PEOPLE v. VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA, GR No.

200334, 2014-07-30
Facts:
Squarely raised in this appeal[1] is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a
warrantless arrest.
The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that were not based on
their personal knowledge.  The... information as to the accused's whereabouts was sent
through a text message.  The accused who never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. 
The bag that allegedly contained the contraband was required to be opened under
intimidating circumstances and without the... accused having been fully apprised of his
rights.
This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the Constitution.  There was no
reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop and frisk" action.  The alleged
waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and without
improper... pressure or coercion
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with
Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.  There being no possible admissible evidence,
the accused should be acquitted.
, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San
Gabriel, La Union, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer"[2] that...
one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would] be transporting marijuana"[3] from
Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect."[5]  PSI Bayan ordered
SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a
checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound... for San Fernando
City.
A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac's checkpoint.[7]  The
jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male
passengers who were carrying marijuana
SPO1
Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor Romana
Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao.
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.[11]  Cogaed and
Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as
a favor for their barriomate named Marvin.
After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like
marijuana.[13]  Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoy met gayam ti
nagyanna," which translates to "Marvin is a... fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag."
SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police
station."[15]  Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags"[16] inside the
station.
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3
Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.
Inside Cogaed's sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,"[19]
and inside Dayao's yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.[
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.[21] PSI Bayan
personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.[22]  Forensic
Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II... performed the tests and found
that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana.
The marijuana collected from Cogaed's blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5 grams.
The marijuana from Cogaed's sack weighed 4,246.1... grams
The marijuana collected from Dayao's bag weighed 5,092 grams
A total of 17,429.6 grams were collected from Cogaed's and Dayao's bags.[
According to Cogaed's testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a
jeepney to take him"[28] to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide.[29]  He
boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his... younger brother's friend.[30]  Upon arrival at
the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.
Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaed's] help in carrying his things, which included a travelling
bag... and a sack."[32]  Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the market.
This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed
what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not... know.[34]  SPO1 Taracatac then
talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation.[35]  Thereafter,
SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station.
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La Union.[42]
Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty.
The case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and
was... exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or
Republic Act No. 9344
The trial court judge initially found Cogaed's arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that
time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that he was
about to do so or that had just done so.  He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and...
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest."[47]  Since the arrest was illegal,
the warrantless search should also be considered illegal.[48]  However, the trial court stated
that notwithstanding the... illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to such
irregularity" [49] when "he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself,
asked him to open his bag."
Cogaed appealed[51] the trial court's decision.
However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and affirmed the trial court's decision.[52] 
The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless... searches
when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his bag."[53] 
Hence, this appeal was filed.
Issues:
(1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2)
whether the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and (3) whether
there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of... the accused.
Ruling:
We find for the accused.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution.  It
has many dimensions.  One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause... to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and
seizures are "reasonable."  As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets
all the requirements of this provision are reasonable.  This warrant requires the... existence
of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.
The existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after asking searching
questions and answers.[57]  Probable cause at this stage can... only exist if there is an
offense alleged to be committed.  Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the law
enforcers.  There must be a particular description of the place and the things to be searched.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless.[59]  In
the Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate
warrant.[60]  This court has taken into... account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,
the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured."
The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest . . . ;
Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed... a criminal activity;
Consented warrantless search;
Customs search;
Stop and frisk; and
Exigent and emergency circumstances
One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is "stop and frisk".  "Stop and
frisk" searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules
of Court.[63]  Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require... that a crime be committed in
flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the
person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the
evidence
On the other hand, "stop and frisk" searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a
crime.  For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals[65] was similar "to a 'stop and
frisk' situation whose object is either to determine the... identity of a suspicious individual or
to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information."[66]  This court stated that the "stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen
dealing with a rapidly... unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant.
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply
with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches[68]) are necessary for law
enforcement.  That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses.  However, this should be balanced... with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police
officer finds himself or herself in.  This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the
police officer.  Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with... criminals
and criminal behavior.  Hence, they should have the ability to discern based on facts that
they themselves observe whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner.  Clearly, a
basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal... knowledge, must
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals
In People v. Solayao
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. 
Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience,
is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs.  A drunk... civilian in guerrilla
wear is probably hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different.  He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling
aboard a jeepney.  There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney
or carrying a bag.  The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer... but by
the jeepney driver.  It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was
"suspicious."
The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed.  He would not have been identified by the police
officers otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person.  The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person.  This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and... reasonably
searched.[85]  Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one's basic right to
security of one's person and effects.
IV
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer
with a judge to determine probable cause.  In Posadas v. Court of Appeals,[86] one of the
earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in
Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable
cause:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with
the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the... same
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is... charged."
Malacat v. Court of Appeals[89] clarifies the requirement further.  It does not have to be
probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion.[90] It has to be a "genuine reason"[91] to
serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop
and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's... experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,[94] Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must
not rely on a single suspicious circumstance.[95]  There should be "presence of more than
one seemingly innocent... activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference
of criminal activity."... warrantless arrest.  The person searched was not even the person
mentioned by the informant.  The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya,... and the
person searched was Victor Cogaed.  Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying
that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one
circumstance.  This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his
belongings... without a valid search warrant
V
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless
there is compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the
purpose of protecting the public.
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person... for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps
to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a... deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
The "stop and frisk" search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of
detecting dangerous weapons.[100]  As in Manalili,[101] jurisprudence also allows "stop and
frisk" for cases... involving dangerous drugs.
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible.  The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. 
For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful
warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to... another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest.  None of the
instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the
arrest was made
At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was
about to commit a crime.  As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto
to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must... execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer."[130]  Both elements were missing when
Cogaed was arrested.[131]  There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers
that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for
the last allowable warrantless arrest.
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed's constitutional rights even if we assume that he did
not object when the police asked him to open his bags.  As this court previously stated:
Appellant's silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no...
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee
Cogaed's silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive
environment brought about by the police officer's excessive intrusion into his private space. 
The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a...
constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion.  In all
cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the
police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer.  The police officer
must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or her... part will amount
to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a
reasonable search.  The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language
known to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. 
There must be an assurance given to the police officer that the accused fully understands his
or her rights.  The fundamental nature of a person's constitutional right to privacy requires
no less.
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures]
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this
constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.[136]  This rule prohibits the
issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to... go on fishing expeditions
Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is
"the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures."[137]  It ensures... that the fundamental rights to one's person,
houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of
his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence
left to convict Cogaed.
VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement