Criminal Law Jurisprudence 2019 by Prof. Modesto Ticman, Jr.

JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™
CRIMINAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE

Prepared by: Atty. Modesto A. Ticman, Jr.
THE REVISED PENAL CODE
BOOK ONE
1. Construction of Penal Laws. Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but
contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be
preferred.1
2. Prospective application. Penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they
acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
advantageous to the accused.2
3. Motive, not essential; exceptions. Motive pertains to the reason which prompts the
accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. It is not an essential element of a crime and need
not be proven by the State in criminal prosecutions. Hence, proof of motive alone will not establish guilt
in the same way that the absence thereof cannot establish innocence.3
3.1 Although the general rule is that motive is not essential to a conviction especially
where the identity of the assailant is duly established by other competent evidence or is not
disputed, the absence of such motive is important in ascertaining the truth as between two
antagonistic theories or versions of the killing. Proof as to motive is essential when the
evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive.4
4. Alibi as a defense. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the witnesses. To be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense
of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the person charged with the
crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be
in two places at the same time.5
1 People vs. Sullano, G.R. No. 228373, 12 March 2018.

2 Valeroso vs. People, 546 SCRA 450 (2008).
3 People vs. Pentecostes, G.R. No. 226158, 08 November 2017.
4 Ubales vs. People, 520 SCRA 251 (2008).
5 see People vs. Ambatang, G.R. No. 205855, 29 March 2017.
6
Calimutan vs. People, 482 SCRA 47 (2006).
Criminal Law Jurisprudence by Prof. Modesto A.Ticman, Jr. for Jurists Bar Review Center™. © 2019 by Jurists
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5. Classification of felonies according to their means of execution. These two types
of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the
offender –
―In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the
language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender,
in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to
another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The
injury caused by the offender to another person is ―unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.‖6
6. Mala in se and mala prohibita, distinguished. The rule is that in acts mala in se, the
intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is
illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is
considered injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.
6.1 A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality,
however, there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No.
7080, as amended. Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as
technical malversation.6
6.2 When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in
se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly
established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.7
6.3 The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The act of hazing
itself is not inherently immoral, but the law deems the same to be against public policy and
must be prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of
hazing. Also, the defense of good faith cannot be raised in its prosecution.9
7. Mistake of fact. A "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would

have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. A proper invocation of this
defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c)
that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the
statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.8
8. How criminal liability may be incurred. A person committing a felony is criminally

liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended. ―Natural‖ refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of
human life or events, while ―logical‖ means that there is a rational connection between the act of the
accused and the resulting injury or damage.9
8.1 When death results, even if there was no intent to kill, the crime is homicide, not
just physical injuries, since with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof. Accordingly, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
6 Dungo vs. People, 761 SCRA 375 (2015)

7 Mabunot vs. People, G.R. No. 204659, 19 September
2016. 9Dungo vs. People, supra note 7.
8 Yapyuco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, 674 SCRA 420 (2012).
9 Quinto vs. Andres, 453 SCRA 511 (2005).
―Art. 4. Criminal liability – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
―1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.‖10
9. Proximate cause; Efficient intervening cause. Proximate cause is defined as that

cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.11
9.1 The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when: (a)
there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury,
and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the
accused; or (b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.
9.2 The ―cause and effect‖ relationship is not altered or changed because of the
pre-existing conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim; the predisposition of the
offended party; the physical condition of the offended party; or the concomitant or concurrent
conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors; or the conditions supervening the
felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.12
10. Impossible crimes. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act
performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent;
[and] (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual13, and (4) that the act performed should not constitute a violation of another
provision of the Revised Penal Code.14
11. Stages of Execution; Attempted, Frustrated and Consummated. In homicide

cases,
the rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is
only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have
brought about death.17 Conversely, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if
the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical
intervention or attendance.15
11.1 Whether attempted/frustrated homicide or Physical Injuries. In order to

determine whether the crime committed is attempted or frustrated parricide, murder or
homicide, or only physical injuries, the crucial points to consider are: a) whether the injury
sustained by the victim was fatal, and b) whether there was intent to kill on the part of the
accused. If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by
the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical
injury.16
10 Ng vs. People, 619 SCRA 219 (2010).

11 Dumayag vs. People, 686 SCRA 347 (2012).
12 Quinto vs. Andres, supra note 11.
13 Jacinto vs. People, 592 SCRA 426 (2009).
14 p. 84, L.B. Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book 1, 18th ed.,
(2012) 17Olalia vs. People, 562 SCRA 723 (2008).
15 People vs. Caballero, 400 SCRA 424 (2003)
16 Etino vs. People, G.R. No. 206632, 14 February
2018 20Perez vs. Court of Appeals, 382 SCRA 182 (2002).
11.2 In Rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus,
for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating
his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed.20
11.3 No frustrated stage in Rape. From the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the
essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. For the consummation of rape,
perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is
sufficient. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because
not all acts of execution were performed.17
11.4 No frustrated stage in Theft. Theft is either attempted or consummated. Theft

is already ―produced‖ upon the ―taking of personal property of another without the latter‘s
consent.‖ There was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere
temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner
already constituted apoderamiento.18
12. Conspiracy. Conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a
penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition.
12.1 How proved. A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive

evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime
itself.19 Mere suspicion, speculation, relationship, association, and companionship do not prove
conspiracy.20 Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of
the crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy
transcends companionship.21 Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish conspiracy.22
12.2 Implied conspiracy. Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy; it may be
established by acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime
charged, from which it may be logically inferred the existence of a common purpose to commit
the same.23
12.3 Conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability. Once conspiracy is

established, all the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or
degree of their participation. The guilt of one is the guilt of all.24
12.4 Conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in the information. Absence of
a particular statement in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet concerning any definitive
act constituting conspiracy renders the indictment insufficient to hold one accused liable for the
individual acts of his co-accused. Thus, each of them would be held accountable only for their
respective participation in the commission of the offense.29
17 People vs. Aca-ac, 357 SCRA 373 (2001).
18 Valenzuela vs. People, 525 SCRA 306 (2007).
19 People vs. Mapalo, 514 SCRA 689 (2007).
20 People vs. Manijas, 391 SCRA 731 (2002).
21 People vs. Compo, 358 SCRA 266 (2001).
22 People vs. Gonzales, 357 SCRA 460 (2001).
23 People vs. Bulan, 459 SCRA 550 (2005)
24 People vs. Yongco, 731 SCRA 544
(2014) 29People vs. Galvez, 519 SCRA 529 (2007).
30
People vs. Baroy, 382 SCRA 56 (2002)
12.5 Confederation, Not an Aggravating Circumstance. Confederation is not
enumerated as an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like
conspiracy which must be alleged in and not merely inferred from the information,
confederation is but a mode of incurring criminal liability and may not be considered criminal in
itself unless specifically provided by law.30
13. Justifying Circumstances; Self-defense. The elements of self-defense are: (1) that
the victim has committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and
limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2) that there be reasonable necessity in the means employed
to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there be lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person claiming self-defense or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person
claiming self-defense be not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim‘s aggression.25
13.1 Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or

inflict physical injury upon a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not
considered unlawful aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly
showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected
attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendant‘s life in real peril.26
13.2 Unlawful aggression, an indispensable requisite. There can be no self-

defense, complete or incomplete unless there is clear and convincing proof of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim.27
13.3 When an unlawful aggression has ceased to exist, the one making a defense
has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor. 28 An act of aggression, when its author does
not persist in his purpose, or when he discontinues his attitude to the extent that the object of
his attack is no longer in peril, is not unlawful aggression warranting self-defense. 29 Aggression,
if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense.30
13.4 Self-defense and retaliation, distinguished. In retaliation, the inceptual

unlawful aggression had already ceased when the accused attacked him. In self-defense, the
unlawful aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured or disabled by the person
making the defense.31 In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already
ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when
the aggressor was injured
by the accused.32
13.5 Reasonable necessity of the means employed. The second element of self-
defense demands that the means employed to neutralize the unlawful aggression are
reasonable and necessary. It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does
not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. 33 What the law
requires is a rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the
emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct
25 People vs. Enfectana, 381 SCRA 359 (2002).

26 Manaban vs. CA, 494 SCRA 503 (2006).
27 Quintos vs. People, 735 SCRA 16 (2014).
28 People vs. San Juan, 386 SCRA 400 (2002).
29 People vs. Geneblazo, 361 SCRA 572 (2001).
30 Sanchez vs. People, 510 SCRA 365 (2006).
31 People vs. Gallego, 406 SCRA 6 (2003).
32 People vs. Advincula, G.R. No. 218108, 11April 2018.
33 People vs. Dagani, 499 SCRA 64 (2006).
more than reason, that moves or impels the defense; and the proportionateness thereof does
not depend upon the harm done, but upon the imminent danger of such injury.34
13.6 Lack of Sufficient Provocation. The provocation must be sufficient to excite

one to commit the wrongful act and should immediately precede the act. This third requisite of
self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when,
even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was
sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation
was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of
aggression.41
13.7 Defense of Relatives. In order that this defense is to be appreciated, the

following requisites must concur, namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the person making the defense took no part
in the provocation.35
13.8 Defense of Strangers. In order to successfully put up this defense an accused

must show (1) the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) that the accused has not been
induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.36
13.9 Avoidance of Greater Evil. To successfully invoke avoidance of greater evil as

a justifying circumstance, the infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or
injury may not befall one‘s self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the
least possible prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid the injury without causing
damage or injury to another or, if there is no such other way but the damage to another may be
minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to one‘s self, then such course should be taken.37
13.10 The evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil
sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this
defense is not applicable. Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the
greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence,
more so, the willful inaction of the actor. 38
13.11 Fulfillment of a Lawful Duty; Requisites. (a) the accused acted in the
performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused
or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or
the lawful exercise of such right or office.39
13.12 Obedience to an Order. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following
requisites must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must be
for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is
lawful.47
34 Velasquez vs. People, G.R. No. 195021, 15 March

2017 Urbano vs. People, 576 SCRA 826 (2009).
41
35 Medina vs. People, 713 SCRA 311 (2014).

36 People vs. Dijan, 383 SCRA 15 (2002).
37 People vs. Punzalan, 687 SCRA 687 (2012).
38 Ty vs. People, 439 SCRA 220 (2004).
39 Yapyuco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, 674 SCRA
420 (2012). 47Ambil vs. Sandiganbayan, 653 SCRA 576
(2011) 48Ortega vs. People, 562 SCRA 450 (2008).
14. Exempting Circumstances. For one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting
circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which
constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. Therefore, while there is a
crime committed, no criminal liability attaches.48
14.1 Insanity. An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted
during a lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime
was committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or
asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused does
not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by commitment of the
accused to a mental institution.40
14.2 Minority. Under the ―Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006‖ (R.A. No.
9344), a child in conflict with the law fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. A child above fifteen (15)
years but below eighteen years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability unless he
has acted with discernment. Persons below eighteen years of age shall be exempt from
criminal prosecution for the crime of prostitution under Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code,
of mendicancy under PD No. 1563, and sniffing rugby under PD No. 1619.
14.3 Accident. For this to be properly appreciated, the following requisites must
concur: (1) that the accused was performing a lawful act with due care; (2) that the injury is
caused by mere accident; and (3) that there was no fault or intent on his part to cause the
injury.
14.4 Uncontrollable Fear. To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence

must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and
imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For
such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious
bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. 41 The compulsion must be
of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.51
14.5 Irresistible Force. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce

the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress,
force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to
induce a wellgrounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 42 A speculative,
fanciful or remote fear, even fear of future injury, is insufficient.43
15. Entrapment vs. Instigation. There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and
schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There
is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two
lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the
criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer
conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it
40 People vs. Racal, G.R. No. 224886, 04 September 2017.

41 People vs. Anticamara, 651 SCRA 489
(2011). 51People vs. Baron, 621 SCRA 646 (2010).
42 People vs. Dequina, 640 SCRA 111 (2011)
43 People vs. Licayan, G.R. No. 203961, 29 July 2015
into execution.44 The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation
does.45
16. Mitigating Circumstances; Incomplete Self-defense. In order that it may be

successfully appreciated (as a privileged mitigating circumstance), it is necessary that a majority of the
requirements of self-defense be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of the other two requisite suffices
to establish incomplete self-defense. Absent the unlawful aggression, there can never be self-defense,
complete or incomplete, because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of
defense will have no basis.46
16.1 Minority as a Mitigating Circumstance. A child, above fifteen (15) years but
below eighteen years of age, who, at the time of the commission of the crime has acted with
discernment shall be entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. A minor is
fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birth date. In A.M. No.
02-l-18-SC dated November 24, 2009, the Supreme Court likewise defined the age of criminal
responsibility as the age when a child, fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old or above but below
eighteen (18) years of age, commits an offense with discernment.47
16.2 Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong. The lack of ―intent‖ to commit
a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the
body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted.58
16.3 Sufficient Provocation/Threats. For this to be appreciated, the following

elements must concur: (1) That the provocation or threat must be sufficient or proportionate to
the crime committed and adequate to arouse one to its commission; (2) That the provocation or
threat must originate from the offended party; and (3) That the provocation must be immediate
to the commission of the crime by the person provoked.48
16.4 Vindication of Grave Offense. For such to be credited, the following requisites
must be satisfied: (1) that there be a grave offense done to the one committing the felony, his
spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees; and (2) that the felony is committed in vindication
of such grave offense.49
16.5 Passion or Obfuscation. To be entitled to this mitigating circumstance, the

following elements must be present: (1) There should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such condition of mind; (2) the act that produced the obfuscation was not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator
might recover his normal equanimity50; and that (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from
lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge.51
44 Chang vs. People, 496 SCRA 321 (2006)

45 People vs. Sta. Maria, 519 SCRA 621 (2007)
46 People vs. Court of Appeals and Tangan, 352 SCRA 599 (2001).
47 People vs. Deliola, G.R. No. 200157, 31 August
2016. 58People vs. Callet, 382 SCRA 43 (2002).
48 People vs. Beltran, 503 SCRA 715 (2006)
49 Napone vs. People, G.R. No. 193085, 29 November 2017.
50 People vs. Cuasay, 569 SCRA 870 (2008).
51 People vs. Gonzalez, 359 SCRA 220 (2001).
16.6 Provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating
circumstances. It is settled that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they
should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance.52
16.7 Voluntary Surrender. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the
following elements must concur: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested, 2) the offender
surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latter‘s agent, and 3) the surrender is
voluntary.
16.8 Filing of Information/issuance of Arrest Warrant. The mere filing of an

information and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender
involuntary. Notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant for his arrest, the accused may still be
entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts
surrounding the very act of giving himself up.53
16.9 Confession of guilt. To be entitled to such mitigating circumstance, the

following requirements must concur: (1) the accused spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) the
confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before a competent court trying the case;
[and] (3) the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution[.]54 and that the accused must have pleaded guilty to the offense charged.55
16.10 Restitution, a mitigating circumstance analogous to Voluntary surrender

and Confession of guilt. Although restitution is akin to voluntary surrender, restitution should
be treated as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused when the two
circumstances are present in a case, which is similar to instances where voluntary surrender
and plea of guilty are both present even though the two mitigating circumstances are treated in
the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering that restitution is also
tantamount to an admission of guilt on the part of the accused, it is proper to consider it as a
separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused.‖56
17. Aggravating Circumstances; Advantage taken of public position. To appreciate

this aggravating circumstance, the public officer must use the influence, prestige or ascendancy which
his office gives him as a means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter is
presented in the inquiry ―Did the accused abuse his office to commit the crime?‖68
17.1 In Contempt of or With Insult to Public Authorities. The requisites of this

circumstance are: (1) the public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties and (2) he
is not the person against whom the crime is committed. None of these circumstances are
present in this case.57
17.2 Disregard of Age or Sex. There must be a showing that the malefactor
deliberately intended to offend or insult the age, rank or sex of the victim.
17.3 Dwelling. This is aggravating if the crime is committed in the dwelling of the
offended party and the latter has not given provocation. Dwelling may mean temporary dwelling
and that it may be aggravating even though the victim was not the owner of the house where
52 Romera vs. People, 434 SCRA 467 (2004).

53 De Vera vs. De Vera, 584 SCRA 506 (2009).
54 People vs. Montinola, 360 SCRA 631 (2001).
55 People vs. Dawaton, 389 SCRA 277 (2002).
56 Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan, 672 SCRA 270
(2012). 68People vs. Villamor, 373 SCRA 254 (2002).
57 People vs. De Mesa, 354 SCRA 397 (2001
the crime was committed[.]58 [B]e he a lessee, a boarder, or a bedspacer, the place is his home,
the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect.59
17.4 When a crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter
has not given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
Provocation in the aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended
party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to the commission of the crime.60
17.5 Dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only be committed in the
abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However,
in robbery with homicide the authors thereof can commit the heinous crime without
transgressing the sanctity of the victim's domicile.61
17.6 Abuse of confidence. It is essential to show that the confidence between the
parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage or
make it easier for him to commit the criminal act. The confidence must be a means of
facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party‘s
belief that the former would not abuse said confidence.62
17.7 Nighttime, band or uninhabited place. By and of itself, it is not an aggravating

circumstance. It becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the offender; or
(2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring
the offender‘s immunity from capture.63
17.8 Aid of armed men. In "aid of armed men," the men act as accomplices only.
They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the
principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators.64
17.9 Recidivism. A recidivist as "one who, at the time of his trial for one crime shall
have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title
of this Code." To prove recidivism, it is necessary to allege the same in the information and to
attach thereto certified copies of the sentences rendered against the accused.77
17.10 Reiteracion. Reiteracion or habituality is present when the accused has been
previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty than
that attached by law to the second offense or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a
lighter penalty.78
17.11 Evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the

following requisites must be shown: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) a
sufficient lapse of time between such a determination and the actual execution to allow the
58 People vs. Melendres, 402 SCRA 279 (2003).

59 People vs. Dela Torre, 373 SCRA 104 (2002).
60 People vs. Rios, 333 SCRA 823 (2000).
61 People vs. Arizobal, 348 SCRA 143 (2000).
62 People vs. Arrojado, 350 SCRA 679 (2001).
63 People vs. Silva, 387 SCRA 77 (2002).
64 People vs. Enojas, 718 SCRA 313
(2014). 77People vs. Dacillo, 427 SCRA 528 (2004)
78
People vs. Cajara, 341 SCRA 192 (2000).
accused time to reflect upon the consequences of his act 65 and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of the will if he desired to hearken to its warning.66
65 People vs. Dimacuha, G.R. No. 191060, 02 February 2015.

66 People vs. Cirbeto, G.R. No. 231359, 08 February 2018
17.12 The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within
a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. There is no evident premeditation when
the attack; was the result of rising tempers or made in the heat of anger.67
17.13 Craft, Fraud or Disguise. Craft involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the
part of the offender. When there is a direct inducement by insidious words or machinations,
fraud is present.68 In disguise, what is important is that there was a concealment of identity by
the accused.69
17.14 Abuse of Superior Strength. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever

there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly
and obviously advantageous to the aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength means to
purposely use force excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size
and strength of the parties.70
17.15 Mere superiority in number would not necessarily indicate the attendance of
abuse of superior strength. The prosecution should still prove that the assailants purposely used
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the persons attacked.71
17.16 Treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. 72 For treachery to be considered, two (2) elements must
concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or retaliate; and, (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted.73
17.17 The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on
the person of the victim, without the slightest provocation on the part of the latter.74
17.18 In treachery, the mode of attack must be consciously adopted. This means that
the accused must make some preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the
execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself
or retaliate. The mode of attack, therefore, must be planned by the offender, and must not
spring from the unexpected turn of events. The meeting between appellant‘s group and the
victim was merely by chance and it could not be said that the mode of attack could have been
planned. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous.89
67 People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 224498, 11 January 2018.

68 People vs. Labuguen, 337 SCRA 488 (2000).
69 People vs. Feliciano, 724 SCRA 148 (2014).
70 People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 226475, 13 March 2017.
71 People vs. Amodia, 571 SCRA 444 (2008).
72 Par. 16, Art. 14, RPC.
73 People vs. Aviles, 541 SCRA 265 (2007).
74 People vs. Hormina, 420 SCRA 102
(2004). 89People vs. Calago, 381 SCRA 448 (2002).
17.19 Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the
victim or acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior of the
victim were held to be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal. 75
17.20 Chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the
moment, or those that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by
treachery, for lack of opportunity of the accused deliberately to employ a treacherous mode of
attack.91
17.21 Ignominy. The aggravating circumstance of ignominy shall be taken into

account if means are employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the
natural effects of the offense; or if the crime was committed in a manner that tends to make its
effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to her moral suffering. 76 Where the accused
in committing the rape used not only the missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior
but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e.
entry from behind, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the commission thereof.77
17.22 Use of motor vehicle. The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if
the same was perpetrated by means thereof.78
17.23 Cruelty. For cruelty to exist, there must be proof showing that the accused
delighted in making their victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical
and moral pain in the consummation of the criminal act. 79 The crime is not aggravated by
cruelty simply because the victim sustained ten stab wounds, three of which were fatal. For
cruelty to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that, in inflicting
several stab wounds on the victim, the perpetrator intended to exacerbate the pain and suffering
of the victim. The number of wounds inflicted on the victim is not proof of cruelty.80
18. Alternative Circumstances; Intoxication. The general rule is that intoxication may be
considered either as aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending the
commission of the crime.81 The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a
mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same
is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or
intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.98
18.1 Relationship. In order that the alternative circumstance of relationship may be

taken into consideration in the imposition of the proper penalty, the offended party must either
be the (a) spouse, (b) ascendant, (c) descendant, (d) legitimate, natural or adopted brother or
sister, or (e) relative by affinity in the same degree, of the offender. The rule is that relationship
is aggravating in crimes against persons as when the offender and the offended party are
relatives of the same level such as killing a brother.99
75 People vs. Gonzalez, 359 SCRA 220

(2001). 91People vs. Caratao, 403 SCRA 482 (2003).
76 People vs. Bumidang, 346 SCRA 807 (2000).
77 People vs. Siao, 327 SCRA 269 (2000).
78 People vs. Enguito, 326 SCRA 508 (2000).
79 People vs. Catian, 374 SCRA 514 (2002).
80 Simangan vs. People, 434 SCRA 38 (2004).
81 Art. 15. RPC; People vs. Bernal, 388 SCRA
211 (2002) 98People vs. Rebucan, 654 SCRA 726 (2011)
99
People vs. Marcos, 349 SCRA 537 (2001).
19. Persons criminally liable; Principals. The principals in the commission of a crime are
(1) those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; (2) those who directly force or induce others
to commit it; and (3) those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it could not have been accomplished.82
19.1 Principal by Direct Participation. Two or more persons taking part in the
commission of a crime are considered principals by direct participation if the following requisites
are present: (a) they participated in the criminal resolution, and (2) they carried out their plan
and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. Two or
more persons are said to have participated in the criminal resolution when they were in
conspiracy at the time of the commission of the crime.101
19.2 Criminal liability as a principal even if there is no conspiracy among the

offenders. Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they
may be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which
mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim. It is sufficient if the
injuries cooperated in bringing about the victim‘s death. The offenders are criminally liable for
the same crime by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal acts. Absent conspiracy
between two or more offenders, they may be guilty of homicide or murder for the death of the
victim as principals by direct participation.83
19.3 Principal by inducement. The conviction of a person as a principal by

inducement requires (1) that the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime; and (2) that such inducement be the determining cause of the
commission by the material executor.84
19.4 Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or

agreement for consideration. The words of advice or the influence must have actually moved the
hands of the principal by direct participation.
19.5 Accomplices. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the

following requisites must concur: (1) that there be community of design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that
there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.85
19.6 Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct
participation after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then
does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide whether
the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct
participation and cooperate in its accomplishment. However, where one cooperates in the
commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he
is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice.86
82 People vs. Ragundiaz, 334 SCRA 193 (2001).

People vs. Dacillo, 427 SCRA 528 (2004).
101
83 People vs. Cabareño, 349 SCRA 297 (2001).

84 Ambagan, Jr. vs. People, G.R. Nos. 204481-82, 14 October 2015.
85 Napone vs. People, G.R. No. 193085, 29 November 2017.
86 People vs. Pilola, 405 SCRA 134 (2003).
19.7 Conspirators distinguished from Accomplices. Conspirators and
accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design.
Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided
upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have
reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators
decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not
decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in
its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their
instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.87
19.8 Accessories. An accessory is one who had knowledge of the commission of the
crime and did not participate in its commission as principal or accomplice, yet took part
subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting oneself or assisting the
offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime,
or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring,
concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or
an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime. To convict an accused as an accessory, the following elements must be proven:
(1) knowledge of the commission of the crime and (2) subsequent participation in it by any of the
three above-cited modes.88
20. Corpus Delicti. Corpus delicti is defined as the body, foundation or substance upon
which a crime has been committed, e.g. the corpse of a murdered man. It refers to the fact that a crime
has been actually committed. Corpus delicti does not refer to the autopsy report evidencing the nature
of the wounds sustained by the victim nor the testimony of the physician who conducted the autopsy or
medical examination. It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for
example, a man has died and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the act.
21. Pardon by the offended party; Recantation/Affidavit of Desistance, not a ground to

dismiss criminal action. A criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the State
belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes. By itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in court. A private complainant loses the right
or absolute privilege to decide whether the criminal charge should proceed, because the case was
already filed and must therefore continue to be heard by the trial court.89
21.1 A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and

reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in
court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the
accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious:
affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a
monetary consideration.90
21.2 Exception. It is only where there exist special circumstances which, when
coupled with the desistance or retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or
statement given, can a retraction be considered and upheld. An affidavit of desistance is merely
an additional ground to buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration that can
result in acquittal.91
87 People vs. Salvador, 695 SCRA 660 (2013).
88 People vs. Tolentino, 380 SCRA 171 (2002)
89 People vs. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647 (2005).
90 People vs. Lamsen, 709 SCRA 522 (2013).
91 Adlawan vs. People, G.R. No. 197645, 04 April 2018.
22. Life imprisonment vs. Reclusion perpetua. The penalty of life imprisonment is not the
same as reclusion perpetua. They are distinct in nature, in duration and in accessory penalties. First,
―life imprisonment‖ is imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion
perpetua is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Second, ―life imprisonment‖ does not carry
with it any accessory penalty. Reclusion perpetua has accessory penalties. Third, ―life imprisonment‖
does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment
for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum
period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.92
22.1 Reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty. Reclusion perpetua remains to be

an indivisible penalty and, when it is the prescribed penalty, should be imposed in its entirety,
i.e., reclusion perpetua sans a fixed period for its duration, regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime. In prescribing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, its duration in years, in fine, need not be specified. 93 Since
reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium or maximum periods. It
is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may
have attended the commission of the crime.113
23. Fine as a penalty. Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
10951, now reads as follows:
―ART. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty.— A fine, whether

imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive
penalty, if it exceeds One million two hundred thousand (₱1,200,000); a correctional
penalty, if it does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but
is not less than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000); and a light penalty, if it be less than
Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000).‖
24. Subsidiary Imprisonment. Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 10159, reads in part:
―Art. 39. Subsidiary Penalty. – If the convict has no property with which to meet
the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a
subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to the
highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of
judgment of conviction by the trial court, subject to the following rules: xxx‖
25. Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly stated in the

Judgment. The accused cannot be legally compelled to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency if it is not stated in the judgment. It is imposed upon the accused and served by him in lieu of
the fine which he fails to pay on account of insolvency. There is not a single provision in the Code from
which it may be logically inferred that an accused may automatically be made to serve subsidiary
imprisonment in a case where he has been sentenced merely to pay a fine and has been found to be
insolvent.94
92 People vs. Latupan, 360 SCRA 60 (2001).

93 People vs. Zacarias, 375 SCRA 278 (2002).
113
People vs. Ramirez, 356 SCRA 595 (2001).
94 People vs. Alapan, G.R. No. 199527, 10 January 2018
115
People vs. Bernardo, 697 SCRA 121 (2013).
26. Complex crimes. A complex crime is only one crime. Although two or more crimes are
actually committed, there is only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the
offender when it comes to complex crimes. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the
commission of a complex crime.115
26.1 Complex crime has two (2) kinds. The first is known as compound crime, or when
a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The second is known as
complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. 95 The
phrase "necessary means" does not mean indispensable; otherwise, the offense as a
"necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and
would be an ingredient thereof.96
26.2 Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their
individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of
execution, giving rise to a single complex offense.97
26.3 In Quasi-delicts, light felonies are not treated and punished as offenses
separate from grave and less grave felonies. Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed
from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. There shall be
no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same
court. (Ivler vs. San Pedro, 635 SCRA 191 [2010]).
26.4 Forcible Abduction with Rape. There can only be one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus,
the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible
abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of the
forcible abduction.98
26.5 No complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of private document. As

there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it is important to
ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with
estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the
proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity
of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa.99
26.6 Special Complex Crimes; as distinguished from complex crimes. A special

complex crime is composed of two or more crimes but is treated by law as a single indivisible
and unique offense for being the product of one criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a
specific penalty provided by law, and is to be distinguished from a compound or complex crime
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. 100 The composite crime and the complex or
compound crime are really distinct and different. The composition of the offenses in the
composite crime is fixed by law, but the combination of the offenses in a complex or compound
crime is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the
necessary means to commit the other. In the composite crime, the penalty for the combination
of crimes is specific, but the penalty in the complex or compound crime is that corresponding to
the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies
95 People vs. Elarcosa, 622 SCRA 417 (2010).

96 David vs. People, G.R. No. 208320, 19 August 2015.
97 People vs. Sanidad, 402 SCRA 381 (2003).
98 People vs. Garcia, 378 SCRA 266 (2002).
99 Batulanon vs. People, 502 SCRA 35 (2006).
100 People vs. Esugon, G.R. No. 185244, 22 June 2015.
the commission of the complex or compound crime may be subject to a separate information,
but the light felony that accompanies the composite crime is absorbed.101
27. Total extinction of criminal liability; Death of convict; Its Implications with Regard
to his Criminal and Civil Liabilities. In People v. Bayotas, the Supreme Court made the following
pronouncements:
―1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, ‗the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.‘‖
―2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
(the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxx xxx xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
―3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action
for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.
―4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension
on a possible privation of right by prescription.‖102
27.1 Prescription of offenses punishable under the RPC. Under Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall ―commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. In People v.
Reyes, it was held that registration in public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is
constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains.103
27.2 The filing of complaint with prosecutor‘s office interrupts the running of period of
prescription of offense charged.104
101 People vs. Salga, G.R. No. 233334, 23 July 2018.

102 People vs. Toukyo, G.R. No. 225593, 20 March 2017.
103 Recebido vs. People, 346 SCRA 881 (2000).
104 Brillante vs. Court of Appeals, 440 SCRA 541 (2004).
27.3 Prescription of offenses punishable under Special Laws. Under Section 2 (of
Act No. 3326, as amended), there are two modes of determining the reckoning point when
prescription of an offense runs. The first, to the effect that prescription shall "run from the day of
the commission of the violation of the law," is the general rule. The fact that any aggrieved
person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his
right arises does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. The second mode is an
exception to the first, and is otherwise known as the discovery rule. The discovery rule, which is
also known as the blameless ignorance doctrine, stipulates that the statute of limitations runs
only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In
other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does
not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action.105
27.4 Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg.
22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4)
years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof.106
27.5 Prescription of offenses punishable by ordinances or covered by the Rules

of Summary Procedure. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the
filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an
ordinance.128
27.6 Prescription of penalties. It shall commence to run from the date the felon
evades the service of his sentence. Evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by
those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
―Escape‖ in legal parlance means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody.
One who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. 107 The
prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to those
who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of
liberty. The period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of
sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered
deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a consequence never evaded
sentence by escaping during the term of his service, the period for prescription never began.130
27.7 Pardon vs. Amnesty. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is
a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts
take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon
is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of
the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the
offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does ‗not work the restoration of the
rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by
the terms of the pardon,‘ and it ‗in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence‘ (Article 36, Revised Penal Code).
105 Del Rosario vs. People, G.R. No. 199930, 27 June 2018.
106 Panaguiton, Jr. vs. Department of Justice, 571 SCRA 549 (2008)
128
Jadewell Parking Systems vs. Lidua, 706 SCRA 724 (2013)
107 Del Castillo vs. Torrecampo and People, 394 SCRA 221
(2002). 130Pangan vs. Gatbalite, 449 SCRA 144 (2005).
While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks
and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before
the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.108
28. Civil liability arising from crimes; Subsidiary civil liability of employers. This
liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is made. However, before
execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose
of 1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind
of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the
offense in the discharge of his duties not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of
such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent.109
28.1 Employer, not a party to criminal case filed against its employee. With
regard to the subsidiary liability of employers, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted
against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this
fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their
employees to the extent of supplying the latter‘s lawyers, the former cannot act independently
on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.110
28.2 Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a defense on
the part of the employer and may not free the latter from subsidiary liability for the employee‘s
civil liability in a criminal action. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability
– Articles 102 and 103 – are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are
applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.111
BOOK TWO
29. Arbitrary Detention. It is committed by any public officer or employee who, without
legal grounds, detains a person. The elements of the crime are: [1] That the offender is a public officer
or employee; [2] That he detains a person; and [3] That the detention is without legal grounds.
29.1 It is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict
his freedom of locomotion. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fear in
the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is compelled to
limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the
victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will.112
29.2 The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical
restraint, is fear.113
108 People vs. Patriarca, 341 SCRA 464 (2000).

109 Basilio vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 341 (2000).
110 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. People, 427 SCRA 526 (2004).
111 Pangonorom and MMTC vs. People, 455 SCRA 211 (2005).
112 Astorga vs. People, 412 SCRA 512 (2003).
113 Astorga vs. People, 437 SCRA 152 (2004).
30. Rebellion. The political motivation for the crime must be shown in order to justify finding
the crime committed to be rebellion.114
30.1 One can be convicted only of rebellion where the murders, robberies and
kidnapping were committed as a means to or furtherance of rebellion. Corollarily, offenses which
were not committed in furtherance of the rebellion, but for personal reasons or other motives,
are to be punished separately even if committed simultaneously with the rebellious acts.115
31. Direct Assault. Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two
ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation
for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition;
and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.116
31.1 When the assault results in the killing of an agent or of a person in authority for
that matter, there arises the complex crime of Direct Assault with murder or homicide. 117
32. Illegal possession and use of bank notes. The elements of the said crime are: (1)
that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any
instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by
another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and
(3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.118
32.1 Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal
offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent
to use said false treasury or bank notes.119
33. Usurpation of authority and Offical functions. There are two ways of
committing this crime: first, by knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer,
agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any
foreign government; or second, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act
pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any
foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. The
former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority, while the latter act constitutes the
crime of usurpation of official functions.120
34. Falsification of Documents. What is punished in falsification of a public

document is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as solemnly
proclaimed in it. Generally, the elements of Article 171 are: 1) the offender is a public officer,
employee, or notary public; 2) he takes advantage of his official position; and 3) that he
falsifies a document by committing any of the ways it is done. On the other hand, the
elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 are: 1) the offender is
a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
114 People vs. Silongan, 401 SCRA 459 (2003).

115 People vs. Oliva, 341 SCRA 78 (2001).
116 People vs. Vidal, G.R. No. 229678, 20 June 2018.
117 People vs. Vidal, ibid.
118 Rimando vs. People, G.R. No. 229701, 29 November 2017.
119 Clemente vs. People, 652 SCRA 382 (2011).
120 Ruzol vs. Sandiganbayan, 696 SCRA742 (2013).
position; 2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171;
and 3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.121
35.1 The offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when
(1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a
document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.122
35.2 Any person in possession of the forged document is presumed to be the author
thereof, despite the absence of any direct evidence of his authorship of the forgery. More
especially, if he is the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document
found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of the falsification.146
35.3 Falsification committed by public officers by causing it to appear that

persons have participated in an act or a proceeding. Its elements are: (1) that the offender
is a public officer, employee or notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position;
(3) that he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that a person or persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.123
35.4 Falsification by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. This

kind of falsification requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the offender makes
in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by the offender are
absolutely false.124 "Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the
truth of the facts narrated.125
35.5 Falsification by making alteration. It elements are: (1) that there be an

alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document; (2) that it was made on a genuine
document; (3) that the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and
(4) that the changes made the document speak something false. When these are committed by
a private individual on a private document the violation would fall under paragraph 2, Article 172
of the same code, but there must be, in addition to the aforesaid elements, independent
evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third person.126
35.6 Falsification by private individuals. This refers to falsification by a private

individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position, of
public, private or commercial documents. Its elements are: [1] that the offender is a private
individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; [2]
that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; and [3] that the
falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.127
35.7 Falsification of public or official document or commercial document vs.

Falsification of a private document. Falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 172 goes
beyond the elements of falsification enumerated under Article 171. The former requires
additional independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third person. In
121 Guillergan vs. People, 641 SCRA 511 (2011).
122 People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 197953, 05 August 2015.
146
Recebido vs. People, 346 SCRA 881 (2000).
123 Bernardino vs. People, 506 SCRA 237 (2006).
124 Santos vs. Sandiganbayan, 347 SCRA 386 (2000).
125 Galeos vs. People, 642 SCRA 485 (2011).
126 Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 477 SCRA 427 (2005).
127 Santos vs. People, 564 SCRA 60 (2008).
Article 171, damage is not an element of the crime; but in paragraph 2 of Article 172, or
falsification of a private document, damage is an element necessary for conviction.128
35.8 The elements of "Use of Falsified Documents," are: (a) That the offender knew
that a document was falsified by another person; (b) That the false document is embraced in
Art. 171 or in any of subdivisions 1 or 2 of Art. 172; (c) That he used such document (not in
judicial proceedings); and, (d) That the use of the false document caused damage to another or
at least it was used with intent to cause such damage.129
36. Perjury. Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law on a material matter. The elements of the felony are: (a) That the
accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) That the
statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath;
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood, and (d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose.130
36.1 Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to
its truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement
is an adequate defense. A false statement which is obviously the result of an honest mistake is
not perjury.131
36.2 On the element of materiality, a material matter is the main fact which is the
subject of the inquiry or any fact or circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or
circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of
inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies.156
36.3 A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn
statements of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false
and must show the statement to be false by other evidence than the contradicting statement.132
37. Obscene Publications. Mere possession of obscene materials, without

intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering
the purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public.
The offense in any of the forms under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity.
The law does not require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or
exhibiting obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for
sale, displayed or exhibited to the public.158
38. Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment. For conviction to lie, it must be

proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly
means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established in this
jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it
must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the
evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an
128 Malabanan vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 186329, 02 August 2017.

129 Lumancas vs. Intas, 347 SCRA 22 (2000).
130 Union Bank vs. People, 667 SCRA 113 (2012).
131 Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice, 475 SCRA 495 (2005).
156
Masangkay vs. People, 621 SCRA 231 (2010)
132 Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice, supra, note 155.
158
Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA 351 (2006) 159Diego
vs. Castillo, 436 SCRA 67 (2004).
injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment remains the law.159
39. Direct Bribery. The crime of direct bribery consists of the following elements:
(1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some
gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in
consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to
refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act
relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. 133 The acts constituting direct
bribery are: (1) by agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of
his official duties; (2) by accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which
does not constitute a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duty; or (3) by
agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which is his official duty to do, in
consideration of any gift or promise.134
40. Indirect Bribery. Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall
accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. The essential ingredient of indirect
bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer
concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration.162
41. Corruption of Public Officials. Its elements are: [1] That the offender makes
offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and [2] That the offers or
promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under circumstances
that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.135
42. Malversation of Public Funds or Property. Malversation may be committed

by appropriating public funds or property; by taking or misappropriating the same; by
consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any other person to take
such public funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property.136
42.1 Requisites of Malversation: [1] That the offender is a public officer; [2] That he
has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; [3] That the
funds or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and, [4] That he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.137
42.2 In the crime of malversation of public funds, all that is necessary for conviction is
proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he failed to account for
the said funds upon demand without offering a justifiable explanation for the shortage.138
42.3 Malversation through Negligence. The felony consists not only in

misappropriation or converting public funds or property to one‘s personal use but also by
133 Balderama vs. People, 542 SCRA 423 (2008).

134 Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, 507 SCRA 258
(2006). 162Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, ibid.
135 Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, 705 SCRA 459 (2013).
136 Pondevida vs. Sandiganbayan, 467 SCRA 219 (2005).
137 Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan, 672 SCRA 270 (2012).
138 Venezuela vs. People, G.R. No. 205693, 14 February 2018.
knowingly allowing others to make use of or misappropriate the same. The felony may thus be
committed by dolo or by culpa. The crime is consummated and the appropriate penalty is
imposed regardless of whether the mode of commission is with intent or due to negligence.139
42.4 Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is still committed; hence, a conviction is proper. All that is necessary for a
conviction is sufficient proof that the accused accountable officer had received public funds or
property, and did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made without any
satisfactory explanation of his failure to have them upon demand. For this purpose, direct
evidence of the personal misappropriation by the accused is unnecessary as long as he cannot
satisfactorily explain the inability to produce or any shortage in his accounts.140 A possible
exception would be when the mode of commission alleged in the particulars of the indictment is
so far removed from the ultimate categorization of the crime that it may be said due process was
denied by deluding the accused into an erroneous comprehension of the charge against him.141
42.5 An accountable public officer is one who has custody or control of public funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office.142 The name or relative importance of the office or
employment is not the controlling factor. The nature of the duties of the public officer or
employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to
account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not malversation
is committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a mere clerk in the provincial or
municipal government may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public
funds and misappropriates the same.143
42.6 Private individuals may be liable for malversation. A public officer who is not
in charge of public funds or property by virtue of her official position, or even a private individual,
may be liable for malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if such public officer or
private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation or illegal
use of public funds or property.144
42.7 Presumption of misappropriation. The failure of the public officer to have duly
forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. 145 An
accountable officer may thus be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of
misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in the officer‘s account which
he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. All that is essential is proof that the accountable
officer has received public funds but that when demand therefor is made, he is unable to
satisfactorily account for the same.174
42.8 Demand is not necessary in malversation. Demand merely raises a prima facie
presumption that the missing funds have been put to personal use. The demand itself, however,
is not an element of, and is not indispensable to constitute malversation. Malversation is
committed from the very moment the accountable officer misappropriates public funds and fails
to satisfactorily explain his inability to produce the public finds he received.146
139 Sarigumba vs. Sandiganbayan, 451 SCRA 533 (2005).

140 Mesina vs. People, G.R. No. 162489, 17 June 2015.
141 Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, 29 July 2015.
142 Quiñon vs. People, 389 SCRA 412 (2002).
143 Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan, 457 SCRA 301 (2005).
144 Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan, ibid.
145 Hernan vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, 05 December 2018
174
Sarigumba vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 167.
146 Venezuela vs. People, supra, note 166.
42.9 The presumption of conversion is — by its very nature — rebuttable. It is not
conclusive but disputable by satisfactory evidence to the effect that the accused did not utilize
the public funds or property for his personal use, gain or benefit. 147 Because of the prima facie
presumption, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location
of the funds or property under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he
has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to do so, the
accused may be convicted therefor.148
43. Technical Malversation. The essential elements of the crime of technical malversation are:
[1] That the offender is a public officer; [2] That there is public fund or property under his administration;
[3] That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance; [4] That he applies
the same to a public use other than that for which such fund or property has been appropriated by law
or ordinance.149 For technical malversation to exist, it is necessary that public funds or properties had
been diverted to any public use other than that provided for by law or ordinance. To constitute the
crime, there must be a diversion of the funds from the purpose for which they had been originally
appropriated by law or ordinance.150
43.1 Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of
diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public
purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but
becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of
public policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence,
malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.151
44. Parricide. It is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed
by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
accused.152 The key element here is the relationship of the offender with the victim.182
45. Death inflicted under exceptional circumstances; As an absolutory cause.

By invoking this defense, the accused waives his right to the constitutional presumption of
innocence and bears the burden of proving the following: [1] That a legally married person
(or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years of age and living with
him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; [2] That he or she kills
any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in the act
or immediately thereafter; and [3] That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of
his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse.153
46. Murder. The elements of murder are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is
killed by accused; (3) the killing is attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
147 Agullo vs. Sandiganbayan, 361 SCRA 556 (2001).

148 Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532 (2008).
149 Abdulla vs. People, 455 SCRA 78 (2005).
150 Tetangco vs. Ombudsman, 479 SCRA 249 (2006).
151 Ysidoro vs. People, 685 SCRA 637 (2012).
152 People vs. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, 09 September
2015 182People vs. Calonge, 623 SCRA 445 (2010).
153 People vs. Puedan, 388 SCRA 266 (2002).
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is neither parricide
nor infanticide.154
46.1 When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the
latter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Since the use of explosives is the
principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the
offense instead of treachery which will then be relegated merely as a generic aggravating
circumstance.185
46.2 Outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim. The mere decapitation of
the victim‘s head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the
killing to murder.155
47. Homicide. The crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2)
the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.187
48. Death caused/physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray; tumultuous

affray, defined. A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person
is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. It may be a melee or
free-for-all, where several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one
another in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or
some of them.188
49. Discharge of firearm. The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender
discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender has no intention
to kill that person. Though the information charged the petitioner with murder, he could be
validly convicted of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense which is necessarily included in
the crime of unlawful killing of a person.189
50. Unintentional abortion, as distinguished from Infanticide. As distinguished

from infanticide, the elements of unintentional abortion are as follows: (1) that there is a
pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion; (3) that the violence is intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence
the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of
infanticide, it is necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of
independent existence.156
51. Intentional Mutilation. The elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of
Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code are the following: 1) that there be a castration, that is,
mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely
and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for
reproduction.157
154 People vs. Brgy. Capt. Tony Tomas, Sr., et al., 643 SCRA 530
(2011) People vs. Comadre, 431 SCRA 366 (2004)
185
155 People vs. Whisenhunt, 386 SCRA 586

(2001). 187Guevarra vs. People, 715 SCRA 384 (2014).
188
People vs. Unlagada, 389 SCRA 224 (2002) 189Dado
vs. People, 392 SCRA 46 (2002).
156 People vs. Paycana, 551 SCRA 657 (2008).
157 Aguirre vs. Secretary of Justice, 547 SCRA
431 (2008). 192Li vs. People, 427 SCRA 217 (2004)
52. Slight Physical Injuries. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the
offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight
physical injuries.192
53. Rape. The crime of rape is committed either by sexual intercourse or by sexual
assault. Rape by sexual intercourse is committed by a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman,193 under any of the following circumstances: (a) Through force,
threat, or intimidation; (b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; (c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d)
When the offended party is under twelve [12] years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. Rape by sexual assault is
committed by any person who, under any of the aforestated circumstances, inserts his penis
into another person‘s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or
anal orifice of another person.158
53.1 Consummated rape. Rape is consummated ―by the slightest penetration of the
female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis.‖ There need not be full
and complete penetration of the victim‘s vagina for rape to be consummated. 159 Penile invasion
necessarily entails contact with the labia. Even the briefest of contacts, without laceration of the
hymen, is deemed to be rape.196
53.2 Statutory rape. Sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is statutory
rape. The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age. Sexual congress with a girl under
12 years old is always rape.160 In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below
twelve years of age consummates the crime of statutory rape regardless of her consent to the
act or lack of it. The law presumes that a woman of tender age does not possess discernment
and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.161
53.3 Liability of several accused in multiple rape. In cases of multiple rape, each
of the defendants is responsible not only for the rape committed by him but also for those
committed by the others. An accused therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed
personally by him but also for the other counts of rape committed by his co-accused.162
53.4 Rape through sexual assault. It is committed by inserting his penis into another
person‘s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
another person. It is also called "instrument or object rape", also "gender-free rape", or the
narrower "homosexual rape,"163 and that the act of sexual assault is accomplished by using
force or intimidation, among others.164
People vs. Buban, 512 SCRA 500 (2007).

193
158 People vs. Olaybar, 412 SCRA 490 (2003).

159 People vs. Jalosjos, 369 SCRA 179
(2001). 196People vs. Teodoro, 691 SCRA 324 (2013).
160 People vs. Perez, 575 SCRA 653 (2008).
161 People vs. Jalosjos, supra, note 195.
162 People vs. Plurad, 393 SCRA 306 (2002).
163 People vs. Gaduyon, 709 SCRA 129 (2013).
164 People vs. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, 08 August 2017.
53.5 Rape by Sexual Assault is not subsumed in Rape through Sexual
Intercourse. An accused charged in the Information with rape by sexual intercourse cannot be
found guilty of rape by sexual assault, even though the latter crime was proven during trial. This
is due to the substantial distinctions between these two modes of rape. In view of the material
differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not necessarily included in the
second, and vice-versa.165
53.6 Inserting a finger inside the genital of a woman is rape through sexual
assault.166 The insertion of one‘s finger into the genital or anal orifice of another person
constitutes rape by sexual assault and not merely an act of lasciviousness.167
53.7 Marital Rape. Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies.
Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.168
53.8 Affidavit of Desistance in Rape Cases. The submission of an affidavit of

desistance by the victim is not a ground for the dismissal of rape case. Rape is no longer
considered a private crime as R.A. No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 has reclassified rape
as a crime against persons. Rape may now be prosecuted de officio; a complaint for rape
commenced by the offended party is no longer necessary for its prosecution. Hence, an affidavit
of desistance, which may be considered as pardon by the complaining witness, is not by itself a
ground for the dismissal of a rape action over which the court has already assumed
jurisdiction.169
53.9 Forcible abduction may be absorbed in Rape. The crime of forcible abduction
with rape is a complex crime that occurs when the abductor has carnal knowledge of the
abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when
the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under
12 years of age or is demented. Where the main objective of the culprit for the abduction of
the victim of rape was to have carnal knowledge of her, he could be convicted only of rape.170
53.10 Rape with Homicide. In a special complex crime of rape with homicide, the
following elements must concur: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal
knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by
reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the
accused killed a woman. Both rape and homicide must be established beyond reasonable
doubt.171
53.11 In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be
understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by
reason or on occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery,
abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly
established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by the accused is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide,
the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance only.172
165 People vs. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, 08 August 2017.

166 People vs. Salvador, G.R. No. 207815, 22 June 2015.
167 People vs. Fetalino, 525 SCRA 170 (2007).
168 People vs. Jumawan, 722 SCRA 108 (2014).
169 People vs. Bagsic, G.R. No. 218404, 13 December 2017.
170 People vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 225743, 07 June 2017.
171 People vs. Narzabal, 632 SCRA 772 (2010).
172 People vs. Laog, 658 SCRA 654
(2011). 210People vs. Muit, 568 SCRA 251 (2008).
54. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. The essence of the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual
deprivation of the victim‘s liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. 210 It includes not only
the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever
length of time.173
54.1 The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention
or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three [3] days; or
(b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person
kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.174
54.2 Public officer as an offender. A public officer can commit kidnapping within the
context of the Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code if the detention is neither in furtherance of
official functions nor in the pursuit of authority vested in him or is not in relation to his office, but
in purely private capacity.213
54.3 In cases of kidnapping, if the person detained is a child, the question is whether
there was actual deprivation of the child's liberty, and whether it was the intention of the accused
to deprive the parents of the custody of the child. 175 What is controlling is the act of the accused
in detaining the victim against his or her will after the offender is able to take the victim in his
custody. In short, the carrying away of the victim in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention can either be made forcibly or fraudulently.176
54.4 If the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth
element is no longer necessary.177
54.5 Ransom. The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that
an individual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person. Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received
by the perpetrators is of no moment.217 Ransom may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary
which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victim‘s release. 218 The amount of and
purpose for the ransom is immaterial.178
54.6 Kidnapping with Homicide. Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course
of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an
afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48,
173 People vs. Mamantak, 560 SCRA 298 (2008).
174 People vs. Chan, G.R. No. 226836, 05 December
2018. 213People vs. Trestiza, 660 SCRA 407 (2011)
175 People vs. Suriaga, 381 SCRA 159 (2002).
176 People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 214502, 25 November 2015.
177 People vs. Silongan, 401 SCRA
459 (2003) 217 People vs. Bautista, 622 SCRA
524 (2010) 218People vs. Ejandra, 429 SCRA 364
(2004).
178 People vs. Parba-Rural, G.R. No. 231884, 27 June
2018. 220People vs. Dionaldo, 731 SCRA 68 (2014)
nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the
last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.‘‖220
54.7 Kidnapping with Rape. When the victim is raped, this gives rise to a special
complex crime wherein the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses.
54.8 No matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because
these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659
punishes these acts with only one single penalty.179
55. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. Its essential elements are: that - (1)
the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender
deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. What is actually being
punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian
of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. The word ―deliberate‖ must
imply something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly
daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.180
56. Grave Coercion. First, that the offender has prevented another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or that he has compelled him to do something against his
will, be it right or wrong; second, that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence,
either by material force or such display of force as would produce intimidation and control
over the will of the offended party; and, third, that the offender who has restrained the will
and liberty of another did so without any right or authority of law.181
57. Unjust vexation. It is defined as any human conduct which, although not
productive of some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent
person. It may exist without compulsion or restraint. However, it being a felony by dolo,
malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a good defense to a charge for
unjust vexation because good faith negates malice. The paramount question to be
considered is whether the offender‘s act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or
disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. The main purpose of the law
penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is precisely to enforce the principle that no person
may take the law into his hands and that our government is one of law, not of men. It is
unlawful for any person to take into his own hands the administration of justice.182
58. Robbery. Intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the
overt acts of the offender. Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the
evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain or animus lucrandi is the usual
motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another,
unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. Intent to
gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking.183
58.1 The term ―gain‖ is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the
benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed.
Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner‘s consent constitutes gain.226
179 People vs. Mirandilla, 654 SCRA 761 (2011).
180 People vs. Marquez, 648 SCRA 694 (2011).
181 Barbasa vs. Tuquero, 575 SCRA 102 (2008).
182 Maderazo vs. People, 503 SCRA 234 (2006).
183 People vs. Del Rosario, 359 SCRA 166
(2001). 226De Guzman vs. People, 569 SCRA 452
(2008).
58.2 In robbery through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person
unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. It merely require that the
property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person
dispossessed thereof suffices184
59. Robbery with Homicide. The accused must be shown to have the principal purpose of
committing robbery, the homicide being committed either by reason of or on occasion of the robbery.
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. So long as the intention of the felons was to
rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. The original design must have been
robbery, and the homicide, even if it precedes or is subsequent to the robbery, must have a direct
relation to, or must be perpetrated with a view to consummate the robbery. The taking of the property
should not be merely an afterthought which arose subsequently to the killing.185
59.1 It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the

circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to
be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless
imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and
homicide, must be consummated.186
59.2 If the original design does not comprehend robbery, but robbery follows the
homicide either as an afterthought or merely as an incident of the homicide, then the malefactor
is guilty of two separate crimes, that of homicide or murder and robbery, and not of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, a single and indivisible offense.
59.3 The law does not require that the sole motive of the malefactor is robbery and
commits homicide by reason or on the occasion thereof. Even if the malefactor intends to kill
and rob another, it does not preclude his conviction for the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide.187
59.4 A homicide is considered as having been committed on the occasion or by

reason of the robbery when the motive of the offender in killing the victim is to deprive the latter
of his property, to eliminate an obstacle to the crime, to protect his possession of the loot, to
eliminate witnesses, to prevent his being apprehended or to insure his escape from the scene of
the crime,188 or to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery. 232 Essential for conviction
of robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery
and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes
are committed at the same time.189
59.5 It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the
victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or
that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed
184 People vs. Reyes, 399 SCRA 528 (2003).

185 People vs. Lara, 505 SCRA 137 (2006).
186 People vs. Hernandez, 432 SCRA 104 (2004).
187 People vs. Milliam, 324 SCRA 155 (2000).
188 People vs. Cachuela, 698 SCRA 161
(2013). 232People vs. Cariňo, G.R. No. 232624, 09 July
2018.
189 People vs. Ebet, 634 SCRA 689 (2010).
by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of
homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide.190
59.6 The word ―homicide‖ (in robbery with homicide) is used in its generic sense.
Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. 191 Also, it embraces not only the act
which results in death but also all other acts producing anything short of death. Neither is the
nature of the offense altered by the number of killings in connection with the robbery. 192 Stated
differently, the homicides or murders and physical injuries, irrespective of their numbers,
committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged in the composite crime of
robbery with homicide.193
59.7 Robbery with homicide is committed even if the victim of the robbery is different
from the victim of homicide, as long as the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
of the robbery. It is not even necessary that the victim of the robbery is the very person the
malefactor intended to rob.194
59.8 There is no crime of robbery with homicide committed by a band. If robbery with
homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as robbery
with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. The element of band would be
appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.195
59.9 Whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the

robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals
in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the
homicide, unless it is clearly shown that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.196
59.10 If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of
the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire
to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited
and gained from the robbery.197198199
59.11 When the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is accompanied by
another offense like rape or intentional mutilation, such additional offense is treated as an
aggravating circumstance which would result in the imposition of the maximum penalty of
death.242
59.12 In People vs. De Jesus243 and People vs. De Leon244 however, it was held that:
―It is immaterial that, xxx, aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of
authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Once a homicide is committed
by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the
felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide.‖
190 People vs. Laog, 658 SCRA 654 (2011).

191 People vs. Ebet, 634 SCRA 689 (2010).
192 People vs. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589 (2000).
193 People vs. Dinamling, 379 SCRA 107 (2002).
194 People vs. Daniela, 401 SCRA 519 (2003).
195 People vs. Sugan, 646 SCRA 406 (2011).
196 People vs. FO1 Dela Cruz, 575 SCRA 412 (2008)
197 People vs. Labagala, G.R. No. 221427, 30 July
2018 People vs. Fabon, 328 SCRA 302 (2000).
242
198 SCRA 384 (2004).

199 SCRA 178 (2009).
59.13 When the killing is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the
qualifying circumstances attendant to the killing would be considered as generic aggravating
circumstances.200
60. Robbery with Rape. For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be
shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way
around. This special complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a
situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property
belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.201 In
other words, the offenders had an intent to rob personal property belonging to another, and such intent
preceded the rape. If the original plan was to rape but the accused after committing the rape also
committed the robbery when the opportunity presented itself, the offense should be viewed as separate
and distinct; if the intention of the accused was to rob, but rape was committed even before the
asportation, the crime is robbery with rape. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of
the robbery. Article 294 of the RPC does not distinguish whether the rape was committed before, during
or after the robbery; it suffices that the robbery was accompanied by rape.202
60.1 Whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a

robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape,
although not all of them took part in the rape. 203 Once conspiracy is established between two
accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the
rape committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that
he endeavored to prevent the other from committing the rape. The rule in this jurisdiction is that
whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who
took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of
them took part in the rape.204
60.2 The special complex crime of robbery with rape covers cases of multiple rapes.
This is primarily due to the fact that the juridical concept of this crime does not limit the
consummation of rape against one single victim or to one single act, making other rapes in
excess of that number as separate, independent offense or offenses. All the rapes are merged
in the composite, integrated whole that is robbery with rape, so long as the rapes accompanied
the robbery. It does not matter too whether the rape occurred before, during, or after the
robbery.250
60.3 There is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be
considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of
the same Code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is specific paragraph
(paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.‖205
61. Theft. The fact that the stolen property was found in the possession of the accused created
the disputable presumption that he stole the same. If a person is found in possession of stolen goods
200 People vs. Montinola, 360 SCRA 631 (2001).

201 People vs. Bongos, G.R. No. 227698, 31 January 2018.
202 People vs. Romobio, G.R. No. 227705, 11 October 2017.
203 People vs. Bongos, supra, note 246.
204 People vs. Verceles, 388 SCRA 515
(2002). 250People vs. Seguis, 349 SCRA 547 (2001).
205 People vs. Gano, 353 SCRA 126 (2001).
after the commission of the crime, that person is called upon to give an explanation for his
possession.206
61.1 Property subject of theft; Unlawful taking. Any property which is not included
in the enumeration of real properties under the Civil Code and capable of appropriation can be
the subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code. xxx. The business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property which can be the object of
theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.207 Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of
one‘s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At
the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be
attempted theft, if at all.208
61.2 Where one, in good faith, takes another's property under claim of title in himself,
he is exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be.
And the same is true where the taking is on behalf of another, believed to be the true owner.
The gist of the offense is the intent to deprive another of his property in a chattel, either for gain
or out of wantonness or malice to deprive another of his right in the thing taken. This cannot be
where the taker honestly believes the property is his own or that of another, and that he has a
right to take possession of it for himself or for another.209
62. Qualified Theft; Qualifying Circumstances. Theft is qualified when any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed
with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the
property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion
of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.210
62.1 “With Grave Abuse of Confidence.” The grave abuse of confidence must be
the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the
appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them
which the appellant abused.257
62.2 Taking money in his possession by receiving teller of bank is Qualified

Theft. The possession of money received by a teller in behalf of a bank is considered only as
material possession of the teller. Juridical possession remains with the bank. If the teller
appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony committed is theft and not estafa.
Since the teller occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places money in the teller‘s
possession due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be
committed.258
63. Occupation of real property or Usurpation of real rights in property. The requisites of
usurpation are that the accused took possession of another‘s real property or usurped real rights in
another‘s property; that the possession or usurpation was committed with violence or intimidation and
that the accused had intent to gain. In order to sustain a conviction therefor, the proof must show that
the real property occupied or usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person,
206 People vs. dela Cruz, 326 SCRA 324 (2000).

207 Laurel vs. Abrogar, 576 SCRA 41 (2009).
208 People vs. Canceran, G.R. No. 206442, 01 July 2015.
209 People vs. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 220685, 29 November 2017.
210 Miranda vs. People, 664 SCRA 124
(2012) 257 People vs. Sabado, G.R. No. 218910, 05
July 2017. 258Roque vs. People, 444 SCRA 98 (2004).
and that the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or violence done to the
person ousted of possession of the property.211
63.1 Article 312 may be considered as defining and penalizing the single, special and indivisible
crime of occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons. It is not a complex crime as defined under Article 48. Article 312 provides a
single, albeit two-tiered, penalty consisting of a principal penalty, which is that incurred for the acts of
violence, and an additional penalty of fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the accused. This
is clear from the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him." For
want of a better term, the additional penalty may be designated as an incremental penalty. What Article
312 means then is that when the occupation of real property is committed by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons, the accused may be prosecuted under an information for the violation
thereof, and not for a separate crime involving violence or intimidation. But, whenever, appropriate, he
may be sentenced to suffer the penalty for the acts of violence and to pay a fine based on the value of
the gain obtained. Thus, if by reason or on the occasion of such occupation or usurpation, the crime of
homicide, or any physical injuries is committed; or when the same shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation; xxx; the accused may be convicted for the violation of Article 312.
However, he shall be sentenced: (a) to suffer the penalty for homicide, rape, intentional mutilation
and/or physical injuries, or for the intimidation, which may fall under Article 282 (Grave Threats) or
Article 286 (Grave Coercion) of the Revised Penal Code, as the case may be, and (b) to pay a fine
based on the value of the gain obtained by him212
64. Estafa in general. For charges of estafa to prosper, the following elements must be
present: (1) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (2)
that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person.213
64.1 Estafa through conversion or misappropriation. The elements of estafa with

abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part
of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (4) that there is demand by the offended party to the offender.214
64.2 In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of

misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return
the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.215
64.3 The words ―convert‖ and ―misappropriate‖ as used in the aforequoted law
connote an act of using or disposing of another‘s property as if it were one‘s own or of devoting
it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To ―misappropriate‖ a thing of value for
one‘s own use or benefit, not only the conversion to one‘s personal advantage but also every
attempt to dispose of the property of another without a right.216
211 Quinao vs. People, 335 SCRA 741 (2000).

212 Alfeche vs. People, 211 SCRA 770.
213 People vs. Gallo, 622 SCRA 439 (2010).
214 Gamaro vs. People, G.R. No. 211917, 27 February 2017.
215 Pamintuan vs. People, 621 SCRA 538 (2010).
216 Lee vs. People, 455 SCRA 256 (2005).
64.4 Damage as an element of Estafa. It may consist in: (1) the offended party
being deprived of his money or property as a result of the defraudation; (2) disturbance in
property right; or (3) temporary prejudice.217
64.5 A fiduciary relationship between the complainant and the accused is an essential
element of estafa by misappropriation or conversion, without which the accused could not have
committed estafa.218
64.6 When the thing is received by the offender from the offended party in trust or in
commission or for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession
and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which
gives the transferee a right over the thing transferred and this he may set up even against the
owner.219 So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the
perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. Hence, conversion
of personal property in the case of an employee having mere material possession of the said
property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical
possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes Estafa.220
64.7 Deceit, not an element estafa by abuse of confidence. Deceit is not an

essential requisite of estafa by abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place of
fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas.221
65. Estafa by means of false pretenses. Its elements are the following: [1] That there must be
a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; [2] That such false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; [3] That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; [4] That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.222
65.1 Under this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. xxx. It is
essential that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the
only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing of value.223
65.2 Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to

deceive, including all acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable
duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue
and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all
multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one
individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth
and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is
cheated.224
217 Khitri vs. People, G.R. No. 210192, 04 July 2016.

218 Murao vs. People, 462 SCRA 366 (2005).
219 San Diego vs. Court of Appeals, 755 SCRA 260 (2015).
220 Benabaye vs. People, G.R. No. 203466, 25 February 2015.
221 Brokmann vs. People, 665 SCRA 83 (2012).
222 Franco vs. People, 643 SCRA 474 (2011).
223 People vs. Calimon, 577 SCRA 116 (2009).
224 People vs. Mateo, G.R. No. 210612, 09 October 2017.
65.3 Deceit is defined as any act or devise intended to deceive; a specie of
concealment or distortion of the truth for the purpose of misleading. 225 False pretense is any
deceitful practice or device by which another is led to part with the property in the thing taken.226
65.4 A person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code (now under the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 [R.A. No. 8042])and estafa under paragraph 2(a) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. 227 The reason for the rule is that the crime of illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction, while the crime of estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is
necessary for conviction.228 Unlike in illegal recruitment where profit is immaterial, a conviction
for estafa requires a clear showing that the offended party parted with his money or property
upon the offender‘s false pretenses, and suffered damage thereby.277
65.5 In estafa by means of false pretenses, Lastly, unlike estafa under paragraph 1 (b)
of Article 315 of the Code, proof that the accused misappropriated or converted the swindled
money or property as an element is not required. All that is required is proof of pecuniary
damage sustained by the complainant arising from his reliance on the fraudulent
representation.229
65.6 Estafa by postdating or issuing a check. Its elements are the following: (1)
postdating or issuing checks in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the checks were
issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover said checks; (3) knowledge on the part of the
drawer of checks of such lack or insufficiency of funds; and (4) damage capable of pecuniary
estimation to the payee thereof. Underlying all these must be the presence of fraud or deceit.230
65.7 The first element of the offense requires that the dishonored check must have
been postdated or issued at the time the obligation was contracted. In other words, the date the
obligation was entered into, being the very date the check was issued or postdated, is a material
ingredient of the offense.231
65.8 The act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the
efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain money
or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or
postdated. In other words, the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted
with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender. Prima facie
evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.232
65.9 It is the fraud or deceit employed by the accused in issuing a worthless check
that is penalized. Deceit, to constitute estafa, should be the efficient cause of defraudation. It
must have been committed either prior or simultaneous with the defraudation complained of.
There must be concomitance: the issuance of a check should be the means to obtain money or
225 People vs. Pascual, G.R. No. 204873, 27 July 2016.
226 Pablo vs. People, 442 SCRA 146 (2004).
227 People vs. Temporada, 574 SCRA 258 (2008).
228 People vs. Comila, 517 SCRA 153
(2007). 277People vs. Chua, 680 SCRA 575 (2012).
229 Lopez vs. People, 703 SCRA 118 (2013)
230 Flores vs. People, 375 SCRA 491 (2002).
231 People vs. Dinglasan, 389 SCRA 71 (2002).
232 People vs. Wagas, 705 SCRA 17 (2013).
property from the payee. Hence, a check issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation does not
constitute estafa even if there is no fund in the bank to cover the amount of the check.233
65.10 If the transaction was one for a loan of money and for which the accused issued
checks to guarantee the payment of the loan, he has the obligation to make good the payment
of the money borrowed by him. But such obligation is civil in character and in the absence of
fraud, no criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code arises from the mere issuance of
postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment. 234 In the same vein, if the accused issued the
checks as evidence of indebtedness to cover the value of the jewelry, a drawer who issues a
check as security or evidence of investment is not liable for Estafa.235
65.11 There is no estafa through bouncing checks when it is shown that private
complainant knew that the drawer did not have sufficient funds in the bank at the time the check
was issued to him. Such knowledge negates the element of deceit and constitutes a defense in
estafa through bouncing checks.285
65.12 Uncollected deposits are not the same as insufficient funds. The prima facie
presumption of deceit arises only when a check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds. Notably, the law speaks of insufficiency of funds but not of uncollected deposits.236
65.13 If there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds

cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori intent, which is hard to determine and may not
be inferred from mere failure to comply with a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist.
Notice of dishonor is required under both par. 2(d) Art. 315 of the RPC and of BP 22. Under
both laws, notice of dishonor is necessary for prosecution (for estafa and violation of BP 22).
Without proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and
no crime (whether estafa or violation of BP 22) can be deemed to exist.237
65.14 There can be no estafa if the accused acted in good faith because good faith
negates malice and deceit.238
65.15 Novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
extinguishment of criminal liability for Estafa.239 It may prevent the rise of criminal liability as
long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. In other words, novation
does not extinguish criminal liability but may only prevent its rise.‖ 240 The role of novation may
only be either to prevent the rise of criminal liability, or to cast doubt on the true nature of the
original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that the breach of the obligation would not
give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other
similar disguise is resorted to.241
65.16 The reimbursement or restitution to the offended party of the sums swindled by
the accused does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. It only extinguishes pro tanto
the civil liability. Moreover, estafa is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by
the State on its own motion even though complete reparation had been made for the loss or
233 People vs. Reyes, 454 SCRA 635 (2005).
234 People vs. Cuyugan, 392 SCRA 140 (2002).
235 People vs. Dimalanta, 440 SCRA 55
(2004). 285People vs. Reyes, 454 SCRA 635(2005).
236 Dy vs. People, 571 SCRA 59 (2008).
237 People vs. Ojeda, 430 SCRA 436 (2004).
238 Recuerdo vs. People, 493 SCRA 517 (2006).
239 Ocampo-Paule vs. Court of Appeals, 376 SCRA 83 (2002).
240 Diongzon vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 477 (1999).
241 Degaños vs. People, 707 SCRA 438 (2013).
damage suffered by the offended party. The consent of the private complainant to petitioner‘s
payment of her civil liability pendente lite does not entitle the latter to an acquittal. Subsequent
payments does not obliterate the criminal liability already incurred. Criminal liability for estafa is
not affected by a compromise between accused and the private complainant on the former‘s
civil liability.242
65.17 Estafa through issuance of bouncing checks vs. Violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The issuance of a check subsequently dishonored, estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are
separate and distinct from each other because they pertain to different causes of action. xxx,
among other differences, damage and deceit are essential elements for estafa under Article 315
2(d) of the RPC, but are not so for violation under B.P. Blg. 22, which punishes the mere
issuance of a bouncing check, xxx. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is
dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued
the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code.
Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored
check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a
preexisting obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such
circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each
of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire
banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Reyised Penal Code are mala in se, while
those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.243
66. Other Forms of Swindling. The elements of other forms of swindling under
Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that the thing
disposed of be real property; (2) that the offender knew that the real property was
encumbered, whether the encumbrance is recorded or not; (3) that there must be express
representation by the offender that the real property is free from encumbrance; and (4) that
the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of another.244
67. “Other Deceits.” For one to be liable for ―other deceits‖ under the law, it is
required that the prosecution must prove the following essential elements: (a) false pretense,
fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the preceding articles; (b) such false pretense,
fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or
prejudice. It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes
the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant to part with her property. Thhis
includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Articles 315 to 317
of the Revised Penal Code. It is intended as the catchall provision for that purpose with its
broad scope and intendment.245
68. Destructive Arson. In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to
determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated – whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the
main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the
occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if,
on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building
or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person,
242 Firaza vs. People, 518 SCRA 681 (2007).

243 Batac vs. People, G.R. No. 191622, 06 June 2018.
244 Estrellado-Mainar vs. People, G.R. No. 184320, 29 July 2015.
245 Guinhawa vs. People, 468 SCRA 278 (2005).
and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up
the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed – homicide/murder and
arson.246
69. Malicious Mischief. Its elements are: (1) That the offender deliberately caused
damage to the property of another; (2) That such act does not constitute arson or other
crimes involving destruction; (3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed
merely for the sake of damaging it.297
70. Concubinage. Even a subsequent pronouncement that the marriage is void

from
beginning, the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage.247
71. Acts of Lasciviousness. There must be a confluence of the following elements

before conviction can be had for such crime: (1) that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a)
through force, threat, or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and (d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; and (3) that the offended
party is another person of either sex.248 In acts of lasciviousness, the acts complained of are
prompted by lust or lewd design where the victim has not encouraged such acts. In cases of
acts of lasciviousness, the offender is deemed to have accomplished all the elements
necessary for the existence of the felony once he has been able, by his overt acts, to
actually achieve or attain his purpose.249
72. Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, distinguished. While rape and acts of
lasciviousness have the same nature, they are fundamentally different. For in rape, there is
the intent to lie with a woman, whereas in acts of lasciviousness, this element is absent.301
73. Simple Seduction. To constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some
deceitful promise or inducement. The woman should have yielded because of this promise
or inducement.250
74. Forcible Abduction. The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, are: (1)
that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2)
that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.251
246 People vs. Malngan, 503 SCRA 294 (2006).

Taguinod vs. People, 659 SCRA 23 (2011).
297
247 Beltran vs. People, 334 SCRA 106 (2000)

248 Orsos vs. People, G.R. No. 214673, 20 November 2017.
249 People vs. Perez, 378 SCRA 476
(2002) 301Tibong vs. People, 630 SCRA 639 (2010).
250 People vs. Pascua, 406 SCRA 103 (2003).
251 People vs. Ablaneda, 357 SCRA 479 (2001).
74.1 If the main objective of the accused when the victim was taken by him was to rape her,
then forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape. 252 Although forcible abduction was seemingly
committed, the accused is not guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape when the
objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the
forcible abduction.
75. Bigamy. Its elements are, that: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first
marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has
not been preemptively declared dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and,
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.253
75.1 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such
marriages have juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. 254
75.2 The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Thus, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. Even if theaccused eventually obtained a declaration that his
first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.255
75.3 What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.308
75.4 In one case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. The accused and the complaining witness merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance
to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which accused might be
held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts
a subsequent marriage.309
75.5 The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons
who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. In the
crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on
the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved
marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. The second
spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice.310
252 People vs. Lining, 384 SCRA 427 (2002).

253 Morigo vs. People, 422 SCRA 376 (2004).
254 Manuel vs. People, 476 SCRA 461 (2005).
255 People vs. Abunado, 426 SCRA 562
(2004). 308People vs. Odtuhan, 701 SCRA 506 (2013).
76. Article 351, Repealed. The felony of Premature Marriages defined and punished
under Article 351311 of the Revised Penal Code has already been decriminalized with the
passage of Republic Act No. 10655 in March 2015.
77. Libel. For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be present:
(a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the
victim must be identifiable.312
77.1 Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject
printed phrase must be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the
words imputed not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is necessarily
rendered immaterial.313
77.2 An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it

ascribes to the latter the commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real
or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or
discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. 314 In
determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally
be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood
in another sense. Moreover, a charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the
hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered
were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to
hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.315
77.3 Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written,
known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. A communication of the
defamatory matter to the person defamed alone cannot injure his reputation though it may
wound his self-esteem, for a man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the
estimation in which other hold him. In the same vein, a defamatory letter contained in a closed
envelope addressed to another constitutes sufficient publication if the offender parted with its
possession in such a way that it can be read by person other than the offended party. If a
sender of a libelous communication knows or has good reasons to believe that it will be
intercepted before reaching the person defamed, there is sufficient publication. The publication
of a libel, however, should not be presumed from the fact that the
Morigo vs. People, 422 SCRA 376 (2004).

309
Santiago vs. People, G.R. No. 200233, 15 July 2015.

310
311
“Article 351. Premature marriages. - Any widow who shall marry within three hundred and one day from the
date of the death of her husband, or before having delivered if she shall have been pregnant at the time of his death, shall be
punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.
“The same penalties shall be imposed upon any woman whose marriage shall have been annulled or dissolved, if she
shall marry before her delivery or before the expiration of the period of three hundred and one day after the legal separation.”
312
Soriano vs. People, G.R. No. 225015, 21 November 2018.
313
Lopez vs. People, 642 SCRA 668 (2011).
314
Brillante vs. Court of Appeals, 440 SCRA 541 (2004).
315
Soriano vs. People, G.R. No. 225015, 21 November 2018.
immediate control thereof is parted with unless it appears that there is reasonable probability that it is
hereby exposed to be read or seen by third persons.256
77.4 To satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a third person or a
stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement. It is enough if by intrinsic
reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to
facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to; or if the
latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did
understand that he was the person referred to.257
77.5 Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or
spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed; it
implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the author of
the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as
to the truth or falsity thereof.258
77.6 The presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation qualifies as
privileged communication.259 Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove
malice on the part of the accused (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that accused‘s
imputation is malicious (malice in law).
77.7 A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if the author has
acted in bad faith. This class includes allegations or statements made by parties or their counsel in
pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial and administrative proceedings, as well as
answers given by the witness in reply to questions propounded to them in the course of said
proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers
are responsive to the questions propounded to said witnesses.260
77.8 In libel cases against public officials, for liability to arise, the alleged defamatory statement
must relate to official conduct, even if the defamatory statement is false, unless the public official
concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was
false or not.261
77.9 Liability of editor of the publication. Criminal liability for libel equally applies to an editor
of a publication in which a libelous article was published and states that the editor of the same shall be
responsible for the defamation in writing as if he were the author thereof. Indeed, when an alleged
libelous article is published in a newspaper, such fact alone sufficient evidence to charge the editor or
business manager with the guilt of its publication. This sharing of liability with the author of said article is
based on the principle that editors and associate editors, by the nature of their positions, edit, control
and approve the materials which are to be published in a newspaper. This means that, without their nod
of approbation, any article alleged to be libelous would not be published.262
78. Oral Defamation. Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken)
means, instead of in writing. It is defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to
prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood." The elements of oral
256 Belen vs. People, G.R. No. 211120, 13 February 2017.
257 MBPC and Batuigas vs. Domingo and People, G.R. No. 170341, 05 July 2017.
258 MBPC and Batuigas, ibid.
259 MBPC and Batuigas, ibid.
260 Belen vs. People, G.R. No. 211120, 13 February 2017.
261 Jalandoni vs. Hon. Secretary of Justice, 327 SCRA 107 (2000).
262 Bautista vs. Cuneta-Pangilinan, 684 SCRA 521 (2012).
defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5)
directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonour,
discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It
becomes grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature.263
79. Slander by Deed. Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is committed by
performing any act, which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person. The elements
are (1) that the offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor, (2) that such
act is performed in the presence of other person or persons, and (3) that such act casts dishonor,
discredit or contempt upon the offended party. Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by
deed of a serious nature or not, depends on the social standing of the offended party, the
circumstances under which the act was committed, the occasion, etc. It is libel committed by actions
rather than words. The most common examples are slapping someone or spitting on his/her face in
front of the public market, in full view of a crowd, thus casting dishonor, discredit, and contempt upon
the person of another.264
79.1 Pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase ―Fuck You,‖ which is similar to the
expression ―Puta‖ or ―Putang Ina mo,‖ in local parlance. Such expression was not held to be
libelous in Reyes v. People, xxx. In Villanueva though, the Supreme Court held that ―in light of the fact
that there was a perceived provocation coming from complainant, petitioner‘s act of pointing a dirty
finger at complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of the
case that the act complained of was employed by petitioner ‗to express anger or displeasure‘ at
complainant for procrastinating the approval of his leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor,
discredit or contempt upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature, thus, the penalty shall be
arresto menor meaning, xxx‖325
#updated/ 071619
263 De Leon vs. People, G.R. No. 212623, 11 January 2016.

264 Villanueva vs. People, 487 SCRA 42 (2006).
325
Villanueva, ibid.

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What are the different classifications of felonies according to their means of execution?

What are the different classifications of felonies according to their means of execution?

What is the difference between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes?

What is the difference between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes?

JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™

CRIMINAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE

THE REVISED PENAL CODE

1 People vs. Sullano, G.R. No. 228373, 12 March 2018.

7. Mistake of fact. A "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would

8. How criminal liability may be incurred. A person committing a felony is criminally

6 Dungo vs. People, 761 SCRA 375 (2015)

9. Proximate cause; Efficient intervening cause. Proximate cause is defined as that

11. Stages of Execution; Attempted, Frustrated and Consummated. In homicide

11.1 Whether attempted/frustrated homicide or Physical Injuries. In order to

10 Ng vs. People, 619 SCRA 219 (2010).

11.4 No frustrated stage in Theft. Theft is either attempted or consummated. Theft

12.1 How proved. A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive

12.3 Conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability. Once conspiracy is

13.1 Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or

13.2 Unlawful aggression, an indispensable requisite. There can be no self-

13.4 Self-defense and retaliation, distinguished. In retaliation, the inceptual

25 People vs. Enfectana, 381 SCRA 359 (2002).

13.6 Lack of Sufficient Provocation. The provocation must be sufficient to excite

13.7 Defense of Relatives. In order that this defense is to be appreciated, the

13.8 Defense of Strangers. In order to successfully put up this defense an accused

13.9 Avoidance of Greater Evil. To successfully invoke avoidance of greater evil as

34 Velasquez vs. People, G.R. No. 195021, 15 March

35 Medina vs. People, 713 SCRA 311 (2014).

14.4 Uncontrollable Fear. To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence

14.5 Irresistible Force. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce

40 People vs. Racal, G.R. No. 224886, 04 September 2017.

16. Mitigating Circumstances; Incomplete Self-defense. In order that it may be

16.3 Sufficient Provocation/Threats. For this to be appreciated, the following

16.5 Passion or Obfuscation. To be entitled to this mitigating circumstance, the

44 Chang vs. People, 496 SCRA 321 (2006)

16.8 Filing of Information/issuance of Arrest Warrant. The mere filing of an

16.9 Confession of guilt. To be entitled to such mitigating circumstance, the

16.10 Restitution, a mitigating circumstance analogous to Voluntary surrender

17. Aggravating Circumstances; Advantage taken of public position. To appreciate

17.1 In Contempt of or With Insult to Public Authorities. The requisites of this

52 Romera vs. People, 434 SCRA 467 (2004).

17.7 Nighttime, band or uninhabited place. By and of itself, it is not an aggravating

17.11 Evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the

58 People vs. Melendres, 402 SCRA 279 (2003).

65 People vs. Dimacuha, G.R. No. 191060, 02 February 2015.

17.14 Abuse of Superior Strength. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever

67 People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 224498, 11 January 2018.

17.21 Ignominy. The aggravating circumstance of ignominy shall be taken into

18.1 Relationship. In order that the alternative circumstance of relationship may be

75 People vs. Gonzalez, 359 SCRA 220

19.2 Criminal liability as a principal even if there is no conspiracy among the

19.3 Principal by inducement. The conviction of a person as a principal by

19.4 Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or

19.5 Accomplices. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the

82 People vs. Ragundiaz, 334 SCRA 193 (2001).

83 People vs. Cabareño, 349 SCRA 297 (2001).

21. Pardon by the offended party; Recantation/Affidavit of Desistance, not a ground to

21.1 A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and

22.1 Reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty. Reclusion perpetua remains to be

―ART. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty.— A fine, whether