Gombrich Art and Illusion
Gombrich Art and Illusion
Gombrich Art and Illusion
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'making precedes matching': with this famous formula, decade later Keith Moxey presented Gombrich as 'the most
the epitome of his Art and Illusion (i960),1 Ernst Gombrich eloquent advocate' of the 'resemblance theory of representation',
proposed that artists, before they ever dream of copying what according to which 'representation has something to do with
they see before them, make pictures by manipulating inherited the imitation of nature'. Moxey then contrasted this view
'schemata' that designate reality by force of convention. At some with that of the philosopher Nelson Goodman, numbering
point an artist compares a pictorial schema to direct observationhim among 'Gombrich's critics', who 'pointed out that [. . .] a
of the world, and on that basis presumes to correct the schema.picture never resembles anything so much as another picture'.3
This then enters the stock of available formulae until some later A reader who turns to Goodman's book Languages of Art for
artist holds it up to the world and ventures a further adjustment. further elucidation, however, will be surprised to find that the
In this way art may come to have a history. Beholders, in turn, author mentions Gombrich not as his intellectual antagonist, but
make their own sense of pictures by collating what they see on rather as a principal witness in his own conventionalist cause:
the canvas with what they know about the world and with what 'Gombrich, in particular, has amassed overwhelming evidence to
they remember of other pictures. show how the way we see and depict depends on and varies with
Gombrich's account of the making of art as an experimental experience, practice, interests, and attitudes'.4
and even improvisational process impressed many readers In Art and Illusion Gombrich makes a powerful case against
beyond the academic discipline of art history. However, for two what Ruskin called the 'innocence of the eye' (p.296). Per-
decades or more, many art historians have considered his name ception, in Gombrich's account, is not a given but a learned
a byword for a rationalist, Eurocentric and naively naturalist practice, involving an active construction of the world. Resem-
approach to art with which they no longer would wish to be blance to reality is an effect generated by the interplay between
associated. A forceful blow to Gombrich's reputation was struck the expected and the unexpected. Pictures are 'relational
by Norman Bryson in his Vision and Painting: The Logic of the models' of reality (p.253). Pictorial realism was a historical and
Gaze (1983), an intricately reasoned critique of the quest for collective product, and hard-won. The artist is not free, but
an 'Essential Copy' that has supposedly driven Western art and faces a limited array of choices (p. 3 76). Cultures determine what
art theory since Antiquity. Bryson argued that the picture, as a is possible (p. 86).
conventional sign, delivers not reality but only a coded message Such propositions inverted the conventional wisdom about
about reality and that verisimilitude is nothing more than representation. Like his near-exact contemporary, Claude Lévi-
'rhetoric' that persuades the unwary viewer that he or she is see- Strauss, Gombrich was a 'reverse thinker'. Lévi-Strauss argued
ing things as they really are. Within the discipline of art history, that myths are made by combining bits and pieces of previous
for at least a decade, Bryson's polemic was highly influential. myths. Meaning does not precede, but rather follows, the
His anti-naturalism was embraced by art historians who wished myth-maker's bricolage. 'Mythical thought [. . .] is imprisoned in
to modernise their discipline, bringing it into step with the the events and experiences which it never tires of ordering and
development of critical theory and poststructuralism that by the re-ordering in its search to find them a meaning'.5 Gombrich
1980s had already profoundly reshaped literary studies. too solved problems by turning them inside out. For example,
The problem-solving model of the development of Western he pointed out that astrological associations do not explain
art that Art and Illusion proposed left Gombrich, in Bryson's view, character traits but create them: human nature adjusts itself, as it
aligned with an unacceptable classical theory of representation: were, to fit the signs.6
'so far from questioning the Whig optimism of that version, it Gombrich's paradoxical argument is also homologous with
in fact reinforces its evolutionary and ideological drive'.2 After that of Thomas S. Kuhn, who in his The Structure of Scientific
Bryson, one could almost be forgiven for thinking that the Revolutions (1962) described the paradigmatic, essentially social
phrase 'Essential Copy', implying an endpoint to the process of basis of scientific knowledge. Just as Kuhn's demonstration of the
experimentation, was Gombrich's, which it was not. Yet only a collective and conventional nature of scientific knowledge was a
We are grateful to the Azam Foundation for sponsoring this article. played a similar role in Umberto Eco's Theory of Semiotics, Bloomington
1 E.H. Gombrich: Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, 1976, pp.204- 05, a classic treatise that makes the most extreme case possible for
New York i960. Originally delivered in 1956 as the A.W. Mellon Lectures in the the conventionality of signs. Even iconic signs, or pictures, which would seem
Fine Arts at the National Gallery of Art, Washington. to be related to what they signify in stronger than conventional ways, figure in
2 N. Bryson: Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze, Cambridge 1983, p.21. Eco's analysis as the products of cultural convention. In making his case, Eco
3 K. Moxey: The Pradice of Theory: Poststructuralism, Cultural Politics, and Art History, enlisted none other than Gombrich, citing his analysis of Constable's recoding of
Ithaca 1994, pp.30-31. the light effects in the English landscape in Wivenhoe Park (National Gallery of
4 N. Goodman: Languages of Art, Indianapolis and Cambridge 1976, p. 10. Gombrich Art, Washington; 18 16).
5 C. Lévi-Strauss: The Savage Mind, Chicago 1966, p. 22. end up producing four quite different-looking works - that Wölfllin had retold on
6 R. Woodfield: 'Warburg's "Method"', in idem, ed.: Art History as Cultural the first page of his Principles.
History: Warburg's Projects, Amsterdam 2001, p.285, citing a little-read essay by 8 Cited by O. Pacht in idem: The Practice of Art History, London 1999, p.29.
Gombrich published in a Belgian journal in i0S4· 9 Cited by L. Steinberg: 'The Eye is a Part of the Mind', in idem: Other Criteria, New
7 H. Wölfllin: Principles of Art History (191 5), New York 1950, p. 17. Gombrich even York 1972, p. 290.
began his second chapter with the very anecdote from Ludwig Richter - involving 10 E. Gilson: Painting and Reality, New York 1957, pp.259 and 265, note 25.
four draughtsmen who strive to render a natural motif with perfect objectivity and 11 Steinberg, op. cit. (note 9), p. 292.
12 ifciW., pp.51-53. Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting Literary Anthropology, Baltimore and London 1993,
13 M. Podro: Depiction, New Haven 1998, p. 26. Bryson, op. cit. (note 2), pp.284-89.
p. 30, allowed as much. W. Iser: How to Do Theory, Oxford 2006, pp.52- 55, makes a 14 E.H. Gombrich: 'Raphael s "Stanza della Segnatura , in idem: Symbolic Images,
similar argument. See the more extended discussion of Gombrich in W. Iser: The London 1972, p.ioi. See also the final words of 'Meditations on a Hobby Horse', in
the volume of the same name (London 1963); or Art and Illusion, p. 396, the penul- conception of the image as the resurrection of Life'; Bryson: op. at. (note 2),
timate sentence of the book, on our habitual reluctance 'to recognize ambiguityp. 3. I am not sure that common sense does conceive of the image in this way,
behind the veil of illusion'. but if it does, then this is the most interesting remark Bryson makes in Vision and
15 Compare the reference by Bryson to a 'generally held, vague, common-sensePainting.