Rok Žavbi v priporu, obtožen je terorizma v Italiji’. STA, May 9, 2016; URL: https://www.sta.
si/2260865/rok-zavbi-v-priporu-obtozen-je-terorizma-v-italiji.
[50] ‘Rok Žavbi, islamist iz Tuhinjske doline: Od nesrečne ljubezni, do islamskega borca in terorističnega osumljenca’. Kamnik.info,
May 10, 2016; URL: https://www.kamnik.info/islamist-iz-tuhinjske-doline-od-nesrecne-ljubezni-do-islamske-poroke/.
[51] Ibid.
[52] ‘Slovenija Roka Žavbija izročila Italiji’. STA, June 23, 2016; URL: https://www.sta.si/2277383/slovenija-roka-zavbija-izrocila-
italiji.
[53] ‘Italija izgnala Slovenca, obsojenega zaradi novačenja borcev za IS’. STA, July 26, 2018; URL: https://www.sta.si/2538265/italija-
izgnala-slovenca-obsojenega-zaradi-novacenja-borcev-za-is.
[54] ‘Sova zaznala dve kulturni društvi, v katerih se združujejo domnevni zagovorniki radikalnega islama’. Dnevnik, September 5,
2014; URL: https://www.dnevnik.si/1042680242/slovenija/sova-zaznala-dve-kulturni-drustvi-v-katerih-se-zdruzujejo-domnevni-
zagovorniki-radikalnega-islama.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Europol (2014), ‘TE-SAT 2014: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’; URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/documents/europol_tsat14_web_1%20%281%29.pdf; Europol (2015), ‘European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
2015’; URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/p_europol_tsat15_09jun15_low-rev.pdf.
[57] ‘Neznanci z napisi, ki pozivajo k verski nestrpnosti, oskrunili kapelico na Šmarni gori’. Dnevnik, January 4, 2017; URL: https://
www.dnevnik.si/1042758508/lokalno/ljubljana/neznanci-z-napisi-ki-pozivajo-k-verski-nestrpnosti-oskrunili-kapelico-na-smarni-
gori; ‘“Allahu Akbar!” kriči napis na oskrunjeni kapelici na Šmarni gori.’ Reporter, January 3, 2017; URL: https://reporter.si/clanek/
slovenija/allahu-akbar-krici-napis-na-oskrunjeni-kapelici-na-smarni-gori-490286?fb_comment_id=1510806612270498_15117565
48842171.
[58] Europol (2016), ‘European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2016’; URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/
sites/default/files/documents/europol_tesat_2016.pdf.
[59] ‘Ekstremisti novačijo Rome v severovzhodni Sloveniji’. Sobotainfo.com, July 21, 2016; URL: https://sobotainfo.com/novica/
politika-gospodarstvo/ekstremisti-novacijo-rome-v-severovzhodni-sloveniji/122138.
[60] ‘Velenjskega župana z grozilnimi pismi pozivajo h gradnji džamije’. STA, March 31, 2016; URL: https://www.dnevnik.
si/1042732907.
[61] ‘Župan Mestne občine Velenje Bojan Kontič pisal predsednikoma’. Velenjcan.si, February 28, 2018; URL: https://www.velenjcan.
si/nb/novice/zupan-poziva-predsednike-k-iskanju-sistemskih-resitev-zaradi-intenzivne-rasti-deleza-tujcev-v-sloveniji.
[62] ‘Avstrijski islamist o lokaciji v Dolu pri Ljubljani: “Tam so bile puške, orožje, lahko si tudi streljal”.’ 24ur.com, January 27, 2016;
ISSN 2334-3745 44 June 2020

URL: https://www.24ur.com/novice/slovenija/vir-avstrijskega-novinarja-ima-seznam-imen-in-opis-poti-domnevnih-skrajnezev.
html.
[63] ‘IS-Anhänger wurden 2014 nahe Laibach ausgebildet’. Die Presse, January 26, 2016; URL: https://www.diepresse.com/4912670/
is-anhanger-wurden-2014-nahe-laibach-ausgebildet.
[64] Europol (2015), ‘European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2015’; URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/documents/p_europol_tsat15_09jun15_low-rev.pdf.
[65] ‘Kaj o džihadistih ve SOVA.’ Delo, January 29, 2016; URL: https://www.delo.si/novice/politika/kaj-o-dzihadistih-ve-sova.html.
[66] “Hrvaški mladenič priznal krivdo za terorizem.” STA, July 17, 2018; URL: https://www.sta.si/2535491/hrvaski-mladenic-priznal-
krivdo-za-terorizem.
[67] “Je v Sloveniji delovala potencialna teroristična celica.” 24ur.com, March 15, 2019; URL: https://www.24ur.com/novice/slovenija/
druzinam-naj-bi-narocili-naj-ne-spostujejo-slovenskega-pravnega-reda.html.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Iztok Prezelj (2008), ‘Introduction: Counter-Terrorism and Crisis Management as Challenges for the EU, NATO and Western
Balkan States’; in: Iztok Prezelj (Ed.), The Fight against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans. Amsterdam: IOS
Press.
ISSN 2334-3745 45 June 2020

Suspect Community: A Product of the Prevention of Terrorism

Acts or a Product of Conflict Dynamics?
by Emma Ylitalo-James
Abstract
The ‘suspect community’ theory, first introduced by Paddy Hillyard, claims that the British Prevention of Terrorism
Act 1974 in its operation was responsible for producing discrimination against the communities of Northern
Ireland during ‘The Troubles”. This theory has subsequently been applied to Muslim communities in the UK in
the wake of the attacks of 9/11 (New York and Washington) and 7/7 (London Transport System) by Islamist
terrorists. This article presents an alternative theory on the emergence of suspect communities, arguing that a
suspect community is formed at the initiation of conflict and not in response to legislation dealing with conflict.
In this alternative framework, the initiation of conflict and the reactions of opposing factions, combined with
public outgroup perceptions of threat, create the suspect community. This alternative theory draws on psychosocial
theories, including group perception of threat, social and group identity theory and out-group paranoia. The article
suggests an altered starting point and offers a process to potentially reduce public bias and therefore radicalisation
and recruitment at the community level.
Keywords: suspect community, group threat, terrorism, conflict, prejudice, Northern Ireland
Introduction
The suspect community—a group of people under suspicion from members of the wider society—has been
a historical phenomenon for centuries wherever conflict has been in existence.[1] The creation of a suspect
community or any group which poses an apparent threat to society, its dominant structure or the governing
body is not a new phenomenon—although a specific theory of the suspect community was introduced only in
1993 by Paddy Hillyard.[2] The original theory suggested that the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions Act)
1973 and subsequent British Prevention of Terrorism Acts (to be referred to as PTA) were responsible for the
discrimination against Irish and Northern Irish communities, particularly in mainland Britain and at border
crossings, causing infringements of the civil liberties of those at the receiving end. The PTA was initiated four
years after the escalation of ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland and has since been updated in the Prevention
of Terrorism Act 2005.[3] It was claimed that the introduction of the PTA and its counterterrorism measures,
including stop and search, increased suspicion toward the Irish community and was ultimately responsible for
the creation of a suspect community—a community experiencing discrimination and distrust from the side of
the authorities and the general public.[4]
Pantazis and Pemberton[5] have argued that British PTA legislation, intended to counter terrorist activity,
has increased radicalisation and led to recruitment into terrorist groups in the Muslim population in the
United Kingdom and had historically done the same in Northern Ireland. It is certainly plausible that PTA
legislation may create both sympathy toward, and stigmatisation of certain segments of the community.[6]
However, the identification of contributing factors behind the creation of a suspect community, may be worthy
of reexamination, based on an alternative theory. This is the purpose of this article.
During conflict and in the presence of a perceived threat, a number of psychological, behavioural and
psychosocial processes occur on an individual and a group level.[7] It is suggested here that these reactions
primarily emanate from the actions of the source of the perceived threat, creating suspicion and ultimately
a ‘suspect’ group—the suspect community. This theory, an alternative to Hillyard’s original theory, rests on
perceived threat and identity formation in the population causing suspicion, with the government’s safeguarding
policy in the form of anti-terrorism legislation being a secondary contributing factor only.
ISSN 2334-3745 46 June 2020

The theory of the suspect community in its accepted form has linked the formation of a suspect community
to the introduction of counterterrorist protocols. The hypothesis from the research presented here suggests
that the suspect community is created at the community conflict and perception of threat levels, not as a
consequence of counterterrorism legislation. It is also suggested that the psychosocial group dynamics which
create responsive behaviour to a perception of threat are partially responsible for the growth and support of
extremist ideals as well as the perpetuation of a conflict. In short, the notion ‘they blew people up’ contributes
more to the creation of a suspicion of a community than legislation devised to safeguard the population from
extremists emanating from that community.
Suspect Community Theory

The established theory suggests the suspect community is instigated from PTA legislation which then causes
suspicion through targeting of those communities via emergency legislation and the implementation of
counterterrorism measures. The original theory has been carried from the Northern Irish conflict into current
concerns about Muslim extremist terrorism on the UK mainland.[8]
One of the elements Hillyard’s theory raised is the dual judicial system used in the conflict in Northern Ireland.
He alleged it caused resentment and alienation of the higher risk community and suspicion from the side of the
general public. This thesis was supported by case studies presented by Hickman[9] and Heath-Kelly.[10] One
point not raised in the literature is that there are other dual judicial systems in place in British law enforcement,
like in the case of sex offenders listing and the Serious Crime Act 2015[11] relating to gang crimes. These
examples include special provisions and restrictions under the judicial system, such as stop and search, powers
of seizure and, in the case of sex offenders, loss of civil liberties, i.e. restrictions in the freedom of movement.
[12] Hillyard’s theory would suggest that these measures meant for sex offenders and gang members also
create a suspect community based on official scrutiny, surveillance and reporting in the media. However, this
is clearly not the case. It is therefore the thesis of this article that the acts of the offenders themselves create
concern among the public toward those individuals, not the existence of a dual judicial system.
Additionally, through PTA legislation, there are concurrent risk assessments concerning individuals, groups
and communities, representative of their potential terrorist threat. This singles out individuals with those
characteristics. This has created for some, a segregation and air of suspicion towards those from the North
and from the Republic of Ireland.[13] This particularly affected those living and travelling between mainland
Britain, which was the basis of the theory. This was also transposed to the resident Muslim community of the
UK.[14]
Although Hillyard’s theory is widely accepted and has been transferred to current extremist terrorist threats,
there has been opposition to the theory from Steven Greer.[15] Greer raises the important point that the suspect
community begins formation from intimidation into conformity by the majority in that divided community,
not at the level of the state. Greer’s suggestion of this has led to an alternative causal theory of creation of
suspicion through a threat perception at a psychosocial level within community conflict[16].
Alternative Causal Theory

The alternative causal theory at this point addresses the question: what makes a group of people sharing similar
traits of religion, physicality and origin an apparent threat? This cannot be solely due to legislation as there
has to be a perception of potential threat based on actions of that group. Ultimately, the legislation is in place
due to the actions of political violent extremist groups against government and society. The alternative causal
theory is structured upon the psychological and behavioural aspects of group dynamics in the perception of,
and reaction to a real or perceived threat. These elements are drawn together from classic experimental and
theoretical research in psychology to create a suggested alternative theory.
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Creation of the Suspect Community Traversing the Macro to Micro

On a simplistic level, terrorism hinges on a majority population which appears to have controlling power
over a minority which in turn has grievances. This results in conflict and terrorist activities, as discussed
by Martha Crenshaw.[17] The suspect community originates from behaviour of perceiving to be a ‘suspect’
within inter community conflict, and follows a process of group dynamics and the formation of prejudice
and discrimination[18] and how the group or community responds. The social impact on the communities
associated with those terrorist groups can be profound, from deteriorating inter-community relations to global
stigma.[19] This is particularly pertinent for those who have discernible characteristics, like physical attributes
or accents. The implications for those associated with the communities committing terrorist acts are far-
reaching, as Hillyard has pointed out.
Although the PTA instigated security measures on the border crossings between mainland Britain and the North
and South of Ireland, the repercussions of Northern and Southern Irish community memberships produced
stigmatisation.[20] Hickman et al discuss the suspectification of those of Irish and Muslim backgrounds in
England. For those of Irish backgrounds the pinnacle was experienced during the main IRA bombing campaigns
in England from 1972 to 1996.
On a macro level, the community experienced prejudice from the mainland Britain community on the basis
of fear and anxiety in a response to the sustained threat of further violence, discussed in Stephan and Stephan’s
2012 book “Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination”.[21] Stephan and Stephan introduced integrated threat
theory which is a major component in this work because of its applicability from micro to macro levels.
Although the PTA had policies for policing, counterterrorism intelligence gathering, surveillance and practical
operational standpoints, the prejudice felt toward the Irish community was on a societal level. Hickman et al
describe this in the context of perceived suspicion from the general public toward the Irish community.
On a meso platform, with that being the physical movement of persons between ports, airports and border
crossings, encountering systematic scrutiny at security checkpoints is not something specific to the crossings
from the island of Ireland to mainland Britain. As Hillyard points out, individuals being from an area of
potential threat are singled out as “not normal”, with additional scrutiny. Within Northern Ireland, legal
vehicle checkpoints operated by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (now Police Service Northern Ireland), Ulster
Defence Regiment and the Army were a normal part of daily life. The use of Northern Ireland photographic
driving licenses and carrying of other identification was standard with security forces operating checkpoints
for intelligence gathering, disruption of potential attacks or making random checks.[22] Normalisation and
acceptance of random security scrutiny for a majority of the population of Northern Ireland during the troubles
would have already included much of the community within the parameters of intergroup threat theory[23]
(discussed later in the article) through real and symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes.
Previous situations at borders and country security check points within Northern Ireland were likely to create
normative appropriateness[24] from the perspective of the traveller, in the selection of individuals to be stopped
and questioned.
The suspicion of opposing factions and intergroup conflict within Northern Ireland itself[25], highlight the
integrative threat theory of Stephan and Stephan[26] at the micro level. These divisions were intensified from
historical, ideological and subsequently geographical social experience[27] and further divided into sub-
level suspect communities. These were not only between nationalist and loyalist factions, but intergroups
conflicts within those factions, for instance, between the UDA and UVF and the Provisional IRA and INLA.
This is discussed in key research by Neil Ferguson and Shelley McKeown Jones which brings the argument
of categorisation of others within social identity theory to the fore and underpins the applicability of the two
theoretical models.
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Interlinking Theories
Theoretical models combine to provide a new vision on the emergence of suspect communities and the
dominant drivers for their creation. Such models have previously been applied to Northern Ireland and, to
some degree, also to mainland United Kingdom. The theories outlined below provide an interlocking, layered
framework which suggests suspect community creation happens predominantly on a psychosocial platform
rather than primarily a political one.
The Imagined Suspect Community—Perception
Perception of what is ‘suspect’ or a threat is based on a set of criteria defined by previous actions, by race, religion,
physical attributes, education or by social values.[28] It is augmented after each encounter, representation
or event, building a notion of potential threat[29]. There are two issues raised in the perception criteria of
the suspect community. First is the marginalisation and therefore possible loss of participation in democratic
processes either at an inter-community or at a political level. Second, and more relevant, is the misidentification
of suspects from either a sectarian territory level[30], or from a counterterrorism security measures level.[31]
This also applies to the general population and the misidentification of suspects.
The concept of the imagined suspect community was put forward by Marie Breen-Smith as a progression
from Hillyard’s theory of the suspect community. This is the construction of the out-group beyond the real or
experienced involvement and to a degree, stereotyping. The theory ties in with Benedict Anderson and Stephan
and Stephan’s models.[32] To identify what an ‘other’ is, in terms of security, as Ronnis Lipshutz stated, it must
be known what the ‘conditions of insecurity’ are.[33]
Media has also contributed to the construction of an imagined community. From the Northern Irish perspective,
media coverage of the conflict coupled with terrorist attacks in the mainland of Great Britain from members of
the Provisional IRA, had already created an imagined and suspect community of the Catholic Northern Irish.
[34] In the current climate, Breen-Smith claimed that after the attacks of 9/11 and its coverage in the media
Muslim communities became the ‘suspect’ or ‘other’ community.
The Group Belief
Belief systems are the fundamental combining factor for a group, from one community to an entire nation.
Based on those beliefs, the formulation of the ‘other’ or the outside group is the demarcation of difference and
the point where discrimination, stemming from natural group dynamic behaviour, occurs.[35]
In order to compose a “collective truth” and to make sense of the world individually, a series of cognitive
templates is developed to interpret and respond to external events and expectations, becoming organised beliefs.
[36] Those beliefs, if upheld, become ingrained and habituated[37] but can hold distortions based on (mis-)
perception and prior experience. Unless challenged, they can cause bias and misrepresentation of individuals,
groups and situations. Unless the challenge is enough to reform those beliefs, it will be disregarded or reframed
to be consistent with the current perception.
Group beliefs are purported to be based on a collective truth experienced by other group members.[38] It is
also deemed as essential that the collective core beliefs, or cognitive templates, on a group basis are shared and
make sense of the socially shared cognition.[39] In a situation of conflict or threat, this becomes a powerful
determinant of reaction and ties into the ‘imagined’ community of Anderson[40] and Breen-Smith.[41] The
problem with this response is that it is based on a certain worldview rather than on objective reality.[42] This
can cause discrimination, potential conflict escalation and reinforcement of beliefs.
During the Northern Ireland conflict, there was little challenge to the belief system of potential threat through
the UK media. Mostly negative reporting in the form of media coverage of terrorist attacks and atrocities in
Northern Ireland was in line with the collective experience of attacks in England itself. Therefore, no juxtaposing
viewpoint was available to the public to challenge the common view portrayed in the British media through
reporting of events.[43]
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Social and Group Identity Theory

Social identity theory in the case of discrimination, hostility, conflict and terrorism, is the assigning of a
category of ourselves to a specific group which is in line with our own personal, social and cultural identity.
[44] This also begins the formation of who is friend and foe, based on our individual categorisation and who we
consider our own in-group or out-group. This also supports feelings of safety and security on an individual and
group level, defining what is normal and abnormal behaviour. There is a clear boundary between the in-group
and the out-group, making the out-group the ‘suspect’ in terms of conflict.[45]
As Tajfel’s and Turner’s social identity theory suggests[46], a self-categorisation process occurs to distinguish
between groups which are identified with. The depersonalisation process which categorises people and their
distinguishable attributes removes the human and individual aspect of a person and assigns them to a specific
group. This is relevant in the context of being ‘suspect’, as in a conflict environment it is the self and others
categorisation which determines whether a person belongs to an opposing or threat group.[47] In terms of
conflict, personal, social and cultural identification theory are the bedrock of group choice.[48] Depersonalisation
and ascribed prototypicality to unknown individuals saves time in the situation of potential threat (also referred
to as heuristics). These prototypes, described by Hogg[49], are part of the depersonalisation and categorisation
process and give the attributes of an unknown individual or group a ‘not like me and therefore must be in the
opposing faction’, protection response.[50] In terms of individual and group protection, a clear definition of the
morality and righteousness of the group is established.
In terms of social identity theory, as Hogg previously noted, “Groups only exist in relation to other groups,
they derive their descriptive and evaluative properties, and thus their social meaning, in relation to these other
groups.”[51] Behaviour as an in-group member or as a ‘suspect’ is derived from events at the inception of the
conflict. External factors linked to authorities, law and legislation become secondary, if having any effect at all
as the perception of a suspect community has already been formed.
Although each conflict has its own specific characteristics, each warring faction will consist of members who
identify with the cause.[52] The same can be said of what we believe we are defending or protecting. Therefore,
with regard to personal, social and cultural identity, the combination augments our behaviour toward our in-
group and its protection. Cairns et al.[53] suggest that out-group derogation with in-group favouritism tend
to mainly occur in situations where there is extreme conflict. This supports the argument from Ferguson and
McKeown Jones[54] that during lower levels of sectarian conflict and instability, lower levels of in-group bias
exist. This argument could also be transposed to that of mainland Britain during periods of instability and
increased threat perception of those potentially perceived as the out-group or as communities representing
potential terrorist threat as experienced by Irish and Muslim communities.
The combination of personal, social and cultural identity, as proposed by Schwartz,[55] produces a strong
momentum towards the group over the individual. As each group must legitimise its actions, a clear
understanding of the boundaries and ‘morality’ has to be established, particularly if the group is in conflict, or
believes itself to be in conflict with others.[56]
In terms of the conflict within Northern Ireland, clear demarcation between factions were not only ideologically
driven, but geographical dispersal and isolation of groups further heightened in-group favouritism and
cohesion. Ferguson and McKeown Jones[57] make the point that prior research shows in-group identification
as an explanation for paramilitary organisation membership along with in-group pride as antecedent factors.
These factors alone suggest that social identity and categorisation of self and others plays a potentially larger
part in creation of a suspect community from groups associated with potential threat, through to national
identity.
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In-Group Behaviour and the Perception of Threat

The perception of threat to a group can induce changes to group behaviour and attitude.[58] It produces
vulnerability within the group and challenges their worldview, beliefs and values, while possibly enhancing
group cohesion. The perception of threat, or the projection of hostility from an out-group not only affects the
group but also causes individual re-examination of self-definition and categorisation to reaffirm commitment
to that group.[59]
In the research of Ryan King[60] on group threat theory, prejudice was seen to be higher against those groups
which were perceived to be the greatest threat, where the perceived minority group is relatively large and
where there is competition for resources. Within this group threat theory, the ‘dominant group’ is considered
as the majority or largest group. In Northern Ireland, whilst the Protestants in the North were a majority,
the Catholic minority in the North saw themselves as ‘Irish’ and therefore part of the large, predominantly
Catholic population of the Republic of Ireland (the south) with the ideal of a united Ireland, thus the majority.
[61] Within this theory it is suggested that both Protestant and the Catholic community saw themselves as the
majority and both behaved as such, both with according reactions of a dominant group.[62]
As King stipulates, the dominant group will fear that the minority group will throw existing structures and
arrangements into disarray. Increase or strengthening of the minority will also induce further hostility towards
the perceived minority group.[63]
Stephan and Stephan[64] used the model of intergroup threat theory, that of symbolic and realistic threat, to
predict levels of intergroup conflict and prejudice. They made the distinction between emotion and evaluation
in the perception of threat leading to prejudice, conflict and warfare. They included the emotional factors as that
of ‘hatred’ or ‘disdain’ and evaluative factors as disapproval based on criteria from information of the activity
of the group. Combining the two elements constructs a powerful determinant for distortion of threat which
consistently contributes to the ‘suspect’, ‘other’ or ‘them’ faction. Combined with the criteria of social identity
theory and group threat theory there is a compelling argument that communities viewed as representative of
terrorist groups, or out-groups, could foremost be viewed with suspicion by majority in-groups.
If this is applied to communities which represent a threat, in this instance those from Northern and Southern
Ireland as well as Muslim communities in current day terms, prejudice and perceived threat would be a
relatively logical progression.
Out-Group Paranoia—Being One of the Suspect Communities

Roderick Kramer[65] developed the theory of Out-group Paranoia from the psychosocial relationship between
groups of distrust. Paranoid cognition between groups was developed from the understanding that cognitions
of suspicion, mistrust and making personal attributions about the behaviour or intent of others[66] are relatively
commonplace for individuals in their daily lives.[67] Kramer drew together the theories and the conclusion
that individuals are more likely to experience paranoid cognitions when under apparent scrutiny or feeling
self-conscious and applied it to group behaviour. The theory centres on the role of trust between groups and
the apparition of negative intent and judgement against those who are thought to be scrutinisers.
Drawing on the research of Breen-Smith[68], Hogg[69] and Eidelson[70] already discussed above, the state
of being under observation, particularly in conflict, security and counter terrorism situations is likely to bring
about a feeling of being ‘being scrutinised’ or ‘self-consciousness’. This occurs even if a group or an individual
is innocent of any negative intent. This makes it more likely to distrust or experience cognitive paranoia,
forming realistic, symbolic or both, manifestations of distrust and conspiracy or ‘sinister attribution error’[71],
ascribing ulterior motives. The importance of this relates not only to Northern Ireland and other conflicts, but
also to the current relationship with the Muslim community in the United Kingdom. Although two distinctly
different situations, the out-group paranoia theory also gives understanding of the dynamics of the building
conflict between British Muslim and non-Muslim population. This is particularly relevant when members
ISSN 2334-3745 51 June 2020

of a community which would be deemed as suspect are singled out within public or official interaction and
associated reactions.
Public Reaction to Terrorist Attacks—the Public, Risk and Suspects

Rubin et al.[72], conducted a survey in the seven-month period after the London bombings in July 2005. The
results were similar to those seen in Fischoff et al.’s study[73] on post 9/11 impacts in that a long stress response
and concern over safety and the possibility of another attack were identified as present. Previous research had
suggested that individuals’ heightened stress and perception of threat after a major incident subsides after an
initial two- to three-month period.[74] Repeated media reporting of incidents as in the case of Northern Ireland
for those in the UK mainland and exposure to daily incidents within Northern Ireland perpetuated public
awareness and reinforced historical incidents of violence and terrorism towards the public, both realistic and
symbolic. In the same scenario, continuing global terrorist events involving Muslim extremist organisations
have been broadcast. If the same theories are applied, they create the same ‘suspicion’ and cognitive paranoia
towards that out-group of Muslim extremists, which extends to all those who are within the ‘symbolic’ and
‘categorised’ section of the community before new counterterrorism legislation is applied. This relates back to
the categorisation mentioned by Ferguson and McKeown Jones under the social identity aspect of the model.
The Argument of the Hillyard Theory in Recruitment and Radicalisation

The relevance of radicalisation to this work is the relationship of conflict and distrust (suspicion) at the
opposing faction level. There has been suggestion that current counterterrorism legislation alienates the general
communities from which violent extremists emanate.[75] The PTA special powers have been questioned as
whether they are in part responsible for the alienation of a specific community as being under suspicion and
therefore at additional risk of radicalisation.
As Greer[76] noted, the PTA 2000 is there to criminalise proscribed terrorist organisations, across all conflicts
and those directly associated and involved with them. This in itself does not marginalise and alienate the entire
community. The powers under the Act also cover, as Greer states, money laundering and baggage screening
at airports for all passengers. This, as Greer notes, effectively means passengers and financial institutions are
under suspicion, are stopped and searched and have their finances investigated. At present there is no evidence
of financial institution members being drawn to extremism nor having bags searched at an airport being a
catalyst for individual passengers to become radicalised.
Although in Northern Ireland recruitment took place predominantly on the ground, based on experiences
of injustice and loss[77] amongst other pathways, today’s injustice has become more ‘global’. As John Horgan
pointed out, one of the potential contributing factors of radicalisation is identification with injustice which
currently is accessible on a global scale.[78] Accessing written text and supporting broadcasts of insurgent
and terrorist organisations is freely available on the Internet. Horgan provided examples of European Muslims
who have become involved with violence due to identification with Palestinian victims of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, the Iraq war and Indian repression in Kashmir. In John Horgan’s research there is little, if any,
suggestion of a feeling of being ‘suspect’ from counterterrorism legislation, and he lists contributory factors
as being the result of dissatisfaction with current circumstances, displacement or disenfranchisement. The
mechanisms of radicalisation are complex and diverse and at this juncture, until further direct empirical
evidence is secured, the argument will continue to proceed as a matter of theoretical debate.
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Northern Ireland and Terrorist Events—Communication and Contact

In the case of terrorism, during conflict or post event, a risk communication procedure presented by Sheppard
et al.[79], becomes of paramount importance when dealing with potential mass panic. They suggest the use
a communication management conduit to increase informed decision-making, reducing fear, anxiety and
confusion in the case of a major terrorist attack. Two points raised by them feed directly into this hypothesis
on a smaller scale: that of ‘dread risk’ and ‘unknown risk’.[80] Scaling it down to national level terrorism and
creation of suspect communities, these two points are poignant, not only as a contributory condition, but also
as an intervention.
The risk management from the government in the event of a mass attack has suggested guidelines in three overall
areas. Clear and direct instruction to assist with decision-making, enough information to familiarise the public
with the facts of the incident without bias and to allay incorrect risk perception and alertness including in regard
to protective measures. Interestingly, here is a possible intervention which could be developed at this level
to combat increased discrimination and provide an opportunity for public involvement in counterterrorism.
This could reduce many of the issues discussed regarding conflict and suspect community. This would utilise
integrated contact hypothesis, discussed by Hewstone and Swart[81] found to be effective in Northern Ireland
on an interpersonal level rather than on a group platform to stunt or regress the categorisation process and
group division. However, as Hewstone and Swart noted, “it remains a challenge for contact as an intervention
to prove equally effective for both groups” as members of disadvantaged groups have weaker results with this
method as Pettigrew and Tropp concluded based on a meta-analysis of 515 contact studies.[82]
Combining these approaches with social programs and transparent governmental press briefings could be
an effective alternative pathway from the current theory of Hillyard’s. A clear media process to highlight the
differentiation and consequences for individuals subject to suspect community prejudice by the public may be
able to increase awareness and reduce bias. This combines with expectation management of those within the
suspect communities exposed to counterterrorism procedures and a protocol of post engagement explanation
and support.
Discussion
The suggested causal theory states the suspect community originates from the perception of being a ‘suspect’
within inter community or national conflict, rising from a process of identity and group dynamics, influenced
by external multifarious factors. It also suggests the creation of that initial ‘suspect’ or risk community arises
from the process and experience of actual conflict or violent events, which threaten the lives of a wider section
of society.[83] As Lewin[84] noted, each group becomes suspect to the other. According to the proposed
theoretical model, this happens in stages.
The first stage involves competing ideologies, incorporating elements from the group threat theory of Ryan
King.[85] King’s research showed the level of prejudice was higher against minority groups perceived to be
gathering momentum. The role of social identity and categorisation falls within this initial stage, leading to a
division of self and others.
The second stage, once the groups are formed, is based on past and recent actions and their repercussions.
Kramer’s theory of out-group paranoia[86] plays a distinctive part in this second stage of suspect community
formation. When individuals and groups are under threat or pressure, due to anxiety they tend to overestimate
the level of threat, also supporting the out-group paranoia theory. Distrust through events, history, and media
reporting can either be a compounding driving factor for increased hostilities, or a catalyst opportunity for
the innocent members of the ‘suspect community’ to distance and separate their identity from that of the
extremists. At this point, according to Sheriff[87], the categorisation of the high-risk group as a threat has
already occurred.
In the third stage of distrust and the suspect community enters the discussion of the PTA on communities
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which would be considered higher risk from a counterterrorism perspective by the authorities. A number of
investigators have used Hillyard’s theory (Hickman[88], Pantazis[89], Breen-Smith[90]) to draw comparison
with current day UK legislation, namely the PTA 2000, with the terrorist threat of extremist Muslim factions.
Hillyard made succinct arguments regarding the difference in the judicial system and special powers and
claimed that the Irish community was criminalised by the state due to these powers, and a causal sequence led
to the UK’s general population manifesting racism.
Terrorist incidents provoke fear in the community[91] and among the wider population. It would appear,
according to mass response in the Rubin et al. report of the July 2005 bombings, that the general population
post attack will assimilate the categories of higher risk individuals from the perspective of their own personal
safety. Therefore, it is hard to assert at this level that only the Prevention of Terrorism Acts of 1974 and 2000
and their subsequent amendments are a major causal factor for the creation of the suspect community or the
main contributing factor to radicalisation in the UK.
The importance of an alternative theory dialogue lies with the opportunity of an intervention point on
correct identification of suspect community creation in the form of contact hypothesis[92] and using risk
communication strategy to implement it.[93] Using community initiatives already in place with a focus on
exposure and inclusion to create contact, there may be an opportunity to involve the suspect communities in
the counterterrorism process. This could lead to a reduction in anxiety and via that, possibly reduce prejudice.
Further research would be critical in the implementation and design of the strategy, but the potential of this
approach is worth considering.
Conclusion
The actions of terrorism involve atrocities that even the rules of war would not excuse. Sectarian conflict, as in
the case of Northern Ireland, affects the human rights and civil liberties of those living amongst it and betrays
the right to life of its ordinary citizens. The fine balance of integration of a counterterrorism protocol and
infringement of civil liberties of those living in or travelling between the affected areas has been an ongoing
area of controversy and argument. It has concerned those it affects and those actioning or coordinating the
protocols at policing, legal and political level, ever since the introduction of the Special Powers Act (1922) and
subsequent PTSs.
Within the suggestions of Hillyard’s theory asserting that PTA process threatens the rights of individuals
suspected of terrorist activities and those associated with the higher-risk communities, there is no mention
of the State’s responsibility that ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law’ under Section 1, Article 2 of
the European Convention on Human Rights. Without these protective mechanisms, even greater civil liberties
may be removed without true safeguarding of the citizens of the state under threat. As with most civil rights
issues connected with counterterrorism, the problem of security outweighing legality requires continual and
crucial reassessment.
Although this article focuses on the creation of the suspect community from wider societal aspects, there
is a two-way conduit of prejudice from communities experiencing suspicion. The application of the same
theoretical models mentioned in the work applied to the suspect community of imagined and real threat, out-
group paranoia and perception of threat can be applied to the wider society and precipitate withdrawal, self-
enforced isolation and marginalisation.
Exposure and personal interaction from a contact hypothesis strategy, particularly outlined by Ferguson
and McKeown Jones, in unison with risk communication strategy from community through societal levels
could be an effective way forward. Expectation management of what may be experienced due to the PTA 2000
processes may provide greater understanding toward those perceived higher-risk communities. Post attack
risk communication strategies could deliver this which may increase the possibility of enhanced cooperation
between communities, aiding counterterrorism initiatives. Cross community individual involvement in this
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process may provide opportunity at this point for negotiation, readdressing elements of the legislation and
inclusion of the communities. This process hinges upon the support of the community and the clear message
at state level that the prevention of terrorism acts serves to preserve the rights of its citizens, even if they are
challenged.
When incorporating the notion of the suspect community as Hillyard projects it into government
counterterrorism strategies only at state level, there is the danger of decreased protection for UK society from
a reduction of special powers.
Although mistakes were made in some areas of the PTA as pointed out by Hillyard, the Northern Ireland
conflict gave an opportunity to assess the legislative and judicial system used. It is inevitable that people
associated with a high-risk section of the population will come under scrutiny and judgement, particularly
under counterterrorism strategies. The possibility of application of risk communication as suggested by
Sheppard et al. in combination with the PTA legislation should be conducted within the Muslim community
and post-conflict study of Northern Ireland communities. It is suggested this work may afford opportunity for
reexamination and opening of a new discussion of this complex subject.
There must be a level of acceptance that in times of threat there will be those who are caught up in the fight
to combat that which threatens our very lives. Dropping our sights away from the state level to how a suspect
community is formed may afford options to understanding how to regain the support of a nation whilst still
upholding its security and protection.
About the Author: Emma Ylitalo-James is originally from Northern Ireland and forged a career as a therapist
and lecturer in behavior and communication with a BSc (Hons) in Psychology and MSc in War and Psychiatry
from King’s College University London. She is currently a PhD student with Cranfield University in Defense
and Security with her main area of research in psychology in terrorism. Previous research includes decision-
making distortion in time critical high-pressure environments and target selection. She has spoken at the Society
of Terrorism Research Conference in 2019 Oslo and her current research is in the decision-making strategy and
psychological drivers of escalation from sympathetic to active terrorist involvement.
Notes
[1] Kainz, Howard. ‘Biblical Terrorism: With a Platonic deconstruction’. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 32, no. 1 (1999), pp. 40-59.
[2] Hillyard, Paddy. Suspect Community: People’s Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain. Pluto Press, 1993.
[3] United Kingdom: Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 [United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland], Chapter 2, 11 March
2005; URL: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/2/pdfs/ukpga_20050002_en.pdf.
[4] Breen-Smyth, Marie. ‘Theorising the “Suspect Community”: Counterterrorism, security practices and the public imagination.’
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7, no. 2 (2014), pp. 223-240.
[5] Pantazis, Christina and Simon Pemberton. ‘From the ‘Old’ to the ‘New’ Suspect Community: Examining the Impacts of Recent
UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation.’ The British Journal of Criminology, 49, no. 5 (2009), pp. 646-666.
[6] Choudhury, Tufyal and Helen Fenwick. ‘The Impact of Counter-terrorism Measures on Muslim Communities.’ International
Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 25, no. 3 (2011), pp. 151-181.
[7] Zarate, Michael A., Berenice Garcia, Azenett A. Garza, and Robert T. Hitlan. ‘Cultural Threat and Perceived Realistic Group
Conflict as Dual Predictors of Prejudice.’ Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, no. 1 (2004), pp. 99-105..
[8] Ragazzi, Francesco. ‘Suspect Community or Suspect Category? The Impact of Counter-Terrorism as “Policed Multiculturalism”.’
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42, no. 5 (2016): pp. 724-741.
[9] Hickman, Mary, Lyn Thomas, Sara Silvestri, and Henri Nickels. ‘“Suspect Communities?” Counter-Terrorism Policy, the Press,
and the Impact on Irish and Muslim Communities in Britain.’ University of London Institutional Repository (2011). URL: https://
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openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/8735/1/
[10] Heath-Kelly, Charlotte. ‘Reinventing Prevention or Exposing the Gap? False Positives in UK Terrorism Governance and the
Quest for Pre-emption.’ Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5, no. 1 (2012), pp. 69-87.
[11] United Kingdom: Serious Crime Act 2015 [United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland], 2015 c, 9, Part 3; URL: http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/9/contents/enacted.
[12] Demleitner, Nora V. ‘Abusing State Power or Controlling Risk: Sex Offender Commitment and Sicherungverwahrung,’ Fordham
Urban Law Journal, 30 (2002), p. 1621.
[13] Bigo, Didier, and Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet. ‘Northern Ireland as Metaphor: Exception, Suspicion and Radicalization in the
“War on Terror”,’ Security Dialogue 42, no. 6 (2011), pp. 483-498.
[14] Pantazis, Christina and Simon Pemberton (2009), op. cit.
[15] Greer, Steven. ‘Anti-Terrorist Laws and the United Kingdom’s “Suspect Muslim Community”: A Reply to Pantazis and Pemberton,’
The British Journal of Criminology 50, no. 6 (2010), pp. 1171-1190.
[16] Greer, Steven. ‘Reply to Marie Breen-Smyth, “Theorising the “Suspect Community”: Counterterrorism, Security Practices and
the Public Imagination,’ Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7, no 3 (2014), pp. 468-471.
[17] Crenshaw, Martha. ‘The Causes of Terrorism’. Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981), pp. 379-399.
[18] Lewin, Kurt. ‘Group Decision and Social Change.’ Readings in Social Psychology, 3, no 1 (1947), pp. 197-211.
[19] Hankir, Ahmed, Frederick R. Carrick, and Zaman Zaman. ‘Part I: Muslims, Social Inclusion and the West: Exploring Challenges
Faced by Stigmatized Groups,’ Psychiatra Danubina, 29, no. 3 (2017), pp.164-72.
[20] Hickman, Mary J., Lyn Thomas, Henri C. Nickels, and Sara Silvestri. ‘Social Cohesion and the Notion of “Suspect Communities”:
A Study of the Experiences and Impacts of Being “Suspect” for Irish Communities and Muslim Communities in Britain,’ Critical
Studies on Terrorism, 5 , no. 1 (2012), pp. 89-106.
[21] Stephan, Walter G. and Cookie W. Stephan. ‘An Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice,’ in Stuart Oskamp (ed.), Reducing Prejudice
and Discrimination. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, 2000, pp. 23-45.
[22] Jackson, Brian A. ‘Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a “Long War”. British Experience in Northern Ireland,’ Military Review 87,
no, 1 (2007), p. 74.
[23] Stephan, Walter G. and Cookie W. Stephan. ‘Intergroup Threat Theory,’ The International Encyclopedia of Intercultural
Communication (2017), pp. 1-12.
[24] Mathias Blanz, Amelie Mummendey, and Sabine Otten. ‘Normative Evaluations and Frequency Expectations Regarding Positive
Versus Negative Outcome Allocations Between Groups,’ European Journal of Social Psychology 27, no. 2 (1997), pp. 165-176.
[25] Hughes, Joanne, Andrea Campbell, Miles Hewstone and Ed Cairns. ‘Segregation in Northern Ireland: Implications for
Community Relations Policy,’ Policy Studies 28, no. 1 (2007), pp. 33-53.
[26] Stephan, Walter S. and Cookie White Stephan (2000) op. cit.
[27] Hughes, Joanne et al. (2007) op cit.
[28] Crenshaw, Martha. ‘The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,’ Political Psychology 21, no. 2 (2000), pp.
405-420.
[29] Fenigstein, Allan and Peter A. Vanable. ‘Paranoia and Self-Consciousness,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62, no.
1 (1992), p. 129.
[30] Ravenscroft, Emily. ‘The Meaning of the Peacelines of Belfast,’ Peace Review 21, no. 2 (2009), pp. 213-221.
[31] Breen-Smyth, Marie (2014) op. cit.
[32] Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1991.
[33] Lipschutz, Ronnie. After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century. New York: Sunny Press, 2012.
[34] Nickels, Henri C., Lyn Thomas, Mary J. Hickman and Sara Silvestri. ‘Constructing “Suspect” Communities and Britishness:
Mapping British Press Coverage of Irish and Muslim Communities, 1974–2007,’ European Journal of Communication 27, no. 2
(2012), pp. 135-151.
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[35] Stephan, Walter G., and Cookie W. Stephan (2017), op. cit.
[36] Bandura, Albert. ‘Perceived Self-Efficacy in Cognitive Development and Functioning,’ Educational Psychologist 28, no. 2 (1993),
pp. 117-148.
[37] Gross, Richard. Key Studies in Psychology. 6th Edition. London; Hachette, 2012.
[38] Bar‐Tal, Daniel. ‘From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis,’ Political
Psychology 21, no. 2 (2000), pp. 351-365.
[39] Nye, Judith and Aaron M. Brower. What’s Social about Social Cognition? London; Sage, 1996.
[40] Anderson, Benedict (1991), op. cit.
[41] Breen-Smyth, Marie (2017), op. cit.
[42] Beck, Aaron T. Prisoners of Hate: The Cognitive Basis of Anger, Hostility, and Violence. New York; Harper Collins Publishers, 1999.
[43] Nickels, Henri C. et al (2012), op. cit..
[44] Schwartz, Seth J., Curtis S. Dunkel and Alan S. Waterman. ‘Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective.” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 32, no. 6 (2009), pp. 537-559.
[45] Horgan, John. ‘From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism,’
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008), pp. 80-94.
[46] Tajfel, Henri. ‘Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour,’ Information (International Social Science Council) 13, no. 2 (1974), pp.
65-93.
[47] Hogg, Michael A. ‘A Social Identity Theory of Leadership,’ Personality and Social Psychology Review 5, no. 3 (2001), pp. 184-200.
[48] Schwartz, Seth J. et al (2009), op. cit.
[49] Michael A. Hogg, op. cit.
[50] Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg. Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances. New York; Springer-Verlag
Publishing, 1990.
[51] Hogg, Michael A. (2001), op. cit.
[53] Cairns, Ed, Jared Kenworthy, Andrea Campbell, and Miles Hewstone. ‘The Role of In‐Group Identification, Religious Group
Membership and Intergroup Conflict in Moderating In‐Group and Out‐Group Affect,’ British Journal of Social Psychology 45, no. 4
(2006), pp. 701-716.
[54] Ferguson, Neil and Shelley McKeown. “Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Conflict in Northern Ireland,” in Shelley
McKeown, Reeshma Haji and Neil Ferguson (eds.) Understanding Peace and Conflict Through Social Identity Theory, pp. 215-227.
Cham: Springer, 2016.
[57] Ferguson, Neil and Shelley McKeown (2016), op. cit.
[58] Ravenscroft, Emily (2016), op. cit.
[59] Tajfel, Henri (1974), op. cit.
[60] King, Ryan D. and Darren Wheelock. “Group Threat and Social Control: Race,Perceptions of Minorities and the Desire to
Punish.” Social Forces 85, no. 3 (2007), pp. 1255-1280.
[61] Pettigrew, Thomas F. and Linda R. Tropp. “A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory.” Journal Personality and Social
Psychology 90, no. 5 (2006), p. 751.
[62] King, Ryan D. and Darren Wheelock (2007), op. cit.
[63] Blalock, Hubert. Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations. New York: Wiley, 1967.
[64] Stephan, Walter G. and Cookie W. Stephan (2000), op. cit.
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[65] Kramer, Roderick. ‘The Sinister Attribution Error: Paranoid Cognition and Collective Distrust in Organizations,’ Motivation and
Emotion 18, no. 2 (1994), pp. 199-230.
[66] Fenigstein, Allan and Peter A. Vanable (1992), op. cit.
[67] Rotter, Julian B. ‘A New Scale for the Measurement of Interpersonal Trust,’ Journal of Personality 35, no. 4 (1967), pp. 651-665.
[68] Breen-Smyth, Marie (2014), op. cit.
[70] Eidelson, Roy J., and Eidelson, Judy, I. ‘Dangerous Ideas: Five Beliefs That Propel Groups Toward Conflict’. American Psychologist
58, no. 3 (2003), p. 182
[71] Fenigstein, Allan and Peter A. Vanable (1992), op. cit.
[72] Rubin, G. James, Chris R. Brewin, Neil Greenberg, Jamie Hacker Hughes, John Simpson, and Simon Wessely. ‘Enduring
Consequences of Terrorism: 7-Month Follow-up Survey of Reactions to the Bombings in London on 7 July 2005,’ The British Journal
of Psychiatry 190, no. 4 (2007), pp. 350-356.
[73] Fischhoff, Bayuch, Roxana M. Gonzalez, Deborah A. Small, and Jennifer S. Lerner. ‘Judged Terror Risk and Proximity to the
World Trade Center,’ in Viscusi, W. Kip (ed.) The Risks of Terrorism, pp. 39-53. Springer, Boston, MA, 2003.
[74] Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber and Gallya Lahav. ‘Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies,’
American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (2005), pp. 593-608.
[75] Hickman, Mary et al (2011) op. cit.
[76] Greer, Steven (2010), op. cit.
[77] Eidelson, Roy J. and Judy I. Eidelson (2003), op. cit.
[78] Horgan, John (2008), op. cit.
[79] Sheppard, Ben, James Rubin, Jamie K. Wardman, and Simon Wessely. ‘Terrorism and Dispelling the Myth of a Panic Prone
Public,’ Journal of Public Health Policy 27, no. 3 (2006), pp. 219-245.
[80] Slovic, Paul Ed. The Perception of Risk. Earthscan Publications, 2000.
[81] Hewstone, Miles, and Hermann Swart. ‘Fifty‐Odd Years of Inter‐Group Contact: From Hypothesis to Integrated Theory,’ British
Journal of Social Psychology 50, no. 3 (2011), pp. 374-386.
[82] Pettigrew, Thomas F., and Linda R. Tropp (2006), op. cit., p. 751.
[83] Rogers, Brooke M., Richard Amlôt, G. James Rubin, Simon Wessely, and Kristian Krieger. ‘Mediating the Social and Psychological
Impacts of Terrorist Attacks: The Role of Risk Perception and Risk Communication,’ International Review of Psychiatry 19, no. 3
(2007), pp. 279-288.
[84] Lewin, Kurt (1947), op. cit.
[85] King, Ryan D. and Darren Wheelock (2007), op. cit.
[86] Kramer, Roderick (1994), op. cit.
[87] University of Oklahoma. Institute of Group Relations, and Muzafer Sherif. Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers
Cave Experiment. Vol. 10. Norman, OK: University Book Exchange, 1961.
[88] Hickman, Mary et al (2011), op. cit.
[89] Pantazis, Christina and Simon Pemberton (2009), op. cit.
[90] Breen-Smyth, Marie (2014) op. cit,
[91] Rubin, G. James et al. (2006), op. cit.
[92] Allport, Gordon. The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, Addison-Wessley, 1954.
[93] Sheppard, Ben et al. (2006), op. cit.
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Research Notes
Terrorism and COVID-19: Actual and Potential Impacts

by Gary Ackerman and Hayley Peterson
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic presents both challenges and opportunities for terrorists. While the hazards of the
disease and disruptions to society inhibit some of their operations, by their very nature as asymmetric adversaries,
terrorists tend to adapt quickly and exploit conditions of uncertainty and instability to further their goals.
This Research Note provides a preliminary overview of how COVID-19 might affect the state of contemporary
terrorism. In so doing, it introduces and discusses 10 different ways that the pandemic could impact the terrorism
landscape in the short, medium and long term. These range from terrorists leveraging an increased susceptibility
to radicalization and inciting a rise in anti-government attitudes, to engaging in pro-social activities and even
reconsidering the utility of bioterrorism. Acknowledging the publication of this Research Note in the midst of the
pandemic and its necessarily speculative nature in the absence of historical precedent, the discussion nonetheless
seeks to draw attention to several possible pathways along which terrorism might evolve in response to COVID-19
and its attendant societal effects.
Keywords: CBRN, pandemic; COVID-19; radicalization; bioterrorism; emerging threats
Introduction
As the SARS-CoV-2 virus spread inexorably across the globe in the early months of 2020, the pandemic it
generated has caused unprecedented disruption to the connected, just-in-time world of the early 21st century.
Politicians appear bereft of answers, the global economy has become moribund while common people the
world over have been subjected to lockdowns, social distancing and an interruption in the normal routines
of life. When it comes to terrorism, as much as some would like to paint terrorists as some type of aberrant
“other”, the truth is that they are spawned from and almost always reside, or at least operate in, our societies.
Insofar as they form part—albeit a violent, extremist and unlawful part—of our societies, terrorist individuals
and groups, just like everyone else, will thus necessarily be affected by the pandemic and the general social
disruption it has wrought. At the same time, by their very nature as asymmetric adversaries, terrorists tend
to be markedly adaptive actors, seeking to leverage any vulnerabilities they perceive in their environment.
They have often proven particularly adept at exploiting conditions of uncertainty and instability to further
their goals. It can be expected, therefore, that the more strategic and tactically adroit amongst today’s terrorist
adversaries will attempt to gain whatever advantage they can from the COVID-19 pandemic. The potential
obstacles and opportunities presented to terrorists by the pandemic are thus worthy of careful and prompt
consideration. This is especially pertinent given the possibility that COVID-19 is likely to have second-order
effects, in addition to immediate impacts, on global affairs.
This Research Note seeks to provide a preliminary overview of how COVID-19 might affect the state of
contemporary terrorism, with the acknowledgment that we are still in the midst of the pandemic and additional
consequences might yet emerge. The first thing to realize in this regard is that to a large extent we are in uncharted
territory. The last time the world experienced a pandemic as global and consequential as the one caused by
COVID-19 was during the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic (often erroneously referred to as the “Spanish Flu”).
At that time, several decades before the so-called “modern” age of terrorism, the United States in particular
did witness a rise in attacks by anarchist followers of Luigi Galleani, culminating in the devastating Wall Street
bombing of September 16, 1920.[1] However, the increased spate of bombings had begun before the pandemic
and was more closely linked to opposition to the First World War, making any direct causal connection to
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the pandemic tenuous at best.[2] The 1918–1919 pandemic is, however, associated with a number of broader
sociopolitical changes, several of which are potentially relevant to the current discussion and will be addressed
below.
The historical record therefore does not offer much in the way of direct guidance and, in the absence of extensive
empirical evidence, we are forced to rely mostly on inference. Our assertions can be informed, however, by our
existing understanding of terrorist psychology and ideology, past terrorist conduct in (somewhat) comparable
situations, and the relatively few observations of terrorist behavior that have come to light so far during the
pandemic. Nevertheless, our analysis must necessarily tend towards the speculative, at least until sufficient
time has passed to robustly test our arguments with observed data.
Before proceeding, we return to the idea that the general social upheaval caused by the pandemic will affect the
vast majority of terrorists to some degree. With the possible exception of a small number of completely isolated
extremists (mostly associated with fringe millenarian groups or guerrillas based in remote locations[3]),
most terrorist organizations and networks will be just as susceptible to infection by COVID-19 and just as
disrupted by general social distancing measures and interruptions in supply chains and transportation systems
as the rest of the world.[4] The risk of infection by COVID-19 may very well not deter a terrorist attack in its
final operational phases—suicide bombers, for example, would not be expected to be overly concerned about
getting sick on their way to blow themselves up. Yet, most other elements of terrorist networks, from trainers
and quartermasters to ideologues and commanders, will in the vast majority of cases be reluctant to expose
themselves unnecessarily to infection, if not due to the innate human psychological aversion to contamination
and a regard for their own mortality[5], then for the operational challenges that having multiple ill cadre would
pose. In any event, shutdowns, lockdowns and other social distancing measures will tend to inhibit numerous
aspects of terrorist operations, from the movement of operatives within and across borders, to the acquisition of
vehicles, weapons and equipment.[6] This diminution in the organizational functions of terrorist groups likely
extends to at least some, albeit lesser, degree to violent extremist individuals, since even their more limited
machinations invariably require a certain amount of travel and logistical activities in the broader society.[7]
In short, the pandemic arguably increases the overall “friction” of terrorist operations, with the extent to
which this occurs dependent on the levels of disruption and official control in the location where the terrorists
are operating.[8] This argument holds equally for all types of terrorists, from jihadist networks and racial
supremacist militias to idiosyncratic misanthropes and hyper-nationalist paramilitaries. That being said, the
COVID-19 pandemic does present terrorists with a number of opportunities for expanding, or at least adapting,
their activities, both violent and otherwise, and in certain circumstances might even act as a stimulus to action.
What follows is an initial attempt to categorize and enumerate the various ways in which the pandemic and its
sociopolitical consequences might shape the terrorism landscape in both the short term and beyond. Given the
popular predilection for lists, we present a “Top 10” of the most significant potential impacts, although we offer
these in no particular rank order of relevance or likelihood.
Effects of COVID-19
1. Terrorists Engaging in Pro-Social Activities

Terrorists groups often seek and obtain some degree of legitimacy by engaging in social welfare and other
activities, especially in areas of poor governance. Even if only temporarily or cynically, larger terrorist
organizations with specific constituencies appear to view the pandemic as an opportunity to broaden their
support—and hence recruitment and funding—in the long term. While most terrorist groups lack the
resources to mount full-scale medical responses, even modest efforts can serve to garner positive attention
to these organizations and highlight the inadequacies of the local government. Amongst jihadists, Lashkar-e-
Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have offered to provide essential services and assistance to people affected by
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COVID-19 in Pakistan.[9] In neighboring Afghanistan, the Taliban, which aspires to governance and controls
substantial territory, has promised safe passage to healthcare workers crossing their territory, engaged in
their own public health information campaign to counter the virus, and reportedly provided some healthcare
services.[10] Perhaps the most active efforts have been made by (the not coincidentally most well-resourced)
Shi’ite Hizb’allah in Lebanon, which has sought to contrast itself with the dysfunction of the broader Lebanese
state by allegedly deploying 1,500 doctors, 3,000 nurses and paramedics, 20,000 more activists, as well as more
than 100 emergency vehicles to handle COVID-19 and disinfect public spaces.[11] These groups clearly see
the propaganda value of such efforts, for example, when an encrypted channel run by the Iba news network
channel which is linked to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham uses images and videos to champion HTS’s social distancing
and other alleged efforts to address COVID-19.[12] Although most prevalent amongst jihadists, pro-social
activities have also been seen amongst other extremist milieus. While the appropriateness of labeling such
actors as terrorists is debatable, anarchist networks in the United States have organized free food distribution
and mutual aid efforts to help address the social disruption caused by the pandemic.[13] These kinds of pro-
social activities have thus far been conspicuous by their absence, however, among terrorists espousing far right
ideologies.
2. Increased Susceptibility to Radicalization

The pandemic has resulted in widespread and extended dislocation and disruption to daily lives, in which
many people have lost their jobs, or loved ones who provided for them, and are afraid for themselves and their
futures.[14] This in turn can lead to low-level underlying psychological symptoms, ranging from increased
anxiety to mild paranoia, which are likely to worsen the longer the disruptions continue and can in turn
lead to new or resurgent self-destructive behaviors like domestic abuse or substance abuse.[15] Significantly,
these uncertainties and psychological setbacks arguably make a greater number of people more susceptible to
radicalizing narratives that seek to scapegoat various “others” and promise simple solutions.[16] There is a fair
amount of evidence that radicalization is facilitated by actual or perceived personal losses[17], frustrations[18]
and reminders of death[19], all of which can be associated with the pandemic. At the same time, with more
people spending more time online, there are more opportunities for extremists to engage with their purported
constituencies.[20]
The disruptions and stresses arising from the pandemic thus provide fertile ground for radicalization and
extremist propaganda. We have already seen examples of terrorist organizations exploiting the pandemic to
directly bolster their recruitment efforts. ISIS has used hashtags related to COVID-19 to redirect Internet users
to its jihadist propaganda[21], while in Turkey the same group is reportedly focusing its recruitment efforts
particularly on migrants from Turkmenistan who have become unemployed as a result of the pandemic.[22]
Then there are the widespread attempts by various extremists, including terrorists, to prey on the uncertainties,
anxieties and disruptions caused by the pandemic—as well as a newly captive online audience—in order to feed
into and, they hope, broaden the appeal of their narratives. Sunni jihadists have either claimed that COVID-19
is a plot by Islam’s enemies, or like al-Qa’ida and ISIS, have painted COVID-19 as an example of Allah’s wrath
against the corrupt and the nonbelievers that can only be stopped by increased adherence to the “true” Islam.
[23] Pro-ISIS groups have also reportedly heightened efforts to disseminate propaganda material specifically
in the English language to target vulnerable populations under lockdown orders in the West.[24] In a recent
online publication specifically targeting the “Western World”, al-Qaeda has sought to encourage conversions to
Islam during isolation periods and stay-at-home orders.[25]
At the same time, among the far right, there have been numerous attempts to scapegoat the ostensible “other”
for the virus, whether this be the Chinese, the Jews or immigrants in general, often explicitly associating these
groups with pestilence and filth in tropes reminiscent of Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda from the 1930s.[26]
The stigmatization of foreigners as bringers of disease was also witnessed during the 1918–1919 influenza
pandemic[27] and has been repeated during the current one.[28] Several COVID-19 specific memes, such as
“corona-chan”, have also become popular on far right online discussion forums.[29]
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The result of this noxious combination of an uncertain, anxious populace and eager, opportunistic extremists
is an observed increase in activity on online extremist platforms. For example, encrypted channels on Telegram
associated with far-right ideology groups have seen a large growth in users. One white supremacist channel
in particular has seen an 800% increase in users during COVID-19, while other similar right-wing ideology
channels grew by more than 6,000 users in the month of March alone.[30] Following the implementation of
lockdown and social distancing measures in the United States, far-right content and engagement online had
increased by 13% and reached a 21% increase in engagement levels 10 days after the lockdown measures began.
[31] Far-right extremist groups are not alone in seeing this expeditious growth in their online user base, with
ISIS and jihadi channels seeing a similar massive increase in online activity.[32] Attempts by extremist groups
to intensify their social media efforts are so prevalent that even U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres
acknowledged the phenomenon on April 27, 2020, noting that these groups intend to disseminate their hateful
rhetoric to recruit young people in particular.[33]
One particularly pernicious aspect of the lockdowns associated with COVID-19 is that at the same time as
socially distanced, anxious individuals might be becoming more susceptible to radicalization, the isolation
from others and alienation from normal social intercourse itself means that there is a lower chance that
behaviors associated with radicalization will be noticed by others who might otherwise be able to intervene. A
senior British counterterrorism official has cited this as a reason why referrals to the United Kingdom’s Prevent
program have fallen since the country began its lockdown.[34]
3. A Rise in Anti-Government Attitudes

Dissatisfaction with government responses to COVID-19, exacerbated by conspiracy theories peddled by a
range of parties, is likely to accentuate existing levels of frustration and stoke anti-government extremism in
particular. The first leg of this argument is based upon the generally reactive, often haphazard and sometimes
blatantly incompetent response of governments around the world to the pandemic.[35] This has no doubt
undermined public confidence in ruling regimes and, in places with already poor governance, has likely served
only to erode the government’s legitimacy even further. It is interesting to note that recent preliminary findings
have discovered a link between areas most affected by the influenza pandemic of 1918–1919 and increased
support for the Nazis in Germany in subsequent elections in the early 1930s.[36]
The second leg on which this notion rests lies in how those extremists whose ideology is particularly hostile
to the state have pounced on government missteps to exacerbate levels of popular frustration, which, as noted
above, is often associated with aggression. Extremists are doing this using a maelstrom of disinformation
and conspiracy theories.[37] There has been a particularly colorful array of such theories stemming from
far right extremists in North America and Europe, with supporters of the mysterious online activist group
QAnon asserting that China, Bill Gates, Big Pharma or others are responsible for creating the coronavirus
(sometimes involving an obscure chemical called adrenochrome) and that anti-COVID-19 measures are a
plot by the “Deep State”.[38] In the United Kingdom, a prominent theory amongst the far right (and some
on the far left) is that 5G transmission towers are somehow responsible for spreading COVID-19.[39] These
types of anti-government conspiracy theories are not limited to the far right—many on the far left of the
political spectrum spin theories about how government responses to the virus, and potentially the virus itself,
are merely facades for protecting or further empowering corporate elites and their authoritarian government
allies.[40] Such conspiracy-mongering is not harmless—even if it does not result in new recruits for recognized
terrorist groups, it can still mobilize extremist fellow travelers. This was demonstrated when, in early April
2020, train engineer Eduardo Moreno purposely derailed a train in hopes of crashing it into the U.S. Navy
Hospital Ship Mercy, which was docked at the Port of Los Angeles. Moreno claimed that he wanted to draw
attention to a COVID-19-related conspiracy, possible one espoused by some QAnon activists that Mercy was
taking COVID-19 victims to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.[41]
The final leg supporting an argument about the rise of anti-government extremism in the wake of COVID-19
references the recently witnessed pointed opposition to the expansion of the state into everyday life via
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lockdowns and other restrictive measures. The atmosphere has become more heated following the killing of
the African-American George Floyd by a policeman in Minnesota, which has set off large demonstrations
around the world, despite the coronavirus restrictions on public gatherings. The opposition of those with anti-
government animus is likely made more acute when the government response includes mobilizing large numbers
of people in uniform; in this regard, the deployment of the National Guard in several states in the USA can be
expected to particularly inflame anti-government extremists. Here is one instance where the present echoes
the past—during the 1918 influenza pandemic, an Anti-Mask League was formed in the United States, which
organized large public protests and reportedly even led some opponents of enforced mask-wearing to attempt
the bombing of a public official.[42] During the current pandemic, so-called Liberate activists have protested
widely in the United States against local or state shutdown orders, with one person espousing anti-government
animus arrested for threatening to kill New Mexico’s governor and another for allegedly threatening to blow
up the Orlando Police Department’s headquarters, both over the coronavirus restrictions.[43] Opposition to
coronavirus restrictions also seems to be stimulating emerging strands of far-right extremism, such as the
burgeoning “boogaloo” movement. Similar opposition has occurred in Europe.[44] This overall dynamic of
increased opposition to the state might intensify as the economic repercussions of the pandemic persist over
longer periods of time and the governments in many states fail to relinquish the enhanced emergency powers
they granted themselves during the pandemic.[45]
4. Inspiration for Apocalyptic-Millenarian Extremists

Rather than merely looking for opportunities to turn the pandemic to their advantage, a small percentage of
terrorists might actually be inspired by the spread of the virus and the death and disruption that it has left in its
wake. Among groups whose ideologies have a distinct apocalyptic or millenarian flavor, there are both those
who believe that they must merely passively prepare for the end and that no other actions on their part are
necessary, as well as the more dangerous sort who believe that when the time is right they must act to facilitate
or even initiate their version of Armageddon in order to secure salvation. These latter types, typified by groups
like Aum Shinrikyo and the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord, might regard the current global
pandemic as a portent of the prophesied end times or perhaps a sign of their deity’s wider displeasure with
humanity. The pandemic, which is evocative of biblical plagues and divine punishments, might then act as a
catalyst for these groups to initiate whatever long-term plans they have been hatching, some of which might
include violence against the public.[46] Within the current terrorist context, besides the stereotypical cults that
might have flown under the radar[47], other candidates for being galvanized into action by COVID-19 are the
most extreme elements of the radical environmentalist movement[48] and jihadists like ISIS, whose worldview
contains strains of millenarianism.[49]
5. Terrorists Working from Home

With widespread stay-at-home orders and extended disruption to normal societal operations, terrorists (just
like many of us) may be forced to operate from the confines of their own homes. Working with what they may
have available, and leveraging the currently augmented population of Internet users, we have already noted
increased propaganda efforts by extremists online. Beyond the uptick in the production and dissemination of
propaganda materials and enhanced recruitment efforts, however, terrorists might also utilize their “downtime”
to plan and coordinate future attacks. While there is no direct evidence of this occurring, it is plausible that
committed radicals will eschew binge-watching the latest Netflix series in favor of conducting any operational
preparations that they are able to. In today’s data-saturated environment, this could include a wide array of
electronic ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) activities, from evaluating potential targets using
Google Earth, and combing message boards to identify gaps in a target’s defenses to establishing Dark Web
channels by which to procure illicit materials that can be used in weapons. Such activities carry some risk of
detection or infiltration by authorities, but at the very least terrorists could utilize the time to improve their
technical and other skills, for example, by taking online chemistry or electronics courses to assist with bomb-
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making. Although the number of past attempts of terrorists attempting to launch high-impact cyberattacks has
been limited, the pandemic may also allow operational cadre to enhance their cyberattack abilities or even to
attempt attacks against targets of opportunity. Cybercrime has escalated in general during the pandemic[50],
with a significant increase in attempted ransomware attacks against critical response infrastructure like hospitals
and other medical services.[51] Rather than hold vital systems hostage for money, enterprising terrorists could
seek to disable or otherwise disrupt these systems and thus exacerbate the health impact of the pandemic.
6. Establishing Bioterrorism as a Viable Tactic

Much has been written about terrorist calculations for engaging in bioterrorism[52], with the general consensus
among experts being that only a relatively small subset of terrorists is willing and able to do so.[53] Within the
terrorist calculus, however, at least part of the motivation to pursue biological agents as weapons is based on
the consequences that such weapons are likely to have. These, in turn, are influenced to a large degree by the
vulnerability of the target society to infectious diseases in general.[54] The inability of even highly developed
countries to stop the spread of the virus and the often incoherent and delayed responses of authorities at all
levels have exposed the myriad weaknesses present in global public health systems. Such outcomes will not
go unnoticed by terrorist groups, who will remember these impacts when seeking new means to achieve their
goals. It must be remembered that a key strategy of terrorism is to inflict psychological damage on populations
as a means of coercion, usually through physical harm or the threat thereof. The societal disruption, economic
damage, and deaths caused by COVID-19 are a perfect script for the theatre of terrorism.
It is thus logical that for many terrorists, wherever their prior calculations for bioterrorism had ended up, the
vulnerabilities highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic have shifted these towards the more attractive end of
the scale.[55] For those terrorists who were near but not quite at the tipping point where they would actively
pursue bioterrorism, the pandemic might push them across the Rubicon. At the same time, the indiscriminate
nature of COVID-19, and the fact that it is affecting everyone irrespective of religion, ethnicity or citizenship,
might give other terrorists that only target specific populations pause, at least when it comes to utilizing
contagious pathogens. The potential increase in the likelihood of bioterrorism might therefore be restricted to
the more generally misanthropic terrorists or those espousing more transcendental ideologies.
7. Weaponizing COVID-19
While the majority of past cases of terrorists and other violent non-state actors attempting to use biological
agents to cause harm have involved noncontagious agents, like Bacillus anthracis and various biological toxins,
there have been roughly a dozen cases involving contagious pathogens according to the Profiles of Incidents
involving CBRN and Non-state Actors (POICN) Database.[56] Among the more prominent of these figure
plots by R.I.S.E., a small group who planned to use Salmonella typhi in 1972 as part of a plot to destroy the
world and repopulate it[57], as well as the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo, which attempted to collect
Ebola virus samples in Zaire during its “African Salvation Tour” in 1992.[58] In 1995, white supremacist Larry
Wayne Harris ordered vials of Yersinia pestis, the causative agent of bubonic and pneumonic plague,[59] and
in 2014 a laptop of a Tunisian linked to ISIS indicated an interest in weaponizing the same agent.[60] Recent
studies have suggested that intentionally disseminating dangerous pathogens by using one person to infect
others is certainly possible for perpetrators who are less concerned with their own safety.[61] It is therefore
not out of the question—particularly since it is so infectious and samples are readily accessible—that terrorists
might be drawn to considering using the SARS-CoV-2 virus as a weapon.
There are three possible scenarios in this regard. First, there are low-level threats of actual spreading of the virus
with little to no premeditation, usually as part of an emotional outburst or idiosyncratic behavior. There have
been multiple cases in the United States, as well as reports from the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Belgium,
Australia, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere of individuals claiming to have coronavirus intentionally and coughing
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or spitting on other people, licking products in stores, and similar behavior.[62] While not rising to the level of
behavior that academics generally attach to the term terrorism, at least in the United States some of these have
been prosecuted as cases of terrorism.[63]
The second scenario involves using the virus as part of a planned attack on specific ideological targets. In
this regard, the virus itself provides a relatively quick and easy way for terrorists to engage in “bioterrorism,”
since they can merely become infected and then purposely spread the virus. There have indeed been calls
amongst white nationalists and jihadists to do just this. Far-right groups using Telegram in the United States
have encouraged those of their followers who contract COVID-19 to spread the disease to law enforcement,
non-Whites and Jews, e.g., by spreading saliva on door handles at FBI offices[64] or synagogues.[65] At the
most repugnant end of this spectrum are calls to use COVID-19 against the Jews in what a sick joke of far-
right activists termed “Holocough”.[66] There have also been indicators among jihadists of similar tactics, such
as ISIS-linked networks in Indonesia reportedly calling on “infected followers to spread the coronavirus to
law enforcement officials”[67] and the arrest in Tunisia on April 16, 2020 of an alleged Islamist for plotting to
spread COVID-19 among security forces.[68]
The third scenario consists of perpetrators intentionally spreading the coronavirus in an indiscriminate
manner in order to prolong or reignite the pandemic on a large scale. At the moment, with the virus established
in almost every country worldwide, carrying through on such threats is unlikely to make an overwhelming
difference on the ground, although it could exacerbate infection rates in areas with low current exposure or
sideline some first responders. The main benefit for a terrorist group attempting such an act would thus be
largely rhetorical for now, and even this would be in some doubt as in many cases it would be difficult to verify
that the terrorists claiming the attack had actually carried it out as opposed to a natural social spreading of
the disease. It is important to note, however, that if current efforts to control the pandemic are successful and
within a few months the first wave subsides, the majority of the population will still be susceptible to the virus
and it will be relatively easy for extremists or other malcontents to initiate a second wave. Therefore, the actions
of terrorists in this regard become far more salient after the first wave of COVID-19 passes. Thankfully, the
window for launching such an attack is relatively small, as once a reliable vaccine is developed, this avenue of
bioterrorism is no longer viable.
8. Conventional Attacks during the Pandemic

Aside from areas of high instability, where the pandemic might provide attack opportunities because it draws
away security forces, many terrorists in more developed parts of the world will likely conclude that pandemic
times are not the best time to launch a major attack. In addition to the operational friction noted above, there
are strategic disincentives when the attention of the world is fixed firmly on the disease: it will be that much
more difficult to achieve a large publicity footprint.[69] After all, no politically motivated terrorist group worth
its salt wants to be relegated to the ninth or tenth headline in a news feed. At the same time, most traditional
targets of high civilian concentration, such as airports, subways and entertainment venues, are more or less
deserted, making it more advantageous for those terrorists seeking mass casualties to wait until the shutdowns
and restrictions have been lifted. Even then, it might be some time before the number of people frequenting
many soft targets like transportation hubs will recover to pre-pandemic levels.
There is one glaring exception, however, when it comes to medical facilities. These and related places where
victims of the coronavirus are being treated can provide both a concentration of casualties and high levels of
publicity were they to be attacked. This was ostensibly the case with Timothy Wilson, a white nationalist and
anti-government extremist who was killed in Missouri on March 24, 2020 after apparently planning to attack
a local hospital.[70] He had reportedly already been plotting an attack, but changed his target and his timing
following the outbreak of COVID-19, because the medical center apparently “offered more casualties”.[71]
Therefore, wherever the pandemic continues to result in large numbers of victims being treated in health care
facilities, particular attention should be paid to these venues.
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While these arguments might hold for mass-casualty operations, they are less applicable to smaller-scale
terrorist attacks, often carried out by so-called “lone wolves”. Jihadists have called upon their followers to
exploit the disruptions caused by the pandemic to launch attacks in the West.[72] Isolated examples of such
small-scale attacks have occurred, including, for example, the stabbing of several people on April 4, 2020 and
the injuring of three police officers by deliberate vehicle ramming on April 27, 2020 both in France and both
perpetrated by alleged jihadists.[73]
9. Less-Secure Facilities
COVID-19 will likely have an adverse effect on the security of many facilities. While those guarding high-value
targets in the West (such as government buildings) are usually designated as essential personnel and remain on
post during the pandemic, in other cases facilities might be left less secure than during normal undertakings.
This could be the result of limited operations, personnel being quarantined or falling ill, a psychologically
distracted workforce, or even, simply, reduced foot traffic by passersby. In addition to its implications for crime
and other malfeasance, this situation might have at least three consequences for terrorism.
First, with respect to carrying out attacks, although many areas operating with minimal personnel or visitors
might make less attractive targets for terrorists seeking a high body count, for those terrorists who specifically
seek fewer or no casualties (such as most animal rights extremists) or who have a penchant for symbolic targets
like national monuments or sacred spaces, the lower levels of security and general disruption might provide
them with increased opportunities to carry out a successful attack.
Second, enterprising terrorists might see lower facility security as an opportunity to acquire materials from
locations where they might otherwise not take the risk. Facilities of concern for theft during the pandemic
include weapons storage areas, chemical plants, and facilities that store nuclear, radiological or other hazardous
materials. At the same time, even legitimate purchases might become less risky for terrorists. For example, a store
clerk that ordinarily would notice and report an individual attempting to purchase large quantities of peroxide,
might miss such an attempt when they are anxious about their own exposure, and where every customer is
purchasing larger quantities of everyday items. Terrorists might realize this and make more attempts now than
at other times to purchase or steal raw materials that could be used to produce IEDs or other weapons.
Third, is the security of prisons and other detention areas. In its al-Naba newsletter on March 19, 2020, ISIS
encouraged its followers “to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic to free ‘Muslim prisoners’,” including its members
in Syrian prisons and detention camps.[74] It might not be much of a coincidence, then, that at Gwheran
Prison in northeastern Syria, there was a massive riot on March 30, 2020 during which several ISIS fighters
escaped.[75]
10. CT Distractions
Counterterrorism personnel are not immune to the physical or psychological effects and the social disruption
caused by the pandemic. At all levels, from intelligence analysts to law enforcement, counterterrorism personnel
have the potential, like any individual, to fall ill from the virus or experience its attendant psychological anxieties
and frustrations. At the very least, the ongoing situation will reduce capabilities and introduce friction into the
counterterrorism process (e.g., with analysts teleworking or suffering personal stresses), thus making it more
likely that a crucial warning indicator or piece of intelligence could fall through the cracks.
Potentially even more detrimental at a systemic level is that dealing with COVID-19 might draw resources
away from counterterrorism operations both at home and abroad, as personnel, money and other resources
are diverted to help combat the virus. We are already seeing potential ramifications of counterterrorism
distractions on an international scale, as large terrorist networks seek to exploit the gaps that COVID-19 has
opened on security. In the Horn of Africa, U.S. forces had declared a public health emergency in late April,
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steering international cooperation meetings originally intended for counterterrorism focus to combat al-
Shabaab into an effort against the presumably coming disease.[76] Also adjusting to the newest threat on the
horizon, INTERPOL has recently shifted its terrorism monitoring operations to a remote effort while some
French troops have been pulled back from West Africa, leaving the Sahel region more susceptible to attacks
and radicalization campaigns from regional affiliates of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and especially Boko Haram.[77] Iraq
has also suffered by the withdrawal of troops from several European countries as security attention and efforts
are redirected to combat the spreading of disease.[78]
Capitalizing on this distraction, multiple terrorist groups, and in particular ISIS, have explicitly called upon their
followers to carry out attacks on vulnerable opponents who have increasingly focused attention on COVID-19.
An expansion in ISIS-affiliated attacks across several continents was recorded following the publication of
the Islamic State’s March 19, 2020 edition of al-Naba, in which the group encouraged taking advantage of
the disruption caused by the coronavirus.[79] The month of April alone saw 110 incidents across Iraq, the
highest recorded figure of incidents since December 2019, as ISIS and other groups sought to target vulnerable
security forces.[80] Of note within this context is the report of a specific upsurge in attacks in Iraq following the
implementation of a long-term curfew.[81]
With the ongoing spread of the virus across the globe and the potential for a second and even third wave, national
and international coordination on counterterrorism might only be weakened over time. The extent to which
these immediate strains on counterterrorism activities will persist or intensify will depend on the duration
and extent of the progress of the disease. What is perhaps more problematic is that the long-term economic
damage brought about by the pandemic might curtail available resources to devote to counterterrorism for
several years. Governments that have seen their coffers emptied and their gross national product dwindle will
face difficult choices with respect to where they spend their diminished revenues and—notwithstanding a
genuine commitment to counterterrorism—might be forced into feeding their population and reinvigorating
their economies at the expense of defense spending, including funding for counterterrorism. Moreover,
recovery from the pandemic might suck all the proverbial air out of government policy for some time, leaving
an attention deficit that hampers interagency and international collaboration on counterterrorism.
Conclusions
A useful way to assess the various impacts and potential effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the terrorism
landscape is to parse them out temporally. In other words, to distinguish between those impacts that are likely
to be felt only in the short term during the current initial outbreak (likely not more than two to three months
from the time of writing), those likely to operate in the medium term (between the conclusion of the first wave
and the achievement of widespread immunity to the virus, likely at the earliest by spring 2021), and those that
are likely to manifest or persist into the longer term (up to several years from the time COVID-19 is conquered).
With respect to those effects that will largely be limited to the short term, these include all of the factors that
are directly related to the lockdowns and other restrictions put in place to reduce the contagion. First, the
diminution in terrorist capability and desire to launch large-scale attacks on many densely populated soft targets
will only persist while these targets are sparsely populated—as soon as the restrictions are lifted and normal
activities resume, both the friction and the disincentives will evaporate. On the positive side, from the point
of view of the counterterrorists, the added attractiveness of medical facilities as targets and the opportunities
to exploit lower security at certain facilities will also diminish. Some of the stresses underlying an increased
susceptibility to radicalization and the more trenchant opposition to government measures will also decrease,
as will several of the more direct distraction of security forces and diversion of counterterrorism resources. It
should be noted, however, that should there be a resurgence in the pandemic, with additional waves with high
numbers of infections, then all of these short-term effects will recur—and in terms of the psychological and
anti-government effects, these might even intensify.
As discussed above, the greatest danger from terrorists utilizing COVID-19 itself as a weapon will arise in the
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medium term, after the first wave is over. Several of the other factors are likely to continue to have an impact
in the medium term, although perhaps not as acutely as before. In particular, the economic fallout of the
pandemic might only begin to become clear once the initial crisis period has passed and will continue to cause
psychological stress and potentially anger against the government even when people can leave their homes and
return to more quotidian pursuits. Thus, some heightened susceptibility to radicalization and anti-government
attitudes will carry over into the medium term. For similar economic reasons, counterterrorism forces the
world over might also face shortfalls in resources during this period. Moreover, any apocalyptic-millenarian
groups that have been stirred by the pandemic might begin to activate their doomsday scripts during this
period.
It is during the longer term, however, that the pandemic is likely to have its greatest impact on the threat of
terrorism, for this is when many of the second-order effects of COVID-19 will begin to unfold. It is during
the years following the end of the pandemic, during what many project will be a lengthy economic stagnation
and recovery period, that the gains made through current terrorist efforts to radicalize, recruit and engage in
pro-social activities are likely to bear fruit. Large numbers of disillusioned and unemployed people, especially
youth, are often a boon for terrorist groups and the operational consequences of increased recruitment and
radicalization are likely to be felt then. It is also during this period that any terrorist group which has discovered
increased utility in the notion of biological agents as weapons is likely to put its newfound interest to the test.
Lastly, there is the danger that counterterrorism might fall lower on the agenda of many governments just as
these COVID-19-induced threats are manifesting.
Therefore, just as was the case with the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic, it is the structural changes resulting
from the pandemic that are likely to have the most significant effects on the future of terrorism.
While much of this discussion has been speculative, it should at the very least serve to place some of the
potential effects of COVID-19 on the radar and in a broader context. It is crucial that despite a possible decrease
in resources or attention, counterterrorism agencies the world over keep a sharp lookout for indicators that any
of these systemic risks are emerging.
About the Authors:

Gary A. Ackerman is Associate Professor of Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security and Cybersecurity at
the University at Albany (SUNY), where his research focuses on understanding how terrorists and other adversaries
make tactical, operational, and strategic decisions, particularly with regard to innovating their use of weapons
and tactics. Much of his work in this area is centered on the motivations and capabilities of non-state actors to
acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. In addition to his faculty position, he is
Associate Dean for Research and Laboratory Development, and the founding director of the Center for Advanced
Red Teaming (CART).
Hayley Peterson is currently a graduate student at the University at Albany (SUNY), where she is obtaining
a Master of Business Administration (MBA). She serves as a Research Assistant for the Center for Advanced
Red Teaming and recently graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security,
and Cybersecurity. Her research interests include red teaming, national security, military and defense policy, and
weapons of mass destruction.
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Notes
[1] Gage, Beverly, The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America in its First Age of Terror, New York: Oxford University Press
(2009).
[2] Avrich, Paul, Sacco and Vanzetti: The Anarchist Background, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1991); Senta, Antonio and
Sean Sayers, Luigi Galleani The Most Dangerous Anarchist in America, Chico, CA: AK Press (2019).
[3] Past examples of such groups are the Rajneeshees, the Covenant, Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, and certain remote factions
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or Sendero Luminoso. Current examples might include some factions of AQIM and Boko
Haram.
[4] Nicholson, Dylan, ‘COVID-19 an opportunity for terrorists or a threat to their existence’, Defence Connect, April 29, 2020; URL:
https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/5995-global-terror-and-covid-19.
[5] Davey, Graham, ‘Disgust: the disease-avoidance emotion and its dysfunctions’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences 366, 1583 (2011): pp. 3453-3465; Tybur, Joshua, Debra Lieberman, Robert Kurzban, and Peter DeScioli, ‘Disgust:
Evolved function and structure’, Psychological Review 120, 1 (2013): pp. 65-84; Woody, Sheila and Bethany Teachman, ‘Intersection
of disgust and fear: Normative and pathological views’, Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice 7, 3 (2000): pp. 291–311; Brady,
Robert and Jeffrey Lohr, ‘A behavioral test of contamination fear in excessive health anxiety’, Journal of Behavior Therapy and Exper-
imental Psychiatry 45, 1 (2014): pp. 122-127.
[6] Although the facts are not entirely clear, a potential real-world example of this can be seen in the arrest of Muhammad Masood,
a Pakistani doctor, on March 19, 2020 for attempting to provide material support to ISIS. He had originally intended to travel to
Syria via Amman, Jordan, but after Jordan closed its borders due to COVID-19, he was forced to find an alternate travel route,
which apparently allowed law enforcement to set a trap for him by dangling the prospect of passage on a cargo ship from Los
Angeles to Syria. See Department of Justice, ‘Pakistani Doctor Charged with Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIS’, (PRN
20-330) March 19, 2020; URL: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pakistani-doctor-charged-attempting-provide-material-support-isis.
[7] There have been some instances of attacks by radical individuals under lockdown conditions, such as the stabbing by a suspect-
ed jihadist of seven people in Romans-sur-Isère, France on April 4, 2020. See Marone, Francesco, ‘Terrorism and Counterterrorism
in a Time of Pandemic’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, May 15, 2020; URL: https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubbli-
cazione/terrorism-and-counterterrorism-time-pandemic-26165.
[8] Especially where such controls are weak, terrorists might still enjoy at least moderate freedom of action (as discussed later in
the text).
[9] Bellinger, Nisha and Kyle Kattelman, ‘How the coronavirus increases terrorism threats in the developing world’, The Con-
versation, May 26, 2020; URL: https://theconversation.com/how-the-coronavirus-increases-terrorism-threats-in-the-develop-
ing-world-137466.
[10] Asia-Pacific Foundation, ‘APF Analysis: Protecting Counter-Terrorism Funding in the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Era’, May 13,
2020; Clarke, Colin, ‘Yesterday’s Terrorists Are Today’s Public Health Providers’, Foreign Policy, April 8, 2020; URL: https://foreign-
policy.com/2020/04/08/terrorists-nonstate-ungoverned-health-providers-coronavirus-pandemic/.
[11] Perry, Tom and Laila Bassam, ‘Hezbollah deploys medics, hospitals against coronavirus in Lebanon,” Reuters, March 25, 2020;
URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-hezbollah/hezbollah-deploys-medics-hospitals-against-coronavi-
rus-in-lebanon-idUSKBN21C3R7; Hanna, Andrew, ‘What Islamists Are Doing and Saying on COVID-19 Crisis’, Wilson Center,
May 14, 2020; URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/what-islamists-are-doing-and-saying-covid-19-crisis; Clarke, Colin, op.
cit.
[12] Asia-Pacific Foundation, ‘APF Analysis: The Coronavirus (COVID-19) Impact on the ISIS Detention Camps in Syria’, April 27,
2020.
[13] Loadenthal, Michael, ‘The 2020 Pandemic and Its Effect on Anarchist Activity’, ISPI, May 15, 2020; URL: https://www.ispion-
line.it/it/pubblicazione/2020-pandemic-and-its-effect-anarchist-activity-26157.
[14] Kecmanovic, Jelena, ‘Pandemic anxiety is making us sleepless, forgetful and angry. Here are tips for coping’. The Washing-
ton Post, April 3, 2020; URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/wellness/anxiety-coronavirus-sleep-memory-anger-fo-
cus/2020/04/03/61dab1b0-75b9-11ea-85cb-8670579b863d_story.html.
[15] Taub, Amanda, ‘A New COVID-19 Crisis: Domestic Abuse Rises Worldwide’, The New York Times, April 6, 2020; URL: https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/world/coronavirus-domestic-violence.html; Bettinger-Lopez, Caroline and Alexandra Bro, ‘A Dou-
ble Pandemic: Domestic Violence in the Age of COVID-19’, Council on Foreign Relations, May 13, 2020; URL: https://www.cfr.org/
in-brief/double-pandemic-domestic-violence-age-covid-19; Panchal, Nirmita, Rabah Kamal, Kendal Orgera, Cynthia Cox, Rachel
Garfield, Liz Hamel, Cailey Muñana and Priya Chidamabaram, ‘The Implications of COVID-19 for Mental Health and Substance
ISSN 2334-3745 69 June 2020

Use’, KFF, April 21, 2020; URL: https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/the-implications-of-covid-19-for-mental-

health-and-substance-use/.
[16] There is substantial literature on how the need for cognitive closure and uncertainty interact to lead to greater discrimination
against, and distrust of, outgroups. See, for example, Brizi, Ambra, Lucia Mannetti and Arie Kruglanski, ‘The Closing of Open
Minds: Need for Closure Moderates the Impact of Uncertainty Salience on Outgroup Discrimination’, British Journal of Social Psy-
chology 55, 2 (2015); Orehek, Edward, Shira Fishman, Mark Dechesne, Bertjan Doosje, Arie Kruglanski, Angela Cole, Billie Saddler
and Tarra Jackson, ‘Need for Closure and the Social Response to Terrorism’, Basic and Applied Social Psychology 32, 4 (2010): pp.
279-290.
[17] McCauley, Clark and Sophia Moskalenko, ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism’, Terrorism
and Political Violence 20, 3 (2008): p. 419; Kruglanski, Arie, Michele Gelfand and Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Terrorism as means to an
end: How political violence bestows significance’, (In P. R. Shaver & M. Mikulincer (Eds.), Meaning, mortality, and choice: The social
psychology of existential concerns) American Psychological Association (2012): pp. 203-212; Kruglanski, Arie, Xiaoyan Chen, Mark
Dechesne, Shira Fishman and Edward Orehek, ‘Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest for Personal Signif-
icance’, Political Psychology 30, 3 (2009): pp. 331-357; Borum, Randy, Psychology of Terrorism, Tampa: University of South Florida
(2004); Wiktorowicz, Quintan, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington: Indiana University Press
(2004).
[18] Berkowitz, Leonard, ‘Frustration-aggression hypothesis: an examination and reformulation’, Psychological Bulletin 106, 1
(1989): pp. 59-73; Ciampi, David, ‘Developmental and motivational factors of transnational terrorists’, Forensic Examiner 14, 3
(2005): pp. 29-34.
[19] Pyszczynski, Tom, Abdolhossein Abdollahi, Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, Florette Cohen and David Weise, ‘Mortality
salience, martyrdom, and military might: the great Satan versus the axis of evil’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32, 4
(2006): pp. 525-537.
[20] Basit, Abdul, ‘The COVID-19 Pandemic: An Opportunity for Terrorist Groups?’ Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 12, 3
(2020): pp. 7-12.
[21] Pauwels, Annelies, ‘How Europe’s terrorists take advantage of the pandemic’, EUObserver, April 29, 2020; URL: https://euob-
server.com/opinion/148173.
[22] Bellinger, Nisha and Kyle Kattelman, op. cit.
[23] MEMRI, ‘The way forward—A word of advice on the coronavirus pandemic’, (In Al-Qaeda Central: COVID-19 Is Divine
Punishment For Sins Of Mankind; Muslims Must Repent, West Must Embrace Islam), March 31, 2020; URL: https://www.memri.
org/reports/al-qaeda-central-covid-19-divine-punishment-sins-mankind-muslims-must-repent-west-must; European Institute for
Counter Terrorism and Conflict Prevention, ‘COVID-19: Is Bioterrorism on the Rise Now?’; URL: https://www.eictp.eu/en/covid-
19-is-bioterrorism-on-the-rise-now/; Marone, Francesco, op. cit.; Stoian Karadeli, Andreea, ‘COVID-19 and Terrorist Groups’,
International Security and Defence Journal, June 2020; URL: https://euro-sd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESD_6-20-Eurosa-
tory-lo-res.pdf; Shehab, Hesham, ‘Islamist hate preacher warns Muslims to arm themselves amid coronavirus threats’, JNS, April 27,
2020; URL: https://www.jns.org/opinion/islamist-hate-preacher-warns-muslims-to-arm-themselves-amid-coronavirus-threats/.
[24] Hincks, Joseph, ‘With the World Busy Fighting COVID-19, Could ISIS Mount a Resurgence?’ Time, April 29, 2020; URL:
https://time.com/5828630/isis-coronavirus/.
[25] Coleman, Julie, ‘The Impact of Coronavirus on Terrorism in the Sahel’, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, April 16,
2020; URL: https://icct.nl/publication/the-impact-of-coronavirus-on-terrorism-in-the-sahel/.
[26] Community Security Trust, Coronavirus and the Plague of Antisemitism, London (2020).
[27] Kraut, Alan, ‘Immigration, Ethnicity, and the Pandemic’, Public Health Reports (2010).
[28] ADL, ‘White Supremacists Respond to Coronavirus With Violent Plots and Online Hate’, March 26, 2020; URL: https://lasve-
gas.adl.org/white-supremacists-respond-to-coronavirus-with-violent-plots-and-online-hate/.
[29] Mello Jr., John, ‘Far-Right Spreads COVID-19 Disinformation Epidemic Online’, TechNewsWorld, May 5, 2020; URL: https://
www.technewsworld.com/story/86648.html.
[30] Perrigo, Billy, ‘White Supremacist Groups Are Recruiting With Help From Coronavirus—and a Popular Messaging App’, Time,
April 8, 2020; URL: https://time.com/5817665/coronavirus-conspiracy-theories-white-supremacist-groups/.
[31] Silke, Andrew, ‘COVID–19 and terrorism: assessing the short-and long-term impacts’, May 5, 2020; URL: https://www.
poolre.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/COVID-19-and-Terrorsim-report-V1.pdf.
[32] Hincks, Joseph, op. cit.
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[33] Lederer, Edith, ‘UN chief: Extremists using COVID-19 to recruit online youths’, AP News, April 27, 2020; URL: https://apnews.
com/a6cf967c03f7ff00e170949a9eaeb11a.
[34] Dearden, Lizzie, ‘Coronavirus: Terror threat to hospitals as extremists call for attacks during lockdown’, Independent, April 21,
2020; URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/coronavirus-lockdown-hospitals-nhs-terror-threat-5g-conspi-
racy-theory-a9476066.html.
[35] See Wallach, Philip and Justus Myers, The federal government’s coronavirus response – Public health timeline, Brookings,
March 31, 2020; URL: https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-federal-governments-coronavirus-actions-and-failures-time-
line-and-themes/; Goodman, Ryan and Danielle Schulkin, ‘Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic and U.S. Response’, May 7, 2020;
URL: https://www.justsecurity.org/69650/timeline-of-the-coronavirus-pandemic-and-u-s-response/; Abuza, Zachary, ‘Explaining
Successful (and Unsuccessful) COVID-19 Responses in Southeast Asia’, The Diplomat, April 21, 2020; URL; https://thediplomat.
com/2020/04/explaining-successful-and-unsuccessful-covid-19-responses-in-southeast-asia/; Scheffer, David, ‘Is It a Crime to Mis-
handle A Public Health Response?’ Council on Foreign Relations, April 22, 2020; URL: https://www.cfr.org/article/it-crime-mishan-
dle-public-health-response.
[36] Blickle, Kristian, Pandemics Change Cities: Municipal Spending and Voter Extremism in Germany, 1918–1933, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York Staff Reports 921 (2020) [Prepublication Version]; URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/re-
search/staff_reports/sr921.pdf.
[37] This should not discount the role played by state actors in spreading disinformation about the virus, although this is not the
focus of the present discussion. See Schaub, Heiko, ‘The Role of State-Supported Disinformation in the Wake of COVID-19’, PRIO
Blogs, June 9, 2020; URL: https://blogs.prio.org/2020/06/the-role-of-state-supported-disinformation-in-the-wake-of-covid-19/, but
the focus here is on non-state extremists.
[38] Broderick, Ryan, ‘QAnon Supporters And Anti-Vaxxers Are Spreading A Hoax That Bill Gates Created The Coronavirus’,
BuzzFeed News, January 23, 2020; URL: https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/qanon-supporters-and-anti-vaxxers-
are-spreading-a-hoax-that;
ISD, “COVID-19 Disinformation Briefing No. 1,” March 27, 2020; URL: https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.
com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Briefing-Covid-19.pdf.
[39] Silke, Andrew, op. cit.
[40] See, for example, the blog ‘The Plague and The Fire’, URL: https://plagueandfire.noblogs.org/en/
[41] Department of Justice, ‘Train Operator at Port of Los Angeles Charged with Derailing Locomotive Near U.S. Navy’s Hospital
Ship Mercy’, (PRN 20-064) April 1, 2020; URL: https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/train-operator-port-los-angeles-charged-de-
railing-locomotive-near-us-navy-s-hospital; Neiwert, David, ‘Coronavirus conspiracy theorists are too nuts even for a zom-
bie-apocalypse movie scenario’, Daily Kos, April 3, 2020; URL: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2020/4/3/1933811/-Coronavi-
rus-conspiracy-theorists-are-too-nuts-even-for-a-zombie-apocalypse-movie-scenario; Silke, Andrew, op. cit.
[42] Lawrence Kane, Peter, ‘The Anti-Mask League: lockdown protests draw parallels to 1918 pandemic’, The Guardian, April 29,
2020; URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/29/coronavirus-pandemic-1918-protests-california; Clark, Dartunor-
ro, ‘’A breaking point’: Anti-lockdown efforts during Spanish flu offer a cautionary tale for coronavirus’ NBC News, May 11, 2020;
URL: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/breaking-point-anti-lockdown-efforts-during-spanish-flu-offer-caution-
ary-n1202111.
[43] Bertrand, Natasha, ‘DHS warns of increase in violent extremism amid coronavirus lockdowns’, POLITICO, April 23, 2020;
URL: https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/23/dhs-increase-in-coronavirus-inspired-violence-205221.
[44] Dickson, Caitlin, ‘A pandemic of conspiracy theories spreads across the internet and around the world’, Yahoo News, May
21, 2020; URL: https://www.yahoo.com/news/a-pandemic-of-conspiracy-theories-spreads-across-the-internet-and-around-the-
world-195903321.html.
[45] Loadenthal, Michael, op. cit.
[46] For more on the dangers of apocalyptic-millenarian terrorists, see Lifton, Robert, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum
Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism, New York: Metropolitan Books (2000); Stern, Jessica, The Ultimate
Terrorists, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1999).
[47] In the early 1990s, despite Aum Shinrikyo’s international activities involving efforts to develop CBRN weapons, its unprece-
dented resources and its virulent anti-Americanism, the cult was “not on anybody’s radar screen”. See Senate Government Affairs
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Minority Staff), ‘Hearings on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A
Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo’, October 31, 1995: p. 91.
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[48] ‘Contributions are urgently solicited for scientific research on a species-specific virus that will eliminate Homo shiticus from
the planet’. – Gula, “Eco-Kamikazes Wanted,” Earth First! Journal, Sept. 22, 1989: p. 21.
[49] Abdul Basit maintains that the COVID-19 pandemic “feeds into the apocalyptic, end-of-time narratives of ISIS” (Basit, Abdul,
op. cit., p. 8.). As an example of associated fantastical thinking, Abubakar Shekau, one of the leaders of Boko Haram, has declared
that true believers are protected from the virus and, consequently, he has denounced efforts to combat the virus. See Campbell,
John, ‘Boko Haram’s Shekau Labels Anti-COVID-19 Measures an Attack on Islam in Nigeria’, Council on Foreign Relations, April
17, 2020; URL: https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-harams-shekau-labels-anti-covid-19-measures-attack-islam-nigeria.
[50] Cimpanu, Catalin, ‘FBI says cybercrime reports quadrupled during COVID-19 pandemic’, ZDNet, April 18, 2020; URL:
https://www.zdnet.com/article/fbi-says-cybercrime-reports-quadrupled-during-covid-19-pandemic/.
[51] INTERPOL, ‘Cybercriminals targeting critical healthcare institutions with ransomware’, April 4, 2020; URL: https://www.inter-
pol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2020/Cybercriminals-targeting-critical-healthcare-institutions-with-ransomware.
[52] Ackerman, Gary and Kevin Moran, ‘Bioterrorism and Threat Assessment’, Paper #22 commissioned by the Weapons of
Mass Destruction Commission (The “Blix” Commission), Stockholm (2005): pp. 1-18; URL: http://docshare01.docshare.tips/
files/2791/27919768.pdf; Loeb, Cheryl, ‘Jihadists and Biological and Toxin Weapons’, (In Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett
(Eds.), Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction), Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press (2009): p. 59.
[53] Hoffmann, Bruce, ‘Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses’, The Nonproliferation Review 4, 3 (1997); Stern,
Jessica, op. cit.; Sprinzak, Ehud, ‘On Not Overstating the Problem’, (In Hype or Reality?: The “New Terrorism” and Mass Casualty
Attacks, ed. by Brad Roberts), Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute (2000); Tucker, Jonathan and Amy
Sands, ‘An Unlikely Threat’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, 4 (1999).
[54] Ackerman, Gary and Kevin Moran, op. cit., pp. 5-7.
[56] Binder, Markus and Gary Ackerman, ‘Pick Your POICN: Introducing the Profiles of Incidents involving CBRN and Non-state
Actors (POICN) Database’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism pp. 1-25 (2019).
[57] Carus, W. Seth, ‘R.I.S.E. (1972)’, (In Jonathan Tucker, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weap-
ons), Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press (2000).
[58] Kaplan, David, ‘Aum Shinrikyo (1995)’, (In Jonathan Tucker, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons), Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press (2000).
[59] Stern, Jessica, ‘Larry Wayne Harris (1998)’, (In Jonathan Tucker, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biolog-
ical Weapons), Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press (2000).
[60] Doornbos, Harald and Jenan Moussa, ‘Found: The Islamic State’s Terror Laptop of Doom’, Foreign Policy, August 28, 2014;
URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/28/found-the-islamic-states-terror-laptop-of-doom/.
[61] Pilch, Richard, ‘How to keep the new coronavirus from being used as a terrorist weapon’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
March 27, 2020; URL: https://thebulletin.org/2020/03/how-to-keep-the-new-coronavirus-from-being-used-as-a-terrorist-weap-
on/#.
[62] For examples, see Andrew, Scottie and Anna Sturla, ‘A grocery store threw out $35,000 in food that a woman intentionally
coughed on, sparking coronavirus fears, police said’, CNN, March 26, 2020; URL: https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/26/us/woman-
coughed-on-produce-trnd/index.html; Rice, Rachel, ‘Man charged after police say he licked items at Warrenton Walmart to mock
virus fears’, St. Louis Today, March 11, 2020; URL: https://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/coronavirus/man-charged-
after-police-say-he-licked-items-at-warrenton/article_2e9d0fc7-b21a-5ebc-a8e9-cc181f3f3934.html; Johncox, Cassidy, ‘Mt. Morris
man charged after attempting to infect others with COVID-19 at grocery store, police say’, ClickOnDetroit, March 28, 2020; URL:
https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2020/03/28/mt-morris-man-charged-with-multiple-felonies-after-claiming-to-have-
covid-19-attempting-to-infect-others-at-grocery-store/; WBTV, ‘Police look for Texas woman who says she’s spreading COVID-19’,
April 6, 2020; URL: https://www.wbtv.com/2020/04/06/police-look-texas-woman-who-says-shes-spreading-covid-/; Jorge, Kaylin,
‘Tennessee man facing terrorism charge after yelling he had COVID-19, coughing on people’, Fox 17, April 7, 2020; URL: https://
fox17.com/news/local/tennessee-man-facing-terrorism-charge-after-yelling-he-had-covid-19-coughing-on-people; Kaur, Harmeet,
‘A woman was arrested after licking $1,800 worth of grocery store items, police say’, CNN, April 9, 2020; URL: https://www.cnn.
com/2020/04/09/us/woman-licked-grocery-store-items-trnd/index.html; Kuriakose, Sabina, ‘2 men charged, accused of inten-
tionally coughing to threaten spread of coronavirus’, News 8, March 27, 2020; URL: https://www.wtnh.com/news/crime-news/2-
men-charged-accused-of-intentionally-coughing-to-threaten-spread-of-coronavirus/; BBC News, ‘Coronavirus: Man spat in faces
of police officers jailed’, April 21, 2020; URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-52368784; Курмашева,
Асем, “Жителя Алматы арестовали за плевок на кнопки лифта в многоэтажке,” апреля 12, 2020; URL: https://liter.kz/zhite-
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lya-almaty-arestovali-za-plevok-na/; Васильев, Андрей, “В Австралии арестована женщина, которая покашляла на офицера

полиции,” марш 28, 2020; URL: https://rg.ru/2020/03/28/v-avstralii-arestovana-zhenshchina-kotoraia-pokashliala-na-ofi-
cera-policii.html; Silke, Andrew, op. cit.
[63] LawZ, ‘DOJ Just Warned That Intentional Spread of COVID-19 Could Be Terrorism - What It Means’, March 26, 2020; URL:
https://lawandcrime.com/covid-19-pandemic/doj-just-warned-that-intentional-spread-of-covid-19-could-be-terrorism-what-it-
means/; Office of The Attorney General, ‘Man Charged with Terroristic Threats for Allegedly Coughing on Food Store Employee and
Telling Her He Has Coronavirus’, March 24, 2020; URL: https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases20/pr20200324b.html.
[64] Sheth, Sonam, ‘White supremacists discussed using COVID-19 as bioweapon, explosive internal document reveals’, Business
Insider, March 22, 2020; URL; https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-white-supremacists-discussed-using-covid-19-as-bio-
weapon-2020-3.
[65] Ong, Kyler and Nur Aziemah Azman, ‘Distinguishing Between the Extreme Far-right and IS’s Calls to Exploit COVID-19’,
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 12, 3 (2020): pp. 18-21.
[66] Community Security Trust, op. cit., p. 9.
[67] Ong, Kyler and Nur Aziemah Azman, op. cit., p. 20.
[68] Marone, Francesco, op. cit.
[69] Although we discussed this idea as early as April 16, 2020, it was subsequently echoed by Silke, Andrew, op. cit.
[70] Kosnar, Michael and Phil Helsel, ‘FBI says man killed in Missouri wanted to bomb hospital amid coronavirus epidemic’, NBC
News, March 25, 2020; URL: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fbi-says-man-killed-missouri-wanted-bomb-hospital-amid-
coronavirus-n1169166.
[71] Stephenson, Mercedes and Stewart Bell, ‘Violent extremists may exploit coronavirus pandemic, target hospitals, threat report
warns’, (citing the U.S. National Counterterrorism Centre April 1 Report), Global News, April 8, 2020; URL; https://globalnews.ca/
news/6795248/extremists-may-exploit-coronavirus-pandemic-threat-report/.
[72] Díaz, Itxu, ‘Islamic Terrorists Confront Coronavirus’, National Review, April 28, 2020; URL; https://www.nationalreview.
com/2020/04/coronavirus-pandemic-islamic-terrorists-confront-virus/.
[73] Marone, Francesco, op. cit.
2020; Esmaquel II, Paterno, ‘’Wrath of God’ vs ‘infidels’: Terrorists exploiting COVID-19’, Rappler, April 25, 2020; URL: https://
www.rappler.com/world/global-affairs/258988-terrorist-groups-exploiting-covid-19.
2020.
[76] Asia-Pacific Foundation, ‘APF Analysis: Protecting Counter-Terrorism Funding in the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Era’, May 13,
2020.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Salem, Kareem, ‘ISIS looks to prosper in a world distracted by the virus’, The Interpreter, April 24, 2020; URL; https://www.lowyinstitute.
org/the-interpreter/isis-looks-prosper-world-distracted-virus.
[80] Clarke, Colin, ‘Remember Us? Islamic State Stays Active During Coronavirus Pandemic’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, May
8, 2020; URL: https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/05/remember-us-islamic-state-stays-active-during-coronavirus-pandemic/.
[81] Lucente, Adam, ‘Islamic State steps up attacks in Iraq during coronavirus lockdown’, Al-Monitor, April 21, 2020; URL: https://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/is-attacks-iraq-coronavirus-lockdown.html.
ISSN 2334-3745 73 June 2020

Countering Terrorist Acts against Christian Places of Worship

by Katalin Pethő-Kiss
Abstract
Christian places of worship have been recurring targets for violent non-state actors since at least the late 1990s.
To reach a realistic understanding of this threat this Research Note has scrutinized a sample of 26 attacks, looking
at nine parameters. Important lessons can be drawn from incidents by looking at mortality rates, weapons used,
perpetrator motivations, preventative and reactive measures taken—including spontaneous defensive actions taken
by victims or bystanders. The objective of this Research Note is to identify specific security challenges Christian
communities face. Suggestions are made on how to enhance existing security arrangements and how to arrive at
a more effective security regime.
Keywords: Christian places of worship, soft targets, target hardening, religion
Introduction
Places of worship long and widely considered sacrosanct, have become attractive targets for terrorists. Between
1998 and 2019 there were 30 terrorist attacks targeting synagogues,[1] 482 on Muslim mosques,[2] seven
on Hindu temples[3] and 70 on Christian churches.[4] These acts of violence offer excellent opportunities
to inflict fear and cause a number of civilian casualties. As soft targets[5] religious sites with their spacious
layouts,[6] have vulnerabilities that can easily be exploited. As places with a large concentration of people but
with limited protective measures in place,[7] houses of worship can provide significant chances to maximize
casualties without the need for sophisticated planning and preparation. Additionally, attacks directed at houses
of worship receive wide media coverage, which is often the main objective of terrorists. By examining the
circumstances of violent acts on Christian churches, this Research Note aims to achieve a better understanding
of the threat.
With this in mind, this Research Note quantitatively assesses a number of attacks on Christian places of worship
that occurred between 1998 and 2019. Violent acts targeting individual religious leaders remain outside the
scope of this exploration. Information from the Global Terrorism Database (University of Maryland) has been
used to select cases. The main factor in selecting the examined 26 incidents was the availability of detailed-
enough information. No geographic restrictions[8] have been set for this Research Note. In an effort to better
understand the modus operandi of the perpetrators, the incidents were examined along nine dimensions, one
of these being the number of people killed.
Number of Fatalities
The first graph represents the number of fatalities in attacks on Christian houses of worship. When examining
the graph, the most apparent peak refers to the coordinated Islamic terrorist suicide bombings in Sri Lanka at
Easter time in April 2019, whereby 150 persons died at two Christian churches.
The number of victims varies according to several factors, including the level of sophistication of the attack
and prior surveillance, which can lead to a substantial increase in the number of casualties. Sequencing bomb
explosions, for instance, increases the level of fatalities. Ideology underpinning such violent acts also determines
how fatal an attack can be. Certain extremist groups content themselves with setting churches on fire while
others seek to kill worshippers.
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Number of Fatalities
200
150
100
50
0
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
The graph below provides a comparison between the number of fatalities in attacks on houses of worship and
those on a better-hardened target, namely police stations.[9] As can be seen, in 2009 the mortality rate in plots
against police stations increased dramatically. There may be various reasons for this. Firstly, this peak coincides
with the operational surge of Boko Haram (BH) and Tehrik-i-Taliban (TiP) in Nigeria and Pakistan. Both
groups were highly active between 2011 and 2015[10] and police stations were one of their primary targets.
Secondly, in most of these attacks the blast happened outside the police facilities (in front of the building or
targeting mobile police convoys), substantially diminishing the effect associated with the hardened nature
of such places. And thirdly, plots against police personnel have become highly attractive for various terrorist
groups that want to project an image of strength. In addition, undermining the capabilities of law enforcement
agencies increases feelings of public insecurity.
Number of Fatalities in Comparison

1000
500
0
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Attacks on religious sites Attacks on police facilities
Modus operandi, ideological background and the timing of incidents all play a role in determining the level of
fatalities, with Easter and Christmas being times requiring enhanced preparedness.
Typology of Attacks on Christian Sites

The first chart below distinguishes between attacks outside Christian religious sites (outdoor) and incidents
where perpetrators managed to force their way into a church (indoor). As the bar chart illustrates, outdoor
strikes make up the overwhelming majority of incidents. This indicates that most perpetrators tend to opt for
safer ways to attack by staying outside the place of worship, reducing the risk of being caught. It is less common
for an attacker to enter a church and confront the target audience at close quarters (e.g. with a bladed weapon).
[11]
Type of Attacks on Christian Houses of Worship, Part 1

30
20
20
10 6
0
Outdoor Indoor
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The next chart differentiates attacks on religious sites based on the perpetrators’ modus operandi. Bombing
was the most common practice. Various operational benefits of explosive devices explain this trend. Firstly,
it meets extremists’ operational objectives of drawing public attention, inducing fear and at the same time
causing mass casualties. Secondly, when deploying an IED controlled from a distance, perpetrators can ignore
the risks associated with entering the church. This does not apply for suicide bombings.[12] At the opposite
end of lethality are arson attacks.[13] All three arson incidents in the sample occurred in Northern Ireland and
were committed in pursuit of loyalist (Protestant) objectives.[14]
Attacks inside a church were driven by a range of presumed motives, including personal thirst for revenge, rage
(a sudden wave of emotions) or mental disorder. The latter was the case in St. Lucia, where the sanity of the
assailants were questioned in the subsequent criminal proceedings.[15] The assailant attacking churchgoers
with a sword in Yogyakarta turned out to be a lone wolf, who was striving to prove his commitment to jihadist
ideology after failing to become a member of ISIL.[16]
Type of Attacks on Christian Houses of Worship, Part 2

40
20
0
Facility attack/Arson Bombing/Explosion Armed assault
What emerges is that terrorists tend to prefer outdoor attacks. Therefore, the surrounding environment of places
of worship need to be integrated as well in security plans for religious sites. Since bombing was predominantly
chosen in the incidents analysed, it is highly advisable to raise the awareness of staff and congregations regarding
suspicious objects placed in or near churches and develop protocols for handling such incidents.
Weapons Used in the Attacks

Explosive devices are designed to destroy or damage structures and incapacitate people.[17] Due to the difficulty
to obtain military explosives, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have become the weapon of choice for most
terrorists. A wide variety of ingredients for the construction of IEDs are available. The commercial availability
of dual-use products, together with practical instructions on the Internet on how to construct explosive devices
substantially increase the prevalence of more or less primitive IEDs. Using an IED in an attack offers various
operational advantages for the offenders, including staying at some distance from the target while having
remote control of the device and its timing. In the following graph, a separate column has been created for pipe
bombs, as it is much easier to construct this type of IED. It indicates also that the perpetrator has a low level of
operational expertise. A fragmentation grenade is thrown by hand and therefore requires greater closeness to
the target audience.[18] Assaults involving firearms and bladed weapons were committed only in three out of
the 26 investigated incidents. As indicated above, Protestant extremists in Northern Ireland were responsible
for all three church arson incidents.[19] Their targeting clearly reflected the focus of their wrath.[20]
Weapons Used in the Attacks

20
10
0
IED Arson Fragmentation Firearms and Pipe bombs Sharp object
grenade grenade
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The weapons used in incidents reflect on both their technical capabilities and their ideologies. A better
understanding of arms acquisition constitutes an elemental factor in any risk assessment process. Taking
into consideration that IEDs were deployed in the vast majority of the 26 incidents examined, there is an
obvious need for training on detecting such devices. Signs left behind by the perpetrator can be identified with
developed observation skills.[21] Advanced detection techniques can assist in the identification of offenders
despite camouflage attempts. Pre-operational surveillance actions are usually crucial for perpetrators; at the
same time, these can be noticeable for observant churches’ staff.
Perpetrators and Their Motivations

Religious extremist ideologies motivated the majority of cases in our sample. In 14 out of the 26 incidents, a
designated Islamic terrorist group claimed responsibility for the attack. Islamic extremists not belonging to
a proscribed terrorist organization were the perpetrators in two other plots.[22] Other religious extremist
ideologies inspired only a very small number of attacks. While Protestants[23] used intentional violence in
three incidents, Hindu extremists and Rastas were responsible for one each.
Perpetrators
Unknown
Anarchist extremist
Other religious extremist
Hindu extremist
Protestant extremist
Islamic extremist
Designated terror group
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
It is notable here that in roughly 15% of the incidents perpetrators remain unknown. In these four cases there
were no fatalities and the damage to the churches caused by the blasts was minor.[24]
In the vast majority of the examined cases, the cause that motivated the terrorists was related to their ideological
and/or political objectives. Targeting Christian places of worship reflected sectarian violence,[25] Irish
nationalism,[26] Hindu extremism[27] and Islamic terrorism[28] as well as extremist ideologists of sects.[29]
There were, however, four cases when an individual claim—outside, or only partly related to a terrorist
organization’s political or ideological objective—provided the rationale for a plot. In these instances, special
claims (a demand for the release of jailed comrades,[30] perpetrators’ beliefs,[31] a search for a hiding
suspect[32] or an extortion demand[33]) constituted the reason for the acts. In the remaining two cases, lone
actors’ idiosyncratic claims[34] explain their motivation.
Motivation of the Perpetrators

20
15
10
5
0
Ideological or political Individual claims Unknown
objective
To better understand the risk posed by violent extremist groups, it is of great importance to know more about
the ideological objectives used to justify their actions. Exploring their ideological perspectives can help to
better evaluate certain rogue entities and determine the associated risk. Risk is contextual[35] and ideological
doctrines are essential components of this context. At the same time, scrutinizing prior attacks allows for a
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more accurate prediction of likely future violence, for a better identification of plausible attack scenarios as well
as for the development of more effective countermeasures.
Preventative Measures Taken
In the cases under consideration here, preventative actions were given particular attention only when there
had been prior attacks on the same church or when there was a warning of an impending threat that had been
communicated in advance. It is also notable, however, that in a considerable number of cases—regardless of a
prior warning signal or of advance intelligence—no preventive measures were taken to tighten security.
Preventative Measures Taken
No relevant information is available

Incidents where there were no preventative measures
taken regardless of prior warnings
Incidents where preventative measures were taken prior
to the incident
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
As the information in the chart below demonstrates, two-thirds of preventative measures put in place were
physical security-related actions (installed grilles, padlocks, reinforced glasses,[36] barriers,[37] having police
patrolling at the entrance of the church.[38]) There were only two incidents when the immediate threat of an
attack induced preparatory acts by the targeted congregation. In one of these cases priests took up 24/7 watch
positions so that they could immediately alarm authorities in case of an impending attack[39] and in the other
case, church services were rescheduled to outmanoeuvre the potential assailants.[40]
Nature of Preventative Measures Taken

5
0
Only physical security related preventative measures Physical and other preventative measures taken
Preventative measures serve to deter, detect or delay potential attacks. A proactive security concept should
not only involve physical security arrangements but also human vigilance. Preventative instruments and
mechanisms should be integrated into the security system around religious sites.
Reactive Measures Taken

Reactive actions can be examined with an eye on two aspects: temporal scope and personal scope. Half of
the response measures taken were meant to have only a short-term impact. Evacuating target churches,[41]
intensifying security with targeted patrols[42] and imposing 24-hour curfews and bag searches[43] were the
most common initiatives taken after an attack. Their aim was to reduce the chance of a second blast, manage
the crisis situation and thereby diminish other, potential harmful consequences; but they were not intended to
involve new security arrangements.
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Temporal Scope of Reactive Measures Taken
Short term Medium term Long term
It was exceptional for medium-term impact measures to be introduced. In the three cases where this occurred,
the ultimate goal of the initiatives was to control the tense local situation, but not to address the root causes of
the phenomenon. Cancelling religious events[44] served to diminish the short-term risk of a confrontation.
Importantly, these measures did not intend to strategically address the threat of a similar attack occurring in
the future.
Another observation is that only the most recent incidents (2015–2019) induced national-level strategic
responses to attacks against Christian communities. Efforts aiming to tighten the security of churches,[45]
exploring ways to increase public safety during services,[46] articulating the need to address radicalization,[47]
programs for firearm control[48] and imposing immigration restrictions to prevent the entry of foreign terrorist
elements[49]—all these intended to address the threat from a broader perspective.
Reactive measures were imposed in 15 out of the 26 examined incidents. As the table below indicates, most
frequently local security agencies were the addressees of these responsive actions.
Entities Processing the Reactive Measures Taken

Incident number 1 6 11 13 14 15 16 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Local security
X X X X X X X X X X X
agencies
National-level
security agencies
X X X X X
Local Christian
community X X X X X X
From the above it follows that not only preventive measures, but also the response to acts of violence should
be addressed in emergency security plans. Such arrangements ought to be determined in accordance with the
outcome of periodic risk assessments. The effectiveness of crisis management operations can be enhanced by
having protocols for communication with emergency services in place. These should be refreshed and updated
by regular joint exercises with local law enforcement entities to reduce the reaction time.
Spontaneous Self-Defence by Victims and Bystanders

Spontaneous self-defence actions by victims or bystanders were noted in only four out of the 26 incidents.
Obviously, an attacker’s modus operandi substantially determines whether there is any chance for such reactions.
In case of a remotely controlled explosion, for instance, it is highly unlikely that the injured victim or bystander
can intervene in a meaningful way. In two of the cases investigated, people at the crime scene attempted to
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bring the set fires under control.[50] In another incident, victims took actions to defend themselves and their
family members when an assailant equipped with a sword was attacking people in the St. Lidwina Catholic
Church, in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.[51] Only in one case did bystanders confront attackers to restrain them.[52]
Spontaneous Self-Defense Operations by Victims and Bystanders
Incidents where there were spontaneous self-defense operations by victims or bystanders
No relevant information available
Community outreach programs can increase situational awareness among the public. Once members of a
congregation or other local residents have received training on applicable protocols in case of a terrorist attack,
the fear and panic that such incidents aim to induce will be arguably less.
Conclusion
This Research Note has sought to bring a better understanding to the threat posed by violent non-state actors
to Christian houses of worship. By analysing 26 incidents, some countermeasures can be suggested.
In an effort to harden the soft-target nature of religious sites, a first step is to develop and cultivate a security-
oriented mindset.[53] To be able to develop a sound security plan, a risk-based approach is needed.[54] The
development of a comprehensive threat landscape exploration[55] is a prerequisite for the identification and
prioritization of risks. To do so, information and intelligence from various sources should be brought together.
Stakeholder partnerships and lessons learned from past incidents are of paramount importance. Any threat
analysis should keep pace with the evolving nature of threats and with new risks linked to emerging technologies.
[56] Therefore, risks should be reassessed periodically, especially with regard to high-profile religious events
(Easter, Christmas). Ultimately, risk management must be based on the results of consecutive rounds of risk
assessments.
Idiosyncrasies of a place of worship need to be taken into account when designing a security system. In line
with this, concentric circles of defence[57] are to be created to find a delicate balance between the inherently
open nature of such places and the need for an enhanced level of security.[58] Applying a combination of
multiple security measures in a defence-in-depth model[59] ensures that an attacker who manages to penetrate
one layer of defence may still be intercepted by a subsequent layer. Gathering intelligence from all sources is a
first step. Engaging in proactive security measures such as installing surveillance cameras and having security
officers in place constitutes a second defensive layer. Bearing in mind that most of the attacks on Christian
places of worship occurred outside the churches, the direct environment of places of worship must be given
particular attention.
Identifying and locating suspicious activities and objects through detection forms the third defensive layer.
Taking into account that bombing has been the most common mode of operation, teaching personnel how
to recognize and handle a suspected explosive device is vital. In the same vein, it is important to establish
appropriate physical security measures to prevent the planting of an explosive device. For instance, trash bins
on the premises should be kept locked, parked cars should be kept at a safe distance, and plants and trees
should be trimmed to make the placing of explosives more difficult.[60] Similarly, assuming that perpetrators
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engage in preoperational surveillance operations, an efficient CCTV system ought to be in place.

Defensive layers ought to make an intruder’s entry more difficult and, to the extent that these are visible, also
act as a deterrent since these give the appearance of a secured facility. Since in a traditional religious service all
worshippers face the altar, it is necessary to ensure that the entrance in their back is always under surveillance.
Innovations provided by new and emerging technologies[61] should be applied in target-hardening efforts. It
is, however, not enough to install an integrated security system; its operation should be regularly maintained
and fine-tuned in line with changing threat levels. It must also be kept in mind that physical security
measures require well-trained staff who are able to operate technical defence mechanisms professionally.[62]
Implementing extensive security measures, however, presumes the availability of a corresponding financial
budget. To reduce budgetary constraints,[63] there is a need to find appropriate funding for maintaining and
upgrading security measures.[64] This can be addressed, at least in part, with the mobilization of volunteers as
in the ‘Church Watch Programs’[65] designed to improve a congregation’s safety and security.[66]
Additional active security measures need to be in place should the first layers of defence fail to prevent or
deter attacks on a church. Security plans should entail actions not only to thwart a plot but also to minimize
the potential consequences of a completed attack. In line with this, action plans should define the role of the
emergency response team, and involve procedures for evacuating the building as well as for crisis communication
with the respective authorities. And lastly, a well-structured training program should raise security personnel’s
and churchgoers’ awareness on the features of any newly adopted security strategy.[67]
Unfortunately, in many cases perpetrators are unlikely to encounter much resistance. This is because, on one
hand, places of worship generally do not have the capacity to strike back on attackers[68] and, on the other hand,
government agencies will rarely have the capacity to ensure the constant security for all places of worship.[69]
With this in mind, the protection of Christian places of worship is a “shared responsibility”.[70] Developing
strong, collaborative working relationships among all stakeholders can reduce the risk of an attack.[71]
Regular consulting between operators of religious sites and local police will enhance security.[72] Organizing
joint training sessions and engaging in scenario-based exercises (including red teaming)[73] can equip the
security personnel of religious sites with relevant skills, gauge their crisis readiness and help identify existing
operational gaps in their security systems. To resolve budgetary constraints for upgrading existing security
arrangements, building liaisons with law enforcement agencies can also provide information for religious
sites on grants they might be eligible for. Establishing communication channels with emergency services can
considerably improve timely reporting of an attack. Local police can improve crisis management capabilities by
gaining familiarity with the in-house security arrangements of local religious communities.[74] It is, however,
of great importance to emphasize that measures taken by private entities to tighten the security of soft targets
should complement and never substitute official security arrangements by law enforcement agencies.[75]
Involving the public in efforts to enhance security is another building block to enhance security. For this, the
observational skills and the security consciousness of the public in general and the churchgoers in particular
need to be developed.[76] Community outreach programs and initiatives encouraging greater engagement of
churchgoers can ensure a better situational awareness as well as inform individuals on protocols on how to
promptly report noticed suspicious activities.[77] Accordingly, besides staying vigilant it is also important to
embed the habit of “say something if you see something.”[78] It is important to stress that enhancing a culture
of security awareness[79] should not make people fearful and paranoid, but should make them resilient. Being
prepared and trained to handle a terrorist attack on a religious institution should in the end decrease the panic
an attack can trigger.
In addition, one should broaden the scope of public-private partnerships with other religious communities.
Inter-faith dialogue between the top of religious hierarchies can also contribute to building trust between
Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus and other religions, thereby reducing polarization at the bottom. The
necessity of strengthening the security features of places of worship has already been stressed by leaders of
various faith communities. Several public safety programs[80] seek to prevent violent attacks on places of
worship. Therefore, it is highly advisable to consult with other religious communities and learn about their
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protection efforts and the challenges they face.
About the Author: Katalin Pethő-Kiss is former deputy head of the Central European CBRNE-Training Centre
in Budapest. Previously, she worked at the law desk of the Hungarian Europol National Unit, being responsible for
terrorism and violent extremism-related tasks, with a special focus on explosives and CBRN. She has completed her
Master of Research Studies in Policing, Intelligence and Countering Terrorism at Macquarie University (Australia),
being a recipient of an Endeavour Scholarship. While in Sydney, she was assessing risks of CBRN terrorism and
comparing Australian and EU legislation in this area. Currently she works as a Senior Analyst at the Hungarian
Counter Terrorism Information and Criminal Analysis Centre.
Notes
[1] Attacks occurred in Latvia, Russia, Iraq, South Africa, Germany, France, Tunisia, Turkey, United States, Australia, Norway,
Belgium, Israel, Denmark and Brazil. Sources for this information: The Global Terrorism Database (START, University of
Maryland), Daniel Koehler (2019) ‘The Halle, Germany, Synagogue Attack and the Evolution of the Far-Right Terror Threat’, CTC
Sentinel, Volume 12, Issue 11, pp. 14-21, URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/halle-germany-synagogue-attack-evolution-far-right-terror-
threat/ and Chas Danner (2019) ’What WE Know About the Southern California Synagogue Shooting’, Intelligencer, 28 April, 2019,
URL: https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/04/what-we-know-about-the-california-synagogue-shooting.html
[2] Attack occurred in Algeria, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, India, Iran, Sudan, Argentina,
Afghanistan, Macedonia, United Kingdom, Australia, Fiji, South Africa, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Netherlands, Philippines, Iraq,
Thailand, Sri Lanka, United States, Somalia, Germany, Yemen, Nepal, France, Yemen, Lebanon, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Libya, Kenya,
Syria, Bahrain, Egypt, Central African Republic, Turkey, South Sudan, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Canada, Ethiopia, Cyprus, Russia, Spain, Tanzania, Cameroon, Central African Republic, New Zealand, and Norway. Sources for
this information: The Global Terrorism Database (START, University of Maryland), ‘Christchurch shootings: Mosque attacker
charged with terrorism,’ BBC, 21 May 2019, URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48346786 and Henrik Pryser Libell
(2019) ‘Norway Police Investigate Mosque Attack as Attempted “Act of Terrorism”,’ The New York Times, 11 August 2019, URL:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/11/world/europe/norway-mosque-attack-terrorism.html
[3] Attack occurred in Sri Lanka and India. Sources for this information: The Global Terrorism Database (START, University of
Maryland) and ‘Delhi temple attack: HC says “no” to plea for SIT probe,’ The Hindu, 5 July 2019, URL: https://www.thehindu.com/
news/cities/Delhi/delhi-temple-attack-hc-says-no-to-plea-for-sit-probe/article28294588.ece
[4] Attack occurred in United Kingdom, Yemen, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pakistan, Italy, Philippines, India, St. Lucia, Bangladesh,
Venezuela, Iraq, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Kenya, United States, Central African Republic, Indonesia,
Jamaica, Latvia, Turkey, Nepal, Australia, Chile, and Sri Lanka. Sources for this information: The Global Terrorism Database
(START, University of Maryland) and ‘Sri Lanka attacks: Easter Sunday bombing marked one year on,’ BBC, 21 April 2020, URL:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52357200
[5] Soft Target Protection Institute (2016), ‘Basics of soft target protection—guidelines (2nd version)’, URL: https://mail.google.
com/mail/ca/u/1/#inbox/KtbxLvHcJtBwVnwhPjPngSspcHSLLxZcSB?projector=1&messagePartId=0.8
[6] Moeller, Hans Mathias (2016), ‘Why Soft target terrorist attacks will remain a threat?’ Global Risk Insights, URL: https://
globalriskinsights.com/2016/07/soft-target-terrorist-attacks/
[7] Karlos, V., Larcher M., Solomos G. (2018), ‘Review on soft target/public space protection guidance’, JRS Science for Policy
Report, 2018, 2nd Edition, URL: https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC110885/soft_target-public_space_
protection_guidance.pdf
[8] Attack occurred in Central African Republic, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
[9] Religious sites are only one type of soft targets, therefore to be able to compare fatality rates of plots against soft and hardened
targets, a specific type of a so-called hardened spot (police station) has been chosen for the analysis. To ensure a consistent
comparison between incidents on houses of worship and police-related facilities, the same basic criteria have been used for both
types of targets during the same time period (1998–2018) in the same countries (Central African Republic, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States) committed against
government, military and police targets by the same perpetrator groups (Loyalist Volunteer Forces (LVF), International Solidarity,
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jemaah Islamiya (JI), Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISSN 2334-3745 82 June 2020

(ISIL), Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Union for Peace in Central Africa (UPC). The Global Terrorism Database (START,
University of Maryland) provided the incident data for this analysis.
[10] Boko Haram continuously improved its operational capabilities and was highly active under Abubakar Shekau’s leadership.
On March 7 2015, Boko Haram’s leader entered into an alliance with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, reconstituting itself
as the Islamic State in West Africa. (Chandler, Adam (2015) ‘The Islamic State of Boko Haram?’ The Atlantic, URL: https://www.
theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/boko-haram-pledges-allegiance-islamic-state/387235/). In 2014, TiP’s organization
was fractured and most of the partaking groups pledged their alliance with the Islamic State. (‘Pakistan Taliban sack spokesman
Shahidullah Shahid for IS vow,’ BBC, October 21, 2014, URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29640242)
[11] ‘St. Lucia Church Assailants Contend They Were Fighting Corruption’, The Washington Post, URL: https://www.
washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/01/02/st-lucia-church-assailants-contend-they-were-fighting-corruption/181fb5a9-
738c-4b28-9949-78d1e27ada9c/; ‘Man attacks churchgoers at St. Lidwina church in Yogyakarta’, The Jakarta Post, February 11,
2018, URL: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/02/11/man-attacks-churchgoers-at-st-lidwina-church-in-yogyakarta.html
[12] Horowitz, Michael C. (2015) ‘The Rise and Spread of Suicide Bombing’, Annual Review of Political Science, 18:69-84; URL:
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-polisci-062813-051049
[13] Kocsis, Richard (2002) ‘Arson: Exploring Motives and Possible Solutions’, Australian Institute of Criminology, Trend and Issues
in Crime and Criminal Justice, no. 236, p. 3; URL: https://aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/tandi236
[14] ‘Who are the Loyalist Volunteer Force?’, BBC, September 14, 2010, URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-
ireland-11164817 ; ‘The Parish enters the new Millenium’ (2000) URL: https://www.ballymenaparish.org/parish-history-1798-2000/
parish/2000?format=pdf; CAIN Web Service, ‘A Draft Chronology of the Conflict’, URL: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/chron/
ch01.htm
[15] ‘Two St. Lucian Rastafarians plead guilty in fatal church attack’, Jamaica Observer, February 5, 2013, URL: http://www.
jamaicaobserver.com/news/Two-St-Lucian-rastafarians-plead-guilty-in-fatal-church-attack&template=MobileArticle
[16] Widiastuti, Rina, ‘Suliyono, Penyerang Gereja St Liddwina Pernah Coba Pergi ke Suriah’, Tempo.co, February 13, 2018; URL:
https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1060166/suliyono-penyerang-gereja-st-lidwina-pernah-coba-pergi-ke-suriah/full&view=ok .
[17] Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation (2008) ‘Potential Terrorist Attack Methods Joint Special Assessment’,
National Security Archive, pp. 30-34; URL: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb388/docs/EBB015.pdf
[18] Stewart, Scott (2013) ‘The Role of Improvised Explosive Devices in Terrorism’; in: Stratfor, URL: https://worldview.stratfor.
com/article/role-improvised-explosive-devices-terrorism
[19] Fields, R. Douglas (2018) ‘Inside the Mind of an Arsonist’, Psychology Today, URL: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/
the-new-brain/201811/inside-the-mind-arsonist
[20] ‘Inside an Arsonist’s Mind’, Officer, November 19, 2007, Officer, URL: https://www.officer.com/home/article/10249289/inside-
an-arsonists-mind
[21] United States Marine Corps ‘Improvised explosive device (IED) B3L0487XQ-DM Student Handout’, Marines, URL: https://
www.trngcmd.marines.mil/Portals/207/Docs/TBS/B3L0487XQ-DM%20Improvised%20Explosive%20Device.pdf?ve
[22] ‘Man attacks churchgoers at St. Lidwina church in Yogyakarta’, Jakarta Post, February 11, 2018, URL: https://www.
thejakartapost.com/news/2018/02/11/man-attacks-churchgoers-at-st-lidwina-church-in-yogyakarta.html; ‘2019 Sri Lanka Easter
Bombings’; Wikipedia, URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Sri_Lanka_Easter_bombings
[23] ‘Blamed for arson attacks’, Republican News, October, 2015; URL: https://republican-news.org/current/news/2015/10/
lvf_blamed_for_arson_attacks.html; ‘The Parish enters the new Millennium’ (2000) URL: https://www.ballymenaparish.org/parish-
history-1798-2000/parish/2000?format=pdf
[24] ‘Bombe davanti a due chiese suora ferita nel padovano’, La Repubblica, January 4, 2010; URL: https://www.repubblica.it/online/
cronaca/bombechiesa/bombechiesa/bombechiesa.html?refresh_ce; ‘Pipe bomb parts found near church’, The Irish Times, February
1, 2013, URL: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/pipe-bomb-parts-found-near-church-1.1043664
[25] ‘Anti-Catholic protests rekindled in Ballymena’, Irish Times, July 24, 2000; URL: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/anti-
catholic-protests-rekindled-in-ballymena-1.295799?mode=print&ot=example.AjaxPageLayout.ot
[26] Clarity, James F. (1998) ‘Arsonists Burn 10 Catholic Churches in Ulster’, The New York Times, July 3, 1998; URL: https://www.
nytimes.com/1998/07/03/world/arsonists-burn-10-catholic-churches-in-ulster.html
[27] D’Silva, Margaret Usha (2004), ‘Fear and religious strife: some thoughts on the church bombings in India’, Intercultural
Communication Studies, XIII:2, URL: https://web.uri.edu/iaics/files/07marg.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745 83 June 2020

[28] ‘Bombs target Indonesian churches,’ BBC, December 25, 2000, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1086275.stm
[29] ‘Maiduguri: Nigeria arrests for “Boko Haram” attacks’, BBC, June 10, 2011, URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-13724349; Abrak, Isaac (2012) ‘Nigeria church bombing kill 19, spark reprisals’, June 17, 2012, URL: https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-nigeria-violence/nigeria-church-bombings-kill-19-spark-reprisals-idUSBRE85G0CR20120617
[30] ‘Terrorists strike’, The Guardian, December 19, 2000. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/dec/19/rorycarroll
[31] ‘St. Lucia Church Assailants Contend They Were Fighting Corruption’, The Washington Post, URL: https://www.
washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/01/02/st-lucia-church-assailants-contend-they-were-fighting-corruption/181fb5a9-
738c-4b28-9949-78d1e27ada9c/
[32] ‘Updated timeline of Boko Haram attacks and related violence’, The New Humanitarian, December 12, 2013, URL: http://www.
thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2013/12/12/updated-timeline-boko-haram-attacks-and-related-violence
[33] ‘Bomb explodes outside Catholic church in Basilan,’ The Manila Times, February 28, 2015, URL: https://www.manilatimes.
net/2015/02/28/news/regions/bomb-explodes-outside-catholic-church-in-basilan/166259/
[34] ‘Turkey: increased intimidation of Christians, including bomb scare at Trabzon church’, Middle East Concern, February 5,
2018, URL: https://www.meconcern.org/2018/02/05/turkey-increased-intimidation-of-christians-including-bomb-scare-at-
trabzon-church/; ‘Man attacks churchgoers at St. Lidwina church in Yogyakarta’, The Jakarta Post, February 11, 2018, URL: https://
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/02/11/man-attacks-churchgoers-at-st-lidwina-church-in-yogyakarta.html
[35] S. D., Hart (1998), ‘The role of psychopathology in assessing the risk of violence: conceptual and methodological issues’, Legal
and Criminological Psychology, 3, pp. 123-140.
[36] ‘Anti-Catholic protests rekindled in Ballymena’, Irish Times, July 24, 2000, URL: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/anti-
catholic-protests-rekindled-in-ballymena-1.295799?mode=print&ot=example.AjaxPageLayout.ot
[37] ‘Suicide Bomber Kills 2 at Nigeria Church,’ Voice of America, September 23, 2012, URL: https://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-
news/2012/09/23/suicide-bomber-kills-2-at-nigeria-church-2/
[38] ‘Red Cross: Kenya church attacks kill 17 near Somali border’, CNN, July 1, 2012, URL: https://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/01/
world/africa/kenya-explosions/index.html
[39] Sloan, Stephen and Anderson Sean K. (2009) ‘Historical Dictionary of Terrorism Third Edition’ (The Scarecrow Press), p. 403.
[40] Minchakpu, Obed (2011) ‘Churches in Nigeria shuttered, massive assault feared’, God Reports, July 14, 2011, URL: http://
godreports.com/2011/07/churches-in-nigeria-shuttered-massive-assault-feared/
[41] ‘Bombs Rock Indonesia Christmas Celebrations’, ABC News, January 6, 2006, URL: https://abcnews.go.com/International/
story?id=81856&page=1
[42] Garcia, Bong (2010) ‘Grenade explodes outside Jolo church’, Sun Star Philippines, May 21, 2010; URL: https://www.sunstar.
com.ph/article/195067
[43] Abrak, Isaac (2012) ‘Nigeria church bombings kill 19, spark reprisals’, Reuters, June 17, 2012; URL: https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-nigeria-violence/nigeria-church-bombings-kill-19-spark-reprisals-idUSBRE85G0CR20120617
[44] ‘Loyalists attack Catholic homes and churches’, The Irish Times, July 8, 1998; URL: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/loyalists-
attack-catholic-homes-and-churches-1.170886
[45] ‘Two blasts at Lahore churches claim 15 lives’, GEO News, March 15, 2015; URL: https://www.geo.tv/latest/98175-two-blasts-
at-lahore-churches-claim-15-lives
[46] Ulloa, Sylvia D. (2015) ‘Las Cruces church bomb investigation stalls’, Cincinnati, August 25, 2015; URL: https://eu.cincinnati.
com/story/news/local/2015/08/25/las-cruces-church-bomb-investigation-stalls/32331877/
[47] ‘Elderly Dutch priest among four injured in sword attack’, UCA News, February 13, 2018; URL: https://www.ucanews.org/
news/elderly-dutch-priest-among-four-injured-in-sword-attack/81516
[48] Ranada, Pia (2019) ‘Crackdown on firearms, private armies a priority for Bangsamoro gov’t—Murad’, Rappler, January 28,
2019; URL: https://www.rappler.com/nation/222105-crackdown-firearms-private-armies-priority-bangsamoro-government
[49] ‘ISIS claims double bomb attack on Philippines church that killed at least 18’, The Defense Post, January 27, 2019; URL: https://
thedefensepost.com/2019/01/27/philippines-isis-claims-double-suicide-bomb-attack-cathedral-jolo-sulu/
[50] Sloan, Stephen and Anderson, Sean K. (2009) ‘Historical Dictionary of Terrorism Third Edition’ (The Scarecrow Press), p. 403.;
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CAIN Web Service, ‘A Draft Chronology of the Conflict’; URL: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch01.htm
[51] Chan, Francis (2018), ‘Sword-wielding attacker in Yogyakarta church shot by police’, The Straits Times, February 11, 2018,
URL: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/knife-wielding-attacker-wounds-four-church-goers-in-indonesia-police
[52] Fineman, Mark (2001), ‘Attack Points to ‘Lethal’ Mix of Religion, Rebellion, Drugs’, Los Angeles Times, January 7, 2001; URL:
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-jan-07-mn-9428-story.html
[53] ‘Protecting Your House of Worship from the Threat of Terrorism’, Ministry Advantage; URL: https://ministryadvantage.net/
protecting-your-house-of-worship-from-the-threat-of-terrorism/
[54] US DHS (2018) ‘Soft Targets and Crowded Places Security Plan Overview,’ p. 11; URL: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publica tions/DHS-Soft-Target-Crowded-Place-SecurityPlan-Overview-052018-508_0.pdf
[55] CJ Lindgren, ‘Biosecurity policy and the use of geospatial predictive tools to address invasive plants: updating the risk analysis
toolbox’; Risk Analysis, 2011 32(1), pp. 9–15.
[56] Global Counterterrorism Forum, ‘The GCTF Soft Target Protection Initiative—Antalya Memorandum on the Protection
of Soft Targets in a Counterterrorism Context, p. 4; URL: https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Links/Meetings/2017/
Twelfth%20GCTF%20Coordinating%20Committee%20Meeting/GCTF%20-%20Antalya%20Memorandum%20on%20the%20
Protection%20of%20Soft%20Targets%20in%20a%20Counterterrorism%20Context.pdf?ver=2017-09-17-010844-720
[57] RJ Wallace and JM Loffi, ‘Examining Unmanned Aerial System Threats & Defenses: A Conceptual Analysis’, in International
Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, 2015, 2(4). https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2015.1084
[58] William C. Carcara, (2009) ‘Advising Houses of Worship on a Comprehensive and Balanced Security Plan’ in Police Chief
Magazine, July: 54, p. 1.
[59] Sean Barnum, Michael Gegick, CC Michael, (2005) ‘“Defense in Depth,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.’
URL: https://www.us-cert.gov/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/defense-in-depth
[60] Barry Curtiss-Lusher and Jonathan A. Greenblatt (2015) ‘Protecting Your Jewish Institution: Security Strategies for Today’s
Dangerous World’, Anti-Defamation League, p. 48., URL: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/Protecting-Your-
Jewish-Institution-2015-Edition-Final-docx.pdf
[61] ‘Horizon 2020 Work Programme 2018–2020’, p. 31.
[62] Stewart, Scott and Burton, Fred, ‘Security at Places of Worship’, Telluric; URL: https://telluric.us/security-at-places-of-worship
[63] ‘A Cooperative Effort Protecting Houses of Worship Best Practices’, Annapolis, URL: https://www.annapolis.gov/
DocumentCenter/View/271/2015-Protecting-Houses-of-Worship-PDF?bidId=
[64] Henne, Daniel (2019) ‘Hardening Soft Targets’, New Visions for Public Affairs, Volume 11, Spring, p. 17.
[65] ‘Church Watch: A Way to Harden Soft Targets’; US Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services, URL:
https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/08-2018/church_watch.html
[66] ‘Church Watch: A Way to Harden Soft Targets’, US Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services, URL:
https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/08-2018/church_watch.html
[67] Ing. Zdeněk Kalvach et al, (2016) ‘Basics of soft target protection—guidelines (2nd version)’, pp. 10-12.
[68] Ing. Zdeněk Kalvach et al, (2016) ‘Basics of soft target protection—guidelines (2nd version)’, p. 5.
[69] Kalvach et al, ‘Basics of soft target protection—guidelines (2nd version)’, p. 6.
[70] Global Counterterrorism Forum, ‘The GCTF Soft Target Protection Initiative—Antalya Memorandum on the Protection of
Soft Targets in a Counterterrorism Context’, p. 13; URL: https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Links/Meetings/2017/
Twelfth%20GCTF%20Coordinating%20Committee%20Meeting/GCTF%20-%20Antalya%20Memorandum%20on%20the%20
Protection%20of%20Soft%20Targets%20in%20a%20Counterterrorism%20Context.pdf?ver=2017-09-17-010844-720
[71] An outstanding example of such collaboration is the SAFE Washington concept where Jewish agencies and law enforcement
cooperate closely; URL: https://www.safewashington.com/
[72] National Counter Terrorism Security Office (2009) ‘Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Places of Worship’, p.
17; URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/375136/Places_of_
Worship_Reviewed.pdf
[73] Yang, Calvin (2020) ‘New programme to prepare religious groups to handle crisis, including teaching members of first-aid
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skills’, in Strait Times, January 14, 2020; URL: https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/new-programme-to-prepare-

religious-groups-to-handle-crisis-including-teaching
[74] Stewart, Scott and Burton, Fred, ‘Security at places of worship’, Telluric, URL: https://telluric.us/security-at-places-of-worship
[75] Kalvach et al, ‘Basics of soft target protection—guidelines (2nd version)’, p. 5. and ‘Urban Agenda for the EU—Security in
Public Spaces, Orientation Paper’, p. 17.
[76] Meyer, Claire (2019) ‘Houses of Worship Security Funding Extends Beyond Grants’, ASIS International, October 1, 2019, URL:
https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/articles/2019/10/house-of-worship-security-funding-extends-beyond-
grants/
[77] Homeland Security National Protection and Programs Directorate Office of Infrastructure Protection, ‘Security of Soft Targets
and Crowded Places—Resource Guide’, p. 10.
[78] ‘Religious Security Summit Provides Resources for Congregations’, Lutheran Advocacy Ministry in Pennsylvania, October 25,
2019, URL: https://www.lutheranadvocacypa.org/religious-security-summit-provides-resources-for-congregations/
[79] Homeland Security (2018) ‘Soft Targets and Crowded Places Security Plan Overview’, Telluric, p. 5; URL: https://telluric.us/
security-at-places-of-worship
[80] Stewart Bell (2019) ‘We’re a target: Canada’s places of worship are fortifying, and the government is helping pay for it’, Canada
News, 9 May, 2019; URL: https://globalnews.ca/news/5233159/canadas-places-of-worship-fortifying/; The Muslim Council of
Britain, (2019) ‘Muslim Council of Britain to the Home Office—Amendments to the Places of Worship Protective Security Scheme’,
11 June 2019; URL: https://mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Briefing-AmmendmentsToPlacesofWorshipPSS-11June2019.
pdf; US Department of Homeland Security (2013) ‘Houses of Worship Security Practices Guide’, May 2013; URL: https://cdn.
fedweb.org/fed-91/2/Houses%2520of%2520Worship%2520Security%2520Practices%2520Guide%25207%252023%25202013.
pdf, Jennifer Levin-Tavares (2014), ‘Creating a Jewish Security Plan in Modern Times: Achieving a Warm Welcoming Secure
Mishkan’, September 2014; URL: https://natanet.org/docs/Jennifer-Levin-Tavares-FTA-Thesis-9-14.pdf, The Hindu American
Foundation (2019), ‘A Guide to Temple Safety and Security’, URL: https://www.hinduamerican.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/
HAFN_19_024-TempleGuide-r8_04222019_web_0.pdf. See details of the UK Government’s Places of Worship Protective Security
Funding Scheme Program at URL: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/places-of-worship-security-funding-scheme.
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Right-Wing Terror: A Fifth Global Wave?

By Vincent A. Auger
Abstract
Violence committed by individuals and groups inspired by far-right ideologies is increasingly seen as a transnational
threat. There is an urgent need to better understand why this type of terrorism has become more frequent and how
far-right groups operate within and across borders. One promising avenue of analysis is the concept of “waves of
terrorism,” pioneered by David C. Rapoport. Rapoport argued that the emergence of distinctive types of terrorist
activity in different historical periods could be explained by new underlying political and ideological forces.
Rapoport identified four “waves” of terrorist activity since the late 19th century. Does right-wing violence constitute
a fifth global wave? This research note evaluates the utility of the “waves of terrorism” argument for understanding
right-wing terrorism.
Keywords: right-wing terrorism, white supremacism, waves of terrorism, David C. Rapoport
In March 2019, a gunman in New Zealand livestreamed his attack on two mosques, during which he killed 50
people. The killer was Australian, and his “manifesto” explaining his actions referenced a Norwegian neo-Nazi
and European ideologues who fear the extinction of the white race. In August 2019, a man in El Paso, Texas
killed 22 people in a Walmart, allegedly to stop a “Hispanic invasion” of the United States. Two months later, an
anti-Semite livestreamed his attempt to attack a synagogue in Halle, Germany; failing to gain entrance to the
place of worship, he randomly killed two pedestrians. And in February 2020, a right-wing extremist killed nine
in a shooting rampage in Hanau, Germany.
These incidents, horrific as they are individually, are part of a broader pattern—a significant growth in far-
right terrorism (especially white supremacist/nationalist terror) in recent years, across Europe, North America,
Australia and New Zealand. According to an analysis by the Institute for Economics and Peace, there has been
a surge in far-right terror incidents since 2010, with a 320% increase between 2014 and 2018.[1]
Jihadist attacks continue to kill more people in Europe, but right-wing extremists in Europe and the U.S. have
conducted more attacks and there has been a significant increase in deaths attributed to far-right terror since
2010.[2] An analysis by the group New America shows a sharp increase in far-right terrorism within the United
States beginning in 2009–10, with far-right terrorists responsible for more deaths than jihadists since 2008.
[3] In early February 2020, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified that “racially/ethnically motivated violent
extremists (RMVEs)” are “the top threat we face from domestic violent extremists;” after the Hanau attack, the
German justice minister declared that “Far-right terror is the biggest threat to our democracy right now.”[4]
Might this increase in right-wing violence indicate the emergence of a new “wave” of terrorism, as David C.
Rapoport defined it almost 20 years ago? Can we use Rapoport’s criteria to evaluate the evolving nature of, and
prospects for, far-right terror? This paper will first discuss Rapoport’s theory of waves of terrorism. The paper
will then examine whether the recent surge in far-right terrorism fits Rapoport’s concept of a terrorist wave.
Rapoport’s Wave Theory of Terrorism

Rapoport contends that “modern” terrorism began in the late nineteenth century and has distinctive
characteristics. He asserts that “time and the changing character of the international political context…gives
terrorism a cyclical character.”[5] He termed this a “wave,” defined as
a cycle of activity in a given time period—a cycle characterized by expansion and contraction phases.
A crucial feature is its international character; similar activities occur in several countries, driven by a
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common predominant energy.[6]

For Rapoport, that “energy” takes the form of an ideology that gains special preeminence, triggered by
“unanticipated international political transformations” that expose vulnerabilities in the existing order or that
appear to create opportunities for radical change.[7] Rapoport does not argue that every group inspired by
this energy pursues the exact same goals; rather, he suggests that “local aims are common in all waves, but the
crucial fact is that other states are simultaneously experiencing similar activities.”[8] When that ideology can
no longer generate the formation of new organizations, the wave dissipates. Rapoport suggests that waves last
“approximately a generation,” about 40 years.[9]
Rapoport identifies four waves of modern terrorism. The “anarchist” wave began in the 1870s, spurred by
democratic and egalitarian ideals of the French Revolution, and lasted until the beginning of the First World
War. This was followed by an “anti-colonial”/nationalist wave that embraced the post–World War I ideal of
national self-determination; according to Rapoport, this wave was dominant from the 1920s through the 1960s.
A “leftist” wave, inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideology and reaction against the Vietnam War, lasted from
the 1960s until the 1980s. Finally, since 1979, a “religious” wave of terrorism has existed, initiated by several
developments in the Muslim world, especially the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Rapoport argued that this religious wave is merely the latest phase of modern terrorism, and that he expects
that a new wave will eventually emerge:
The world of politics always produces large issues to stimulate terrorists who regularly invent new ways
to deal with them. What makes the pattern so interesting and frightening is that the issues emerge
unexpectedly—or, at least, no one has been able to anticipate their tragic course.[10]
While Rapoport did not speculate about the nature of the next wave of terror, other scholars have offered
ideas of what it might look like. D. K. Gupta suggests that if a fifth wave arrives, it “should exhibit a collective
consciousness based on ethno-nationalism, religious identity, or economic class. In all probability it would
contain elements of all three.”[11] Jeffrey Kaplan suggested that the fifth wave would be composed of ethnic
utopians trying to remake their societies, following the example of Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge.[12] Jeffrey
Simon asserts that no single ideology will dominate a fifth wave, but instead a “Technological Wave” will
emerge, characterized by “lone operators” using the internet, cyber tools, and weapons of mass destruction to
wreak havoc.[13] More recently, Honig and Yahel argue that “terrorist semi-states” that control territory but
continue to launch terrorist attacks internationally (such as the Islamic State) may be the next wave.[14]
While each of these suggestions is plausible, right-wing terror should also be considered as a possible fifth
wave, given the recent surge in far-right violence. Does far-right terrorism meet Rapoport’s criteria for this
new wave? Is there a clear expansion in that type of terrorism? Is it transnational in character? Is it motivated
by an ideology which is identifiable and distinct? Does it differ from earlier forms of right-wing terror? Is it
distinguishable from the fourth, religious wave of terrorism?
Defining Right-Wing Terrorism

What is right-wing terrorism? There are many definitions of the far-right, and scholars have offered a variety of
ways of thinking about this form of terror. The Institute for Economics & Peace provides a useful summary of
the major components of the far-right:
‘Far-right’ refers to a political ideology that is centred on one or more of the following elements:
strident nationalism (usually racial or exclusivist in some fashion), fascism, racism, anti-Semitism,
anti-immigration, chauvinism, nativism, and xenophobia.[15]
Given these disparate elements, Daniel Byman suggests that “right-wing terrorism should be seen as a label of
convenience that lumps together various causes.”[16] Daniel Koehler also agrees that right-wing extremism is
best viewed as a “family of ideologies.”[17] Tore Bjørgo and Jacob Aasland Ravndal identify three “families”
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of far-right political movements (cultural nationalists, ethnic nationalists, and racial nationalists), while
acknowledging that some groups or individuals may embrace more than one of these identities.[18] Perhaps
the most useful summary of these ways of understanding far-right terrorism comes from Koehler:
the term right-wing extremism covers a broad range of ideologies that essentially see violence as a
legitimate tool to combat a political and ethnic ‘enemy’ (including individuals with different culture,
religion, nationality or sexual orientation) seen as a threat to the (sic) own race or nation.[19]
Within this right-wing ideological stew, recent data suggest that white supremacists are particularly dangerous.
[20] Bjørgo and Ravndal argue that “adherents of racial nationalism, such as neo-Nazis, fascists and white
supremacists, figure high among perpetrators of extreme-right violence” and that “racial enemies” were the
target of a majority of deadly attacks in Russia and Western Europe.[21] A recent report from the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) indicates that 65% of far-right
extremists in the U.S. between 1948–2018 espoused a white supremacist ideology.[22] During the period 2009–
2018, white supremacists were responsible for 76% of far-right extremist killings in the United States, while
anti-government extremists were responsible for 19%.[23] An analysis by START found that white supremacists
were responsible for 71.4% of “ideologically motivated homicides committed by Far-Right Extremists” between
2010–2018, with that percentage increasing to 84% for the 2015–2018 timeframe.[24] Parkin, Freilich and
Chermak similarly find that white supremacists committed 75% of far-right homicides in 2017.[25]
Finally, it is important to note methodological difficulties in the study of right-wing terrorism. Most databases
attempt to discern a dominant ideological orientation of a particular attacker, and to differentiate between
hate crimes and terrorism.[26] Since analysts may use different criteria for making these determinations, this
inevitably leads to differences in specific numbers of attacks and perpetrators in different studies; however,
what is notable is that the basic trends and rough percentages of attacks carried out by far-right extremists are
consistent across most studies.[27]
Right-Wing Terror: A Fifth Wave?
Does recent right-wing terror constitute a fifth wave of terrorism? Rapoport himself was unconvinced. Writing
in 2016, he responded to critiques that he did not account sufficiently for right-wing terrorism:
How do Right-Wing groups fit into the wave process? Right-Wing groups have been present in every
wave. Usually…they fight against wave groups. U.S. Christian groups are part of the Religious Wave.
[28]
Rapoport’s argument suggests that rather than a new wave, there are two alternative (although somewhat
contradictory) ways to characterize right-wing terrorism: modern right-wing terror is really part of the fourth,
religious wave of terrorism; or that it is merely a continuation of long-standing right-wing groups (and that
those groups engage in what might be called “non-wave” or “counter-wave” types of terrorism).
To assess these alternatives, it is first necessary to discuss whether right-wing terror has the required
characteristics of a wave. Then the argument that right-wing terror is part of the fourth wave will be evaluated.
Finally, the contention that modern right-wing terror is simply a continuation of earlier, “non-wave” far-right
violence is analyzed.
A new wave?
Does right-wing terrorism meet Rapoport’s criteria for a wave? Has there been an expansion of activity? Is
there an identifiable cause of this expansion? Does this terrorism have an international character? Does it have
a “common predominant energy” or ideology? The evidence supports the argument that right-wing terror does
meet the criteria for a wave.
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An expansion of activity: As discussed earlier, almost all measures of far-right terrorism show a significant
increase in violent incidents over the past 10–15 years, although the number of right-wing attacks resulting
in fatalities has fluctuated.[29] Koehler, for example, documents a sharp rise in right-wing attacks against
refugees and mosques in Germany from 2013–15.[30] The data also indicate more organizing and recruiting
activities by the far-right, especially using social media, during this period.[31]
A triggering cause: The “unanticipated international political transformation” that has triggered the rise in far-
right violence in North America, Western Europe and Australia is the rise in right-wing and populist political
movements and concern about rising levels of immigration.[32] Koehler argues convincingly that the Syrian
refugee crisis sharply increased violence in Europe since 2012 against immigrants.[33] Two European officials
who supported liberal immigration and asylum policies were assassinated. Jo Cox, a Member of Parliament in
the United Kingdom, was murdered in June 2016 by a white supremacist who considered Cox a “collaborator”
bringing non-whites to Britain.[34] Three years later an official in Germany, Walter Luebcke, was killed by a neo-
Nazi opposed to German immigration policies.[35] In Australia, a combination of the perception of increased
numbers of Muslim immigrants and the spread of European white supremacist ideology has played an important
role.[36] The rise of right-wing political movements and political leaders has provided “mainstreaming” for
right-wing views, encouraging extremists to believe that violence would be more acceptable and less risky.[37]
Political developments in the U.S. may also have played a significant role in the recent rise in right-wing
terrorism. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security warned in April 2009 that the election of Barack Obama
and the economic recession were being used by right-wing groups in the U.S. to increase their recruiting
and propaganda activity.[38] Eight years later, the election of Donald Trump was welcomed by many white
supremacists in the U.S. as validation of their worldview.[39] Some—such as the terrorist who attacked a
Walmart in El Paso, Texas, in response to “the Hispanic invasion of Texas”—consciously echoed the president’s
anti-immigrant rhetoric.[40] In Europe also, the election of Trump was seen by some on the far-right as part of
a global movement in support of their views.[41]
An international character: The recent expansion of right-wing terrorism is clearly transnational in nature.
The fact that there are variations in frequency of attacks, in the nature of the targets or in the specific tactics
used in different areas of the world is not significant in determining the transnational nature of the wave; as
Rapoport argued, “local aims are common in all waves, but the crucial fact is that other states are simultaneously
experiencing similar activities.”[42]
There is little doubt that many right-wing terrorists see themselves as engaged in a transnational struggle. Far-
right terrorists invoke predecessors in other countries in justification of their own actions. Anders Breivik,
whose 2011 attack in Norway killed 77, is cited as an inspiration by many white supremacists around the
world.[43] Crawford and Keen point out that the perpetrator of the Hanau terrorist attack posted a YouTube
video in English, specifically addressing an American audience, demonstrating his “intentions to reach a global
audience.”[44] Caniglia, Winkler and Metais argue that the attacks in Halle and Hanau were inspired by the
attacks in New Zealand and El Paso and that they “signal a global interrelation between far-right extremists’
behavior” and are evidence of “a world-wide, rapidly expanding network of far-right, neo-Nazi, and white
supremacy extremists.”[45] Analysts also point to the involvement of some far-right “foreign fighters” in the
Ukraine as further evidence of the transnational nature of the movement.[46]
A “common predominant energy”: As Bruce Hoffman pointed out in 1982, right-wing extremists have long
been motivated by a hatred of liberal democracy and a desire to create a state “based on authoritarian rule,
intense nationalism, and racial purity.”[47] While this goal is still important, in recent years it has been
supplemented by the perception of a mortal threat: the impending “great replacement” or genocide of the
white race. This is a belief that “white people are at risk of being wiped out through migration, miscegenation
or violence.”[48] Western elites (often characterized as globalizers and/or Jews) are seen as complicit in this
genocide by promoting increased immigration and multiculturalism.[49] These ideas have been referenced by
several recent far-right terrorists in the “manifestos” that they posted just before they conducted their attacks.
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Far-right ideology also offers a solution to the danger of “white genocide.” The use of violence is intended to
intimidate enemies and to stop immigration, but more broadly it is intended to “awaken” the white race to the
danger it faces. The ultimate goal is to provoke a resolution to the crisis: a race war, leading to an ethnically pure
white/Aryan homeland.
Part of the religious wave?
Rapoport argued that right-wing terror—or at least terror conducted by “U.S. Christian groups”—is part of
the religious wave. But how should we distinguish between “religious” and nonreligious terror groups? While
many types of groups have a particular religious tradition as part of their ethnic or racial identity (including
second wave groups such as the Irgun or the Irish Republican Army), Heather Gregg has convincingly argued
that truly religious groups have unique goals—instigating the apocalypse, creating a theocracy, or cleansing
a territory of other religions—that are not shared by nonreligious groups.[50] Similarly, Jones et. al. define
religious terrorism as “violence in support of a faith-based belief system.”[51] The relevant question is whether
modern far-right terrorists are “religious terrorists” in this sense.
Religious ideology was certainly important for many American right-wing groups in the past. Studies by Bruce
Hoffman and Kathleen Belew clearly demonstrated the importance of Christian theology for many far-right
groups in the United States from the 1970s and 1990s, including militias, the Christian Patriot and Christian
Identity movements, and the Aryan Nations.[52] Religious justification for violence may still be important for
some on the far-right today.
But even if Christian theology was central to the ideology of the far-right in America (it was never as important
for many European far-right groups), that is not necessarily the case today. Paul Jackson argues that some
neo-Nazis now view Christianity as “outdated and irrelevant” to their movement.[53] Hoffman suggests that
the far-right in the U.S. is changing, and is less focused on Christian theology or identity. He quotes an analyst
of these groups: “The neo-Nazi types of the late 1980s to 2000 are being replaced by Nationalists concerned
about immigration—and they are wearing suits and square-rimmed glasses rather than combat boots and
red suspenders.”[54] Other studies also suggest that as far-right groups internationalize their operations, “a
melding of agendas from different communities” occurs, leading to less salience for Christian Identity theology.
[55] Perhaps reflecting this evolution, in detailed discussions of how to define right-wing terror, neither Jones
nor Freilich identify modern right-wing terrorists as religious in nature.[56]
Many on the far-right continue to use Christian language and symbols (such as references to the Crusades),
but this history is appropriated mostly for recruiting and propaganda purposes.[57] For many on the far-right,
Christianity is certainly part of their ethnic or racial identity, just as Catholicism and Protestantism are crucial
to the identity of Northern Irish Republicans and Loyalists. But just as the IRA are not considered religious
terrorists, neither should most modern right-wing extremists.
Finally, the fact that the fourth wave may still be underway does not disqualify right-wing terror from
consideration as a distinct wave. Rapoport’s discussion of waves implied that each wave would follow its
predecessor in succession, but the empirical analysis by Rasler and Thompson demonstrates that waves often
overlap. They show that the third (leftist) wave was completely coincident with both the final 25 years of the
second (anti-colonial/nationalist) wave and the first 15 years of the fourth (religious) wave, and that the second
and fourth waves also had considerable overlap.[58] It is therefore perfectly consistent with Rapoport’s wave
framework that a fifth wave may have begun during the fourth wave.
Non-wave terrorism?
Is far-right terrorism “non-wave”—a form of terror that exists outside the wave framework but has been
“present in every wave”, according to Rapoport? This would suggest that modern right-wing terror is not a new
phenomenon, is little different than it was in the past, and cannot be considered a wave.
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It is indisputable that far-right terrorists have been active in Europe, North America and Australia for many
decades. Rapoport points to the Ku Klux Klan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Transnational neo-
Nazi groups have been active since at least the 1960s.[59] From 1990–99, white supremacists were responsible
for 78% of far-right ideologically motivated homicides in the U.S., and they killed as almost many people in
that decade (79) as they did from 2000–18 (87) (many more if the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing is included).
[60] European right-wing terror has also been motivated by anti-immigrant and anti-Semitic ideas well before
2009; in 1980, far-right extremists were responsible for mass casualty attacks in Bologna, Munich and Paris.
[61]
But to dismiss right-wing terror as unchanged, and therefore incapable of having wave characteristics, is to
ignore some important developments in the nature of far-right terrorism in the past decade. Two issues deserve
attention: changes in the way violence is used, and the new role of social media in transnational right-wing
networks.
With notable exceptions such as Bologna and Oklahoma City, right-wing terrorism in the past was “high
frequency but low intensity”: there were many incidents but few fatalities.[62] Koehler observed that right-
wing terror attacks “usually do not attempt to inflict indiscriminate mass casualties.”[63] He also noted that
far-right terrorists rarely claimed credit for their attacks or explain their motives, suggesting that in the eyes of
the perpetrators “right-wing attacks are often self-explanatory.”[64]
But recently, far-right terrorists have conducted or attempted more mass casualty attacks, setting “a novel
standard for a new generation of extreme right terrorists.”[65] Perpetrators have also made a point of posting
lengthy “manifestos” on the internet and even livestreaming their attacks to a global audience. Explanations
for these frightening developments vary. Some analysts suggest that right-wing terrorists are emulating the
methods of jihadist groups, while Crawford and Keen suggest that this new “gamification of mass violence”
frames “terrorism as a competitive act” and “incentivize(s) violence as a way of generating subcultural status”
among other far-right extremists.[66]
Social media and new technology are transforming the far-right in other ways. While use of the internet among
right-wing extremists has existed for decades, social media may be qualitatively altering their self-identity and
activities.[67] Hoffman argues that “the threat is evolving rapidly” as social media platforms “unite disparate,
disgruntled individuals in an ideologically more cohesive echo chamber.”[68] In this context, “online platforms
serve as nonstop, virtual white supremacist rallies where coordination can happen in real time, regardless of
location.”[69] Koehler suggests that this facilitates “hive” terrorism, “committed by a spontaneously formed
crowd that quickly disbands after the incident” (perhaps the terroristic equivalent of “flash mobs”).[70] More
broadly, social media helps to enhance the perception of a global far-right movement with a unified purpose,
so that a “challenge previously thought to be predominantly local is acquiring a transnational character.”[71]
Patterns of far-right terror in Europe and the U.S. provide some support for this conclusion. Consider the
following graph, from the Institute for Economics & Peace:[72]
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Source: Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2019, p. 50.
The data show that there were significant numbers of far-right terrorist incidents in both Western Europe and
the U.S. from the 1970s to the 1990s. It is also clear that the timing and frequency of far-right terror differed
in the two regions, with European incidents peaking considerably earlier than those in the U.S. These patterns
are consistent with the idea that far-right terrorism was based on local factors, operating in the background of
“wave terrorism.”
But the data from 2005–2018 seem to tell a different story. During this period, far-right terrorist activities
in the U.S. and Western Europe have moved into synchronization. Might this be evidence of an emerging
wave and a change from earlier patterns of far-right violence? It would be consistent with the evidence that
white supremacist and other far-right groups in America and Europe are responding to similar concerns about
immigration and white “replacement,” and that they are sharing their ideas and plans internationally. While
these data are not definitive, they support the argument that a new wave of terrorism exists.
Conclusion
Considerable evidence and analysis support an argument that a fifth, far-right wave of global terrorism may
be underway. What developments would weaken this argument? If far-right terror around the globe develops
a more explicit religious character, that would support an alternative analysis that right-wing violence is part
of the fourth wave. Similarly, if right-wing terrorism declines sharply even as immigration issues persist, that
might indicate that the surge in far-right violence is a transient phenomenon based on local political conditions
rather than a transnational wave. Future research should continue to examine evidence supporting the idea of
a fifth wave, while also looking for those indicators that might disprove the argument.
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If this argument is correct, however, governments will need to rethink how they deal with transnational right-
wing terrorism. Many of the law enforcement and intelligence tools used against jihadism must be redirected
towards right-wing terror, and states must share information and resources across borders in the face of a
persistent transnational threat. For if this is a fifth wave, we may be dealing with an enhanced threat from right-
wing terror for many years to come.
About the Author: Vincent A. Auger, Ph.D. is the Dan and Laura Webb Professor of Political Science at
Western Illinois University. His research and teaching are in the areas of U.S. foreign policy, international conflict
management, and terrorism. Email: [email protected]
Notes
[1] Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, Sydney, November 2019. URL:
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf.
[2] Economist. 2019. ‘Why white nationalist terror is a global threat.’ 21 March (accessed 30 August 2019) URL: https://www.economist.
com/international/2019/03/21/why-white-nationalist-terrorism-is-a-global-threat; Joshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, Jeff
Gruenewald, William S. Parkin and Brent R. Klein, ‘Patterns of Fatal Extreme-Right Crime in the United States,’ Perspectives on
Terrorism 12:6 (December 2018), 38-51.
[3] New America. Terrorism in America After 9/11. (2020) (accessed 24 May 2020) URL: https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/
terrorism-in-america/what-threat-united-states-today/
[4] Christopher Wray, ‘Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee,’ 5 February 2020 URL: https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/
fbi-oversight-020520 ; Melissa Eddy, ‘Far-Right Terrorism Is No. 1 Threat, Germany Is Told After Attack,’ The New York Times, 21
February 2020 URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/world/europe/germany-shooting-terrorism.html
[5] David C. Rapoport, ‘It is Waves, Not Strains,’ Terrorism and Political Violence. 28:2 (2016), p. 217.
[6] David C. Rapoport, ‘The four waves of modern terrorism,’ in John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, eds. Terrorism Studies: A Reader.
(New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 42.
[7] David C. Rapoport (2016), op. cit., p. 218.

[8] David C. Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,’ Anthropoetics. VIII:1 (Spring–Summer, 2002), p. 3 URL:
www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/terror/
[9] David C. Rapoport, ‘The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism,’ Current History, V. 100, n. 650 (December
2001), p. 420.
[11] D.K.Gupta, ‘Waves of international terrorism: An explanation of the process by which ideas flood the world,’ in Jean E. Rosenfeld,
ed. Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy: The Four Waves theory and political violence. (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 40.
[12] Jeffrey Kaplan, ‘Terrorism’s Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma,’ Perspectives on Terrorism 2:2 (January 2008),
12-24.
[13] Jeffrey D. Simon, ‘Technological and lone operator terrorism: Prospects for a Fifth Wave of Global Terrorism,’ in Rosenfeld ed.,
op. cit., pp. 44-65.
[14] Or Honig and Ido Yahel, ‘A Fifth Wave of Terrorism? The Emergence of Terrorist Semi-States.’ Terrorism and Political Violence
31:6, (2019) 1210-1228. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1330201
[15] Institute for Economics & Peace, op. cit, p. 45.
[16] Daniel Byman, ‘Is Right-Wing Terrorism Rising?’ The National Interest 13 August 2019 URL: https://nationalinterest.org/print/
feature/right-wing-terrorism-rising-73241
[17] Daniel Koehler, ‘German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective. A First Quantitative Overview of the “Database on
Terrorism in Germany (Right-Wing Extremism}”—DTG Project,’ Perspectives on Terrorism 8:5 (October 2014), pp. 50-51. Also
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see Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington, The Right-wing Terrorism Threat in Europe, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, March 2020, pp. 5-7. URL: https://www.csis.org/analysis/right-wing-terrorism-threat-europe
[18] Tore Bjørgo and Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Extreme-Right Violence and Terrorism: Concepts, Patterns, and Responses, ICCT
Policy Brief, September 2019, pp. 3-5. URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Extreme-Right-Violence-and-Terrorism-
Concepts-Patterns-and-Responses.pdf
[19] Koehler, op. cit., p. 51.
[20] For a review of the development of white supremacism, see Pete Simi, ‘Why Study White Supremacist Terror? A Research Note,’
Deviant Behavior 31:3 (2010), pp. 251-273. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01639620903004572; and Kathleen Belew, Bring the War
Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
[21] Bjørgo and Ravndal, op. cit., p. 5, and graphic on p. 12.
[22] START (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), Profiles of Individual Radicalization in
the United States (PIRUS), May 2020, p. 2 URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_PIRUS_ResearchBrief_May2020.pdf
[23] ADL Center on Extremism, Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2018. (2019), pp. 14, accessed 28 August 2019. URL:
https://www.adl.org/media/12480/download
[24] START (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), Far-Right Fatal Ideological Violence
against Religious Institutions and Individuals in the United States: 1990–2018. (October 2018), p. 1, accessed 12 December 2019. URL:
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_ECDB_FarRightFatalIdeologicalViolenceAgainstReligiousTargets1990-2018_Oct2018.
pdf.
[25] William Parkin, Joshua D, Freilich, and Steven Chermak, ‘Did far-right extremist violence really spike in 2017?’ The Conversation.
January 4 2018, accessed 13 December 2019. URL: https://theconversation.com/did-far-right-extremist-violence-really-spike-
in-2017-89067.
[26] For a useful discussion, see Joshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, Jeff Gruenewald, William S. Parkin and Brent R. Klein,
‘Patterns of Fatal Extreme-Right Crime in the United States,’ Perspectives on Terrorism 12:6 (December 2018); Jacob Aasland Ravndal,
‘Right-wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV Dataset,’ Perspectives on Terrorism 10:3 (June 2016);
ADL Center on Extremism (2019), op. cit. pp. 13-20; Bjørgo and Ravndal, op. cit, pp. 5-8
[27] Also see Tim Lister, ‘The Nexus Between Far-Right Extremists in the United States and Ukraine,’ CTC Sentinel, 13:4 (April
2020), p. 31 URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/the-nexus-between-far-right-extremists-in-the-united-states-and-ukraine/ ; Koehler (2014),
op. cit., pp. 49-50.
[29] For example, see Bjørgo and Ravndal, op. cit., pp. 7-8; Jones et. al, op. cit.
[30] Daniel Koehler, ‘Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe,’ PRISM 6:2 (July 2016), pp. 92-94. URL: https://cco.ndu.edu/
Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_6-2/Koehler.pdf?ver=2016-07-05-104619-213
[31] Gabriel Weimann and Natalie Masri, The Virus of Hate: Far-Right Terrorism in Cyberspace, International Institute for Counter-
Terrorism (March 2020). URL: https://www.ict.org.il/images/Dark%20Hate.pdf; Lister, op. cit, pp. 33-34.
[32] Richard J. McAlexander, ‘How Are Immigration and Terrorism Related? An Analysis of Right- and Left-Wing Terrorism in
Western Europe, 1980–2004,’ Journal of Global Security Studies, 5:1 (2020), pp. 179-195. URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/
ogy048; and Richard J. McAlexander, ‘Terrorism does increase with immigration—but only homegrown, right-wing terrorism,’ The
Washington Post. 19 July 2019, accessed 12 August 2019. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/19/immigration-
does-lead-more-terrorism-by-far-right-killers-who-oppose-immigration/. Also see Simi, op. cit., pp. 262-63.
[33] Koehler (2016), op. cit.
[34] Ian Cobain, Nazia Parveen and Matthew Taylor. ‘The slow-burning hatred that led Thomas Mair to murder Jo Cox,’ The Guardian,
23 November 2016, accessed 29 December 2019. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/23/thomas-mair-slow-
burning-hatred-led-to-jo-cox-murder
[35] BBC, ‘Walter Lübcke killing: Suspect with far-right links confesses.’ 26 June 2019, accessed 18 December 2019. URL: https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48771880.
[36] Kristy Campion, ‘A “Lunatic Fringe”? The Persistence of Right-Wing Extremism in Australia,’ Perspectives on Terrorism, 13:2
(April 2019), pp. 2-20. URL: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2019/
issue-2/campion.pdf
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[37] Koehler (2016), op. cit., pp. 87-88, 95; Byman, op. cit.
[38] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in
Radicalization and Recruitment. (2009), accessed 6 August 2019. URL: https://fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf.
[39] J.M. Berger, ‘How White Nationalists Learned To Love Donald Trump,’ Politico Magazine. 25 October 2016, accessed 12
December 2019. URL: https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/donald-trump-2016-white-nationalists-alt-right-214388
[40] Peter Baker and Michael D. Shear, ‘El Paso Shooting Suspect’s Manifesto Echoes Trump’s Language,’ The New York Times, 4
August 2019, accessed 5 August 2019. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/04/us/politics/trump-mass-shootings.html; also see
Adam Goldman, ‘Man Who Claimed Trump Would Start a “Racial War and Crusade” Is Arrested,’ The New York Times, 20 August
2019, accessed 21 August 2019. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/us/politics/eric-lin-neo-nazi-arrested.html
[41] Sylvia Taschka, ‘Trump’s America shines bright for Europe’s radical New Right,’ The Conversation. 7 October 2019. URL: https://
theconversation.com/trumps-america-shines-bright-for-europes-radical-new-right-121243
[42] Rapoport (2002), op. cit.
[43] Morris Dees and J. Richard Cohen, ‘White Supremacists Without Borders,’ The New York Times, June 22 2015, accessed 10
October 2019. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/opinion/white-supremacists-without-borders.html; for an interesting
interactive presentation, see Weiyi Cai and Simone Landon, ‘Attacks by White Extremists Are Growing. So Are Their Connections,’
The New York Times, 3 April 2019, accessed 30 October 2019. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/03/world/white-
extremist-terrorism-christchurch.html.
[44] Blyth Crawford and Florence Keen, ‘The Hanau Terrorist Attack: How Race Hate and Conspiracy Theories Are Fueling Global
Far-Right Violence,’ CTC Sentinel, 13:3 (March 2020), p. 1. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/hanau-terrorist-attack-race-hate-conspiracy-
theories-fueling-global-far-right-violence/
[45] Mattia Caniglia, Linda Winkler and Solene Metais, The Rise of the Right-Wing Violent Extremism Threat in Germany and Its
Transnational Character, European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC), 27 February 2020, p. 1. URL: http://www.
esisc.org/upload/publications/analyses/the-rise-of-the-right-wing-violent-extremism-threat-in-germany-and-its-transnational-
character/ESISC_The%20Rise%20of%20the%20Right-Wing%20Violent%20Extremism%20Threat%20in%20Germany%20.pdf
[46] Lister, op. cit.; The Soufan Center, White Supremacy Extremism: The Transnational Rise of The Violent White Supremacist
Movement, 27 September 2019. URL: https://thesoufancenter.org/research/white-supremacy-extremism-the-transnational-rise-of-
the-violent-white-supremacist-movement/
[47] Bruce Hoffman, Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe, RAND Note N-1856-AF, March 1982. URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/
N1856.html; also see Belew, op. cit.; and Koehler (2016) op. cit., p. 97.
[48] Jacob Davey and Julia Ebner, ‘The Great Replacement’: The Violent Consequences of Mainstreamed Extremism. Institute for
Strategic Dialogue (2019), p. 4, accessed 7 November 2019. URL: https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/The-
Great-Replacement-The-Violent-Consequences-of-Mainstreamed-Extremism-by-ISD.pdf
[49] Jacob Davey and Julia Ebner, ibid, pp. 7-14; ADL Center on Extremism, New Hate and Old: The Changing Face of American
White Supremacy (2018), pp. 12-15, accessed 6 November 2019. URL: https://www.adl.org/media/11894/download.
[50] Heather S. Gregg, ‘Defining and Distinguishing Secular and Religious Terrorism,’ Perspectives on Terrorism 8:2 (April 2014),
pp. 39-43. URL: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2014/issue-2/
defining-and-distinguishing-secular-and-religious-terrorism--heather-s.-gregg.pdf
[51] Jones. et. al., op. cit., p. 3.
[52] Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, third edition. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017); Belew, op. cit.
[53] Paul Jackson, Transnational Neo-Nazism in the USA, United Kingdom, and Australia, Program on Extremism, George Washington
University, February 2020, p. 15. URL: https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Jackson%20-%20Transnational%20
neo%20Nazism%20in%20the%20USA%2C%20United%20Kingdom%20and%20Australia.pdf
[54] Hoffman, op. cit., p. 127.
[55] Quote is from Byman, op. cit.; also see ADL Center on Extremism, Hate Beyond Borders: The Internationalization of
White Supremacy (2019), accessed 20 December 2019. URL: https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/hate-beyond-borders-the-
internationalization-of-white-supremacy; and ADL Center on Extremism, New Hate and Old, op. cit.
[56] Jones et. al., op. cit., p. 3; Freilich et. al., op. cit., p. 39.
[57] Ariel Koch, ‘The New Crusaders: Contemporary Extreme Right Symbolism and Rhetoric,’ Perspectives on Terrorism 11:5 (October
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2017), 13-24. URL: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2017/issue-

5/0320175-the-new-crusaders-contemporary-extreme-right-symbolism-and-rhetoric-by-ariel-koch.pdf; and Jackson, op. cit., p. 19.
[58] Karen Rasler and William Thompson, ‘Looking for waves of terrorism,’ in Rosenfeld ed., op. cit., pp. 21-22.
[59] Rapoport (2012), op. cit., pp. 41-43; Jackson, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
[60] START (2018), op. cit.; also see William Parkin et. al., op. cit. Interestingly, the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 (which killed 168
people) is usually excluded from these numbers, just as the September 11 attacks are often excluded from many statistics concerning
jihadist terror in the U.S. In both cases, the justification for the exclusion is based on the somewhat unique and disproportionate
nature of those events, as Parkin et. al. discuss.
[61] Hoffman (1982), op. cit.
[62] Bjørgo and Ravndal, op. cit., p. 9.
[63] Koehler (2016), op. cit., p. 97.
[64] Koehler (2016), ibid, p. 98; also see Koehler (2014), op. cit., p. 56.
[65] Bjørgo and Ravndal, op. cit., p. 2.
[66] Crawford and Keen, op. cit., p. 4.
[67] Maura Conway, Ryan Scrivens, and Logan Macnair, ‘Right-Wing Extremists’ Persistent Online Presence: History and
Contemporary Trends.’ International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. October 2019. URL: https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_
publication/Right-Wing-Extremists-Persistent-Online-Presence-History-and-Contemporary-Trends.pdf; Ben Makuch, ‘Neo-Nazi
Terrorism Is Evolving Online.’ 10 October 2019. URL: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pa7xy9/neo-nazi-terrorism-is-evolving-
online; J.M. Berger, THE ALT-RIGHT TWITTER CENSUS (2018). URL: https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/
AltRightTwitterCensus.pdf.
[68] Bruce Hoffman, ‘How Serious Is White Nationalist Terror?’ Council on Foreign Relations, 29 March 2019. URL: https://www.cfr.
org/in-brief/how-serious-white-nationalist-terrorism
[69] Lewis, op. cit., p. 7.
[70] Koehler (2016), op. cit., p. 97.
[71] Caniglia et. al., op. cit., p. 1.
[72] Institute for Economics & Peace, op. cit., p. 50.
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More Grist to the Mill? Reciprocal Radicalisation and Reactions

to Terrorism in the Far-Right Digital Milieu
by Benjamin Lee and Kim Knott
Abstract
Reciprocal radicalisation is the theory that extremist organisations are connected and feed on one another’s rhetoric
and actions to justify violent escalation. Recent empirical work has suggested that reciprocal radicalisation is a good
deal more subtle than is often assumed, and is nuanced by organisational, social and political context. This study
seeks to apply the theory of reciprocal radicalisation to the far-right digital milieu, an online space conceptualised as
underpinning the varying physical manifestations of the far-right. Based on a qualitative thematic analysis of user
posts in three far-right web forums, the study concludes that responses to ideologically opposed terrorism within
the far-right milieu are often at odds with the assumed radicalising effects of terrorist attacks. While responses were
not uniform, for many users in the far-right digital milieu, jihadist terrorism was an obvious and expected result of
the wider failures of politics and society. Although there were some calls for violent reprisal, they were juxtaposed
by non-violent responses which interpreted jihadist terror as a consequence and sign of societal decadence and
political weakness around issues of migration and rights.
Keywords: far-right extremism, radicalisation, right-wing terrorism
Introduction
Extremism is frequently presented as a two-sided coin; extreme beliefs and actions in one group fuel a
corresponding extremism in another. Recent work on reciprocal radicalisation and cumulative extremism
has pointed out that relationships between extremists are often complex, and there has been a call for more
conceptual clarity when discussing reciprocal radicalisation. Recent research suggests that greater attention
should be paid to the wider political and social context, and to the various channels connecting opposing
groups.[1]
Existing conceptions of the far-right tend to focus on named groups and hierarchical organisations at a time
when far-right activism has increasingly manifested online. Although far-right groups and movements represent
a core security challenge, this analysis suggests that the role of larger organisations in the far-right has changed.
[2] Much far-right activism now takes place online over a series of digital platforms conceptualised loosely as a
digital milieu. Rather than understanding supporters of the far-right as affiliated to specific groups or ideologies,
we conceptualise far-right activism as more autonomous and fluid, with activists free to graze on a variety of
ideologies and narratives offered digitally. Physical mobilisations represent the outward manifestation of a
much larger and more inclusive digital space. So, while the reactions of groups and movements to ideological
opponents are still of significance, there is an open question about how such opponents are understood and
targeted in less organised digital spaces. The central research question of this analysis is, how do users in the
far-right digital milieu react to terror attacks by militant jihadists?
We provide a qualitative thematic analysis of responses on three platforms representing differing factions
within the far-right digital milieu.
• The Right Stuff Forum, an alt-right affiliated forum linked to the website and podcast host therightstuff.
biz
• Gates of Vienna, an influential blog within counter jihadism
• Stormfront, a well-established white supremacist forum
Data is drawn from a series of terror attacks in the United Kingdom in 2017. These attacks were perpetrated
by individuals belonging to religious and ethnic minorities to which the far-right is assumed to be hostile.
Attacks were also indiscriminate and included victims who conformed to in-groups that the far-right claims to
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represent (although these were defined differently in each space).

• 22 March 2017, Westminster attack
• 22 May 2017, Manchester Arena bombing
• 3 June 2017, attack in the London Bridge area
Analysis shows responses in far-right digital spaces to jihadist attacks were mixed. Rather than the explicit
calls for escalation and matched violence that might have been anticipated in a fully two-directional
relationship between far-right and jihadist extremism, commentators quickly integrated terror attacks into
wider preestablished narratives that focused heavily on criticism of both the government and societal actors
deemed to be weak in the face of threats from minorities. This is better explained by the older theory of split
delegitimization than it is by reciprocal radicalisation.[3] This supports wider analyses that have begun to
question the assumed links between extremisms.
Reciprocal Radicalisation: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence

The starting point for this analysis is the assumption that different forms of extremism, in this case jihadism
and far-right extremism, are connected to one another and mirror actions on the opposing side. Reciprocal
radicalisation has been identified by many names[4], including cumulative extremism[5], cumulative
radicalisation[6], tit-for-tat radicalisation[7], co-radicalization[8], and interactive escalation.[9] The term
reciprocal radicalisation is used here as it has become the preferred term for policy makers and featured briefly
in the UK Government’s 2015 counter-extremism strategy[10] as well as in the press.[11]
The original observation that led to the concept of cumulative extremism stemmed from Roger Eatwell’s
analysis of the 2001 riots in Northern England through the lens of the 2005 terrorist attack on London.[12]
Among a list of issues he believed were leading to increased ethnic tensions, Eatwell noted the impact of
‘extremist animosities fuelling each other’.[13] Centring on Bradford, Eatwell suggested that the presence
of far-right groups, including the British National Party (BNP) and the National Front, contributed to the
formation of new forms of ‘racial identity politics’. The theory was that the far-right’s attempts at mobilisation
in the area, centring on the Muslim other and in particular the statements of extremist preachers such as Abu
Hamza, contributed to the violence.[14] On the other side, the BNP is identified as serving as a scapegoat
for Muslim leaders, allowing them to avoid asking harder questions about the support for violence within
their own community. These developments on both sides, Eatwell argued, contributed to a wider clash of
civilisations narrative.
Likewise, the idea of escalations between competing extremist groups had been identified by other researchers
in different contexts. Sprinzak’s[15] analysis of the Israeli radical right for example included a description of
the Jewish Underground’s reactions to a series of Arab terror attacks, describing an ‘outcry for revenge’.[16]
The Jewish Underground went on to attack Arab mayors, a Muslim college in Hebron, and attempted to blow
up five Arab buses.[17] In the realm of social movement theory, countermovements, including cases such as
the pro-life movement in the US, are interpreted as arising in response to the perceived legislative successes
of their opponents.[18] Countermovements are seen as issue-focused; they make competing claims on the
state and seek coverage from the media.[19] A similar relational and dynamic approach explicitly grounded
in social movement theory, from Alimi et al., has argued that radicalisation is about more than the risk factors
associated with groups and emerges where the ‘relational context’ is supportive.[20] Work from 2017 has also
demonstrated the need for nuance and context, where seemingly minor conflicts and frictions drive a broader
radicalisation. Even minor brushes with the state, individuals or, in the context of reciprocal radicalisation,
opposing groups, can contribute to the wider process of radicalisation.[21]
However, it was Eatwell’s (2006) observation that caught the imagination of researchers. Goodwin[22] applied
his thesis to the emergence of the English Defence League (EDL), a counter-jihad inspired street group that
emerged following protest activities by the Islamist group Al-Muhajiroun.[23] Goodwin’s account is explicit
that the formation of the EDL in response constituted cumulative extremism. This is at odds somewhat with
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Eatwell’s original description of cumulative extremism in the context of violent clashes, seemingly expanding
the concept to include the foundation of an organisation. This expansion of reciprocal radicalisation theory to
encompass not only behaviour but organisational change was noted by Bartlett and Birdwell.[24] In support
of this, they highlighted statements by the UK Prime Minister in response to the murder of Drummer Lee-
Rigby, footage of the killers at an anti-EDL protest, as well as a separate foiled 2012 plot to attack an EDL
rally.[25] Among the recommendations offered by Bartlett and Birdwell was to further develop the concept
of reciprocal radicalisation by differentiating between increasing support for a group and escalation of tactics
within already-established groups.
An intervention by Busher and Macklin called for specificity in the analysis of reciprocal radicalisation.[26]
They walked back Eatwell’s original idea, reframing it as focussing on ‘interactional dynamics’, but suggesting
that more specificity was needed to explain why interactions between extremists very often did not result in
any observable escalation. For Busher and Macklin, cumulative extremism relied too heavily on an isolated
explanation, and their proposals served to root escalations in social, political and temporal contexts. Of
particular interest in this study is the question of coupling between movements. Busher and Macklin noted that
opposing movements can be coupled asymmetrically, and that they may not mirror one another directly but
may instead remain within their own fixed repertoires of action. The push towards conceptualising reciprocal
radicalisation as a more dynamic process influenced by the wider political and social context was further
emphasised in a follow-up analysis by Busher and Macklin.[27]
The empirical evidence for reciprocal radicalisation has been mixed. The case for it has included a heavily
reported connection between terror attacks and hate-crime against minorities.[28] Likewise, the manifestos of
far-right terrorists have in some cases explicitly referenced violence by opposed groups.[29] Other studies have
looked explicitly at the relationships between groups and movements, most notably the interlinkage between
jihadists and the far-right. Holbrook analysed the English-language discourses of Islamists and the far-right,
raising concerns that the militancy present in jihadist activism might work to shame far-right activists unable to
match their ferocity.[30] Ebner’s wide-ranging analysis of different forms of extremism argues that Neo-Nazism
and Salafism are ideologically two sides of the same coin and notes references to one another’s ideologues in
rhetoric and the propensity of various outrages from both sides to act as recruiting sergeants in what Ebner
calls a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’.[31]
By way of counterevidence, Macklin and Busher offered a historical analysis of mobilisations between fascists
and anti-fascists over four distinct periods in the UK.[32] They noted the missing ‘spirals of violence’, suggesting
that repertoires of action are relatively fixed, and that broader movement strategies, intra-movement dynamics,
the state, and movement cultures, all factor into how movements respond to one another. In the case of the
four waves identified by Macklin and Busher, violence occurred in short-lived spikes as opposed to perpetually
escalating spirals. Carter took Northern Ireland as a historical example of movement-countermovement
relationship in a situation in which movements were closely connected to wider sectarian interests within
Northern Irish society.[33] While the fascist-anti-fascist mobilisations more commonly used as evidence of
cumulative extremism provided a useful case study, neither movement commanded significant support from
the wider community, as was the case in Northern Ireland.[34]
Taking the evidence together, the resulting picture is somewhat unclear. In some cases, extremist groups and
actors undoubtedly see themselves as taking revenge for the outrages of ideological opponents. However, these
connections have been seen to vary depending on the wider organisational, political and social contexts. In
the case of fascist and anti-fascist mobilisations for example, groups have been largely unwilling to move away
from their already-established patterns of behaviour. What follows identifies a new organisational context for
the far-right and sets up the analysis that follows as a test, or more accurately an exploration, of reciprocal
radicalisation theory in the context of a far-right digital milieu.
The Far-Right Digital Milieu

The far-right digital milieu as conceptualised here is a digital space that acts as a repository of far-right ideas
and narratives, as well as providing a site of connections between a range of far-right factions. Although factions
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may be ideologically differentiated, they are envisaged as sharing a dislike of both alien out-groups and the
society and politics that is perceived to harbour them. Differing factions also share a distrust of mainstream
social and political values they see as unfriendly towards shared far-right ideals. This paper seeks to identify the
reactions in the far-right milieu to ideologically-opposed violence, and to test these against the expectations of
the reciprocal radicalisation framework.
There has been a tendency to understand the far-right as a series of discrete organisations. An established
traditional account of the far-right in the UK, for example, categorised organisations by their attitudes to
political power.[35] The far-right was composed of distinctive coteries with little interest in political power,
leagues and pressure groups seeking to exert indirect influence, and formally constituted parties that sought
to contest elections. However, beneath these formal structures has always operated a more nebulous ‘milieu’
composed of influential figures and their audiences, often interacting through journals and interpersonal
connections.[36]
Extreme and radical right authors, such as Louis Beam, argued that organisations would always be vulnerable
to attack from outside and infiltration from within.[37] Academia too has continued to develop accounts of
far-right organisation that portray it as increasingly flexible, fluid and hard to pin down.[38] Virchow[39] used
the example of German neo-Nazi groups to put forward the idea of groupuscular organisation: many niche
groups coordinated through informal contacts and shared sources of information.[40] More recent analysis of
street groups has also drawn attention to informal modes of organisation and lack of hierarchy.[41] Explicit
violence has also pointed to the limited role for organisations in explaining terrorism originating from the
extreme right. Reviews of extreme-right attacks have often noted the increasing prevalence of so-called lone
actors.[42]
Although formal organisations and physical mobilisations persist in the extreme and radical right, they have
been joined by a fast-growing and more accessible network of influencers and activists online. Conceptualised
here as the far-right digital milieu, this space encompasses the internet,[43] the world wide web[44] and social
media.[45] Where the far-right presence has been removed from social media, there has been significant
evidence of it organising on privacy-centric applications such as Discord or establishing new platforms such
as Gab and Voat.
The concept of the digital milieu is intended to sit alongside hierarchical organisations, not replace them as
a venue for far-right activism. However, the concept of a digital milieu better reflects the diminished role of
organisation and the increased fluidity within the far-right. It draws in part on the idea of the radical milieu
from terrorism studies as a space adjacent to terrorist movements where participation is possible without formal
group membership, for example for the distribution of propaganda.[46] The radical milieu, as conceptualised
by Waldmann and others, is probably too narrowly drawn, however, to encompass the entirety of far-right
activism as it is deals explicitly with terrorism. In addition, it is based on an assumption that all actors are
pulling in the same direction, which again is difficult to identify in the highly factionalised contemporary far-
right.
A more fitting description comes from the work of Colin Campbell, specifically his conceptualisation of the
cultic milieu. While the concept of a cultic milieu has been used as the basis for accounts of neo-Nazi occultism
and the overlapping organisations of the US far-right, it also serves as a good basis for understanding the current
far-right digital milieu.[47] Campbell observed a world of new religious movements and esoterica in which
organisations were constantly emerging and collapsing and in which, for the most part, members showed a
willingness to engage with one another and entertain their ideas. Where organisations did emerge, there was
little expectation of loyalty from followers (except in revelatory cults). The common core, Campbell observed,
was heterodoxy and opposition to mainstream thought, as well as a shared ideological commitment to seeking
truth.[48] Similarly, the far-right digital milieu contains a range of ideological positions encompassing both
the radical and the extreme. While some of these positions are incompatible, for example neo-Nazism and
counter-jihadism, they have a shared dislike of the ‘liberal’ establishment as well as minority groups. Although
anti-Semitism is a clear point of fracture, content critical of left-wing politics or Muslims for example may
be well received in both factions. The resulting picture is one conceived here as the far-right digital milieu,
composed of platforms, actors and mobilisations.
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• The milieu is distributed across a range of platforms. This may include social media but can also include
conventional websites and other platforms. Where discourse is too extreme for social media, actors will
typically seek to move to other platforms.[49]
• Influencers are actors who seek to build a following within the milieu, frequently by creating content
in the form of text, videos, or other items. In contrast, most rank and file actors within the milieu are
passive, either reacting and sharing original content created by others, or consuming content without
interacting.
• Where conditions are conducive, the far-right digital milieu may give rise to physical mobilisations.
These can be collective e.g. street protests, political campaigning, and they can also be individual such
as stickering campaigns and lone direct-action including violence.
Identifying the contemporary far-right as a digital milieu highlights five features of relevance to an analysis of
reciprocal radicalisation. First, the digital milieu is potentially limitless in size. While physical mobilisations are
limited by cost and geography, there are no such limits in the digital space. Any and all activists can potentially
involve themselves in any and all areas of the milieu. Second, following directly from the scale of the milieu is
the well-documented lack of respect for geographic boundaries in various manifestations of the far-right.[50]
Ironically for ideologies built on nationalism, physical location within the milieu is often irrelevant. In the case
of reciprocal radicalisation, which has its origins in local contests between groups, analysis needs to consider
that activists may be contributing who are not even on the same continent.
Third, while physical participation is both costly in resources and risky for activists seeking to limit public
exposure, activism within the digital milieu is relatively cheap and low risk. Activists can participate
anonymously and largely free from the risk of reprisals for their actions or statements. Fourthly, the milieu is
an information space (rather than a physical ‘meat space’) and so verifiable responses will likely be limited
to rhetoric only, although the influence of the digital milieu on individuals and groups is an open question.
Finally, the milieu is inclusive, allowing any would-be influencers to ‘have a go’ either through contributions
on social media, forums, or discrete websites. While very few attain the dominant status of sites, such as The
Right Stuff, Daily Stormer and Geller Report, these are simply the most visible superstructures of an enormous
reservoir of potential influencers with their own platforms. In the context of interactive platforms such as web
forums in particular, this means a single narrative strand is often difficult to extract from posts reacting to an
event. While previous analysis has tended to focus on organisational responses, responses in a digital milieu
are likely to be less coherent.
Overall, this creates an expectation that reciprocal radicalisation trends in the far-right digital milieu are likely
to be harder to analyse than those identified in distinct groups and movements. Analysis is limited largely to
communication rather than behavioural data and will need to accommodate a range of potential responses
from a geographically and ideologically diverse population. However, taking this approach also prevents the
problem of focusing solely on those relationships and reactions arising from discrete organisations, and thus
missing a large component of contemporary far-right activism.
Data and Methods

To recap, reciprocal radicalisation embodies the idea that different forms of extremism will escalate their
behaviours and rhetoric based on the actions of opposed groups. However, the empirical evidence thus far
suggests that any analysis needs to take into account the broader context in which groups are operating. In this
paper we look to a broader scale than organised groups or movements. Based on our conceptualisation of the
far-right digital milieu, reactions to opposing extremist groups are expected to be less coherent, less inhibited
by immediate risk, and to come from a wider range of geographical settings. What this paper now seeks to
do is to analyse the reactions to oppositional extremist violence within the far-right milieu in the hope of
understanding how well these reactions match up to the reciprocal radicalisation thesis.
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Operationalising this requires focusing on the trends underpinning reciprocal radicalisation. The following
framework was based in part on Benford and Snow’s approach to frame analysis in social movement theory
but adapted to fit the specific context of reciprocal radicalisation.[51] It was further developed on the basis of
a pilot analysis of the data. The framework is in three parts, consisting of blame, victimisation and response.
• Blame: The primary consideration here is the way in which terrorism is characterised and who is held
responsible for it. If the far-right digital milieu is in part motivated by responding to the actions of
militant jihadists then we would expect a recognition within the milieu that militant jihadists are
responsible for an attack and constitute a specific and recognisable opponent.
• Victimisation: A second analytical consideration is how activists within the milieu describe and
interpret the victims of a terror attack. This factor has not yet been discussed explicitly in the reciprocal
radicalisation literature. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that reciprocal radicalisation is in-
part related to how victims are perceived. Sympathy with victims can be interpreted as an appropriate
motivation and justification for a response. This question is thought to be particularly relevant to
activists within the far-right, many of whom believe some sections of Western societies to be decadent,
or culpable for terrorism in other ways, for example through support for immigration.
• Response: Lastly, the analysis seeks to capture discussion of potential responses to terror attacks. In the
context of reciprocal radicalisation the main issue of interest here is discussions of violent responses
and escalation. However, other forms of response and non-response will also be considered.
To be clear a qualitative and exploratory approach has been taken to the available data, with these themes
being identified in the pilot phase and applied thereafter. The intention here has been to develop a better
understanding of how the mechanics of reciprocal radicalisation play out in the far-right digital milieu. The
aim of the paper has not been to produce a census of extreme-right views online, nor to identify a single
dominant trend within a specific forum. Given our conceptualisation of the far-right digital milieu above,
complex and conflicting views are to be expected.
This research focused specifically on comment data provided on three far-right, English language websites
and forums in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. The sites were chosen on the basis of their prominence within
contrasting factions of the milieu. We selected sites that were widely perceived as influential or important by
activists themselves. This is not intended to be a comprehensive or systematic survey of far-right web presences.
Table 1: Case selection
Site URL Faction

Gates of Vienna http://gatesofvienna.net/ Counter Jihad
The Right Stuff https://forum.therightstuff.biz/catego- Alt-Right

Forum ry/82/news-current-events
Stormfront https://www.stormfront.org/forum/ White Supremacy

index.php
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Table 2: Jihadist terror attacks in the UK 2017

Date Location
22 March 2017 Westminster
22 May 2017 Manchester Arena
3 June 2017 London Bridge
Overview of the Data

The comment data were rich and dense, but also messy. Responses to different attacks varied widely in scale.
Gates of Vienna (GoV) is published as a blog and users can interact in the form of a comment. GoV tended
to make multiple posts following an attack as a result of which the conversation in the comment section was
diffused over different posts. In this case, the analysis was based on the first four posts dealing with an attack.
Responses in both Stormfront (SF) and The Right Stuff Forum (TRSF), both organised as web forums, tended
to coalesce around single large threads. In each case the largest thread was included in the analysis.
Table 3: Responses to posts on UK terror attacks
Westminster (22/3/17) Manchester (22/5/17) London Bridge (3/6/17)
Gates of Vienna (first 158 188 83

four posts only)
Stormfront 400 925 578

The Right Stuff NA 340 13
As Table 3 shows, SF was the most prolific of the sites, publishing 1,903 comments across the three events. GoV
featured far fewer user comments, perhaps reflecting its organisation as a blog. TRSF was the most erratic of
the forums. At the time of data collection, the comments relating to the Westminster attack were unavailable.
The Manchester bombing generated an extensive discussion thread, while the London Bridge attack discussion
was cursory. It is unclear if this was discussed in more depth on another part of the forum. The Manchester
bombing, which took place immediately following a concert by Ariana Grande, generated the greatest reaction
across all three sites. Looking at the discussion the merger of Jihadist violence with popular culture seemed to
create a particularly powerful reaction.
Before turning to the analysis, it is important to stress the theoretical aspect of this case selection. The three
sites are interpreted as distinct but not unified factions within the far-right digital milieu. They do not represent
coherent movements or organisations, and the analysis does not seek to identify a definitive position on the
blame for the attacks or what should be done as a consequence. Rather, this analysis aims to highlight the
reasoning on display within these spaces and to suggest general trends.
In this vein, there are some headline trends on display in the data. First, users returned to threads multiple
times. This was particularly so where significant new information came to light. On SF, several users emerged
as key figures responding multiple times across the different attacks. This confirms previous observation of SF
that argued for considering the site as a digital community.[52] However, it is also the case that individual users
may post under multiple names. This means that the size of the datasets cannot be equated to the number of
individual users posting; it is possible that relatively few users may be creating a large amount of material.[53]
Secondly, there were a large number of links to material on other sites. This included links to extremist media,
for example commentary produced by influential figures within the far-right milieu. Where threads were
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being updated in real time there was a much greater reliance on regular media. Despite the critical approach
to the ‘mainstream media’ in the milieu, content in the milieu continues to be reliant on information made
available through mainstream reporting that cannot be accomplished by smaller radical media producers. This
coincides with previous observations of the role of extremist online networks in curating regular media content
for supporters.[54]
Third, distinctive voices were on display in each of the spaces analysed. These coincided with the broader
character of each faction. GoV, as a counter-jihadist blog, reflected a focus on civic values and a broader
appeal for respectability and legitimacy.[55] TRSF reflected the more playful and outrageous tendencies of
the alt-right, alongside posts more clearly intended to shock and demonstrate the user’s edginess.[54] SF, as
the oldest and seemingly largest space analysed, reflected a more traditional right-wing extremism. There was
comparably greater emphasis on biological race in both TRSF and SF compared to GoV’s more cultural take.
Likewise, attempts to link violent Islamist terrorism to a Jewish conspiracy were absent from GoV, but present
on both TRSF and SF.[56]
Lastly, discussions paid very little attention to geography. Although usernames often suggested a specific
location (e.g. HailBritain) there was no way to confirm the locations of users posting. This is significant in the
context of the far-right digital milieu, further supporting the idea that, despite the emphasis on nationalism
inherent in far-right activism, the online space has fostered a more inclusive form of right-wing extremism that
places greater emphasis on shared ethnicity (SF, TRSF) or culture (GoV) than nation states.
The following analysis reports findings based on the three aspects of reciprocal radicalisation developed above:
the assignation of blame for terror attacks, the position of the victims of terror attacks, and attitudes towards
future action.
Blame
Terrorism is calculated to produce an emotive response from target audiences.[57] Within the framework
of reciprocal radicalisation, terrorist action can be viewed as one potentially escalatory pathway between
extremist groups and individuals. For this to be the case, terrorist violence needs to be clearly linked to a target
outgroup. For this relationship to hold true, then responses to jihadist terrorism on the far right need to be
clearly linked to the perpetrating groups or those they claim to represent. In the case of IS-inspired terrorism,
this was expected to manifest in attributing blame to both jihadist groups and generalised references to the
Muslim population. In practice, the data showed blame attributed to a wide array of actors. These included
Muslims as a group but also extended to wider society (including victims of attacks) and political leadership.
Within these categories, as illustrated below, there were further degrees of nuance. There was relatively little
discussion of named opposition groups.
The Muslim Other

Given the framing of much far-right activity as anti-Muslim, it is no surprise that the blame for terror attacks
was attributed to Muslims as a group or Islam as a religion. This was demonstrated in several instances, often
beginning with speculation before an attacker’s identity was formally known:
‘… I don’t mean ‘islamists’ or ‘radical moslems’, let’s be honest here, the problem is islam–plain,
ordinary islam.’
:Peter35 GoV 23/5/2017
‘Ah, just the muslims, expressing their love for us with their weekly terrorist attack. When they are not
raping our children, they are killing them.’
TenDollarBill SF 3/6/2017
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The more alt-right orientated TRSF chose to make a joke out of the perceived routine nature of Islamist terror
attacks. TRSF was notable for allowing users to embed images in their responses. User Wilhelm posted a
commonly used image meme in the aftermath of the Manchester attack. The image was a still from the television
show South Park with the caption ‘Let’s not jump to conclusions… Aaaand it’s Muslims.’ Another post on TRSF
linked to a 44-second YouTube video composed entirely of British conspiracy theorist Paul Joseph Watson,
repeating the phrase ‘imagine my shock’.[58]
Political Elites
While the assumed identity of the attackers was enough to link terrorism to the presence of Muslims for
most users, some also sought to suggest that jihadist violence was evidence of some deeper problem. These
explanations existed along a spectrum, encompassing the simple incompetence of the political elites tasked
with security at one end, and outright conspiracy at the other.
‘Oh dear….What will the Muslim brotherhood mayor of Londistan have to say.’
Last Call, GoV, 22/3/17
‘Unhinged violence like this results when traitorous politicians allow a flood of Third World scum to
displace the native Whites.’
PrairieSister, SF, 22/3/18
‘Jew supremacists are behind these attacks and blame the Muslims. Ariana Grande is a Jew puppet.
Look up “Ariana Grande Satanist”. The Satanic Jews that control Hollywood own her. She always dates
negros to help push White genocide.’
AmericaFree, SF, 22/5/2017
‘Theresa May is a traitor. She’s not stupid, she’s not mistaken, she’s not unwilling to admit she was
wrong — she’s a traitor. May is a traitor and a member of the traitor class. Not the ruling class, the
traitor class. The awash in Saudi money traitor class. Which has a death grip on the levers of power in
Great Britain and a near death grip on the levers of power here in the States.’
Ricpic, GoV, 5/6/17
Society
Blame for jihadist terrorism was also directed at society more generally. This manifested as claims that society
was in some way either stupid or degenerate and thereby responsible for the terrorism visited upon it.
‘Britons are still at the flowers and tea candles stage of awareness.’
Col. B. Bunny, GoV, 7/6/17
‘Just go back to your football and kebabs. I just saw two white morons interviewed by some CNN
gimp, and all these morons could do was try to be funny and giggle like brain-dead retards. They
don’t even care.’
Multiculturalism Sux, SF, 3/6/17
In some cases, the failure of societies to recognise and deal with terrorism was interpreted as an inherent
longing for societal collapse.
‘I sometimes go on the prepper forums and realise they are all wanting it to happen. Especially in
Britain, this life of an overbearing Nanny who wants you to watch your football and reality TV, drink
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your beer and shut up. People are longing for a collapse.’
Edgyshitlord, TRSF, 26/5/2017
Victimisation
A further consideration suggested by reciprocal radicalisation theory is the attitude to victims. The actions
of an opposed group are implicitly assumed to harm individuals an extremist group perceives as part of its
constituency. However, responses addressing the victims online varied dramatically.
In a small number of posts, commentators expressed sympathy with the victims, in some cases specifically
noting that the victims could potentially have been someone close to them.
‘My heart and prayers go out to my fellow brothers and sisters in Manchester, UK. This was a concert
full of young girls. These are our daughters!!!’
SPYDERcat, SF, 22/5/17
‘Meanwhile my heart goes out to all the victims, their family and friends. God bless them all.’
Disenfranchised, GoV, 23/3/17
‘I feel extremely bad for the cop who was knifed to death.’
Simon Legree, SF, 22/3/17
However, also present were narratives which suggested that the victims of terrorism were in some way
responsible. Hubris (excessive pride or self-confidence) was a dominant theme in several posts. Where victims
could be linked to wider narratives of societal failure this tendency was more acute. This placed much greater
distance between commentators and victims, suggesting that the deaths and injuries of latter did not impact
the former.
In the case of the Westminster attack, several commentators seized on the fact that the location of the attack was
presumably targeting politicians as evidence of multicultural policies coming back to haunt their instigators.
No variation in political positions was acknowledged, all political figures were grouped into the same class.
‘How terrible. I hope all them politicians are OK :p’
Lizardman, SF, 22/3/17
‘I don’t have any sympathy for liberal politicians. They are getting what they deserve (cultural
enrichment).’
Ssvanguard, SF, 22/3/17
The politics and ethnicity of Ariana Grande became a particular focus with some commentators. This was also
extended to the victims present at the Manchester concert. This is a similar mechanism to that used to distance
the space from the politicians and elites of Westminster.
‘So, an arena, chocked full of globalists/marxists, was bombed by the same Islamic fundamentalists
they sponsor... the irony! I am having a hard time finding sympathy for the dead and injured concert
goers, the promoters, and the performers. All of them promote white genocide! ☠’
Beowulf, SF, 22/5/17
In addition to directly blaming victims for the attacks, some went further, welcoming jihadist violence as good
for their wider political agenda.
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‘This shit needs to happen every day. Every country in Europe needs this happening every day. Fastest
way to wake them normies up.’[59]
Wilhelm, TRSF, 23/5/17
In this instance these arguments were directly contested by other commentators arguing that accusing the
concertgoers of promoting white genocide could not be supported. The tendency to blame instead of sympathize
with the victims generated overt friction within these online spaces. Where users made these arguments there
were often others expressing criticism. This was either on the grounds that the conclusions being reached about
the attitudes of the victims were unsupported, or that blaming the victims in this way would make the wider
far-right seem uncaring.
‘I don’t think you saying ‘Good’ will attract Britons to WN[white nationalism], even if they get woken
up by this event.’
Last Patrol, SF, 22/3/17
‘Your comment is either from a sick soul or one that has been defeated and is desperately lashing
back. Those were our people, children nonetheless targeted, and someone could feel even a hint of
glee or complete indifference?’
Kaspar Hauser, SF, 22/5/17
Response
In keeping with the distributed organisation of the milieu, suggested responses were diverse. Equally, the
overall contents of the thread were far more orientated towards assigning blame for the attacks than proposing
any course of action to prevent further attacks. Although caution is advised in identifying systematic trends in
this way, there was a distinction between how the different user groups proposed reacting to the attack. These
included indirect calls for violence against both ethnic minorities and political elites.
Violent Responses
At the most extreme, some commentators openly advocated violence in response to the attacks. This was
consistent to some degree with the concept of reciprocal radicalisation, with violence by one group or side
driving a violent response from the other. One user referenced a future holocaust. This was probably the most
overtly violent response identified in the material as it advocated for genocide of non-Whites and those of
mixed race. Potentially this post only managed to survive moderation on the site as it was buried partway
through a post that included an embedded music video and accompanying song lyrics.
‘The coming non white and mixed white Holocaust will be glorious and it is coming despite all the
defeatist moaning on these sites.’
DeadBonesRising, SF, 22/3/17
DeadBonesRising also uses the post to critique what they see as ‘defeatist moaning’ by other users, suggesting
that other responses expressing frustration at the apparent inability of societies to protect themselves were
weak.
Another post made on GoV in the aftermath of the London Bridge attack made a specific reference to the
assassination of politicians and journalists out of frustration at their treachery. This represents a different
advocation of violence from calls to target ethnic and religious minorities. The framing of the threat in the
form of a question distances the author from an explicit call to violence while leaving open the possibility that
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they would endorse such actions.

‘When will citizen groups begin assassinating their traitor politicians? After 1 more attack, 2 more? At
some point British politicians will be knifed & shot & mowed down by citizens fed up with the traitor
class. Journalists may also be targeted for their deliberate lies.’
Stephen Carter, GoV, 5/6/17
Other references appeared to be slightly more veiled, including one user referring to ‘Crusades 2.0’ in an
apparent threat against Muslims, and others suggesting that violent attacks were building towards wider
violence, though it was left unclear as to whom such violence would be directed.
‘We are getting close to The Crusades 2.0. Keep pushing muzzies.’
beast9, SF, 23/3/17
‘I do honestly think that there IS a way out in the longer term but I would add that there is no pathway
that I can foresee at this point that is peaceful, pleasant or benign.’
Watching and waiting, GoV, 5/6/17
‘Fire will meet fire! No amount of Liberals that love them and protect them will stop it.’
BulldogRevolver, SF, 22/3/17
Less clear is the following post on Gates of Vienna:
‘We need to create list, database of these writers of these[epithet] newspapers who are still putting out
this marxist garbage and covering for islam. And the editors who allow it to go to print.’
Zhukov, GoV, 23/3/17
This user advocated for creating a list of enemies, although the purpose is unclear. The creation of such lists has
been a common tactic in the far-right space.[60]
Where violence was referenced or even explicitly advocated, it was done in an indirect way. There is little in the
analysis of the threads that can be construed as evidence of specific actions to be undertaken. Instead, posting
remained vague. It is not clear whether there was an understanding among users that such planning should be
kept off public forums, which is likely, or if such planning is simply not extant in the digital spaces examined.
Nonviolent Responses
As well as indirectly advocating violence, nonviolent courses of action were discussed. Many of these involved
the kind of nonviolent organising typically associated with campaign groups. One thread on Stormfront raised
the possibility of using the coverage of the Westminster attack as a way of generating publicity.
‘Whatever, do what you like, I’m just pointing out that it is an opportunity to get some live coverage
without getting censored. If you go now, everyone will see you, if you wait, no one will.’
time will tell, SF, 22/3/17
Another post talked in more general terms about organising for the future.
‘This youngest generation - generation Z? - the one coming up right now, these are the ones who
understand all of this for what it is. If I had a nickel for every one I’ve spoken to about the invasion,
and who understood perfectly, I’d be a wealthy woman.’
Roo, SF, 22/3/17
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However, despite the widespread condemnation of political elites, there was a distinct undercurrent in many
proposed responses that assumed a role for law enforcement, the justice system and the state, although the
advocated responses were extremely draconian and could be considered a form of structural violence.
‘Start deporting them back to their muslim paradise until you are back to being the Great Britain I once
knew, about how many years ago — at least 20 or 30 or more years ago.’
Maria_dee, GoV, 23/3/2017
‘Most Moslems are coloured, deportation, based on inclined to be terrorist religion should take place,
instead of picking on Poles or division with Scott’s.’
Pagonis, SF, 22/3/17
‘Westerners must now hold politicians, muslim groups, new media, and pro-immigration groups
directly responsible for these murders. And criminal lawsuits are a good way to start.’
marsouin, GoV, 22/3/17
This is an acute contrast with the more overtly violent rhetoric, suggesting that hope remains for an orderly
response to the problems identified by the far-right. This may illustrate a distinction between those who wish
to violently overthrow the current order and impose a new political solution (extremists), and those who retain
a belief in a longer term and potentially more peaceful political transition, albeit one with far-reaching and
potentially violent outcomes that include mass deportations and restrictions to individual rights (radicals).
Conclusions
This research note has taken the concept of reciprocal radicalisation and attempted to apply it to unorganised
digital spaces rather than organised and coordinated movements. As a consequence of focusing on the digital
milieu, there are some limitations to the conclusions we can draw. While the general push of reciprocal
radicalisation research has been the need for greater contextualization and precision, the far-right digital
milieu effectively decontextualizes far-right activism, limiting it to the information space. While the incidents
of interest all took place in the UK, the far-right response captured here is global, albeit exclusively English-
speaking. Likewise, activity in the far-right milieu also has temporal implications. While coherent groups and
movements can be expected to develop reasonably consistent narratives over time, the data analysed here is a
product of a particular configuration of users on the three sites who have potentially never interacted before
and may never interact again. Had the configuration of users been different then the response may also have
differed.
For the same reasons the data can be read in different ways. While there is evidence here to support the idea
of some contributors using violent rhetoric against Muslims as a result of the attacks, there are contradictory
stories also present in the data. Based on the attribution of blame, the positioning of victims, and the proposed
solutions, there is less here to suggest that the users are likely to deepen their commitment or escalate their
activities against their ideological opponents. Instead, the data indicate that the result of many thousands of
words and posts is to incorporate incoming information about jihadist violence into preexisting narratives.
There were subtle differences in narratives depending on the site. TRSF was noticeably more irreverent, SF
more race-focused, and GoV attempted to emphasise a clash of cultures with less focus on race. Despite this,
the three sites shared, along with the far-right digital milieu as a whole, a profound disconnection with the
current social and political settlements in Europe and North America. Immigration, and Muslim immigration
particularly, constitutes a grievance, as does the broader decline in the morality and vitality of the Western/
White world.
The blame for attacks was variously attributed to a generalised Muslim other, political elites, and/or a wider
sickness in society. Commentators generally did not view terrorist attacks as strategic and linked to the aims of
jihadist groups or movements. This gave rise to the situation where the attackers and their goals were almost
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completely ignored, subsumed under race and religion. In the minds of many, their actions were autonomous
and inevitable rather than in service of a strategic goal. For activists within the far-right digital milieu it was
both natural and inevitable that Muslims should hate them. It is in the field of blame that the instrumental
reconfiguring of terror attacks to fit pre-existing worldviews is most evident. The actions of small groups of
jihadi terrorists are quickly linked both to a political elite that is seen as either incompetent or actively pursuing
policies designed to persecute the groups on behalf of which the far-right claims to speak. In some cases, this
link is extended to encompass the entirety of the society from which the far-right feels disconnected.
The position of victims was also highly contested. Although some sympathy was on display, in many cases
commentators took steps to distance themselves from victims, either by sidelining them or creating narratives
in which their victimisation was somehow seen as hubristic. In either case, refusing to accept the victim of
terrorism as one of their own further distances the far-right space from the retaliatory logic of reciprocal
radicalisation. If the victims are not one of us, then no response is required.
Although some posts offered solutions, a great many posts were seeking to attribute blame. They revealed
contrasting approaches, most notably between those advocating for violence and those advocating for legal
change (but outside existing norms around human rights). Where violence was advocated it was against either
generalised ethnic or religious groups, or against treacherous political leaders. Specific retaliation against
groups was not explicitly advocated, although some of the posts could certainly be read as a ratchetting up of
general tensions.
The methodological limitations of this study mean that we must remain cautious. This is a relatively deep dive
into a small range of threads and should not be viewed as a comprehensive description of how specific online
forums reacted to the attacks. Despite limitations arising from our approach, what we can say is that the far-
right digital milieu does not behave as predicted by the reciprocal radicalisation thesis. Blame, victimisation
and responses were all at odds with the revenge mechanics of reciprocal radicalisation. For these users at
least, Jihadist terror attacks represented more grist to an existing mill rather than a stimulus for new courses
of action. Seemingly few in these spaces required any further evidence for the hostility of ‘Islam’ or the need
to extrapolate the actions of a small group to that of a wider population. Even more surprising was how little
blame was attributed directly to the terrorists themselves. Blame instead quickly shifted to a series of targets
that were consistent with deeper concerns held by those within the far-right milieu over the current political
and social settlement in many Western countries. That Muslims engage in terrorism is taken as self-evident; the
real crimes, in the eyes of the far-right digital milieu, are that political leaders and wider society either do not
see the obvious truth of this or are somehow implicated in deliberately perpetuating terrorism. While activity
within the milieu is by definition rhetorical only, it follows that any radical actions that might arise from this
are just as likely, if not more so, to target political leadership as religious and ethnic minorities.
While the theoretical basis of this paper is the concept of reciprocal radicalisation, the results point to an older
theoretical account of far-right terrorism. The theory of split delegitimization argues that right-wing terrorism
is distinct as it targets primarily ‘non-ruling groups’ theorised as alien and hostile. Right-wing groups were
theorised to expect silence or complicity from regimes.[61] However, this approach also highlighted how some
groups had come to see the regime as co-opted by non-ruling groups and thereby making the regime, and those
complicit with it, legitimate targets.[62] Based on the data analysed here, users of all three sites had closed the
‘legitimation gap’ to varying degrees. While the reciprocal radicalisation thesis presents the far-right and jihadi
extremists as coupled enemies, in these far-right digital contexts analysis suggests that jihadist extremism is
often taken as symptomatic of the greater threat presented by weak or complicit regimes.
This research has attempted to expand the concept of reciprocal radicalisation to take into consideration the
wider digital milieu that forms the background context to more formal organisations. While other analyses
have concentrated on organisations and movements, this research acknowledges the extent to which, for the
far-right, organisation has become more digitally focused and autonomous, and traditional organisations have
been hollowed out. Despite expanding the concept of reciprocal radicalisation, the findings support existing
evidence from researchers that questions the explanatory validity of reciprocal radicalisation. In keeping with
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Macklin and Busher’s[63] historical analysis of fascist and anti-fascist mobilisations, the evidence here suggests
that, in the context of the digital milieu, violent action can be taken as a sign of business as usual as opposed to
a need to change existing repertoires of action.
On future research, a number of possibilities present themselves. Macklin and Busher’s conclusions and
suggestions remain untested in a range of settings and contexts. Most recently the debate around the risks posed
by ‘incel’ culture raised the prospect of an extremist mindset seemingly disconnected entirely from traditional
enemies and focused instead on both women and society more generally.[64] Understanding the relationships
between this space and other extremist groups, as well as the wider social context, is an urgent research project.
Likewise, this research has touched only a small section of the extreme-right space online. Looking ahead,
accelerationist groups and channels, including the Siege Culture scene, may provide an interesting test case
for reciprocal radicalisation, in particular given the tendency of such actors to co-opt to some degree the signs
and symbols of Jihadism.[65] Lastly, more work remains to be done on the idea of the far-right milieu itself.
Despite the widely acknowledged trends of increasing digital activism and the ‘post-organisational’ far-right,
much research and policy remains firmly fixed on organisational models that are decreasing in relevance.[66]
While the ‘groupusculization’ of the extreme-right movement has been widely acknowledged, the connective
tissue that holds these grouplets together is inescapably digital.[67] As Campbell called for a greater focus on
the milieu that supported the rapid cycle of cult formation and collapse, so too is there a need for a focus on the
digital milieu underpinning emerging extreme-right groupuscules.[68]
Acknowledgments: This work was funded by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST).
CREST is commissioned by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC Award: ES/N009614/1) with
funding from the UK Intelligence Community.
About the Authors:

Benjamin Lee is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats. Based
at Lancaster University, UK, Benjamin’s research has focused on the transnational far-right and in particular the
role of new technology in expanding access to, and distribution of, far-right ideas.
Kim Knott is Professor of Religious and Secular Studies at Lancaster University and Deputy Director of the Centre
for Research and Evidence of Security Threats. She leads the CREST research programme on Actors and Ideologies
in Social Context. She has worked on religious and diasporic minorities, religious/secular relations, and the spatial
study of religion.
Notes:
[1] Joel Busher and Graham Macklin, ‘Interpreting “Cumulative Extremism”: Six Proposals for Enhancing Conceptual Clarity,’
Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 27, no. 5 (2015), 884-905.
[2] Roger Griffin, ‘From Slime Mould to Rhizome: An Introduction to the Groupuscular Right,’ Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 37, no. 1
(2003), 27–50.
[3] Ehud Sprinzak ‘Right Wing Terrorism in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization,’ in T. Bjorgø, (Ed.), Terror
From the Extreme Right (Frank Cass, 1995).
[4] Kim Knott, Benjamin Lee, and Simon Copeland, Briefings: Reciprocal Radicalisation. (Centre for Research and Evidence on
Security Threats, 2018).
[5] Roger Eatwell, ‘Community Cohesion and Cumulative Extremism in Contemporary Britain,’ The Political Quarterly, vol. 77, no.
2 (2006), 204–216.
[6] Jamie Bartlett and Jonathan Birdwell, Cumulative Radicalisation Between the Far-Right and Islamist Groups in the UK: A Review
of Evidence, (Demos, 2013).
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[7] Paul Jackson and Matthew Feldman, The EDL: Britain’s “New Far Right” Social Movement. (2011).
[8] Douglas Pratt, ‘Islamophobia as Reactive Co-Radicalization,’ Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, vol. 26, no. 2 (2015), 205–218.
[9] Joel Busher and Graham Macklin, 2015, op. cit.
[10] HM Government, Counter-Extremism Strategy, (2015).
[11] ‘The real terrorist risk in Europe is “reciprocal radicalisation”, where far right and Islamist extremists boost each other’s
popularity,’ accessed February 20, 2019, URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/berlin-christmas-market-attack-terrorism-
terrorist-refugees-far-right-neo-nazi-extremes-reciprocal-a7489946.html
[12] Roger Eatwell, 2006, op. cit.
[13] Roger Eatwell 2006, op. cit., 213
[14] Hamza (often spelled Hamsa) is currently serving life without parole in the United States after being extradited from the UK on
terror changes in 2012.
[15] Ehud Sprinzak, ‘The Emergence of the Israeli Radical Right,’ Comparative Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1989), 171-192.
[16] The Jewish Underground was a messianic terror group that emerged from the radical right organisation Gush Emunim beginning
in 1978 following the Camp David Accords.
[17] Ehud Sprinzak, 1989, op. cit.
[18] David Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg, ‘Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity,’ American
Journal of Sociology, vol. 101 no. 6 (1996), 1628–1660.
[19] David Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg, 1996, op. cit.
[20] Eitan Alimi, Charles Demetriou and Lorenzo Bosi, The Dynamics of Radicalization: A Relational and Comparative Perspective,
(Oxford University Press, 2015).
[21] Gavin Bailey and Phil Edwards, ‘Rethinking “Radicalisation”: Microradicalisations and Reciprocal Radicalisation as an
Intertwined Process,’ Journal for Deradicalization, No. 10 (2017), 255–281.
[22] Matthew Goodwin. The Roots of Extremism: The English Defence League and the Counter-Jihad Challenge. (2013)
[23] The counter jihad is a far-right faction characterised primarily by a belief that Europe and the US are at risk of Islamisation.
They are distinct from white supremacy and other forms of ethnonationalism in that they reject racial nationalism in favour of
cultural markers of belonging, often subsumed under the heading of Judeo-Christian values. See: Benjamin Lee ‘Why We fight:
Understanding the Counter-Jihad Movement,’ Religion Compass, vol. 10 no. 10, (2016), 257-265.
[24] Jamie Bartlett and Jonathan Birdwell, 2013, op. cit.
[25] Drummer Lee-Rigby was attacked and murdered in a Woolwich street by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale on 22 May
2013. Adebolajo and Adebowale attempted to behead Rigby and told passers-by that the attack was revenge for UK armed forces’
attacks against Muslims. In June 2012 Omar Mohammed Khan, Mohammed Hasseen, Anzal Hussain, Mohammed Saud, Zohaib
Ahmed and Jewel Uddin travelled to an EDL rally in Dewsbury. The rally ended early and the attackers returned to Birmingham.
They were stopped on the M1 for having no car insurance. A subsequent search of the car uncovered homemade explosives, shotguns,
knives and a statement describing a ‘day of retaliation’.
[26] Joel Busher and Graham Macklin, 2015, op. cit.
[27] Joel Busher and Graham Macklin, ‘Understanding “Reciprocal Radicalisation” as a Component of Wider Conflict Dynamics,’
(Radicalisation Research, 2018)
[28] Mark Littler and Matthew Feldman, Annual Monitoring, Cumulative Extremism, and Policy Implications, (Centre for Fascist,
Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies, 2015)
[29] The manifesto released by the Christchurch attacker Brenton Tarrant referenced the death of Ebba Akerlund, an 11-year-old
killed in a 2017 Islamist terror attack in Stockholm.
[30] Donald Holbrook, ‘Far Right and Islamist Extremist Discourses: Shifting Patterns of Enmity,’ in M. Taylor, Currie, P., and
Holbrook, D. (eds.) Extreme Right-Wing Political Violence and Terrorism. (Bloomsbury, 2013)
[31] Julia Ebner, The Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right Extremism, (I.B. Tauris 2017). 139, 141
ISSN 2334-3745 113 June 2020

[32] Graham Macklin and Joel Busher, ‘The Missing Spirals of Violence: Four Waves of Movement–Countermovement Contest in
Post-War Britain,’ Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, vol. 7 no. 1 (2015), 53–68.
[33] Alexander Carter ‘Cumulative Extremism: Escalation of Movement–Countermovement Dynamics in Northern Ireland between
1967 and 1972,’ Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, vol. 9 no. 1 (2016) 37-51.
[34] Alexander Carter, 2016, op. cit. 10
[35] Michael Billig Fascists: A Social Psychological View of the National Front, (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978)
[36] Nigel Copsey ‘Au Revoir to “Sacred Cows”? Assessing the Impact of the Nouvelle Droite in Britain,’ Democracy and Security, vol.
9, no. 3, (2013), 287–303. Graham Macklin ‘Co-opting the Counter Culture: Troy Southgate and the National Revolutionary Faction,’
Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 39, no. 3, (2005) 301–326.
[37] ‘Leaderless Resistance,’ accessed October 10, 2018, URL http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm See also: ‘A Practical Guide
to The Strategy and Tactics of Revolution,’ accessed October 10, 2018, URL: https://ironyouthparty.wordpress.com/2011/08/01/
strategy-and-tactics-of-revolution-david-myatt/ ‘Building a Distributed Counterjihad Network,’ accessed October 10, 2018 URL:
http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com/2009/06/building-distributed-counterjihad.html
[38] Jefferey Kaplan, ‘Right Wing Violence in North America,’ in T. Bjorgø, (Ed.), Terror From the Extreme Right (Frank Cass, 1995).
[39] Fabian Virchow, ‘The Groupuscularization of neo-Nazism in Germany: The Case of the Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland,’ Patterns
of Prejudice, vol. 38 no. 1, (2004), 56–70.
[40] See also: Roger Griffin, 2003, op. cit.
[41] Hilary Pilkington, Loud and Proud: Passion and Politics in the English Defence League. (Manchester University Press, 2016). Joel
Busher, The Making of Anti-Muslim Protest: Grassroots Activism and the English Defence League, (London: Routledge, 2015).
[42] Daniel Koehler (2014), ‘German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective. A First Quantitative Overview of the Database
on Terrorism in Germany (Right-Wing Extremism – DTGrwx Project,’ Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 8 no. 5, (2014). Jacob Ravndal
(2016). ‘Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV Dataset,’ Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 10,
no. 3, (2016).
[43] “When Hate Went Online,’ accessed July 26, 2019, URL: https://www.researchforprogress.us/topic/34691/when-hate-went-
online/. The term far-right is used here to include activists opposed to democratic methods (extreme-right) and those willing to work
towards far-right goals within democratic structures (radical-right). See: Jacob Ravndal and Tore Bjørgo, ‘Investigating Terrorism
from the Extreme Right: A Review of Past and Present Research,’ Perspectives on Terrorism, vol 12, no. 6, (2018).
[44] Jacob Ravndal, ‘Anders Behring Breivik’s Use of the Internet and Social Media,’ JEX Journal for Deradicalization and Democratic
Culture, no. 2, (2013) 172–185. Benjamin Lee, ‘A Day in the “Swamp”: Understanding Discourse in the Online Counter-Jihad Nebula,’
Democracy and Security, vol. 11 no. 3, (2015), 248–274.
[45] Derek O’Callaghan, Derek Greene, Maura Conway, Joe Carthy, and Pádraig Cunningham, ‘Down the (White) Rabbit Hole: The
Extreme Right and Online Recommender Systems,’ Social Science Computer Review, vol. 33, no. 4, (2015), 459–478. Rebecca Lewis,
Broadcasting the Reactionary Right on YouTube (Data & Society Research Institute, 2018). Maura Conway, ‘Routing the Extreme-
Right: Challenges For Social Media Platforms,’ The RUSI Journal, Vol. 165, No. 1, (2020), 108-113.
[46] Peter Waldmann, ‘The Radical Milieu: The Under-Investigated Relationship Between Terrorists and Sympathetic Communities,’
Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 2, no 9 (2008). Stefan Malthaner and Peter Waldmann, ‘The Radical Milieu: Conceptualizing the
Supportive Social Environment of Terrorist Groups,’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, no. 37 vol. 12 (2014), 979–998. See also: Maura
Conway, ‘From al-Zarqawi to al-Awlaki: The Emergence of the Internet as a New Form of Violent Radical Milieu,’ CTX: Combating
Terrorism Exchange, no. 2, vol. 4 (2012) 12–22.
[47] Colin Campbell ‘The Cult, the Cultic Milieu, and Secularization,’ in J. Kaplan, and Lööw, H. (eds) The Cultic Milieu: Oppositional
Subcultures in an Age of Globalization, (Roman & Littlefield, 2002) 12-25. Jeffery Kaplan (2002) ‘The Postwar Paths of Occult National
Socialism,’ in J. Kaplan, and Lööw, H. (eds) The Cultic Milieu: Oppositional Subcultures in an Age of Globalization, (Roman & Littlefield,
2002) 225-264. Jeffrey Kaplan, ‘Right Wing Violence in North America,’ in T. Bjorgø, (ed) Terror From the Extreme Right. (Frank Cass,
1995), 44-95.
[48] Colin Campbell, 2002, op. cit. Robert Balch and David Taylor, ‘Seekers and Saucers: The Role of the Cultic Milieu in Joining a
UFO Cult,’ American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 20 no. 6 (1977), 839–860.
[49] Lella Nouri, and Amy-Lousie Watkin, ‘Far-Right Hate Group “Britain First” (That Trump Retweeted) Joins Extremist-Friendly
Gab,’ accessed June 2, 2020, URL: http://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2018/08/03/far-right-hate-group-britain-first-that-trump-
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retweeted-joins-extremist-friendly-gab/
[50] Manuela Caiani & Patricia Kröll, ‘The transnationalization of the extreme right and the use of the Internet,’ International Journal
of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, vol. 39, no. 4, (2015). Anton Shekhovtsov, Russian and the Western Far-Right: Tango
Noir. (Routledge, 2018), Graham Macklin, ‘“Only Bullets will Stop Us!” – The Banning of National Action in Britain,’ Perspectives on
Terrorism Vol. 12, No. 6, (2018) 104-122.
[51] Robert Benford and David Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,’ Annual Review of
Sociology, vol. 26, no. 1 (2000), 611–639.
[52] Lorraine Bowman-Grieve, ‘Exploring Stormfront: A Virtual Community of the Radical Right,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
vol. 31 no. 11 (2009), 989-1007.
[53] Estimates from the Southern Poverty Law Centre (SPLC), a US-based anti-hate advocacy group, suggest that as of 2015
Stormfront had 300,000 users accounts registered, although far fewer of these were actively posting (SPLC n.d.). SPLC also noted
that as no account is required to access most of the material on SF, the numbers reading the forums may be far higher.
[54] Benjamin Lee, 2015, op. cit.
[55] Benjamin Lee, ‘Why We Fight: Understanding the Counter-Jihad Movement,’ Religion Compass, vol. 10 no. 10 (2016), 257-265.
[56] Angela Nagle, Kill All Normies: Online Culture Wars from 4chan and Tumblr to Trump and the Alt-Right (Zero Books, 2017).
George Hawley, Making Sense of the Alt-Right, (Columbia, 2017). Mike Wendling, Alt-Right: From 4chan to the White House, (Pluto
Press, 2017).
[57] Alex Schmid, ‘The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism,’ Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 6 no. 2 (2012).
[58] ‘Paul Joseph Watson “Well Imagine My Shock” Compilation,’ accessed July 26, 2019, URL: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=72KbeqN7pZ4
[59] Normie is a term used to refer to political unengaged whites by the alt-right
[60] The website ‘redwatch’ seemingly carried on from a printed newsletter linked to far-right terror group Combat18 of the same
name. Other far-right spaces have given birth to ‘campus watch’, an initiative of the Middle East Forum, a thinktank linked to Daniel
Pipes, which maintains lists of trustworthy and untrustworthy academics. A recent push by the German right-wing AfD encouraged
schoolchildren to inform on teacher bias. Although these calls are not inherently violent, they feed into a well-established right-wing
trope of the ‘day of the rope’, a point when scores will be settled against political opponents. This event-- mass murder of political
opponents—is described in detail in the far-right novel The Turner Diaries, but has also featured more obliquely in a 2010 speech by
UK far-right activist Paul Weston that included the line: ‘You will appear before a Nuremberg-style court, and you will be tried for
treason, and you will be tried for crimes against humanity, and for the first time in a very long time you will be answerable to us!’.
[61] Ehud Sprinzak, 1995, op. cit.
[62] Ehud Sprinzak, 1995, op. cit. Jeffery Kaplan, 1995, op. cit.
[63] Graham Macklin and Joel Busher, 2015, op. cit.
[64] Alex DiBranco, ‘Male Supremacist Terrorism as a Rising Threat,’ accessed June 2, 2020, URL: https://icct.nl/publication/male-
supremacist-terrorism-as-a-rising-threat/
[65] Community Security Trust ‘“White Jihad”: Jack Renshaw’s journey from a far-right student to would-be terrorist,’ accessed June
2, 2020, URL: https://cst.org.uk/news/blog/2020/05/13/white-jihad-jack-renshaws-journey-from-a-far-right-student-to-would-be-
terrorist
[66] Joe Mulhall, ‘A Post-Organisational Far Right?’ accessed June 2, 2020, URL: https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/research/state-of-
hate-2018/online-radicalisation/post-organisational-far-right/
[67] Graham Macklin, Failed Fuhrers: A History of Britain’s Extreme-Right (Routledge 2020) pp. 549-550. Paul Jackson ‘#hitlerwasright:
National Action and National Socialism for the 21st Century,’ Journal for Deradicalization Winter 14/15, No. 1, (2014) p97-115. Roger
Griffin, 2003, op. cit., Virchow, 2004, op. cit.
[68] Colin Campbell, 2002, op. cit.
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Policy Notes
‘Remodelling:’ The Need for More Robust Models and Metrics

for Counterterrorism Threat Analysis
by Jason A. Bakas
Abstract
In this Policy Note the author addresses shortcomings found in many current proprietary counterterrorism threat
assessment tools used by government agencies. In addition, he provides evidence which makes a strong case for
the adoption of a Structured Professional Judgment methodology, to be used as the basis of future proprietary or
in-house terrorist threat assessments within law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Keywords: actuarial, counterterrorism, intelligence agency, law enforcement, structured professional judgment,
terrorist threat assessment, validity
Introduction
Terrorism threat assessments are important tools used throughout law enforcement and intelligence agencies
internationally. These assessments are designed to evaluate the threat specific terrorist groups and lone actors
pose. The models are necessary for counterterrorism (CT) agencies to be able to minimize poor judgments
in the form of both false positives - that is identifying individuals or groups as a terrorist threat, when in fact
they are not intending to engage in terrorist acts - and false negatives - where individuals or groups who are
intending to commit acts of terrorism are not considered dangerous, which may result in a terrorist attack being
committed. In many cases, organizations responsible for CT develop their own proprietary threat assessments.
This is often done to ensure the threat assessment fulfils the operational needs related to a counterterrorism
organization’s abilities. However, there are some critical issues that have been identified with regards to many
of these in-house terrorist threat assessments. These issues are not only theoretical, but have been witnessed by
the author of this Policy Note as critical flaws in a number of proprietary CT threat assessments internationally.
Questionable Validity
One of the main concerns found with many proprietary threat assessments is questionable validity. A critical
process in evaluating the effectiveness of any threat assessment metric or model, is to evaluate it for both
reliability and validity. These frameworks are used to determine if an assessment instrument is actually
measuring what it claims to be measuring, and that the resulting judgements that come from employing the
assessment instrument accurately reflect the outcomes of what is meant to be assessed. To paraphrase renowned
researchers and assessment developers Douglas and Kropp - without evidence of reliability and validity, a
threat assessment instrument is valueless.[1] This author has found that rigorous tests of validity and reliability
are rarely conducted or reported. This widespread tendency to under report - or not conduct - tests of validity
and reliability leaves many proprietary CT threat assessments in a precarious situation. It begs the question: Is
it simply under-reporting or hidden invalidity? We just don’t know. When encountering these proprietary threat
instruments, the author would enquire about how the assessment was developed, its validity and how the
validity was tested. These questions would be directed to the sub-units or research divisions which created the
assessments. In almost all cases, the question of appropriate constructs and validation testing was not answered,
or poorly answered. This leaves it unclear how these metrics were developed; how indicators were defined; the
degree of efficacy the assessment has; or if the metric is based on robust empirical or theoretical evidence.
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Further, in many cases where CT agencies did conduct testing on their proprietary threat assessment models,
researchers placed an over-reliance on Cronbach’s α, as the sole source of evidence demonstrating validity
and reliability. The problem here is that these assessments may seem to demonstrate strong structural validity
on the surface, but when subjected to more rigorous tests beyond Cronbach’s α, they may have significant
shortcomings. These more rigorous tests include examining for scores across time with Test-Retest Reliability;
or the structure of the latent constructs with Confirmatory Factor Analysis; or Measurement Invariance for an
assessment’s equivalence across populations; or calculating Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient, Kendall’s Coefficient of
Concordance, or Intraclass Coefficient for inter-rater reliability. Very few of the CT assessments seen by this
author were examined with any of these more advanced methods. This raises some serious questions – the first
being: why not?
You Don’t Know, What You Don’t Know

The answer to a lack of testing might come from a 2017 study conducted by Flake and colleagues, which
found that tests of structural validity, such as measurement invariance, are poorly understood and infrequently
conducted in many scholarly works within social and personality measurement psychology (the structure of
psychometrics are very similar to threat assessments, they are both latent variable models).[2] Moreover, Flake
and colleagues study found many of these same scholarly works rarely reported rigorous methodologies for
testing validity or these lacked appropriate validation testing completely. In addition, a 2008 study by Aiken
and colleagues, found that measurement and test theory is often ignored in doctoral level graduate studies
within psychology and that only a minority of doctoral students know how to apply the methods of reliability
testing correctly.[3] Thus, if many doctorate level academic researchers lack this knowledge, we can make the
inference that many practitioner researchers may also lack the knowledge in measurement and Classical Test
Theory. However, this is a poor excuse. Practitioner researchers and their instruments should be held to the
highest standard. Lives are depending on them getting it right.
The Issues with Actuarial Metrics as Terrorist Threat Tools

The lack of proper reliability, and validity (weather it be based on a lack of knowledge or otherwise) brings
to light a much larger issue regarding the efficacy of many proprietary CT threat assessments. Because many
organizations don’t test - or don’t know how to properly test their assessments - we can not see whether
there are some fundamental problematic issues that are underlying the construction of these metrics. The
vast majority of these proprietary threat assessments witnessed by the author (almost all), are what can be
defined as actuarial models – they are latent variable models that employ the use of a ‘check list’ system of
fixed numerically weighted indicators.[4] These indicators are scored, using statistical formulas to calculate
and conclude a predictive threat score on a numerical scale, or as a predictive percentage. The advantages of
actuarial metrics include their ability to allow objectivity in decision-making and a high inter-rater reliability
across evaluators. However, in this author’s opinion, there are some critical limitations which make actuarial
metrics highly problematic for terrorist threat assessment. This is especially the case when they are constructed
by researchers who themselves have a poor understanding of measurement - and test-theory. The main issue
here is the tool’s generalizability across terrorist actors. Actuarial applications for assessing terrorist threats
lack strong invariance. They may work well for a specific type of terrorist actor or group who remain static, as
unchangeable entities - but they do not work so well when applied to a spectrum of terrorist individuals, or
groups of individuals; or the same terrorist individuals or groups of individuals in different contexts or settings;
or over time. Such a statement is admittedly controversial and may raise more than a few eye brows – but as
explained below in further detail, this should become more evident.
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Poor Linguistic Invariance

There are hundreds of definitions of terrorism, and equally hundreds of scholarly works which discuss the
various definitional issues of terrorism. For example, in 2011 Easson and Schmid identified 260 definitions
of terrorism that hold a level of validity in describing this phenomenon.[5] Some researchers and analysts
hold that terrorism must be motivated by ideology, while others state it can (also) be motivated by personal
or vicarious revenge, or other idiosyncratic incentives.[6] Many other examples of disagreement exist, e.g.
regarding raicalization or extremism. The same definitional disagreement issues are found within government
and CT organizations, which makes sharing intelligence data sometimes potentially problematic. This issue
becomes even more complicated when it comes to additional definitional issues, such as those surrounding
‘lone wolf ’ or ‘lone actor’ terrorism. For example, some agencies include in their monitoring individuals with
severe mental illness who are inspired or directed to engage in attacks on behalf of an extremist movement.
Others exclude these, because mental illness-related lethal violence is considered to be ‘mass murder’ and not
terrorism, even if it is linked to a larger extremist movement. The boundaries of terrorism are inevitably fuzzy,
and if we do not have a precise way of defining terrorism - then we really do not know what exactly is - or
should be - considered a threat indicator for terrorism. Because of this, we do not know the extent to which
an actuarial model includes all the right elements, and excludes all the irrelevant elements. This issue becomes
more problematic when assigning weights or numerical values to these indicators.
Questionable Indicators
In relation to questionable concepts, and the notion of what exactly is - or should be - considered a threat
indicator for terrorism, the author has found that many threat assessment instruments incorporate empirically
questionable indicators – indicators that may have been found to be related to threats in some isolated cases,
but are not necessarily applicable across most individuals or groups of terrorists. Within academia, the issue
of a lack of robust generalizable indicators to terrorism propensity is rooted in low base-rates.[7] Base-rates
are statistics used to describe the percentage of a population that demonstrates some characteristic. The issue
of low base-rates in scholarly works can be the result of a relatively small body of empirical data, which stems
from the obvious challenges of academics having access to – and being able to publish – operational terrorist
data acquired from CT organizations. Despite CT organizations housing a large body of empirical data (which
is acquired in the course of their investigations) – we do not really know if concepts found in the ‘in-house data’
used to develop indicators are truly generalizable. This is due to a couple of reasons. The first being, the type, scope
and quality of data collected. If we look at the way the UK’s Metropolitan Police has collected data on suspected
gang members, we can see how datasets held by law enforcement organizations could be problematic.[8] A
May 2020 report by Amnesty International found that the Metropolitan Police’s Gangs Matrix - a database
of suspected gang members in London designed to be used by police to prevent serious gang violence – had
collected data in a “chaotic, inconsistent” manner and was “not fit for [its] purpose”.[9] Reports state that the
threshold for data collection was “very low” with “no clear guidance or criteria, and wide discretion for police
officers and partner agencies”.[10] If this same problematic issue exists also within CT organizations, there
would likely be challenges in effectively operationalizing data. The second issue, as previously stated, is a lack of
appropriate construct and validation testing. Because we have seen an indicator’s relevance in a limited number
of ‘N’ cases – does this mean it is relevant across a spectrum of most terrorist actors? We don’t know – and without
proper testing we cannot make claims about the generalizability of indicators with a high level of confidence.
Moreover, because terrorist investigations and terrorist groups or individuals are nuanced in situational and
dynamic contexts, it raises the question – assuming we had well collected data, what are the chances of finding
robust generalizable indicators, that would be efficacious, when applied in actuarial models?
By definition, an indicator must vary systematically with changes in the latent construct - it must increase or
decrease monotonically with that latent construct. In other words, when higher or lower scores are observed on
the indicator, this must be related to an increase or decrease in the latent construct’s values. However, many of the
indicators found by this author in proprietary threat assessments have been shown to not be generalizable within
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the academic literature – and, as stated, there is no evidence to suggest they have demonstrated generalizability
in ‘in-house’ CT datasets. For example, the author has seen “time spent consuming violent extremist media” as
a threat indicator on more than one nationally used terrorist threat assessment. However, those who are found
to be both consumers and producers of violent extremist media are not necessarily on a trajectory for engaging
in terrorism violence.[11] The same can be said for radicalization. “The degree or severity of radicalization” was
found to be present in many proprietary actuarial threat assessments, but it has been well documented that
holding an extremist or radical ideology does not necessarily put an individual on a trajectory for engaging in
terrorism violence. In fact, most persons who hold an extremist ideology do not themselves engage in violence.
[12] Moreover, not everyone who engages in violence, in the name of a terrorist group or movement, holds
an extremist or radical ideology.[13] Therefore, the best evidence available demonstrates that indicators such
as extremist media consumption and radicalization, do not necessarily vary monotonically with the construct
of interest - which in our case is the threat of engaging in a terrorist attack. Thus, models that use this type of
indicators are making an indirect inference. If we do not have accurate threat indicators, how can we expect to
predict or measure the threat of terrorism? This begs the question: why are we selecting imperfect indicators for
assessments and mechanically apply them the same way every time?
While all types of assessment instruments are reliant on the assumption of validity generalization from
population data to an individual - this is especially the case in actuarial models, because these have a great
assumption burden, due to the fact that they function mathematically or algorithmically.[14] Thus, for actuarial
models to be efficacious we need probability statistics (i.e. base-rates) of a sufficient breadth of quality and
quantity. But is this realistic? As stated, each terrorist investigation and terrorist group or individual is nuanced
in situational and dynamic contexts. The weight of indicators may need to be based upon case-specific details.
Actuarial fixed weighted indicators calculated with an algorithm are not going to be able to account for this.
As a consequence, in some cases they may pay too much attention to certain indicators and not enough (or
ignore) to other indicators. Because it is mathematical or algorithmic, the process of how threat predictions
were made cannot be reviewed – we just have to trust the algorithm. It is highly problematic to use imperfect
fixed weighted indicators to make threat predictions in cases where we know a dynamic mixture of nuance,
situation and context matter. On top of this, we cannot check the process to make sure it is accounting for
and evaluating the most important factors. We are just blindly trusting the assessment even though we know
indicators may be flawed - that’s like trusting your wrist watch, when it doesn’t tell time all that well and when
time might be changing.
Poor Measurement Invariance

The issue of poor generalizability of indicators, brings to light the issue of assessment measurement invariance.
Measurement invariance is a scaled capacity to measure the same construct in a comparable way across
populations or across contexts. In other words, it is the degree of generalizability of an evaluation. Outside
of terrorism, this is often tested to see if an assessment or metric is well represented across different genders
or cultures. The question of measurement invariance (assuming concepts are defined in a consistent manner)
can be answered by applying statistical evaluations, such as the application of Multi-Group Confirmatory
Factor Analysis. However, the vast majority of actuarial proprietary CT threat assessments encountered by this
author were unable to demonstrate strong measurement invariance - yet each assessment claimed it. Again,
this widespread tendency to not demonstrate - or not conduct – appropriate testing leaves many proprietary
threat assessments in a precarious situation, leaving us with the question: do they really work the way they say
they work?
Issues related to linguistic invariance and questionable indicators, create inherent problematic issues with
measurement invariance. This is especially the case in actuarial models, as stated previously, since these models
hold a great assumption burden, due to the fact that they function statistically.[15] If an assessment developer
uses a small population data set of a specific terrorist type or sub-type as his or her representative sample,
we are likely to see qualities of validity and reliability only hold in relation to the given test population. The
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generalizability to other terrorist populations, or even the same terrorist population were changes occur, is
questionable. What’s true for jihadists might not be true for white nationalists, ethnic secessionists, or even for
a different jihadist group. If this lack of generalizability was related to genders or cultures, these assessments
would be seen as biased towards a gender or cultural majority. In its application to terrorism, this is still a bias,
but bias towards the specific terrorist type or sub-type sample used in the development of a measurement
instrument. In many cases assessment developers in CT organizations are not testing the relation between test
scores and criterion variables or outcomes, to see if they are consistent across groups, using large samples. They
are simply just assuming strong invariance. These assessments are then rolled out with false confidence, which
may lead to an intelligence or security agency adopting and implementing a potentially flawed assessment.
Simpson’s Paradox
Another, and most problematic issue with the use of actuarial metrics for proprietary threat assessment is
Simpson’s paradox. This is a phenomenon in which individual trends appear in different groups of data but
disappears or reverses when these groups are combined. For example, assuming the indicators are accurate, if
we apply a high trending threat group of individuals – ‘Jihadi Group A’ (who are consistent with the data set
majority used in development) - to a threat assessment, we would likely see a relationship were the greater the
presence or degree of indicators, the greater the threat outcome. If we also plotted a high – yet low trending
threat group of individuals – ‘Jihadi Group B’, on its own, we see a trend in the opposite direction. However, if
we do not separate the groups, we would see the regression line in the direction of ‘Jihadi Group A’. Therefore,
a CT agency would consider individuals in ‘Jihadi Group B’ as moving towards a high threat direction, when
in fact it is not (see Figure 1).
Figure 1:
We might even see a positive trend (high threat) in both groups when they are separate, but when the groups
are combined, we see a negative trend; resulting in a low threat (see Figure 2).[16]
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Figure 2:
We can see from this, that in many cases actuarial threat metrics do not always demonstrate an accurate threat
picture. The issue is, we need to know when to break down our terrorist populations into groups. However, this
author has encountered many proprietary threat metrics that are meant to be used as universal for all terrorists
- or for all terrorists of a specific subtype. So why would a CT analyst identify distinct factors and collect for group
differences if they are told they do not need to? It is important to note, that no test model is capable of perfectly
capturing the theoretical variables of interest and that some degree of error is unavoidable, but this can be
accounted for with proper statistical test analysis. The issue here is with Systematic Error sometimes called
Statistical Bias – it is bias built into the test. This is not a question of inaccurate intelligence leading to a faulty
threat picture, as is often claimed. Rather it is the reliance on threat assessment instruments that have not been
properly developed or evaluated before they are rolled out for application.
One Solution may be Adopting an SPJ Approach

The Structured Professional Judgment or SPJ method of assessment has been used in medical practice and
psychology for decades. In fact, in recent years a handful of these SPJ psychometric violence assessments have
been designed by academics for use in evaluating terrorism violence – primarily to be utilized in correctional
settings.[17] Despite this trend, in all the in-house developed CT threat assessments this author has seen, few
used the SPJ approach.
Like actuarial metrics, the SPJ model provides assessors with a structured ‘check list’ of indicators that are
rooted in strong empirical or theoretical evidence. However, it differs as this ‘check list’ does not hold the
same level of rigidity. Rather, the list of indicators functions as a set of systematic guidelines for evaluating
the outcome construct - in our case terrorism threat. The SPJ methodology ‘unlocks’ the indicators from fixed
numerically weighted rankings and allows the evaluator (in our case a CT analyst or case officer) to attribute
the presence and relevance of indicators - through interpreting and appreciating information related to the
threat propensity of the individual or group under investigation. Therefore, unlike actuarial metrics, which
may pay too much attention to certain indicators and not enough or altogether ignore other indicators, the SPJ
method allows the evaluator the flexibility to take into account situational and contextual factors, while still
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being guided in decision-making with a structured approach.

As a result of this flexibility, the SPJ method mitigates against issues discussed as problematical in this Policy
Note, such as poor invariance and test bias. Further, these SPJ models are not predictive but rather probabilistic,
and thus attribute the presence or degree of indicators to an increased level of threat, not a determinate level
of threat. As mentioned before, SPJ tools have been used in physicians’ medical assessments for years. For
example, while conducting a health check-up, if a doctor were to find a patient to have (i) hypertension (ii)
be a smoker; (iii) suffer from obesity; (iv) have a family history of heart disease and (v) have diabetes - that
physician would be able to conclude that the patient has an increased probability for cardiovascular failure
-related death (i.e. all the major indicators are present). However, if only one or two of those indicators are
present (lets say hypertension and family history) an individual could be potentially at the same level, or higher
level, of probabilistic risk of cardiovascular related death. As we know, not everyone with all heart disease
indicators will have a heart attack while some people with only one or two of those indicators will actually have
a heart attack and die as a consequence. This same principle applies to terrorist threat. It is not necessarily the
number of indicators, but rather the value of those indicators found to be present within the context of the
case that matters. Because of the SPJ method’s flexibility, and its design to allow the evaluator to interpret and
appreciate information, it has been argued that the SPJ approach is the more appropriate and the most fruitful
form of assessment when completing evaluations under conditions where the information available is limited
and often is also of poor quality.[18] This is often the case during active investigations, when time-pressured
CT professionals do not have enough data on-hand that would meet a ‘clinical standard.’
While most familiar with SPJ maintain that this flexibility is a strength of the method, others have criticized
it as a weakness. It has been suggested that the interpretive nature of the methodology can lead to decision-
making bias, and even that the SPJ approach is ill-suited for law enforcement or other security agency use.
However, research conducted by Storey and colleagues found that, following proper training, SPJ assessments
could be accurately used by police and other criminal justice professionals.[19] Moreover, many scholars argue
through training and acquiring a background knowledge on indicators to violence and the population type
being assessed, issues of bias can be minimized or even off-set. When it comes to CT, anyone applying or using
any type of threat model should be highly knowledgeable about terrorism in general and the terrorist group or
individual they are assessing.
There Is Still the Problem of Questionable Validity

Of the few SPJ proprietary CT threat assessments this author had the privilege to observe, many did not
provide strong evidence – or any evidence - related to appropriate construct and validation testing. This takes
us back to the same issue - it is unclear how these metrics were developed; how indicators were defined, the
degree of efficacy the assessment has; or if the metrics used are based on robust empirical or theory-driven
evidence. Even though SPJ assessments do not apply algorithmic or statistical computations in determining
threat attribution – they still must be developed and tested with strong scientific rigor. These models still
need to demonstrate reliability and validity; indicators still must demonstrate evidence of a relationship-based
outcome with the latent construct; and the indicators must still demonstrate evidence of generalizability to the
terrorist population of interest. Oversights in appropriate testing could lead to false positive or false negative
assessments of threats, which could be significantly detrimental to public safety. In short, reliability and validity
testing must be conducted, and should be reported.
Conclusion
In this Policy Note, a number of shortcomings found in many proprietary threat assessments that have been
developed by law enforcement CT organizations were presented. In the author’s opinion, many of these arose
from a poor understanding of model development and evaluation testing. These issues are amplified when
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untrained or unskilled model developers attempt to create functional actuarial threat metrics. Because terrorism
is an elastic and amorphous concept, the author argues that - even at best - CT actuarial threat assessments are
problematic, and he concludes that the adoption of a Structured Professional Judgment methodology would
likely be more efficacious. Therefore, it is recommended, that the Structured Professional Judgment method
should be adopted as basis of future proprietary or in-house terrorist threat assessments. Now more than ever,
forecasting the threat terrorists, or potential terrorist actors, pose is of utmost importance; we cannot afford to
get it wrong given the high number of potential perpetrators. A 2020 report by the UK government found that
British intelligence agencies are aware of more than 43,000 individuals who pose a potential terrorist threat
to the UK.[20] Of that number, 3,000 are considered ‘subjects of interest’ and are under active investigation. If
CT agencies are going to develop their own threat assessment metrics and models, they need to have all the
knowledge to get it right. To paraphrase Victoroff – a lack of good understanding on terrorism has left many
CT policy makers to design counterterrorism strategies without the full benefit of facts – or – worse - be guided
by theoretical presumptions assumed to be factual.[21]
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Policy Note are the author’s and the author’s alone. They do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of the author’s professional or academic affiliations. The counterterrorist
threat assessments discussed in this Policy Note have been personally examined by the author. The names of
the agencies which develop and own the assessment instruments discussed here, the number of assessments
examined, as well as the nature and contents of these assessment tools, can, unfortunately, not be disclosed here
for security reasons.
About the Author: Jason A. Bakas is an intelligence professional and researcher. He has been recognized
internationally for his work in advancing risk and threat assessments in the application of counterterrorism and
counter-organized crime. He holds a Master’s of Arts from American Military University’s School of Security and
Global Studies and was a student of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START), at the University of Maryland. Correspondence ought to be addressed to: [email protected]
Notes
[1] Douglas, K. S., & Kropp, P. R. (2002). ‘A prevention-based paradigm for violence risk assessment: Clinical and research applica-
tions’. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 29(5), 617–658; URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/009385402236735
[2] Flake, J. K., Pek, J., & Hehman, E. (2017). ‘Construct validation in social and personality research: Current practice and recom-
mendations’. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 8(4), 370-378; URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617693063
[3] Aiken, L. S., West, S. G., & Millsap, R. E. (2008). ‘Doctoral training in statistics, measurement, and methodology in psycholo-
gy: Replication and extension of Aiken, West, Sechrest, and Reno’s (1990) survey of PhD programs in North America’. American
Psychologist, 63(1), 32–50; URL: https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.63.1.32
[4] See the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Indicators of Mobilization to Violence (IMV), as an example of a counterterrorism
actuarial model which employs a check list system of fixed numerically weighted indicators. Please note:, neither this Policy Note,
nor the author are stating, implying or otherwise suggesting any factors discussed in this paper are in any way related or relevant to the
IMV. The IMV is simply cited as an example of a counterterrorism actuarial model used in law enforcement. The IMV was leaked
to the public in 2017: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3460923-Imv-Score-Final.html#document/p1
[5] Easson, J.J., & Schmid, A. P. (2011), ‘250+ Academic, Gvoernmental and Intergovernmental Definitions of Terrorism’; in:
Schmid, A. P. (Ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 99-200.
[6] Khalil, J. (2014). ‘Radical beliefs and violent actions are not synonymous: How to place the key disjuncture between attitudes
and behaviors at the heart of our research into political violence’. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37(2), 198-211; URL: https://doi.
org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.862902; Spaaij, R. (2011). Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Pre-
vention. Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media. p. 856.
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[7] Gill, P., Horgan, J., Corner, E., & Silver, J. (2016). ‘Indicators of lone actor violent events: The problems of low base rates
and long observational periods’. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 3(3-4), 165–173; URL: https://doi.org/10.1037/
tam0000066; Herrington, V., & Roberts, K. (2012). Risk assessment in counterterrorism. In U. Kumar & M. K. Mandal (Eds.),
Countering Terrorism: Psychosocial Strategies (pp. 282–305). London, United Kingdom: Sage; Pressman, D. E., & Flockton, J. (2014).
Violent extremist risk assessment: Issues and applications of the VERA-2 in a high-security correctional setting. In A. Silke (Ed.),
Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical issues in management, radicalisation and reform (pp. 122–143). London, United King-
dom: Routledge; Sarma, K. M. (2017). ‘Risk assessment and the prevention of radicalization from nonviolence into terrorism’.
American Psychologist, 72(3), 278–288; URL: https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000121
[8] Of note, neither this Policy Note, nor the author are stating, implying or otherwise suggesting that any counterterrorism orga-
nization collects data in an improper or inaccurate way, or in a manner that is discriminatory or racialized. The comparison to the
way the UK Metropolitan Police collected data is simply for reference purposes, to provide the reader with an open source example
of how police organizations may have erred in data collection.
[9] Amnesty International UK (2020, May 18). Trapped in the Gangs Matrix. URL:https://www.amnesty.org.uk/london-tri-
dent-gangs-matrix-metropolitan-police; Full Report: Amnesty International. (2018). Trapped in the Matrix: Secrecy, stigma, and
bias in the Met’s gangs database; URL: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2018-05/Trapped%20in%20the%20Matrix%20Amnes-
ty%20report.pdf?lJSxllcKfkZgr4gHZsz0vW8JZ0W3V_PD=
[10] Ibid.
[11] Brachman, J. M. (2010 Jul, 29). ‘My Pen Pal, the Jihadist’. Foreign Policy. URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/07/29/my-
pen-pal-the-jihadist/; Brachman, J. M. (2010 Oct, 10). “Watching the Watchers.” Foreign Policy.URL: https://foreignpolicy.
com/2010/10/12/watching-the-watchers/21; Brachman, J. M. (2008). Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice. New York:Routledge.
[12] Borum, R. (2011). ‘Radicalization into violent extremism I: A review of social science theories’. Journal of Strategic Security,
4(4), 7-36; URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.1; Horgan, J., & Taylor, M. (2011). ‘Disengagement, de-radicalization and
the arc of terrorism: Future directions for research’. In R. Coolsaet (Ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge (pp.
173-186). London, UK: Ashgate.
[13] Borum, R. and Robert Fein (2017) ‘The Psychology of Foreign Fighters’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (40) 3, 248-266;
URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188535; Holbrook, D., & Horgan, J. (2019). ‘Terrorism and Ideology: Cracking the
Nut’. Perspectives on Terrorism, 13(6), 2-15; URL: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspec-
tives-on-terrorism/2019/issue-6/01-holbrook-and-horgan.pdf; Khalil, J. (2014). ‘Radical beliefs and violent actions are not synony-
mous: How to place the key disjuncture between attitudes and behaviors at the heart of our research into political violence’. Studies
in Conflict & Terrorism, 37(2), 198-211; URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.862902; Neumann, P. R. (2015). ‘Victims,
Perpetrators, Assets: The narratives of Islamic State defectors’. King’s College London: ICSR, p.9; URL: https://icsr.info/wp-content/
uploads/2015/10/ICSR-Report-Victims-Perpetrators-Assets-The-Narratives-of-Islamic-State-Defectors.pdf .
[14] Hoekstra R, Kiers HAL and Johnson A. (2012) ‘Are assumptions of well-known statistical techniques checked, and why (not)?’
Front. Psychology 3:137; URL: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00137
[15] Ibid.
[16] Clifford H. Wagner (1982) ‘Simpson’s Paradox in Real Life’, The American Statistician, 36:1, 46-48; DOI:
10.1080/00031305.1982.10482778; an example of Simpson’s paradox: a positive trend appears for two separate groups and a nega-
tive trend appears when the groups are combined. URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simpson%27s_paradox#/media/File:Simp-
son’s_paradox_continuous.svg
[17] Lloyd, M. (2019). ‘Extremism Risk Assessment: A Directory’. The Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats
(CREST); URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/extremism-risk-assessment-directory/
[18] Sarma, K. M. (2017). ‘Risk assessment and the prevention of radicalization from nonviolence into terrorism’. American Psy-
chologist, 72(3), p.280; URL: https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000121
[19] Storey, E. J., Gibas, A. L., Reeves, K. A., & Hart, S. D. (2011). ‘Evaluation of a violence risk (threat) assessment training
program for police and other criminal justice professionals’. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 38,554–564; URL: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/0093854811403123
[20] Gadher, D. (2020). ‘Terrorism in the UK: Number of suspects tops 40,000 after MI5 rechecks its list’. The Times. April 11; URL:
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/terrorism-in-the-uk-number-of-suspects-tops-40-000-after-mi5-rechecks-its-list-pqm6k62ph
[21] Victoroff, J. (2005). ‘The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches’. Journal of Conflict Resolu-
tion, 49(1), 3-42; URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704272040
ISSN 2334-3745 124 June 2020

Bibliography: Children, Youth, and Terrorism

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism – BSPT-JT-2020-5]
Abstract
This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliog-
raphies and other resources on the nexus between children, youth, and terrorism. It covers minors’ exploitation
by terrorist groups within organizations (e.g., as child soldiers or executioners) as well as other forms of direct or
indirect victimization (e.g., terrorist attacks against minors, their enslavement by militant organizations, or the
impact of terrorist acts on their psychological well-being). The bibliography focuses on recent publications (up to
May 2020) and should not be considered as exhaustive. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing
more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference
retrieval systems have been employed to broaden the search.
Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, children, youth, minors, adolescents, juveniles, terrorism, vic-
timization, exploitation, abuse, recruitment, child soldiers
NB: All websites were last visited on 20.05.2020. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.
Bibliographies and other Resources

Gangi, Jane M. (2009): Annotated Bibliography of Children’s Literature Resources on War, Terrorism, and
Disaster since 1945: By Continents/Countries for Grades K-8. Childhood Education, 85(6), 390-394. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/00094056.2009.10521407
Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project (YEIP) (2017, December): Young, Marginalised but not Radical-
ised: A Comparative Study of Positive Approaches to Youth Radicalisation: Bibliography. [in 6 Languages]. URL:
http://yeip.org/download/588
Books and Edited Volumes

Abbas, Tahir; Hamid, Sadek (Eds.) (2019): Political Muslims: Understanding Youth Resistance in a Global Con-
text. (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East). New York: Syracuse University Press.
Aidi, Hisham D. (2014): Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the New Muslim Youth Culture. New York: Vintage
Books.
Alabed, Bana (2017): Dear World: A Syrian Girl’s Story of War and Plea for Peace. New York: Simon & Schus-
ter.
Alava, Séraphin; Frau-Meigs, Divina; Hassan, Ghayda; with the collaboration of Hasna Hussein and Yuanyu-
an Wei (2017): Youth and Violent Extremism on Social Media: Mapping the Research. [e-Book]. Paris: United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). URL: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/
ark:/48223/pf0000260382
Benard, Cheryl (Ed.) (2005, September): A Future for the Young: Options for Helping Middle Eastern Youth
Escape the Trap of Radicalization. (RAND Working Papers, WR-354). [e-Book]. Santa Monica: RAND Cor-
poration. URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR354.html
Berko, Anat (2007): The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and their Dispatchers. (Eliza-
ISSN 2334-3745 125 June 2020

beth Yuval, Trans.). Westport: Praeger Security International.

Berko, Anat (2012): The Smarter Bomb: Women and Children as Suicide Bombers. Lanham: Rowman & Little-
field.
Bloom, Mia; with John Horgan (2019): Small Arms: Children and Terrorism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Borchgrevink, Aage (2013): A Norwegian Tragedy: Anders Behring Breivik and the Massacre on Utøya. (Guy
Puzey, Trans.). Cambridge: Polity Press.
Briggs, Jimmie (2005): Innocents Lost: When Child Soldiers Go to War. New York: Basic Books.
Bromark, Stian (2014): Massacre in Norway: The 2011 Terror Attacks on Oslo and the Utøya Youth Camp.
(Hon Khiam Leong, Trans.). Dulles: Potomac Books.
Cohen, Jared (2007): Children of Jihad: A Young American’s Travels among the Youth of the Middle East. Lon-
don: Gotham Books.
Cummings, E. Mark et al. (2017): Political Violence, Armed Conflict, and Youth Adjustment: A Developmental
Psychopathology Perspective on Research and Intervention. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan / Springer Nature. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51583-0
Davenport, Nicola (Ed.) (2017, July): Responses to Returnees: Foreign Terrorist Fighters and their Families.
[Manual]. Brussels: Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/
homeaffairs/files/ran_br_a4_m10_en.pdf
D’Costa, Bina (Ed.) (2016): Children and Violence: Politics of Conflict in South Asia. Delhi: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Denov, Myriam; Shevell, Meaghan C. (Eds.) (2019): Social Work Practice with War-Affected Children: The
Importance of Family, Art, Culture, and Context. Abingdon: Routledge.
Desbois, Patrick; Nastasie, Costel (2018): The Terrorist Factory: ISIS, The Yazidi Genocide, and Exporting Ter-
ror. (Shelley Temchin, Trans.). New York: Arcade Publishing.
Drumbl, Mark A.; Barrett, Jastine C. (Eds.) (2019): Research Handbook on Child Soldiers. (Research Hand-
books in International Law). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Duffy, Joe; McClements, Freya (2019): Children of the Troubles: The Untold Story of the Children Killed in the
Northern Ireland Conflict. Dublin: Hachette Books Ireland.
Dyregrov, Atle; Raundalen, Magne; Yule, William (2019): What Is Terrorism? A Book to Help Parents, Teachers
and other Grown-ups Talk with Kids about Terror. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
Edler, Kurt et al. (2015): Islamismus als pädagogische Herausforderung. (Brennpunkt Schule). Stuttgart: W.
Kohlhammer.
El-Gayar, Wael; Strunk, Katrin (Eds.) (2014): Integration versus Salafismus: Identitätsfindung muslimischer
Jugendlicher in Deutschland: Analysen – Methoden der Prävention – Praxisbeispiele. Schwalbach am Taunus:
Wochenschau Verlag.
Friedman, Matthew J.; Mikus-Kos, Anica (2005): Promoting the Psychosocial Well Being of Children Following
War and Terrorism. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 4). Am-
sterdam: IOS Press.
Friedman, Shimi (2018): The Hilltop Youth: A Stage of Resistance and Counter Culture Practice. (The Levant
and Near East: A Multidisciplinary Book Series). Lanham: Lexington Books.
Gerlach, Julia (2006): Zwischen Pop und Dschihad: Muslimische Jugendliche in Deutschland. Berlin: Ch. Links.
ISSN 2334-3745 126 June 2020

Giduck, John (2005): Terror at Beslan: A Russian Tragedy with Lessons for America’s Schools. n.p.: Archangel
Group.
Glaser, Michaela; Frank, Anja; Herding, Maruta (Eds.) (2018): Gewaltorientierter Islamismus im Jugendalter:
Perspektiven aus Jugendforschung und Jugendhilfe. (Sozialmagazin, 2. Sonderband 2018). Weinheim: Beltz.
Greenbaum, Charles W.; Veerman, Philip; Bacon-Shnoor, Naomi (Eds.) (2006): Protection of Children during
Armed Political Conflict: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. Antwerp: Intersentia.
Greenfeld, Valerie L. (2018): Backyard Jihad: How Parents Can Detect the Invisible Threat of Radicalization.
Phoenix: Jones Media Publishing.
Grover, Sonja C. (2011): Schoolchildren as Propaganda Tools in the War on Terror: Violating the Rights of
Afghani Children under International Law. Heidelberg: Springer. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-
17900-6
Grzegorczyk, Blanka (2020): Terror and Counter-Terror in Contemporary British Children’s Literature. (Chil-
dren’s Literature and Culture). Abingdon: Routledge.
Habila, Helon (2016): The Chibok Girls: The Boko Haram Kidnappings and Islamist Militancy in Nigeria. New
York: Columbia Global Reports.
Hofmeister, Wilhelm; Sarmah, Megha (Eds.) (2015): From the Desert to World Cities: The New Terrorism.
[e-Book]. (KAS Panorama, 01/2015). Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS). URL: https://www.kas.
de/en/web/politikdialog-asien/single-title/-/content/from-the-desert-to-world-cities-the-new-terrorism-1
Huynh, Kim; D’Costa, Bina; Lee-Koo, Katrina (2015): Children and Global Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Kaddor, Lamya (2015): Zum Töten bereit: Warum deutsche Jugendliche in den Dschihad ziehen. München:
Piper.
Kieran, David (Ed.) (2015): The War of my Generation: Youth Culture and the War on Terror. New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press.
Kurdi, Tima (2018): The Boy on the Beach: My Family’s Escape from Syria and our Hope for a New Home. New
York: Simon & Schuster.
La Greca, Annette M. et al. (Eds.) (2002): Helping Children Cope with Disasters and Terrorism. Washington,
DC: American Psychological Association (APA).
Lall, Marie; Saeed, Tania (2019): Youth and the National Narrative: Education, Terrorism and the Security State
in Pakistan. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Lefa, Melissa (Ed.) (2017, September): Correcting the Course: Advancing Juvenile Justice Principles for Children
Convicted of Violent Extremism Offenses. (Report). The Hague: Global Center on Cooperative Security / In-
ternational Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). URL: https://www.globalcenter.org/publications/correct-
ing-the-course-advancing-juvenile-justice-principles-for-children-convicted-of-violent-extremist-offenses
LoCicero, Alice (2014): Why “Good Kids” Turn into Deadly Terrorists: Deconstructing the Accused Boston Mar-
athon Bombers and Others Like them. Santa Barbara: Praeger.
LoCicero, Alice; Sinclair, Samuel J. (2008): Creating Young Martyrs: Conditions that Make Dying in a Terrorist
Attack Seem like a Good Idea. (Contemporary Psychology). Westport: Praeger Security International.
Lombardi, Marco et al. (2015): Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism among Youth to Prevent Ter-
rorism. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 118). Amster-
dam: IOS Press.
ISSN 2334-3745 127 June 2020

Maira, Sunaina Marr (2016): The 9/11 Generation: Youth, Rights, and Solidarity in the War on Terror. New
York: New York University Press.
Mansour, Ahmad (2015): Generation Allah: Warum wir im Kampf gegen religiösen Extremismus umdenken
müssen. Frankfurt: Fischer.
Moaveni, Azadeh (2019): Guest House for Young Widows: Among the Women of ISIS. New York: Random
House.
Moland, Naomi A. (2020): Can Big Bird Fight Terrorism? Children’s Television and Globalized Multicultural
Education. New York: Oxford University Press.
Morgan, Matthew J. (Ed.) (2009): The Impact of 9/11 on Psychology and Education. New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan US / Springer Nature. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230101593
Nash, Carolyn et al. (2017): Youth Led Guide on Prevention of Violent Extremism through Education. [e-Book].
New Delhi: Mahatma Gandhi Institute of Education for Peace and Sustainable Development. URL: https://
unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000260547
Nathan, Tobie (2019): Wandering Souls. (Stephen Muecke, Trans.) Cambridge: Polity Press.
Nilan, Pam (2017): Muslim Youth in the Diaspora: Challenging Extremism through Popular Culture. Abingdon:
Routledge.
Nortje, Windell; Quénivet, Noëlle (2020): Child Soldiers and the Defence of Duress under International Crimi-
nal Law. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan / Springer Nature. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20663-5
Nuri, Maqsudul Hasan; Khan, Rashid Ahmad; Khan, Muhammad Nawaz (2011): De-Radicalization and En-
gagement of Youth in Pakistan. Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) / Hanns Seidel Founda-
tion (HSS).
O’Neil, Siobhan; van Broeckhoven, Kato (Eds.) (2018, February): Cradled by Conflict: Child Involvement
with Armed Groups in Contemporary Conflict. [e-Book]. New York: United Nations University (UNU). URL:
https://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:6409
Özerdem, Alpaslan; Podder, Sukanya (2011): Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration. London: Pal-
grave Macmillan.
Panjwani, Farid et al. (Eds.) (2018): Education and Extremisms: Rethinking Liberal Pedagogies in the Contem-
porary World. Abingdon: Routledge.
Peled-Elhanan, Nurit (2012): Palestine in Israeli School Books: Ideology and Propaganda in Education. (Library
of Modern Middle East Studies, Vol. 82). London: I.B. Tauris.
Pilkington, Hilary; Pollock, Gary (Eds.) (2015): Radical Futures? Youth, Politics and Activism in Contemporary
Europe. (Sociological Review). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
PIN (2020, February): Psychoeducational Workshop Program: Handbook for Facilitators. [e-Book]. Belgrade:
Author. URL: https://www.hedayahcenter.org/resources/reports_and_publications/pin-handbook-for-facili-
tators
Ramsauer, Petra (2015): Die Dschihad-Generation: Wie der apokalyptische Kult des Islamischen Staats Europa
bedroht. Wien: Styria Premium.
Rosen, David M. (2005): Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism. (The Rutgers Series in
Childhood Studies). New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Rosen, David M. (2012): Child Soldiers: A Reference Handbook. (Contemporary World Issues). Santa Barbara:
ABC-CLIO.
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Roy, Olivier (2017): Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State. (Comparative Politics and Interna-
tional Studies Series). London, Hurst.
Samad, Yunas; Sen, Kasturi (2007): Islam in the European Union: Transnationalism, Youth and the War on
Terror. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
Schmidt, Wolf (2012): Jung, deutsch, Taliban. Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag.
Schnabel, Albrecht; Tabyshalieva, Anara (Eds.) (2013): Escaping Victimhood: Children, Youth, and Post-Con-
flict Peacebuilding. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
Singer, P. W. (2006): Children at War. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Speckhard, Anne (2015): Bride of ISIS: One Young Woman’s Path into Homegrown Terrorism. McLean: Ad-
vances Press.
Sterio, Milena (2018): Prosecuting Juvenile Piracy Suspects: The International Legal Framework. (Routledge
Research in International Law). Abingdon: Routledge.
Ulusoy, M. Demet (2008): Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism and Youth. (NATO Science for
Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 46). Amsterdam: IOS Press.
United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) (2019,
October): Children Affected by the Foreign-Fighter Phenomenon: Ensuring a Child Rights-Based Approach.
[Handbook]. URL: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/0918_ftf_
handbook_web_reduced.pdf
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2017): Handbook on Children Recruited and Exploited
by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups: The Role of the Justice System. [e-Book]. Vienna: United Nations
(UN). URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Child-Victims/Handbook_on_
Children_Recruited_and_Exploited_by_Terrorist_and_Violent_Extremist_Groups_the_Role_of_the_Jus-
tice_System.E.pdf
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2019): Justice for Children in the Context of Count-
er-Terrorism: A Training Manual. [e-Book]. Vienna: United Nations (UN). URL: https://digitallibrary.un.org/
record/3825844?ln=en
Vestenskov, David (Ed.) (2018, January): The Role of Madrasas: Assessing Parental Choice, Financial Pipelines
and Recent Developments in Religious Education in Pakistan and Afghanistan. [e-Book]. Copenhagen: Royal
Danish Defence College. URL: http://www.fak.dk/biblioteket/publikationer/Pages/THE-ROLE-OF-MADRA-
SAS.aspx
Yousafzai, Malala; with Christina Lamb (2013): I Am Malala: The Girl who Stood Up for Education and Was
Shot by the Taliban. London: Orion Publishing Group.
Theses
Abdikadir, Osman Ali (2016, October): Youth Radicalization as a Tool for Terrorism in East Africa: A Case
Study of Kenya. (Master’s Thesis, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya). URL: http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/
handle/11295/99374
Abrahams, John A. (2017, March): Ideological Radicalization: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding
why Youth in Major U.S. Metropolitan Areas are More Likely to Become Radicalized. (Master’s Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/52941
Akbar, Zara (2017, April): Why Join ISIS? The Causes of Terrorism from the Muslim Youth Perspective. (Mas-
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ter’s Thesis, University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, United Kingdom). URL: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/

eprint/32612
Barricman, Britni (2019, June): Deradicalizing and Disengaging the Children of the Islamic State. (Master’s
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62805
Bartlett, Isam (2018, June): Bring Back our Girls: A Human Rights Analysis of Child Abductions by Boko Ha-
ram. (Master’s Thesis, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa). URL: http://hdl.handle.
net/11394/6518
Clinch, Amy Louise (2011, June): A Community Psychology Approach to Preventing Violent Extremism: Gain-
ing the Views of Young People to Inform Primary Prevention in Secondary Schools. (Doctoral Thesis, University
of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom). URL: http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/3197
Coffman, Cynthia (2019, May): The Rights of Israeli and Palestinian Children Held in Israeli Detention: A Com-
parative Study of West Bank Israeli and Palestinian Children in Contact with the Law. (Master’s Thesis, Ford-
ham University, New York, United States). URL: https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/pubnum/13880842.html
Cohen, Karen Esther (2013, December): Exposure to Terrorism: A Supportive Group Therapy for Israeli Chil-
dren Exposed to Terrorism. (Master’s Thesis, California State University, Northridge, United States). URL:
http://hdl.handle.net/10211.2/4911
Davis, Jennifer Ann (2011, January): Demobilizing the Minors: Examining Compliance with International
Child Soldiering Laws. (Doctoral Thesis, George Washington University, Washington, DC, United States).
URL: https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/pubnum/3438889.html
Denholm, Emma (2019): “It’s the Hardest Conversation I’ve Had to Have”: A Psychosocial Exploration of Teach-
ers’ Experiences of Talking to Children about Terrorism. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Essex, Colchester,
United Kingdom). URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/26096
Difato, Christine Anne (2012, September): An International Relations Analysis of Citizenship and Intercultural
Dialogue among Minority Youth in Berlin and London: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach. (Doctoral Thesis, Uni-
versity of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10871/14049
Faure Walker, Rob (2019): The Emergence of “Extremism” and “Radicalisation”: An Investigation into the
Discursive Conditions that have Enabled UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy to Focus on “Radicalisation” and
“Extremism”, and a Theorisation of the Impact of this Focus. (Doctoral Thesis, University of London, London,
United Kingdom). URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10080055
Froste, Marie (2019, Autumn): The Morality of ISIS Returnees: Using Thought Experiments to Determine Moral
Responsibility or Innocence. (Master’s Thesis, Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden). URL: http://
urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-8949
Fyfe, Shannon (2018, August): Responsibility and the Harm of Mass Sexual Slavery. (Doctoral Thesis, Van-
derbilt University, Nashville, United States). URL: https://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu//available/etd-07172018-
164422
Gjelsten, Craig A. (2008, March): Homeland Security Planning for Urban Area Schools. (Master’s Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4239
Greene, Megan Marie (2014, May): Stories from the Homefront: Digital Storytelling with National Guard
Youth. (Master’s Thesis, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.
net/2152/26854
Haider, Mariam (2010, March): Emotional and Behavioural Problems among Pakistani Children. (Doctoral
Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, Canada). URL: https://escholarship.mcgill.ca/concern/theses/t148fh50z
Hampapur, Veena (2016): Racial Formation in the Post-September 11 Era: The Paradoxical Positioning of
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Working Class South Asian American Youth. (Doctoral Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, United
States). URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8p65v2n7
Hawi, Bildad (2016, October): Information Technology as a Driver of International Terrorism: A Case Study of
Social Media and Youth in Kenya. (Master’s Thesis, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya). URL: http://ere-
pository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/98839
Hlatshwayo, Belinda S. T. (2017, March): International Criminal Law and the African Girl Child Soldier:
Does the International Criminal Law Framework Provide Adequate Protection to the African Girl Child
Soldier? (Master’s Thesis, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa). URL: http://hdl.handle.
net/11427/25316
Holtgraves, Lindsey (2012): The Politics of Identity: The Roots of Radicalization and Home-Grown Terrorism
amongst Second and Third Generation Immigrants in Europe. (Master’s Thesis, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, United States). URL: https://doi.org/10.17615/2nkk-h219
Isokpan, Aisosa Jennifer (2016, March): The Boko Haram Insurgency and the Child’s Right to Education in
Nigeria. (Master’s Thesis, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa). URL: http://hdl.handle.
net/11394/5351
Jones, Jeffrey J. (2010, December): Countering Islamic Radicalization and Al Shabaab Recruitment within the
Ethnic Somali Population of the United States: An Argument for Applying Best Practices for Stemming Youth
Gang Recruitment and Initiation. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL:
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5072
Kihara, Ivy Evonne Wanjiku (2010, October): The Impact of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism on the Right
to Education. (Master’s Thesis, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa). URL: http://hdl.
handle.net/11394/1884
Lampert, Jo (2007, August): The Whole World Shook: Shifts in Ethnic, National and Heroic Identities in Chil-
dren’s Fiction about 9/11. (Doctoral Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia). URL:
https://eprints.qut.edu.au/16550
Mann, Jeffrey M., Jr. (2019, June): Dissuading Young Potential Terrorists. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62695
Muliru, Scofield Yoni Awiti (2016, October): Challenges of Countering Terrorism in Africa: Youth Radicaliza-
tion in Schools in Kenya. (Master’s Thesis, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya). URL: http://erepository.
uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/98254
Murphy, Emma Grace (2017): #BringBackOurGirls: Solidarity or Self-Interest? Online Feminist Movements and
Third World Women. (Master’s Thesis, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand). URL: http://
hdl.handle.net/10092/14517
Ndili, Alex (2016, November): The Role of Community Policing in the Prevention of Youth Radicalization in the
Eastleigh Area of Nairobi County. (Master’s Thesis, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya). URL: http://erepos-
itory.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/100166
Philipupillai, Gillian Geetha (2013): The Marking of Tamil Youth as Terrorists and the Making of Canada as
a White Settler Society. (Master’s Thesis, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada). URL: http://hdl.handle.
net/1807/42640
Pooley, Elizabeth (2015, May): A New Sisterhood: The Allure of ISIS in Syria for Young Muslim Women in
the UK. (Master’s Thesis, Arizona State University, Tempe, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2286/
R.A.150544
Ryder, Emily Jennifer Hana (2016, January): Memory, Perception, Reception: Following the Fate of the Vic-
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tims of Italy’s anni di piombo through the Writing of their Children. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Glasgow,
Glasgow, United Kingdom). URL: http://theses.gla.ac.uk/id/eprint/7056
Sayce, Terence Richard (2015): Recalibrating Youth Bulge Theory: Saudi Arabia’s Youth and the Threat to Secu-
rity. (Doctoral Thesis, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom). URL: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11483
Sayed, Abdul (2017, January): The Rise of Militancy in the Muslim Youth: Discourse Analysis of Recruitment
Tactics of Militant Groups in Pakistan for Inciting Youth to Violence after 9/11. (Bachelor’s Thesis, Linnaeus
University, Växjö, Sweden). URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-60546
Smith, Chelsey (2015, August): The Technology of Hope: Twitter and the #BringBackOurGirls Campaign.
(Master’s Thesis, Royal Roads University, Victoria, Canada). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10170/842
Takieddine, Malda (2014): Oasis of Resilience, Healing and Empowering Syrian Children in Za’atari Ref-
ugee Camp. (Master’s Thesis, University of Washington, Seattle, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.
net/1773/27114
Tani, John J., Jr. (2017, December): Black Flags of their Fathers: The Islamic State’s Returning Foreign Fighter
Youths and the Implications for U.S. Domestic Security. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56820
Tighe, Evan (2011): Trust in Allah, But Tie Your Camel: The Effects of Radicalized Schooling and State Security
on Islamic Terrorism in the Middle East. (Master’s Thesis, University of Georgia, Athens, United States). URL:
https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/tighe_evan_201105_ma.pdf
Vaughn, Leona (2019, March): “Doing Risk”: Practitioner Interpretations of Risk of Childhood Radicalisation
and the Implementation of the HM Government PREVENT Duty. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Liverpool,
Liverpool, United Kingdom). URL: http://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3047974
Westcot, Julia Ellen (2002, September): The September 11th Tragedy: Effects and Interventions in the School
Community. (Master’s Thesis, California State University, San Bernadino, United States). URL: https://schol-
arworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/2271
Wolfberg, William Seth (2012, October): The Homegrown Jihad: A Comparative Study of Youth Radicalization
in the United States and Europe. (Master’s Thesis, University of South Florida, Tampa, United States). URL:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4421
Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Abdel-Fattah, Randa (2019): Managing Belief and Speech as Incipient Violence: “I’m Giving You the Op-
portunity to Say That You Aren’t”. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 14(1), 20-38. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2019.1566632
Abou-Taam, Marwan (2015, September): Jihad-Export – Warum junge Deutsche Jihadisten werden. Die
Kriminalpolizei, 2015/September. URL: https://www.kriminalpolizei.de/ausgaben/2015/september/detailan-
sicht-september/artikel/jihad-export-warum-junge-deutsche-jihadisten-werden.html
Agbiboa, Daniel E. (2018): National Heroes or Coming Anarchy? Vigilant Youth and the “War on Terror” in
Nigeria. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(2), 272-294. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2017.1400497
Agbor, Avitus (2018): Boko Haram and the Abduction of Schoolgirls in Nigeria: Reflecting on “Gender-Based
Crimes” as a Legal Misnomer. In John-Mark Iyi; Hennie Strydom (Eds.): Boko Haram and International Law.
Cham: Springer International Publishing, 311-349. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74957-0_14
Aggarwal, Neil Krishan (2019): The Islamic State: The Transmission of Militancy in Families. In: Media Per-
suasion in the Islamic State. New York: Columbia University Press, Chapter 7.
ISSN 2334-3745 132 June 2020

Ahdash, Fatima (2018): The Interaction between Family Law and Counter-Terrorism: A Critical Examina-
tion of the Radicalisation Cases in the Family Courts. Child and Family Law Quarterly, 2018, 389-414. URL:
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/91278
Ahmad, Haval (2017, Fall): Youth De-Radicalization: A Canadian Framework. Journal for Deradicalization,
12, 119-168. URL: http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/113
Ahmad, Haval; Masinda, Mambo Tabu (2018-2019, Winter): Research Note on Immigrant Youth Radicaliza-
tion and Terrorism: Pre- and Post-Migration Considerations. Journal for Deradicalization, 17, 295-312. URL:
http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/181
Aiello, Emilia; Puigvert, Lídia; Schubert, Tinka (2018, July): Preventing Violent Radicalization of Youth
through Dialogic Evidence-Based Policies. International Sociology, 33(4), 435-453. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1177/0268580918775882
Al-Badayneh, Diab M.; Alhasan, Khawla (2016): Religious Behavior and Radicalization among Arab Youth:
Implications for Terrorism Recruitment and De-Radicalization. In: Sıddık Ekici et al. (Eds.): Countering
Terrorist Recruitment in the Context of Armed Counter-Terrorism Operations. (NATO Science for Peace and
Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 125). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 130-145. DOI: https://
doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-613-2-130
Ali, Hussein Yussuf (2018): Youth Radicalization: Causes, Consequences and Potential Solutions. In: Mi-
chael Keating; Matt Waldman (Eds.): War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-
Shabaab. New York: Oxford University Press, 329-338.
Alkaff, Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman (2018, March): Using Theology to Legitimise Jihadist Radicalism. Counter
Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 10(3), 6-7. URL: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CT-
TA-March-2018.pdf
Al-Lami, Mina; Hoskins, Andrew; O’Loughlin, Ben (2012): Mobilisation and Violence in the New Media
Ecology: The Dua Khalil Aswad and Camilia Shehata Cases. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5(2), 237-256.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2012.692509
Amghar, Samir (2007, November): Salafism and Radicalisation of Young European Muslims. In: Samir
Amghar; Amel Boubekeur; Michael Emerson (Eds.): European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society.
[e-Book]. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 38-51. URL: https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publi-
cations/european-islam-challenges-society-and-public-policy
Andre, Virginie; Mansouri, Fethi; Lobo, Michele (2015): A Fragmented Discourse of Religious Leadership
in France: Muslim Youth between Citizenship and Radicalization. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 35(2),
296-313. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2015.1046743
Anzalone, Christopher (2012, October): Kenya’s Muslim Youth Center and Al-Shabab’s East African Recruit-
ment. CTC Sentinel, 5(10), 9-13. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/CTCSentinel-Vo-
l5Iss107.pdf
Arianti, V. (2018, November): Participation of Children in Terrorist Attacks in Indonesia: A Possible Future
Trend. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 10(11), 4-8. URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/11/CTTA-November-2018.pdf
Arlikatti, Sudha (2016): Counter Terrorism and Human Rights: Missing Perspectives from Muslim Children
and Youth in the USA. In: Sıddık Ekici et al. (Eds.): Countering Terrorist Recruitment in the Context of Armed
Counter-Terrorism Operations. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dy-
namics, Vol. 125). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 181-191. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-613-2-181
Arshad, Misbah (2016, February): Kompass–Muslim Youth Education: Empowerment and Prevention
through Education. In: The Carter Center (Ed.): Countering Daesh Propaganda: Action-Oriented Research for
ISSN 2334-3745 133 June 2020

Practical Policy Outcomes. (Workshop Report). Atlanta: The Carter Center, 77-80. URL: https://www.carter-
center.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/countering-isis/counteringdaeshpropaganda-feb2016.
pdf
Asal, Victor; Brown, Mitchell; Schulzke, Marcus (2015, September): “Kill Them All - Old and Young, Girls
and Women and Little Children”: An Examination of the Organizational Choice of Targeting Civilians. Politi-
cal Science Research and Methods, 3(3), 589-607. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2014.45
Asal, Victor; Fair, C. Christine; Shellman, Stephen (2008): Consenting to a Child’s Decision to Join a Jihad:
Insights from a Survey of Militant Families in Pakistan. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31(11), 973-994.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100802400201
Asghar, Nadia (2013, July): Adverse Impact of Militancy on the Development of Children in FATA. Tigah, 3,
1-17. URL: http://frc.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/1.pdf
Aslam, Mohd Mizan bin Mohammad (2017, April): Threat of Daesh in Universities: Malaysia’s Experi-
ence. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 9(4), 13-17. URL: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/04/CTTA-April-2017.pdf
Atran, Scott (2008, March): Who Becomes a Terrorist Today? Perspectives on Terrorism, 2(5), 3-10. URL:
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2008/issue-
5/35-218-1-pb.pdf
Atran, Scott; Tomass, Mark (2017): A Dialogue on why Western Youth are Attracted to ISIS. In: Charles Web-
el; Mark Tomass (Eds.): Assessing the War on Terror: Western and Middle Eastern Perspectives. (Contemporary
Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 218-227.
Atran, Scott et al. (2018, April): The Islamic State’s Lingering Legacy among Young Men from the Mosul
Area. CTC Sentinel, 11(4), 15-22. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/CTC-SENTI-
NEL-042018-3.pdf
Awan, Imran (2017, March): Religion, Identity and Radicalisation: The Experiences of Young British Mus-
lims of the Crises in Syria. Journal of Muslims in Europe, 6(1), 1-21. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/22117954-
12341336
Awan, Imran; Guru, Surinder (2017): Parents of Foreign “Terrorist” Fighters in Syria – Will they Report their
Young? Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40(1), 24-42. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1206588
Bacani, Benedicto R. (2020): Youth Radicalization and Mitigation in Southern Philippines. In: Mohd Mizan
Aslam; Rohan Gunaratna (Eds.): Terrorist Rehabilitation and Community Engagement in Malaysia and South-
east Asia. (Routledge Studies in the Politics of Disorder and Instability). Abingdon: Routledge, Chapter 9.
DOI [Book]: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367817466
Bagchi, Aniruddha; Paul, Jomon A. (2018, December): Youth Unemployment and Terrorism in the MENAP
(Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) Region. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 64, 9-20.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.seps.2017.12.003
Barna, Cristian (2018, November): The Role of the Family in Preventing the Transformation of Western
Youngsters into Jihadi Fighters. International Annals of Criminology, 56(1-2), 157-177. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1017/cri.2018.13
Basit, Abdul (2017, June): IS Penetration in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Assessment, Impact and Implications.
Perspectives on Terrorism, 11(3), 19-39. URL: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/
customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2017/issue-3/0320173-is-penetration-in-afghanistan-pakistan-ass-
essment-impact-and-implications-by-abdul-basit.pdf
Becker-Blease, Kathryn A.; Finkelhor, David; Turner, Heather (2008): Media Exposure Predicts Children’s
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Reactions to Crime and Terrorism. Journal of Trauma & Dissociation, 9(2), 225-248. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1080/15299730802048652 URL: http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV102.pdf
Ben-Asher, Smadar (2016): Bedouin Children and their Reality Perceptions of the War between Israel and
Gaza. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 36(4), 484-501. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2016.12481
77
Benavides, Abraham David; Keyes, Laura M.; Pulley, Brittany (2016): Understanding the Recruitment Meth-
ods and Socialization Techniques of Terror Networks by Comparing them to Youth Gangs: Similarities and
Divergences. In: Sıddık Ekici et al. (Eds.): Countering Terrorist Recruitment in the Context of Armed Count-
er-Terrorism Operations. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics,
Vol. 125). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 40-54. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-613-2-40
Benhaïm, Michèle; El Malki, Nadim (2018): Notes on Teenage Radicalisation. Research in Psychoanalysis,
2018/1 (25), 34-44. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3917/rep1.025.0034
Ben-Israel, Galit M. (2018, November): Telling a Story via Tumblr Analytics: Europe’s Young Muslim Fe-
male Attraction to ISIS. International Annals of Criminology, 56(1-2), 55-78. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/
cri.2018.6
Berents, Helen (2020, May): Politics, Policy-Making and the Presence of Images of Suffering Children. Inter-
national Affairs, 96(3), 593-608. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz275
Berko, Anat; Erez, Edna; Gur, Oren M. (2017, August): Terrorism as Self-Help: Accounts of Palestinian Youth
Incarcerated in Israeli Prisons for Security Violations. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 33(3), 313-
340. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986217699101
Beutel, Alejandro et al. (2016, September): Field Principles for Countering and Displacing Extremist Narra-
tives. Journal of Terrorism Research, 7(3), 35-49. DOI: https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1220
Biberman, Yelena; Zahid, Farhan (2019): Why Terrorists Target Children: Outbidding, Desperation, and Ex-
tremism in the Peshawar and Beslan School Massacres. Terrorism and Political Violence, 31(2), 169-184. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1135425
Bizina, Margarita; Gray, David H. (2014, Winter): Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Count-
er-Terrorism Policy. Global Security Studies, 5(1), 72-79. URL: http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Bizina%20
Youth-AG.pdf
Bloom, Mia (2015, July 21): Cubs of the Caliphate: The Children of ISIS. Foreign Affairs. URL: https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-07-21/cubs-caliphate
Bloom, Mia; Horgan, John; Winter, Charlie (2016, February): Depictions of Children and Youth in the Is-
lamic State’s Martyrdom Propaganda, 2015-2016. CTC Sentinel, 9(2), 29-32. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CTC-SENTINEL-Vol9Iss214.pdf
Böckler, Nils et al. (2018, September): Same but Different? Developmental Pathways to Demonstrative Tar-
geted Attacks — Qualitative Case Analyses of Adolescent and Young Adult Perpetrators of Targeted School
Attacks and Jihadi Terrorist Attacks in Germany. International Journal of Developmental Science, 12(1-2),
5-24. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3233/DEV-180255
Boudreau, Geneviève Boucher (2014): Radicalization of the Settlers’ Youth: Hebron as a Hub for Jewish
Extremism. Global Media Journal – Canadian Edition, 7(1), 69-85. URL: http://gmj-canadianedition.ca/back-
issues/2014-volume-7-issue-1/v7i1pp69-85
Boyle, Francis A. (2017, March): The Criminal Conspiracy of the Bush Administrations and the Protection
of Iraq’s Children. International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, 11(1-2), 85-92. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1386/ijcis.11.1-2.85_1
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Bricker, Noah Q.; Foley, Mark C. (2013): The Effect of Youth Demographics on Violence: The Importance of
the Labor Market. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 7(1), 179-194. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4119/
ijcv-2974
Bröckling, Micha et al. (2018-2019, Winter): “Kill Them Wherever You Find Them” – Radicalizing Narratives
of the “So-Called” Islamic State via the Online Magazine Rumiyah. Journal for Deradicalization, 17, 240-294.
URL: http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/180
Brooten, Lisa (2008): The “Pint-Sized Terrorists” of God’s Army: Child Soldiers, Media, and Global Politics.
Journal of Children and Media, 2(3), 219-234. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17482790802327459
Browne, Brendan; Dwyer, Clare (2014): Navigating Risk: Understanding the Impact of the Conflict on Chil-
dren and Young People in Northern Ireland. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37(9), 792-805. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.931213 URL: https://pureadmin.qub.ac.uk/ws/files/18617363/Navigating_Risk_
Understanding_the_Impact_of_the_Conflict_on_Children_and_Young_People.pdf
Browne, Deborah (2018): Children as Agents of Terrorism and Political Conflict. In: Andrew Silke (Ed.):
Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism. (Routledge Handbooks). Abingdon: Routledge, 135-
148.
Brzica, Nikola (2017): Potential Adherents of Radical Islam in Europe: Methods of Recruitment and the Age
of Perpetrators in Acts of Terror. Croatian Political Science Review, 54(4), 161-184. URL: https://hrcak.srce.
hr/190342
Bull, Melissa; Rane, Halim (2019): Beyond Faith: Social Marginalisation and the Prevention of Radicalisation
among Young Muslim Australians. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 12(2), 273-297. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080
/17539153.2018.1496781
Campelo, Nicolas et al. (2018, August): Who are the European Youths Willing to Engage in Radicalisation? A
Multidisciplinary Review of their Psychological and Social Profiles. [Literature Review]. European Psychiatry,
52, 1-14. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2018.03.001
Campelo, Nicolas et al. (2018, November): Joining the Islamic State from France between 2014 and 2016:
An Observational Follow-up Study. Palgrave Communications, 4, Article 137. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/
s41599-018-0191-8
Capone, Francesca (2016): Child Soldiers: The Expanding Practice of Minors Recruited to Become Foreign
Fighters. In: Andrea de Guttry; Francesca Capone; Christophe Paulussen (Eds.): Foreign Fighters under In-
ternational Law and Beyond. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 187-204. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-
6265-099-2_11
Cardeli, Emma et al. (2019, December): Exploring the Social-Ecological Factors that Mobilize Children into
Violence. Terrorism and Political Violence. Advance Online Publication. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/095465
53.2019.1701444
Ceri, Veysi et al. (2016): Psychiatric Symptoms and Disorders among Yazidi Children and Adolescents
Immediately after Forced Migration Following ISIS Attacks. neuropsychiatrie, 30, 145-150. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1007/s40211-016-0195-9
Cetorelli, Valeria et al. (2017, May): Mortality and Kidnapping Estimates for the Yazidi Population in the
Area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq, in August 2014: A Retrospective Household Survey. PLOS Medicine, 14(5), Article
e1002297. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002297
Chebotareva, Elena (2014, September): Psychological Factors of Ethnic Extremism in Muslim Youth. Medi-
terranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(22), 140-148. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n22p140
Cheong, Pauline Hope; Halverson, Jeffry R. (2010): Youths in Violent Extremist Discourse: Mediated Identifi-
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cations and Interventions. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(12), 1104-1123. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1
057610X.2010.523862
Cherney, Adrian et al. (2018): Local Service Provision to Counter Violent Extremism: Perspectives, Capabili-
ties and Challenges Arising from an Australian Service Mapping Project. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and
Political Aggression, 10(3), 187-206. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2017.1350735
Christien, Agathe (2016, September): The Representation of Youth in the Islamic State’s Propaganda Maga-
zine Dabiq. Journal of Terrorism Research, 7(3), 1-8. DOI: https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1201
Christodoulou, Eleni (2020, March): “Boosting Resilience” and “Safeguarding Youngsters at Risk”: Critically
Examining the European Commission’s Educational Responses to Radicalization and Violent Extremism.
London Review of Education, 18(1), 18-34. DOI: https://doi.org/10.18546/LRE.18.1.02
Clubb, Gordon (2016): The Role of Former Combatants in Preventing Youth Involvement in Terrorism in
Northern Ireland: A Framework for Assessing Former Islamic State Combatants. Studies in Conflict & Ter-
rorism, 39(9), 842-861. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1144917 URL: http://eprints.whiterose.
ac.uk/95959
Cohen, John D. (2016, November): The Next Generation of Government CVE Strategies at Home: Expanding
Opportunities for Intervention. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 668(1),
118-128. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716216669933
Comer, Jonathan S.; Kendall, Philip C. (2007, September): Terrorism: The Psychological Impact on
Youth. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 14(3), 179-212. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
2850.2007.00078.x
Comer, Jonathan S. et al. (2016, July): Children’s Mental Health in the Context of Terrorist Attacks, Ongoing
Threats, and Possibilities of Future Terrorism. Current Psychiatry Reports, 18, Article 79. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11920-016-0722-1
Comer, Jonathan S. et al. (2008, August): Children and Terrorism-Related News: Training Parents in Cop-
ing and Media Literacy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 76(4), 568-578. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1037/0022-006X.76.4.568
Cook, Joana; Vale, Gina (2019, July): From Daesh to “Diaspora” II: The Challenges Posed by Women and
Minors after the Fall of the Caliphate. CTC Sentinel, 12(6), 30-45. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/up-
loads/2019/07/CTC-SENTINEL-062019.pdf
Coppock, Vicki; McGovern, Mark (2014, May): “Dangerous Minds”? Deconstructing Counter-Terrorism
Discourse, Radicalisation and the “Psychological Vulnerability” of Muslim Children and Young People in
Britain. Children & Society, 28(3), 242-256. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/chso.12060 URL: https://research.
edgehill.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/20177699/Dangerous+Minds.pdf
Corb, Abbee; Grozelle, Renee (2014): A New Kind of Terror: Radicalizing Youth in Canada. JEX, 1 (2014),
32-58. URL: http://journals.sfu.ca/jed/index.php/jex/article/view/55
Ćorović, Aida (2017, May): Radicalization in Serbia: The Youth of Sandžak between a Hammer and an Anvil.
In Vlado Azinović (Ed.): Between Salvation and Terror: Radicalization and the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon in
the Western Balkans. [e-Book]. Sarajevo: Atlantic Initiative, 125-136. URL: http://atlanticinitiative.org/west-
ern
Costanza, William A. (2015, Summer): Adjusting our Gaze: An Alternative Approach to Understand-
ing Youth Radicalization. Journal of Strategic Security, 8(1-2), 1-15. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-
0472.8.1.1428
Cruz, Erik; D’Alessio, Stewart J.; Stolzenberg, Lisa (2020): The Labor Market and Terrorism. Studies in Con-
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flict & Terrorism, 43(3), 224-238. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1455372

Dale, Linda (2014): Youth and Armed Groups in Colombia. Stability, 3(1), Article 29. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.5334/sta.dz
Dantschke, Claudia (2014): Ohne Musik geht es nicht: Salafismus und „Nasheeds“ (Anasheed) in Deutsch-
land. JEX, 3 (2014), 93-110. URL: http://journals.sfu.ca/jed/index.php/jex/article/view/85
Dantschke, Claudia et al. (2018): Zurück aus dem „Kalifat“: Anforderungen an den Umgang mit Rückkeh-
rern und Rückkehrerinnen, die sich einer jihadistisch-terroristischen Organisation angeschlossen haben,
und ihren Kindern unter dem Aspekt des Kindeswohles und der Kindeswohlgefährdung. JEX, 6 (2018), 2-43.
URL: http://journals.sfu.ca/jed/index.php/jex/article/view/01
David, Nachana’a Alahira; Bature, Elizabeth Aishatu (2020): Gender, Vulnerability, and Counter-Terrorism in
the Lake Chad Basin: Impact on Women and Children in Northeast Nigeria. In: Usman A. Tar; Bashir Bala
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Gemmerli, Tobias (2015, April): Extremism on the Internet: The Fight against Online Radicalisation Starts Of-
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Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2019, March): “Everyone Must Confess”: Abuses against Children Suspected of
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Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2019, September): “They Didn’t Know if I Was Alive or Dead”: Military Deten-
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Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) (2015, October): Online Activism and Social Media Usage
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International Crisis Group (ICG) (2019, February): Mitigating Risks for Syrian Refugee Youth in Turkey’s
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International Crisis Group (ICG) (2019, November): Women and Children First: Repatriating the Westerners
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Jansen, Annelies; Verdegaal, Merle (2019, December): Doing Digital Youth Work in a P/CVE Context. (RAN
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Lefas, Melissa; Nozawa, Junko (2016, December): Rehabilitating Juvenile Violent Extremist Offenders in Deten-
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asiaprogram.org/archives/12825
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Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) (2016, September): Meeting on Children and Youth Growing up in
a Radicalised Family/Environment. (Ex Post Paper). URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaf-
fairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-h-and-sc/docs/ran_h_sc_
meeting_on_children_and_youth_hamburg_14-15_09_2016_en.pdf
Rafiq, Haras; Malik, Nikita (2017, February): Refuge: Pathways of Youth Fleeing Extremism. (Quilliam /
Child to Child Report). URL: https://www.quilliaminternational.com/shop/e-publications/refuge-path-
ways-of-youth-fleeing-extremism
Renard, Thomas; Coolsaet, Rik (2018, July): Children in the Levant: Insights from Belgium on the Dilemmas
of Repatriation and the Challenges of Reintegration. (Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 98). URL: http://
www.egmontinstitute.be/children-in-the-levant-insights-from-belgium-on-the-dilemmas-of-repatria-
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Reynolds, Louis; Scott, Ralph (2016, December): Digital Citizens: Countering Extremism Online. (DEMOS
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Richardson, Roslyn (2013, December): Fighting Fire with Fire: Target Audience Responses to Online Anti-Vio-
lence Campaigns. (ASPI Report). URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/report/fighting-fire-fire-target-audience-re-
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Ruf, Maximilian; Jansen, Annelies (2019, December): Study Visit: Returned Women and Children –Study-
ing an Ongoing Experience on the Ground. (RAN Ex Post Paper). URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/
what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/study-visit-returned-women-and-chil-
dren-studying-ongoing-experience-ground-10-11-december_en
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Issue Paper). URL: http://www.oijj.org/en/docs/publications/a-nimble-nmbl-approach-to-youth-engage-
ment-in-pcve
Saltman, Erin Marie; Dow, Moli; Bjornsgaard, Kelsey (2016): Youth Innovation Labs: A Model for Preventing
and Countering Violent Extremism. (ISD / YouthCAN Report). URL: https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publica-
tions/youth-innovation-labs-a-model-for-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism
Saltman, Erin Marie; Kirt, Jas (2016, June): Guidance for International Youth Engagement in PVE and CVE:
Youth Responses to Resolution 2250 and the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. (ISD / Youth-
CAN Report). URL: https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/guidance-for-international-youth-engage-
ment-in-pve-and-cve
Schwartz, Matthew; Yalbir, Naz (2019, March): Desecuritizing Kenyan Youth: Young People’s Perspectives on
Community Priorities in Mombasa. (Global Center on Cooperative Security, Policy Brief). URL: https://www.
globalcenter.org/publications/desecuritizing-kenyan-youth-young-peoples-perspectives-on-community-pri-
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Scott, Jacqueline (2017, October): Children and Extreme Violence: Insights from Criminology on Child Trajec-
tories into and out of Non-State Armed Groups. (UNU “State of Research” Brief). URL: https://collections.unu.
edu/view/UNU:6291
Sharma, Kunaal (2016, November): What Causes Extremist Attitudes among Sunni and Shia Youth? Evidence
from Northern India. (GW Program on Extremism Occasional Paper). URL: https://extremism.gwu.edu/
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Shtuni, Adrian (2020, February): The Reintegration Imperative: Child Returnees in the Western Balkans. (Re-
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solve Network Policy Note). URL: https://www.resolvenet.org/research/reintegration-imperative-child-re-

turnees-western-balkans
Sidło, Katarzyna W. (2017, December): Beyond Signposting: New Approach to Working with Families of Rad-
icalised Youth and Cooperating with National Authorities. (EuroMeSCo Policy Brief No. 75). URL: https://
www.euromesco.net/publication/beyond-signposting-new-approach-to-working-with-families-of-radical-
ised-youth-and-cooperating-with-national-authorities
Sommerfelt, Tone; Taylor, Mark B. (2015, February): The Big Dilemma of Small Soldiers: Recruiting Children
to the War in Syria. (NOREF Report). URL: https://noref.no/Publications/Regions/Syria/The-big-dilemma-
of-small-soldiers-recruiting-children-to-the-war-in-Syria
Souidi, Yassine; Ebner, Julia; Rouass, Saeida (2016, October): Engaging Families to Counter Violent Extremism
in North Africa: Opportunities and Challenges. (FATE / Quilliam Report). URL: https://www.quilliaminterna-
tional.com/shop/e-publications/fate-engaging-families-to-counter-violent-extremism-in-north-africa
Speckhard, Anne (2015, October): The Hypnotic Power of ISIS Imagery in Recruiting Western Youth. (ICSVE
Brief Reports). URL: https://www.icsve.org/the-hypnotic-power-of-isis-imagery-in-recruiting-western-
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Speckhard, Anne (2017, March): Recovery, Rehabilitation and Reintegration of the “Lost” Children Living and
Serving under the Islamic State. (ICSVE Brief Reports). URL: http://www.icsve.org/brief-reports/recovery-re-
habilitation-reintegration-of-the-lost-children-living-and-serving-under-the-islamic-state
Speckhard, Anne (2017, October): The Psychological Ordeals of Hostages: American Hostage Caitlan Coleman
Endured Rape, Murder of her Child and a Terrifying Rescue – to what Outcome? (ICSVE Research Reports).
URL: https://www.icsve.org/the-psychological-ordeals-of-hostages-american-hostage-caitlan-coleman-en-
dured-rape-murder-of-her-child-and-a-terrifying-rescue-to-what-outcome
Speckhard, Anne; Shajkovci, Ardian (2018, May): ISIS – When Serving Terrorism is an “All in the Family”
Affair: How to Recover the Lost Children and Spouses of ISIS. (Paper presented at the 2018 OSCE-wide Count-
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Area and Beyond”, Rome, Italy, May 11, 2018). URL: https://www.icsve.org/isis-when-serving-terrorism-is-
an-all-in-the-family-affair-how-to-recover-the-lost-children-and-spouses-of-isis
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Trisko Darden, Jessica (2019, May): Tackling Terrorists’ Exploitation of Youth. (AEI Report). URL: https://
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April%202019_0.pdf
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Vale, Gina (2018, July): Cubs in the Lions’ Den: Indoctrination and Recruitment of Children within Islamic State
Territory. (ICSR Report). URL: https://icsr.info/2018/07/23/cubs-in-the-lions-den-indoctrination-and-re-
cruitment-of-children-within-islamic-state-territory
Vale, Gina (2019, October): Women in Islamic State: From Caliphate to Camps. (ICCT Policy Brief). URL:
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van Ark, Rumyana (2019, August): The Caliphate’s Women and Children – What Role Can the Family Courts
Play? (Part 1). (ICCT Perspectives). URL: https://icct.nl/publication/part-1-the-caliphates-women-and-chil-
dren-what-role-can-the-family-courts-play
van Ark, Rumyana (2019, August): The Caliphate’s Women and Children – What Role Can the Family Courts
Play? (Part 2). (ICCT Perspectives). URL: https://icct.nl/publication/the-caliphates-women-and-children-
what-role-can-the-family-courts-play-part-2
van der Heide, Liesbeth; Geenen, Jip (2017, August): Children of the Caliphate: Young IS Returnees and the
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www.usip.org/publications/2010/05/why-youth-join-al-qaeda
Verdegaal, Merle; Haanstra, Wessel (2017, December): The Role of Youth Work in the Prevention of Radicalisa-
tion and Violent Extremism. (RAN Ex Post Paper). URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/
files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-yf-and-c/docs/ran_yf_c_role_
youth_work_prevention_radicalisation_violent_extremism_06-07_12_2017_en.pdf
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A Youth Perspective. (UNICRI / ICCT Report). URL: https://icct.nl/publication/social-media-in-mali-and-
its-relation-to-violent-extremism-a-youth-perspective
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Graduates into Society. (Royal Danish Defence College Policy Brief). URL: http://www.fak.dk/biblioteket/
publikationer/Pages/THE%20ROLE%20OF%20MADRASAS%20IN%20PAKISTAN.aspx
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gram on Extremism Report). URL: https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/ISIS%20
in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf
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Violent Extremist Groups. (Global Center on Cooperative Security, Policy Brief). URL: https://www.global-
center.org/publications/reorienting-cultural-production-policies-ideas-to-dissuade-youth-from-joining-vio-
lent-extremist-groups
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Study. (NOREF / GSDRC Report). URL: https://gsdrc.org/publications/youth-armed-violence-and-job-cre-
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Woltman, Pomme; Gssime, Yasmine (2019, March): Guidelines for Young Activists: How to Set Up a P/CVE
Initiative: Part 1: How to Develop Your Own PVE Initiative. (RAN Ex Post Paper). URL: https://ec.europa.eu/
home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-
young/docs/ran_young_ex_post_kick-off_ea_s1_amsterdam_250319_en.pdf
Woltman, Pomme; Gssime, Yasmine (2019, May): Guidelines for Young Activists: How to Set up a P/CVE
Initiative: Part 2: How to Develop a Project Plan for your P/CVE Initiative. (RAN Ex Post Paper). URL: https://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/
about-ran/ran-young/docs/ran_young_how_to_develop_project_plan_bordeaux_070519_en.pdf
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Woods, Eric (2016, June 23): Childhood’s End – Recruitment Strategies in Iraq and Syria. Bellingcat. URL:
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/06/23/9783
Woods, Eric (2016, November 16): Lost Boys – Child Combatants of the Syrian Civil War. Bellingcat. URL:
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/11/16/lost-boys-child-combatants-syrian-civil-war
Wright, Nicholas D. (2020, February): Young People Aged 0-17: Neuroscience and Cognition to Break Cycles of
Radicalization. (Report for the Pentagon Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment Group). URL: https://nsi-
team.com/young-people-aged-0-17-neuroscience-and-cognition-to-break-cycles-of-radicalization
Yenwong-Fai, Uyo (2019, July): Surviving Boko Haram: Why Children Under Five Matter. (ISS Policy Brief).
URL: https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/surviving-boko-haram-why-children-under-five-matter
Note
Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the
Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories, on professional networking sites, or author
homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green
Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of preprints); it might therefore
not have passed through all editorial phases publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.).
In some cases, articles may only be cited after obtaining permission by the author(s).
About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., is a Professional Information Specialist. Since 2011, she works for
the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). In addition, she serves as Information Resources Editor
to ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. In her editorial role, she regularly compiles bibliographies and other resources for
Terrorism Research (for an inventory visit https://archive.org/details/terrorism-research-bibliographies). She
wrote her doctoral thesis on Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents (focus: media-oriented hostage
takings). E-mail: [email protected]
ISSN 2334-3745 167 June 2020

Bibliography: Internet-Driven Right-Wing Terrorism

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism – BSPT-JT-2020-6]
Abstract
This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, news ar-
ticles, blogposts, multimedia items, bibliographies, and other resources on internet-driven right-wing terrorism.
It focuses on recent publications (up to May 2020) and should not be considered as exhaustive. The literature has
been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies.
Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to broaden the search.
Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, right-wing terrorism, attacks, mass shootings, Pittsburgh,
Christchurch, Poway, El Paso, Bærum, Halle, Hanau, social media, 4chan, 8chan, Discord, Gab, Telegram,
memes, memetic warfare, manifestos, “Alt-Right”, accelerationism
NB: All websites were last visited on 03.06.2020. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.
Bibliographies and Other Resources

Alt-Right Glossary (2016, December-). In: RationalWiki. URL: https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Alt-right_glossa-
ry
Amadeu Antonio Stiftung (1998-): URL: https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/en/
Angry White Men (2014, April-): URL: https://angrywhitemen.org
Angry White Men (n.d.-): Cucktionary. URL: https://angrywhitemen.org/cucktionary
Anti-Defamation League (ADL) (1913, September-): URL: https://www.adl.org
Anti-Defamation League (ADL) (2000, October-): Hate on Display: Hate Symbols Database. URL: https://
www.adl.org/hate-symbols
Anti-Fascism & Far Right (2015, March-): @FFRAFAction. URL: https://twitter.com/FFRAFAction
Axelsen, Jørgen Eikvar (2018, December): Bibliography of Works on the Extreme Right Cited in this Special
Issue. Perspectives on Terrorism, 12(6), 177-191. URL: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/as-
sets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2018/issue-6/raxelsen.pdf
Bellingcat Investigation Team (2019, November 6): Massive White Supremacist Message Board Leak: How
to Access and Interpret the Data. [Access links and analysis guide to the entire leaked SQL database from
neo-Nazi / white supremacist message board “Iron March”]. Bellingcat. URL: https://www.bellingcat.com/re-
sources/how-tos/2019/11/06/massive-white-supremacist-message-board-leak-how-to-access-and-interpret-
the-data
Berkeley Center for Right-Wing Studies (CRWS) (2009-): URL: https://crws.berkeley.edu
Berkeley Center for Right-Wing Studies (CRWS) (2017-2019): FBI Freedom of Information Act Archive of
Radical Right-Wing Groups and Individuals. URL: https://crws.berkeley.edu/fbi-foia-archive
Burley, Shane [Shane Burley] (2016, February-): @shane_burley1. URL: https://twitter.com/shane_burley1
Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) (2016, April-): URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english
Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) (2018, October-): Bibliography on Norwegian and International
ISSN 2334-3745 168 June 2020

Research on July 22. URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/topics/online-resources/bibliographies/22july/

index.html
Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) (2020, April-): Documentaries and Fiction [about the far right].
[Bibliography]. URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/topics/online-resources/bibliographies/documen-
taries-and-fiction/index.html
Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR) (2018, April-): URL: https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com
Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR) (2018-): Bibliography. [Ongoing Series].
• 2015. URL: https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/bibliography/bibliography-2015
• 2016. URL: http://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/bibliography/bibliography-2016
• 2020. URL: https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/bibliography/bibliography-2020
Crawford, Blyth [Blyth Crawford] (2019, January-): @CrawfordBlyth. URL: https://twitter.com/Crawford-
Blyth
Decker, Benjamin T. [(((ben)))] (2010, October-): @btdecker. URL: https://twitter.com/btdecker
Dittrich, Miro [Autopoiesia]. (2015, September-): @DittrichMiro. URL: https://twitter.com/dittrichmiro
Ebner, Julia [Julia Ebner] (2015, January-): @julie_renbe. URL: https://twitter.com/julie_renbe
Evans, Robert [Robert Evans (The Only Robert Evans)] (2010, April-): @IwriteOK. URL: https://twitter.com/
IwriteOK
Fielitz, Maik [Maik Fielitz] (2018, January-): @maik_fielitz. URL: https://twitter.com/maik_fielitz
German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies (GIRDS) (2014-): URL: http://girds.org
Hartleb, Florian [Florian Hartleb] (2018, May-): @FlorianHartleb. URL: https://twitter.com/florianhartleb
Höfner, Roman [Roman Höfner] (2015, February-): @Roman_Hoefner. URL: https://twitter.com/Roman_
Hoefner
HOPE not hate (2004-): URL: https://www.hopenothate.org.uk
Jewish Worker, The (2019, November-): Iron March Exposed. [Search interface for the entire leaked SQL data-
base from neo-Nazi / white supremacist message board “Iron March”]. URL: https://ironmarch.exposed
Know Your Meme (2008, December-): [Meme Database; Don Caldwell, Ed.-in-Chief, et al.]. URL: https://
knowyourmeme.com
Macklin, Graham [Graham Macklin] (2011, July-): @macklin_gd. URL: https://twitter.com/macklin_gd
Makuch, Ben [Ben Makuch] (2011, December-): @BMakuch. URL: https://twitter.com/bmakuch
Miller-Idriss, Cynthia [Cynthia Miller-Idriss] (2015, January-): @milleridriss. URL: https://twitter.com/
milleridriss
Mudde, Cas [Cas Mudde] (2014, January-): @CasMudde. URL: https://twitter.com/CasMudde
Online Hate Prevention Institute (OHPI) (2012-): URL: https://ohpi.org.au
ISSN 2334-3745 169 June 2020

Owen, Tess [Tess Owen] (2013, February-): @misstessowen. URL: https://twitter.com/misstessowen

Project Whispers (2020, April-): [Millions of messages from private discussions by members of the far right
and other extremists on Discord chat servers]. URL: https://whispers.ddosecrets.com
Quent, Matthias [Matthias Quent] (2015, September-): @Matthias_Quent. URL: https://twitter.com/matthi-
as_quent
Quent, Matthias et al. (Eds.) (in preparation): Zeitschrift für Rechtsextremismusforschung (ZRex). URL:
https://www.idz-jena.de/newsdet/call-for-papers-neue-zeitschrift-fuer-rechtsextremismusforschung-zrex
Quinn, Timothy et al. (2013, March-): Hatebase. URL: https://hatebase.org
Ravndal, Jacob Aasland [Jacob Aasland Ravndal] (2013, August-): @Jacravn. URL: https://twitter.com/
Jacravn
Sieber, Roland [Roland Sieber] (2015, June-): @Roland_Sieber. URL: https://twitter.com/Roland_Sieber
Snyder, Gwen [Gwen Snyder is uncivil] (2008, September-): @gwensnyderPHL. URL: https://twitter.com/
gwensnyderPHL
Snyder, Gwen [Gwen Snyder is uncivil] (2019, July 10-): (thread). [Thread on Nazi/“Alt-Right” signifi-
ers with a special emphasis on vocabulary and symbols]. URL: https://twitter.com/gwensnyderPHL/sta-
tus/1148985308945571840
Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) (1971, August-): URL: https://www.splcenter.org
Squire, Megan [megan squire] (2007, March-): @MeganSquire0. URL: https://twitter.com/megansquire0
Thompson, A. C. [A.C. Thompson] (2012, February-): @ACInvestigates. URL: https://twitter.com/acinvesti-
gates
Unicorn Riot (2017-): Discord Leaks. [Hundreds of thousands of internal messages from white supremacist
and neo-nazi Discord chat servers]. URL: https://discordleaks.unicornriot.ninja/discord
Urban Dictionary (1999-): [Aaron Peckham, Founder]. URL: https://www.urbandictionary.com
Zywietz, Bernd [Propagandaforschung] (2016, July-): @OnPropFor. URL: https://twitter.com/OnPropFor
Books and Edited Volumes

Ashe, Stephen D. et al. (Eds.) (in press): Researching the Far Right: Theory, Method and Practice. (Routledge
Studies in Fascism and the Far Right). Abingdon: Routledge.
Baeck, Jean-Philipp; Speit, Andreas (Eds.) (2020): Rechte Egoshooter: Von der virtuellen Hetze zum Lives-
tream-Attentat. Berlin: Ch. Links.
Baldauf, Johannes; Ebner, Julia; Guhl, Jakob (Eds.) (2019): Hate Speech and Radicalisation Online: The OCCI
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Belew, Kathleen (2018): Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America. Cam-
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Bromark, Stian (2014): Massacre in Norway: The 2011 Terror Attacks on Oslo and the Utøya Youth Camp.
(Hon Khiam Leong, Trans.). Lincoln: Potomac Books.
Burley, Shane (2017): Fascism Today: What it Is and How to End it. Chico: AK Press.
Ebner, Julia (2017): The Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right Extremism. London: I.B. Tauris.
Ebner, Julia (2020): Going Dark: The Secret Social Lives of Extremists. London: Bloomsbury.
Ehsan, Rakib; Stott, Paul (Eds.) (2020, April): Countering the Far Right: An Anthology. [e-Book]. Lon-
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Hartleb, Florian (2020): Lone Wolves: The New Terrorism of Right-Wing Single Actors. Cham: Springer Inter-
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Hawley, George (2017): Making Sense of the Alt-Right. New York: Columbia University Press.
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Lyons, Matthew N. (2018): Insurgent Supremacists: The U.S. Far Right’s Challenge to State and Empire. Mon-
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Simi, Pete; Futrell, Robert (2015): American Swastika: Inside the White Power Movement’s Hidden Spaces of
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Valeri, Robin Maria; Borgeson, Kevin (Eds.) (in press): Cyber Hate: Examining the Functions and Impact of
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(Master’s Thesis, Columbia University, New York, United States). DOI: https://doi.org/10.7916/d8-j5pa-yz09
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Garpvall, Jessica (2017, Spring): “I’m Tired of Being Sh-t on for Being White”: Collective Identity Construction
in the Alt-Right Movement. (Master’s Thesis, Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden). URL: http://
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Construction of White Identity. (Master’s Thesis, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands). URL: http://hdl.
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toral Thesis, York University, Toronto, Canada). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10315/36766
Lindén Guiñez, Emilia (2019): Genderless Violence and Invisible Whiteness: A Study of how White Supremacist
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Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, United States). URL: http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/36546

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Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Albrecht, Stephen; Fielitz, Maik (2019): Rechtsterrorismus im digitalen Zeitalter. Wissen schafft Demokratie,
6/2019, 176-187. DOI: https://doi.org/10.19222/201906/16
Alizadeh, Meysam et al. (2019, May): Psychology and Morality of Political Extremists: Evidence from Twitter
Language Analysis of Alt-Right and Antifa. EPJ Data Science, 8, Article 17. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1140/ep-
jds/s13688-019-0193-9
Battersby, John (2020): Security Sector Practitioner Perceptions of the Terror Threat Environment before the
Christchurch Attacks. Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, 15(2), 295-309. DOI: https://
doi.org/10.1080/1177083X.2019.1701049
Berger, J. M.; Aryaeinejad, Kateira; Looney, Seán (2020): There and Back Again: How White Nationalist
Ephemera Travels between Online and Offline Spaces. The RUSI Journal, 165(1), 114-129. DOI: https://doi.or
g/10.1080/03071847.2020.1734322
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Bevensee, Emmi; Ross, Alexander Reid (2018): The Alt-Right and Global Information Warfare. In: Nao-
ki Abe et al. (Eds.): 2018 IEEE International Conference on Big Data: Dec 10 – Dec 13, 2018, Seattle, WA,
USA: Proceedings. Los Alamitos: IEEE Computer Society, 4393-4402. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/BigDa-
ta.2018.8622270 URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.02712
Bogerts, Lisa; Fielitz, Maik (2020, March): Die visuelle Kultur des (neuen) Rechtsterrorismus. Antifaschis-
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ismus
Bowman-Grieve, Lorraine (2009): Exploring “Stormfront”: A Virtual Community of the Radical Right. Stud-
ies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(11), 989-1007. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100903259951
Bray, Rex, III; Singer-Emery, Jacques (2020, April): Lingua Ferro Iter: Insights Gained through Linguistic
Analysis of Iron March. Small Wars Journal, 4/2020. URL: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lingua-fer-
ro-iter-insights-gained-through-linguistic-analysis-iron-march
Brzuszkiewicz, Sara (2020, April): Jihadism and Far-Right Extremism: Shared Attributes with Regard to Vio-
lence Spectacularisation. European View, 19(1), 71-79. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685820915972
Buckingham, Louisa; Alali, Nusiebah (2020): Extreme Parallels: A Corpus-Driven Analysis of ISIS and Far-
Right Discourse. Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, 15(2), 310-331. DOI: https://doi.org
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/10.1080/1177083X.2019.1698623
Conway, Maura (2020, January): Routing the Extreme Right: Challenges for Social Media Platforms. The
RUSI Journal, 165(1), 108-113. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2020.1727157
Crawford, Blyth; Keen, Florence (2020, March): The Hanau Terrorist Attack: How Race Hate and Conspir-
acy Theories Are Fueling Global Far-Right Violence. CTC Sentinel, 13(3), 1-8. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2020/03/CTC-SENTINEL-032020.pdf
Crosset, Valentine; Tanner, Samuel; Campana, Aurélie (2019, April): Researching Far Right Groups
on Twitter: Methodological Challenges 2.0. New Media & Society, 21(4), 939-961. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1177/1461444818817306
Crothers, Charles; O’Brien, Thomas (2020): The Contexts of the Christchurch Terror Attacks: Social Science
Perspectives. [Special Issue]. Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, 15(2). URL: https://
www.tandfonline.com/toc/tnzk20/15/2
Crothers, Charles; O’Brien, Thomas (2020): The Contexts of the Christchurch Terror Attacks: Social Science
Perspectives. [Introduction]. Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, 15(2), 247-259. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/1177083X.2020.1746364
Deem, Alexandra (2019): The Digital Traces of #whitegenocide and Alt-Right Affective Economies of Trans-
gression. International Journal of Communication, 13, 3183-3202. URL: https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/
view/9631
De Koster, Willem; Houtman, Dick (2008): “Stormfront Is Like a Second Home to Me”: On Virtual Commu-
nity Formation by Right-Wing Extremists. Information, Communication & Society, 11(8), 1155-1176. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/13691180802266665 URL: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/18512475.pdf
Droogan, Julian (Ed.-in-Chief) (2019): After Christchurch: Global Perspectives on Far Right Terrorism. [Spe-
cial Issue]. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 14(3). URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/
toc/rpic20/14/3
Ellis, Gavin; Muller, Denis (2020): The Proximity Filter: The Effect of Distance on Media Coverage of the
Christchurch Mosque Attacks. Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, 15(2), 332-348. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/1177083X.2019.1705358
Fisogni, Primavera (2019): Cyber Terrorism and Self-Radicalization – Emergent Phenomena of Onlife Age:
An Essay through the General System Theory. International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism, 9(3), 21-
35. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4018/IJCWT.2019070102
Gallaher, Carolyn (2020, January): Mainstreaming White Supremacy: A Twitter Analysis of the American
“Alt-Right”. Gender, Place & Culture. Advance Online Publication. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/096636
9X.2019.1710472
Ganesh, Bharath (2020, January): Weaponizing White Thymos: Flows of Rage in the Online Audiences of the
Alt-Right. Cultural Studies. Advance Online Publication. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09502386.2020.17146
87
Gilbert, Jarrod; Elley, Ben (2020): Shaved Heads and Sonnenrads: Comparing White Supremacist Skinheads
and the Alt-Right in New Zealand. Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, 15(2), 280-294.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1177083X.2020.1730415
Gornishka, Iva; Rudinac, Stevan; Worring, Marcel (2020): Interactive Search and Exploration in Discussion
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tional Conference, MMM 2020, Daejeon, South Korea, January 5–8, 2020, Proceedings, Part II. (Lecture Notes
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Gottschalk, Simon (2020, March): Accelerators, Amplifiers, and Conductors: A Model of Tertiary Deviance
in Online White Supremacist Networks. Deviant Behavior. Advance Online Publication. DOI: https://doi.org/
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Greaves, Lara M. et al. (2020): Comparative Study of Attitudes to Religious Groups in New Zealand Reveals
Muslim-Specific Prejudice. Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, 15(2), 260-279. DOI:
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Greene, Viveca S. (2019): “Deplorable” Satire: Alt-Right Memes, White Genocide Tweets, and Redpilling
Normies. Studies in American Humor, 5(1), 31-69. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5325/studamerhumor.5.1.0031
Grover, Ted; Mark, Gloria (2019, July): Detecting Potential Warning Behaviors of Ideological Radicalization
in an Alt-Right Subreddit. Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference on Web and Social Media,
13(1), 193-204. URL: https://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/ICWSM/article/view/3221
Hakoköngäs, Eemeli; Halmesvaara, Otto; Sakki, Inari (2020, April-June): Persuasion through Bitter Humor:
Multimodal Discourse Analysis of Rhetoric in Internet Memes of Two Far-Right Groups in Finland. Social
Media + Society, 6(2). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120921575
Hartzell, Stephanie L. (2020, March): Whiteness Feels Good Here: Interrogating White Nationalist Rhetoric
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Hine, Gabriel Emile et al. (2017, May): Kek, Cucks, and God Emperor Trump: A Measurement Study of
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Holt, Thomas J.; Freilich, Joshua D.; Chermak, Steven M. (2020, January): Examining the Online Expression
of Ideology among Far-Right Extremist Forum Users. Terrorism and Political Violence. Advance Online Pub-
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Hughes, Brian (2019, December): “Pine Tree” Twitter and the Shifting Ideological Foundations of
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Hutchinson, Jade (2019, June): Far-Right Terrorism: The Christchurch Attack and Potential Implications on
the Asia Pacific Landscape. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 11(6), 19-28. URL: https://www.rsis.edu.
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Ibrahim, Yasmin (2020, May): Livestreaming the “Wretched of the Earth”: The Christchurch Mas-
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Kaiser, Jonas; Rauchfleisch, Adrian; Bourassa, Nikki (2020): Connecting the (Far-)Right Dots: A Topic Mod-
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King, Bryant (2019, August): “I’m as Mad as Hell and I’m Not Gonna Take This Anymore:” Evaluating the
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Kleinberg, Bennett; van der Vegt, Isabelle; Gill, Paul (2020, February): The Temporal Evolution of a Far-Right
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Köhler, Daniel (2019, December): The Halle, Germany, Synagogue Attack and the Evolution of the Far-
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Lavi, Michal (2020, Spring): Do Platforms Kill? Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 43(1), 477-573. URL:
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Lister, Tim (2020, April): The Nexus between Far-Right Extremists in the United States and Ukraine. CTC
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Macklin, Graham (2019, December): The El Paso Terrorist Attack: The Chain Reaction of Global Right-Wing
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Malevich, Simon; Robertson, Tom (2020, February): Violence Begetting Violence: An Examination of
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Mattheis, Ashley (2019, December): Disrupting the Digital Divide: Extremism’s Integration of Offline /
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Carless, Will; Corey, Michael (2019, June 14): To Protect and Slur: Inside Hate Groups on Facebook, Police
Officers Trade Racist Memes, Conspiracy Theories and Islamophobia. Reveal. URL: https://www.revealnews.
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org/article/inside-hate-groups-on-facebook-police-officers-trade-racist-memes-conspiracy-theories-and-is-
lamophobia
Coelho, Leonardo; Evans, Robert (2019, November 7): Dogolachan and the Ghost of Massacres Past. Belling-
cat. URL: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2019/11/07/dogolachan-and-the-ghost-of-massacres-past
Colborne, Michael (2020, March 18): Revealed: The Ukrainian Man who Runs a Neo-Nazi Terrorist Telegram
Channel. Bellingcat. URL: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/03/18/revealed-the-ukrainian-man-who-
runs-a-neo-nazi-terrorist-telegram-channel
Dearden, Lizzie (2019, August 24): Revered as a Saint by Online Extremists, how Christchurch Shooter In-
spired Copycat Terrorists Around the World. The Independent. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/australasia/brenton-tarrant-christchurch-shooter-attack-el-paso-norway-poway-a9076926.html
Dearden, Lizzie (2019, October 11): Use of 3D Printed Guns in German Synagogue Shooting Must Act as
Warning to Security Services, Experts Say. The Independent. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/europe/3d-gun-print-germany-synagogue-shooting-stephan-balliet-neo-nazi-a9152746.html
Diehl, Jörg et al. (2019, March 28): The Growing Threat of Online-Bred Right-Wing Extremism. Spiegel On-
line International. URL: https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-growing-threat-of-online-bred-right-
wing-extremist-a-1259742.html
Emberland, Terje (2020, February 24): Why Conspiracy Theories Can Act as Radicalization Multipliers of
Far-Right Ideals. Right Now! URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/right-now/2020/
conspiracy-theories-radicalization-multipliers.html
Evans, Robert (2018, October 11): From Memes to Infowars: How 75 Fascist Activists Were “Red-Pilled”.
Bellingcat. URL: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2018/10/11/memes-infowars-75-fascist-activ-
ists-red-pilled
Evans, Robert (2019, March 15): Shitposting, Inspirational Terrorism, and the Christchurch Mosque Mas-
sacre. Bellingcat. URL: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2019/03/15/shitposting-inspiration-
al-terrorism-and-the-christchurch-mosque-massacre
Evans, Robert (2019, April 28): Ignore the Poway Synagogue Shooter’s Manifesto: Pay Attention to 8chan’s /
pol/ Board. Bellingcat. URL: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2019/04/28/ignore-the-poway-syna-
gogue-shooters-manifesto-pay-attention-to-8chans-pol-board
Evans, Robert (2019, August 4): The El Paso Shooting and the Gamification of Terror. Bellingcat. URL:
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2019/08/04/the-el-paso-shooting-and-the-gamification-of-terror
Evans, Robert; Wilson, Jason (2020, May 27): The Boogaloo Movement Is Not What You Think. Bellingcat.
URL: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/05/27/the-boogaloo-movement-is-not-what-you-think
Fielitz, Maik (2019, March 18): Christchurch als bitterböses Meme. Belltower.News. URL: https://www.bell-
tower.news/rechtsextremer-terror-christchurch-als-bitterboeses-meme-82559
Fielitz, Maik (2019, October 24): Lessons not Learned: From Christchurch to Halle. CARR Blog. URL: https://
www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2019/10/24/lessons-not-learned-from-christchurch-to-halle
Flade, Florian et al. (2020, May 1): Dunkle Seiten. Süddeutsche Zeitung. URL: https://projekte.sueddeutsche.
de/artikel/politik/imageboards-dunkle-seiten-e585855
Forchtner, Bernhard (2019, August 13): Eco-Fascism: Justifications of Terrorist Violence in the Christ-
church Mosque Shooting and the El Paso Shooting. openDemocracy. URL: https://www.opendemocracy.
net/en/countering-radical-right/eco-fascism-justifications-terrorist-violence-christchurch-mosque-shoot-
ing-and-el-paso-shooting
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Ganesh, Bharath (2019, March 28): How the Swarm of White Extremism Spreads Itself Online. The Spinoff.
URL: https://thespinoff.co.nz/media/28-03-2019/how-the-swarm-of-white-extremism-spreads-itself-online
Glaser, April (2018, October 9): White Supremacists Still Have a Safe Space Online. Slate. URL: https://slate.
com/technology/2018/10/discord-safe-space-white-supremacists.html
Glaser, April (2019, August 8): Telegram was Built for Democracy Activists. White Nationalists Love it. Slate.
URL: https://slate.com/technology/2019/08/telegram-white-nationalists-el-paso-shooting-facebook.html
Glaser, April (2019, November 11): Where 8channers Went after 8chan. Slate: Future Tense. URL: https://
slate.com/technology/2019/11/8chan-8kun-white-supremacists-telegram-discord-facebook.html
Hagen, Sal et al. (2019, August 9): Infinity’s Abyss: An Overview of 8chan. OILab Blog. URL: https://oilab.eu/
infinitys-abyss-an-overview-of-8chan
Hankes, Keegan; Sinders, Caroline; Unicorn Riot (2019, May 9): Extremists Purge Hateful Messages af-
ter Christchurch Massacre. Hatewatch. URL: https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/05/09/extrem-
ists-purge-hateful-messages-after-christchurch-massacre
Hatewatch Staff (2018, April 19): McInnes, Molyneux, and 4chan: Investigating Pathways to the Alt-Right.
Hatewatch. URL: https://www.splcenter.org/20180419/mcinnes-molyneux-and-4chan-investigating-path-
ways-alt-right
Hayden, Michael Edison (2019, March 15): New Zealand Terrorist Manifesto Influenced by Far-Right Online
Ecosystem, Hatewatch Finds. Hatewatch. URL: https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/03/15/new-zea-
land-terrorist-manifesto-influenced-far-right-online-ecosystem-hatewatch-finds
Hoffman, Bruce (2019, April 2): Back to the Future: The Return of Violent Far-Right Terrorism in the Age of
Lone Wolves. War on the Rocks. URL: https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/back-to-the-future-the-return-of-
violent-far-right-terrorism-in-the-age-of-lone-wolves
Hoffman, Bruce; Ware, Jacob (2019, November 27): Are We Entering a New Era of Far-Right Terrorism? War
on the Rocks. URL: https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/are-we-entering-a-new-era-of-far-right-terrorism
Hume, Tim (2019, August 14): The Christchurch Shooter Was Allowed to Write a Letter from Prison. It End-
ed Up on 4chan. VICE News. URL: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ne8vbq/the-christchurch-shooter-
was-allowed-to-write-a-letter-from-prison-it-ended-up-on-4chan
Hutchinson, Eliza (2020, February 13): VKontakte vs. Facebook: From Open White Supremacy to Stealth.
Bellingcat. URL: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/02/13/vkontakte-vs-facebook-from-open-white-su-
premacy-to-stealth
Katz, Rita (2019, March 20): New Zealand Shooting: White Supremacists and Jihadists Feed Off Each Other.
Daily Beast. URL: https://www.thedailybeast.com/new-zealand-shooting-white-supremacists-and-jihadists-
feed-off-each-other
Katz, Rita (2019, December 5): Telegram has Finally Cracked Down on Islamist Terrorism: Will it Do the
Same for the Far-Right? Washington Post. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/12/05/tele-
gram-has-finally-cracked-down-islamist-terrorism-will-it-do-same-far-right
Köhler, Daniel (2019, October 10): What does the Halle Attack Say about Far-Right Terrorism in Germany?
Right Now! URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/right-now/2019/the-halle-attack.html
Krohn, Jonathan (2019, March-April): How a Gay Teen, an Internet Nazi, and a Late-Night Rendezvous
Turned to Tragedy. Mother Jones. URL: https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2019/03/how-a-gay-
teen-an-internet-nazi-and-a-late-night-rendezvous-turned-to-tragedy
Lamoureux, Mack; Kamel, Zachary (2019, November 14): Neo-Nazi Terror Groups Are Using iFunny to
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Recruit. VICE. URL: https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/vb5kx3/neo-nazi-terror-groups-are-using-ifunny-

to-recruit
Liyanage, Chamila (2020, January 9): Endchan: Narratives of the Chanosphere. openDemocracy. URL: https://
www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/endchan-narratives-chanosphere
Lyons, Matthew N. (2019, April 18): The Christchurch Massacre and Fascist Revolutionary Politics. threeway-
fight. URL: http://threewayfight.blogspot.com/2019/04/the-christchurch-massacre-and-fascist.html
Mackintosh, Eliza; Mezzofiore, Gianluca (2019, October 10): How the Extreme-Right Gamified Terror. CNN.
URL: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/10/europe/germany-synagogue-attack-extremism-gamified-grm-intl/
index.html
Makuch, Ben (2020, March 15): Audio Recording Claims Neo-Nazi Terror Group is Disbanding. Mother-
board. URL: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qjdnam/audio-recording-claims-neo-nazi-terror-group-is-
disbanding
Makuch, Ben; Lamoureux, Mack (2019, September 17): Neo-Nazis Are Glorifying Osama Bin Laden. Mother-
board. URL: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bjwv4a/neo-nazis-are-glorifying-osama-bin-laden
Maley, Paul (2019, September 7): The Ruin of Brenton Tarrant: Brenton Tarrant Squandered a Fortune –
and then he Left his Mother Shaken to her Core. The Australian. URL: https://www.theaustralian.com.au/
inquirer/the-killer-within-brenton-tarrants-online-fantasy-reallife-horror/news-story/295609c73561cb9e-
8f6a2a31cc66015b
Maly, Ico (2019, May 23): White Terrorism, White Genocide and Metapolitics 2.0. Diggit Magazine. URL:
https://www.diggitmagazine.com/column/white-terrorism-white-genocide-and-metapolitics20
Mattheis, Ashley (2019, September 16): Manifesto Memes: The Radical Right’s New Dangerous Visual Rhet-
orics. openDemocracy. URL: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/manifesto-me-
mes-the-radical-rights-new-dangerous-visual-rhetorics
Munn, Luke (2019, March 19): Algorithmic Hate: Brenton Tarrant and the Dark Social Web. Institute of Net-
work Cultures Blog. URL: https://networkcultures.org/blog/2019/03/19/luke-munn-algorithmic-hate-bren-
ton-tarrant-and-the-dark-social-web
Musharbash, Yassin; Stark, Holger (2019, March 23): Der einsame Wolf und sein digitales Rudel. ZEIT On-
line. URL: https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2019-03/tarrant-und-die-rechtsextreme-szene
Neiwert, David (2019, April 29): The New Age of Chain Terrorism: White Far-Right Killers Are Inspiring
Each Other Sequentially. Daily Kos. URL: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2019/4/29/1853869/-The-new-
age-of-chain-terrorism-White-far-right-killers-are-inspiring-each-other-sequentially
O’Malley, Nick (2019, April 21): “Unprecedented” Surge of Online Extremism after Christchurch. The Sydney
Morning Herald. URL: https://www.smh.com.au/national/unprecedented-surge-of-online-extremism-af-
ter-christchurch-20190420-p51fss.html
O’Malley, Nick; Barlass, Tim; Begley, Patrick (2019, August 10): White-Bred Terrorist: The Making of a Killer.
Good Weekend | The Sydney Morning Herald. URL: https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-
the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html
Önnerfors, Andreas (2018, July 6): “Finspång” – An Execution Meme of the Swedish Radical Right Ignites the
Political Discourse. CARR Blog. URL: https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2018/07/06/finspang-an-execu-
tion-meme-of-the-swedish-radical-right-ignites-the-political-discourse
Önnerfors, Andreas (2019, March 18): “The Great Replacement” – Decoding the Christchurch Terrorist
Manifesto. CARR Blog. URL: https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2019/03/18/the-great-replacement-de-
coding-the-christchurch-terrorist-manifesto
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Owen, Tess (2019, October 7): How Telegram Became White Nationalists’ Go-To Messaging Platform.
VICE News. URL: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/59nk3a/how-telegram-became-white-national-
ists-go-to-messaging-platform
Paul, Kari (2019, August 9): 8chan: Ex-Users of Far-Right Site Flock to New Homes Across Internet. The
Guardian. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/08/8chan-shutdown-users-social-media
Poulsen, Kevin (2019, August 9): 8chan Refugees Blow their Anonymity. Daily Beast. URL: https://www.the-
dailybeast.com/8chan-users-migrating-to-zeronet-are-accidentally-revealing-their-locations
Ravndal, Jacob Aasland (2019, March 16): The Dark Web Enabled the Christchurch Killer. Foreign Policy.
URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/16/the-dark-web-enabled-the-christchurch-killer-extreme-right-ter-
rorism-white-nationalism-anders-breivik
Reid Ross, Alexander; Bevensee, Emmi; ZC; in collaboration with the Autonomous Disinformation Research
Network (2019, December 19): Transnational White Terror: Exposing Atomwaffen and the Iron March Net-
works. Bellingcat. URL: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2019/12/19/transnational-white-terror-exposing-
atomwaffen-and-the-iron-march-networks
Reitman, Janet (2018, May 2): All-American Nazis: How a Senseless Double Murder in Florida Exposed the
Rise of an Organized Fascist Youth Movement in the United States. Rolling Stone. URL: https://www.rolling-
stone.com/politics/politics-news/all-american-nazis-628023
Romano, Aja (2019, March 16): How the Christchurch Shooter Used Memes to Spread Hate. Vox.
URL: https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/3/16/18266930/christchurch-shooter-manifesto-memes-sub-
scribe-to-pewdiepie
Roose, Kevin (2019, March 15): A Mass Murder of, and for, the Internet. The New York Times. URL: https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/technology/facebook-youtube-christchurch-shooting.html
Schiano, Chris (2019, May 10): Neo-Nazis Use Discord Chats to Promote New Zealand Copycat Shootings.
Unicorn Riot. URL: https://unicornriot.ninja/2019/neo-nazis-use-discord-chats-to-promote-new-zealand-
copycat-shootings
Squire, Megan (2019, March 26): Why the Next Terror Manifesto Could Be Even Harder to Track. The
Conversation. URL: https://theconversation.com/why-the-next-terror-manifesto-could-be-even-harder-to-
track-114048
Squire, Megan (2020, February 23): Alt-Tech & the Radical Right, Part 3: Why Do Hate Groups and Terror-
ists Love Telegram? CARR Blog. URL: https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/02/23/alt-tech-the-radical-
right-part-3-why-do-hate-groups-and-terrorists-love-telegram
Sunshine, Spencer (2019, October 18): Anti-Semitic and Anti-Muslim Murders Are Latest in String of Fascist
Attacks. Truthout. URL: https://truthout.org/articles/anti-semitic-and-anti-muslim-murders-are-latest-in-
string-of-fascist-attacks
Tarabay, Jamie (2019, July 5): As New Zealand Fights Online Hate, the Internet’s Darkest Corners Resist. The
New York Times. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/world/asia/new-zealand-internet.html
Tell MAMA [Staff] (2019, September 3): How Christchurch Inspired further Acts of Far-Right Terror. Tell
MAMA. URL: https://tellmamauk.org/how-christchurch-inspired-further-acts-of-far-right-terror
Thalen, Mikael (2019, August 11): No, the Norway Mosque Shooter Did Not Post to 8chan before Attack. The
Daily Dot. URL: https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/norway-mosque-shooter-8chan
Thayer, Nate (2019, December 5): Secret Identities of U.S. Nazi Terror Group Revealed. Nate Thayer – Jour-
nalist. URL: https://www.nate-thayer.com/secret-identities-of-u-s-nazi-terror-group-revealed
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Thompson, A. C.; Winston, Ali; Hanrahan, Jake (2018, February 23): Inside Atomwaffen as it Celebrates a
Member for Allegedly Killing a Gay Jewish College Student. ProPublica. URL: https://www.propublica.org/
article/atomwaffen-division-inside-white-hate-group
Uberti, David (2019, October 3): Facebook Went to War against White Supremacist Terror after Christ-
church. Will it Work? VICE News. URL: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vb5yk3/facebook-went-to-war-
against-white-supremacist-terror-after-christchurch-will-it-work
Wells, Georgia; Lovett, Ian (2019, September 4): “So What’s His Kill Count?”: The Toxic Online World where
Mass Shooters Thrive. The Wall Street Journal. URL: https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-toxic-online-
world-where-mass-shooters-thrive-11567608631
Wilson, Matthias (2019, December 1): Researching Right-Wing Extremism in Central Europe. Key Findings.
URL: https://keyfindings.blog/2019/12/01/researching-right-wing-extremism-in-central-europe
Multimedia Items
Aminy, Najib et al. (Producers) (2019, June): Hate in the Homeland. [Reveal / PRX Podcast]. URL: https://
www.revealnews.org/episodes/hate-in-the-homeland
Bachelard, Michael (Presenter) (2019, March): After Christchurch: Lessons from an Atrocity. [The Sydney
Morning Herald / The Age Podcast; Please Explain series]. URL: https://www.smh.com.au/please-explain/
after-christchurch-lessons-from-an-atrocity-20190320-p515ny.html
Cramer, Florian (2017, March): Meme Wars: Internet Culture and the “Alt-Right”. (Talk presented at the
exhibition “How much of this is fiction”, @ FACT, Liverpool, United Kingdom). [Video]. URL: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=OiNYuhLKzi8
Epp, Alexander et al. (2018, September): The Hate Network: A Visual Story about Atomwaffen Division. [Vi-
sual Story; Weitwinkel series]. Spiegel Online. URL: https://www.spiegel.de/international/the-hate-network-
an-inside-look-at-a-global-extremist-group-a-1226861.html
Evans, Robert (2019, August): The War on Everyone. [Audio Book]. URL: http://www.thewaroneveryone.com
Feldman, Matthew; Alexander, Audrey (Interviewees); Hadley, Adam; Bodo, Lorand (Presenters) (2019, Sep-
tember): How do Terrorists Use the Internet? [The Tech Against Terrorism Podcast series]. URL: https://www.
techagainstterrorism.fm/how-do-terrorists-use-the-internet
Fielitz, Maik; Bogerts, Lisa (Interviewees); Janin, Maygane; Berntsson, Jacob (Presenters) (2020, April): Far-
Right Violent Extremists and Meme Culture. [The Tech Against Terrorism Podcast series]. URL: https://www.
techagainstterrorism.fm/far-right-violent-extremists-and-meme-culture
Gross, Terry (Presenter); Amy Salit; Mooj Zadie (Producers & Editors) et al. (2019, March): Author Says New
Zealand Massacre Points to a Global Resurgence of “Extremism”. [npr Podcast; Fresh Air series]. URL: https://
www.npr.org/2019/03/25/706482037/author-says-new-zealand-massacre-points-to-a-global-resurgence-of-
extremism
Harper, Daniel; Graham, Jack (Presenters) (2019, January-): I Don’t Speak German. [Podcast series]. URL:
https://idontspeakgerman.libsyn.com
Harrison, David (Investigative Reporter); Sorrell, Lee (Producer-Director) et al. (2018, December): Gen-
eration Hate. [Al Jazeera English Documentary; 2 parts]. URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/
generation-hate-part-1-181226094751438.html https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/generation-hate-pa
rt-2-181226095511884.html
Longbottom, Toby (Director & Editor); Penfold, Paula (Writer & Reporter); Bingham, Eugene (Writer & Pro-
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ducer) et al. (2019, August): Infinite Evil: The Incubators of Online Hate. [Stuff Circuit Documentary; Circuit
series]. URL: https://interactives.stuff.co.nz/2019/circuit/infinite-evil-documentary/
Miller-Idriss, Cynthia (Interviewee); Bokhari, Kamran (Interviewer) (2019, April): Tackling the Threat of
White Extremism. (CGP Podcast; The Lodestar series). URL: https://cgpolicy.org/multimedia/tackling-the-
threat-of-white-extremism
Nagle, Angela (Producer); Woodhouse, Leighton (Director & Producer) et al. (2018): Trumpland: Kill all
Normies. [Fusion Documentary]. URL: https://archive.org/details/trumplandkillallnormies
Reeve, Elle (Correspondent) et al. (2017, August): Charlottesville: Race and Terror. [VICE News Documenta-
ry]. URL: https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/qvzn8p/vice-news-tonight-full-episode-charlottesville-race-
and-terror
Reeve, Elle (Correspondent) et al. (2018, August): The Alt-Right Is in Shambles One Year after Charlottesville.
[VICE News Documentary]. URL: https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/wjk7bn/a-year-after-charlottesville-
the-alt-right-is-in-shambles
Reeve, Elle (Correspondent) et al. (2019, September): How 8chan Was Born — and Became the Worst Place on
the Internet. [VICE News Documentary]. URL: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/3kxde9/how-8chan-was-
born-and-became-the-worst-place-on-the-internet
Rubinsztein-Dunlop, Sean (Reporter) et al. (2019, March): Under the Radar. [ABC News Documentary; Four
Corners series]. URL: https://www.abc.net.au/4corners/under-the-radar/10946120
Subedar, Anisa; Wendling, Mike (Presenters) et al. (2019, March): Decoding Far-Right Online Hate after
Christchurch. [BBC News Podcast; Trending series]. URL: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3csws84
Thompson, A. C. (Producer & Correspondent); Hajj, Karim (Producer); Rowley, Richard (Writer & Direc-
tor) et al. (2018, August): Documenting Hate: Charlottesville. [PBS FRONTLINE / ProPublica Documentary].
URL: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/documenting-hate-charlottesville
Thompson, A. C. (Producer & Correspondent); Hajj, Karim; Soohen, Jacqueline (Producers); Rowley, Rich-
ard (Writer & Director) et al. (2018, November): Documenting Hate: New American Nazis. [PBS FRONTLINE
/ ProPublica Documentary]. URL: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/documenting-hate-new-ameri-
can-nazis
Note
Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to
the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories, on professional networking sites,
or author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the
content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of
preprints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer
review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after obtaining permission by the author(s).
About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., is a Professional Information Specialist. Since 2011, she works at
the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). In addition, she is the Information Resources Editor
of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. In her editorial role, she regularly compiles bibliographies and other resources for
Terrorism Research (for an inventory, see URL: https://archive.org/details/terrorism-research-bibliographies).
Judith wrote her doctoral thesis on Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents (focus: media-oriented
hostage takings). E-mail: [email protected]
ISSN 2334-3745 189 June 2020

Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 17 Books on Terrorism & Counter-

Terrorism-Related Subjects
Reviewed by Joshua Sinai
So many books are published on terrorism- and counterterrorism-related subjects that it is difficult to catch up on a
large backlog of monographs and edited volumes received for review. In order to deal with this backlog, this column
of capsule reviews consists of short single paragraph overviews and Tables of Contents of 17 books, including also
several books published less recently but still meriting attention. Some of the new books will be reviewed in future
issues of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’ as stand-alone reviews. The books are listed topically.
General
John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker (Eds.), Strategic Notes on Third Generation Gangs
[A Small Wars Journal – El Centro Anthology] (Indianapolis, IN: Exlibris, 2020), 674 pp., US $ 26.99
[Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-7960-9561-6.
The contributors to this important edited anthology present an updated multidisciplinary approach to
analyzing what they term a third generation street gang (3Gen Gang) theory, which was first introduced
in a series of papers by co-editor John P. Sullivan in 1997. Today, the contributors argue, the threats have
evolved to encompass sophisticated gangs with transnational reach, which are also accompanied by political
dimensions, particularly in countries such as Mexico, that affect the communities and nations where they
operate, resulting in a threat to global security, as well. Dr. Sullivan served as a Lieutenant with the Los Angeles
Sheriff ’s Department and is a Senior Fellow with “Small Wars Journal-El Centro.” Dr. Bunker is an Adjunct
Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, and is a Senior Fellow with
“Small Wars Journal-El Centro.”
Table of Contents: Prologue On 3GEN Gangs; Foreword: Narco-Insurgent-Gang-Terror (NIGT) Phenomenon;

Introduction: Third Generation Gangs from Theory to Reality; Part I: Third Generation Gangs; Future Conflict:
Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence; Third-Generation Gangs and Criminal Insurgency in Latin
America; Part II: Third Generation Gangs Strategic Notes [23 Notes]; Part III: Military Trained Gang Members;
Background; Third Generation (3Gen) Gangs and Military Trained Gang Members (MTGMs); The Threat
of Street Gangs, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, and Domestic Terrorist/Extremist Groups with Military-Trained
Members [4 Notes]; Part IV: Conclusions; Conclusion: The Past, Present and Potential Future of Third Generation
Gang Studies; Postscript: Gangs and Conflict: Armed Conflicts are on the Rebound and They are Harder than
Ever to Stop; Afterword: Mexico’s Forever War; Appendices: Appendix 1: Gangs & Drug Trafficking in Central
America Conference; Appendix 2: Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13): A Law Enforcement Primer; Appendix 3: Iraq
and the Americas: 3 GEN Gangs Lessons and Prospects; Appendix 4: Gangs in Baghdad; Appendix 5: Gangs,
Criminal Empires and Military Intervention in Cape Town’s Crime Wars; Selected Readings.
Counterterrorism
Jürgen Brandsch, Killing Civilians in Civil War: The Rationale of Indiscriminate Violence (Boulder, CO:
FirstForumPress/A Division of Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2020), 239 pp., US $ 45.00 [Hardcover], ISBN:
978-1-6263-7863-6.
This is an important examination of the dilemmas faced by perpetrators, whether governments or insurgents,
in their use of indiscriminate violence targeting civilians in their wars. By examining these issues, the author
presents proposals on how to prevent such atrocities. The author is the head of the Project on Small Arms and
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Light Weapons Control at the Bonn International Center for Conversion.
Table of Contents: Targeting Civilians in Civil Wars; What Do We Know About Indiscriminate Violence?;
State Use of Indiscriminate Violence; Nonstate Use of Indiscriminate Violence; Conceptual Building Blocks;
A Theory of Group-Selective Violence; How Does Indiscriminate Violence Work in Practice?; Assessing the
Effects of Indiscriminate Violence; Group-Selective Violence Across History; Violence Against Civilians in
Ethnic Wars; Conclusion: Does Group-Selective Violence Work?
Bruce W. Dayton and Louis Kriesberg (Eds.), Perspectives in Waging Conflicts Constructively: Cases,
Concepts, and Practice (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 234 pp., US $ 122.00 [Hardcover], US $
42.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-4422-6551-6.
The contributors to this volume offer diverse perspectives on mitigating and resolving major conflicts
through what they term a “constructive conflict approach,” which they apply to examining how this worked
in lessening the destructive impact of those conflicts in cases such as Israel and the Palestinians, Britain in
Northern Ireland, and dealing with aggressive countries such as North Korea. Co-editor Dayton is Associate
Professor of Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation and director of the CONTACT Peacebuilding
Program at the SIT Graduate Institute, School for International Training, and co-editor Kriesberg is Associate
Professor of Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation and director of the the same program as Bruce Dayton..
Table of Contents: Introduction; Communication, Constructiveness, and Asymmetry in Nonviolent Action

Theory and Practice; Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Prerequisite or Burden for Constructive
Conflict Transformation?; Strategic Nonviolent Action: Waging Constructive Conflict against
Authoritarianism; Peaceful Separation: The Politics of Constructive Dissolution; Factors for De-escalation:
Israel and a Shift to Constructive Conflict; The State of Constructive Conflict in Northern Ireland;
What Is a Constructive Peace Process?: Inclusion in Peace Negotiations; Non-Provocative
Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region; and Global Contexts for Waging Conflicts Constructively.
Louis Kriesberg and Bruce W. Dayton, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution [Fifth Edition]
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 452 pp., US $ 122.00 [Hardcover], US $ 56.00 [Paperback], ISBN:
978-1-4422-4326-2.
This textbook presents a comprehensive framework for analyzing how a spectrum of social conflicts can be
resolved through a “constructive conflict approach.” As a textbook, it discusses key principles and core ideas
about conflicts and how they can be resolved, as well as the roles of social movements and non-governmental
organizations, including conflict actors, and the use of various persuasive means to de-escalate conflicts, which
are applied to a series of case studies. Post-conflict activities that are likely to result in long term peace are also
discussed.
Table of Contents: List of Figures and Tables; Preface and Acknowledgments; Acronyms; Analyzing Social
Conflicts; Underlying Conditions for Social Conflicts; The Emergence of Conflicts; Alternative Conflict
Strategies; Adopting Conflict Strategies; Escalation of Conflicts; De-escalation of Conflicts; Mediation
in Conflicts; Settling Conflicts; Conflict Outcomes and Consequences; Synthesis, Specifications, and
Challenges; Appendix A: Selected Organizations in the Field of Constructive Conflicts; Appendix B:
Selected Websites Relating to Social Conflicts.
Will Irwin, Decision-Making Considerations in Support to Resistance [JSOU Report 20-1] (MacDill AFB,
FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, March 2020), 86 pp., (No cost information), [Paperback], ISBN:
978-1-9417-1546-8. URL: https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=53517726.
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This monograph examines the components of strategic- and operational-level decision-making, including the
elements of risk and legality, involved in providing unconventional warfare support to a resistance force as a
foreign policy option. These are applied to supporting insurgent resistance in unsuccessful cases such as the
Bay of Pigs event against the Castro regime in Cuba in April 1961, and successful cases such as supporting local
Afghani forces in removing the Taliban in late 2001. The author is a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special
Operations University. He is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer with experience as a defense analyst,
researcher, historian, instructor, and writer.
Table of Contents: From the Director; Foreword; About the Author; Introduction; Influencing the Decision-
Making Process; Prospect: Opportunity and Timing; Peril: Risks and Consequences; Premise: Assumptions
and Feasibility; Propriety: Sovereignty and Intervention; Conclusion; Acronyms.
William Knarr and Mark Nutsch, Village Stability Operations and the Evolution of SOF Command and
Control in Afghanistan: Implications for the Future of Irregular Warfare [JSOU Report 20-2] (MacDill AFB,
FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, March 2020), 174 pp., (No cost information), [Paperback], ISBN:
978-1-9417-1544-4. URL: https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=53882670.
In this conceptually important monograph, the authors examine how the evolution of the Special Operations
Forces (SOF) command and control mechanisms can operate effectively in countering terrorist groups at the
village level in countries with weak sociopolitical systems, such as Afghanistan. Dr. Knarr is a non-resident
Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) in Tampa Florida. Former U.S. Army Major
Nutsch is a consultant to the Special Operations Forces community.
Table of Contents: Foreword; About the Authors; Introduction; A War of Necessity; Searching for Context
and Solutions from the Past; VSO/alp Programs; Adapting Village Stability Operations Concepts to Reality;
Top-Down Interagency (Supporting Governance and Development) Meets Bottom-Up Counterinsurgency;
Activating the Special Operations Joint Task Force: Synchronizing Missions and Managing Resources;
International and Multinational Contributions; Special Operations Forces/Conventional Forces Integration;
Discussion/ Summary: Successes, Failures, and Implications; Acronyms.
Phil Miller, Keenie Meenie: The British Mercenaries Who Got Away with War Crimes (London: Pluto Press,
2020), 352 pp., US $ 99.00 [Hardcover], US $ 17.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7453-4079-1.
A fascinating and detailed account of the covert operations of Keenie Meenie Services, a British private
mercenary company, which was involved in providing “shadowy” paramilitary services to clients in conflict
regions such as Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, and Nicaragua. The account is based on the author’s investigative
reporting, including access to newly declassified evidence about the British government’s tacit support for the
company’s operations. The author, a veteran British journalist and producer, is a staff reporter for Declassified
UK, an investigations unit focusing on British foreign policy.
Table of Contents: Prologue: Piramanthanaru Massacre; Introduction: Return of the Privateers; White Sultan of
Oman; Bodyguards and Business Building; Teenage Rebellions; The Upside Down Jeep; Oliver North’s British
Mercenary; The Exploding Hospital; Mercenaries and Mujahideen; The English Pilot; Grenades in Wine
Glasses; Bugger off my Land!; Epilogue.
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Religion and Terrorism
Charles Selengut, Sacred Fury: Understanding Religious Violence [Third Edition] (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2017), 250 pp., US $ 100.00 [Hardcover], US $ 39.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-4422-7684-0.
This is a well-written, insightful and authoritative examination of the connection between extremist religious
faiths and violence around the world. All the major religiously-based violent extremist groups are covered,
such as Christian Identity, Hindu extremists, Jewish fundamentalist groups, and Islamist groups such as al-
Qaida and the Islamic State. Significant questions are discussed such as how “religious” is this type of terrorist
violence and the factors that motivate extremist adherents to conduct terrorist attacks on behalf of their beliefs.
The author is professor of sociology at County College of Morris, New Jersey.
Table of Contents: Introduction: The Study of Religion and Violence; Fighting for God: Scriptural
Obligations and Holy Wars; Psychological Perspectives; Apocalyptic Violence; Civilizational Clashes,
Culture Wars, and Religious Violence; Religious Suffering, Martyrdom, and Sexual Violence; Conclusion:
Toward a Holistic Approach to Religious Violence.
Jihad
Iraj Bashiri, The History of the Civil War in Tajikistan (Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2020), 336 pp.,
US $ 119.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-6446-9287-5.
This is the author’s well-informed personal account, based on his extensive research visits to the country, of
the evolution of the conflict between the radical Muslim Tajiks against the Soviet Tajiks, which ended in the
establishment of an independent Tajik state in 1997. The author, a prominent scholar in the fields of Central
Asian and Iranian studies is a professor of history at the University of Minnesota.
Table of Contents: The War Year; The Emirate of Bukhara; The Sovietization of Tajikistan; End of an Era; The
Government of National Reconciliation; Reinventing the Wheel; The Path to Recovery; Appendix; Glossary;
List of Abbreviations.
Noah Feldman, The Arab Winter: A Tragedy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020), 216 pp., US $
22.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-6911-9429-9.
This is an assessment of the Arab Spring, which the author argues represented the first time in recent Middle
Eastern history that many of the region’s people undertook collective action to achieve political and social
reforms in their societies. To examine these issues, uprisings and their consequences include the Egyptian
revolution, the Syrian civil war, the Islamic States in Iraq and Syria and the Tunisian struggle toward what
the author terms a struggle toward Islamic constitutionalism are presented. The author is Felix Frankfurter
Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA.
Table of Contents: Preface; The People Want; Tahrir and the Problem of Agency; Syria and the Question of
Fault; The Islamic State as Utopia; Tunisia and Political Responsibility; Afterword: Catharsis?
Joel Hodge, Violence in the Name of God: The Militant Jihadist Response to Modernity (New York: Bloomsbury
Academic, 2020), 296 pp., US $ 80.50 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-3501-0497-6.
This account utilizes René Girard’s mimetic theory of religiously sanctioned violence, to explain the historical
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trajectory of militant jihadism as a violent response against the impact of modernity on their societies. The
author is a Senior Lecturer in Systematic Theology at Australian Catholic University.
Table of Contents: Introduction: Why Another Book on Jihadism?; Part I: René Girard’s Mimetic Theory;
Violence in Modernity; Part II: The Islamic Modernity; The Militant Jihadist Response to Modernity; The
Rise of Violent Jihad; Jihadism and Violence; Violence and Identity; Sacred Jihadist Totalitarianism; Part III:
Why Is God Part of Human Violence? The Idolatrous Nature of Militant Jihadism; The Sacred and the Holy:
Alternatives to Escalating Violence; Appendix: René Girard at a Glance.
Samuel M. Katz, No Shadows in the Desert: Murder, Vengeance, and Espionage in the War Against ISIS (New
York, NY: Hanover Square Press, 2020), 368 pp., US $ 28.99 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-3350-1383-5.
This is a dramatic insider’s account of the behind-the-scenes battle by the Jordanian General Intelligence
Department (GID) against ISIS, which had held a Royal Jordanian Royal Air Force’s pilot hostage after his
F-16 fighter aircraft crashed over ISIS territory in Syria on January 3, 2015. The pilot, First Lieutenant Moaz al-
Kasasbeh, was ultimately executed in a highly publicized and brutal execution. The author’s account of Jordan’s
GID’s revenge against the pilot’s ISIS captors draws on his extensive contacts with the Jordanian government,
which provided him the inside material to produce this fascinating book. The author is a New York City-based
author of numerous books on terrorism and counterterrorism.
Table of Contents: Glossary; October 26, 2019; Author’s Note: Prologue: Slider One-One; Book One: A New
Storm Over the Horizon; What Could Go Wrong?; The Fall of Mosul; The Line in the Sand; Send in the Vipers;
Book Two: The Human Bazaar; Held Captive; The Point of No Return; Barbaric; The Extortionists; Shock and
Horror; Kill the Monsters; Book Three: Guillotine; Amman Station; The Kill List; Tradecraft; The Third World
War; Say, Die in Your Rage; Book Four: Payback; Desert One; Just Rewards; Find, Fix and Finish; Dirty Battles,
A Dirty War; Dawn before Daylight; Postscript: Caution and Vigilance.
Jacob Zenn, Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2020), 415 pp., US $ 47.50 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-6263-7878-0.
This is a comprehensive, detailed and authoritative account of the origins and current activities
of Boko Haram, including its relationship with the Islamic State. To examine these issues, the
author draws on his extensive interviews and access to primary sources in Arabic and Hausa.
The author is Senior Fellow on African Affairs at The Jamestown Foundation and Adjunct Professor in
Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program.
Table of Contents: Boko Haram and Global Jihad; Nigerian Jihadists in Sudan and the Sahel.; Al-Qaeda in
Nigeria; Ideological Preparation for Jihad; Broken Alliances with Salafis; Mobilizing for Battle; The Role of al-
Qaeda Affiliates; Factional Feuds and Territorial; Conquests; Allegiance to the Islamic State; The Islamic State
in West Africa Province; The Future of Global Jihad in Nigeria; Appendixes.
United States
Matthew Dallek, Defenseless Under the Night: The Roosevelt Years and the Origins of Homeland Security
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 360 pp., US $ 24.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-1997-4312-4.
This is an interesting account of the origins of modern homeland security in the United States, which began with
the establishment by President Franklin Roosevelt of the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) in the early 1930s.
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During World War II, the OCD managed the recruitment and activities of more than 10 million volunteers for
civilian defense. Also examined are issues such as civil liberties and the militarization of civilian life – issues
that are still relevant in the activities of today’s Department of Homeland Security. The author is Professor of
Political Management at George Washington University.
Table of Contents: Introduction: Guns and Butter; Ultimate Armageddon; No Pact, Treaty, Symbol, or Person;
Two Fronts; The Problem of Home Defense; An American Plan; London Burning; A Sweeping Conflagration
of Insanity; Heart and Soul; We Can’t All Run to Central Pk; A Man Must Be Protected; Fair Game; The Liberal
Approach; All These Rights Spell Security; Conclusion: National Security Liberalism.
Dennis A. Pluchinsky, Anti-American Terrorism: From Eisenhower to Trump – A Chronicle of the Threat
and Response; Volume I: The Eisenhower through Carter Administrations (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific
Publishing Ltd., 2020), 720 pp., US $ 58.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-7832-6872-6.
This is the first volume of the author’s comprehensive and extensively detailed four volume overview of the
origins and evolution of the United States’ Government’s approach to counterterrorism from the Dwight
Eisenhower through the Donald Trump administrations. This first volume covers the years from the Eisenhower
to the Carter presidencies - what the author terms the first phase of the international terrorist threat facing
the United States. The second volume, covering the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, is
scheduled to be published in a few months. The author is a retired U.S. Government terrorism analyst in the
U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security Threat Analysis Group/Division, giving this volume
a unique insider’s perspective.
Table of Contents: Introduction to Volume I; Chapter 1: The Prologue: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson
Administrations; Chapter 2: The Nixon and Ford Administrations (1969–1976) — The Overseas Threat;
Chapter 3: The Nixon and Ford Administrations (1969–1976) — The Internal Threat; Chapter 4: The Nixon
and Ford Administrations (1969–1976): The Response — The Overseas Threat; Chapter 5: The Nixon and
Ford Administrations; (1969–1976): The Response — The Internal Threat; Chapter 6: The Nixon and Ford
Administrations (1969–1976): The Ford Administration; Chapter 7: The Carter Administration (1977–1980)
— The Overseas Threat; Chapter 8: The Carter Administration (1977–1980) — The Internal Threat; Chapter
9: The Carter Administration (1977–1980): The Response — Part I; Chapter 10: The Carter Administration
(1977–1980): The Response — Part II; Chapter 11: The Carter Administration (1977–1980): The Response —
Part III; Chapter 12: Summation and Prognosis; Appendix.
Jason Ralph, America’s War on Terror: The State of the 9/11 Exception from Bush to Obama (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 200 pp., US $ 100 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-1996-5235-8.
This is a critical account of the effectiveness of the components of targeting, prosecution, detention as well
as interrogation of suspected terrorists in the United States’ counter-terrorism efforts against mostly Islamist
terrorists, including a discussion on adherence to customary international law and treaty law, during the
administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. The author is Professor of International Relations at
the University of Leeds, England.
Table of Contents: Introduction; The use of force after 9/11; Prosecuting terrorist suspects after 9/11; Detaining
terrorist suspects after 9/11; Interrogating terrorist suspects after 9/11; The State of the American Exception.
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Scott Shane, Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone (New York, NY: Tim Duggan
Books, 2016), 416 pp., US $ 28.00 [Hardcover], US $ 17.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-8041-4031-7.
This is a dramatic journalistic account of the increasing use of weaponized drones by the American government,
particularly under President Barack Obama, to target the leaders of Islamist terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida.
The pursuit, targeting and assassination by a weaponized drone of Anwar al-Awlaki (and his associates) in
their hideout in Yemen in May 2011 forms the book’s central narrative. The author is a Washington, DC-based
national security reporter for The New York Times.
Table of Contents: Prologue; Part I: 2009-2010; Merry Christmas; You Are Still Unsafe; Part II: 1990-2002; He
Had a Beautiful Tongue; An Exquisite Weapon; We Are the Bridge; Totally Planning to Stay; Stealthy, Agile,
and Lethal; Part III: 2002-2009; What Was the Transformation; WWW Jihad; I Face the World as It Is; Part IV:
2010-2014; The Guy Everyone Wanted to Find; The Time for Reaping; A Bigger Brand; Afterword.
About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He can be
reached at: [email protected].
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Klaus Hock & Nina Käsehage (Eds.).’ Militant Islam’ vs. ‘Islamic
Militancy’? Religion, Violence, Category Formation and Applied
Research. Contested Fields in the Discourses of Scholarship.
(Zürich: LIT Verlag, 2020), 272 pp., US $ 52.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-3-6439-1275-6.
Reviewed by Ahmet S. Yayla
‘Militant Islam’ vs. ‘Islamic Militancy’ focuses on overlooked and understudied questions of radical Islamic
movements and the distinctive factors of such groups by considering theoretical and practical frameworks.
Throughout this edited volume, the authors focus their analyses on discourses on radical Islam, political Islam,
Islamic extremism, and religious violence. They do so by asking questions about what people are discussing
when they refer to Salafism, Jihadism, and Islamic terrorism in order to try to overcome discrepancies in these
terminologies.
This book consists of eight contributions, based on an international workshop organized by the Department of
Religious Studies and Intercultural Theology, in cooperation with a Research Group on ‘Power of Interpretation:
Religion and Belief Systems in Conflicts of Interpretational Power,’ held at the University of Rostock on
November 16-17, 2017.
Hans G. Kippenberg, in his chapter “The end of Jihadi Movements in the Light of Comparative Studies in the
Decline of Terrorism,” analyzed the endings of terrorist groups on religious and nonreligious levels. He also
provided a synopsis of terrorism and jihadism by examining the motives for renouncing violence.
Alex P. Schmid, under the title of “Religion and Violent Extremism – with a Focus on Islamist Jihadism,” studied
the definitions and relationships between religion and violence through the lens of the three Abrahamic faiths:
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Schmid analyzed how Salafi Jihadist ideologies interpret the Islamic sacred
texts to justify their violence and killing, believing they are being done in the name of God. He also reviews the
relationship between jihad and terrorism. Consequently, this chapter concludes that jihadism will continue to
be a challenge in the 21st century, similar to how the ideologies of Fascism and Communism were during the
20th century.
In his “Beyond Religion – Beyond Islam: The Challenge of Ultra-Islamist Violence” contribution, Reinhard
Schulze highlighted the political stereotyping of “Islamic terrorism” by considering de-radicalization programs.
The author criticizes reducing the meaning of Islam to militant jihad, which led to the equation of Islam and
vicious terrorist attacks in some quarters. In the end, the author suggests reconsidering the notions of Islam,
religion, and violence to overcome the possibility of social stigmas being attached.
“The Problem of Salafism, the Problem with ‘Salafism’: An Essay on the Usability of an Academic Category
to Understand a Political Challenge” by Florian Zemmin discusses the politicization and misuse of the term
Salafism. In this chapter, the author explains how the meaning of Salafism changed over the years by almost
demonizing the religion of Islam through the violent activities of terrorists. In his conclusion, the author
suggests that the use of the term “Islamic extremism” is more appropriate than “Militant Islam” because the use
of Islamic extremism identifies extremism as the main problem, instead of the religion.
Andrew Hammond, in the chapter “Contesting Legitimacy: Zahid Kevseri’s Semantic War with Emerging
Salafism,” argues that Kevseri, the last Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam Mustafa Sabri’s deputy in Istanbul, became
a “lightning rod for the Salafi movement” after his death. Kevseri was a prominent scholar in the tradition of
Hanafi-Maturidism, and he held a critical position towards Ibn Taymiyya, by countering Salafi and Wahhabi
practices, such as the frequent use of takfīr (declaring Muslims non-believers).
Nina Käsehage argues in her chapter, “Empowerment through Violence – European Women in Jihadi
Movements,” that the role of women in Jihadi movements has been underrated based on her own interviews
and observations. In her research on “Female Salafistic Jihadi,” she examined the various motives of European
female Jihadi members for joining terrorist groups. Dr. Käsehage concluded that one of the main reasons why
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Salafi Jihadist groups were able to recruit female members was because of “empowerment through a specific
form of violence.” Finally, the author, in her conclusion, suggests the development of alternative forms of
empowerment for (Muslim) females participation in Europe to counter radicalization and recruitment.
In “Islamism and Women in the Sahel: Roots and Evolutions,” Olga Torres discusses the development of Islam in
the Sahel, as well as how it impacted Muslim women through the progress which occurred between the eighth
and sixteenth centuries. Diaz concludes that it is only possible to counter the threat of female extremism and
radicalization in the Sahel by addressing the deep historical roots, including social, educational, and economic
factors that have affected the female population adversely compared to their male counterparts.
Claudia Carvalho and Johannes Saal, in their analysis “The Hidden Women of the Caliphate – a Glimpse into
the Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist Network on Facebook,” reviews the role of Muslim women and their online
activities, particularly on Facebook. According to the authors, female jihadists’ activities within Spanish-
Moroccan online networks contribute to “bridging social capital and the brokerage function,” and the most
effective female jihadists are the ones who perform online.
In sum, this volume provides productive and multidimensional approaches and discussions to a variety of
issues, including the definitional and perceptional challenges in describing or labeling Islamic extremism
or militancy, the perception of the religion of Islam and Salafism through the eyes of the extremists, other
Muslims, and outsiders, the relationship of faith and violence, and the role of females in a variety of jihadist
settings and groups.
Klaus Hock is Head of the Department of Religious Studies and Intercultural Theology at the University of
Rostock. His research focus is on Christian-Muslim relations and transculturation. Nina Käsehage is a Research
Fellow at the University of Rostock with a focus on Islamic radicalization. Currently, she is working on the
religious socialization of children in the former Islamic State (IS).
About the Reviewer: Ahmet S. Yayla is an Assistant Professor and the Director of the Center for Homeland
Security at DeSales University.
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Florian Hartleb. Lone Wolf. The New Terrorism of Right-Wing

Single Actors. Cham: Springer, 2020. 186 pp. ISBN 978-3-030-36153-2. Softcover: EUR 25.99;
e-Book: EUR 21.39; US $ 29.99.
Reviewed by José Pedro Zúquete
If you ask security policy makers or analysts what the dominant trend in terrorism is today, the chances are high
that they will tell you that it is the threat of lone wolf terrorism, especially that originating from Islamic and far
right environments. The last few years have witnessed a spike in the number of studies of this phenomenon.
Lone Wolves, by the German political scientist Florian Hartleb, specifically probes the threat from solo right-
wing actors and provides a far-ranging perspective on such perpetrators and their backgrounds, motivations,
trajectories of violent radicalization, and murderous deeds.
Hartleb makes a good case throughout this book of the benefits of taking an in-depth look at the particular
– at each episode of lone actor terrorism - in order to establish tendencies and commonalties and to capture
the universal, or a broader view of the phenomenon. Three arguments specifically stand out. The author
criticizes – rightly in my view – the way that authorities are often too quick to attribute attacks to mental
imbalance or personal issues (the ‘running amok’ view) even when the choice of victims appears targeted, the
perpetrator expressed clear grievances of a political or religious nature, or both. Such “depoliticisation” and
“pathologisation” (p. 174-175) impede a full understanding of the act. The reasons for such a predisposition
are, however, insufficiently explained here.
Hartleb, through various case studies, makes clear that lone wolves adhere to an ideology of validation that
legitimizes the act. At the same time, he gives credence to the view that mental disorder is indeed a risk factor
for lone-wolf terrorists even if it is not the cause of lone wolf terrorism. Finally, lone wolves are not really
“lone,” in the sense that they are usually part of community subcultures and networks that are often virtual.
Hence, “[t]his finding becomes even more significant, as it contradicts the assumption that lone wolf terrorists
do not communicate with other people” (p. 166). The author makes a powerful case that David Sonboly, the
German-Iranian teen who went on a killing spree in Munich in 2016, was indeed a lone wolf terrorist while
the German authorities played down (even negated) the political motivations for his attack. The 18-year-old
fit all criteria, including hatred for ethnic minorities, especially Turks, although he himself was of minority
origin; the immersion in an online subculture where extremist and violent views were the norm (in the gaming
platform ‘Steam’); and a mental disorder. As a counter-strategy and prevention measure, the author forcefully
makes the case that the online communities of the video game industry constitute a sort of blind spot in the
monitoring of extremism on the Internet.
Lone Wolves: The New Terrorism of Right-Wing Single Actors would have benefited from better editing; the
language is often convoluted, and some sentences are confusing to read. There are minor factual mistakes
too: Hartleb confuses Richard Spencer, a major Alt Right leader, with Robert Spencer, the Counter Jihadi
ideologue (p. 145), while shortly before that, he states that the “Bible” of the Identitarian movement is a book
by Renaud Camus on the “Great Replacement” (p. 141). However, if the movement has a “Bible,” it is Guillaume
Faye’s Why We Fight). Finally, I think the volume lacks sufficient dialogue with social psychology literature,
particularly in terms of psychological factors that may serve as a catalyst for lone wolves. For example, the
hypothesis that some individuals may be pushed to action owing not to lack of empathy but rather to an excess
of empathy to the grievances of his group (or the group he sees himself part of). Yet all in all, these are minor
shortcomings. This is a book well worth reading as it opens new research directions not only regarding the
question of “what makes a lone wolf terrorist” but also how the milieus that propagate them may be countered.
If, as many believe, we are going through the initial stages of a renaissance of lone wolf terrorism, these issues
assume utmost importance, and Hartleb is to be commended for addressing them.
ISSN 2334-3745 199 June 2020

About the Reviewer: José Pedro Zúquete, Ph.D. is a political sociologist. His research focuses on comparative
radical politics, social movements, and the impact of globalization. He is currently a Research Fellow at the Institute
of Social Sciences- University of Lisbon, Portugal.
ISSN 2334-3745 200 June 2020

Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and

Related Subjects
by Berto Jongman
Most of the clickable items included became available online between April and June 2020. They are categorized
under thirteen headings (as well as sub-headings, not listed below):
1. Non-Religious Terrorism
2. Religious Terrorism
3. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics
4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism
5. Extremism, Radicalization
6. Counterterrorism Strategies, Tactics and Operations
7. Specific Operations and/or Specific Policy Measures
8. Prevention, Preparedness and Resilience Studies
9. State Repression, Civil War and Clandestine Warfare
10. Intelligence Operations
11. Cyber Operations
12. Risk and Threat Assessments, Forecasts and Analytical Studies
13. Also Worth the Time to Read/Listen/Watch
N.B. Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects is a regular feature in ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.
For past listings, search under ‘Archive’ at www.universiteitleiden.nl/PoT
1. Non-Religious Terrorism
S. Ozer. YPG/PKK terror group disturbs peace in northern Syria. Anadolu Agency, June 2, 2020. URL: https://
www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/ypg-pkk-terror-group-disturbs-peace-in-northern-syria/1862398
J. Villalba. Colombia’s EPL bitterly divided between political, drug trafficking factions. InSight Crime, May 22,
2020. URL: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/epl-colombia-divided-factions/
Hundreds of thousands flee violence in eastern DR Congo. France24, May 8, 2020. URL: https://www.
france24.com/en/20200508-hundreds-of-thousands-flee-violence-in-eastern-dr-congo?ref=tw
W. Rosenau. The dark history of America’s first female terrorist group. Politico, May 3, 2020. URL: https://
www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/05/03/us-history-first-women-terrorist-group-191037
ISSN 2334-3745 201 June 2020

2. Religious Terrorism
2.1. Al-Qaeda and Affiliates
B. Roggio. UN: thousands of Pakistanis fight in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban. FDD’s Long War Journal,
June 3, 2020. URL: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/06/u-n-thousands-of-pakistanis-fight-in-
afghanistan-alongside-the-taliban.php
Intelbrief: AQIM leader killed, but al-Qaeda remains a highly resilient adversary. The Soufan Center, June 8,
2020. URL: https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-aqim-leader-killed-but-al-qaeda-remains-a-highly-resil-
ient-adversary/
A.Y. Zelin. New video message from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham: ‘One of the Mujahidin from inside Jabal al-Za-
wijay directs messages of splendor and dignity to his Muslim people.’ Jihadology, June 6, 2020. URL: https://
jihadology.net/2020/06/06/new-video-message-from-hayat-taḥrir-al-sham-one-of-the-mujahidin-from-in-
side-jabal-al-zawiyah-directs-messages-of-splendor-and-dignity-to-his-muslim-people/
Al-Qaeda North Africa chief killed: what next for the region? Channel News Asia, June 7, 2020. URL:
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/al-qaeda-north-africa-chief-killed--what-next-for-the-re-
gion--12812386
R. Callimachi, E. Schmitt. French military says it killed top Qaeda leader in Africa. The New York Times, June
6, 2020. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/world/africa/al-qaeda-abdelmalek-droukdal.html
Mali: extremism & counter-extremism. Counter Extremism Project, 2020. URL: https://www.counterextrem-
ism.com/countries
W. Assanvo, B. Dakono, L.A. Theroux-Benoni, I. Maiga. Violent extremism, organized crime and local con-
flicts in Liptako-Gourma. Institute for Security Studies. 2019. URL: https://media.africaportal.org/documents/
Violent_extremism.pdf
B. Daragahi. ISIS and al-Qaeda set to profit from COVID-19 as lockdowns and aid shortages makes Sahel
communities ‘an easy target’. The Independent, June 5, 2020. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/indepen-
dentpremium/world/coronavirus-isis-al-qaeda-mali-sahel-a9548266.html
The long Taliban, US War in Afghanistan. Asharq al-Awsat, June 4, 2020. URL; https://english.aawsat.com/
home/article/2316701/long-taliban-us-war-afghanistan
S. Amiri. Taliban will pursue both peace talks and jihad: deputy chief. Tolo News, June 3, 2020. URL: https://
tolonews.com/afghanistan/taliban-will-pursue-both-peace-talks-and-jihad-deputy-chief
J. Barnett. The evolution of East African Salafi-jihadism. Hudson Institute, May 28, 2020. URL: https://www.
hudson.org/research/16075-the-evolution-of-east-african-salafi-jihadism
Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution
2501 (2019) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to
peace, stability and security of Afghanistan. United Nations, S/2020/415, May 27, 2020. URL: https://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2020_415_e.pdf
J. Donati. Taliban and al-Qaeda remain linked, UN study says. The Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2020. URL:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-and-al-qaeda-remain-linked-u-n-study-says-11591053642
A. Meleagrou-Hitchens. Incitement. Anwar al-Awlaki’s Western jihad. Harvard University Press, 2020. URL:
https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674979505
K. Zimmerman. Salafi-jihadi ecosystem in the Sahel. Critical Threats, April 21, 2020. URL: https://public.
tableau.com/profile/american.enterprise.institute5522 - !/vizhome/ZIMMERMAN_NETWORK/Full
ISSN 2334-3745 202 June 2020

G. Porter. Washington’s tall tale of Iranian-al-Qaeda alliance based on questionable sourced book ‘The Ex-
ile’. The Grayzone, May 19, 2020. URL: https://thegrayzone.com/2020/05/19/washingtons-tall-tale-of-irani-
an-al-qaeda-alliance-based-on-questionably-sourced-book-the-exile/?fbclid=IwAR3b7WEVQB-snmJt5c0alf-
Nn7XuOnXM2y6ug3C7H57XkJkeuAEjY8yAPzpI
Taliban Sources Project (TSP) Department of Culture Studies and Oriental languages, UiO, May 2020. URL:
https://www.hf.uio.no/ikos/english/research/taliban-sources-repository/about-the-repository/index.html
T. Joscelyn. Pensacola shooter had ’significant ties’ to AQAP, FBI finds. FFD’s Long War Journal, May 18, 2020.
URL: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/05/pensacola-shooter-had-significant-ties-to-aqap-fbi-
finds.php
I. Black. The Caravan: Abdallah Azzam and the rise of global jihad review - recent history at its finest. The
Guardian, May 17, 2020. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2020/may/17/the-caravan-abdal-
lah-azzam-and-the-rise-of-global-jihad-review-recent-history-at-its-finest?fbclid=IwAR0SJ7MYlIsupH-
PuI9O0pQDq5OROEerT2kkSlwe-7TKFqiuj3cNk89H-H3w
M. Isikoff. In court filing, FBI accidentally reveals name of Saudi official suspected of directing support for
9/11 hijackers. Yahoo News, May 13, 2020. URL: https://news.yahoo.com/in-court-filing-fbi-accidentally-re-
veals-name-of-saudi-official-suspected-of-directing-support-for-911-hijackers-224555851.html
M. al-Lami. Africa’s Sahel becomes latest Al-Qaeda-IS battleground. BBC, May 11, 2020. URL: https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-africa-52614579
CIA discovered Bin Laden’s location 10 months before killing him. Asharq al-Awsat, May 5, 2020. URL:
https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/2268431/cia-discovered-bin-laden’s-location-10-months-killing-
him
E. Columbo, M. Harris. Extremist groups stepping up operations during the COVID-19 outbreak in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa. CSIS, May 1, 2020. URL: https://www-csis-org.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.csis.org/analysis/
extremist-groups-stepping-operations-during-covid-19-outbreak-sub-saharan-africa?amp
2.2. Islamic State (Daesh) and Affiliates
C. Weiss. Islamic State in Somalia suffers setbacks despite uptick in claimed activity. FDD’s Long War Journal,
June 1, 2020. URL: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/06/islamic-state-in-somalia-suffers-set-
backs-despite-uptick-in-claimed-activity.php
Is Islamic State making a comeback in Sinai? Al-Monitor, June 7, 2020. URL: https://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2020/06/egypt-army-operation-sinai-terrorism-attacks.html
J. Davis. The future of the Islamic State’s women: assessing their potential threat. The Hague: ICCT, June 8,
2020. URL: https://icct.nl/publication/the-future-of-the-islamic-states-women-assessing-their-potential-
threat/
W. Nasr. ISIS in Africa: the end of the ‘Sahel exception’. Center for Global Policy, June 2, 2020. URL: https://
cgpolicy.org/articles/isis-in-africa-the-end-of-the-sahel-exception/
J.A. Warren. ISIS is the cockroach caliphate that just keeps coming back. The Daily Beast, June 6,
2020. URL: https://www.thedailybeast.com/isis-is-the-cockroach-caliphate-that-just-keeps-coming-
back?ref=home&via=twitter_page
S. Kittleson. Kirkuk tribesmen rally as IS launch new wave of attacks. Al-Monitor, May 27, 2020. URL: https://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/iraq-kirkuk-is-terrorism-security.html
W. Nasr. Africa’s Sahel region becomes latest battleground for jihadist groups. France24, June 4, 2020. URL:
https://www.france24.com/en/20200604-africa-s-sahel-region-becomes-latest-battleground-for-jihad-
ISSN 2334-3745 203 June 2020

ist-groups
S.M. Gohel, D. Winston. A complex tapestry of collusion and cooperation: Afghanistan and Pakistan’s terror-
ism networks. London School of Economics, June 5, 2020. URL: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2020/06/05/
long-read-a-complex-tapestry-of-collusion-and-cooperation-afghanistan-and-pakistans-terrorism-networks/
Sidelining the Islamic State in Niger’s Tillabery. International Crisis Group, Report #289, Africa, June 2, 2020.
URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/289-sidelining-islamic-state-nigers-tillabery
A. Roul. Islamic State-Khorasan remains potent force in Afghan jihad. Terrorism Monitor, 18(11), June 3,
2020. URL: https://jamestown.org/program/islamic-state-khorasan-remains-potent-force-in-afghan-ji-
had/?mc_cid=031c64857b&mc_eid=4d383fa44a
S. West. Islamist militants in Mozambique intensify attacks in Cabo Delgado province. Terrorism Monitor,
18(11), June 3, 2020. URL: https://jamestown.org/program/islamist-militants-in-mozambique-intensify-at-
tacks-in-cabo-delgado-province/?mc_cid=031c64857b&mc_eid=a8bffb1fa0
H. al-Hashemi. Interview: ISIS’s Abdul Nasser Qardash. Center for Global Policy, June 4, 2020. URL: https://
cgpolicy.org/articles/interview-isiss-abdul-nasser-qardash/
T. Joscelyn, B. Roggio. Generation jihad Ep.12 – The ISIS spokesman’s latest rant. FDD’s Long War Journal,
June 2, 2020. URL: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/06/generation-jihad-ep-12-the-isis-
spokesmans-latest-rant.php
D. Otto. Exclusive: how ISIS & al-Qaeda affiliates manipulate Amnesty International and other NGOs to sur-
vive in Africa. Geo-Political Intelligence, EONS Intelligence, May 31, 2020. URL: https://eonsintelligence.com/
details/david-otto-col-13882973037/how-isis-al-qaeda-affiliates-manipulate-amnesty-international-and-oth-
er-ngos-to-survive-in-africa-1131919644
M. Mayli Albaek, P. Darmsgard, M. Shiekh Ibrahim, T. Kingo, J. Vithner. The controller: how Basil Hassan
launched Islamic State terror into the skies. CTC Sentinel, 13(5), 2020. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/may-2020/
M. Knights, A. Almeida. Remaining and expanding: the recovery of Islamic State operations in Iraq 2019-
2020. CTC Sentinel, 13(5), 2020. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/may-2020/
J. Zenn. ISIS in Africa: the caliphate’s next frontier. Center for Global Policy, May 26, 2020. URL: https://cg-
policy.org/articles/isis-in-africa-the-caliphates-next-frontier/
F. Bergoglio Errico. A case study of the jihadi indoctrination process: method and content. European Eye on
Radicalization, May 22, 2020. URL: https://eeradicalization.com/a-case-study-of-the-jihadi-indoctrination-
process-method-and-content/
A. Kumar Singh. Threat of Islamist terrorism in India is real. League of India, May 25, 2020. URL: https://
leagueofindia.com/internal-challenges/the-threat-of-islamist-terrorism-in-india/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_
medium=twitter
The Philippines: extremism & counter-extremism. Counter Extremism Project, 2020. URL: https://www.coun-
terextremism.com/countries/philippines
Hassan Hassan. Islamic State is back and this time the West is ill-prepared to take it on. The Guardian, May
24, 20, 2020. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/24/islamic-state-is-back-and-
this-time-the-west-is-ill-prepared-to-take-it-on?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other
Attacks and security campaigns. Four commanders among 37 ISIS members killed in Ramadan. Syrian Ob-
servatory of Human Rights, May 23, 2020. URL: https://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=166067
D. Gartenstein-Ross, E. Chace-Donahue, C.P. Clarke. The threat of jihadist terrorism in Germany. The Hague:
ICCT, May 22, 2020. URL: https://icct.nl/publication/the-threat-of-jihadist-terrorism-in-germany/
ISSN 2334-3745 204 June 2020

L. Aboufadel. Russia blames US for resurgence of ISIS in east Syria. Al Masdar News, May 21, 2020. URL:
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/russia-blames-us-for-resurgence-of-isis-in-east-syria/
Islamic State believed behind crop fires in Iraq’s disputed territories. Al-Monitor, May 13, 2020. URL: https://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/farm-fires-resume-iraq-disputed-territories-islamic-state.html
D. Depetris. No, ISIS isn’t resurging amid the coronavirus pandemic. Defense One, May 15, 2020.
URL: https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/05/no-isis-isnt-resurging-amid-coronavirus-pandem-
ic/165401/?oref=d-channelriver
C. Paton. New ISIS leader in Libya – Abdel Qader al-Najdi threatens Daesh invasion of Rome through Africa.
International Business Times, May 10, 2020. URL: https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/new-isis-leader-abdel-qader-al-
najdi-threatens-daesh-invasion-rome-through-north-africa-1548697
C.P. Clarke. Remember us? Islamic State stays active during coronavirus pandemic. Foreign Policy Research
Institute, May 8, 2020. URL: https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/05/remember-us-islamic-state-stays-ac-
tive-during-coronavirus-pandemic/
Counterterrorism police fear ISIS cells are being reactivated to plot attacks across Europe after second terror
arrest in Spain. Daily Mail Online, May 9, 2020. URL: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8302571/
Counter-terrorism-police-fear-ISIS-cells-reactivated-plot-attacks-Europe.html
C. Lister. ISIS’s dramatic escalation in Syria and Iraq. Middle East Institute, May 4, 2020. URL: https://www.
mei.edu/blog/isiss-dramatic-escalation-syria-and-iraq
E. Hagedorn. Islamic State prison riot underscores fragile security in north east Syria. Al-Monitor, May 5,
2020. URL: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/islamic-state-syria-prison-riot-securi-
ty-kurdish-hasakeh.html?fbclid=IwAR2AtXvBELAHfPSlyVay-h98e6Mk8VgZ21I_wBZU1VuF_6EoFp-
5f1eIPJHU
S. Maor-Hirsh. ISIS in the age of COVID-19 –from Islamizing the pandemic to implementing the jihadist
strategy. ICT, May 3, 2020. URL: https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2542/ISIS_in_the_Age_of_COVID-19 - gsc.
tab=0
Syria: ISIS dumped bodies in gorge. Mass graves hold thousands, investigations needed. Human Rights
Watch, May 4, 2020. URL: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/04/syria-isis-dumped-bodies-gorge?fbclid=I-
wAR2BH2betYScwKdBJX_5lNwWV80gADZV7Yc4y6qPx5xzqpdbSHyLahd_uhE
T. Joscelyn. Analysis: the Islamic State’s ideological campaign against al-Qaeda. FDD’s Long War Journal, May
4, 2020. URL: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/05/analysis-the-islamic-states-ideological-cam-
paign-against-al-qaeda.php
ISIS terrorists attempt to breakout of Syrian prison after starting new riot: video. Al Masdar News, 2020.
URL: https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/isis-terrorists-attempt-to-breakout-of-syrian-prison-after-start-
ing-new-riot-video/
L. Andrews. ISIS takes advantage of Covid crisis to launch attacks on military positions in Iraq and oil
fields and civilians in Syria. Daily Mail Online, May 3, 2020. URL: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti-
cle-8282389/ISIS-takes-advantage-Covid-crisis-launch-attacks-Iraq-Syria.html
S.J. Frantzman. ISIS is on track to double its attacks in Iraq and Syria. The Jerusalem Post, May 2, 2020.
URL: https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/isis-threat/isis-is-on-track-to-double-its-attacks-in-iraq-and-syr-
ia-626617
ISSN 2334-3745 205 June 2020

2.3. Other Muslim Groups/Organizations
S. Brzuskiewicz. Joining and leaving the Muslim Brotherhood in the West: a talk to Lorenzo Vidino. Europe-
an Eye on Radicalization, June 1, 2020. URL: https://eeradicalization.com/joining-and-leaving-the-muslim-
brotherhood-in-the-west-a-talk-to-lorenzo-vidino/
The closed circle: joining and leaving the Muslim Brotherhood in the West. European Eye on Radicalization,
May 20, 2020. URL: https://eeradicalization.com/the-closed-circle-joining-and-leaving-the-muslim-brother-
hood-in-the-west/
Y. Fazeli. Torture, abduction, murder: inside Kata’ib Hezbollah, Iran terrorist proxy in Iraq. Al Arabiya,
May 31, 2020. URL: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2020/05/31/Iran-s-terrorist-proxy-organiza-
tion-in-Iraq-Kata-ib-Hezbollah-militia.html
N. Jahanbani. Reviewing Iran’s proxies by region: a look toward the Middle East, South Asia and Africa. CTC
Sentinel, 13(5), 2020. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/may-2020/
Muhammad Hussein. It is time for the Iran-backed axis militias to be treated exactly like Daesh. Middle East
Monitor, May 30, 2020. URL: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200530-it-is-time-for-the-iran-backed-
axis-militias-to-be-treated-exactly-like-daesh/
H. Ghaddar. Deciphering Hezbollah chief Nasrallah’s rhetoric: resistance is no longer a priority. Al Arabiya,
May 29, 2020. URL: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2020/05/29/Deciphering-Hez-
bollah-chief-Nasrallah-s-rhetoric-Resistance-is-no-longer-a-priority.html
News of terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (May 20-26, 2020). The Meir Amit Intelligence & Terror-
ism Information Center, May 27, 2020. URL: https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/news-terrorism-israeli-pal-
estinian-conflict-may-20-26-2020/
The Nujaba movement, an Iraqi Shiite militia handled by Iran, also operates in the Gaza Strip. The Meir Amit
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, May 25, 2020. URL: https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/nuja-
ba-movement-iraqi-shiite-militia-handled-iran-also-operates-gaza-strip/?fbclid=IwAR0IivBIO8ycnIIW88ay-
IQpo4UqQHNg5bcFxFqjeGsupsXO5f1DoiurOLlk
H. Ghaddar. A bad week for Hezbollah. Al Arabiya, May 7, 2020. URL: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/
news/middle-east/2020/05/07/A-bad-week-for-Hezbollah.html
Settlement talks flare up divisions among Houthi leaderships. Asharq al-Awsat, May 10, 2020. URL: https://
english.aawsat.com/home/article/2276701/settlement-talks-flare-divisions-among-houthi-leaderships
Advances of Ansar Allah: January 1 – May 20, 2020. (Map update). South Front, May 10, 2020. URL: https://
southfront.org/advances-of-ansar-allah-jauary-1-may-10-2020-map-update/
Hezbollah leader fires back after terrorist designation, says Germany ‘surrendered to US will’. Al Masdar
News, May 4, 2020. URL: https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/hezbollah-leader-fires-back-after-terror-
ist-designation-says-germany-surrendered-to-us-will/
3. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics

M. Demuynck, T. Mehra, R. Bergema. ICCT situation report: the use of small arms & light weapons by
terrorist organizations as a source of finance in the Middle East and North Africa. The Hague, ICCT, June 3,
2020. URL: https://icct.nl/publication/icct-situation-report-the-use-of-small-arms-light-weapons-by-terror-
ist-organisations-as-a-source-of-finance-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/
P. Salahin Refsdal. Dugma: the button. 2020. [on Suicide Terrorism in Syria] URL: https://www.journeyman.
tv/film/6585?fbclid=IwAR18E8ETEeORac3NNihBcaVN_TWwLHsANCbZKAeFIHQImTGL4tX_xBKJVpU
ISSN 2334-3745 206 June 2020

P. Gurski. Will terrorists be using drones and technology? Quick Hits 33. Borealis Threat & Risk Consulting,
April 15, 2020. URL: https://borealisthreatandrisk.com/terrorists-using-drones-and-technology/
Illicit possession, transfers, and use of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADSs). Small Arms Survey,
April 2, 2020. URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/2020/highlight-manpads-prolifera-
tion.html
4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism
4.1. Criminal Groups
M. Glenny. From drug dealers to loan sharks: how coronavirus empowers organised crime. The Guardian,
June 7, 2020. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/07/after-six-months-of-coronavirus-how-
close-are-we-to-defeating-it
Danish ‘crime boss’ Amir Mekky arrested in Dubai. The New Arab, June 5, 2020. URL: https://english.alaraby.
co.uk/english/news/2020/6/5/danish-crime-boss-amir-mekky-arrested-in-dubai
Enterprising criminals – Europe’s fight against the global networks of financial and economic crime. EU-
ROPOL, June 5, 2020. URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/enterprising-criminals-
–-europe’s-fight-against-global-networks-of-financial-and-economic-crime
I. Ortiz, B. Darby. Mexican government freezes nearly 2000 cartel bank accounts. Breitbart, June 3, 2020.
URL: https://www.breitbart.com/crime/2020/06/02/at-least-11-dead-across-u-s-during-protests/?utm_
source=facebook&utm_medium=social
Impact of COVID-19 on transnational organized crime in East Africa. ENACT, June 1, 2020. URL: https://
globalinitiative.net/impact-of-covid-19-on-transnational-organised-crime-in-east-africa/
A. Cachia. Mafia crime ring who ‘made £100 million through fraud and rigged public tender contracts in-
volving EU funds’ is dismantled in Italy. Daily Mail Online, May 28, 2020. URL: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-8365303/Mafia-crime-ring-rigged-public-tender-contracts-involving-EU-funds-dismantled-Ita-
ly.html
L. Tondo. Puglia crime wave points to emergence of ‘fifth’ Italian mafia. The Guardian, May 19, 2020. URL:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/19/puglia-crimewave-points-to-emergence-of-fifth-italian-
mafia
Ten alleged MS-13 members and associates charged with three murders, attempted murder, murder conspira-
cy and firearms offenses. The US Department of Justice, May 14, 2020. URL: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ed-
ny/pr/ten-alleged-ms-13-members-and-associates-charged-three-murders-attempted-murder-murder
President of Honduras Congress linked to cachiros drug cartel: report. InSight Crime, May 13, 2020. URL:
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/president-honduras-congress-cachiros/
Mexico’s everyday war: Guerrero and the trials of peace. Report No.80, Latin America & Caribbean, Interna-
tional Crisis Group, May 4, 2020. URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/mexico/80-mex-
icos-everyday-war-guerrero-and-trials-peace
R. Muggah. The pandemic has triggered dramatic shifts in the global criminal underworld. Foreign Policy,
May 8, 2020. URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/08/coronavirus-drug-cartels-violence-smuggling/
R.J. Bunker, J.P. Sullivan. Mexican cartel strategic note No.29: an overview of cartel activities related to
COVID-19 humanitarian response. Small Wars Journal, May 9, 2020. URL: https://smallwarsjournal.com/
jrnl/art/mexican-cartel-strategic-note-no-29-overview-cartel-activities-related-covid-19
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J. McDermott. The ghost loses drug trafficking partners. InSight Crime, March 29, 2020. URL: https://www.
insightcrime.org/investigations/the-ghost-drug-trafficking-partners/
4.2. Political Violence, Hate Crimes, Anti-Semitism
B. Knight. Germany sees rise in anti-Semitic, political crimes. Deutsche Welle, May 27, 2020. URL: https://
www.dw.com/en/germany-antisemitsm-crimes/a-53583839
E. Schumacher. Anti-Semitism in the US hits 4-decade high. Deutsche Welle, May 12, 2020. URL: https://
www.dw.com/en/anti-semitism-in-the-us-hits-4-decade-high-report/a-53402428
Egypt warns of ‘hate speech’ on social media. Asharq al-Awsat, May 10, 2020. URL: https://english.aawsat.
com/home/article/2276606/egypt-warns-‘hate-speech’-social-media
A. Hudson. Covid-19 has unleashed ‘Tsunami of hate and scaremongering,’ says UN chief. Newsweek, May
8, 2020. URL: https://www.newsweek.com/covid-19-has-unleashed-tsunami-hate-scaremongering-says-un-
chief-1502740
5. Extremism, Radicalization
5.1. General
Trendlines. A weekly review of violent extremism in America. Issue 212, May 25, 2020. URL: https://home-
landsecurityinsight.com/reports/trendlines/
E. Winterbotham, E. Pearson. A methodological approach to conducting research on violent extremism.
Resolve Net, May 1, 2020. URL: https://www.resolvenet.org/research/radical-milieu-methodological-ap-
proach-conducting-research-violent-extremism
M. Sold. The amalgamation of virtuality and reality in radicalization processes. Global network on Extremism
& Technology, April 23, 2020. URL: https://gnet-research.org/2020/04/23/the-amalgamation-of-virtuali-
ty-and-reality-in-radicalisation-processes/
5.2. Right-wing Extremism
T. Hume. It’s not all bad: coronavirus shut down Europe’s neo-Nazi music festival scene. Vice, May 7, 2020.
URL: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qj4dex/its-not-all-bad-coronavirus-shut-down-europes-neo-nazi-
music-festival-scene?utm_campaign=sharebutton
Feuerkrieg Division (FKD). ADL, 2020. URL: https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/feuerkrieg-divi-
sion-fkd
B. Sales. Meet the Boogaloo Bois, the violent right-wing extremists who (mostly) don’t hate the Jews. Jewish
Journal, June 5, 2020. URL: https://jewishjournal.com/news/united-states/316982/meet-the-boogaloo-bois-
the-violent-right-wing-extremists-who-mostly-dont-hate-the-jews/
Intelbrief: examining Atomwaffen Division’s transnational linkages. The Soufan Group, May 20, 2020. URL:
https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-examining-atomwaffen-divisions-transnational-linkages/
Boogaloo supporters animated by lockdown protests, recent incidents. ADL, May 22, 2020. URL: https://
www.adl.org/blog/boogaloo-supporters-animated-by-lockdown-protests-recent-incidents
The Boogaloo: extremists’ new slang term for a coming civil war. ADL, November 26, 2019. URL: https://
www.adl.org/blog/the-boogaloo-extremists-new-slang-term-for-a-coming-civil-war
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M. Harrington. What Antifa and the alt-Right have in common. UnHerd, June 4, 2020. URL:
https://unherd.com/2020/06/both-the-radical-left-and-right-are-left-behinds/?tl_inbound=1&tl_
groups%5B0%5D=18743&tl_period_type=3
B. Johnson. How Islamist extremists and white supremacists try to exploit civil unrest. Homeland Security
Today, June 2, 2020. URL: https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/how-islamist-ex-
tremists-and-white-supremacists-try-to-exploit-civil-unrest/
S. Kutner. Swiping right: the allure of hyper masculinity and crypto-fascism for men who join the Proud
Boys. The Hague: ICCT, May 26, 2020. URL: https://icct.nl/publication/swiping-right-the-allure-of-hyper-
masculinity-and-cryptofascism-for-men-who-join-the-proud-boys/
G. Jasser, M. Kelly, A.K. Rothermel. Male supremacism and the Hanau terrorist attack: between online
misogyny and far-right violence. The Hague: ICCT, May 20, 2020. URL: https://icct.nl/publication/male-su-
premacism-and-the-hanau-terrorist-attack-between-online-misogyny-and-far-right-violence/
A. Schonfield. 80 years ago, the British Union of Fascists was forced to dissolve. This is what its demise can
teach us today. The Independent, May 22, 2020. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/coronavirus-im-
migration-bill-british-union-fascists-hostile-environment-a9526501.html
America’s far right is energized by Covid-19 lockdowns. The Economist, May 17, 2020. URL: https://www.
economist.com/united-states/2020/05/17/americas-far-right-is-energised-by-covid-19-lockdowns?fsrc=scn/
fb/te/bl/ed/apoliticalvirusamericasfarrightisenergisedbycovid19lockdownsunitedstates&fbclid=IwAR3V9Yx-
17JCCnPeNB3QNHPL0VGaUhkoIt_5Z66CMuH2hM8
E. Sahinkaya, D. Galperovich. Radical Russian Imperial Movement expanding global outreach. VOA, May
9, 2020. URL: https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/radical-russian-imperial-movement-expand-
ing-global-outreach?fbclid=IwAR2ny0GhAY8pcCYIkiJMGDeUz1-K3mGaKxX7CURLykyrqPORw_4N-
bzPTa8U
J. Wilson. Revealed: major anti-lockdown group’s links to America’s far right. The Guardian, May 8, 2020.
URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/08/lockdown-groups-far-right-links-coronavirus-pro-
tests-american-revolution
Dreiging extreemrechts ‘grote blinde vlek’. NOS.nl, May 8, 2020. URL: https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artike-
l/2333187-dreiging-extreemrechts-grote-blinde-vlek.html
L. Stenzler-Koblentz. The far-right leverages COVID-19 pandemic to gain influence and encourage violence.
ICT, April 30, 2020. URL: https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2541/The_Far_Right_Leverages_COVID_19?fb-
clid=IwAR2OM5rDwRCkFcLx67gecs1XfWKA0ZzXCVDB4kd2i8r-gqe-xUhKp2UTtmg - gsc.tab=0
A. Shekhovtsov. Moscow’s far-right ‘useful-idiots’. Russia brief, Issue 6. Oxford Changing Character of War
Centre, April 30, 2020. URL: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55faab67e4b0914105347194/t/5eaaae25fc-
9c3c3780b54a1a/1588244011982/CCW+Russia+Brief+Issue+6+-+April+2020.pdf
A.M. Bliuc, J. Betts, M. Vergani, M. Iqbal, K. Dunn. The growing power of online communities of the ex-
treme-right: deriving strength, meaning, and direction from significant socio-political events ‘in real life.’ The
Hague: ICCT, April 28, 2020. URL: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/drone-killings-don’t-work-accord-
ing-book-148836?fbclid=IwAR0O-KSe0XMRhoECGry1zAtym3IgKx56Rj-WmX8iUDikPjAFvY3gzTJfjK8
The far right wants to make its shared ‘Boogaloo’ fantasy of violent civil war a reality. Daily Kos, April 28,
2020. URL: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2020/4/28/1940542/-The-far-right-wants-to-make-its-shared-
Boogaloo-fantasy-of-violent-civil-war-a-reality
Far right terrorism: similarities and differences vs. Islamic terrorism. Herzliya: ICT, April 20, 2020. URL:
https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2534/Far_Right_Terrorism_Eng?fbclid=IwAR26RfDluuCpaFixN8W4j3MEnI-
j4T4MCwbWCpp_tbRk74Nzz2WIVsb34Ra8 - gsc.tab=0
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5.3. Leftwing Extremism
N. Munro. Authors: Antifa rioters are the tech economy’s college discards. Breitbart, June 6, 2020. URL:
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2020/06/06/authors-antifa-rioters-are-the-tech-economys-college-dis-
cards/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social
M. Biesecker, M. Kunzelman, J. Bleiberg, A. Durkin Richer. As Trump blames Antifa, protest records show
scant evidence. Associated Press, June 7, 2020. URL: https://apnews.com/20b9b86dba5c480bad759a3bd-
34cd875
S.J. Frantzman. Antifa’s complex origins: ’terrorism’ or anti-fascism? The Jerusalem Post, June 3, 2020. URL:
https://www.jpost.com/international/antifas-complex-origins-terrorism-or-anti-fascism-630125
S. G. Jones. Who are Antifa, and are they a threat? CSIS, June 4, 2020. URL: https://www.csis.org/analysis/
who-are-antifa-and-are-they-threat?fbclid=IwAR16D9Mt7-cG-I4NQowL4rKQ-USPCe-RNBmFDqqmKJqY-
cl6QJjrMekwV5JM
T. Lavin. How to be an antifascist from your couch. You don’t have to punch Nazis to fight fascism. The Na-
tion, June 5, 2020. URL: https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/antifa-online/
‘Antifa’ is literally never mentioned in the first prosecutions of protest violence. The Daily Beast, June 5, 2020.
URL: https://www.thedailybeast.com/antifa-is-literally-never-mentioned-in-the-first-prosecutions-of-pro-
test-violence
Antifa and YPG/PKK share same ideological ground for terrorism. Daily Sabah, June 2, 2020. URL: https://
www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/antifa-and-ypgpkk-share-same-ideological-ground-for-terror-
ism?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter
B. Gertz. Antifa planned anti-government insurgency for months, law enforcement official says. Washington
Times, June 3, 2020. URL: https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jun/3/antifa-planned-anti-gov-
ernment-insurgency-george-f/?fbclid=IwAR2nh9PYfPjz95GsUJbnIr8c5wW1-JI_vn6BWhMsUSpRNX9oil-
B96r1D8UA
A. Speckhard, M. Ellenberg. Perspective: why branding Antifa a terror group is a diversion. Homeland
Security Today, June 2, 2020. URL: https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/per-
spective-why-branding-antifa-a-terror-group-is-a-diversion/?fbclid=IwAR1ER45d75r8eidawQEgmZF-
NeFslOaX-ciaBGsepio9PVzNBmiV3lX4eyLY
5.4. Islamist Extremism
C. Yeginsu. One of UK’s most prolific extremist cell is regrouping. The New York Times, May18, 2020.
URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/18/world/europe/uk-extremist-cell-anjem-choudary.html?fb-
clid=IwAR14s0YEBB_t_cPk31rDhuWCZHusufbD1PWvnF5QJDBPsa7RXDoafkd7psc
A. Speckhard. Kimberly Pullman: a Canadian woman lured over the Internet to the ISIS caliphate. Voxpol,
April 22, 2020. URL: https://www.voxpol.eu/kimberly-pullman-a-canadian-woman-lured-over-the-internet-
to-the-isis-caliphate/
B. Daragahi. Religious extremists are making the coronavirus pandemic even worse. The Independent, March
30, 2020. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/voices/coronavirus-religious-ex-
tremism-iran-united-states-pakistan-israel-india-a9433181.html?fbclid=IwAR2wj9F3KPGTMuTQ1U0wp-
PgvpeWkQPEQzDjpHYVMOedD4blzlBLwMH3uceI
F. Flade. Germany’s risk assessment tool for jihadists. Jih@d, June 18, 2018. URL: https://ojihad.wordpress.
com/2018/06/18/germanys-risk-assessment-tool-for-jihadists/
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S. Brzuskiewicz. Radicalization in Italy: a talk with Alberto Pagani. European Eye on Radicalization, March
10, 2020. URL: https://eeradicalization.com/radicalization-in-italy-a-talk-with-alberto-pagani/
5.5. Single Issue Extremism
Assessing the threat of incel violence. GW Program on Extremism, YouTube, May 26, 2020. URL: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=2QessrnaeG8&feature=youtu.be
M. Kimmel, J. Cook. Gender and violent extremism today. ICCT Live briefing, June 4, 2020. URL: https://icct.
nl/event/icct-live-briefing-gender-and-violent-extremism-today/
S. Russell. ‘No going back’: how Extinction Rebellion is redefining its image in lockdown. The Independent,
May 22, 2020. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/long-reads/coronavirus-mutu-
al-aid-extinction-rebellion-climate-activism-lockdown-a9509076.html
L. Cerulus. How anti-5G anger sparked a wave of arson attack across Europe. Politico, April 30, 2020. URL:
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/30/how-anti-5g-anger-sparked-a-wave-of-arson-attacks-across-eu-
rope-228050
6. Counterterrorism Strategies, Tactics and Operations

E. Rosand, S. Weine. Lessons from the Global Counterterrorism Forum for International Cooperation
on pandemics. IPI Global Observatory, May 28, 2020. URL: https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/05/les-
sons-from-global-counterterrorism-forum-international-cooperation-pandemics/?
I. Kfir, J. Coyne (Eds.) Counterterrorism Yearbook 2020. ASPI, 2020. URL: https://s3-ap-southeast-2.ama-
zonaws.com/ad-aspi/2020-03/ASPI Counterterrorism YB2020.pdf?XVWQRHtHM0Yjs4OTfES3sLpkmC-
l36X4e&fbclid=IwAR2ljlUVWNRhMmzwVq7zbzn5nAUINN2KaEHzeNMBqN2u98pXwMFUIEvXmNo
R. Gramer. Inspector General criticizes US counterterrorism coordinator. Foreign Policy, May 11, 2020. URL:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/11/counter-terrorism-bureau-criticized-mismanagement-morale-state-de-
partment-nathan-sales-middle-east-africa-terrorism/
D. Lindorff. Recalling the hundreds of thousands of civilian victims of America’s endless ‘war on terror’. The
Transnational, May 4, 2020. URL: https://transnational.live/2020/05/04/recalling-the-hundreds-of-thou-
sands-of-civilian-victims-of-americas-endless-war-on-terror/?fbclid=IwAR0GR7GS-2MfM5xTFUerRUn-
LaQvtkGSFMS-v9s5UJ1wghBH2T5_GDCXvyZw
D. Axe. Drone killings don’t work, according to this book. The National Interest, April 28, 2020. URL: https://
nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/drone-killings-don’t-work-according-book-148836?fbclid=IwAR0O-KSe0X-
MRhoECGry1zAtym3IgKx56Rj-WmX8iUDikPjAFvY3gzTJfjK8
S. Wittendorp, E. Bakker, J. de Roy van Zuijdewijn, A. Koebrugge. Strijd op meerdere fronten: de aanpak van
jihadisme en buitenlandse strijders. Leiden: ISGA, February 2020. URL: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/
onderzoek/onderzoeksoutput/governance-and-global-affairs/strijd-op-meerdere-fronten-de-aanpak-van-ji-
hadisme-en-buitenlandse-strijders
T. de Wekker. Wanneer mag de overheid een gekaapt vliegtuig neerschieten? Terrorismebestrijding
vraagt om moeilijke keuzes. Leids Dagblad, April 14, 2020. URL: https://www.leidschdagblad.nl/cnt/
dmf20200414_75132368/wanneer-mag-de-overheid-een-gekaapt-vliegtuig-neerschieten-terrorismebestrij-
ding-vraagt-om-moeilijke-keuzes?utm_source=www.linkedin.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=/
feed/
C. Bramesco. ‘I just don’t see how this ends’: a sobering new film on the Afghan war. The Guardian, April 16,
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2020. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2020/apr/16/the-longest-war-afghanistan-greg-bark-

er-documentary-showtime?fbclid=IwAR15tki5_e5vuDHt8-woVFLTx8m1p8BESbjWUE2yTLd1zb9uJKUL-
Mh-aveI
6. 1.Counterterrorism: Kinetic Operations & Military Assistance

Syria tribes condemn Russia for recruiting members for Libya’s rogue General Haftar. The New Arab, June 1,
2020. URL: https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/News/2020/6/1/Syria-tribes-condemn-Russia-for-recruit-
ing-members-for-Haftar
East Syria air raids kill 12 pro-Iran fighters: monitor. The New Arab, June 7, 2020. URL: https://english.alara-
by.co.uk/english/news/2020/6/7/east-syria-air-raids-kill-12-pro-iran-fighters-monitor
E. M. Lederer. Sahel force fighting terrorism faces growing threat. Associated Press, June 6, 2020. URL: https://
apnews.com/cb25cc17d798e039b1c601585b67d9a6
Yemeni army captures major city from UAE-backed forces. Middle East Monitor, June 7, 2020. URL: https://
www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200607-yemeni-army-captures-major-city-from-uae-backed-forces/
Kurdish forces announce new plan to hunt down the remnants of IS in Syria. SBS News, June 5, 2020. URL:
https://www.sbs.com.au/news/kurdish-forces-announce-new-plan-to-hunt-down-the-remnants-of-is-in-syr-
ia
H. Nsaibia. State atrocities in the Sahel: the impetus for counterinsurgency results is fueling government
attacks on civilians. ACLED, May 20, 2020. URL: https://acleddata.com/2020/05/20/state-atrocities-in-the-sa-
hel-the-impetus-for-counter-insurgency-results-is-fueling-government-attacks-on-civilians/
S. Kittleson. Iraqi forces team up for anti-IS operation in Kirkuk. Al-Monitor, June 4, 2020. URL: https://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/06/iraq-kirkuk-isis-kadhimi.html
Task Force Takuba – European SOF in Sahel. SOF News, March 29, 2020. URL: https://sof.news/africa/task-
force-takuba/
US air strikes target Taliban in Afghanistan. RFE/RL, June 5, 2020. URL: https://www.rferl.org/a/u-s-air-
strikes-target-taliban-in-afghanistan/30655347.html
French forces kill al-Qaeda’s North Africa chief in Mali, defence minister says. France24, June 5, 2020. URL:
https://www.france24.com/en/20200605-french-forces-kill-al-qaeda-s-north-africa-chief-in-mali-ministry-
says
Nigerian troops sustain massive assault on terrorists in North East – DHQ. Vanguard, June 5, 2020. URL:
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/06/nigerian-troops-sustain-massive-assault-on-terrorists-in-n-east-dhq/
O. Onur Gemici. Turkey neutralizes 78 terrorists in May. Anadolu Agency, June 4, 2020. URL: https://www.
aa.com.tr/en/turkey/4-terrorists-neutralized-in-southeastern-turkey/1866139
Afghanistan: civilian loss in the US air war. Al Jazeera, June 3, 2020. URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/pro-
grammes/faultlines/2020/06/afghanistan-civilian-loss-air-war-200602093444066.html
B. Usta. Turkey adopts 4-step strategy for permanent peace, stability in Idlib. Daily Sabah, June 3, 2020. URL:
https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/turkish-security-forces-inflict-heavy-blow-on-ypgp-
kk-terrorism-in-may
Mozambique security forces kill 78 insurgents Cabo Delgado – government. The East African, June
3, 2020. URL: https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Mozambique-security-forces-kill-insur-
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gents/4552902-5569990-msl7r9/index.html
M. Hussain. More than 70 children killed in just 10 airstrikes in Afghanistan, report finds. The Intercept, June
3, 2020. URL: https://theintercept.com/2020/06/03/children-killed-airstrikes-afghanistan-tbij-report/?utm_
source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=theintercept
Russian, Syrian warplanes strike foreign jihadists in Hama, Latakia. Al Masdar News, June 3, 2020. URL:
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/russian-syrian-warplanes-strike-foreign-jihadists-in-hama-latakia/
Security Council reauthorizes deployment of African Union Mission in Somalia, unanimously adopting
Resolution 2520 (2020). United Nations, SC/14198, May 29, 2020. URL: https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/
sc14198.doc.htm
Dangerous terrorist plan to target Baghdad, Kurdistan and a number of provinces foiled. Shafaaq, May 31,
2020. URL: https://www.shafaaq.com/en/iraq-news/dangerous-terrorist-plan-to-target-baghdad-kurdis-
tan-and-a-number-of-provinces-foiled/?fbclid=IwAR0cYzTvA0I4M-4nlGFKjEnBnQeCqWeramsTzaqOEk-
5f8ZdDLtVJ1D3hCrM
US considers sending ‘training’ unit to Tunisia amid North Africa tensions. Middle East Monitor, May 30,
2020. URL: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200530-us-considers-sendingtraining-unit-to-tuni-
sia-amid-north-africa-tensions/
Turkish jets bomb south Kurdistan. Riskmap, May 30, 2020. URL: https://www.riskmap.com/inci-
dents/992187-turkish-jets-bomb-south-kurdistan
Declining trends in multilateral peace operations continued in 2019; attention shifting towards the Middle
East and North Africa – new SIPRI data. SIPRI, May 27, 2020. URL: https://www.sipri.org/media/press-re-
lease/2020/declining-trends-multilateral-peace-operations-continued-2019-attention-shifting-towards-mid-
dle-east
Mehr Soldaten für Mali. Tagesschau, May 29, 2020. URL: https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/mali-bunde-
swehr-133.html
Syrian army drone strike kills commander of Turkish-backed group. Al Masdar News, May 25, 2020. URL:
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-army-drone-strike-kills-commander-of-turkish-backed-
group/
R. Ratcliffe, E. Stoakes. Myanmar army accused of new atrocities in attack on Rakhine village. The Guardian,
May 25, 2020. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/25/myanmar-army-accused-new-atroci-
ties-attack-rakhine-buddhist-village-rohingya
Most Turkey-PKK engagements in 2020 took place in Kurdistan region, conflict watchdog reports. Kurdis-
tan24, May 22, 2020. URL: https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/f20b6b55-16e6-411b-aa69-ec8c6dc44c89
W. van Wilgenburg. Unidentified drone targets former ISIS leader in Turkish-controlled Afrin: Syria Monitor.
Kurdistan 24, May 23, 2020. URL: https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/1a68628f-ef4e-48f5-86b2-f96db-
e32cd88?fbclid=IwAR1ZR5BN81AYIJi8u6LA4ya1Q3UKskXj7fF9i_28HIoVK7s0qTxMhnfbCMk
M. Sheets. US carried out strike on Pensacola shooter’s al-Qaeda contact in Yemen after the FBI broke
through encryption on his iPhones. Daily Mail Online, May 23, 2020. URL: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-8336319/U-S-carried-strike-Pensacola-shooters-al-Qaeda-contact-Yemen.html
Attacks and security campaigns. Four commanders among 37 ISIS members killed in Ramadan. Syrian Hu-
man Rights Committee, May 23, 2020. URL: https://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=166067
Russian forces kill six ISIS fighters in special operation. Al Masdar News, May 22, 2020. URL: https://www.
almasdarnews.com/article/russian-forces-kill-6-isis-fighters-in-special-operation/
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‘Key’ Taliban member arrested in Herat by NDS. Tolo News, May 23, 2020. URL: https://tolonews.com/af-
ghanistan/‘key-taliban-member-arrested-herat-nds
Russian soldiers ‘liquidate’ six ISIS militants in Dagestan after terrorists planned attacks on police and reli-
gious leaders. Daily Mail Online, May 22, 2020. URL: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8349151/Rus-
sian-soldiers-liquidate-six-ISIS-militants-Dagestan-terrorists-planned-attacks.html
Russian security services engage in combat with militants in Dagestan. Tass, May 22, 2020. URL: https://tass.
com/emergencies/1159279
Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress. January 1, 2020-
March 31, 2020. May, 2020. URL: https://media.defense.gov/2020/May/13/2002298979/-1/-1/1/LIG_OIR_
Q2_MAR2020_GOLD_508_0513.PDF
Why is Egypt building more walls around Gaza? Al-Monitor, May 14, 2020. URL: https://www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/originals/2020/05/egypt-wall-tunnels-gaza-hamas-siege-border-security.html
M. Ahmad. Thailand forces kill three suspected insurgents in Pattani. Benar News, April 30, 2020. URL:
https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/three-killed-04302020172352.html
M. Ahmad, Phaicharoen. Bloodshed returns to insurgency-hit Thai Deep South after month of inactivity.
Benar News, May 4, 2020. URL: https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/new-attacks-05042020183411.
html
H.J. Cohen. Pulling troops out of Africa could mean another endless war. War on the Rocks, May 13, 2020.
URL: https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/pulling-troops-out-of-africa-could-mean-another-endless-war/
Niger claims 75 ‘Boko Haram terrorists’ killed in twin operations. The New Arab, May 13, 2020. URL: https://
english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/5/13/niger-claims-75-boko-haram-terrorists-killed
Afghanistan resumes offensive campaign against Taliban. Deutsche Welle, May 12, 2020. URL: https://www.
dw.com/en/italian-police-nab-91-mafia-suspects-in-mega-raid/a-53414320
Tunisia foils terrorist plot targeting its military: Defense Ministry. Al Arabiya, May 11, 2020. URL: https://
english.alarabiya.net/en/News/north-africa/2020/05/11/Tunisia-foils-terrorist-plot-targeting-its-military-De-
fense-Ministry.html
‘Key’ Daesh leaders arrested in Kabul: NDS. Tolo News, May 11, 2020. URL: https://tolonews.com/afghani-
stan/key-daesh-leaders-arrested-kabul-nds
‘Civilians killed’ in government airstrike in Balkh: residents. Tolo News, May 12, 2020. URL: https://tolonews.
com/afghanistan/‘civilians-killed’-govt-airstrike-balkh-residents
Turkish intelligence help rescue Italian aid worker kidnapped in Kenya. Daily Sabah, May 10, 2020. URL:
https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkish-intelligence-helps-rescue-italian-aid-worker-kid-
napped-in-kenya
Israel concerned about potential withdrawal of US forces from Sinai. Asharq al-Awsat, May 9, 2020. URL:
https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2274861/israel-concerned-about-potential-withdrawal-us-forces-si-
nai
Turkey arrests dozens of ISIS elements in 4 months. Asharq al-Awsat, May 6, 2020. URL: https://english.aaw-
sat.com/home/article/2270211/turkey-arrests-dozens-isis-elements-4-months
Turkey neutralizes over 1,300 terrorists in 2020. Middle East Monitor, May 9, 2020. URL: https://www.mid-
dleeastmonitor.com/20200509-turkey-neutralises-over-1300-terrorists-in-2020/
J. Hodge. After five bloody years in Syria, Russia is turning against Iran – and Assad. The Daily Beast, May
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9, 2020. URL: https://www.thedailybeast.com/russia-is-turning-against-iranand-assadin-syria?via=ios&fb-

clid=IwAR1XAKDHzuWRFxPrIlaT7fBTWmrhVI5IbDEaUcPrrWwaQvlubyVdJ_3qpME
Iraqi airborne operation wipes out ISIS hideouts along Syrian border. Al Masdar News, May 08, 2020. URL:
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/iraqi-airborne-operation-wipes-out-isis-hideouts-along-syrian-bor-
der/
US: military killed over 130 civilians in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia in 2019. Middle East Monitor, May
7, 2020. URL: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200507-us-military-killed-over-130-civilians-in-iraq-
syria-afghanistan-somalia-in-2019/
R. Kheel. Pentagon: US military operations killed 132 civilians in 2019. The Hill, May 6, 2020. URL: https://
thehill.com/policy/defense/496487-pentagon-us-military-operations-killed-132-civilians-in-2019
K. Abu Toameh. Egypt says it destroyed more than 3,000 Gaza tunnels. The Jerusalem Post, May 4, 2020.
URL: https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/egypt-says-it-destroyed-more-than-3000-gaza-tunnels-626863
Egypt reports 15 military casualties in Sinai recently. Reuters, May 3, 2020. URL: https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-egypt-security/egypt-reports-15-military-casualties-in-sinai-recently-idUSKBN22F0L7
7. Specific Operations and/or Specific Policy Measures
7.1. Foreign Fighters and their Families
Turkey deports 12 Islamic State-linked fighters to Finland. Al-Monitor, June 1, 2020. URL: https://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/06/turkey-deports-12-islamic-state-fighters-finland.html - ixzz6ONX-
55Now
J. Coleman, T. Advimetaj. Kosovo’s experience in repatriating former foreign fighters. The Hague: ICCT, June
2, 2020. URL: https://icct.nl/publication/kosovos-experience-in-repatriating-former-foreign-fighters/
Over 100 ‘Islamic State’ fighters return to Germany. Deutsche Welle, May 24, 2020. URL: https://www.
dw.com/en/over-100-islamic-state-fighters-return-to-germany/a-53549985
L. Sanders IV. Career foreign fighters fuel conflict in the Middle East. Deutsche Welle, June 1, 2020. URL:
https://www.dw.com/en/career-foreign-fighters-fuel-conflict-in-the-middle-east/a-53632925
EU agency wants ‘IS’ returnees charged with war crimes. Deutsche Welle, May 23, 2020. URL: https://www.
dw.com/en/eu-agency-wants-is-returnees-charged-with-war-crimes/a-53546679?fbclid=IwAR0YWZA-
WQtsZkO0R8DT89_Zb3Vf-Bxuft92L_3Tr1hAQqnt3C0RAkJ5lUf8
Understanding career foreign fighters. USIP, May 26, 2020. URL: https://www.usip.org/events/understand-
ing-career-foreign-fighters
Traumatised by caliphate’s reign of terror, Iraq’s religious minorities fear plans to resettle IS families. The
New Arab, May 6, 2020. URL: https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2020/5/7/iraqs-religious-minori-
ties-fear-plans-to-resettle-is-families
8. Prevention, Preparedness and Resilience Studies

Can an ISIS terrorist be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society? ICSVE, June 10, 2020. URL: https://
www.eventbrite.com/e/can-an-isis-terrorist-be-rehabilitated-and-reintegrated-into-society-tick-
ets-107628106564?aff=erelexpmlt
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Beyond Conflict. Innovation lab for neuroscience & social conflict. Approach. URL: https://beyondconflictint.
org/what-we-do/approach/
K. Braddock. Weaponized Words: the strategic role of persuasion in violent radicalization and counter-radi-
calization. Modus-Zad, May 19, 2020. URL: https://modus-zad.de/blog/book-review-weaponized-words/
S. Brzuszkiewicz. Review of the TV show Caliphate. European Eye of Radicalization, May 8, 2020. URL:
https://eeradicalization.com/review-of-the-tv-show-caliphate/
E. Rosand, K. Koser, L. Schumicky-Logan. Preventing violent extremism during and after the COVID-19
pandemic. Brookings, April 28, 2020. URL: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/28/
preventing-violent-extremism-during-and-after-the-covid-19-pandemic/
S. Jarle Hansen, S. Kid (Eds.) Routledge Handbook of Deradicalization and Disengagement. New York:
Routledge, 2020, 374 pp. URL: https://www.amazon.com/Routledge-Handbook-Deradicalization-Jarle-Han-
sen-dp-1138229962/dp/1138229962/ref=mt_hardcover?_encoding=UTF8&me=&qid=1586891628
C.P. Clarke. Conducting P/CVE assessment in conflict environments: key considerations. Washington, DC:
RESOLVE Network, 2020. URL: https://www.resolvenet.org/research/conducting-pcve-assessment-con-
flict-environments-key-considerations
9. State Repression, Civil War and Clandestine Warfare
9.1. Arbitrary Arrest/Detention/ Prison System
L. Sanders IV. Egypt’s prisons not fit for humans. Deutsche Welle, May 28, 2020. URL: https://www.dw.com/
en/egypts-prisons-not-fit-for-humans/a-53585733
Chang Xin. The police region of Xinjiang: checkpoints, camps, and fear. Bitter Winter, May 9, 2020. URL:
https://bitterwinter.org/the-police-region-of-xinjiang-checkpoints-camps-and-fear/?source=zy&fbclid=I-
wAR1bV_3kPwihf_V2Fx5ey85q39_ZRAm55Z9Rf9Bj8vVmtksiGDYECJcPpeI
Former Chinese state journalist is jailed for 15 years after posting ‘negative’ reports about Communist offi-
cials. Daily Mail Online, May 1, 2020. URL: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8277195/Chinese-jour-
nalist-jailed-15-years-posting-negative-reports-Communist-Party.html?ito=social-twitter_mailonline
9.2. Extra-judicial Killings, Executions
D. Endeshaw, G. Paravicini. Ethiopian security forces accused of 39 extrajudicial killings. Reuters, May
29, 2020. URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-violence/ethiopian-security-forces-ac-
cused-of-39-extrajudicial-killings-idUSKBN2351AU
O. Anyadike. Sahelian security forces accused of hundreds of extrajudicial killings. The New Humanitarian,
May 5, 2020. URL: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/05/05/Sahel-Mali-Niger-Burkina-Fa-
so-security-forces-killings
Families plead with Saudi authorities to return bodies of relatives beheaded in mass execution. The New Arab,
April 23, 2020. URL: https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/News/2020/4/23/Saudi-families-plead-for-bod-
ies-of-executed-relatives
T. Stickings. China ‘put thousands to death’ in 2019 – far more than any other country – despite global exe-
cutions falling 5% to a ten year low, Amnesty reveals. Daily Mail Online, April 21, 2020. URL: https://www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8240101/China-thousands-death-2019-far-country.html
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‘Grim milestone’: Saudi Arabia carries out 800th execution since 2015. The New Arab, April 15, 2020. URL:
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/News/2020/4/15/Saudi-Arabia-carries-out-its-800th-execution-
since-2015
9.3. Torture
M. von Hein. Syrian victims of torture testify in German court. Deutsche Welle, June 5, 2020. URL: https://
www.dw.com/en/syrian-victims-of-torture-testify-in-german-court/a-53699921
B. Daragahi. Syrian regime torturer put on trial for war crimes in world first. The Independent, April 23,
2020. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/url-border-force-cocaine-lorries-dover-
nca-a9480251.html
Syrians face their torturers in German court, in huge step towards justice for Assad’s victims. The New Arab,
April 20, 2020. URL: https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/4/20/in-germany-syrians-take-their-
torturers-to-court
10. Intelligence Operations

5 Eyes, 9 Eyes, & 13 Eyes countries –what you need to know. VPN Monitor, May 27, 2020. URL: https://www.
vpnmentor.com/blog/understanding-five-eyes-concept/
J.K. Wright. Never again? Learning from September 11 to improve tomorrow’s strategic intelligence. Inter-
national Studies Journal, (16)3), Winter 2020, pp. 87-126. URL: http://www.isj.ir/En/index.php/quarterly/
item/68-isj63e?fbclid=IwAR07RuUtQEHb97HIJJWWWx4mrdyu1rP_qSnoUzWwxLBpHUWNd0oVSZ-
TW6tA
B. Gellman. Dark mirror: Edward Snowden and the surveillance state. Vintage Digital, 2020, 448p. URL:
https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Mirror-Edward-Snowden-Surveillance-ebook/dp/B019CGXXDI
A. Anthony. Barton Gellman: ‘The Assange precedent is dangerous’. The Guardian, May 23, 2020. URL:
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2020/may/23/barton-gellman-the-assange-precedent-is-dangerous?C-
MP=twt_books_b-gdnbooks&fbclid=IwAR1DTay4_bNtlzuQs-5ddNc0h4AzQxPLjon2ZA6WPTyR8UnY-
jr9yNkvaXFs
V. Bevins. The Jakarta method. Washington’s anticommunist crusade & the mass murder program that
shaped our world. Public Affairs Books, 2020. URL: https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/vincent-bev-
ins/the-jakarta-method/9781541724013/
G. Greenwald. The CIA’s murderous practices, disinformation campaigns, and interference in other coun-
tries still shape the world order and US politics. The Intercept, May 21, 2020. URL: https://theintercept.
com/2020/05/21/the-cias-murderous-practices-disinformation-campaigns-and-interference-in-other-coun-
tries-still-shapes-the-world-order-and-u-s-politics/?fbclid=IwAR2_vd9XeEh1jNF7D6qpY3DauUScKdy-
IChyY_ipYSa0puePC68Ah5wrILlI
B. Jacobs. Maximator: European signals intelligence cooperation from a Dutch perspective. Intelligence and
National Security, April 7, 2020. URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2020.1743538
Somali intelligence chief accuses Qatar of links with al-Shabaab: Saudi influence? Hiiraan Online, May 16,
2020. URL: https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2020/May/178160/omali_intelligence_chief_accuses_qatar_of_
links_with_al_shahbaab_saudi_influence.aspx
T. Wesolowsky. Media identify Russian in alleged plot to poison Czech officials with ricin. RFE/RL, May 11,
2020. URL: https://www.rferl.org/a/media-out-russian-in-alleged-plot-to-poison-czech-officials-with-ri-
cin/30606089.html
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11. Cyber Operations

B. Crothers. North Korea conducting massive cyber threats against US, other countries, reports say. Fox
News, June 5, 2020. URL: https://www.foxnews.com/tech/north-korea-conducting-massive-cyber-threats-
against-us-other-countries-reports-say
D. Danan. Report: Iranian cyber attacks on Israeli water systems thwarted for a year. Breitbart, June 7, 2020.
URL: https://www.breitbart.com/middle-east/2020/06/07/report-iranian-cyberattacks-on-israeli-water-sys-
tems-thwarted-for-a-year/
P. Paganini. British army launches a new cyber regiment. Security Affairs, June 7, 2020. URL: https://securi-
tyaffairs.co/wordpress/104413/cyber-warfare-2/british-army-soc.html
Y. Melman. Iran struck first. ‘Israel’ retaliated massively. Behind the cyber war rattling the Middle East.
Haaretz, May 25, 2020. URL: https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/iran-israel-cyber-war-middle-
east-mossad-persian-gulf-port-1.8858292?utm_source=traffic.outbrain.com&utm_medium=referrer&utm_
campaign=outbrain_organic
B. Caspit. Israel response to cyber attack sends clear warning to Iran. Al-Monitor, May 22, 020. URL: https://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/israel-us-iran-mike-pompeo-aviv-kochavi-cyberattack-port.
html
Large cyber attack against Israel conducted from Gaza, Turkey, North Africa. Al Masdar News, May 22, 2020.
URL: https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/large-cyber-attack-against-israel-conducted-from-gaza-tur-
key-north-africa/
Israel behind cyber attack that causes ‘total disarray’ at Iran port – report. The Times of Israel, May 19, 2020.
URL: https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-said-behind-cyberattack-that-caused-total-disarray-at-iran-port-
report/
Six facilities said hit in Iran’s cyber attack on Israel’s water system in April. The Times of Israel, May 19, 2020.
URL: https://www.timesofisrael.com/6-facilities-said-hit-in-irans-cyberattack-on-israels-water-system-in-
april/
Cyber war was coming: a reflection on the 25 year old thesis that predicted a generation of cyber conflict.
OODA Loop, May 14, 2020. URL: https://www.oodaloop.com/archive/2020/05/14/cyberwar-was-coming/?fb-
clid=IwAR1bwxgOr9YyEYZS7JzZkKsX_13BfC0bBk_mmIiV7MP04Xh-qh5Lzb7BoXs
Cybersecurity firm links Chinese group to cyber espionage in Southeast Asia. Benar News, May 8, 2020. URL:
https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/indonesia-china-05082020191357.html
R. Bergman. China’s military is tied to debilitating new cyber attack tool. The New York Times, May 11, 2020.
URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/07/world/asia/china-hacking-military-aria.html?fbclid=IwAR2rD-
9cI1cOmvSmq8a3-nDwtP2yZWyrUziHiq_sOwFqoaTdJug2CZoQLEsE
T. O’Connor. Report accuses Iran of cyber attack on US company treating coronavirus. Newsweek, May 8,
2020. URL: https://www.newsweek.com/report-accuses-iran-attack-drug-company-coronavirus-1502838
Z. Doffman. Chinese military cyber spies just caught crossing a ‘very dangerous’ new line. Forbes,
May 7, 2020. URL: https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2020/05/07/chinese-military-cy-
ber-spies-just-caught-crossing-a-very-dangerous-new-line/?fbclid=IwAR0KUXe9OEmk2gPNpAUZFwIj6T-
sO6DGgCaBr-gEkVDhPM-ea8kj70m8tGFk - 7b5ee4cd2ab3
A. Mishra. Pakistan’s anti-India warfare goes unchallenged. Sunday Guardian, May 2, 2020. URL: https://
www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/pakistans-anti-india-cyber-warfare-goes-unchallenged
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11.1. Internet Regulation, Censorship
A. Lucente. Facebook closes accounts linked to Kurdish intelligence in Iraq. Al-Monitor, June 5, 2020. URL:
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/06/facebook-closes-accounts-kurdish-intelligence-iraq.
html
G. Porter. The FBI launches open attack on ‘foreign’ alternative media outlets challenging US foreign policy.
The Grayzone, June 5, 2020. URL: https://thegrayzone.com/2020/06/05/the-fbi-launches-open-attack-on-for-
eign-alternative-media-outlets-challenging-u-s-foreign-policy/
D. O’Sullivan. Facebook shuts down far-right group planning to bring weapons to protests. CNN, June 3,
2020. URL: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/02/us/facebook-protest-violence/index.html
O. O’Connell. Facebook engineer quits job and says about disallowing speech that incites violence. The
Independent, June 2, 2020. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/face-
book-trump-racist-violence-zuckerberg-twitter-a9545556.html?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter
- Echobox=1591135159
J. Vibes. Censorship-free social network ‘explodes’ after adding 200,000+ new users in just a few days. Activist
Network, May 23, 2020. URL: https://www.activistpost.com/2020/05/censorship-free-social-network-ex-
plodes-after-adding-200000-new-users-in-just-a-few-days.html
L. Kenton. Facebook agrees to pay $52 million in settlement with content moderators who developed
PTSD after having to ‘regularly’ watch videos of rape, murder and suicide. Daily Mail Online, May 12, 2020.
URL: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8313235/Facebook-agrees-pay-52-million-settlement-con-
tent-moderators-developed-PTSD.html
Facebook dismantles ‘disinformation network’ tied to Iranian state media. Middle East Eye, May 5, 2020.
URL: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/facebook-dismantles-disinformation-network-tied-iran-state-me-
dia
A. al-Waara. Facebook deactivates dozens of accounts of Palestinian journalists and activists. Middle East Eye,
May 6, 2020. URL: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/facebook-deactivates-accounts-dozens-palestin-
ian-journalists-and-activists
S. Mann. Facebook appoints 20 members to its ‘Supreme Court’ for speech rules, including noted Trump
critic. Just the News, May 7, 2020. URL: https://justthenews.com/nation/culture/facebook-appoints-20-mem-
bers-its-supreme-court-free-speech-rules
B. Cole. Russian authorities block online conspiracy theories claiming coronavirus ‘is a genetically-modified
bioweapon’. Newsweek, May 6, 2020. URL: https://www.newsweek.com/russia-coronavirus-conspiracy-theo-
ries-vaccines-1502353
M. Impelli, J. Murdock. What is Facebook’s oversight board? Company installs group in attempt to combat
misinformation on site. Newsweek, May 6, 2020. URL: https://www.newsweek.com/what-facebooks-over-
sight-board-company-installs-group-attempt-combat-misinformation-site-1502405
12. Risk and Threat Assessments, Forecasts and Analytical Studies

L. Duffy. Jihadism and recidivism. European Eye on Radicalization, May 15, 2020. URL: https://eeradicaliza-
tion.com/jihadism-and-recidivism/
L. Close. Motives of far-right and Islamist terrorists ‘eerily similar’. The Strategist, May 19, 2020. URL: https://
www.aspistrategist.org.au/motives-of-far-right-and-islamist-terrorists-eerily-similar/
How are terrorists and violent extremists using gamification? The Tech against Terrorism podcast, May 13,
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2020. URL: https://www.techagainstterrorism.fm/how-are-terrorists-and-violent-extremists-using-gamifica-

tion/
A. Speckhard, M. Ellenberg. How Assad’s atrocities became a powerful motivator for terrorist recruitment.
Home Security Today, May 12, 2020. URL: https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/
how-assads-atrocities-became-a-powerful-motivator-for-terrorist-recruitment/?fbclid=IwAR33rjzZ0M4y-
BRcqe9908FDZdUCDJIyCgtg8QyWJGkSHaJYt22AtK5AEj7w
Where to publish academic research on online extremism and terrorism?: what we can learn from journal
article entries in Vox-POL’s online library. Vox Pol, May 7, 2020. URL: https://www.voxpol.eu/where-to-pub-
lish-academic-research-on-online-extremism-and-terrorism-what-we-can-learn-from-journal-article-en-
tries-in-vox-pols-online-library/?fbclid=IwAR0EgNbbRq7tPWH2Z4Gu4bFNSyVjwifcl9LRZyJidBwrxAV3D-
iD6jdEtv8Q
B. Ganor. Terror explained in the era of COVID-19. ICT, YouTube, May 5, 2020. URL: https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=c63Wjgw3LBo
CrisisWatch. Tracking conflict worldwide. June alerts and May trends. International Crisis Group, June 2020.
URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/june-alerts-and-may-trends-2020
Right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: the RTV dataset. UiO: Center for Research and Ex-
tremism, May 2020. URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/topics/online-resources/rtv-dataset/index.html
M. Jensen, E. Yates, S. Kane. Profiles of individual radicalization in the United States (PIRUS). START, May
2020. URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_PIRUS_ResearchBrief_May2020.pdf
Konfliktbarometer 2019. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, April 2020. URL: https://hiik.
de/konfliktbarometer/aktuelle-ausgabe/
Recent developments highlight enduring jihadist threat to the United States. IPT News, June 2, 2020. URL:
https://www.investigativeproject.org/8420/recent-developments-highlight-enduring-jihadist
Atrocity Alert No.205: UN global ceasefire, South Sudan and Myanmar (Burma). Global Centre for the Re-
sponsibility to Protect. May 27, 2020. URL: https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/atrocity-alert-no-205/
Hong Kong security, police chiefs warn of growing ‘terrorism’ as China security laws loom. Channel Asia.
May 25, 2020. URL: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/hong-kong-protests-security-chief-terror-
ism-china-12766828
B. Ganor (ICT) on current terrorist threats and commonalities between Covid19 and terrorism. ITSSVerona,
YouTube, may 15, 2020. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SHc5IePPM2c&feature=youtu.be
A. Silke. COVID-19 and terrorism: assessing the short-and-long-term impacts. Pool Re, May 2020. URL:
https://www.poolre.co.uk/solutions/risk-awareness/covid-19-and-terrorism-report/
Dreigingsbeeld terrorisme Nederland 52. NCTV, May 7, 2020. URL: https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/dtn/
actueel-dreigingsniveau
E. Karmon. The CBRNe threat in the COVID-19 era. International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT),
YouTube, may 6, 2020. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7waB7vKgMI
J. Sinai. Issues in predicting and forecasting future terrorist warfare. The Journal of Counterterrorism & Home-
land Security International, May 2020. URL: https://www.iacsp.com/publications.php
R.S. Cohen, N. Chandler, S. Efron, B. Frederick, E. Han, K. Klein, F.E. Morgan, A.L. Rohoades, H.J. Shatz, Y.
Sokh. Peering into the crystal ball. Holistically assessing the future of warfare. RAND, Research brief, RB-
10073-AF, May 2020. URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10073.html?utm_source=What-
CountsEmail&utm_medium=International Affairs+AEM: Email Address NOT LIKE DOTMIL&utm_cam-
ISSN 2334-3745 220 June 2020

paign=AEM:474903421
13. Also Worth the Time to Read/Listen/Watch

The monopoly on violence (documentary). Activist Post, June 7, 2020. URL: https://www.activistpost.
com/2020/06/the-monopoly-on-violence-documentary-film.html
Sixteen game-changing technologies you might not know about yet. Forbes, June 4, 2020. URL: https://www.
forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/06/04/15-game-changing-technologies-you-might-not-know-
about-yet/ - 320eb1c429db
A. Gescinska. Herwaardering van de waarheid begint met twijfel. NRC Handelsblad, June 5, 2020. URL:
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2020/06/05/herwaardering-van-de-waarheid-begint-met-twijfel-a4001903 - /han-
delsblad/2020/06/06/
Global shocks: security implications of major worldwide crises. King’s College London, June, 2020. URL:
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/events/series/global-shocks-security-implications-of-major-worldwide-crises-3
The UN says a new computer simulation tool could boost global development. MIT Technology Review,
May 29, 2020. URL: https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/29/1002404/united-nations-comput-
er-agents-simulation-boost-global-sustainable-development-goals/?utm_medium=tr_social&utm_cam-
paign=site_visitor.unpaid.engagement&utm_source=Twitter - Echobox=1590768914
Peace, Conflict, and COVID-19. Council of Foreign Relations, May 15, 2020. URL: https://www.cfr.org/article/
peace-conflict-and-covid-19?utm_source=fb&utm_medium=social_owned&fbclid=IwAR0SJ7MYlIsupH-
PuI9O0pQDq5OROEerT2kkSlwe-7TKFqiuj3cNk89H-H3w
About the Compiler: Berto Jongman is Associate Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He is a former senior
Military Intelligence Analyst and currently serves as International Consultant on CBRN issues. A sociologist by
training, he also worked for Swedish and Dutch civilian research institutes. Drs. Jongman was the recipient of the
Golden Candle Award for his World Conflict & Human Rights Maps, published by PIOOM. He is editor of the
volume ‘Contemporary Genocides’ (1996) and has also contributed to various editions of ‘Political Terrorism’, the
award-winning handbook of terrorism research, edited by Alex P. Schmid.

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Conference Monitor/Calendar of Events

June – October 2020 and beyond-
Compiled by Reinier Bergema
The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), in its mission to provide a platform for academics and practitioners
in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism, compiles an online calendar, listing recent and upcoming ac-
ademic and professional conferences, symposia and similar events – both on- and offline – that are directly
or indirectly relevant to the readers of Perspectives on Terrorism. The calendar includes academic and (inter-)
governmental conferences, professional expert meetings, civil society events and educational programs. The
listed events are organised by a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental institutions, including
several key (counter) terrorism research centres and institutes.
We encourage readers to contact the journal’s Associate Editor for Conference Monitoring, Reinier Bergema,
and provide him with relevant information, preferably in the same format as the items listed below. Reinier
Bergema can be reached at <[email protected]> or via Twitter: @reinierbergema.
June 2020
COVID-19 and Social Media – Meeting Challenges Using Lessons Learned from Countering Terrorism
Henry Jackson Society
3 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @HJS_org
Gender and Violent Extremism Today

International Centre for Counter-Terrorism –The Hague (ICCT)
4 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICCT_TheHague
Strategies for Addressing Global White Supremacists

Foundation for Defense of Democracies
4 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @fdd
Book Talk: Weaponized Words: The Strategic Role of Persuasion in Violent Radicalization and Count-
er-Radicalization
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)
8 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @START_UMD
Incitement: Anwar al-Awlaki’s Western Jihad

International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR)
9 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICSR_Centre
Can an ISIS Terrorist be Rehabilitated and Reintegrated into Society?

International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism
10 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @icsve
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Weaponising COVID-19: Far-Right Antisemitism in the UK and US

Henry Jackson Society
11 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @HJS_org
Border Management and Human Rights: Collection and Sharing of Information and New Technologies
in the Counter-Terrorism and Freedom of Movement Context
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
15-25 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @osce
A Decade of Review: The UN’s Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee
Asser Institute
15 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @TMCAsser
Violent Non-State Actors and the Pandemic: Extremist Narratives, Adaptations, and Governance
Valens Global
15 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @Valens_Global
CARR Far Right De-Radicalisation Webinars: Nigel Bromage (EXIT UK)

Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR)
16 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @C4ARR
Chad’s Pivotal Role in the Sahel

International Institute for Strategic Studies
16 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @IISS_org
Webinar: Finding Solutions to Insecurity in Cabo Delgado

Chatham House
16 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @ChathamHouse
COVID–19 and Terrorism: Assessing the Short- and Long-Term Impacts

Pool Re Solutions
16 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a
Ethics for Mental Health Workers in the Prevention of Radicalisation

Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Mental Health
16-17 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope
START Webinar: Information Warfare

17 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @START_umd
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Human Dignity and Human Security in Times of Terrorism

Asser Institute
17 June, online
The Impact of the Islamic State on Terrorism Research

George Washington University’s Program on Extremism
17 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @gwupoe
Webinar: The Impact of COVID-19 on Peace Operations in Africa

Egmont Institute
18 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @Egmontinstitute
Weapons of the Weak State: Contracts and Consent in Post-Conflict Statebuilding

Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
18 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @FSIStanford
RADPol2020 Conference “Towards Evidence-Based Practice and Policy: What Research Projects Offer to
Practitioners in the Field of Preventing Radicalisation”
Polish Platform for Homeland Security
18 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @PolishPlatform
U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East

Center for Strategic & International Studies
22 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @csis
Repatriation of FTFs and Their Families: Why Not?

International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT)
23 June, online
Webinar: EU Options for Dealing with the Syrian Conflict

Clingendael Institute
23 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @clingendaelorg
Families ‘Left Behind’ by FTFs

Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Families, Communities and Social Care
23-24 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope
Refugees and COVID-19: The Case of the Syrian and Rohingya Crises
Wilson Center
24 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @thewilsoncenter
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After the Attack: Crisis Communication Strategy and the Role of the Media
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT)
25 June, online
RADPol2020 Conference “Sharing the Insights on Central and Eastern Europe Approaches in Radicali-
sation and Violent Extremism”
25 June, online
Terrorist Financing Present and Future

29 June, online
Natural Resources, Sustainable Development, and Peace in Africa

Wilson Center
30 June, online
Women Rising: In and Beyond the Arab Spring

Wilson Center
30 June, online
July 2020
RADPol2020 Conference Doing it Better “Improving Policy and Practice Tackling Radicalisation and
Violent Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe”
2 July, online
Tunisia’s Missionaries of Jihad

Monash University
3 July, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @MonashUni
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) TM 2020 Update

9 July, online
The Executive Certificate Program in Counter-Terrorism Studies

International Institute for Counter-Terrorism
12-31 July, Herzliya, Israel
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICT_org
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Progressive Terrorism Studies Webinar Series – The Persistent Online Presence: The Shift in Plat-
form Exploitation Over Time
Royal United Services Institute
14 July, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org
CARR Far Right De-Radicalisation Webinars: Ryan Scrivens (Michigan State University)
Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR)
16 July, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @C4ARR
Trump’s Deployment of Terrorist Designations: A Look at the IRGC and Russian Imperial Movement
21 July, online
August 2020
Understanding Incel Violence

Monash University
14 August, online
Advanced Summer Programme: Preventing, Detecting, and Responding to Violent Extremism

Leiden University Centre for Professional Learning & International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague
17-21 August, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @UniLeidenCPL; @ICCT_TheHague
Advanced Summer Program: Terrorism, Countering Terrorism, and the Rule of Law
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague & Asser Institute
24-28 August, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICCT_TheHague; @TMCAsser
September 2020
From Potential to Prosperity: Africa’s Long-Term Future

Institute for Security Studies Africa
2-3 September, Johannesburg, South Africa
Website: visit | Twitter: @issafrica
The World Counter Terror Congress 2020

Counter Terror Expo
8-10 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @CTX_Event
Women, Terrorism, and Counter-Terrorism

Monash University
9 September, online
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Whitehall Briefing - The Future of UK–EU Intelligence Sharing in a Post-Brexit World

9 September, London, United Kingdom
Trading Emerging Technologies: Security and Human Rights Perspectives

Asser Institute
15 September, online
IVth ‘Silent Leges Inter Arma?’ Conference

International Society for Military Law and the Law of War
15-18 September, Bruges, Belgium
Website: visit | Twitter: @ISMLLW
Extreme Threats to the UK

17 September, online
Counter Terrorism / Attack the Network [Course]

NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)
21-25 September, Ankara Turkey
Countering CBRN at Home and Beyond

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
23 September, London, United Kingdom
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Asser Institute
28 September-2 October, The Hague, The Netherlands
German Prevention Congress

Deutscher Praeventionstag
28-29 September, Kassel, Germany
Website: visit | Twitter: @praeventionstag
Women in Terrorism and Counterterrorism

September, Ankara Turkey
14th Annual International Conference: Unanswered Questions and Under-Researched Topics in Terror-
ism Research
Society for Terrorism Research
September, London, United Kingdom
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Website: visit | Twitter: @SocTerRes
October 2020 & Beyond
Misogynistic Terrorism and the Far-Right

Monash University
6 October, online
GLOBSEC 2020 Bratislava Forum

GLOBSEC
7-8 October, Bratislava, Slovakia
Website: visit | Twitter: @GLOBSEC
Migration Deals and Their Damaging Effects

Asser Institute
9 October, The Hague, The Netherlands
Annual CT Discipline Conference

12 October, Ankara Turkey
Terrorism Experts Conference (TEC)

13-14 October, Ankara Turkey
COE-DAT CT Lessons Learned (Critical Infrastructure Protection)

Terrorism and Media [Course]

Modern Deterrence Spring 2020 Conference

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
21 October, London, United Kingdom
1980-1920: The Forgotten History of Right-Wing Terrorism

FORENA/University of Applied Science Düsseldorf & NS-Dokumentation Centre of the City of Cologne, and
Nachwuchsforschungsgruppe der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung
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29 October, Cologne, Germany

CBRNe Convergence Boston

CBRNe Convergence
2-4 November, Boston (MA), United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @cbrneworld
Defence Against Terrorism Seminar

3-4 November, Ankara Turkey
Border Security, Refugees, and CT

16-20 November, Ankara Turkey
2020 Stockholm Security Conference

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
18 November, Stockholm, Sweden
Website: visit | Twitter: @sipriorg
Security, Democracy & Cities Conference

European Forum for Urban Security
25-27 November 2020, Nice, France
Website: visit | Twitter: @Efusnews
Advanced Winter Programme: Preventing, Detecting and Responding to Violent Extremism

Leiden University Centre for Professional Learning & International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague
25-29 January 2021, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @UniLeidenCPL; @ICCT_TheHague
Acknowledgement
Special thanks to Alex Schmid, Berto Jongman, Olivia Kearney, Christoph Paulussen, and Hendrik Puls for
their suggestions and contributions to this Conference Calendar.
About the Compiler: Reinier Bergema is a Research Fellow and Project Manager at the International Centre
for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) and an Associate Editor at Perspectives on Terrorism. His research
interests include, inter alia, Dutch (jihadist) foreign fighters and terrorist threat levels across the EU.
ISSN 2334-3745 229 June 2020

About Perspectives on Terrorism
Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered
in Vienna, Austria, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University, Campus The
Hague. PoT is published six times per year as a free, independent, scholarly peer-reviewed online journal
available at the following URL: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism.
PoT has over 9,000 subscribers and seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics
and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The
editors invite researchers and readers to:
• present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent
conflict;
• submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses on
terrorism;
• use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.
Perspectives on Terrorism has sometimes been characterised as ‘non-traditional’ in that it dispenses with some
of the rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice
and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our
online journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of
articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards. The journal’s Research Notes, Special
Correspondence, Op-Eds and other content are reviewed by members of the Editorial Team, while its Articles
are peer-reviewed by outside academic experts and professionals.
While aiming to be policy-relevant, PoT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism
and waging conflicts. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors
to adhere to. They are responsible for the content of their contributions and retain the copyright of their
publication.
The Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism consists of:
Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, Editor-in-Chief Dr. Aaron Y. Zelin, Associate Editor
Prof. James J.F. Forest, Co-Editor Dr. Joshua Sinai, Books Reviews Editor
M.Sc. Christine Boelema Robertus, Associate Dr. Judith Tinnes, Information Resources
Editor for IT Editor
Dr. Tore Bjørgo, Associate Editor Drs. Berto Jongman, Associate Editor for Web
Resources,
Dr. Leah Farrall, Associate Editor
Drs. Reinier Bergema, Associate Editor for
Dr. Jeffrey Kaplan, Associate Editor Conference Monitoring
Dr. Gregory Miller, Associate Editor Mr. Brody McDonald, Assistant Editor for
Dr. John Morrison, Associate Editor Theses
Dr. Bart Schuurman, Associate Editor Ms. Olivia Kearney, Editorial Assistant
Dr. Rashmi Singh, Associate Editor Mrs. Jodi Moore, Editorial Assistant
Dr. Craig Whiteside, Associate Editor
ISSN 2334-3745 230 June 2020

Vol 14 Issue 3

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ISSN 2334-3745

Volume XIV, Issue 3

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Welcome from the Editors

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Previous Literature on Idiosyncratic Terrorism

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Dimension Subdimension Lone Actor Example Dyad/Group Example

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Case Studies of Idiosyncratic Terrorism

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Table 2. Case Studies of Idiosyncratic Terrorism

Terrorism Dimensions of Source of Idio- Fatalities Vic- Other Terror-

Conclusion: The Importance of Idiosyncratic Terrorism

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Implications for Future Research and Theoretical Development

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pp. 501-541; URL: https://harvardjol.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/2017/03/54.1-HLL105.pdf

[61] Ibid., p. 129.

[62] Ibid., p. 93.

[64] Ibid., p. 151.

[65] Ibid., pp. 165-166.

[66] Ibid., p. 132.

[67] Ibid., p. 200.

[68] Ibid., p. 186.

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Failed States and Terrorism: Justifiability of Transnational

Failed States as a Challenge to Global Security

Perspective I: Why Failed States Present a Terrorism Threat

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Perspective II: Why Failed States Do Not Present a Terrorism Threat

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Contrasting Opinions in Scholarly Works

Accounting for Differences in Conclusions

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“Fixing” Failed States in Order to Counter Terrorism

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Failed States, Counterterrorism and Interventionism

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About the Author: Aleksandar Pašagić ([email protected]) holds an MA in International Security

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[41] Coggins, B. L. (2015), op. cit., p. 476.

[44] Tikuisis, P. (2009), op. cit., p. 69.

[50] Fukuyama, F. (2004), op. cit., p. 30.

[51] Newman, E. (2007), op. cit., p. 484.