Constitutional Law (Bill of Rights)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – OUTLINE FOR THE FINALS
TOPIC VIII: Free Access to Courts and Other Bodies, Custodial Investigation, Right to Bail, Rights of the
Accused, Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases, Privilege against Self-Incrimination and Double Jeopardy
A. Free Access to Courts and Other bodies
 Article III, Section 11 – “Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.” – in relation to Article VIII,
Section 5, Paragraph 5 – “ Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court.”
 Article III, Section 12 – (1) “A person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.” (Miranda Rights)
(2) “No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited”
(3) “Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.”
(4) “The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.”
 Article III, Section 13 – “ All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.”
 Article III, Section 14 – (1) “ No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law”
(2) “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
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Constitutional Law 2 Notes- Finals
Ma. Angelica Grace B. Aban
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided that he be duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.”
 Article III, Section 16 – “Persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.”
 Article III, Section 17 – “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.”
Case/s:
 Pangcatan vs. Maghuyop , G.R. No. 247718, March 3,2021

o Free access to the courts is also extended to litigants who may be indigent by exempting
them from obligation to pay docket and filing fees.
o Exemption of Legal and Filing of Fees may only be extended to natural party litigants;
Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person’s poverty, a
condition that only a natural person can suffer.
o Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court : guidelines in
implementing as well as regulating the exercise of the right of free access to the courts
o Retroactive application of OCA Circular in relation to R.A. 9406 pursuant to free access
of the Courts
o Section 19 of Rule 141:
 that his gross income and that of his immediate family do not exceed
 an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee;
 and that he does not own real property with a fair market value of more than
P300,000.00;
 that if the trial court finds that he meets the income and property requirements, the
authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted, and the grant is a
matter of right;
 that, however, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been
met, it should then set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that he has "no
money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities
for himself and his family;"
 that in that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to
disprove the evidence presented by the applicant;
 that, afterwards, the trial court will rule on the application depending on the
evidence adduced;
 that, in addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 provides that the adverse party may later still
contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the
trial court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time
the application was heard;
 that, if the trial court determines after hearing that the party declared as an indigent
is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other
lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court; and
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 that if payment is not made within the time fixed by the trial court, execution shall
issue or the payment of the prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to other
sanctions that the trial court may impose.
B. Custodial Investigation
 People vs. Agustin y Paraggua, G.R. No. 247718, March 3,2021
o Atty. Donato Jr. failed to act as the competent and independent counsel envisioned by the
Constitution.
o The words “competent and independent counsel” in the constitutional provision is not an
empty rhetoric. It emphasizes the need to provide the accused with a diligent and capable
lawyer who will fully safeguard his constitutional rights while under the uniquely stressful
conditions of a custodial investigation.
o In People vs. Peñaflor: “To be a competent and independent counsel in a custodial
investigation, the lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the interview,
counselling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping
the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either
continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview. It has been made clear that
counsel should be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the
person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his
extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to
be presumed innocent.”
o Section 2, paragraph c of R.A. No. 7438:
c) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence
of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of
any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the
municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as
chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as
evidence in any proceeding.
 People vs. Jamo, Jr. , G.R. No. 224586 (Notice), March 24, 2021
o Extra Judicial Confession is inadmissible
o Custodial Investigation-critical pre-trial process
o Quantum evidence requires is proof beyond reasonable doubt
o Even if extra judicial confession is inadmissible but independent evidence adduced is
substantial that is related to the crime, accused may still be convicted
o Custodial Investigation is targeted to a person; not a general inquiry
o Section 2, paragraph b and f of R.A. No. 7348
b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who
arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform
the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and
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to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all
times be allowed to confer private with the person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. Is such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be
provided by with a competent and independent counsel.
f) As used in this Act, “custodial investigation” shall include the practice of issuing an
“invitation” to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected
to have committed, without prejudice to the “inviting” officer for any violation of law.
o Essentially, “custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular person as a suspect.” The operative act is when the police investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation
that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of
his supposed extrajudicial confession.
o In the herein case, the supposed confession, which was made without the assistance of
counsel, is taboo and useless in a court of law. However, the inadmissibility of the
extrajudicial confession cannot be relied upon since guilt of the accused was still proven
beyond reasonable doubt through credible evidence presented by the prosecution.
 People vs. Moreno, G.R. No. 191759, March 2, 2020

o Custodial Investigation and Identification was legal
o Legality of Arrest- any irregularity in the arrest was cured by voluntary surrender of accused and
submitted to arraignment
o Questions on arrest shall be made before arraignment and failure to object to the illegality of arrest
constitutes a waiver on the part of the accused. “Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his
arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea of “not guilty” and by participating in the trial.” (People vs. Kulais and Samson)
o There was no violation of the right to counsel. Accused chose to remain silent, and was not
interrogated and no statement or evidence was extracted from him; neither was any evidence
presented in court that was supposedly obtained from him during custodial investigation.
 People of the Philippines v. Aubrey Enriquez Soria, G.R. No. 248372, August 27, 2020
o Confession made before the News Reporters; is it admissible in court?
o SC: her statements was admissible as evidence since she was not compelled to confess and was
done in her own volition ; factor of spontaneity. She had not only agreed to be interviewed; she
also provided details on why and how she perpetrated the offense, thus the admission of guilt made
before Sorote is admissible in evidence against her. Clearly this confession to the news reporter
was given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. Sorote acted as a member of
the media when he interviewed appellant, an there was evidence presented that would show that
Sorote was acting under the direction and control of the police. More importantly, appellant
voluntarily supplied the details surrounding the commission of the offense.
o These kind of statements is not covered by the protection of Section 12
 Alemar A. Bansilan vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 239518, November 3, 2020
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o Bansilan’s alleged uncounseled admission, suffice it to state that the same was not given during a
custodial investigations, and certainly, not to police authorities. His spontaneous and voluntary
verbal confession given to an ordinary individual (Malayo) was correctly admitted in evidence
because it is not covered by the requisites of Section 12 (1) and (30 of Article III of the constitution.
It has been held that the constitutional procedure on custodial investigation does not apply to
spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime.
 Marvin Porteria Y Manebali vs. People of the Philippines. G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019
o Absence of presence of counsel during questioning of the accused.
o Proof beyond reasonable doubt was not established and thus Porteria was not convicted.
o Importance of difference between hearsay and truthfulness of the hearsay. (Atty. Gina’s example:
Truth that he told me is admitted; but the truth of what he said is not admitted)
o Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that persons under investigation for the
commission of an offense should be informed of their right to remain silent, and their right to
counsel. These rights may not be waived, except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible as evidence against
the accused. This principle is further reiterated in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438. Under this statute ,
extrajudicial confessions made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation must
fulfil the following requirements:
(d)Any extrajudicial confession made by person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation
shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter’s
absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters,
his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by him, otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be
inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
o Thus, the Court cannot determine the voluntariness of Marvin’s supposed confession to Virgie as
to the substance of Marvin’s confession. Aside from her testimony, there is no independent
evidence that establishes the voluntariness and substance of Marvin’s alleged extrajudicial
confession.
o The Court emphasizes that an extrajudicial confession that an extrajudicial confession is not a
sufficient ground for conviction, unless it is corroborated by either direct or circumstantial
evidence. If it is the latter, the accused may be convicted when:
 there is more than one circumstance;
 the facts from which the inferences are derived and proven; and
 the combination of jail the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
1. Rights During Custodial Investigations
 Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)

o Miranda Rights origin
o The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
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otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, unless it demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination.
 The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado interrogation as it exists today is
inherently intimidating, and works to undermine the privilege against self-incrimination.
Unless adequate preventive measures are taken to dispel the compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product
of his free choice.
 The privilege against self-incrimination , which has had a long and expansive historical
development, is the essential mainstay of our adversary system, and guarantees the the
individual the “right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise
of his own will,” during a period of custodial interrogation as well as in the courts or during
the course of other official investigations.
 In the absence of other effective measures, the following procedures to safeguard the Fifth
Amendment privilege must be observed:
 the person in custody must, prior to the interrogation, be clearly informed that he
has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in
court
 he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to
have a lawyer with him during the interrogation; and that
 if he is an indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
 If the individual indicates, prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease; if he states that he wants an attorney, the
questioning must cease until an attorney is present.
 Where an interrogation is conducted without the presence of an attorney and a
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the Government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
 Where the individual answers some questions during in-custody interrogation, he has
not waived his privilege, and may invoke his right to remain silent thereafter.
 The warnings required and the waiver needed are , in the absence of a fully effective
equivalent , prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement, exculpatory or
exculpatory, made by a defendant.
 People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)

o The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding.
The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" However, the right can be claimed
only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot
be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline
to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether.
o The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It does not
impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial to advise a witness of his right against
self-incrimination. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness at the appropriate time, it follows
that the right is waived, expressly, or impliedly.
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o Rights in Custodial Interrogation apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an
offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police authorities. The suspect must be warned
prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires
(Miranda Rights). Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been given, the individual may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation can be used against him.
o The rights exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused
persons." And by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way."
o A defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His
interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the
filing of the criminal case in court or the public prosecutors' office. Hence, there is no occasion to
speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation."
o The accused in court or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor also
possesses the right against self- incrimination. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection
from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is
entitled among others-
 to be exempt from being a witness against himself; and
 to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be
cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall
not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.
o The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself”
signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which
he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or
other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution,
or for a co-accused, or even for himself. And his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any
manner prejudice or be used against him.
o However, he may wish to testify in his own behalf. But he may be cross-examined as to any matters
stated in his direct examination, or connected therewith like any other witness. He may not on
cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer that he will give,
or the evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with
which he is charged.
o However, if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which might incriminate him,
not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of which
he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against
self-incrimination.
o In the instant case, the Orders of the judge of the lower court were rendered with grave abuse of
discretion and should be annulled and set aside. Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in
ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand.
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o The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation did not therefore come into play.
It is also clear that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the
administrative investigation and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded. His offer to
compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities thru a letter was a free and even spontaneous
act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had
not been accorded to Ramos.
 People vs. Guillen, G.R. No. 191756, November 25, 2013

o It should be borne in mind that when appellant was brought to the police station, he was already a
suspect to the crime of rape. As such, he was already under custodial investigation. Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides, viz:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
o Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the accusation of “AAA” at the police
station, he was exercising his basic and fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence
should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that
appellant’s silence should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In fact, this right cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel and any admission obtained in violation
of this rule shall be inadmissible in evidence
2. Custodial Investigation – When is there custodial investigation?

 People vs. Lugod, G.R. No. 136253, February 21,2001
o There is no question that at the time of his apprehension, accused-appellant was already placed
under arrest and was suspected of having something to do with the disappearance of Nairube. In
fact, the lower court declared that accused-appellant's warrantless arrest was valid based on Section
5 (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. However, at the time of his arrest, the apprehending
officers did not inform the accused-appellant and in fact acted in a blatant and wanton disregard
of his constitutional rights specified in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, which provides:
 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
 2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
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 3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
 (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well
as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
o Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel,
and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one.
Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Besides, even if
he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing and with the
assistance of counsel. Consequently, the accused-appellant's act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo
that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for
having transgressed accused-appellant's rights under the Bill of Rights.
o This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how
brutal the crime committed may be. In the same vein, the accused-appellant's act in pointing out
the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the accused-appellant's right
to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the uncounselled confession and is considered a
fruit of the poisonous tree. Thus, in People vs. De La Cruz, we ruled that:
 "Equally inadmissible, for being integral parts of the n admission - or fruits of the
poisonous tree - are the photographs of subsequent acts which the accused was made to do
in order to obtain proof to support such admission or confession, such as (a) his digging in
the place where Virginia Trangia was allegedly buried, (b) his retrieving of the bones
discovered therein (c) his posing before a photographer while executing such acts."
o Even if we were to assume that accused-appellant was not yet under interrogation and thus not
entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the police station, the acts of
accused-appellant subsequent to his apprehension cannot be characterized as having been
voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. His confession
was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he told the truth.
Furthermore, when accused-appellant allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2 Gallardo,
the whole police force as well as nearly one hundred (100) of the townspeople of Cavinti escorted
him there. Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople were antagonistic towards accused-appellant
and wanted to hurt him. The atmosphere from the time accused-appellant was apprehended and
taken to the police station up until the time he was alleged to have pointed out the location of the
body of the victim was highly intimidating and was not conducive to a spontaneous response.
Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, accused-appellant's claim that he was beaten up and
maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged
confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he visited accused-appellant in the jail cell,
he noticed that the accused-appellant had bruises on his face, corroborated accused-appellant's
assertion that he was maltreated.
 Other matters on Custodial Investigation

 means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after an accused has been taken into
custody or otherwise has been deprived of action in any significant way.
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 it begins when there is no longer a general inquiry on an unsolved crime and the investigation
focuses on a particular person as a suspect
 Interrogating or exacting a confession from a suspect – Custodial Investigation
 Rights under custodial investigation may not be invoked in situations where statements are
spontaneously made as when an accused himself goes to a police station: Voluntary confession
(Josalva vs. People)
 People vs. Boquingo, statements made by the accused were inadmissible as evidence as they were
made without counsel during the preliminary investigation.
 People vs. Sunga, the right to counsel applies to certain pre-trial proceedings that could be deemed
critical stages in the criminal process. Any preliminary investigation is no different from in-
custody interrogation by the police. For a suspect who takes part in the preliminary investigation
is subjected to no less than the state’s processes is oftentimes intimidating and relentless of
pursuing those who may be liable for the criminal prosecution.
 R.A. 7438 – Custodial Investigation is deemed to include the practice of issuing an invitation to a
person who is investigated in connection to an offense he is suspected to have committed without
prejudice to the the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law.
 People vs. Del Rosario – It was held that from the time that Del Rosario was invited for questioning
at the house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation and so
the rights under Article III, Section 12 would already attach.
 A police line-up is not considered a part of any custodial inquest since it is conducted before the
stage of investigation is reached.
 As the SC has considered affixing the signatures of the accused on the inventory of the evidence
ceased from him or the boxes or plastic bags where the evidence would be placed as considers as
already being subsumed by the concept of custodial investigation and so without being informed
of his right to remain silent and to counsel or to be assisted by the counsel the evidence that are
ceased with his signature would be inadmissible as evidence in court against him.
 Note that not all investigations would trigger Article III, Section 12. In instances where one is
invited as a resource person in a public hearing conducted by Congress or the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, one cannot invoke the right to be assisted by counsel because that is not in the nature
of a criminal investigation.
 The same is true with administrative proceedings in companies or during employment, these are
not criminal investigations that would trigger Article III, Section 12.
 SC also held that a person under normal audit investigation is not under custodial investigation
because an audit examiner can hardly be deemed to as the law enforcement officer contemplated
by the constitution. The Court Administrator is not a law enforcement officer, an investigation
conducted by him does not constitute custodial investigation within the contemplation within the
constitutional guarantee.
 An investigation conducted by the CSC involving fake eligibility is not custodial investigation.
 When an arrested person signs a booking sheet or an arrest report in the police station, he is not
admitting commission of an offense nor is confessing to any incriminating circumstance, as such
the booking sheet no more than a record of his arrest and a statement on how the arrest was made.
It is simply a police report and has no probative value as an extrajudicial statement of the person
being detained. The signing of an accused in the booking sheet or an arrest report is not a custodial
investigation that triggers Section III, Article 12 of the Constitution.
 Admissions in a video tape, news conference or interview is not covered by Article II, Section 12.
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Article III
 Rights covered by Article II , Section 12:
o the right to remain silent
o the right to competent or independent counsel, preferably his own choice; at all stages of
the investigation;
o If he could not afford counsel, he must be provided by the government with one
o the right counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused
to admit something that is false
o Gamboa vs. Cruz, the right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, this is when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and or confessions or admissions
from the respondent, at that point the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to
avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions from the lips of the person
undergoing investigation.
o The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth,
as an officer of the court, it is an attorney’s duty first and foremost seek the truth. However, the
counsel should be able throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the questions by
conferring with his client and stopping the investigation should the need arise. The duty of the
lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the right of an
accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time. Thus, when the lawyer merely affixes his
signature to the confession as a witness, and he testified that he had not assisted the accused when
the latter was being investigated by the police, extra judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence
against the accused.
o People vs. Bolanos, while being conducted to the police station on board a police jeep the accused
made extra judicial confession that he killed the victim. In as much as the uncounselled confession
was the sole basis of the judgement of conviction, the SC held that the trial court committed
reversible error, while on board the police jeep, he accused is deemed to have already been under
custodial investigation and should have been informed of his rights, right to remain silent and right
to be assisted by counsel. And since his admissions were done without counsel, his admission was
not admitted by the Court as evidence against him.
o Paraffin Test- not covered under custodial investigation
o Being photographed is not custodial investigation.
o Being informed of rights in custodial investigation – the police investigator must take an effort that
accused understood said rights. In instances that the accused is a grade school graduate, feeble
minded or only understands a certain vernacular, the investigator must adjust accordingly and
communicate with the same dialect that the accused could understand or in such simple words so
that even if the accused is of low or no education, he would able to understand and exercise his
rights or waive his rights.
o Competent and independent counsel- “competent” and “independent” should not be empty
rhetoric. The role of a lawyer in custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyeronly
gives perfunctory advice instead of advocacy of the rights of the persons being questioned. If the
advice of counsel is so cursory as to be rendered useless, voluntariness is impaired, as held in the
case of People vs. Juela.
o To be competent and independent, it is only required for the lawyer to be willing to safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine
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preemptory and meaningless of the individual’s constitutional rights as held in the case of People
vs. Bagnate citing People vs. Porio.
o People vs. Lucero-petitioner was denied the right to counsel when the lawyer, not counsel of
choice, arrived at the police station around 9 pm at the second night of the accused’s detention and
talked about his rights, left the accused in the custody of the police during the actual interrogation
and just came back the next day for examination and affixing of signatures of the statement of the
accused.
o People vs. Morial,- Lawyer left about 30 minutes at the start of the custodial investigation with
instruction that before the accused signs the extrajudicial statement, it should be shown to him first.
o People vs. Bermas the mere pro forma appointment of counsel de officio who fails to genuinely
protect the interest of the accused merits inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession that was
elicited.
o A counsel who is not independent will not suffice. In the case of People vs. Bandula, the court
stressed that the constitution requires that the counsel be independent, obviously he cannot be a
special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, municipal attorney, whose
interest is admittedly adverse to the interest of the accuse. As legal officer of the municipality it is
seriously doubted whether a municipal attorney can effectively undertake the defense of the
accused without running into conflict of interest.
 In People vs. Januario it was held that there was violation of this provision when the counsel of
the accused in the custodial investigation conducted by the NBI was an applicant for employment
with the NBI. As he in fact joined the NBI months later.
 In People vs. Espanola, SC declared that the City Legal officer was not and independent counsel
within the purview of the constitutional provision, nor can a mayor be considered as independent
counsel.
 Since as mayor his duties were inconsistent with his responsibilities to the suspect, as held in
People vs. Velarde and People vs.Taliman.
 The mere fact that the lawyer is a retired member of the Judge Advocate’s Office does not cast
any doubt on the impartiality of the assisting counsel, People vs. Hernandez.
 Preferably of his own choice: This does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a
person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling his defense, otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely
in the hands of the accused who can impede or obstruct progress of an interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer who for one reason or another is not available to protect his interest (People vs.
Barasina)
 The right to counsel does not mean that the accused must personally hire his own counsel. The
constitutional provision is satisfied when a counsel is engaged by anyone acting on behalf of the
person under the investigation or appointed by the court upon petition by said person or someone
on his behalf. (People vs. Espiritu)
 Person under custodial investigation may refuse counsel chosen for him. A lawyer provided by
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused only when he does not raise any objection against
said appointment during the course of the investigation and accused subscribes the veracity of the
statements made before the swearing officer.
 Rights enumerated in Article III, Section 12 could only be waived in writing and signed by the
person in the presence of counsel. The right to be informed of these rights cannot be waived.
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 The burden that these rights were waived rests on the prosecution. The presumption that official
duty has regularly been performed cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence (People vs.
Jara and People vs. Taruc)
 R.A. No. 7438- Section 2 (d) – Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained
or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of
his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents,
elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
 Also guaranteed in Article III, Section 12, no torture, force, and alike which vitiates the freewill
shall be used during investigation.
 Where the appellant did not present any evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their
persons or where they failed to complain to the officers who administered their oaths, where they
did not institute any criminal or administrative action against the alleged intimidators for
maltreatment where there appeared no marks of violence on their bodies, and where they did not
submit themselves to be examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should
be considered factors indicating voluntariness of confession (People vs. Bagnate)
 Secret Detention places are prohibited, Confessions or admissions obtained in violation of rights
are inadmissible in evidence.
 2 kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions:
o Coerced confession- the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence
threat or intimidation.
o Uncounselled statements- given without the benefit of the Miranda Warning
o The alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused during the custodial investigation
is relevant and material only where the extra judicial confession form the accused is the only basis of
conviction
o People vs. Mahinay- guidelines for arresting and investigating officers:

1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a
language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language
known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be
used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be
provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be
appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel of after a valid
waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time he has the right to communicate or confer
by the most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either
retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or
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minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited
by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be
the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be
done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is
void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage
of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such
indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the
interrogation must cease if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right
to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process,
regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation
of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in the whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
o Can the exclusionary rule be waived? Yes, for failure of the accused to accept the offer in evidence the
uncounselled confession was admitted in evidence and in such instance the exclusionary rule is deemed
waived.
o People vs. Andan-When the court considered as admissible the uncounselled confessions made by the
accused to a mayor whom he treated as a confidant and who did not even question him, and voluntary
statements made to news reporters during televised interview. But not to his confessions made during
custodial investigation leading to the subsequent discovery and seizure from his house of the evidence
eventually used against him.
o Uncounselled extrajudicial statements given to barangay tanods and barangay chairmen have likewise
been considered as inadmissible as evidence. But, uncounselled admissions to neighbors , barangay
kagawads which were not made during custodial investigations have been admitted in evidence.
o People vs. Galit which reiterated Morale vs. Enrile, confessions were rejected because of the proven
torture inflicted on the accused which led to the confession.
o A re-enactment of a crime in the absence of counsel is inadmissible as evidence against the accused
(People vs. Juarez)
o Any objection regarding a violation of the rights under Article III, Section 12 must be raised before
arraignment. In People vs. Concepcion, SC stressed that an extrajudicial confession obtained without the
assistance of counsel but later affirmed by the accused in open court during his trial has been considered
admissible against the accused.
o Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the
co-conspirator, the confession is receivable as evidence against co-accused. But an extrajudicial
confession which is inadmissible against an accused because of a violation of his right to be informed or
his right to counsel, would be inadmissible against his co-accused.
o What are the penalties that attach if these rights are violated:
o R.A. No. 7438:
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“Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any
investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a
penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10)
years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed
upon the investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.
o The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon
orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and
independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
o (b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate
family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or
priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or
from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years,
and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
o The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial
responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.”
3. Administrative Investigations – What are the rights of a person under administrative investigation?
 Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sumilang, 271 SCRA 316
o Custodial Investigation has been defined as “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.”
o It is an investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigation
conducted by the Municipal Police and the NBI and other police agencies in our
government.
o Thus, in this case the Office of the Court Administrator can hardly be deemed to be the law
enforcement authority contemplated in the Constitution.
 People vs. Uy, G.R. No. 157399, November 17,2005

o The rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accused-appellant are
not available before government investigators enter the picture. Thus as held in one case
that admissions made during the course of an administrative investigation by Philippine
Airlines do not come within the purview of Section 12 of the Constitution. The protective
mantle of the constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or confessions
made to a private individual, or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was
not part of the investigation, or even to a mayor approached as a personal confidante and
not in his official capacity.
o Along the same vein, we held that a videotaped interview showing the accused
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen is not
covered by the provision although in so ruling, SC warned trial courts to take extreme
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caution in further admitting similar confessions because it recognized the distinct
possibility that the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may
attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the
exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television.
o Neither does the constitutional provision on custodial investigation extend to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the accused orally admits having committed the crime, nor to a person
undergoing an audit examination because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement
officer.
4. Police Line-up – Is the right to counsel available here?

 Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988)
o The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions
or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person
undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
o No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed
by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf,
and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
o In this case, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial
inquest, hence, Gamboa was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. When
petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been
held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the
custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that
when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as
when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail
of the services of his lawyer
o The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions, the suspect should then be assisted by counsel
o The right to counsel extend to those under police investigation even if there is no
real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the
moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions
or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous
at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel,
unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
 People vs. Escordial , G.R. No. 138934, January 16, 2002

o As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the
cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of
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attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the
possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when
these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police.
o An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a
show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from
a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these
types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the
accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle
the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." It was ruled that
any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-
up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as
evidence against him.
o Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on
January 3, 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and
Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been
made when accused-appellant did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-
court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him. Consequently, the
testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held
inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation
of [the primary] illegality.'"
o Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not
render the in-court identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the
"fruits of the poisonous tree." This in-court identification was what formed the basis
of the trial court's conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not derived or drawn
from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof, it is
admissible as evidence against him. However, whether or not such prosecution
evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is another
matter altogether.
 Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63, SCRA 3 (1975)

o Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution declares as inadmissible a
confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense who has not been informed of his right (to remain silent and) to counsel.
o This should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a
confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the
New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible
in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity
of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he
had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the
right to be so informed before that date.
Page 17 of 60
o Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person
under investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be
informed of such right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that
any confession obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence,
can and should be given effect only when the right already existed and had been
violated. Consequently, because the confessions of the accused in G. R. Nos. L-
37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the effectivity of the New
Constitution in accordance with the rules then in force, no right had been violated
as to render them inadmissible in evidence although they were not informed of
"their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be informed of such right,"
because, We repeat, no such right existed at the time.
5. Investigations not considered custodial investigations

 Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175
o A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation
o Constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution can only be
invoked when the accused is under "custodial investigation," or is "in custody
investigation.” A custodial investigation is any "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way."
o A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit
examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in
the above rule.
 Manuel vs. N.C. Construction Supply, G.R. No. 127553, November 28, 1997
o In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during the course of the
investigation conducted by private respondents' counsel to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to terminate their employment. Petitioners were not under custodial
investigation as they were not yet accused by the police of committing a crime. The
investigation was merely an administrative investigation conducted by the employer, not a
criminal investigation. The questions were propounded by the employer's lawyer, not by
police officers. The fact that the investigation was conducted at the police station did not
necessarily put petitioners under custodial investigation as the venue of the investigation
was merely incidental. Hence, the admissions made by petitioners during such
investigation may be used as evidence to justify their dismissal.
o Private respondents, however, failed to observe due process in terminating the employment
of petitioners. Due process demands that the employer should furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the
cause(s) for termination and afford him ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of a representative if he so desires. Specifically, the employer
must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of employment can be
legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought, and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. There is no showing in this case that
private respondents furnished petitioners with such notices. Private respondents, through
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their counsel, Atty. Reyes, immediately terminated petitioners' services upon conclusion
of the investigation. Private respondents must therefore indemnify petitioners for failure to
observe due process before dismissing them from work.
 Remolona vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 137473, August 2,2001
o A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of
the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty
rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an
administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel
or not. (See Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (Civil Service Act) and
Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules of the
Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in
administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine
whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers and
employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such,
the hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution.
o In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in the investigation conducted
by the CSC field office. The investigation was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining
the facts and whether there is a prima facie evidence sufficient to form a belief that an
offense cognizable by the CSC has been committed and that Remolona is probably guilty
thereof and should be administratively charged. Perforce, the admissions made by
Remolona during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal.
 People vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001

o "At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means - by telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility
of the arresting officer to see to it that that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested,
by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole
or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence."
o Clearly, the constitutional right to counsel as enunciated in the aforecited case may be
invoked only by a person under custodial investigation for an offense. Accused-appellant's
extra-judicial confession was properly admitted and considered by the trial court
considering that when accused-appellant gave his statement he was not under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation is "the stage where the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends
itself to elicit incriminating statements." Indeed, custodial investigation refers to
Page 19 of 60
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
o In this case, when Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group discovered that there was
a discrepancy in the proof sheet brought about by the issuance of a cashier's check
numbered 013702 made payable to Firebrake Sales and Services in the amount of Thirty
Six Thousand, Four Hundred Eighty pesos and Thirty centavos (P36,480.30), accused-
appellant was summoned to appear before Valentino Elevado, Assistant Accountant,
Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank for questioning. It bears stressing that
Elevado is not a police officer or law enforcer but a private person who was a bank officer.
In the course of the interview, accused-appellant admitted having issued the subject
cashier's check without any legitimate transaction, to his co-accused Amiel Garcia who
was then encountering financial difficulties. He also admitted that out of the amount of the
check, P8,500.00 went to his personal benefit. His admissions were reduced into writing
and offered as Exhibit "B" by the prosecution. It is well-settled that the legal formalities
required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to those extra-judicial confessions
obtained during custodial investigation.
6. Confession to Newsmen- would confession to media practitioners be admissible in evidence?

 People vs. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997)
o The Court found that when the police arrested appellant, they were no longer
engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was
already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house.
o Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the
police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional
rights when he was investigated and interrogated.
o The Court ruled that the confession is inadmissible in evidence. So too were the
two bags recovered from appellant's house. The victim's bags were the fruits of
appellant's uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence
also inadmissible.
o However, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the
mayor is inadmissible.
o It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the
local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes
of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution.
o Appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation
by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority
ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously,
freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not
know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked
with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.
o Appellant's confessions to the media were properly admitted. The confessions were
made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other
investigating officer. Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news
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reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in
evidence.
o The constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but
given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed
the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating
facts or confessions.
o The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion
by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
o Confessions to the Media are Not Covered by the Protection of the Bill of Rights
o The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the
State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without
need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government,
rights that government has the duty to protect.
 People vs. Endino, G.R. No. 133026, February 20,2001

o We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a
medium for admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several
cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken
in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the
connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced
extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having
an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to
the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system.
o We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an
accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and
conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is
essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given
under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
o A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media
confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession
always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and
scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous
task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating
polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and
protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
 People vs. Ordono, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000

o Requirements for a Confession to be Admissible in Evidence:
For a confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy 4fundamental
requirements: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be
Page 21 of 60
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession
must be express; and, (d) the confession must be in writing. (People vs. Deniega)
o Among all these requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an
accused's right to counsel to adequately protect him in his ignorance and shield him
from the otherwise condemning nature of a custodial investigation.
o The person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the
person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense.
o If there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any statement elicited
from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. This exclusionary rule is
premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.
7. Other Confessions
 People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26,2006
o The accused shall have a right to an independent counsel during custodial
investigation
o Art. III Sec. 12 of the Constitution provides that any person under investigation for
the commission of the offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice.
o The same provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation; when the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to
focus on a particular person as a suspect.
o Edna’s claim that the confession given to the witnesses, being uncounseled
extrajudicial confessions, should not be admitted is valid only as to the confession
given to the barangay chairman. When she was brought to the barangay hall, she
was already a suspect. Thus, there should be a presence of a counsel. As a result,
the lighter, as well as the testimony given to the barangay chairman are
inadmissible. This however does not affect the guilt of Edna as there are strong
evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 People vs. Gomez, 270 SCRA 432 (1997)

o While the sworn statement taken from appellant by an NBI agent at the Stanley
Prison in Hongkong during his incarceration was not made the basis for
Immaculata's conviction by the court a quo, a word could be said about the manner
in which it was procured. It would seem that appellant was merely apprised in
general terms of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent. He then
was asked if he would be willing to give a statement. Having answered in the
affirmative, the NBI investigating agent asked him whether he needed a lawyer.
Appellant answered:
"S. Sa ngayon po ay hindi na at totoo lang naman ang aking sasabihin. Kung
mayroon po kayong tanong na hindi ko masasagot ay sasabihin ko na lang
po sa inyo."
Page 22 of 60
o After that response, the investigation forthwith proceeded. This procedure hardly
was in compliance with Section 12(1), Article III, of the Constitution which
requires the assistance of counsel to a person under custody even when he waives
the right to counsel. It is immaterial that the sworn statement was executed in a
foreign land. Appellant, a Filipino citizen, should enjoy these constitutional rights,
like anyone else, even when abroad.
o Under our laws, the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of an accused for a
criminal offense lies with the prosecution. The burden must be discharged by it on
the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense or the lack of it. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who are to act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
o Here, it is not unlikely for one to suspect that appellant has had an inkling on the
existence of the conspiracy but the essential connecting link showing a definite
community of design between him and the others just has not been adequately
shown. When the circumstances obtaining in a case are capable of two or more
inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the
other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the
court must acquit.
 Illinois vs. Perkins, 496 US 292, (1990)

o An undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give
Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that may elicit
an incriminating response. The Miranda doctrine must be enforced strictly, but
only in situations where the concerns underlying that decision are present.
Those concerns are not implicated here, since the essential ingredients of a "police
dominated atmosphere" and compulsion are lacking. It is Miranda's premise that
the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and official
interrogation, whereby the suspect may feel compelled to speak by the fear of
reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of more lenient treatment should he
confess. That coercive atmosphere is not present when an incarcerated person
speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a fellow inmate and whom he
assumes is not an officer having official power over him. In such circumstances,
Miranda does not forbid mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect's
misplaced trust. The only difference between this case and Hoffa v. United States,
385 U. S. 293 -- which upheld the placing of an undercover agent near a suspect in
order to gather incriminating information -- is that Perkins was incarcerated.
Detention, however, whether or not for the crime in question, does not warrant a
presumption that such use of an undercover agent renders involuntary the
incarcerated suspect's resulting confession. Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S. 1 --
which held that an inmate's statements to a known agent were inadmissible because
no Miranda warnings were given -- is distinguishable.
o Where the suspect does not know that he is speaking to a government agent, there
is no reason to assume the possibility of coercion. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.
Page 23 of 60
S. 201, and similar cases -- which held that the government may not use an
undercover agent to circumvent the Sixth Amendment right to counsel once a
suspect has been charged -- are inapplicable, since, here, no murder charges had
been filed at the time of interrogation. Also unavailing is Perkins' argument that a
bright-line rule for the application of Miranda is desirable, since law enforcement
officers will have little difficulty applying the holding of this case.
8. Re-enactment – Is the presence of a counsel required in the re-enactment of a crime?

 People vs. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36 (1992)
o Clearly, the trial court took into account the testimony given by Panfilo Capcap on
what had occurred during the re-enactment of the crime by Luvendino. We note
that the re-enactment was apparently staged promptly upon apprehension of
Luvendino and even prior to his formal investigation at the police station. The
decision of the trial court found that the accused was informed of his constitutional
rights "before he was investigated by Sgt. Galang in the police headquarters" and
cited the "Salaysay" of appellant Luvendino. The decision itself, however, states
that the re-enactment took place before Luvendino was brought to the police station.
Thus, it is not clear from the record that before the re-enactment was staged by
Luvendino, he had been informed of his constitutional rights including,
specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived such right before
proceeding with the demonstration. Under these circumstances, we must decline to
uphold the admissibility of evidence relating to that re-enactment.
9. What rights are available:

a. To remain silent
b. To Competent & Independent Counsel – Is the right to counsel absolute in all phases of the
investigation and trial?
 People vs. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 (1994)
o The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions
or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person
undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense. Hence, if there is no
counsel at the start of the custodial investigation, any statement elicited from the
accused is inadmissible in evidence against him.
o In this case, when they were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had
no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial
investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect
to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty.
Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay.
 People vs. Quidato, G.R. No. 117401, October 1, 1998
Page 24 of 60
o The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid
waiver of the right to counsel -- that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel --
is inadmissible in evidence. [Constitution, Article III, Sec. 12(1) and (3); People vs.
Cabintoy, 247 SCRA 442 (1995).] It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave
their statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed
the same in the presence of counsel the next day. As ruled in People vs. Compil:
[244 SCRA 135 (1995)]
o The belated arrival of a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer the following day even if prior
to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect (of lack
of counsel) for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory
statements from accused-appellant --Thus, in People vs. De Jesus (213 SCRA 345
[1992]) we said that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without
the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence
of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.
 People vs. Januario, 267 SCRA 608

o Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the
lawyer were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be
competent and independent, i.e., that he Is willing to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely
be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's
constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, this Court stressed that an accused's right
to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel 'contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.
o Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation
(if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or
by the latter's relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the
court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to
file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given
as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in
many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can
be symbiotic.
 People vs. Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133138, July 23,2004

o The words "competent and independent counsel" in the constitutional provision is
not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely
stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the
choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.
o As heretofore stated, Atty. Fortunato Parawan, at that time, was the barangay
captain of Barangay Lorega, Cebu City
o In People v. Culala, the Court reiterated the rule that a municipal attorney cannot
be an independent counsel because as a legal officer of the municipality, he
provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying
Page 25 of 60
out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace
and order, and it was seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. Thus, the Court
held that he is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the
accused during custodial investigations.
o This is reiterated in People v. Taliman, and People v. Velarde, we further ruled that
a municipal mayor cannot likewise be an independent counsel as required by the
Constitution.
 Counsel of Choice – will the proceeding be suspended until the counsel of choice is available?
 People vs. Gallardo, G.R. No. 113684, January 25, 2000
o We have held that "while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person
under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally
lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may
reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by
the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any
objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation
and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the
swearing officer." [People vs. Suarez, 267 SCRA 136 (1997), citing People vs.
Parojinog, 203 SCRA 673 (1991).]
o In the case at bar, although Atty. Velasco was provided by the State and not by the
accused themselves, the accused were given an opportunity whether to accept or
not to accept him as their lawyer. They were asked and they immediately agreed to
have Atty. Velasco as their counsel during the investigation. There is no
requirement in the Constitution that the lawyer of an accused during custodial
investigation be previously known to them. The Constitution provides that the
counsel be a competent and independent counsel, who will represent the accused
and protect their constitutionally guaranteed rights.
o Also, we have held that "to be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all
the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not
intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but,
rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false. The counsel, however, should never
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth." [Ibid, p. 137, citing
People vs. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47 (1989).]
 People vs. Barasina, 228 SCRA 450 (1194)

o The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the
choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise
the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who
can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a
lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.
Page 26 of 60
o In this case, Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant
within the contemplation of the Constitution. No evidence was presented to negate
his competence and independence in representing appellant during the custodial
investigation. Moreover, appellant manifested for the record that Atty. Giduquio
was his choice of counsel during the custodial proceedings.
o While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation
cannot afford the services of counsel – or where the preferred lawyer is not available
– is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice as
he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not
raise any objection against the counsel's appointment during the course of the
investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement
before the swearing officer. (See People v. Continente)
o The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should
never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
o In this case, the December 17, 1996 custodial investigation upon appellant's
apprehension by the police authorities violated the Miranda doctrine on two
grounds: (1) no counsel was present; and (2) improper waiver of the right to counsel
as it was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, the
December 23, 1996 custodial investigation complied with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1.
Even though improper interrogation methods were used at the outset, there is still
a possibility of obtaining a legally valid confession later on by properly
interrogating the subject under different conditions and circumstances than those
which prevailed originally.
o Appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby inducing him to execute
an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against the person who
threatened him, nor he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not
understand the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect,
yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.
 Counsel’s presence required in entire proceedings

 People vs. Morial, G.R. No. 129295, August 15, 2001
o Atty. Tobias, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to remain silent,
by his "coming and going" during the custodial investigation, and by his abrupt
departure before the termination of the proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution contemplated when it added the modifier
"competent" to the word "counsel." Neither can he be described as the "vigilant and
effective" counsel that jurisprudence requires. Precisely, it is Atty. Tobias'
nonchalant behavior during the custodial investigation that the Constitution abhors
and which this Court condemns. His casual attitude subverted the very purpose for
this vital right, which is to:
x x x curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even by the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. What
is sought to be avoided is the "evil of extorting from the very mouth of the
Page 27 of 60
person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very
evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him." These
constitutional guarantee have been made available to protect him from the
inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such
investigation.
o Even granting that appellant consented to Atty. Aguilar's departure during the
investigation and to answer questions during the lawyer's absence, such consent
was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Under
Section 12 (3), Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless
the same is made in writing and in the presence of counsel. No such written and
counselled waiver of these rights was offered in evidence.
c. To be informed of such rights

 People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289
o Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution which reads:
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence."
o When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of
his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. Therefore, it would
not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation
the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the (1973) Constitution. He is not only
duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also
explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation
may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands.
o In this case, the police testified that he informed Nicandro of her constitutional
rights when she was under custodial investigation. What specific rights he
mentioned to Nicandro, he did not say. Neither did he state the manner in which
she was advised of her constitutional rights so as to make her understand the. This
is significant in this case because Nicandro is illiterate and cannot be expected to
be able to grasp the significance of her right to silence and to counsel upon merely
hearing an abstract statement.
 People vs. Canela, 208, SCRA 842

o There is no showing that accused-appellant was properly informed of his
constitutional rights. While Sgt. Atienza claimed that he informed the accused-
appellant of his constitutional rights when he prepared the booking sheet and arrest
report, a perusal of said document failed to show that accused-appellant was
informed of said rights.
Page 28 of 60
o And this was eventually admitted by Sgt. Atienza on cross-examination. Not only
did he not inform accused-appellant of his rights, he also failed to explain said rights
to him. He simply made the accused read the same. Even when accused-appellant
was made to sign on the ten-peso bills allegedly confiscated from him in the buy-
bust operation; he was only made to read his constitutional rights.
o Making accused-appellant read his constitutional rights is simply not enough. The
prosecution must show that accused-appellant understood what he read, and that he
understood the consequences of his waiver.
o The failure of the arresting officers to follow established procedure in dealing with
persons they may have arrested engenders doubts as to the veracity of their claim
that they arrested accused-appellant after he had tried to sell them marijuana.
 People vs. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541

o The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates
"the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It is not enough for
the investigator to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution or Section 12, Article III of the
present Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such provision in
practical terms, e.g., what the person under investigation may or may not do, and
in a language the subject fairly understands. The right to be informed carries with
it a correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and
contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding
what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree
of explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education,
intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing
the investigation.
o In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed
of such right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should
be told that he can ask for counsel if he so desires or that one will be provided him
at his request. If he decides not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be
provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver,
to be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel
must be a lawyer.
o The waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
Consequently, even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
d. Rights cannot be waived except in writing and signed by the person in the presence of his
counsel
 Sec. 2(d), R.A. 7438
o Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial
Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. –
Page 29 of 60
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all
times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his
place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an
offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him,
of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer
privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If
such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided
with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the
investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or
thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and
write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the
assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect
known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report
shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in
the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in
writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the
waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be
allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or
any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any
member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-
governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human
Rights of by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited
by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include
his or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister,
grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or
ward.
 Sec. 12, Article III (1)

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice.
e. No torture, force, etc., which vitiates the free will shall be used.
Page 30 of 60
 People vs. Bagnate, G.R. Nos. 133685-86, May 20, 2004
o To be admissible in evidence, an extrajudicial confession must be express
and voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an independent
and competent counsel, and a person under custodial investigation must be
continuously assisted by counsel from the very start thereof.
o The presence of counsel is intended to secure the voluntariness of the
extrajudicial confession, and the assistance given must be independent and
competent, that is, providing full protection to the constitutional rights of
the accused.
o Running through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical or psychological is forcefully
apparent.
o To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions
being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to
stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but,
rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion
as would lead the accused to admit something false.
f. Secret detention places are prohibited

g. Confessions/ admissions obtained in violation of rights are inadmissible in evidence (Refer
to
 There two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this section namely:
o coerced confessions, the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence,
threat and intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2; and
o uncounselled statements given without the benefit of the Miranda warning, which are
subject of paragraph 1.
 The alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation
is relevant and material only where an extrajudicial confession or admission from the accused
becomes the basis of conviction.
 Exclusionary rule- includes the Fruit of the poisonous tree
C. Right to Bail
Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution
“SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”
Rule 114, Section 1, Rules of Court

“Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the
conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash
deposit, or recognizance.”
Page 31 of 60
Kinds of Bail ( Sections 10, 11, 14 & 15, Rule 114, Rules of Court)
Section 10. Corporate surety. — Any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a surety in accordance
with law and currently authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a bond subscribed jointly by the
accused and an officer of the corporation duly authorized by its board of directors. (10a)
Section 11. Property bond, how posted. — A property bond is an undertaking constituted as lien on the
real property given as security for the amount of the bail. Within ten (10) days after the approval of the
bond, the accused shall cause the annotation of the lien on the certificate of title on file with the Register
of Deeds if the land is registered, or if unregistered, in the Registration Book on the space provided
therefor, in the Registry of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies, and on the corresponding
tax declaration in the office of the provincial, city and municipal assessor concerned.
Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the court his compliance and his failure to do so shall
be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bond and his re-arrest and detention. (11a)
Section 12. Qualifications of sureties in property bond. — The qualification of sureties in a property
bond shall be as follows:
(a) Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines;
(b) Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the amount of the undertaking;
(c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount less than that expressed in the
undertaking but the aggregate of the justified sums must be equivalent to the whole amount of bail
demanded.
In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over and above all
just debts, obligations and properties exempt from execution. (12a)
Section 13. Justification of sureties. — Every surety shall justify by affidavit taken before the judge that
he possesses the qualifications prescribed in the preceding section. He shall describe the property given
as security, stating the nature of his title, its encumbrances, the number and amount of other bails entered
into by him and still undischarged, and his other liabilities. The court may examine the sureties upon oath
concerning their sufficiency in such manner as it may deem proper. No bail shall be approved unless the
surety is qualified. (13a)
Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. — The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in
cash with the nearest collector or internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount
of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon
submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the
requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited
shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be
returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit. (14a)
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Section 15. Recognizance. — Whenever allowed by law or these Rules, the court may release a person
in custody to his own recognizance or that of a responsible person. (15a)
About Bail:
o When right may be invoked; by whom
o The right to bail emanates from the right to be presumed iincocent. It is accorded to a person in
custody of the law who may by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed
provisional liberty upon filing a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required
under specific circumstances [People vs. Fiztergald, G.R. No. 149723, October27, 2006] Any
person under detention, even if no formal charges have yet been filed, can invoke the right to bail.
o Exceptions:
 Wen charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher and evidnce of
guilt is strong.
 Traditionally, the right to bail is not available to the military.
o Only persons under detention may petition for bail for the purpose of bail is to secure their provisional
release.
o Under a new section in Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, any person in custody who is not yet charged in
court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held.
o Pantilo vs. Canoy-where the SC annulled the bail verbally granted by the judge without any written
application therefore on the judges claim that it should atleast be considered as constructive bail, The
Court said that there is no such specie of bail under the rules.
o Section 13 has reversed the ruling in Garcia Padilla vs. Enrile, preserving the right to bail even if the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has been suspended.
o The right to bail emanates from the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in custody of
the law who may by the reason of the presumption of innocence, he enjoys the allowed provisional liberty
upon filing a security to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under specific
circumstances. So any person under detention even there is no formal charge may invoke the right to bail.
o Is the right to bail absolute? No.
o Exceptions:
 When charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and evidence of guilt is
strong;
 Not available to military
Rule 114: Bail is a matter of right or by the judge’s discretion; or it may be denied.
As a matter of right:
o People vs. Napoles , G.R. No. 247611, January 13, 2021
o The right to bail is cognate to the fundamental right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a
person in the custody of the law who may be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security
to guarantee his, or her appearance before any court. It is a reconciling mechanism to accommodate
both the accused's provisional liberty and the society's interest in assuring the accused's presence
at trial.
o The Constitution guarantees every accused's right to bail, except for those charged with a capital
offense when the evidence of guilt is strong:
“SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
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sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.”
o On the other hand, bail after conviction is not absolute.22 It is a matter of judicial discretion which
must be exercised with grave caution owing to the ascertainment of the accused's guilt:
“The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should
be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and
therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking,
be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of
innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is
upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be
properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the
conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail
than before conviction.”
 Office of the Court Administrator vs. Flor, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2503, July 28, 2020 , Per Curiam
 Judges should maintain competence and diligence which are prerequisites to the due performance
of judicial office. Their role in the administration of justice requires a continuous study of the law
and jurisprudence. A contrary rule will not only lessen the faith of the people in the courts but will
also defeat the fundamental role of the judiciary to render justice and promote the rule of law.
Thus, unfamiliarity with the laws and procedures is a sign of incompetence which betrays the
confidence of the public in the courts. Indeed, judges ought to simply apply basic, simple and well-
known rules and jurisprudence. Anything less is ignorance of the law. In that light, we find that
Judge Flor, Jr.'s disregard of the settled procedures in granting bail reflects gross ignorance of the
law.
 Foremost, it is basic that bail cannot be allowed without a prior hearing to a person charged with
an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. As such, bail is a matter of
discretion and its grant or denial hinges on the issue of whether the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. Yet, the determination of the requisite evidence can only be reached after due
hearing. Thus, a judge must first evaluate the prosecution's evidence. A hearing is likewise required
for the trial court to consider the factors in fixing the amount of bail. Notably, this Court outlined
the duties of a judge in resolving bail applications, to wit:
o In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation;
o Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless
of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
o Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
o If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail
bond otherwise petition should be denied.
 Padua and Pimentel vs. People, G.R. No. 220913, February 4, 2019
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 The general rule, therefore, is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Thus, from the
moment an accused is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law,
he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his
right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
 Indeed, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes
the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. However, in
narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even
though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. Nevertheless, if a person
invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.
 People vs. Tanes, G.R. No. 240596, April 3, 2019

o Before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty
lower than reclusion perpetua. Bail becomes a matter of discretion if the offense charged is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment that is, bail will be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong.
o Procedure when bail is discretionary:
 In this case, Tanes was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 which
carries the penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes' bail becomes a matter of judicial
discretion if the evidence of his guilt is not strong.
 To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the conduct of bail
hearings is required where the prosecution has the burden of proof, subject to the right of
the defense to cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence in rebuttal. The court is to
conduct only a summary hearing, consistent with the purpose of merely determining the
weight of evidence for purposes of bail.
 The court's grant or denial of the bail application must contain a summary of the
prosecution's evidence. On this basis, the judge formulates his or her own conclusion on
whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.
 Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945)

o The Court held that upon application by a political prisoner or detainee to the People's Court for
provisional release under bail, a hearing, summary or otherwise, should be held with due notice to
the Office of Special Prosecutors, as well as to the prisoner or detainee. It will be remembered that
section 22 of the People's Court Act subjects the prosecution, trial, and disposal of cases before
the People's Court to "existing laws and rules of court," unless otherwise expressly provided in
said act. Consequently, the hearing and disposal of application for bail for provisional release
before the People's Court should be governed by existing laws and rules of court, the hearing and
disposal of such applications being a mere part of the "prosecution, trial, and disposal" of the
corresponding cases before said court.
o If attention should be directed to the clause "unless otherwise expressly provided herein" in said
section 22, in connection with the first proviso of section 19 of the same act, it should be borne in
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mind that the provisions of said act should be construed in harmony with those of the Constitution,
under the well-settled rule of statutory construction that legislative enactments should be
construed, wherever possible, in a manner that would avoid their conflicting with the fundamental
law.
5. Procedure to Bail
 Paderanga vs. Drilon, 241 SCRA 741 (1995)
o It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of
Regional State Prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion for
bail and this should be so notwithstanding the statement that they were "neither
supporting nor opposing" the motion. What is of significance is the manifestation that
the prosecution was "submitting (the motion) to the sound discretion of the Honorable
Court." By that, it could not be any clearer. The prosecution was dispensing with the
introduction of evidence en contra and this it did at the proper forum and stage of the
proceedings, that is, during the mandatory hearing for bail and after the trial court had
fully satisfied itself that such was the position of the prosecution.
o In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, it was stressed that where the trial court
has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for
bail is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of
duty, the court, in the interest of justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as
to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. And, in the very
recent administrative matter Re: First Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon.
Fernando de Leon, Chief State Prosecutor, Department of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon,
City Prosecutor of Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison, 36 the Court, citing Tucay
vs. Dumagas, etc., held that where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion
of the accused, the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and
from there diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really not
contesting the bail application.
o No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed
to the trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the
transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992 and
the omnibus order of March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to
procedural rules. As summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted
all means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the
prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the
evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through them
did the court conclude that petitioner could be provisionally released on bail.
Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up to the present, petitioner
has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
 Go vs. Bongolan, A.M. 99-1464, July 26, 1999

o "Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal
offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present
exceptions thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the
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evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for
admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course,
grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the
bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as
the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under
the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary
or otherwise in the discretion of the court, is required with the participation of both the
defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant.
Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets
the required quantum.
o "Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
want to introduce before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally
entitled as the accused to due process. If the prosecution is denied this opportunity,
there would be a denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the court's
order in respect of (sic) the motion or petition is void. At the hearing, the petitioner can
rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his
own evidence in rebuttal. When, eventually, the court issues an order either granting or
refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution,
followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The
court, though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely
objected to, for these represent only heresay evidence, and thus are insufficient to
establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires."
o A bail hearing is mandatory to give the prosecution reasonable opportunity to oppose
the application by showing that evidence of guilt is strong. We note that the prosecution
was caught off guard in the regular hearing of May 20, 1998, when Atty. Astudillo
sprang on it a Motion to Amend the Information and Fix Bail. It is true that when asked
by Judge Bongolan whether the prosecution would present additional evidence,
Prosecutor Gayao responded in the negative. Subsequently, however, the prosecution
changed its mind when it stated in its Opposition that a resolution of the Motion for
admission to bail would be premature since it has additional witnesses to present. In
his Comment, Judge Bongolan contends that it is not necessary for the prosecution to
present all its witnesses before he could resolve the motion for bail. The stance cannot
be sustained.
 People vs. Gako, G.R. No. 135045, January 16, 1997

o Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that:
“No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to
bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."
o Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with respect to persons charged
with a crime the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death,
when the evidence of guilt is strong. Private respondent Go, accused in the criminal
case, was charged with murder in 1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the law that
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re-imposed the death penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua. Thus, accused Go's right to bail is merely discretionary.
o We have consistently held that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary
or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the
existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to
make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.[16] A
summary hearing is defined as "such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail.
On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry
as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor
will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein
offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross examination".
6. Bail on Appeal- is bail on appeal available?

 People vs. Fortes, 223 SCRA 619 (1992)
o The clear implication, therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to
suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor
of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have
only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong -- which would have been
sufficient to deny bail even before conviction -- it would have likewise ruled that
the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be
granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
 Maguddatu vs. CA, G.R. No. 139599, February 23, 2000

o The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only be used during the 15-
day period to appeal (Rule 122) and not during the entire period of appeal. This is
consistent with Section 2(a) of Rule 114 which provides that the bail "shall be
effective upon approval and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner
cancelled, until the promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it." This
amendment, introduced by SC Administrative Circular 12-94 is a departure from
the old rules which then provided that bail shall be effective and remain in force at
all stages of the case until its full determination, and thus even during the period of
appeal. Moreover, under the present rule, for the accused to continue his provisional
liberty on the same bail bond during the period to appeal, consent of the bondsman
is necessary. From the record, it appears that the bondsman, AFISCO Insurance
Corporation, filed a motion in the trial court on January 06, 1987 for the
cancellation of petitioners' bail bond for the latter's failure to renew the same upon
its expiration. Obtaining the consent of the bondsman was, thus, foreclosed.
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o Pursuant to the same Section 5 of Rule 114, the accused may be admitted to bail
upon the court's discretion after conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. However, such bail shall be
denied or bail previously granted shall be cancelled if the penalty imposed is
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years if any one of the
circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5 is present. From the
records of the case, petitioners are not entitled to bail.
7. Standards for fixing bail

 Rule 114 Section 9, Rules of Court:
o Section 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. — The judge who issued the warrant or
granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily,
but not limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required. (9a)
 Villasenor vs. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 (1967)

o In the matter of bail fixing, courts perforce are to be guided at all times by the
purpose for which bail is required. The definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114,
Rules of Court, gives this purpose - "the security required and given for the release
of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in
which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance." And, in amplification thereof, Section 2 of the same rule states that
the condition of the bail is that "defendant shall answer the complaint or
information in the court in which it is filed or to which it may be transferred for
trial, and after conviction, if the case is appealed to the Court of First Instance upon
application supported by an undertaking or bail, that he will surrender himself in
execution of such judgment as the appellate court may render, or that, in case the
cause is to be tried anew or remanded for a new trial, he will appear in the court to
which it may be remanded and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof."
o Expressions in varying language spell out in a general way the principles governing
bail fixing. One is that the amount should be high enough to assure the presence of
defendant when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. Another is that "the good of the public as well as the rights of the accused,"
and "the need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right to freedom from unnecessary
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restraint before conviction under the circumstances surrounding each particular
accused, "should all be balanced in one equation.
o We are not to consider solely the inability of a defendant to secure bail in a certain
amount. This circumstance by itself does not make the amount excessive. 12 For,
where an accused has no means of his own, no one to bail him out, or none to turn
to for premium payments, any amount fixed no matter how small would fall into
the category of excessive bail; and, he "would be entitled to be discharged on his
own recognizance."
8. Right to bail and right to travel abroad

 Manotoc vs. CA, G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986
o A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required
and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will
appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in
the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as
a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave
the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the
courts.
o The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute
right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (Sec 6. Art. III, 1987
Constitution) states:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful
of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health.
o The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order
as contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.
9. Right to bail and extradition

 Government of the US vs. Judge Puruganan and Mark Jimenez, G.R. No. 148571,
December 17,2002 Old rule
o An extraditee is not entitled to bail. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution as
well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, apply only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.
o The constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor
of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter
he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case
like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
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
Government of Hongkong vs. Hon. Felixberto Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
o While the court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving
recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty,
a re-examination of the Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
NEW RULE :
o The State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited
to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.
o If bail can be granted in deportation cases, there is no justification why it should
not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why
it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
o The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be
viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it
that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
o The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines
honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. However, it does not necessarily mean that
in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. An extraditee cannot be deprived
of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
 Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

o In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons (1951) and Chirskoff v. Commission of
Immigration(1951), th[e] Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no
formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality
of an order of deportation. [T]he Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee's right to bail.
10. Waiver of the right to bail

 People vs. Judge Donato, 198 SCRA 130
o Validity of the Waiver of Right to Bail - Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that
rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
o Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except
for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or
surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that
such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or
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such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.
o A person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right
or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is
legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed
by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further
provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy.
o It is competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to
consent to action which would be invalid if taken against his will.
o The SC declared that the right to bail was another one of the constitutional rights
which could be waived. It was a right which was personal to the accused and whose
waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
 People vs. Manes, G.R. No. 122737, February 17, 1999

o The Failure of the Appellants to Object to the Absence of Hearing in the Petition
for Bail Amounted to a Waiver of their Right to Bail. Appellants contend that the
trial court committed a serious error of law when it went on with the trial of the
case without hearing the petition for bail that was set for hearing several times.
o In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the
accused has no right to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a
petition for bail to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong before deciding
to grant or deny bail to the accused.
o While the accused can apply for bail and have the court hear his application
summarily and promptly, such right may be waived expressly or impliedly. (Munoz
vs. Rilloraza)
o The Court found that the trial court proceeded to try the case without resolving the
petition for bail that appellants filed. However, the latter did not call the attention
of the trial court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only in the appeal
that they raise this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the attention of the trial court
at the earliest opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived their right to
bail.
o When Bail must be Denied, as it is Neither a Matter of Right nor Discretion-The
issue has been rendered academic by the conviction of the accused. When an
accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment or death, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail must
be denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.
11. Bail and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
 The right to bail is not impaired by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
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D. Rights of the Accused During Trial
Article III, Section 14
“(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.”
o Criminal due process as held in Mejia vs. Pamaran, has the following ingredients:
 the accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction
 the accused has proceeded against under the orderly processes of law
 the accused has been given notice and the opportunity to be heard
 the judgment rendered was within the authority of Constitutional Law
o Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan which reiterated Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, Sc declared that cross
examination of the accused and the witnesses by the trial court indicated bias because of the manner of
questioning, and thus, violated due process.
o Where the questions propounded by the court are merely clarificatory questions to clear up dubious points
or elicit relevant evidence, such questioning does not constitute bias. (People vs. Castillo)
o People vs. Cerida, trial court intensively questioned the witnesses and the accused. Approximately 43%
of the questions were asked by the judge not the prosecutor, was held as a necessary questioning. Judges
after all, have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence and have
the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts and the issues involved and clarify ambiguous remarks
by the witnesses and address the points overlooked by counsel.
o The right to a hearing, In Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, the SC held that the reopening of a
case without giving the accused the opportunity to introduce controverting evidence is an error and a
denial of due process.
o People vs. Hubert Webb, the SC held that there was no denial of due process where the trial court refused
to grant the petition of Webb to take the deposition of witnesses residing abroad, because they were merely
corroborative. The main evidence or testimony on those facts have already been taken in court.
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, RA 7080, Plunder Law, as amended by RA No. 7659, was challenged on the
grounds that it was vague, it dispenses with reasonable doubt standard in criminal prosecution and abolishes
the mens rea in crimes. The SC however ruled that any legislative statute are presumed constitutional and
petitioner failed to overturn the presumption of constitutionality.
o Plea of Guilt in a capital offense (People vs. Sta. Teresa)
o Stringent Constitutional standards impelled by law
 The trial court must do a searching inquiry on the voluntariness of the plea and a
comprehension on the consequences thereof
 The prosecution shall be required to produce evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability
 The accused must be asked if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to
do so if he so desires
o Strict compliance with these requirements must be observed by the judge. Failure to do so constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
o Bias and partiality on the part of the judge and prosecutor-resulted to vacating of acquittal of the accused
“(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature of the cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
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compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: provided, that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear unjustifiable.”
o Presumption of Innocence
o innocent until contrary is proven
o establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt is the burden of the prosecution
o conviction depends on the strength of the prosecution.
o People vs. Longboy- acquittal of the accused is inevitable if inculpatory facts are capable of two
or more explanations; one consistent with innocence and one with guilt; scales will tip in favor of
innocence.
o Presumption or regular performance of duty, cannot by itself prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
o People vs. Angus-Prosecution must stand on its strength
o Presumption of guilt:
 Unexplained flight
 possession of the subject of the crime
o No inference of guilt may be drawn from the accused when he fails to make a statement. But invoking
this runs a risk of prejudice on the accused.
o (People vs. Bato) Circumstantial evidence may warrant conviction through the following requisites:
 There is more than one circumstance;
 The facts from which the inferences were derived are proven;
 The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt
o Equipoise Rule- evidence adduced by the parties are evenly balanced. The Constitutional presumption of
innocence must tilt in the favor of the accused.
o The right to the presumption of innocence could only be invoked by individuals charged with a criminal
offense.
The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel
o The right to present evidence in his defense and to be present in defend oneself in any stage of the
proceedings
o The right to assistance of efficient counsel
o The right to counsel in trial is not subject to waiver.
o Duty of the judge to provide counsel de oficio for the accused.
o Distinction between Custodial Investigation and Trial.
o The right to choose counsel cannot be used to delay the proceedings.
o A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer (Andrada vs. People) except when the negligence or
incompetence is so gross as to have prejudiced the constitutional right of the accused to be heard.
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
o For adequate preparation of defense of the accused
o Patula vs. People- crime should be alleged or necessarily included in the charge against him
o Constitutional guarantee has a three-fold purpose:
 Furnish the accused with such description of the charge against him as will enable him to
prepare his defense
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 For the accused to be able to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against prosecution from the same offense
 To inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficiently
law to support a conviction
o The description and not the designation of the offense is controlling
o Requisites in order for this right not to be violated:
 Information must state the name of the accused
 the designation of the offense by statute
 a statement of the act or omission so complained of as constituting the offense
 The name of the offended party
 The approximate time and date of the commission of the offense ; and
 the place where the offense had been committed
o If there is conspiracy and it is not alleged in the information, the court’s finding of conspiracy will violate
the constitutional provision
o Not necessary to include precise time unless the time is material in the offense charged.
o Accused can only be convicted with the crime alleged and charged in the information.
o The void for vagueness rule-when statute itself is couched in such indefinite language that it is impossible
to understand what crimes are alleged, in such cases the law is deemed void.
o The right to be informed cannot be waived pursuant to public policy.
Political Offense Doctrine
o Common crimes perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense are divested of their character as common
offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients and
consequently cannot be punished separately from the principal offense or complexed with the same to
justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People vs. Hernandez)
Additional:
o Exception: Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court:
o “Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof – When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.”
o Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused in court and notifying him of the charged offense.
A speedy, impartial and public trial
o a trial free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays with objectives of justice and fairness.
1. prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration;
2. to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused ;
3. to limit the possibility that the defense would be impaired.
o R.A. No. 8493- Speedy Trial Act of 1998

“Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial.
- The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or
from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending,
whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least
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fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed
by the court.”
“Section 9. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Act, for the first twelve-
calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial
imposed by Section 7 of this Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period the
time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the time limit with
respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80) days.”
o Impartial trial- cold neutrality of an impartial judge
o Pervasive publicity does not per se prejudicial to the right of the accused to a fair trial.
o Public trial is not absolute – instances of crimes in rape or acts of lasciviousness where underage victims
are involved.
o In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre
cases, the Court lays down the following guidelines toward addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino
and Estrada:
a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary
purposes and for transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting.
b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they intend to
broadcast the audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that they have the necessary
technological equipment and technical plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking that they
will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire remaining
proceedings until promulgation of judgment. No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No
media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an application duly approved
by the trial court.
c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide
a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No panning and zooming shall be
allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera
and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or
employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not produce or beam any
distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is operating should
not be visible. A limited number of microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless
technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court. The Public
Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial
court on the physical set-up of the camera and equipment.
d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities shall
be conducted in such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the
dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera equipment monitoring
the proceedings shall be for the account of the media entities, which should employ technology
that can (i) avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the
unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of
technical glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media entities’ facilities, the
media entities shall access the audio-visual recording either via wireless technology accessible
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even from outside the court premises or from one common web broadcasting platform from which
streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds. At all times, exclusive access
by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should be protected or encrypted.
e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in its entirety,
excepting such portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court applies, and where
the trial court excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in instances
where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification issues or there are issues which involve the
security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative
testimonies is material, minority of the witness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of the image of the
witness or mute the audio output, or both.
f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial break or any other
gap shall be allowed until the day’s proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of recess
called by the trial court and during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is ordered
excluded.
g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going proceedings, the
proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes
depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any
commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment,
except brief footages and still images derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes based on the
recording, only for news purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject
to the contempt power of the court;
i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of
the trial court which may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency requires, including the
suspension or revocation of the grant of application by the media entities.
k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design and recommend
appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations, and administrative matters referred to it by
the Court concerning the live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the
above-outlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall also report and recommend on the
feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology that would meet the herein
requirements. It may conduct consultations with resource persons and experts in the field of
information and communication technology.
l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on
recording devices such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number of media
practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed in addition to these guidelines.
o speedy disposition of cases (Article III, Section 16) vs. speedy trial (criminal law concept)
o Dismissal tantamount to acquittal if this rule is violated.
o In ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following
factors must be considered (Tilendo vs. Ombudsman):
o (1) the length of delay;
o (2) the reasons for the delay;
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o (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
o (4) the prejudice caused by the delay
Trial in absentia
o Thus, before a trial in absentia may be had, the following requisites must be present:
1. that there has been an arraignment;
2. that the accused has been notified; and
3. that his failure to appear is unjustified.
o Accused is required to be in court:
1. during arraignment and plea;
2. during the trial for identification
3. during promulgation of decision except in light offenses wherein counsel may appear in his behalf
The right to meet the witnesses face to face

The right to compulsory processes:
o Subpoena Ad testificantum- subpoena used to compel a person to testify.
o Subpoena duces tecum- used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein
specified.
Requisites for issuance:
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the
following requisites are present:
(1) Test of relevancy: the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the
issue subject of the controversy ; and
(2) Test of definiteness: such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified.
Article III, Section 16
“All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.”
F. Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

 Art. III, Sec. 16
o All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
 Lee v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 234664-67, January 12, 2021
o Records show that he was fully aware of the documents and other evidence
presented against him, and he was likewise accorded all the opportunity to confront
the evidence and subject the prosecution's witnesses to cross-examination.
o Thus, petitioner Lee was apprised of the nature and causes of the accusation against
him.
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 Leonardo v. People, G.R. No. 246451, February 3, 2021
o In Dela Pena v. Sandiganbayan, where the accused raised the issue of delay only
after the case was set for arraignment, the Court pronounced that the accused was
guilty of acquiescence by silence equivalent to laches, if not effective waiver of
their right to speedy disposition of the cases against them, viz.:
o It is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the case was set
for an-arraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of the delay in the conduct of
the preliminary investigation. As stated by them in their Motion to Quash/Dismiss,
other than the counter-affidavits, they did nothing. Also, in their petition, they
averred: "Aside from the motion for extension of time to file counter-affidavits,
petitioners in the present case did not file nor send any letter-queries addressed to
the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao which conducted the preliminary
investigation." They slept on their right - a situation amounting to laches. The
matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those four years, they
showed signs of asserting their right to a speedy disposition of their cases or at least
made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that they
were not waiving that right. Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver
of such right. As aptly stated in Alvizo, the petitioner therein was "insensitive to
the implications and contingencies" of the projected criminal prosecution posed
against him "by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the
matter, which inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems
to have been without his objection, and hence impliedly with his acquiescence."
 Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. Nos. 236177-210, February 3,

2021
o We find merit in the petition. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioner's motions despite her timely and consistent assertion of the right
to speedy disposition of cases.
o The right to speedy disposition of cases is enshrined under Section 16, Article III
of the Constitution, viz:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
o Notably, Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution further requires the Ombudsman
to act promptly on all complaints filed before it:
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government- owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the
action taken and the result thereof.
o This same mandate can be found in Section 13 of RA 6670, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989:
Section 13. Mandate. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of
the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against officers or employees of the government, or of any subdivision,
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agency or instrumentality thereof, including government- owned or
controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal
liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote
efficient service by the Government to the people.
o In resolving issues involving the right to speedy disposition of cases, the Court laid
down the following guidelines in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division17
(Cagang):
 First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to
speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to
speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of
law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked
before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is
that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right
to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.
 Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint

prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges,
however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for
preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances
of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the
prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the
filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of
whether there has been inordinate delay.
 Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof.
If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current
Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be
promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden
of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond
the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the
burden of justifying the delay. If the defense has the burden of proof, it must
prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only
politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second,
that the defense did not contribute to the delay.
 Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must
prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of
preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the
complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay
inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a
result of the delay.
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 Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts
must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence
to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.
 An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of

the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically
motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of
evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the
prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is
properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be
dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.
 Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy
disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the
accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be
invoked. In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the
delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.
 Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must
be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate
motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise,
they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.
 In re Petition for Coverage of the Ampatuan Cases, AM No. 10-5-5-SC/AM No. 10-11-1-
SC/AM No. 10-11-7-SC, 14 June 2011
o an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an adverse
judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed
out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for
continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge,
and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise
exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.
o One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the
earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases – the
private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses – inside the courtroom.
On public trial, Estrada basically discusses:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more
than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public
trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned
and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public
trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors
must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense,
a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to
observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not
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too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall
then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.
o Even before considering what is a "reasonable number of the public" who may observe
the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings
already necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families. It cannot be gainsaid that
the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere
curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial
participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense have
listed more than 200 witnesses each.
o The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will
accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is
unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of
the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the
courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent
limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public
trial.
H. Privilege against Self-Incrimination

o When is the right against self-incrimination available?
o What is the scope of the right against self-incrimination?
o Art. III, Section 17 - No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
*Compulsory testimonial incrimination
 United States v. Tan The, 23 Phil. 145 (1912)

o The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be
compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant’s own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
o Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in discussing the question before us,
said:
"If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical
control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever
form exercised, then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in
his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the
law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly
overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential
articles — a clear reductio ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely
compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion."
o The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral
examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling
confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. (People v.
Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.)
 People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, December 9, 1999
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o Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution is not applicable in the use of one’s
body in evidence
o The proscription on the use of the testimony or admission made without the assistance of
the counsel and the right against self- incrimination is applicable only when physical or
moral compulsion is used to extort communication and not in the inclusion of the
accused's body evidence when it may be material. For instance, the substance emitted
from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of
lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as
evidence against him.
o In this case, the police properly admitted the hair samples found in the scene of the crime
for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
 People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000

o The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination [Section 12, Article III,
Constitution.] proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it
may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of
counsel is not required. [People v. Olvis, et al., G.R. No. 71092, 154 SCRA 513 (1987).
o The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. [People v. Casinillo, 213
SCRA 777 (1992); People v. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 (1994); People v. Rondero, G.R. No.
125687, 9 December 1999.] Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery
may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy;
[Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)] and an accused may be compelled to submit to
physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical
determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by
his victim; [U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 (1912)] to expel morphine from his mouth;
[U.S. v. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 (1917)] to have the outline of his foot traced to
determine its identity with bloody footprints; [U.S. v. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 (1913); U.S. v.
Zara, 42 Phil. 308 (1921)] and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes
removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
[People v. Otadora, et al., 86 Phil. 244 (1950)]
H. Double Jeopardy: Rule 117 Section 7

 A first jeopardy attaches only:
a) after a valid complaint or information (all elements of the offense charged is given);
b) before a competent court of jurisdiction (3 jurisdiction, cannot be waived by the accused); decision
is null and void if court has no jurisdiction
c) after arraignment (reading information in court to the accused in the language or dialect known to
the accused, must be assisted by counsel);
d) When a valid plea has been entered (different kinds of plea. Must be simple and unconditional.);
People vs. Balisapan; and
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e) When the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
f) Finality of acquittal doctrine-review of acquittal will constitute double jeopardy.
 People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 228281, June 14, 2021
o Petitioner's failure to adequately establish grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan not only
takes this case out of the purview of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari; it also makes the
reversal of the Assailed Decision — one of acquittal — repugnant to Abalos' constitutional right
against double jeopardy.
o Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
o However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense
which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any
of the following instances:
 (a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or
omission constituting the former charge;
 (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a
plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or
 (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor
and of the offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.
o In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment,
he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.
o From the above, the requirements for double jeopardy to exist are as follows: (1) a valid
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the
accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
o The case at hand meets all the foregoing requirements. Abalos was charged with violation of
Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan under an information dated July 15, 2010.
He was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty on August 10, 2010.On May 11, 2016, the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the Assailed Decision acquitting Abalos of the crime
charged for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This was
affirmed by the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division in its Assailed Resolution dated
September 29, 2016, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
o The existence of double jeopardy in this case calls for the application of the "finality-of-acquittal"
rule, which, as the name implies, makes a judgment of acquittal unappeasable and immediately
Page 54 of 60
executory upon its promulgation. The rationale for this rule was explained by the Court in People
v. Velasco:
x x x The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court
cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of
the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x[.]" Thus Green expressed
the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent, he may be found guilty.”
o It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled
to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy
underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount
importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not
guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's
liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure
that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty
in a subsequent proceeding.
I. CRUEL, INHUMAN, DEGRADING PUNISHMENT

TOPIC IX : Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
Article III, Section 3(1)
What is the effect of breach of privacy of communication and correspondence?
 Sanchez v. Darroca, G.R. No. 242257 (Resolution), June 15, 2021)
 Any person who records without consent violates R.A. No. 4200
TOPIC X: Freedom of Expression, Peaceably to Assemble and to Petition Government for Redress of
Grievances
 Article III, Section 4
 It should bring to mind Voltaire. “I may not agree with what you say but I will defend till death your right
to say it.”
 Clear and Present danger Rule- product of wartime
 Balancing of Interest Test
 Abrams vs. US
o Distribution of Leaflets Condemning the Russian Civil War
o Limitations of Free Speech is more strict during Wartime
o Dissenting Opinion: Justice Holmes (Clear and Present Danger Rule) – Silly Leaflets
Page 55 of 60
o Imminent Lawless Action Test- speech is inciting imminent lawless action or likelt to incite
imminent lawless action
o Context here is based when there is a war
Right to Assembly
 Article III, Section 8 – The right of the people , including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
 Slord Development Coporation vs. Noya
o Despite the substantive reason being present violation of a closed shop provision is a ground of
dismissal still there are requirements for a valid dismissal with the two notice rule: Notice and
right to answer.
 NAACP vs. Alabama

o You cannot be compelled to your right to associate with the State interfering requirements or
compelling to disclose the members of such organization.
 Shelton vs. Tucker

o Statute is unconstitutional since it prohibits the right to association.
 Roberts vs. United States Jaycees

o USJ-pursue education and charitable purposes. Limited membership to males.
o Anti-discrimination law was promptly applied in this case
o Had there been a special reason for USJ to maintain their exclusive membership to male, then the
petition would have been granted.
 Boy Scouts of America vs. Dale

o Discrimination based on sexuality
 Read on Public Assembly Act (BP 880)

o "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form
of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or
expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing
any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress
of grievances.
o The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious
purposes shall be governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the declaration of policy
as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.
o The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike
areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its
implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
o Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for
any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit
shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established
by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated
educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational
Page 56 of 60
institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for
by law are not covered by this Act.
o Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for
an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor
or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route
thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction
so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.
o Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not
interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a
law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed
and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to
maintain peace and order at all times.
 PBM Employees vs. PBM

o Facts: Petitioners (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization), a legitimate labor union
of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., informed their employer of their schedule for a mass
demonstration in protest for the alleged abuses of the Pasig police. The union was informed that
any demonstration should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company, furthermore
the company invoked that the demonstration is a violation of their CBA agreement however
petitioners contend it is an exercise of their freedom to peaceable assembly to seek redress of their
grievances against the abusive Pasig police and not a strike against their employer. Respondent
dismissed the petitioners and the court sustained their demonstration is one of bargaining in bad
faith.
o Issue: Whether or not there was a restraint in the exercise of the right to peaceable assembly of the
petitioners.
o Held: The court held that the primacy of human rights such as freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. The
obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm was for
their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference
with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities. As such, the demonstration could not also be
considered as a violation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement, the respondent’s argument
stretches unduly the CBA as a potent means of inhibiting speech and therefore inflicts a moral as
well as a mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly
and expression.
o Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right
to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the
workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly
employees.
TOPIC XI: RIGHT TO INFORMATION AND ACCESS TO OFFICIAL RECORDS
Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution – The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
Page 57 of 60
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
 Biraogo vs. Martires

o Right to information is not an absolute right. It must be justified why the information is needed
since the custodian of records has the authority to regulate the release of such information.
 Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. vs. Maria Leonor Robredo
o Deliberative process requires utmost confidentiality.
o Deliberations and Notes on Court Decisions is privileged communication.
 Aquinio-Sarmiento vs. Morato

o Voting Slips of Board after watching movies
o refusal to access voting slips was held as violation to constitutional right.
 Chavez vs. PCGG

o Demand to make public the status, negotiations, and records of the PCGG on retrieving the
Marcos’ ill-gotten wealth.
o Your right to information on matters to public concern ; exception : National Security Matters and
Intelligence Information; Trade Secrets and Banking Transaction; Criminal matters; and other
confidential information
o Concept of Privileged communications is subsumed.
 Neri vs. Senate

o NBN ZTE Deal
o Executive Privilege
 Akbayan vs. Aquino

o JPEPA- Trade with Japan
o Obtaining the Full text of the agreement
TOPIC XII: Right to Form Unions/ Associations

 Article III, Section 8 - The right of the people , including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
 SSS Employee vs. CA

o While public employees have the right to form unions, they do not have the right to strike.
 UPCSU vs. Laguesma
o Employees in managerial positions are expected to negotiate and bargain without stopping work
or slowing down work.
 Bar question: Do public employees enjoy right to form associations and unions?
o Yes they do, but they do not have the right to strike.
TOPIC XIII: Freedom of Religion

 Article III, Section 5- no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall be forever allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise
of civil or political rights.
 Bishop Amari v. Villaflor, G.R. No. 224521, February 17, 2020
Page 58 of 60
o Four-fold Test on employer employee relationship
o Dismissal letter was as a missionary, ecclesiastical rule affairs
 Aglipay vs. Ruiz

o determine if public funds are used
 Garces vs, Estenzo

o The resolutions does not abridge freedom of religion. Private funds were used in the acquisition
of the image and does not come from the tax of the people.
o Replevine case-civil case to file to recover property.
 Board of Education vs. Allen

o New York Education Law did not abridge constitutional rights.
o Financial benefits was to students and parents and not the schools.
o A general welfare act : donation of books
 Lemon vs. Kurtzman

o Statutes are unconstitutional
o Excessive entanglement between government and religion.
o Pennsylvania Statute: directly contributing public funds to secular group
 Tilton vs. Richardson

o Higher Education Facilities Act which excludes construction religious structures
o Act is constitutional except for the limit of 20 years, since it underscores that it will be donated to
a specific sect.
o Objective of the act is to provide structure for education.
 Country of Allegheny vs. American Civil Liberties Union

o Two recurring holiday displays.
 Islamic Da’wag vs. Executive Secretary

o IDCP on Halal Food
 Letter of Tony Valenciano

o letters addressed to Chief Justice Puno regarding masses being held in the court house
 Sherbert vs. Verner

o FACTS : Adeil Sherbert is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church and as a member of
such church they observe the Sabbath of their faith on Saturdays. Because of this she was fired
o She filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina
Unemployment Compensation Act, which provides that a claimant is ineligible for benefits if he
from her job after she refused to work on Saturday. She was then unable to obtain other
employment because she is not able to work on Saturdays, has failed without good case to accept
suitable work when offered to him. The application was denied on the ground that she would not
accept suitable work when offered which was sustained by the State Supreme Court.
o ISSUE/S- Whether or not there was a violation of the right to the free exercise of religion of
Sherbert.
o HELD :The South Carolina statute abridged Sherbert’s right to the free exercise of her religion.
Page 59 of 60
o Her disqualification from unemployment compensation benefits, solely because of her refusal to
accept employment in which she would have to work on Saturdays imposes an unconstitutional
burden on the free exercise of her religion.
o The Supreme Court held that government can restrict the free exercise of rights of individuals
ONLY if the regulations survive strict scrutiny, placing a steep burden on state laws in such cases
o There is no compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the said statute which
justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s right to religious freedom under the first
Amendment.
Resources/ References:
 My Legal Whiz
 Supreme Court Website
 Syllabus- Constitutional Law 2 by Atty. Georgina Alvarez
Page 60 of 60

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – OUTLINE FOR THE FINALS

 Pangcatan vs. Maghuyop , G.R. No. 247718, March 3,2021

 People vs. Moreno, G.R. No. 191759, March 2, 2020

1. Rights During Custodial Investigations

 Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)

 People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)

 People vs. Guillen, G.R. No. 191756, November 25, 2013

2. Custodial Investigation – When is there custodial investigation?

 Other matters on Custodial Investigation

o People vs. Mahinay- guidelines for arresting and investigating officers:

 People vs. Uy, G.R. No. 157399, November 17,2005

4. Police Line-up – Is the right to counsel available here?

 People vs. Escordial , G.R. No. 138934, January 16, 2002

 Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63, SCRA 3 (1975)

5. Investigations not considered custodial investigations

 People vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001

6. Confession to Newsmen- would confession to media practitioners be admissible in evidence?

 People vs. Endino, G.R. No. 133026, February 20,2001

 People vs. Ordono, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000

 People vs. Gomez, 270 SCRA 432 (1997)

 Illinois vs. Perkins, 496 US 292, (1990)

8. Re-enactment – Is the presence of a counsel required in the re-enactment of a crime?

9. What rights are available:

 People vs. Quidato, G.R. No. 117401, October 1, 1998

 People vs. Januario, 267 SCRA 608

 People vs. Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133138, July 23,2004

 People vs. Barasina, 228 SCRA 450 (1194)

 Counsel’s presence required in entire proceedings

c. To be informed of such rights

 People vs. Canela, 208, SCRA 842

 People vs. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541

 Sec. 12, Article III (1)

f. Secret detention places are prohibited

Rule 114, Section 1, Rules of Court

 People vs. Tanes, G.R. No. 240596, April 3, 2019

 Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945)

 Go vs. Bongolan, A.M. 99-1464, July 26, 1999

 People vs. Gako, G.R. No. 135045, January 16, 1997

6. Bail on Appeal- is bail on appeal available?

 Maguddatu vs. CA, G.R. No. 139599, February 23, 2000

7. Standards for fixing bail

 Villasenor vs. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 (1967)

8. Right to bail and right to travel abroad

9. Right to bail and extradition

 Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

10. Waiver of the right to bail

 People vs. Manes, G.R. No. 122737, February 17, 1999

o R.A. No. 8493- Speedy Trial Act of 1998

The right to meet the witnesses face to face

F. Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

 Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. Nos. 236177-210, February 3,

 Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint

 An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of

H. Privilege against Self-Incrimination

 United States v. Tan The, 23 Phil. 145 (1912)

 People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, December 9, 1999

 People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000

H. Double Jeopardy: Rule 117 Section 7