Cases 26 35
Cases 26 35
Cases 26 35
2033)
Fats:
Spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Geeslin filed a letter-complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
charging respondent Navarro with deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office, and blatant violation of the
Attorney's Oath or having deliberately misrepresented the facts and the law while acting as counsel for the
defendants. Respondent did not deny the allegations of the Complaint, and in fact admitted during the hearing of the
case set by the Office of the Solicitor General that there is no dispute as to the facts of this case, it follows that the
specifications of the charges against him, which are duly supported by documents, are deemed sufficiently proven.
The only justification invoked by respondent is that he "gave his entire devotion to the interest of his clients"
and that he "did his bounden duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost learning and ability.The acts
complained of in the present case also warrant the suspension of respondent from the practice of law.
Issue:
Is the present case warrant the suspension of against Navarro in the practice of law?
Held:
Yes, present case warrant the suspension of against Navarro in the practice of law.
Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful orders of constituted authority and
illustrate his incorrigible despiciency for an attorney's duty to society. Verily, respondent has proven himself
unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him by law and by the Court, through his deliberate rejection
of his oath as an officer of the court.
Facts:
Petitioner filed administrative charges against Respondent Navarro to prevent the latter from further
perpetrating a large scale fraud upon the public, claiming ownership of properties originally owned by
Ortigas & Company and the Madrigals, and started selling them. In support of his allegation, respondent
Navvarro presented deeds of sale over lots, the locations of which overlap the properties owned by Ortigas.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro be disbarred and his name be stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys.
Issue:
Is respondent Navarro should be disbarred because of his unlawful acts?
Held:
Yes, respondent Navarro should be disbarred because of his unlawful acts
Respondent continued his modus operandi and defied the authorities despite having been
suspended from the practice of law since May 5, 1980 in which the suspension is still in effect. Thus, he
must be disbarred because of such unlawful acts. In resolving disbarment case, we must perforce initially
focus on the degree of integrity and respectability required and expected of the law profession. There is no
denying that membership in the legal profession is achieved only after a long and laborious study. By years
of patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is
not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social
prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact
that everyone is deemed an officer of the court.
1
Case# 28 - IN RE: INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, 22 SCRA 22-28-31, 1973
FACTS:
Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from the
approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt Rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December 1972, the Commission
earnestly recommended the integration of the bar. The Court accepted all comments on the proposed
integration.
ISSUES:
RULING:
Yes, the integration of the bar is constitutional.
Section 5(5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides the constitutional basis for the inherent
power of the Supreme Court to regulate the bar includes the authority to integrate the bar.
Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a lawyer to become a
member of any group of which he is not already a member. All that it does is “to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a
member”. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of
regulation.Since this is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it
is not unfair.
FACTS:
The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rules of Court 139-A and the provisions
of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of the IBP, payment of
membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he
is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a consequence of this, compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE:
Is the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee to the IBP?
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of IBP does not violate his constitutional freedom to associate. The
Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of a distinguished from bar
associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment of reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements.
The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional free to
associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
2
Case#30 - In re: Benjamin Dacanay
Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for hisailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail
of Canada’sfree medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
2004.On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before
the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice.
Issue:
Held:
Yes, petitioner can still resume his practice of law in the Philippines.
Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. He must also
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.The exception is
when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of RA 9225.
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor,
where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law
student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the
inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with
the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in
the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in
Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.
Issue:
Is petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant?
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
litigant.
When a law student appears before the court, he is subject to supervision and control of a member of IBP.
However, such rule shall not apply if the law student appears as non-lawyer before the inferior-courts, provided he is
an agent or friend of the party litigant as prescribed by Section 34, Rule 138 of the RRC.
In the present case, petitioner has justified his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a
party litigant.
3
Case #32 - ZETA VS. MALINAO
87 SCRA 303 , December 20, 1978
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed against Felicisimo Malinao, a court interpreter of the Court of First instance
of Catbalogan, by certain Julio Zeta charging him of illegally appearing in court; grave misconduct in office inciting
and instigating persons to grab land or coerce and tell them not to be afraid as he is a court employee and has
influence over judges; crime of falsification for tampering his daily time records because even he has been out
practicing in the court, he would fill his time record as present; and violation of the Civil Service Law by engaging in
private practice of profession without permission from the Department Head.
Respondent averred that his participationfor defendants’ cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the
services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality.
Issue:
Held:
No, a lower court interpreter, a non-lawyer cannot appear as counsel in any courts.
As a rule, a non-lawyer who practices law will be guilty of illegal practice of law.
In the present case, it is clear that Malinao is appearing in courts or investigative body wherein only
members of the bar are allowed to practice.Thus, Malinao is found guilty of appearing as counsel in a private case,
who should not be allowed to practice as he is not an attorney.
Facts:
Complainant alleged that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several
actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases. Then, he met respondent who
acted as the counsel of his neighbours. Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of
compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public,
inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party
litigant in prior cases, respondent’s imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with
malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was
handling. The manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!” were
uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit
complainant before the public.
Issue:
Held:
No, complainant is not precluded from litigating personally.
A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus,If he appears personally, he is bound by the same rules in conducting the trial of his case. He cannot
after judgement, claim that he was not properly represented by counsel.
4
Case# 34 - Beltran Jr. vs. Abad, 132 SCRA 453 (BM 139)
FACTS:
Mr. Elmo S. Abad was charged by Atty. Procopio Beltran, President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers
Association, of practicing law without being admitted to the Bar. But Abad admitted that during the time he was
waiting for his turn to take the Oath he was made to sign the Lawyer’s Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the
Bar. Respondent, Abad, explained that he had already paid his membership fees and other assessments in the
belief that he was already admitted to the bar in good faith.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes, Mr. Abad unlawfully practicing law without authority to do so.
Section 21, Rule 138 of RRC provides that Attorneys who are suspended or disbarred but continues to
engage in the practice of law are liable for contempt of court, punishable by fine or imprisonment or both upon the
discretion of the court.
In the instant case, Abad didn’t qualify for admission for the Philippine Bar for he was not able to take his
oath and was not able to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Thus, he was held liable for fine and imprisonment of 25 days.
Facts:
Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer for a period of five
years but admitted that he continued to exercise the profession within the period of suspension. On Feb 28, 1950 the
respondent file a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a lawyer but as an agent. Another case, respondent filed
a brief for an order to demolish homes in behalf of his client. He contends that he is not practicing law but only signing
in behalf of his client without designating that he is practicing law.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes, the acts of Atty. Felix David are tantamount to practice of law.
The acts of being a legal consultant are a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those
acts that are characteristics of the legal profession. As such, neither can he allow his name to appear in such
pleading by itself nor as a part of a firms under the signature of another qualified lawyer as he is under suspension
from the practice of law.
In the instant case, he is held liable although he acted as an agent of a litigant or the circumstances provides that
he holds himself out as a lawyer in association, since he cannot do indirectly, what he cannot do directly.
.