Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 17 (2002) 117–127

2002 ITA Open Session: Fire and Life Safety

Current safety issues in traffic tunnels夞
A. Haack1,*
¨ unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen e.V.—STUVA-, Mathias-Bruggen-Str.
Studiengesellschaft fur ¨ 41, D-50827 Cologne, Germany

Abstract

In addition to the manner in which tunnels are furnished, improved control of the state of vehicles and the composition of their
loads could have better safety standards in traffic tunnels. Joint efforts are imperative to arrive at enhanced and harmonised
standards throughout Europe. 䊚 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Starting situation 600 km of tunnel for Underground, rapid transit and

urban railways, with a total of approximately 500 sub-
A modern industrial society requires an efficient and terranean stops are being operated in Germany alongside
reliable transportation infrastructure. This applies to road approximately 450 km of main line tunnels and roughly
as well as rail. This becomes evident from the BMVBW 150 km of road tunnels (Haack, 1998).
statistics applying to Germany alone (Tables 1 and 2). The road tunnels for which the federal government is
In 1997, some 626 000 km of roads of varying responsible for building are detailed in Table 4. Details
categories were available for road traffic (Table 3). The are also provided pertaining to whether the tunnels are
German rail network, on the other hand, amounts to two-way (GV) or one-way (RV).
roughly 44 000 km (without connecting systems or At present, the overall length for operational trans-
trams, industrial and works railways). Some 40 000 of portation tunnels throughout the whole of Europe is well
this total is accounted for by the DB AG and 4000 by in excess of 15 000 km.
railways which are not state-owned. Furthermore, inner It goes without saying that high safety and reliable
urban railway systems (Underground trains, urban rail- availability are essential for such tunnels. This particu-
ways, and trams) have a network of approximately 2100 larly applies to fire incidents in tunnels, which unfortu-
km. nately cannot be entirely excluded. Such fires are
The construction and operation of efficient transpor- characterised by the danger they pose to the persons
tation tunnels is increasingly being called for to ensure affected and also, in many cases, by the considerable
that traffic can flow speedily without hold-ups. This is extent of damage they cause (Fig. 2). Serious cases of
by no means a new recognition. After all, the first fire accidents resulting in persons being hurt or killed
European rail tunnels were built more than 150 years are known in, e.g. Azerbaijan, the UK, France, Italy,
ago and the first Underground systems were built Japan, Canada, Austria and the USA. A number of
towards the end of the 19th century. The high-speed rail major fires have also occurred in Germany as well. In
routes (Fig. 1) and inner urban commuter rail systems, this connection, the confined space available, which
which are being constructed in our age, above all require made escape and rescue conditions even more difficult,
a high percentage of underground alignment. According was of particular significance for the consequences.
to Haack (1998) at present, for example, approximately
2. Recent fire accidents
夞 This article was presented at the ITA Open Session: Fire and
Life Safety, at the 28th ITA General Assembly and World Tunnel Fire incidents in tunnels immediately catch the pub-
Congress, 2–8 May 2002, Sydney, Australia.
*Tel.: q49-221-597-950; fax: q49-221-597-955. lic’s attention and this is quite natural. The media report
E-mail address: [email protected] (A. Haack). at length, in particular when people come to harm. The
1
Past President of ITA—International Tunnelling Association. disastrous London Underground fire at the Kings Cross

0886-7798/02/$ - see front matter 䊚 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 8 8 6 - 7 7 9 8 Ž 0 2 . 0 0 0 1 3 - 5
118 A. Haack / Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 17 (2002) 117–127

Table 1 Table 3
Passenger transportation figures in Germany (1997y1998) Public road network in Germany (as of 1997, BMVBW) Verkehr,
1999
Type of traffic Billion Pkm
Road class 1000 km No. of tunnels
Car 787
Tram, underground, bus 77 BAB (motorway) 11.3 42
Railway 64 Federal roads 41.4 91
Plane 27 Regional roads 86.8 14
8 955 District roads 91.5 4
Cityylocal roads 395.4 33
8 626.4 184
Underground station in November 1987, which cost 31
people their lives, and the catastrophic outcome of the
Baku Underground fire (Azerbaijan) in October 1995, On 24 March, 1999, a refrigerator lorry carrying 9
resulting in 289 deaths, are mentioned as examples. The tons of margarine and 12 tons of flour caught fire. It
Channel Tunnel fire between the UK and France on 18 was coming from France and stopped at the 6700-m
November, 1996 (Fig. 3), where fortunately all the station. A fully-fledged fire soon developed, which
tunnel users escaped with their lives, as well as the two spread to involve 23 lorries and 10 cars (Fig. 4).
terrible fires in road tunnels on 24 March, 1999 below
Mont Blanc in France (Bericht der technischen Unter-
suchung-skommission uber ¨ den Brand vom 24. Marz, ¨
¨
1999; Gemeinsamer Bericht der franzosischen und ital-
¨
ienischen Verwaltungsausschusse zur technischen Unter-
suchung der Katastrophe vom 24 Marz, ¨ 1999; Domke,
1999) and on 29 May, 1999 beneath the Tauern range
in Austria, resulting in 39 and 12 deaths, respectively,
also had serious consequences.
The 11.6-km long Mont Blanc Tunnel was opened
for traffic in 1965. At the time of the accident, its
ventilation and safety concept thus corresponded to
design standards of 40 years ago. As in the case of all
longer transalpine tunnels, the Mont Blanc tunnel is
operated on a bi-directional basis. Until March 1999,
two national companies ran it: one French, the other
Italian. Table 5 displays the development of traffic for
the Mont Blanc Tunnel since it was opened.
The tunnel was equipped with accident bays set 300
m apart and with 18 safety chambers at 600 m gaps.
These chambers were provided with fresh air and con-
Fig. 1. ICE travelling out of a tunnel.
structed to withstand the effects of a fire for roughly
2 h. Seventeen fires have occurred in the tunnel since
1965, five of which required the fire brigade on the
scene. In four of these cases, a heated-up engine was
determined as the cause of the fire. There was not a
single incidence of the fire spreading to neighbouring
vehicles.

Table 2
Goods transportation figures in Germany (1997y1998)

Type of traffic Billion Tkm

Lorry 293
Railway 68
Inland shipping 65
Pipeline 15
Plane 1
8 442 Fig. 2. Hamburg’s Moorfleet Tunnel on the federal motorway follow-
ing the lorry fire in 1968.
 A. Haack / Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 17 (2002) 117–127 119

Table 4
Number of road tunnels built on behalf of the Federal Government
(as of 1998, BMVBW)

Length (m) RV GV
-300 m 33 54
300–500 m 13 11
500–1000 m 17 11
1000–1500 m 6 5
1500–2000 m 1 2
2000–2500 m 0 0
2500–3000 m 1 2
3300 m 1 –
8 72 85

The fire lasted a total of 53 h. Twenty-nine of the 39

dead were found in their vehicles, and nine in the tunnel
or in the safety chambers which did not afford sufficient
protection. One fire officer died as a result of the injuries
he received.
Only some 2 months later, a further terrible fire
occurred in the 6400 m long Tauern Tunnel on 29 May, Fig. 3. Burnt out lorry transporter in the Channel Tunnel between the
1999. This tunnel is also operated bi-directionally. It is UK and France (fire incident on 18 November, 1996).
fitted with 30 emergency call bays set 212 m apart, 61
fire extinguishing bays every 106 m and a total of seven a head-on collision in the tunnels with bi-directional
breakdown bays every 750 m. In 1998, this tunnel had traffic. In the first case a car hit an oncoming mini bus
to cope with 5.55 million vehicles. Including almost because the driver was diverted by a squabble between
1.05 million lorries (s19%). This corresponds to an his two children on the rear seats. Both vehicles caught
average daily frequency of 15 160 vehicles, including fire immediately and five persons of the mini bus lost
2850 lorries in both directions. At the time of the their lives. In the Gotthard Tunnel the accident started
accident, there was a construction site in the tunnel with probably because of severe alcohol abuse of a truck
signal lights regulating traffic, which was confined to a driver. That truck driver lost control of his vehicle,
single lane. A lorry travelling from the south drove into drove snaky and crashed into an oncoming HGV. Both
the end of the tailback at high speed and pushed four
cars under the lorry stopped in front of them. This
incident cost eight lives and resulted in the lorry catching
fire. Attempts to extinguish the blaze were unsuccessful.
As a result, the flames spread to a lorry carrying a
variety of goods. Its load included aerosols containing
hair spray. Altogether, 14 lorries and 26 cars were
destroyed by the conflagration. Apart from the 12 dead,
49 others were injured.
The most recent fire catastrophies with fatal exit
occurred on 6.8.2001 in the 8.3 km long single tube
Gleinalm Tunnel in Austria and on 24.10.2001 in the
nearly 17 km – again single tube – Gotthard Tunnel in
Switzerland. In both cases the origin of the fire has been

Table 5
Development of traffic in the Mont Blanc Tunnel since it opened in
1965 until 1998 (Domke, 1999)

Type of vehicle 1966 1998

Cars=103 503 (92%) 444 (36%)
Lorries=103 45 (8%) 777 (64%)
Total vehicles=103 548 1221 Fig. 4. Burnt out lorry in the Mont Blanc Tunnel (fire incident on 24
March, 1999).
120 A. Haack / Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 17 (2002) 117–127

Table 6 Table 7
Vehicle fires in the Elbe Tunnel, Hamburg (1990–1999) (Statistik- Accident statistics for road tunnels in Germany
Verkehrsentwick-lung)
Cause of accident BAB tunnels Regional road tunnels
Year Annual traffic Total Carsa Lorriesb Motor (one-way traffic) (two-way traffic)
million vehicles cycles
Driving errors 17% 32%
1990 37.0 13 8 5 – Rear end collisions 69% 34%
1991 37.3 9 5 4 – Misc. 13% 32%
1992 37.6 12 9 3 –
1993 38.0 7 5 2 –
1994 39.1 14 13 1 – to roughly two vehicle fires per 100 million driven
1995 40.5 14 10 4 –
1996 40.6 15 14 1 –
kilometres.
1997 40.5 9 7 2 – What about the situation relating to fires in road
1998 38.5 9 5 2 2 tunnels? Here are some examples:
1999 40.3 7 7 – – In Norway, a total of 41 vehicle fires occurred in
8 389.4 109 83 24 2 tunnels during the period from 1990 to 1996. Twenty
a
percent of this total was caused by collisions and
Accounting for 85% of total.
b
Accounting for 15% of total. occurred as a follow-up incident.
The figures provided by the Gotthard Tunnel in
Switzerland before that fire on 24 October 2001 are of
trucks started burning directly. The fire grew extremely particular interest. In 1998, the traffic volume amounted
fast causing tremendous masses of smoke because of to 6.5 million vehicles, including 1 million lorries
the highly energetic fire loads. One truck was loaded
(s15%). In that year, 55 accidents took place in the
with tyres, the other with plastic material. At the end
tunnel, including four which resulted in fires. Altogether,
11 tunnel users died and 13 trucks, 4 vans as well as 6
42 vehicle fires resulted in the Gotthard Tunnel between
cars burnt down. The false ceiling separating the venti-
1992 and 1998. Cars were involved in 21 cases, buses
lation canals from the traffic space collapsed over a
in seven cases and lorries on 14 occasions. During the
section of 200 to 250 m. For the re-opening of the
same period, 5.7 fires occurred in each case per 100
tunnel 2 months after the fire the ventilation system was
million driven kilometres. Another long-term set of
improved by enlargement of the extraction openings in
statistics relating to the operation of the Gotthard Tunnel
the false ceiling. These openings are equipped with
comes up with the figure of four fires per 100 million
remote controlled louvres. It is one of the tragic aspects
driven kilometres, related to all vehicles or six fires per
linked with this accident that these improvements on
100 million driven kilometres, related only to lorries.
the ventilation system were already started before the
The statistics pertaining to the Elbe Tunnel as part of
fire occurred, but not yet finished at the time of the
the A7 federal motorway in Hamburg (Table 6) are also
accident.
most revealing. They indicate that, on average, one fire
incident occurred practically every month within the
3. Accident statistics tunnel from 1990 to 1999. What stands out is the over-
proportional involvement of lorries, amounting to almost
Against the background of these serious fire incidents, 25% in total fire incidents, although they merely account
the issue of vehicle fire frequencies and the attached
risks is inevitably raised. The following data and assess- Table 8
ments provide a relevant overview. First of all, vehicle Accident rates for road tunnels in Germany 1993–1997 (Lemke,
fires in general, and not simply those in tunnels, are 1999) (figures in brackets relate to the open road)
dealt with.
Type of Accidentsy DMy1000
The following two examples from Germany reveal of tunnel 1 million vehicle—km
that a vehicle fire incident is not at all rare. For instance,
over the past 10 years in Dortmund (about half a million Personal Damages Personal injuries
injuries to property and damages
inhabitants), an average of 250 vehicle fires have taken to property
place annually with a fluctuation rate of roughly "20
incidents. In Hamburg (about 1.8 million inhabitants), Motorways with 0.074 0.328 12.78
hard shoulder (0.147) (0.619) (35.00)
the appropriate figures amount to approximately 700
vehicle fires per year with a fluctuation rate of approx- Motorways without 0.130 0.354 21.16
hard shoulders (0.202) (0.923) (45.80)
imately "80 incidents. In Germany each year about
40,000 car an lorry fires are registered by the insurance Regional road 0.141 0.249 19.88
economy (ADAC, 2002). For Central Europe in general, with two-way (0.315) (0.983) (89.40)
traffic
the statistics pertaining to the entire road network relate
 A. Haack / Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 17 (2002) 117–127 121

traffic. Furthermore, the technical standards relating to

fire protection for rail vehicle construction has had a
positive effect in Germany for roughly the last 10 years
in the form of DIN 5510. A comparable guideline is
lacking as far as car making is concerned.
In a nutshell, it can be determined that, in spite of
considerable technical improvements, when it comes to
building cars and lorries, above all, through using fire-
resistant materials for their interiors, an increasing num-
ber of fires in tunnels must be reckoned with. There are
a number of important reasons for this:

● increasing traffic frequencies and the growing number

of hazardous goods transports; in Germany alone, the
Fig. 5. Rapid transit railway fire in Hamburg (11 December, 1996). transportation of hazardous goods amounting to more
than 50 million tonnes per year accounts for approx-
imately 10% of the total quantity carried by lorries
for some 15% of the traffic volume. Thus, the Elbe (Verkehr, 1999);
Tunnel statistics clearly show that lorries pose a consid- ● increasing driving speeds, and in turn, the growing
erably greater danger than cars, not simply on account kinetic energy especially on rail;
of their substantially higher fire load, but also owing to
● the already very large and—mainly for environmental
their over-proportional involvement in incidents.
protection reasons—constantly growing number of
The Elbe Tunnel is Germany’s busiest road tunnel
tunnels with increasing individual lengths both for
and is numbered among Europe’s most highly frequent-
road as well as rail transportation; at present, the 7.9-
ed tunnels asides from the Dartford Tunnel beneath the
km long Rennsteig Tunnel as part of the federal
Thames (to the east of London).
The available data clearly indicate that although fire motorway crossing the heights of the Thuringian
accidents in road traffic constantly occur in tunnels, Forest, which will be Germany’s longest road tunnel,
is under construction. The Landrucken ¨ Tunnel, at
their frequency is, however, relatively low when related
to the overall amount of traffic on all roads. almost 11 km, is Germany’s longest rail tunnel,
In this regard, it is frequently discussed whether tunnel ● the growing risk of arson extending to attacks by
sections should perhaps be basically assessed as being terrorists; at present, some 50% of the fire incidents
more dangerous than open roads. Far-reaching analyses occurring in public commuter transportation in Ger-
by the Ruhr University of Bochum, Institute for Road many result from the fires being laid deliberately. As
and Traffic Studies provide a clear picture for such far as terrorist activities are concerned, the events in
roads (Lemke, 1999). It is shown that the accident risk London (attacks by the IRA), Paris (explosives set
on the open road is generally far higher than the risk in off in the Metro) and Tokyo (gas attacks in the
a tunnel. This is easy to accept when it is considered Underground) are brought to mind.
that, normally, an 80-kmyh speed restriction applies in
a road tunnel. In addition, dangerous climatic influences
such as frozen snow or black ice, heavy rain, fog, gusts
of wind or blinding sunlight do not feature in tunnels.
The Ruhr University survey examined a total of 784
accidents during the period from 1993 to 1997 in 46
German motorway tunnels with directional traffic and
22 trunk road tunnels with two-way traffic. Tables 7
and 8 provide details of the survey results.
The figures for rail traffic are generally considerably
more favourable than for road traffic. Tunnel fire statis-
tics by Prognos dating from 1987 as well as correspond-
ing evaluations by STUVA arrived at roughly the same
conclusions. They show that the probability of tunnel
fires in rail traffic lies by a factor of 20–25 below those
for road traffic. This can be mainly explained by the
exclusive employment of professional drivers and the Fig. 6. Underground railway fire at the Hansaring station in Cologne
high degree of control for the systems applied in rail (24 October, 1978; Source: Fire Brigiade of Cologne).
122 A. Haack / Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 17 (2002) 117–127

Serious fires not only endanger persons to a high

extent and often result in the total loss of the vehicles
involved, they also frequently cause extensive damage
to the tunnel facilities. This is primarily due (Fig. 7) to
the major development of heat in conjunction with, in
some cases, widespread flaking of the concrete close to
the surface as well as through aggressive fire gases.
Although so far, such fires have not affected the stability
of the tunnel section concerned, it can always be
assumed that the tunnel cannot be operated for weeks
or even months on end, on account of the redevelopment
measures, which are necessary. The Tauern Tunnel for
example, was out of commission from 29 May, 1999,
when the fire took place until the end of August that
Fig. 7. Fire dimensioning curves currently applied in various European year—all of 3 months. In the case of the Mont Blanc
countries. Tunnel, the period of closure amounted to nearly 3 years
not only because of the tremendous repair work but also
4. The effects of fire because of extensive modernising and updating of all
the equipment and the escape and rescue concept, and
In the early 1980s, STUVA undertook far-reaching last but not least also on account of the lengthy inves-
investigations at the behest of the Federal Transport tigations undertaken by the public prosecutor’s office.
Ministry designed to improve fire protection in tunnels The Gotthard tunnel was re-opened with some restric-
for Underground, urban and tram railways (Heffels et tions for the truck traffic shortly before Christmas 2001
al., 1984), which resulted in important recognitions. after a 2 months repair period. The consequences of
They were, by and large, confirmed through major fire such operating hold-ups should not be underestimated.
tests in Norway within the framework of the Eureka The closure of important tunnels or tunnel sections for
research project (Haack, 1996, Brande
¨ in Verkehrstun- weeks or months on end inevitably leads, in the case of
neln, 1998) and can thus still be regarded as valid today: inner urban tunnels, to considerable disturbances to
a. As far as the flashover of a fire is concerned, this traffic in densely populated city areas or when it comes
point is reached after some 7–10 min by the vehicles to tunnels on busy transit routes, such as at present, the
normally used in commuter traffic. Mont Blanc Tunnel, where the alternatives are, by and
b. The fire duration of a vehicle varies considerably ´
large, only the Frejus Tunnel further to the west or the
depending on the external conditions and fluctuates Alpine passes. Both situations lead to added traffic
between 30 min and a number of hours. congestion, and in turn, to a further rise in accident
c. Even small fires can release considerable amounts of risks.
smoke gas and lead to a critical situation for the
passengers and the train staff (Fig. 5).
d. In a number of cases, the entire tunnel cross-section
was filled with smoke after a short time to such an
extent that the visibility was less than 1 m, even using
searchlights.
e. Combating fires in tunnels is made considerably more
difficult by the restricted accessibility, the amount of
smoke and the enormous heat radiation.
f. The, in some cases, considerable damage to property
(Fig. 6) is due to the high fire load caused by the rail
vehicles used in commuter traffic. This normally
amounts to between 60 and 80 kg of timber equivalent
load per m2 of passenger space.
In comparison, for residential buildings, the figure of
30–60 kg of combustible material normally applies
per m2 of living space, and for stores, an average of
approximately 100 kg of combustible material per Fig. 8. New transparent fire protection system on the basis of an
m2 of sales area. insulating layer of perforated plates (Haack, 1999).
 A. Haack / Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 17 (2002) 117–127 123

5. Fire protection measures Another during the last years quite often discussed
matter of preventative measures is the installation of
As a result of the recent fire disasters, experts are deluge systems in roads tunnels. That is prescribed in
discussing issues relating to the basic appraisal of Japan as a consequence of the Nihonzaka Tunnel fire
existing safety standards in tunnels. At stake are preven- on 11.7.1979 for all tunnels longer than 10 km or
tative constructional as well as operational protection tunnels with more than 3 km length and high traffic
measures together with those designed to combat fire. density. In Europe and in North America up to now
Preventative constructional measures initially only very few applications can be found. The latest
embrace the choice of suitable materials to be used. In development of high pressure mist systems is very much
this regard, concrete can be classified as a material with promising in this direction. Without any doubt those
a high fire safety factor. It in no way contributes to the installations can significantly contribute to avoid a
fire load. If anything, the problems affecting this mate- spreading of fire to queuing cars behind the place of
rial relate to explosion-like flaking occurring on the original fire. But on the other had the installation of
affected surface in the event of rapidly rising, high those technical systems raise quite a lot of additional
temperatures (Fig. 7). Such flaking endangers tunnel questions. They concern especially the problems with
users attempting to escape, as well as the rescue and immediate destratification of the smoke connected with
extinguishing crews rushing to help. In individual cases, a significant deterioration of escape conditions, the
the flaking reached considerable depths of a number of production of masses of (hot) vapour in addition to the
decimetres, so that the inner reinforcement was exposed smoke, the possible incompatability with special types
and burnt out (see Figs. 2 and 3). When pre-stressed of loading as well as the sufficient function of the whole
concrete structures are involved, this can also lead to system (control, pipes, pumps, nozzles) at any time
the pre-stressing elements becoming completely despite the extremely hard environmental conditions in
detached (Fig. 2), resulting in a total loss of the bearing a tunnel year in, year out.
effect. Recent steps to develop a more fire resistant Other problems are momentainously still linked with
concrete by adding special plastic fibres to significant the control of time and location of activating the system
reducing the flaking effect are therefore most important. and depending on the system with the adequate reser-
In several recent papers it is reported about a successful vation or delivery of extinguishing water. Against this
research in this direction (Dahl and Richter, 2001; background an internationally organised testing is need-
Haack, 2001; Wetzig, 2000). ed. Corresponding discussions and planning on a mul-
The geometrical design of the tunnel cross-section, tinational test site and fire research center in Europe has
the installation of the intermediate ceiling for separating started in 1999 and is still ongoing. Before installing
the air intake and outlet channels above the carriageway those deluge systems in a big style such a comprehensive
zone, and in particular, their side abutment and in many test program should have been conducted not to invest
cases, fire protection linings specially set up in the wall large amounts of public money in a wrong or not
and ceiling zones (Haack, 1994) in the case of road sufficient enough direction. At this point it should also
tunnels, or subterranean stops in the case of Under- be mentioned that other ways for possible improving
ground, rapid transit and urban railways are all numbered the safety in traffic tunnels have to be followed in
among preventative constructional fire protection meas- parallel to the preventative constructional measures just
ures. The newly-developed fire protection system on the mentioned above: installation of deluge or similar auto-
basis of perforated sheets designed to create an insulat- matic extinction systems on the tracks (at least in the
ing layer presented in Fig. 8 provides, among other motor area), on the rolling stock of full railway passen-
things, the advantage that the tunnel lining remains ger cars and mass transit cars, special physical protection
visible for inspection and maintenance purposes com- of the truck tanks etc.
pared with conventional systems comprising plates on a In the case of road tunnels, operational fire protection
mineral basis. The rear ventilation of the fire protection primarily relates to mechanised ventilation, including its
lining resulting from the perforated structure avoids operating concept. In modern tunnels, these are geared
water pressure building up in the event of leaks or the to extreme traffic situations with high traffic densities,
formation of mould fungus. The changeover from suc- and above all, to vehicle fires in the tunnel. Control is
tion and pressure loads when bulky vehicles are passing carried out either manually or automatically, triggered
by at speed is also precluded from the very outset by corresponding fire alarm systems. Both versions have
through the perforated structure (Haack, 1999). their pros and cons. Manual control enables the existing
The setting up of special escape ways, such as, for tunnel control room to act in accordance with the
instance, those in the Gotthard Road Tunnel in Switzer- situation shown by the television cameras. It goes
land, and breakdown bays in the case of long tunnels without saying that, as in the case of all processes
are also numbered among constructional fire protection controlled by man, excessively slow reactions and mis-
measures. interpretations of the development of the fire cannot be
124 A. Haack / Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 17 (2002) 117–127

Fig. 9. Fire test with a heavy lorry within the scope of a European research project with substantial German participation (Brande in Ver-
Kehrestunneln, 1998).

excluded. Automatic systems are devised in advance for on to the next station when the alarm is sounded or
certain scenarios at the planning stage, and in some (better still) into the open as the rescueyescape of
cases, exclude necessary adjustments designed to sup- passengers and combating the blaze can be carried out
port escape and rescue actions. Against this background, much more effectively than in a tunnel section. Special
it appears wise to use systems, which combine both operational guidelines should also be compiled for
types of control. transporting hazardous goods through long road tunnels,
The way in which a vehicle is constructed also plays e.g. travelling through in a convoy with an accompa-
its part in operational fire protection. The use of mate- nying vehicle and at determined distances or closing the
rials, which are not easily combustible especially for the tunnel to hazardous goods transports at particular times
interior, is essential, as well as fire-retarding zones, of day.
overheating displays and the like. The carrying of manual fire extinguishers aboard rail
Then, of course, specially devised alarm plans and cars and railway carriages, as well as in the driver’s cab
instructions informing rail staff what to do in the event of lorries and on buses continues to belong to operational
of fire are of particular importance for operational fire fire protection measures. These are supported by the
protection. Thus, for example, rail vehicles should move setting up of hydrants or stationary water lines with

Fig. 10. Cross-section of the Gotthard Road Tunnel (Switzerland) with parallel ventilation and escape tunnel.
 A. Haack / Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 17 (2002) 117–127 125

hose connections for the speedy provision of extinguish- the footpath and stop in the breakdown bay if
ing water, drainage with the aid of slotted or hollow possible;
gutters (Blennemann, 1998), the establishment of emer- ● secure your vehicle (warning flasher, warning
gency bays with telephone, fire alarm and extinguishers triangle);
in the tunnel. Last, but not least, television monitoring, ● immediately inform the tunnel control room via
loudspeaker units, radio cables and signal light systems emergency call bay (or the emergency centre via
round off modern operational fire protection in tunnels. mobile phone).
Fire combating measures are undertaken by profes- c. In the event of a tailback in the tunnel:
sional and voluntary fire services. It goes without saying ● stop as far to the outside as possible;
that the personnel must be provided with special equip- ● keep your distance to the vehicle in front (do not
ment for use in tunnels. Furthermore, the alarm and edge up bumper-to-bumper);
deployment concepts have, in each case, to be geared ● switch off engine at once;
to the local conditions. Moreover, the fire crews under ● do not get out;
must carry out regular drills as close as possible to real ● switch on radio and listen for loudspeaker
conditions in the tunnel. In this regard, it is essential to messages;
practice collaboration with the tunnel operators, the ● on no account turn;
transport companies, and other rescue and emergency ● do not reverse.
services. Such drills must on no account be carried out d. In the event of a vehicle fire in the tunnel:
in conjunction with deliberately simulated hot fires. This ● stop as far to the outside as possible;
would involve an excessively high risk for those taking ● keep your distance to the vehicle in front (do not
part. Instead they should be undertaken using cold edge up bumper-to-bumper);
smoke generators or dimmed vision on breathing masks. ● switch off engine at once;
All these precautions are taken into consideration and ● switch on warning flasher at end of tailback, get
applied nowadays in the design, construction and oper- out at once, do not lock car door;
ation of modern tunnel facilities. The details are regu- ● escape at once by moving away from the smoke
lated by RABT and the minimum standard needed direction;
described by Deutsche Montan Technologie GmbH ● use specially marked emergency exits. On no
(RABT, 1994; Festlegung von Mindestschutz- account turn;
maßnahmen im Brandfall fur ¨ verschiedene Tunneltypen ● do not reverse.
und Verkehrssituationen, 1999). Nonetheless, absolute
safety in tunnel traffic can never be taken as the basis. This code of behaviour, which could well be lifesav-
ing, should regularly be published by the media (press,
6. How to behave radio, TV), the automobile clubs, the highway patrol
authorities and also even by the government. In this
Should a fire occur in a tunnel, the situation is way, tunnel users can be made aware and trained to face
definitely far worse than out in the open. Escape and all contingencies. Basically, an effort must be made to
rescue possibilities are restricted in terms of the geom- convince the motorist that he only has a few minutes
etry. However, rapidly rising heat radiation, the fast available to extinguish the blaze or make a successful
release of fire gases and a related decrease in visibility, escape should a fire occur in the tunnel. On no account
above all, form potential risks (Fig. 9). The fact that should he feel secure within his vehicle or stay in it
many motorists misinterpreted this situation during the simply to protect his property. The false appraisal of
Mont Blanc Tunnel fire largely contributed to its cata- these two aspects presumably led to 29 tunnel users
strophic outcome. Against this background, it is essential losing their lives in their vehicles during the Mont Blanc
that the following code of behaviour is passed on to Tunnel fire disaster. Permanent training aimed at making
motorists who intend using a road tunnel: motorists aware of how to act is certainly more useful
a. When driving through the tunnel: than the repeated publication of ‘rankings’ on tunnels
● switch on lights and remove sun glasses; and their fire safety standards (ADAC-Motorwelt,
● make sure you observe the speed restriction; 1999a, 2000).
● keep a safe distance to the vehicle in front;
● never overtake in tubes with two-way traffic and 7. Considerations pertaining to the design of future
drive as far to the right as possible; traffic tunnels
● drive with increased attention;
● switch on the radio. The recent fire incidents touched on earlier have
b. Should you have a breakdown: triggered an intensive debate among the general public
● move over as far to the right as possible—ensure (ADAC-Motorwelt, 1999a,b, 2000; Haschek, 1999) and
you use the available hard shoulder, otherwise use expert circles (Day, 1999; Tan, 1997; Brux, 1999)
126 A. Haack / Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 17 (2002) 117–127

pertaining to just how the potential risk of driving thard accident of October 24, 2001 does not change this
through a tunnel should be generally assessed and which general view because it cannot be judged as a normal
possible improvements exist for safety in tunnels. every day to expect event. The statistics given in chapter
When contemplating the relevant issues, it is imper- 3 clearly underline this basic conception.
ative that one should not simply consider the worst A frequently discussed question relates to the permis-
conceivable situations, for example, a collision between sibility of operating a long tunnel with bi-directional
a bus and a tank truck or even a passenger train and a traffic. There is no doubt that two parallel tunnel tubes
tank truck within a single-tube road or rail tunnel with with one-way traffic constitute a considerably lower
bi-directional traffic in each case. Such incidents, which potential risk on account of their better escape and
are highly improbable, would exclude tunnel traffic rescue possibilities than a single tube with two-way
altogether if they were deemed to be the standard. They traffic. Notwithstanding, the demand for operating tun-
cannot be controlled. The consequence would be that nels exclusively with directional traffic cannot generally
tunnel traffic, in general, would be banned or at least, be put forward without proper scrutiny of each individ-
it would become extremely expensive, thus signifying ual case. It must be considered, for instance, that a 10-
that tunnelling could no longer be financed. Everyday or 15-km long tunnel with a high rock overburden and
alleviations associated with tunnels, e.g. in road traffic a relatively low anticipated traffic volume cannot always
and in turn, in the life of a big city, the foundations of be replaced in economic terms in the form of two
modern mobility over long distances, watercourses and parallel single tubes. In spite of two-way traffic exac-
obstacles posed by mountain ranges, would disappear. erbating the situation, a single-tunnel with an absolute
It is obvious that this cannot be the objective of these ban on overtaking and a speed restriction of 80 kmyh,
deliberations. Tunnels are a rather an important compo- which are standard practice, undoubtedly clearly reduces
nent of and the pre-requisite for a well-functioning, the potential risk compared with the situation before
reliable infrastructure in a modern industrial society. tunnels were built, where cars, and above all, lorries
Seen from this point of view, realistic scenarios are were forced to use the steep pass routes, mostly with
required from considerations aimed at improving safety never-ending narrow bends, in summer and especially
in tunnel traffic. In this regard, everything must be in winter. The money required for a parallel tube can
geared to the fact that an absolute zero risk can never again be used more efficiently to relieve a further pass
be attained in our everyday lives. If anything, we should against the background of the low traffic density sce-
orientate ourselves to coastal protection measures. Here, nario through a single tube with two-way traffic. It is
nobody would ever propose designing dykes for the precisely this concept, which has been generally applied
absolutely highest flood mark ever recorded (e.g. the in the Alpine countries in the last 3–4 decades. In this
¨
‘Große Manndranke’ in 1634 along the north German respect, the building of a second tube was and is planned
coastal area). Such facilities could not be realised— in the long term from the very outset in many cases,
either technically nor financially. When it comes to regardless of the traffic development. Thus, all long
coastal protection measures, a degree of protection, tunnels crossing the Alps have so far only been con-
which will most probably be adequate is determined, structed with a single tube. It goes without saying that
and a defined residual risk accepted. the rescue concept in such tunnels is considerably
This should also be the benchmark when assessing enhanced if at least a parallel ventilation tunnel, which
tunnel traffic. Hundreds of vehicle fires in road tunnels can also be used for escape purposes, is excavated,
all over the world prior to the two conflagrations in the should there not be a parallel tube designed to carry
Mont Blanc Tunnel and the Gotthard Tunnel the Tauern traffic. This situation exists at the Gotthard road tunnel
Tunnel, did not lead to these disastrous incidents. In this in Switzerland (Fig. 10). Germany’s motorway tunnels
regard, it should be remembered that eight people in the generally have two tubes and provide a high safety
Tauern Tunnel lost their lives directly on account of the standard in conjunction with their furnishing, which has
pile-up and not because of the fire incident. In the open, to comply with RABT specifications.
they could not have been rescued either given the same It is also essential that the guidelines relating to
accident situation. Against this background, the Mont preventative constructional, operational fire protection,
Blanc incident, in particular, should never be taken into as well as combating fire, is harmonised to a high degree
consideration as an example for the design and setting in the states of the European Union (Rat der Europaisch-
¨
up of future tunnel structures. This incident was if en Union; Memorandum der franzosischen ¨ Delegation
anything, an out of the ordinary catastrophe with an vom 28.9.1999). Currently, entirely different regulations
unforeseeable development. This is also confirmed by exist in the various countries pertaining to the distance
the various vehicle fires, which have taken place in the between escape exits, the rating of mechanical ventila-
interim since 24 March, 1999 and 29 May, 1999, in tion systems, the installation of lights, the maximum
road tunnels—without lives being lost or a fire flash gradients, etc. International research, as well as the
over from vehicle to vehicle occurring. Even the Got- systematic analysis of previous fire incidents must be
 A. Haack / Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 17 (2002) 117–127 127

used here to arrive at the decisive principles for har- tection measures against fire in various tunnel types and traffic
situations); research report commissioned by the Bundesanstalt fur ¨
monised European legislation. This, of course, means
Straßenwesen, Bergisch Gladbach; 10. 12. 1999.
that the governments have to cough up the required DIN 5510: Vorbeugender Brandschutz in Schienenfahrzeugen (Pre-
funds to a sufficient degree. In addition, there is the ventive fire protection in railway vehicles; part 1 to 7); Teil 1:
need to create infrastructural pre-requisites for rapidly Brandschutzstufen, brandschutztechnische Maßnahmen und
translating into practice the longstanding political objec- Nachweise; Teil 2: Brennverhalten und Brandnebenerscheinungen
tive of increasingly transporting goods traffic by rail. von Werkstoffen und Bauteilen - Klassifizierungen, Anforderungen
¨
und Prufverfahren; Teil 3: Raumabschließende Systeme; in Vorber-
This is a pan-European task, which is both essential and eitung; Teil 4: Konstruktive Gestaltung der Fahrzeuge - Sicherheits-
cost-intensive. Switzerland, with the regulations it has technische Anforderungen; Teil 5: Elektrische Betriebsmittel -
consistently applied at federal level, can serve as an Sicherheitstechnische Anforderungen; Teil 6: Begleitende
example here. Maßnahmen - Funktion der Notbremseinrichtung, Informationssys-
In summing up, it should be said that safety technol- ¨
teme, Brandmeldeanlagen, Brandbekampfungseinrichtungen –
Sicherheitstechnische Anforderungen; Teil 7: Einrichtungen fur ¨
ogy in traffic tunnels has made considerable progress ¨
brennbare Gase und Flussigkeiten – Sicherheitstechnische
since the Mont Blanc Tunnel was opened in 1965. Anforderungen.
Decisive improvements have also been undertaken in Domke, J. Der Brand im Mont Blanc Tunnel (Fire in the Mont Blanc
vehicle construction with the objective of enhanced fire Tunnel); Brandschutz, Deutsche Feuerwehr-Zeitung 53 (1999) 8;
protection. Nonetheless, there are a number of important pp. 722–731.
French-Italian Commission: Joint Report on the technical investiga-
issues relating to improved safety concepts for traffic tion about the fire catastrophy of 24. March 1999 in the Mont
tunnels, which still have to be properly clarified. Apart Blanc Tunnel; 6.7.99.
from tunnel furnishing, these include better controls for Haack A. Subsequent fire protection measures in tunnels – technical
the state of a vehicle and the composition of what it is and economic aspects; STUVA-Conference ’93; Tunnel 13 (1994)
carrying. It is essential that all these questions are 3; pp. 49–60.
Haack A. Introduction, main objectives and results of EU 499 firetun.
tackled jointly so that improved and harmonised stan-
1. Internationale Conference ‘Protection from Fire in Rail and
dards for tunnel traffic safety are realised all over Road Tunnels’, Rome, July 1996, 20–21.
Europe. Haack, A. Tunnelbau in Deutschland - Analyse und Ausblick (Tun-
nelling in Germany – analysis and perspective); Tunnelling Con-
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