PANGANDAMAN vs CASAR

G.R. No. 71782, April 14, 1988

Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners
assert that the respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) “John Does” transgressing the
Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to
be seized.
Issue: Whether said warrant is valid
Held: No.
Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) “John Does” not one of whom the witnesses to the
complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long
proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as “totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject.”[30] Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly
describe the person or persons to be seized,[31] the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be
voided.
WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the
petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) “John Does.” The
respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the
preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1748 of his court for further appropriate
action.

Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)
I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its
duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union
of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato
De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines
in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the
checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant
or court order in violation of the Constitution.
II. THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search
and seizures?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures.
 xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden.
A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be
regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by
NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought
about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very
least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in
the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times,
when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDTG.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

Facts:

Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed
at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by
persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.

In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded
the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an
inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport and other identification papers. When
accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his
waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed
four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.

Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from
the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the
officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a
stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought in
connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was
carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.

ALIH v. CASTRO
151 SCRA 279

FACTS:
The respondents raided the compound occupied by the petitioners in Zamboanga City in search of loose
firearms, ammunitions and other explosives. Petitioners pray to recover the articles seized from them and
respondents be enjoind from using the same against them since they did not have a warrant to search the
compound when they seized said articles, thus constituting an illegal search.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts done by the respondents are violative of the Bill of Rights and thus the evidence
obtained therein inadmissible in court
HELD:
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga at the time in question did not excuse the non-
observance of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. At the time of
the “zona” the petitioners were merely suspected of the mayor’s slaying and had not been in fact
investigated. Every person is entitled due process. The respondents defied the precept that “civilian
authority is at all times supreme over the military” so clearly proclaimed in the Constitution. The
respondents simply by-passed civil courts which had the authority to determine whether or not there was
probable cause to search the petitioners’ premises. It follows that as the search of the petitioners’
premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and the ammunitions taken form the raided
compound are inadmissible as evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners.

P. Vs CENDANA

P. Vs CASTILLER

PAPA vs. MAGO

Facts: Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a
reliable information received on 3 November 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects,
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the
port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a
duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate 1 of the customs zone.
When the trucks left gate 1 at about 4:30 p.m. of 4 November 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence
unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two
trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of
Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of
Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and
detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction (Civil
Case 67496), praying for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the police and customs
authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for
the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in
their favor. On 10 November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining Ricardo
Papa (as Chief of Police of Manila) and Juan Ponce Enrile (as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case
67496. However, when the restraining order was received by Papa. et. al., some bales had already been
opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police
Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of Remedios Mago.

Under date of 15 November 1966, Mago filed an amended petition, including as party defendants Collector
of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. At
the hearing on 9 December 1966, the lower court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an
inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant
of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On
23 December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the inventory
of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same should be released as per
agreement of the parties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court.
On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order releasing the goods to Mago upon her filing of a bond in the
amount of P40,000.00.

On 13 March 1967, Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court
releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by
the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure
proceedings. Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they
had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the action for
prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.

Held: The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the
Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect
searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles
or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under
customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container
wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast
or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted,
therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in
question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect
said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance.

This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and
seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given
authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. Martin Alagao and his companion
policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The
Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant herein. The Code authorizes persons having police
authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,
inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop
and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search
warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house
may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in the
case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may
effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

Herein, Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized
the two trucks and their cargo. But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no
search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining herein. The guaranty of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search
of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a
search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to
secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department
of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to
the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

ROLDAN VS ARCA

65 SCRA 336FACTS:Respondent company filed a case against Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N.

Roldan, Jr. for therecovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by
petitionerFisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Nay. The CFI Manila granted it, thus
respondentcompany took to possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI. Petitioner requested the Philippine
Navy to apprehended vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III,also respectively called Srta. Winnie and
Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisionsof the Fisheries Act. On August 5, or 6, 1965, the
two fishing boats were actually seized forillegal fishing with dynamite.ISSUE:WON the seizure of the
vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was valid.DECISION:The seizure of the vessel, its
equipment and dynamites was valid.Search and seizure of vessels and aircraft without search warrant for
violations of the customslaws have been traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrantbecause, the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality and jurisdiction in which the
searchwarrant must be sough before such search or seizure can be constitutionality effected. Thesame
exception should apply to the seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. Theyare usually
equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of thePhilippine Navy or Coast
Guard. Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for a valid search
andseizure, is a search or seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. Under our Rules of Court, a
policeofficer or a private individual may, without warrant, arrest a person a) who has committed, isactually
committing or is about the commit an offense which has been actually committed; b)who is reasonably
believed to have committed the offense which has been actually committed;or c) who is detention
prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving finaljudgement or from temporary detention
during pendency of his case or while being transferredfrom one confinement to another. In the case at
bar, the members of the two vessels werecaught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without
the requisite license. Thus, theirapprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is
lawful. Consequently, theseizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as
an incident to alawful arrest.

G.R. No. L-41686 November 17, 1980

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH IX,
QUEZON CITY

FACTS:

The Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was informed by an undisclosed Informer that a
shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge car.
Spurred by such lead, they stationed themselves in the vicinity of the toll gate of the North Diversion Road
at Balintawak, Quezon City.

A light blue Dodge car driven by Sgt. Hope who was accompanied by Monina Medina approached the exit
gate and after giving the toll receipt sped away towards Manila. The RASAC agents gave a chase and
overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent Sabado blew his whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter
instead of heeding, made a U-turn back to the North Diversion Road, but he could not go through because
of the buses in front of his car. At this point, the agents succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter
stopped.

The Agents saw four (4) boxes on the back seat of the Dodge and upon inquiry as to what those boxes
were, Sgt. Hope answered "I do not know." Respondents told that they were bringing the boxes to the
Tropical Hut at Epifanio de los Santos.

Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who had joined them waited for the man who
according to Monina Medina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear, Col. Abad
"called off the mission" and brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo.

An inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded eleven (11) sealed boxes, four (4) on the rear
seat and seven (7) more in the baggage compartment which was opened on orders of Col. Abad.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure conducted is lawful.

RULING:

What ASAC agents did was a faithful performance of a duty authorized under the Tariff and Customs Code
directing them as authorized agents to retrieve articles reasonably suspected of having been possessed,
issued or procured in violation of the tariff laws for which the government has a direct interest.

The circumstances of the case at bar undoubtedly fall squarely within the privileged area where search and
seizure may lawfully be effected without the need of a warrant. The facts being no less receptive to the
applicability of the classic American ruling, the latter's force and effect as well as the Mago decision must
be upheld and reiterated in this petition. the find that the constitutional guarantee has not been violated and
the respondent court gravely erred in issuing the order of August 20, 1975 declaring as inadmissible
evidence the items or articles obtained and seized by the apprehending agents without any search warrant,
as well as the pictures of said items attempted to be presented as evidence against the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is ordered remanded for further
trial and reception of evidence without excluding the articles subject of the seizure or for such action as the
prosecution may take after the re-assessment and re-evaluation of its evidence as hereinabove directed.

PACIS VS PAMARAN

JOSE G. LOPEZ
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, REPARATIONS COMMISSION, DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND/OR ANY OF THEIR AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR
REPRESENTATIVES

FACTS:

Sometime in 1964, the petitioner and Reparations Commission entered into a conditional contract,
subject to the condition that the title to and ownership of the vessel shall remain with the Commission until
full payment. Later on, petitioner entered into a contract with one Tomas Velasco, authorizing the latter to
supervise and manage the M/V JOLO LEMA. The vessel however was however apprehended, searched
and then seized by the Collector of Customs. A Seizure Identification proceeding was instituted against
said vessel for smuggling into the Philippines 1,408 sacks of Indonesian copra and 86 sacks of
Indonesian coffee beans, in violation of Section 2530 (a) and (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines.

This appeal taken by Lopez directly to the Supreme Court, upon the ground that only questions of law
would be taken up therein.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to interfere with the Seizure
Identification proceeding No. 25/66 pending before the Commissioner of Customs, on account of the
Indonesian agricultural products smuggles into the Philippines through the use of M/V JOLO LEMA

HELD:
Lopez maintains that whatever powers the Commissioner of Customs had, prior thereto, over seizure
identification proceedings had been transferred to the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The Supreme
Court said that this pretense is manifestly devoid of merit. Said section 5 of Republic Act No. 3512 merely
transfers to the Philippine Fisheries Commission the powers, functions and duties of the Bureau of
Customs, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters.
Such transfer should be construed in the light of section 1 of said Republic Act No. 3512, reading.

It is clear that the powers transferred to the Philippine Fisheries Commission by Republic Act No. 3512
are limited to those relating to the "development, improvement, management and conservation of our
fishery resources." All other matters, such as those concerning smuggling, particularly of agricultural
products, into the Philippines, are absolutely foreign to the object and purpose of said Act and could not
have been and were not transferred to the aforementioned Commission. Seizure Identification proceeding
No. 25/66 for the smuggling of Indonesian agricultural products into the Philippines is certainly beyond the
jurisdiction of the Philippine Fisheries Commission.

The M/V JOLO LEMA is not subject to forfeiture, inasmuch as Davao is a port of entry. This is neither the
time nor the place to pass upon the merits of this contention. Suffice it to say that, if petitioner feels it is a
good defense, the proper place to set it up is in Seizure Identification proceeding No. 25/66. If the
Commissioner of Customs overrules such defense and decrees the forfeiture of the vessel, Lopez may
appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, whose decision may, in turn, be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Lastly, petitioner argues that the Reparations Commission may not unilaterally rescind its conditional
contract of purchase and sale in his favor and that the Commission must first seek a judicial declaration of
rescission of said contract. Well-settled is, however, the rule that a judicial action for the rescission of a
contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of
any of its terms and conditions.

PEOPLE VS CRUZ

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 147 scra 509

FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary
Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took
place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428
documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.

Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roque’s leased
residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized,
charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s office merely charged her
and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the
evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a
general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search
and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions
propounded to the applicant’s witness.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?

HELD:

NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties
vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything
conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does
not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to
the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There
is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving
the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a
portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.

It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular
description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar
description were considered null and void for being too general.

People vs Anita Claudio

G.R. No. 72564

April 15, 1988

Facts:

On or about 21 July 1981, in the Olongapo City, Philippines, the above-named ACCUSED without being
lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana
dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo
City.

Issues: a)Whether or not the accused is also liable Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425 aside from Sec. 8, Art. II of
the same Act?

b)Whether warrantless search, seizure, and apprehension is unlawful under Rule 126, Sec.12?

Held:

Yes. In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused
herself. Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony. The
judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Sec. 4, Art II of R.A. 5425

The provision provides the Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs where the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as
a broker in any of such transactions. Although the accused contends that she may not be convicted of
this provision, the court held that contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision
shows that it is not only delivery which is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution and
transportation of prohibited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower
court did not err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.

As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259, 267) "the possession of such considerable
quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user of
prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver
said marijuana.

Rule 126, Sec. 12

The provision provides the Search incident to lawful arrest where a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant in paragraph (12a). Thus, appellant Claudio was caught transporting
prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obiña did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in
flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v.
Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMANDO DEL ROSARIO Y LOPEZ

G.R. No. 109633 July 20, 1994

Facts:
Del Rosario was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammutions and illegal sale of
regulated drugs
Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of PNP Cavite, before RTC judge Arturo de Guia
issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of an : undetermined quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia” in the premises of
appellant’s house. However, the search warrant was not implemented immediately due to lack of police
personnel to form the raiding team.
In the course of the search they found a black canister containing shabu, an aluminum foil, a plastic
.22 caliber, three set of ammunitions and three wallets containing the marked money.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the accused cannot be convicted of the illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions. The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and
seizure of the described quantity of shabu and paraphernalia.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The
constitution itself and the Rules of Court specifically mandate that the search warrant must particularly
describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize
the firearms which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the search warrant.

Neither may it maintain that the gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed,
accused arrest was far from regular and legal. Aid firearm, having been illegally seized, the same is not
admissible in evidence.