GSIS v Reynaldo Palmiery, G.R. No.

217949, February 20, 2019

Facts:

Respondent Reynaldo P. Palmiery (Reynaldo) began his government service on May

2, 1961 as a Laborer in the Philippine Veterans Administration. 5 On January 1, 1987,
or after more than 25 years of service, he retired as a Manager of the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DB-P) when the bank underwent reorganization. 6 The DBP
paid his gratuity benefit under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1616 7 in the amount of Php
189,618.46. Reynaldo received the refund of his contributions amounting to Php
60,395.85.8 In total, he received Php 250,014.31.

On January 2, 1987, Reynaldo re-entered government service when he was

appointed as Manager III in the Social Security System (SSS). He continued to work
in the SSS until his retirement as a Deputy Administrator effective June 1,
1994.9 Reynaldo then claimed retirement benefits under R.A. No. 660; 10 pursuant to
which, he was granted a five (5)-year lump sum pension in the amount of Php
532,491.28. This amount was subject to the following deductions: (a) the amount of
benefits he received prior (i.e. Php 250,014.31); and (b) his outstanding
accountabilities (i.e. Php 57,774.64).11 Thus, Reynaldo received the aggregate
amount of Php 224,836.73 on July 4, 1994.12

After four (4) years, or on July 7, 1998, Reynaldo was appointed as a member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Board of Trustees. During his tenure
as a member of the board, he began to concurrently serve as the GSIS Executive
Vice-President after his appointment to this position on July 16, 1998. 13

On July 11, 2001, Reynaldo refunded to GSIS the amount of Php 895,320.78, or the
benefits he previously received from his retirement. 14 He also requested for the
suspension of his monthly pension, which became effective on July 1, 1999, or five
(5) years after the payment of his lump sum pension.15 Reynaldo likewise refunded
the pension he received on various dates, pending the GSIS' action on his request.
All in all, the total amount Reynaldo refunded to GSIS was Php 920,566.72. 16

Reynaldo retired upon reaching the compulsory retirement age on May 28, 2005. On
May 14, 2010, he applied for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291. 17 Included in
his application was his request for full credit of his government service starting on
July 1, 1961 until his mandatory retirement on May 28, 2005, or approximately 38
years.

In a letter19 dated June 3, 2010, the GSIS Claims Department rejected Reynaldo's

application for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291, for failure to meet the
service requirement. The Claims Department stated that the GSIS would only credit
Reynaldo's service after his re-entry to the government in 1998. Reynaldo was
likewise informed that the amount previously refunded to the GSIS would be
returned to him without interest. Reynaldo replied through a letter 20 dated June 21,
2010, in order to protest the denial of his retirement application.

Issue:

whether Reynaldo's previous years in government should be included in the

computation for his retirement benefits.

1
Ruling:

The Court finds the petition without merit. The GSIS should give full credit to
Reynaldo's years of service in the government.

In computing the years of service, the present GSIS Law excludes only
services credited for retirement for which the corresponding benefits have
been awarded.

The current governing law for retirees in the government service is R.A. No. 8291,
otherwise known as "The Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997" It
amended P.D. No. 1146, or the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977." Under this law, all government employees who have not reached the
mandatory retirement age are compulsorily required to become members of the
GSIS. This membership entitles employees, except those in the judiciary and
constitutional commissions, to life insurance, retirement, and other benefits
(e.g. disability, survivorship, separation, and unemployment). 47

For retirement benefits, in particular, R.A. No. 8291 provides the following
conditions before a member may become qualified to receive this benefit, viz.: (a)
the employee must have rendered at least 15 years of service; (b) the employee
must be at least 60 years old at the time of retirement; and (c) the employee must
not be receiving a monthly pension as a result of permanent total disability. 48 R.A.
No. 8291 further provides for the manner by which service is computed, thus:

SECTION 10. Computation of Service. — (a) The computation of service for the

purpose of determining the amount of benefits payable under this Act shall be from
the date of original appointment/election, including periods of service at
different times under one or more employers, those performed overseas under
the authority of the Republic of the Philippines, and those that may be prescribed by
the GSIS in coordination with the Civil Service Commission.

(b) All service credited for retirement, resignation or separation for which

corresponding benefits have been awarded under this Act or other laws
shall be excluded in the computation of service in case of reinstatement in
the service of an employer and subsequent retirement or separation which
is compensable under this Act.

For the purpose of this section the term service shall include full time service with
compensation: Provided, That part time and other services with compensation may
be included under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
GSIS.49 (Emphases Ours)

Pursuant to this provision, the GSIS argues that there is no longer "any exemption
or condition such as refund of previously received benefits[,] as a restorative
recourse of adding previous services in the computation of service [for reinstated
employees]."50 The provision in Section 12(g) of C.A. No. 186, which allows for the
refund of previously received benefits, is no longer found in the present law. Thus,
the GSIS argues that this recourse is not available to those who re-entered
government service after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291. 51

2
The Court does not agree.

While it is true that Section 12(g) of C.A. No. 186 explicitly provides for giving full
credit to the prior years of service upon the refund of benefits previously
received, the absence of a similar provision in R.A. No. 8291 does not
necessarily mean that the law has abandoned this policy. A review of Section
12 of C.A. No. 186 shows that it covered the conditions for retirement. This
provision prescribed the requirements for an employee-member to avail of the
retirement benefits under C.A. No. 186, as well as the specific benefits to which such
member may be entitled, given the various enumerated conditions.

Section 12(g) of C.A. No. 186 specifically makes reference to Section 12(f), which
disqualifies separated employees receiving the annuity under Section 11 of C.A. No.
186,52 from being appointed to another appointive position, unless he or she
possesses special qualifications. During the period of new employment, the annuity
payment is suspended. Payment of the annuity resumes only after the termination
of the employment.

But under Section 12(g) of C.A. No. 186, the GSIS should give full credit to the
services rendered prior to the reinstatement, if such separated employee is not
receiving the annuity mentioned in Section 11. The full credit of services is
conditioned upon the refund of contributions for retirement, and the benefits
previously received under any pension or retirement plan.

Thus, taken in its proper context, Section 12(g) of C.A. No. 186 applies to a specific
category of employees and their corresponding benefits. The provision's subsequent
absence in R.A. No. 8291 is attributable to the revised conditions for retirement
under the new law, which was streamlined to only three (3) requirements for
eligibility.53 The Court cannot interpret its absence in R.A. No. 8291 as an express
prohibition against refunding previously received benefits for purposes of claiming
retirement benefits under the law. The GSIS, therefore, erroneously relied on the
absence of this provision to deny the claim of Reynaldo.

More importantly, a plain reading of Section 10(b) of R.A. No. 8291 reveals that
employees who already received the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291, or the
other laws, cannot credit their years of service prior to their re-entry in the
government. Conversely, this means that employees who have not received
their retirement benefits are entitled to full credit of their service.

In this regard, those similarly situated, or those who refunded their retirement
benefits to the GSIS after they re-entered government service should be allowed to
include their prior years of service in the computation of their eligibility and
retirement benefits. This is consistent with the legal precept against double
compensation, which prohibits payment for the same services covering the same
period.54 Thus, if the employee has not received his/her retirement benefits, or has
returned them to the GSIS, as the case may be, then the prohibition against double
retirement benefits cannot apply.

For this reason, giving full credit to Reynaldo's years of service in the government
does not contravene any existing statute or policy, especially since it is undisputed

3
that Reynaldo refunded his previously received benefits to the GSIS. The GSIS even
suspended his monthly pension effective October 1, 2001, pursuant to the request of
Reynaldo.55 His re-entry into government service after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8291 is, therefore, inconsequential to the present case. The distinction that the GSIS
created between individuals who re-entered government service before the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, and those who re-entered after its effectivity, cannot
supersede the unambiguous policy in Section 10(b) of the new GSIS Law.

In accepting the refund of Reynaldo, the GSIS cannot subsequently apply PPG No.
183-06, which adopts a new policy prejudicial to the retiree. The GSIS is the primaiy
agency tasked with administering the government's retirement system. Reynaldo,
thus, correctly assumed that when the GSIS accepted the refund of his retirement
benefits, the agency would grant full credit to his years of service in the
government.

Granting full credit to Reynaldo's years of service is neither unjust enrichment nor
violative of the principle against double compensation. There is no express
prohibition under R.A. No. 8291 against crediting the years of service upon the
refund of previously received retirement benefits. In this case, Reynaldo refunded
his retirement pay and monthly pension; and, from the time his monthly pension
was suspended, Reynaldo no longer received the benefits due him. Denying his
claim is, therefore, tantamount to depriving Reynaldo of his compensation for the
years of service he rendered to the government, despite being eligible under the
law.

Ultimately, in our jurisdiction, the inflexible rule is that social legislation must be
liberally construed in favor of the beneficiaries. 61 This includes retirement laws, the
main objective of which is to provide support to retirees, especially at a time when
their employment has ended.62 The benefits that retirees receive from retirement is
also a form of reward for loyally serving their employer. 63 In light of the
humanitarian purpose of retirement laws, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the retiree as the person primarily intended to be benefited by this legislation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated January 21,
2015 and the Resolution dated April 17, 2015, which were both promulgated by the
Court of Appeals in relation to CA-G.R. SP No. 129755, are AFFIRMED.

Quirico D. Aninon v GSIS, G.R. No. 190410, April 10, 2019 (reversed)

4
Facts:

Aniñon rendered intermittent government service from 1969 until 1982, first, as an
employee of the Bureau of Census and Statistics, then, of the Department of Justice,
and then later, of the Supreme Court. In 1988, he returned to the civil service as an
employee of the Supreme Court. He eventually resigned in 1989 to work abroad. 5

During the time Aniñon was separated from the civil service, the prevailing law
governing retirement benefits was Presidential Decree No. 1146 (Revised
Government Insurance Act of 1977),6 which amended and expanded Commonwealth
Act (C.A.) No. 186.7 Under said law, the retiree must have rendered at least 15
years of service to be entitled to retirement benefits. 8

By the time he left in 1989 to work abroad, Aniñon had only been in government
service for 12 years, and his service had been intermittent and not continuous. As
the result of his voluntary separation from the service prior to obtaining the
necessary eligibility, he received from the GSIS an amount of P16,345.12
representing the refund of his premiums, 9 to which he was entitled under Section
11(d) of C.A. No. 186, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 660 (Return of
Premiums).10

On August 19, 1996,11 Aniñon was reinstated in the civil service as an employee of

the Professional Regulatory Commission. He later transferred to the CA on June 3,
1998,12 and then again to the Supreme Court on January 19, 2001,13 where he
served until February 28, 2008.14

Meanwhile, on May 30, 1997, R.A. No. 8291 (GSIS Act of 1997), amending P.D. No.
1146, took effect. Under R.A. No. 8291, the retiree must have served a minimum of
15 years in the government to be eligible for retirement benefits; 15 if the retiree was
previously separated or retired from the Government but was reinstated or re-
employed in the civil service, his length of service shall include the periods of service
at different times under one or more employers 16 but shall exclude such number of
years of service for which he already applied and was awarded benefits under earlier
applicable retirement laws (Previous Services).17

The GSIS, through its Board of Trustees,18 reiterated this rule on computing total
service in its Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 8291 (Implementing
Rules),19 thereby making the previously retired or separated civil servant in effect a
new entrant upon re-employment.20

In connection with the Implementing Rules, the GSIS issued an opinion barring full
credit of service years to reinstated employees in case they retired prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8291 and collected the benefits therefrom, viz.:

To align with DOJ Opinion No. 106, the GSIS issued Policy and Procedural Guidelines
No. (PPG) No. 183-06 on January 3, 2006, 27 which was published on January 28,
2006,28 whereby the GSIS clarified that a reinstated employee should be allowed full
credit of previous services provided he/she meanwhile complied with the refund
requirement, that is, to refund all retirement benefits received from his/her previous

5
retirement or separation from service within 30 days from the publication of PPG No.
183-06.

In his letter dated November 20, 2006 addressed to Mr. Robert M. Agustin, Vice
President, Social Insurance Operations Office I, of the GSIS, 29 Aniñon expressed his
intention to retire on March 24, 2007, his 63 rd birthday. For the purpose, he
requested the full credit of his 12-year government service rendered prior to his
reinstatement in 1996. However, having just learned about the refund requirement,
he requested to be exempt from the coverage of PPG No. 183-06, specifically asking
that he be allowed to belatedly refund the premiums returned in 1989, or,
alternatively, to have the amount of the premiums deducted from his future
retirement proceeds by way of offsetting.

However, Agustin denied Aniñon's request by letter dated January 24, 2007. 30

Aniñon then elevated his concern to the GSIS Board of Trustees. In his petition
dated January 31, 2007,31 he reiterated his request and argued that PPG No. 183-06
violated his right to due process;32 that publication of PPG No. 183-06 in a
newspaper of general circulation was insufficient; that he was entitled to personal
prior notice of PPG No. 183-06 and to a public hearing properly informing him that
failure to pay the refund by the deadline would amount to a waiver; 33 that as a
result, he learned of PPG No. 183-06 only on November 7, 2006, or over eight
months past the deadline set for the refund of retirement benefits previously
received by reinstated government employees;34 and that PPG No. 183-06 also
infringed his right to equal protection35 because prior to its effectivity, reinstated
employees were allowed to comply with the refund requirement through a "post-
payment" scheme recognized by the GSIS in its Primer on RA 8291, 36 whereby the
corresponding contributions would instead be deducted or offset from benefits to be
received.

Issue:

(5) whether or not he retired in 1989 and availed himself of the corresponding
benefits under R.A. No. 1616.

Ruling:

6
 2.
To be entitled to full service credit, Aniñon as a reinstated employee must
refund benefits previously received

We next review and resolve the merits of Aniñon's submission.

Section 10(b) of P.D. No. 1146, as amended by R.A. No. 8291, provides:

x x x x

(b) All service credited for retirement, resignation or separation for which
corresponding benefits have been awarded under this Act or other laws shall
be excluded in the computation of service in case of reinstatement in the service of
an employer and subsequent retirement or separation which is compensable under
this Act. (Emphasis Supplied)

xxxx
This provision contemplates the situation in which: (1) a government employee
previously retired, resigned, or was otherwise separated from service; (2) he/she
received benefits under R.A. No. 8291 or other applicable retirement laws by virtue
of his/her first/previous retirement or separation; (3) he/she is reinstated to
government service; (4) he/she subsequently retires or is separated from service;
and (5) by virtue of his/her second/subsequent retirement or separation, he/she
seeks to avail himself/herself of the benefits under R.A. No. 8291.

In such situation, years of service already counted and credited during his/her
first/previous retirement shall not be creditable service for his/her
second/subsequent retirement.

PPG No. 183-06 reiterates this general rule, and further classifies the reinstated
government employee as a new entrant, viz.:

Section 8.6. Effect of Re-employment. - When a retiree is reemployed, his/her

previous services credited at the time of his/her retirement shall be excluded in the
computation of future benefits. In effect, he/she shall be considered a new entrant.
The exclusion of the previous service from the computation of creditable service for
the second/subsequent retirement effectively bars the retiree from receiving benefits
twice for the same period of service. This rule is consistent with the constitutional
prohibition against double compensation embodied in Section 8, Article IX-B, of the
1987 Constitution, to wit:

PPG No. 183-06 thus allowed the full credit of previous service in connection with
the reinstated employee's second/subsequent retirement provided he/she refunded
all the benefits received from his/her first/previous retirement on or before February
27, 2006.59 However, PPG No. 183-06 disallowed the offsetting method (that is, to
have benefits previously received deducted from proceeds to be received in the
second/subsequent retirement). The refund requirement was consistent with the
rule against unjust enrichment, and allowed the retiring employee to enjoy the
benefits under R.A. No. 8291 in full, even those pertaining to his previous service,
without violating the proscription against double compensation.

Herein, Aniñon has sought to include as creditable service his 12-year previous

7
service for purposes of his subsequent retirement. The controversy arose only when
he requested the GSIS for an exemption from the application of PPG 183-06, that is:
(a) to allow him to comply with the refund requirement even beyond the deadline;
or (b) to allow him to simply offset the amount of the refund against benefits he
would subsequently receive.

For sure, meeting the requisite length of government service, years of age, and non-
receipt of permanent total disability benefits did not ipso facto vest the government
employee the right to the retirement benefits available under R.A. No. 8291. He/She
must also have formally "retired" from service by filing an application for retirement
and submitting the required documents to the GSIS.

The submission of the documentary requirements to the GSIS was as much a

condition sine qua non to the vesting of one's right to the retirement benefits as the
meeting of the eligibility requirements itself. The GSIS, being the statutorily-
mandated body to process benefit claims under R.A. No. 8291, 63 was empowered to
determine the employee's eligibility to receive retirement benefits based on his/her
application and submission of corresponding requirements. Certainly, an individual's
entitlement to retirement benefits cannot be left to his/her self-determination. We
also cannot expect the GSIS to unilaterally pay retirement benefits motu
proprio whenever a government employee attained the age of retirement.

Under the foregoing, the CA was correct in ruling that, at the time of the effectivity
of PPG 183-06, Aniñon's retirement benefits sans his formal application for
retirement and the determination by the GSIS of his eligibility and compliance with
the documentary requirements were only future benefits over which he did not have
any vested right. As such, the guidelines under PPG 183-06 could not have impaired
what was then a mere expectancy.64

4.
PPG No. 183-06 did not apply to the petitioner

Aniñon submits that prior to the effectivity of PPG No. 183-06, the GSIS allowed
compliance with the refund requirement through the offsetting method, pursuant to
which the benefits previously received would instead be deducted from the proceeds
of the last retirement.

To recall, Aniñon had only accumulated 12 years of service in the government upon
being separated from service in 1989. Hence, he was not yet eligible to receive
benefits under prevailing retirement laws,65 which required at least 15 years of
government service.

Nevertheless, Aniñon collected P16,345.12 from the GSIS because Section 11(d) of
C.A. No. 186, the law then in force, entitled him to the refund of his own premiums
and voluntary deposits, to wit:

8
At this point, we clarify and point out that Aniñon was voluntarily separated from
service in 1989. He did not retire or receive retirement benefits 66 inasmuch as he did
not possess the required eligibility at that time. Thus, when he collected the sum of
his premiums or personal contributions, he received only the return of his premiums.

That no retirement benefit was paid pertaining to Aniñon's 12-year period of

previous service leads to the inescapable conclusion that he would not be awarded
retirement benefits twice for the same period. Obviating the danger of double
compensation with respect to his subsequent retirement thus removes Aniñon from
the application of Section 10(b) of P.D. No. 1146, as amended by R.A. No. 8291, as
well as the requirements under PPG 183-06. On this basis, the GSIS plainly erred in
disallowing outright his previous service for non-compliance with guidelines not even
applicable to his situation.

However, this conclusion should not be construed as the ipso facto inclusion of his

previous service in the computation of his creditable service. In order that his
previous service may be appreciated for purposes of computing creditable service,
Aniñon should pay back to the GSIS the premiums returned to him in 1989. Fairness
demands that the corresponding premiums be paid for his prior years of service to
enable him to receive retirement benefits pertaining to that period.

5.
Aniñon could be allowed to refund amount through deduction from future
retirement proceeds

It is not disputed that the GSIS returned Aniñon's personal contributions pertaining
to the period of his previous service. Thus, upon his subsequent retirement, the
required contributions for said period remain unpaid.

The GSIS relies on member and employer contributions to properly administer social
security and insurance benefits.68 As such, it is only fair for Aniñon to remit the
contributions covering the period of his previous service before he could derive
retirement benefits therefrom.

However, we clarify that the GSIS cannot deprive Aniñon of the opportunity to make
good his obligation through the offsetting method, which the law allowed under the
particular circumstances of his case. As stated, Aniñon was separated from service
in 1989 and received a return of his contributions but he continued to be a GSIS
member and remained entitled to certain benefits. 69 Thus, his eligibility to receive
retirement benefits should not be affected by a deficiency in his account.

This interpretation of the pertinent GSIS rules and regulations is supported by the
basic principle that social legislation, such as retirement laws, must be liberally
construed in the retiree-beneficiary's favor. C.A. No. 186, P.D. No. 1146, and R.A.
No. 8291 and its Implementing Rules were enacted "to provide for the retirees
sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the capability to
earn a livelihood."70 Thus, we must interpret these laws in a way that protects and
enhances a government employee's quality of life after devoting his prime years to
the civil service.

9
GSIS v Apolinario Pauig, G.R. No. 210328, January 30, 2017

Facts:

Respondent Apolinario C. Pauig (Pauig) was the Municipal Agriculturist of the Municipality of San
Pablo, lsabela. He started in the government service on February 12, 1964 as Emergency
Laborer on casual status. Later, he became a temporary employee from July 5, 1972 to July 18,
1977. On July 19, 1977, he became a permanent employee, and on August 1, 1977, he became
a GSIS member, as indicated in his Information for Membership.

Thereafter, on November 3, 2004, he retired from the service upon reaching the mandatory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) years old. But when he filed his retirement papers with the GSIS-
Cauayan, the latter processed his claim based on a Record of Creditable Service (RCS) and a
Total Length of Service of only twenty-seven (27) years. Disagreeing with the computation, Pauig
wrote a letter-complaint to the GSIS, arguing that his first fourteen (14) years in the government
service had been. erroneously omitted.

The GSIS ratiocinated that Pauig's first fourteen (14) years in the government were excluded in
the computation of his retirement benefits because during those years, no premium payments
were remitted to it. Under the Premium-Based Policy of the GSIS which took effect on August 1,
2003, only periods of service where premium payments were made and duly remitted to the
System shall be included in the computation of retirement benefits. Aggrieved, Pauig filed a case
before the RTC of Cabagan, Isabela.

Issue:

whether or not the GSIS should include Pauig's first fourteen (14) years in government service
for the calculation of the latter's retirement benefits claim.

Ruling:

The Court rules in the negative.

Retirement benefits are given to government employees to reward them for giving the best years
of their lives to the service of their country. This is especially true with those in government
service occupying positions of leadership or positions requiring management skills because the
years they devote to government service could be spent more profitably elsewhere, such as in
lucrative appointments in the private sector. Hence, in exchange for their selfless dedication to
government service, they should enjoy security of tenure and be ensured of a reasonable
amount of support after they leave the government.  4

Pauig insists that retirement laws must be liberally construed in favor of the retirees because the
intention is to provide for their sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when they no longer
have the stamina to continue earning their livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to
public service, Pauig asserts that he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best
concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length
of his services. That generosity, he argues, is the least he should expect now that his work is
done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the
approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to savor the fruits of his toil.5

10
However, the doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied in this case, where the law
invoked is clear, unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or construction. To uphold
Pauig's position will contravene the very words of the law, and will defeat the ends which it seeks
to attain.
6

Pauig claims that his service in the government from February 12, 1964 to July 18, 1977 should
be credited for the purpose of computing his retirement benefits. The RTC, in ruling in his favor,
relied on Policy 2 of Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 171-03 dated February 2, 2003, which
states:

Indubitably, compulsory coverage under the GSIS had previously and consistently included
regular and permanent employees, and expressly excluded casual, substitute or temporary
employees from its retirement insurance plan. A permanent appointment is one issued to a
person who has met the requirements of the position to which appointment is made, in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards, while
temporary appointment is made in the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes
necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy. Casual employment, on the other hand, is not
permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature.   Based on the records,
11

Pauig began his career in the government on February 12, 1964 as Emergency Laborer on a
casual status. Then, he became a temporary employee from July 5, 1972 to July 18, 1977.
However, the Court notes that it was not until 1997 that the compulsory membership in the GSIS
was extended to employees other than those on permanent status, to wit:

B. MEMBERSHIP IN THE GSIS

SEC. 3. Compulsory Membership. - Membership in the GSIS shall be compulsory for all
employees receiving compensation who have not reached the compulsory retirement
age, irrespective of employment status, except members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police, subject to the condition that they must settle first
their financial obligation with the GSIS, and contractuals who have no employer and employee
relationship with the agencies they serve.

Except for the members of the judiciary and constitutional commissions who shall have life
insurance only, all members of the GSIS shall have life insurance, retirement, and all other social
security protections such as disability, survivorship, separation, and unemployment benefits.  12

Pauig cited the case of GSIS v. CSC,   where the Court ruled that the basis for the provision of
13

retirement benefits is service to the government. Indeed, while a government insurance system
rationalizes the management of funds necessary to keep this system of retirement support afloat
and is partly dependent on contributions made by the thousands of members of the system, the
fact that these contributions are minimal when compared to the amount of retirement benefits
actually received shows_ that such contributions, while necessary, are not absolutely
determinative in drawing up criteria for those who would qualify as recipients of the retirement
benefit system.

Unfortunately, Pauig's reliance on the aforecited case is misplaced. True, in GS/S v. CSC, the
Court allowed the claimants to avail of their retirement benefits although no deductions were
made from their salaries during the disputed periods when they were paid on a per diem basis.
However, unlike in the case at bar, deductions were actually made from claimant's fixed salary
before and after the short controversial period. She assumed in all good faith that she continued
to be covered by the GSIS insurance benefits considering that, in fact and in practice, the
deductions are virtually mandatorily made from all government employees on an essentially
involuntary basis. More importantly, neither of the claimants in this case of GSIS v. CSC was a
casual or temporary employee like Pauig, both of them being elective officials.   Here, the
14

primordial reason why there were no deductions during those fourteen (14) years was because
Pauig was not yet a GSIS member at that time. There was thus no legal obligation to pay the

11
premium as no basis for the remittance of the same existed. And since only periods of service
where premium payments were actually made and duly remitted to the GSIS shall be included in
the computation of retirement benefits, said disputed period of fourteen (14) years must
corollarily be removed from Pauig's creditable service.

The Court must deny Pauig' s appeal to liberal construction since the applicable law is clear and
unambiguous. The primary modality of addressing the present case is to look into the provisions
of the retirement law itself. Guided by the rules of statutory construction in this consideration, the
Court finds that the language of the retirement law is clear and unequivocal; no room for
construction or interpretation exists, only the application of the letter of the law. 15 Therefore,
Pauig' s casual and temporary service in the government from February 12, 1964 to July 18,
1977 must necessarily be excluded from the creditable period of service for retirement purposes.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court GRANTS the petition

and REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the Decision dated July 15, 2013 and Order dated
December 4, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22, in Civil
Case No. 22-1035 insofar as it directs the Government Service Insurance System to include
Apolinario C. Pauig's casual and temporary service in the government from February 12, 1964 to
July 18, 1977 as creditable service for purposes of computing his retirement benefits.

12
Cena v Civil Service Commission etal., G.R. No. 97419, July 3, 1992

May a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service,
be allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement to
enable him to retire with the benefits of an old-age pension under Section 11 par.(b)
of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977? This is the issue raised
before this Court by petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, a Registrar of the Register of
Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.

Facts:

Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on November 16,

1978 as Legal Officer II of the Law Department of Caloocan City where he stayed for
seven (7) years until his transfer on November 16, 1986 to the Office of the
Congressman of the First District of Caloocan City where he worked for only three
(3) months, or until February 15, 1987, as Supervising Staff Officer.

On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of

Malabon, Metro Manila, the position he held at the time he reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years on January 22, 1991. By then, he would have rendered a
total government service of 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his
65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of Justice, through Administrator Teodoro
G. Bonifacio of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), that he be allowed to extend
his service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with
full benefits of old-age pension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146.
chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the Civil Service
Commission whether or not to allow the extension of service of petitioner Cena as he
is covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, series 1990. In his 2nd
Indorsement dated August 6, 1990, the LRA Administrator observed that if
petitioner’s service as of January 22, 1991 of 10 years, 6 months and 6 days (should
be 11 years, 9 months and 6 days) would he extended to 15 years, he would have
to retire on April 15, 1994 at the age of 68 years.

On July 31, 1990, the Civil Service Commission denied petitioner Cena’s request for
extension of service in its CSC Resolution No. 90-681, declaring therein, that Mr.
Cena shall be considered retired from the service on January 22, 1991, the date
when he shall reach the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, unless
his retention for another year is sought by the head of office under Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990.

13
Ruling:

We grant the petition.

Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 November 24, 1987) cannot be interpreted to authorize the Civil
Service Commission to limit to only one (1) year the extension of service of an
employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 without having
completed 15 years of service, when said limitation has no relation to or connection
with the provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect.

As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot authorize

the modification of an express provision of a special law (Revised Government
Service Insurance of 1977). Otherwise, the intent and purpose of the provisions on
retirement and pension of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977
(P.D. 1146) would be rendered nugatory and meaningless.

Section 11 paragraph(b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977

expressly provides, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishing retirement

plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended
to be benefited thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian
purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of
government employees may be enhanced (Bautista v. Auditor General, 104 Phil 428,
Ortiz v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-78957, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812).

The Court stated in Abad Santos v. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176, that a pension
partakes of the nature of "retained wages" of the retiree for a double purpose: (1) to
entice competent men and women to enter the government service, and (2) permit
them to retire from the service with relative security, not only for those who have
retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been incapacitated by illness or
accident.

We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes creating pension or

establishing retirement plans in cases involving officials of the Judiciary who lacked
the age and service requirement for retirement. We see no cogent reason to rule
otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of the Executive Branch, as in the case
of petitioner Cena, who has reached 65 but opted to avail of the statutory privilege
under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 to continue in the service to complete the 15-
year service requirement in order to avail of old-age pension.

There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing ordinary employees in the

Executive Branch, on a case to case basis, to continue in the service to complete the
15-year service requirement to avail of the old-age pension under Section 11 of P.D.
1146. By limiting the extension of service to only one (1) year would defeat the
beneficial intendment of the retirement provisions of P.D. 1146.

In resolving the question whether or not to allow a compulsory retiree to continue in

the service to complete the 15-year service, there must be present an essential
factor before an application under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 may be granted
by the employer or government office concerned. In the case of officials of the

14
Judiciary, the Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of required age or
service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence,
integrity, and dedication to the public service (Re: Gregorio Pineda, supra). It must
be so in the instant case.

It is interesting to note that the phrase "he shall be allowed to continue in the
service to complete the fifteen years" found in Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146 is a
reproduction of the phrase in the original text found in Section 12 (e) of
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended, otherwise known as the "Government Service
Insurance Act" approved on November 14, 1936. There is nothing in the original text
as well as in the revised version which would serve as the basis for providing the
allowable extension period to only one (1) year. There is likewise no indication that
Section 11 par.(b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a
compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less than
15 years of government service, i.e. only a few months short of the 15-year
requirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension.

While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given the Civil Service
Commission the authority "to take appropriate action on all appointments and other
personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of service beyond
retirement age", the said provision cannot be extended to embrace matters not
covered by the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (Sto. Tomas v.
Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46). The authority
referred to therein is limited only to carrying into effect what the special law,
Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977, or any other retirement law being
invoked provides. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an
administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166,
October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators,
L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952,
December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29
SCRA 350).

The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146 otherwise known as
the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." The rule on limiting to
only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of service under
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 s. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded
validity because it has no relation to or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146
supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the
law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has
no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.

As a matter of fact, We have liberally applied Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 in two
(2) recent cases where We allowed two employees in the Judiciary who have
reached the age of 65 to continue in the government service to complete the 15-
year service requirement to be entitled to the benefits under P.D. 1146.

15
It is erroneous to apply to petitioner Cena who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and
6 days of government service, Section 12, par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which provides that
"a member who has rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of
service at the time of separation shall, . . . upon separation after age sixty, receive a
cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of
service."cralaw virtua1aw library

The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which allows him to
extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days to complete the 15-year of service
consistent with the beneficial intendment of P.D. 1146 and which right is subject to
the discretion of the government office concerned.

Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does not apply to the case of herein petitioner
Cena, because he opted to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service
requirement pursuant to Section 11 par.(b) of P.D. 1146. The completion of the 15-
year service requirement under Section 11 par. (b) partakes the nature of a
privilege given to an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of
65 years, but has less than 15 years of service. If said employee opted to avail of
said privilege, he is entitled to the benefits of the old-age pension. On the other
hand, if the said employee opted to retire upon reaching the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years although he has less than 15 years of service, he is entitled to the
benefits provided for under Section 12 of P.D. 1146, i.e. a cash equivalent to 100%
of his average monthly compensation for every year of service. cralawnad

The right under Section 11, par. (b) is open to all employees similarly situated, so it
does not offend the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law. There is
nothing absurd or inequitable in rewarding an employee for completion of the 15-
year service beyond the retirement age. If he would be better off than the one who
has served for 14 years but who is separated from the service at the age of 64, it
would be only just and proper as he would have worked for the whole period of 15
years as required by law for entitlement of the old-age pension. Indeed, a longer
service should merit a greater reward. Besides, his entitlement to the old-age
pension is conditioned upon such completion. Thus, if the service is not completed
due to death or incapacity, he would be entitled to the benefit under Section 12, par.
(b) i.e. a cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every
year of service.

Finally, in view of the aforesaid right accorded under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D.
1146, petitioner Cena should not be covered by Memorandum Circular No. 65 issued
by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig on June 14, 1988. Memorandum
Circular No. 65 allowing retention of service for only six (6) months for "extremely
meritorious reasons" should apply only to employees or officials who have reached
the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same time, have
completed the 15-year service requirement for retirement purposes. It should not
apply to employees or officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of
65 years who but, opted to avail of the old-age pension under par. (b), Section 11 of
P.D. 1146, in which case, they are allowed, at the discretion of the agency
concerned, to complete the 15-year service requirement.

16
Rabor v Civil Service Commission, 244 SCRA 614

Facts:

Sometime in May 1991,  Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao
1

City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already reached
the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1)
month of government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of
Membership"  issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May
2

1988. At the bottom of this "Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following
tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-
legible initial with the following date "2/28/91."

Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the Regional Director
of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City ("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the
foregoing and requesting advice "as to what action [should] be taken on this matter."

In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City Mayor
Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:

Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C.
No. 65 of the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which is hereunder
quoted:

Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory

retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained the service,
except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the
retention shall not exceed six (6) months.

Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated 14 August 1991,
asking for extension of his services in the City Government until he "shall have completed the
fifteen (15) years service [requirement] in the Government so that [he] could also avail of the
benefits of the retirement laws given to employees of the Government." The extension he was
asking for was about two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health and very able to
perform the duties and functions of [his] position as Utility Worker," Rabor sought "extension of
[his] service as an exception to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the
President."  This request was denied by Director Cawad on 15 August 1991.
5

In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor contends that his claim falls squarely within the ruling of this
Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission.  11

Upon the other hand, the Commission seeks to distinguish this case from Cena. The
Commission, through the Solicitor General, stressed that in Cena, this Court had ruled that the
employer agency, the Land Registration Authority of the Department of Justice, was vested with
discretion to grant to Cena the extension requested by him. The Land Registration Authority had
chosen not to exercise its discretion to grant or deny such extension. In contrast, in the instant
case, the Davao City Government did exercise its discretion on the matter and decided to deny
the extension sought by petitioner Rabor for legitimate reasons.

17
We start by recalling the factual setting of Cena.

The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary
meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. Section 11 may be quoted in its entirety:

The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has often been invoked in
respect of retirement statutes:

Being remedial in character, a statute granting a pension or establishing [a]

retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of persons
intended to be benefitted thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security and well-being
of government employees may be enhanced.  (Citations omitted)
14

While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2)
administrative issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be
granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age.

It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum No. 27, took a
very narrow view on the question of what subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is
permissible and valid. That restrictive view must be contrasted with this Court's earlier ruling
in People v. Exconde,   where Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:
17

Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to

be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling
statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion)
for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative
bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex
subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so
important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably; demanded is a showing that the
delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general
purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately
applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test
we now turn.

We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the present Civil
Service law — found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July
1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 — and not alone P.D. No. 1146,
otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of
extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is
covered by both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146. This is crystal clear from
examination of many provisions of the present civil service law.

It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil
Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission
was acting as "the central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate
policies, standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration
in the government."   It was also discharging its function of "administering the retirement
23

program for government officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for

retirement."

In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative Code with
providing leadership and assistance "in the development and retention of qualified and efficient
work force in the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the "enforcement of the constitutional
and statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for the effective implementation
of the retirement of government officials and employees" (Section 16 [14]).

18
We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an
employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not
germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and
psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the
efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons. The policy
considerations which guided the Civil Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension of
service allowable for compulsory retirees, were summarized by Griño-Aquino, J. in her dissenting
opinion in Cena

Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees, something that is, in itself,
quite appropriate. At the same time, however, we are bound to note that there should be
countervailing stress on the interests of the employer agency and of other government
employees as a whole. The results flowing from the striking down of the limitation established in
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and inequitable," as suggested
by Mme. Justice Griño-Aquino in her dissenting opinion. An employee who has rendered only
three (3) years of government service at age sixty-five (65) can have his service extended for
twelve (12) years and finally retire at the age of seventy-seven (77). This reduces the
significance of the general principle of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65) very close to
the vanishing point.

The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel administration and
management in the Civil Service, are aggravated when Cena is considered together with the
case of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission.   Toledo involved the provisions of Rule III, Section
25

22, of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which prohibited the
appointment of persons fifty-seven (57) years old or above in government service without prior
approval of the Civil Service Commission. Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of
1983 provided that a person fifty-seven (57) years of age may be appointed to the Civil Service
provided that the exigencies of the government service so required and provided that the
appointee possesses special qualifications not possessed by other officers or employees in the
Civil Service and that the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees
of the Civil Service. Petitioner Toledo was appointed Manager of the Education and Information
Division of the Commission on Elections when he was almost fifty-nine (59) years old. No
authority for such appointment had been obtained either from the President of the Philippines or
from the Civil Service Commission and the Commission found that the other conditions laid down
in Section 22 of Rule III, CSRPAP, did not exist. The Court nevertheless struck down Section 22,
Rule III on the same exceedingly restrictive view of permissible administrative legislation
that Cena relied on.26

When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena, very strange results follow.
Under these combined doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age may be appointed to the
government service and one (1) year later may demand extension of his service for the next
fourteen (14) years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79). The net effect is thus that the
general statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65) years is heavily eroded and
effectively becomes unenforceable. That general statutory policy may be seen to embody the
notion that there should be a certain minimum turn-over in the government service and that
opportunities for government service should be distributed as broadly as possible, specially to
younger people, considering that the bulk of our population is below thirty (30) years of age. That
same general policy also reflects the life expectancy of our people which is still significantly lower
than the life expectancy of, e.g., people in Northern and Western Europe, North America and
Japan.

19
Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1)
thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly,
be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding
in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority
to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five
(65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is,
nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.

We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the
Office of the President dated 14 June 1988. It will be noted from the text quoted supra (pp. 11-
12) that the text itself of Memorandum Circular No. 65 (and for that matter, that of Memorandum
Circular No. 163, also of the Office of the President, dated 5 March 1968)   does not purport to
27

apply only to officers or employees who have reached the age of sixty-five (65) years and who
have at least fifteen (l5) years of government service. We noted earlier that Cena interpreted
Memorandum Circular No. 65 as referring only to officers and employees who have both reached
the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) and completed the fifteen (15) years of
government service. Cena so interpreted this Memorandum Circular precisely
because Cena had reached the conclusion that employees who have reached sixty-five (65)
years of age, but who have less than fifteen (15) years of government service, may be allowed
such extension of service as may be needed to complete fifteen (15) years of service. In other
words, Cena read Memorandum Circular No. 65 in such a way as to comfort with Cena's own
conclusion reached without regard to that Memorandum Circular. In view of the conclusion that
we today reached in the instant case, this last ruling of Cena is properly regarded as
merely orbiter.

We also do not believe it necessary to determine whether Civil Service Memorandum Circular
No. 27 is fully compatible with Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65; this
question must be reserved for detailed analysis in some future justiciable case.

Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant case, we believe and so
hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of
petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must
be upheld and affirmed.

ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

20