SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 208258. April 27, 2022.]

MARIA VICIA CARULLO-PADUA, petitioner, vs. JOSELITO

PADUA, respondent.

DECISION

HERNANDO, ***  J  :
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This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the August

28, 2006 Decision 2 and the November 14, 2011 Resolution 3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80952. The assailed Decision affirmed
the September 2, 1999 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
Piñas City, Branch 253, in Civil Case No. LP-97-0169, which denied the
petition 5 for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by herein petitioner
Maria Vicia Carullo-Padua (Maria) against respondent Joselito Padua
(Joselito).
Factual Antecedents:
Maria and Joselito were married in a civil ceremony on February 5,
1982 followed by a church wedding on December 18, 1982. The union
produced a son born on March 23, 1986. 6
On July 17, 1997, Maria filed a petition 7 for declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage with the trial court anchored on Article 36 of
the Family Code. Maria alleged that at the time of the celebration of their
marriage, Joselito was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. During their cohabitation, Joselito exhibited excessive sexual
desire and forced her to perform oral and anal sex with him; 8 that there
were occasions when respondent attempted to sexually molest her sister,
nieces and their household help who were staying with them; that
respondent admitted to said attempts of molestations but begged her to
keep said incidents a secret; 9 that Joselito misrepresented himself as a
Roman Catholic when he was actually a born-again Christian; that when
Maria refused to convert to Joselito's religion, he began insulting her
religious beliefs, 10 and that at one point, at the heat of their quarrel,
Joselito attempted to kill Maria by threatening to stab her with a letter
opener. 11
Maria also alleged that Joselito failed to provide financial support for
her and their child; that right after they got married, Joselito insisted that
they stay in her parents' house so that he can give half of his salary to his
own parents; that they were dependent on Maria's parents for
support; 12 and that Joselito never bothered to share in the household
expenses while they were living at her parents' house. Maria further
claimed that when Joselito lost his job in 1985, he remained unemployed
for six months because he did not try to find work until she asked him to
look for one. 13
Joselito also failed to provide emotional and psychological support
to their child. He preferred staying in their room rather than to spend
time with their only son. Occasionally, he would physically harm their child
when the latter would attempt to play with him. 14
Maria further averred that in 1990, Joselito left for Italy to work
without consulting her. While working abroad, Joselito stopped sending
financial support to her and their son after settling the huge debt he
incurred here in the Philippines. Consequently, Maria raised and
supported their son all by herself. Later, in 1992, Joselito sent a letter
admitting to his shortcomings on their marital relationship and making
known of his decision to sever ties with her and their son. However, when
Joselito returned to the Philippines in 1997, he sought custody of their
child who was under her care. 15
Upon the foregoing averments, Maria concluded that there is
sufficient basis to declare Joselito psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations. Hence, Maria's marriage with
Joselito should be declared null and void pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code. 16
 As Joselito did not file an answer, the court a quo ordered the public
prosecutor to conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed
between the parties. 17
After the public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion
between the parties, trial proceeded in Joselito's absence. 18 In its
comment 19 dated December 3, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General
manifested its opposition to the petition.
During trial, petitioner presented herself and psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia
Villegas (Dr. Villegas) as witnesses. Maria testified on the allegations
contained in her petition 20 while Dr. Villegas testified on the personality
evaluation 21 report she prepared. 22
Dr. Villegas testified that she diagnosed Joselito with a personality
disorder of a sexual deviant or perversion based on Maria's narrations.
Joselito's preference for anal and oral sex, as well as the molestations he
committed against Maria's relatives and housemaid, were manifestations
of Joselito's perversion. The root cause of Joselito's personality disorder is
traceable to his wretched childhood. Inasmuch as Joselito spent his youth
with a cruel father and a very protective mother, the unbalanced
relationship between Joselito's parents developed some emotional
confusion on him. As a result, Joselito's sexual development did not
mature. Dr. Villegas added that the psychological disorder of Joselito is
grave, serious and not clinically curable which rendered him
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. 23
Ruling of the Regional Trial
Court:
On September 2, 1999, the trial court denied the petition, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Maria Vicia Carullo-Padua
is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the marriage contract between
said petitioner and Joselito Padua is declared VALID and
SUBSISTING.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. 24
 The trial court held that the evidence adduced by Maria failed to
overcome the legal presumption in favor of the validity of her marriage
with respondent. 25 It ratiocinated that:
x x x [T]he evidence presented by the petitioner only proves
infidelity and sexual perversion of the respondent after the
marriage and standing as it is, cannot be said to be a permanent
sickness and so serious that the same prevented respondent from
assuming his marital obligations. As a matter of fact, respondent
was aware of and accepted that his infidelity and perversion were
all his faults and he even asked forgiveness from petitioner in his
letter dated 15 November 1992 (Exh. 'E'). Contrary to the
contention of petitioner, respondent tried to be a good provider to
his family as shown by the fact, as petitioner admitted herself (TSN,
pp. 12-14, 24 September 1998), that respondent had a job although
his earnings therefrom were not enough because he had to give
one-half of his salary to his own parents for one reason or another.
Nevertheless, petitioner and respondent, during their marriage,
were still able to purchase a parcel of residential land of their own
at T.S. Cruz Subdivision, Almanza, Las Pinas [sic]  City (Exh. 'D').
Without discounting the truthfulness of the report and
testimony of Dr. Cecilia Villegas to the effect that respondent
suffers from a personality disorder of a sexual deviant or pervert
type, this Court is of the considered view that the same is not
supported by veritable proof that such disorder is so grave or
serious as to incapacitate respondent from performing his marital
obligations. Firstly, it is clear from the record that Dr. Villegas'
evaluation and examination of respondent was based on the data
and information supplied by petitioner herself (TSN, pp. 20-21, 11
January 1999), the very person interested in sustaining her petition;
hence, the conclusions derived therefrom are of doubtful veracity.
Secondly, the law requires that prior to the filing of the petition,
there must be an occasion when either or both of the parties in a
marriage contract has been found by a clinical or medical
psychologist or psychiatrist to be suffering from psychological
incapacity and such fact is to be averred in the petition. But as this
petition stands here now, petitioner consulted Dr. Villegas only for
the purpose of sustaining her petition (pp. 30-31, Ibid.); hence, the
findings of Dr. Villegas cannot impartially render the legal aid the
 same is supposed to give to this Court to arrive at an impartial
decision as said findings are tainted with legal infirmity." 26
Maria appealed 27 before the appellate court.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
The appellate court sustained 28 the judgment of the trial court.  CAIHTE

It held that the grounds relied upon by Maria to support her petition
to declare the nullity of her marriage with Joselito, i.e., sexual perversion,
abandonment, Joselito's attempt against her life, and sexual infidelity,
assuming said circumstances to be true, are not grounds for annulment of
the marriage but at best valid grounds for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code. 29
Maria moved for a reconsideration but it was denied in the
appellate court's November 14, 2011 Resolution. 30
Hence, this recourse of petitioner hinged on the following grounds:
A. THE ASSAILED DECISION FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PETITION
BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE. RATHER IT WAS RESOLVED
BASED ON A PRIORI PRESUMPTIONS AND GENERALIZATIONS.
B. SADISM IS A SEXUAL ANOMALY THAT RENDERS RESPONDENT
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED UNDER RULE (SIC)  36 OF
THE FAMILY CODE.
C. PETITIONER PROVED WITH CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
RESPONDENT'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, PERSONALITY
DISORDER, DEVIANCE AND PERVERSION; AND SUCH
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS GRAVE, HAS JURIDICAL
ANTECE[DE]NCE AND IS INCURABLE.
D. RESPONDENT, PROVEN TO BE A SEXUAL DEVIANT AND PERVERT,
IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM HIS ESSENTIAL
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS TO PETITIONER. 31
Maria posits that the appellate court's judgment was based
on priori assumptions and generalizations. 32 In affirming the denial of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the appellate court simply
made a pronouncement that "Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse" 33 without
explaining why Joselito's sexual sadism, abandonment and infidelity do
not constitute psychological incapacity. 34
Maria claims that the CA erred in assuming that sexual perversion
cannot be a ground for annulment of marriage because the same is a
ground for legal separation. The appellate court failed to consider that the
sexual sadism of Joselito affected the foundation of their marriage.
Joselito's sadistic behavior of forcing Maria to perform anal sex with him,
without regard to her feelings, showed that Joselito was patently
incapable of fulfilling his marital duty of loving and respecting her. 35
The appellate court's disregard of the assessment of an expert
witness on Joselito's personality disorder is contrary to settled
jurisprudence that "[b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite
having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties." 36
Since it was clinically found that: (1) Joselito is a sexual
deviant/sadist type, as manifested by his preference for anal and oral sex;
and (2) that said personality disorder of Joselito is characterized by
seriousness or gravity and incurability, it should be discernible that
Joselito is not capable of adhering to a normal sex life. Maria asserts that
one who unconsciously inflicts sexual violence on his wife, such as Joselito,
is incapable of complying with the essential marital obligations of
observing mutual love and respect. Having been declared by a psychiatrist
that Joselito is not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential
marital obligations, a declaration of nullity of their marriage is in order. 37
Issue:
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether the totality of
evidence presented by Maria is sufficient to prove that Joselito is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations,
meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Maria.
Our Ruling
We answer in the negative.
 Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Republic v. Iyoy 38 instructs that the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by:
(a) Gravity — It must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence — It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability — It must be incurable or, even fit were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 39
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina 40 (Molina), provided the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code, viz.:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job x x x.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
 regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.
However, with the recent promulgation of Tan-Andal v. Andal 41 (Tan-
Andal), We have modified the Molina guidelines to prevent its stringent
application in previous nullity cases which is antithetical to the way the
concept of psychological incapacity was created.
In Tan-Andal, the husband had a serious drug addiction who
constantly failed to overcome his vices and went in and out of a
rehabilitation center. His drug addiction was so severe that he even
smoked marijuana in the same room where their daughter is. His drug
addiction also drove his wife's construction company to bankruptcy as he
took the company's money to fund his drug addiction.
The physician-psychiatrist in Tan-Andal diagnosed the husband with
narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder
with psychotic features based on the interviews of the wife, daughter, and
sister-in-law of the husband, and the husband's handwritten personal
history which the latter made while he was in the rehabilitation center.
 In concluding that the husband was psychologically incapacitated,
We used the following parameters (Tan-Andal guidelines) in determining
what constitutes psychological incapacity:
(1) The psychological incapacity must be shown to have been
existing at the time of the celebration of marriage;
(2) Caused by a durable aspect of one's personality structure, one
that was formed prior to their marriage;
(3) Caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause; and
(4) Proven by clear and convincing evidence. 42
Moreover, psychological incapacity is now neither a mental
incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven by expert
opinion, viz.:
[T]his Court now categorically abandons the
second Molina guideline. Psychological incapacity is neither a
mental incapacity nor at personality disorder that must be
proven through expert opinion. There must be proof, however,
of the durable or enduring aspects of a person's personality,
called "personality structure," which manifests itself through
clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The
spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for him or
her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her
essential marital obligations.
Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given
by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in
the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage
may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed
from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, the
judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and
serious incapacity to assume the essential marital obligations.
In this way, the Code Committee's intent to limit the
incapacity to "psychic causes" is fulfilled. Furthermore, there will
be no need to label a person as having a mental disorder just
to obtain a decree of nullity. A psychologically incapacitated
person need not be shamed and pathologized for what could have
been a simple mistake in one's choice of intimate partner, a
 mistake too easy to make as when one sees through rose-colored
glasses. A person's psychological incapacity to fulfill his or her
marital obligations should not be at the expense of one's dignity,
because it could very well be that he or she did not know that the
incapacity existed in the first place. 43 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, as categorically declared by the Court, expert testimony or the
testimony of a psychologist/psychiatrist is no longer required to prove
psychological incapacity. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in
the spouses' lives before they contracted marriage may testify on their
observations as to the incapacitated spouse's behavior. What is important
is that the totality of evidence is sufficient to support a finding of
psychological incapacity.
Similarly, juridical antecedence of psychological incapacity may be
proven by ordinary witnesses who can describe the incapacitated
spouse's past experiences or environment while growing up which may
have triggered one's particular behavior. 44 At any rate, the gravity of
psychological incapacity must be shown to have been caused by a
genuinely serious psychic cause. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" are still not
accepted grounds that would warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. 45
Tan-Andal also modified the requirement on insurability — that
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must now be
incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense. 46 As explained,
psychological incapacity must be:  DETACa

[x x x] so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner,

and contemplates a situation where the couple's respective
personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that
the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable
breakdown of the marriage. "[A]n undeniable pattern of such
persisting failure [to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and
supportive spouse] must be established so as to demonstrate that
there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the
spouse relative to the other." 47 (Emphasis Ours)
 Using the foregoing yardsticks, We reviewed the totality of evidence
presented by Maria and found that the same was miserably wanting to
sustain the conclusion that Joselito was psychologically incapacitated to
perform the basic obligations of marriage.
The personality evaluation report 48 prepared by Dr. Villegas carried
a finding that Joselito suffers from a sexual deviant personality disorder or
perversion. Notably, this was based solely on Maria's narrations. The
psychiatric examination on Maria and interview on her regarding Joselito's
family background merely established that the cause of Joselito's
personality disorder is likely due to the contrasting parenting behavior of
Joselito's father and mother. The relevant portion of her evaluation reads:
On the other hand, Joselito grew up in a family, presenting a
strong psychopathology. A cruel father, with whom children are
afraid of and a protecting and over solicitous mother, developed
confusion in their emotional attachment and identification. It would
just be a natural occurrence, that they would lean towards a lesser
resistance, developed a faulty role identification, especially in
children of the opposite sex. The caring and protecting attitude of
the mother, without the balancing effect of the father, gave the
children unnatural security and attachments, which became
inappropriate in adulthood. Because of faulty identification, he was
not able to resolve and became fixated in a sexual stage of
development, without reaching a mature genital level. 49
The psychiatrist's description of Joselito's parents' traits does not
give this Court a deeper intuitive understanding of Joselito's psychological
state. Notably, there was no information how Joselito reacted towards the
supposed contrasting personalities of his parents during his formative
years. Neither was there any account as to how the said contrasting
parenting behavior affected Joselito's social, intellectual, moral, and
emotional growth.
Although it had been emphasized in Marcos vs. Marcos 50 and
reiterated in Tan-Andal that there is no requirement for one to be
personally examined by a physician before he may be declared
psychologically incapacitated because what is important is the presence of
evidence that adequately establishes the party's psychological incapacity,
still, the totality of evidence presented by Maria is lacking to support a
finding of psychological incapacity on the part of Joselito.
To emphasize, the testimonies of ordinary witnesses who have been
present in the life of the spouses before the latter
contracted marriage should include behaviors that they have
consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated
spouse. 51 Here, not only was there no interview or psychological test
conducted upon Joselito, there was nobody who testified on vital
information regarding his personality structure, upbringing and childhood
such as members of his family, relatives, friends, and co-workers. The
evaluation of Dr. Villegas on Joselito was based merely on information,
accounts and descriptions relayed solely by Maria which glaringly and
expectedly are biased.
Applying the amended guidelines in the Tan-Andal case, Maria
should have presented witnesses who have been present in their lives
before they contracted marriage and who could very well testify on the
respondent's behavior. As it stands, the evidence at hand is insufficient to
prove juridical antecedence.
We likewise observed that Dr. Villegas merely made a general
statement that Joselito's personality disorder is characterized by gravity
and incurability. Dr. Villegas utterly failed to expound on the extent or
degree of gravity and incurability of Joselito's claimed personality
disorder. In any case, it must be stressed that the determination of
psychological incapacity is not overly reliant on a psychological report, as
long as the totality of evidence presented supports a finding of
psychological incapacity. However, apart from the psychological report,
there is no other evidence presented to substantiate the allegation of
psychological incapacity.
Anent Dr. Villegas' statement that Joselito's preference for oral and
anal sex is a grave and serious personality disorder because it affects the
sexual function of Joselito and the sexual life of Maria, 52 We hereby
reiterate our pronouncement in Molina that "mere showing of
'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting personalities' [as in the present
case,] in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity." 53
 In Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio,  54 it was ruled that the failure of the
parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons does
not amount to psychological incapacity. In this case, the couple's
irreconcilable sexual preferences would in no way amount to
psychological incapacity. Joselito's inability to sexually satisfy his wife
Maria because the latter prefers the conventional way of coitus could not
be taken to mean that Joselito is psychologically incapacitated. Sexual
incompatibility is not a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage.
With regard to the other grounds relied upon by Maria in support of
her petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage, i.e.,  sexual
infidelity and abandonment, this Court agrees with the CA that said
circumstances, assuming that they were true, are grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code and not for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity  or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal,
or neglect  in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. 55 This
incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself
to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must
refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation
and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. 56
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family
Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital obligations. 57 It is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibilities and duties as a married
person; incapacity must be so enduring and persistent with respect to a
specific partner, that the only result of the union would be the inevitable
and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. 58
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article. 59 It must be stressed that an unsatisfactory
marriage is not a null and void marriage. 60
Time and again, it has been held that the State takes a high stake in
the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of
married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. 61 Hence, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and preservation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. 62 Presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 63
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
August 28, 2006 Decision and November 14, 2011 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80952 sustaining the validity of the marriage
of Maria Vicia Carullo-Padua with Joselito Padua are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Caguioa, **  Rosario and  Marquez, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, *  J., is on official leave.
 
Footnotes

* On official leave.

** Designated additional Member vice J. Zalameda who concurred in the assailed
CA Decision per Raffle dated April 12, 2022.
*** Per Special Order No. 2887 dated April 8, 2022.
1. Rollo, pp. 25-47.
2. Id. at 8-19. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in
by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Arcangelita Romilla-
Lontok.
3. Id. at 20-21. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in
by Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Rodil V. Zalameda (now a
Member of this Court).
4. Id. at 103-107. Penned by Presiding Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr.
5. Id. at 86-94.
6. Rollo, p. 10.
7. Records, pp. 1-9.
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 3-4.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. at 4-5.
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id. at 26.
18. Id. at 27.
19. Id. at 63-66.
20. Rollo, pp. 104-105.
21. Id. at 82-85.
22. Id. at 105.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 107.
25. Id. at 105-106.
26. Id. at 106.
27. Records, p. 198.
28. Rollo, pp. 8-18.
29. Id. at 16-17.
30. Id. at 20-21.
31. Id. at 33-34.
32. Id. at 34-36.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 36-37.
35. Id. at 37-39.
36. Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, 598 Phil. 666, 700 (2009).
37. Rollo, pp. 40-46.
38. 507 Phil. 485 (2005).
39. Id. at 498.
40. 335 Phil. 664, 676 (1997).
41. G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id., citing Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 678 (1997).
46. Supra note 43.
47. Id., citing J. Perlas-Bernabe's Concurring Opinion.
48. Rollo, pp. 82-85.
49. Id.at 84.
50. 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).
51. Supra note 43.
52. TSN, January 11, 1999, pp. 14-15.
53. Supra note 42 at 674.
54. 579 Phil. 187, 199 (2008).
55. Cortez v. Cortez, G.R. No. 224638, April 10, 2019.
56. Yambao v. Republic, 655 Phil. 346, 358-359 (2011).
57. Cortez v. Cortez, supra note 57.
58. Supra note 43.
 59. Carating-Siayngco vs. Siayngcno, 484 Phil. 396, 413, (2004); Dedel vs. Court of
Appeals, 466 Phil. 226, 233 (2004); Guillen-Pesca vs. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713, 714
(2001); Marcos vs. Marcos, supra note 52; Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, 377
Phil. 919, 931 (1999).
60. Alcazar vs. Alcazar, 618 Phil. 616, 632 (2009).
61. Castro v. Castro, G.R. No. 210548, March 2, 2020.
62. Carating-Siayngco vs. Siayngco, supra note 62 at 412.
63. Id.

 
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