Illegal Immigration From Bangladesh

ILLEGAL MIGRATION FROM BANGLADESH...
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IDSA Monograph Series

No. 56 December 2016
Illegal Migration From

Bangladesh
Deportation, Border
Fences and Work Permits
Pushpita Das
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Cover Ilustration : The Cover depicts Border Fence along India-Bangladesh

Border and a Bangladeshi being apprehended by BSF personnal after
illegaly crossing into India. Cover Photograph courtesy the author. Work
Permit picture source : http://baraboo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
work-permit.jpg
 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
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of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).
ISBN: 978-93-82169-69-7
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monograph have been made by the author in his personal capacity and do not
have any official endorsement.
First Published: December 2016

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ILLEGAL MIGRATION FROM BANGLADESH...| 3
Contents
Abbreviations........................................................................... 5
Introduction ............................................................................ 9
1. Illegal Migration: Trends, Patterns, Estimates and
Reasons................................................................................. 17
2. Impact on Internal Security and the
Securitisation.............................................................................. 40
3. Tackling the Problem: Government's
Response............................................................................. 57
4. Work Permit and Mass Amnesty: An
Assessment.......................................................................... 82
Conclusion.............................................................................. 114
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ABBREVIATIONS
AAGSP All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad

AASU All Assam Students’ Union
AGSP Assam Gana Sangram Parishad
ATTF All Tripura Tiger Force
BGB Border Guards Bangladesh
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BNP Bangladesh National Party
BoPs Border Outposts
BSF Border Security Force
CPI-M Communist Party of India-Marxist
DACA Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
DAPA Deferred Action for Parental Accountability
DCs Deputy Commissioners
DHS Department of Homeland Security
EU European Union
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDR German Democratic Republic
HUJI Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
IMDT Act Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
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IOM International Organization on Migration

IRCA Immigration Reforms and Control Act
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence
JMB Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh
KLO Kamtapur Liberation Army
LAW Legally Authorised Workers
MHA Ministry of Home Affairs
MULFA Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam
MULTA Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam
NDA National Democratic Alliance
NICS National Identity Card Scheme
NLFT National Liberation Front of Tripura
NPR National Population Register
NRC National Register of Citizens
PIF Prevention of Infiltration of Foreigners
PIP Prevention of Infiltration into India of Pakistani
Nationals
RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SAW Special Agricultural Workers
SOPs Standard Operating Procedures
SPs Superintendents of Police
SSP Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan
ST Scheduled Tribe
TNV Tripura National Volunteers

TUJS Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti
UIDAI Unique Identification Authority of India
ULFA United Liberation Front of Assam
UN United Nations
US United States
VHP Vishwa Hindu Parishad
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Introduction
The history of the world is the history of migration. Migration has

taken place since time immemorial and will continue in future. People
have migrated to distant lands in search of food, shelter, freedom,
security and better lifestyle, and in the process have made an impact on
the socio-economic, cultural as well as the political fabric of their
destinations. While on the one hand this impact on the receiving country
has been positive, on the other hand it has sown the seeds of discontent
among the locals. In other words, although migrants have enriched the
cultural, social and economic aspects of their “new homes” with their
skills, industry and dedication, their relative prosperity has fuelled
resentment among the locals. This resentment has led to intense
competition between the migrants and the natives for resources; but
whenever this competition has been politicised, it has led to demands
for preservation of local identity and power, which in turn has fuelled
violence and political disturbance and jeopardised the internal security
of the country. Consequently, migration has come to be increasingly
regarded by the elites of the receiving country as a threat to the greater
political and societal integration, and therefore a security risk. As countries
try to restrict the influx of people into their territory, migration gets
closely linked with border control, terrorism and criminality, resulting
in its securitisation.1
India is often described as a land of migrants, which over centuries has
attracted streams of immigrants from different races and cultures and
assimilated them to build a composite civilisation. Paradoxically,
immigration, while enriching the land with modern innovations and
industries, has also been a source of conflict. India too has experienced
1
Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 5, December 2000, p. 762.
10 | PUSHPITA DAS
intermittent conflict arising out of competition over resources between

local population and immigrants. In contemporary times, the country
has witnessed large-scale immigration from its neighbouring countries.
While some these immigrants are refugees fleeing political and religious
repressions back home, others are economic migrants escaping gruelling
poverty and a bleak future. India has been a generous host to all these
immigrants but large-scale, undocumented immigration from
Bangladesh has become a source of conflict and tensions in the receiving
states. The magnitude of immigration has been too huge and protest
against it too violent, making infiltration, as illegal migration is termed
officially, one of the most politically contentious issues in India since
independence.
Out-migration from the plains of East Bengal into India did take place
during the colonial times too, but the partitioning of the Indian
subcontinent and the subsequent cycle of violence and counter-violence
in 1950 triggered a massive movement of people across the borders
of the newly created India and Pakistan. The influx of the Hindu
refugees from East Bengal into West Bengal, Assam and Tripura created
a crisis for India both internally as well as externally. Externally, Pakistani
establishment’s apparent reluctance to stop atrocities against its minorities
by its majority population and prevent outflow of the Hindus across
the border into India brought the bilateral relations to the brink of
war. Pakistan’s cavalier attitude towards the crisis generated a heated
debate in the Indian Parliament where politicians from all spectrum
pressed Nehru to “act decisively” against Pakistan. Some of them
proposed large-scale exchange of population between East and West
Bengal; and others suggested that since the Hindus coming to India
were larger in proportion compared to the Muslims going to East
Bengal, Pakistan should be forced to cede territory to India.2
Pushed by domestic political pressure and exasperated by Pakistan’s
rebuff to his overtures, Nehru threatened use of force. He even
2
Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years,
Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2010, p. 157.
mobilised troops in March 1950 to compel Pakistan to act against the

perpetrators of communal violence in East Bengal.3 The bilateral crisis
was finally diffused when Liaquat Ali Khan agreed to meet Nehru in
Delhi and the Nehru–Liaquat Pact was signed in April 1950. The pact
stated that India and Pakistan would accord equality of citizenship to
their minorities, the rights of the refugees over immovable properties
would be safeguarded and the culprits of communal violence would
be punished.4
Inside India, the mass migration from East Pakistan into India was
considered as “homecoming” by the national leadership, but at the
local level the situation was deteriorating gradually as more and more
migrants started pouring in. The atrocities against the Hindus in East
Bengal resulted in widespread communal riots in West Bengal thereby
disturbing societal harmony. In Assam and Tripura, the overwhelming
in-migration of refugees intensified the simmering tensions against the
Bengali migrants among the local population. The liberation of
Bangladesh in 1971, and India’s acceptance to absorb all illegal migrants
from East Pakistan who had migrated before March 24, 1971,
introduced a period of lull in the charged up atmosphere. The calm
was however short-lived as Bangladeshis (both Hindus and Muslims)
continued to enter India illegally till mid-1970s. As a result, intolerance
against illegal migrants once again flared up in Assam and Tripura leading
to insurgent movements. During the same time, policymakers at the
national level understood the full impact of illegal migration as the
census report of 1981 revealed that population in the eight border
districts of West Bengal and six districts of Bihar had increased by 150
per cent.5 The unprecedented increase in population in a single decade
was attributed to the massive infiltration from Bangladesh.
3
Ibid., pp. 162–67.
4
Agreement between the Governments of India and Pakistan Regarding Security and Rights of
Minorities (Nehru–Liaquat Agreement), April 8, 1950, New Delhi, available at http://
www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1950/9.html, accessed on December
23, 2015.
5
Avtar Singh Bhasin, India–Bangladesh Relations, Vol. 1, New Delhi: Geetika Publishers,
2003, p. xc.
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Illegal migration from Bangladesh, which was hitherto seen as a regional

problem and therefore a peripheral issue, was catapulted to the national
level in the late 1980s when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its
allies decided to politicise the issue to polarise Hindu votes. Extreme
politicisation of the issue resulted in its securitisation when Bangladeshi
illegal migrants were presented as an existential threat to the society,
culture, economy and polity of the country. Incidentally, the securitisation
of the illegal migration in India drew inspiration from the unfolding
events in the international arena which brought the issue of migration
and its resultant impact on the receiving countries under sharp focus.
The end of Cold War and the break-up of the communist block had
triggered large-scale movement of people from communist countries
to the West, leading to growing concerns in the host countries about
the security repercussions of receiving refugees and migrants. Attitudes
against immigrants in host countries further hardened at the turn of
the twenty-first century. Growing Islamic fundamentalism and its
association with international terrorism propelled countries, world over,
to tighten their borders against immigrants and asylum seekers.
In India too, the securitisation of the issue of illegal migration brought
it under the rubric of national security and the irregular crossing of the
international border by the migrants was viewed as the loss of control
of the Indian state over its borders and a challenge its sovereignty.
Consequently, successive governments in New Delhi tried various
measures not only to prevent Bangladeshi migrants from illegally
crossing the border but also to ensure that they do not find shelter in
India. The failure of the Indian government in tackling illegal migration
effectively kept the issue simmering for decades. Political parties
belonging to various ideologies have been exploiting this issue to garner
votes, especially during elections. The most recent examples being during
the national as well as state elections. During the build-up to the Lok
Sabha elections in 2014, Narendra Modi, displaying his strong stance,
declared that illegal migrants will have to pack their bags and leave
after he wins the elections.6 The issue was raked up yet again in 2016,
6
“Modi: Bangladeshi Immigrants must Pack”, Dhaka Tribune, April 28, 2014, available at
http://archive.dhakatribune.com/south-asia/2014/apr/28/narendra-modi-come-may-
16-bangladeshi-immigrants-must-pack, accessed on June 16, 2016.
on the eve of the West Bengal and Assam elections, when the BJP
declared that once elected to power, they would ensure that illegal
migrants are evicted from the states and the local people given their
due.7
Rationale of the Study
Scholarly works on the issue of illegal migration are substantial, but
most of them deal with the reasons for migration and its impact on
the society and polity of the receiving states. Amalendu Guha’s seminal
work8 provides an impressive background to the issue of illegal
migration by providing a historical analysis of the immigration issue,
and the rise of Assamese nationalism and its complex ethnic politics.
Sanjib Baruah, in his work,9 focuses on the social, economic, cultural
and political consequences of immigration from Bangladesh to Assam,
and on how it has contributed to the mobilisation of Assamese identity
and formation of a distinct Assamese micro-nationalism or sub-
nationalism. Sanjoy Hazarika’s book10 is similar to Baruah’s. Based on
his trips to the border belt of Assam and Bangladesh, and interviews
with migrants, Hazarika analyses the reasons for illegal migration and
how it has contributed to the rise of Assamese militant nationalism
and insurgencies in the state. He also goes a step further and suggests a
7
“Assamese People to Get Due Rights if Illegal Migrants are Driven Out, Says Sonowal”,
The Times of India, May 23, 2016, New Delhi, available at http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/elections-2016/assam-elections-2016/news/Assamese-
people-to-get-due-rights-if-illegal-migrants-are-driven-out-says-Sonowal/articleshow/
52405667.cms, accessed on June 16, 2016.
8
Amalendu Guha, Planter Raj to Swaraj: Freedom Struggle & Electoral Politics in Assam 1826–
1947, New Delhi: Tulika Books, 2006.
9
Sanjib Baruah, “Immigration, Ethnic Conflict, and Political Turmoil—Assam, 1979–
1985”, Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 11, November 1986, pp. 1184–206; also, see Sanjib
Baruah, India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality, New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1999.
10
Sanjoy Hazarika, Rites of Passage: Border Crossings, Imagined Homeland, India’s East and Bangladesh,
New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000; see also Sanjoy Hazarika, “Revisiting the Migration
Debate: Congress, Opposition and Reality”, in Suman Gupta, Tapan Basu and Subarno
Chattarji (eds), Globalisation in India: Contents and Discontents, Delhi: Dorling Kindersley
India, 2010.
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limited set of recommendations, including giving work permits and

temporary amnesty to the illegal migrants. Uddipana Goswami’s work11
also traces the history and process of migration into Assam and discusses
the process of assimilation of the legal settlers into the Assamese
mainstream and the conflicts it has brought about.
Ranabir Samaddar’s book12 concentrates on migrants rather than on
the issue of illegal migration and has a number of micro-studies of
villages, towns and lives of individuals to highlight their plight. Samaddar
argues that if Hindus are treated as refuges and given protection so
should be the Muslim migrants who are also forced to leave their
home under economic distress. He suggests a South Asian protocol
and covenant to protect the rights of refugees from different regions
as a possible solution. Chandan Nandy’s scholarly work,13 based on
extensive fieldwork, similarly traces the processes and reasons for illegal
migration from Bangladesh. He argues that one of the most important
“pull” factors for the illegal migrants is the political patronage extended
to them in India. He views illegal migration from the prism of partition
and argues that the incessant illegal migration is leading to conflicts.
Willem van Schendel14 has taken a more holistic approach to explain
the historical and contemporary causes of immigration from Bangladesh
to both West Bengal and Assam. He has given a voice to the Bangladeshi
borderlanders by narrating their daily travails of living near an
international border, including their counter-strategies of defiance as
well as ignorance of the border between India and Bangladesh. B.B.
Kumar’s edited compendium15 brings together a series of discussions
11
Uddipana Goswami, “Miya or Axamiya? Migration and Politics of Assimilation in
Assam”, Journal of Social and Policy Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 1, December 16, 2010, pp. 3–36.
12
Ranabir Samaddar, The Marginal Nation: Transborder Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal,
New Delhi: Sage, 1999.
13
Chandan Nandy, “Illegal Migration from Bangladesh to India: The Emerging Conflicts”,
Mellon–MIT Foundation on NGOs and Forced Migration, November 30, 2005.
14
Willem van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia, London:
Anthem Press, 2005.
15
B.B. Kumar (ed.), Illegal Migration from Bangladesh, Delhi: Astha Bharati, 2006.
and suggestions on the reasons and the extent of illegal migration. It

also discusses, in detail, the changing demographic profile of the
receiving states and the negative consequences of illegal migration on
the security of the country.
Anand Kumar16 argues that if the internal politics and economic
deprivations in Bangladesh are responsible for pushing people out of
that country, then lenient and permissive attitude of the Indian
policymakers towards illegal Bangladeshi migrants is equally responsible
for the problem that the country is grappling with. He asserts that
illegal migration poses a threat to the country because the issue has not
been adequately securitised. In contrast, Priyankar Updhayaya17 asserts
that while the Indian state had taken the large-scale influx of illegal
migrants from East Pakistan and later Bangladesh in its stride, the India–
Pakistan war and the growing Islamisation of Bangladesh compelled
it to become “hostile to the presence of unauthorized Bangladeshi
migrants on Indian soil”. He argues that securitisation of the issue resulted
in militarisation of the international border which has inflicted untold
miseries on the poor people and therefore, a humanitarian approach
to deal with illegal migration is required. Similar work by Josy Joseph18
examines the securitisation of illegal migration from Bangladesh by
various actors and the influences of political ideologies on the Indian
state’s response to illegal migration. He also argues that desecuritisation
of the issue is necessary to find a lasting solution to the problem.
Outline of the Monograph
Drawing from the debates and discussions on the concept of
securitisation of illegal migration from Bangladesh, this monograph
16
Anand Kumar, “Illegal Bangladeshi Migration to India: Impact on Internal Security”,
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 35, No. 1, January–March 2010, pp. 106–19.
17
Priyankar Upadhyaya, “Securitization Matrix in South Asia: Bangladeshi Migrants as
Enemy Alien”, in Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitav Acharya (eds.),
Non-traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitization, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, pp.
13–39.
18
Josy Joseph, “Securitization of Illegal Migration of Bangladeshis to India”, IDSS Working
Paper No. 100, Singapore, January 2006, pp. i–28.
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discusses, in detail, the events and processes which led the policymakers
to view illegal migrants through the prism of security. In this respect,
the study attempts to provide the government’s perspective on the
infiltration/illegal migration, and also analyses various measures that
the Indian government has taken over the years to tackle the problem.
It also analyses, in detail, the proposed solutions, such as issuance of
work permits and granting of amnesty to the illegal migrants.
Accordingly the monograph is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1
discusses the trends, patterns and reasons of illegal migration from
Bangladesh. It also includes official estimates of illegal migrants
undertaken over several years. Chapter 2 analyses the socio-economic
and political impact of the presence of a large number of illegal
migrants on the receiving societies. It also discusses and analyses the
process of politicisation and securitisation of illegal migration by the
political parties. Chapter 3 studies various measures undertaken by the
Indian government to tackle the problem of illegal migration over the
years, and also analyses the reasons behind its failure to effectively prevent
illegal migration. Chapter 4 critically analyses the twin proposals of
work permit and temporary amnesty for the illegal Bangladeshi migrants
as possible solutions to the problem. In order to gain a better
understanding of the implications of these proposals, the chapter brings
forth debates and experiences of select countries which have
implemented guest worker schemes as well as granted amnesty to illegal
migrants. The monograph concludes by forwarding a few
recommendations.
Chapter - 1
Illegal Migration
Trends, Patterns, Estimates and
Reasons
India has been witnessing immigration since independence. People who

have faced religious and political persecution, economic and social
discrimination, cultural repression and curbs on personal freedom have
made India their home. Many others have entered India to escape
abject poverty and economic stagnation in their country, and to build a
better future for themselves. Of all kinds of migration, illegal migration
from Bangladesh has become the most volatile and contentious issue
in Indian polity today because of the socio-political conflicts it has
brought in its wake. Before discussing the adverse consequences, it is
important to study the trends, magnitude and the reasons behind the
undocumented movement of Bangladeshis into India in order to
understand the problem better.
The trend of migration from the East Bengal plains has its roots in
colonial times. After the conquest of Assam in 1826, the British started
establishing their control over the territory and exploiting its vast natural
resources. Expansion of their administration in Assam required large
numbers of petty officials, which they fulfilled by recruiting educated
Bengalis as clerks in the bureaucracy.1 They also opened up vacancies
for teachers and other professions, which were largely taken up by
people from Bengal. The discovery of tea in Assam resulted in peopling
the state with tribals brought in from Chhotanagpur Plateau to work
as labourers in the large British-owned tea estates. The British also
1
White Paper on Foreigners’ Issue, Home and Political Department, Government of Assam,
October 20, 2012, p. 5.
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opened up the vast and hitherto unexploited land for cultivation and
encouraged peasants from densely populated provinces of undivided
Bengal, especially Mymensingh, Bogra, Rangpur and Pabna, to migrate
and settle in Assam.2
Like Assam, Tripura also witnessed large-scale migration from Bengal
due to promotional migration policy of the rajas of Tripura. By virtue
of their long and close association with Bengal, the rajas of Tripura
were impressed with the intellectual and economic development of it
and desired to replicate the same system in Tripura. The rajas invited
educated Bengalis to help modernise their principality by organising
the administration. They also encouraged the East Bengali agriculturists
to cultivate the forested tracts of Tripura to boost revenue generation
in the state for which they doled out land on easy terms under the
“junglabadi” system.3 Under the system, cultivable waste and forested
land were leased out to the settlers; though initially free, after a period
of three to four years a nominal rent of 2 or 3 annas was collected.4
Thus, lured by a respected and brighter future in Tripura, educated
youths as well as uneducated peasants started arriving in Tripura.
Trends of Migration during British Raj

Goalpara in lower Assam, where abundant cultivable land was available,
was perhaps the first district where peasants from East Bengal settled.
To encourage cultivation in Goalpara, the British had readily granted
land tenure to new settlers, who were also exempted from paying rent
in the first two or three years so as to enable them to settle conveniently.5
Pushed by the repressive zamindari system in Bengal and pulled by the
2
Ibid.
3
Subir Bhaumik, “Disaster in Tripura”, Seminar, 2005, available at http://www.india-
seminar.com/2002/510/510%20subir%20bhaumik.htm, accessed on January 23, 2015.
4
Bani Prassana Misra, Socioeconomic Adjustments of the Tribals: Case-Study of Tripura Jhumias,
New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1976, p. 25.
5
W.W. Hunter, A Statistical Account of Assam, Vol. I, London: Trubner & Co., 1879, p. 64.
attraction of tilling their own land, agriculturists from East Bengal

started to stream into Assam from the early years of the twentieth
century. Connectivity provided by extension of railway from Bengal
into Assam and the merger of Goalpara district with East Bengal
following the partition of Bengal provided further impetus for peasants
to migrate.6
The steady trickle of migrants soon became a torrent as both the
government as well as the earlier settlers encouraged and welcomed
new immigrants. The successive censuses correctly captured the
phenomenon. For example, the 1911 census recorded 51,000 persons
(predominantly Muslims) as born in East Bengal settled in Goalpara as
against 3,000 persons in the rest of Assam. By 1921, their number had
increased to 1,41,000 in Goalpara and 1,17,000 in the rest of Assam.7
In fact, the proportion of Muslims to the rest of population had been
increasing steadily since 1881. In that year, the Muslims accounted for
a mere 9 per cent but increased to 19 per cent in 1931 and to 23 per
cent in 1941.8 More particularly, by 1941, the Muslim population
outnumbered the Hindu population by 1,62,000 in the Goalpara
district.9 Similarly, in the Barpeta subdivision, the Muslims grew from
0.1 per cent in 1911 to 49 per cent in 1941.
Tripura also witnessed large migration of Bengali population from the
first decade of the twentieth century. The number of immigrants from
Bengal was a little over 40,000 in 1901, but in the subsequent decades,
the trend of migrants settling in Tripura started increasingly and by
1931, it rose to more than 1 lakh.10 Thus, as a result of large-scale
6
Uddipana Goswami, “Miya or Axamiya? Migration and Politics of Assimilation in
Assam”, Journal of Social and Policy Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 1, December 16, 2010, pp. 7–8.
7
Ibid., p. 9.
8
1947, New Delhi: Tulika Books, 2006, p. 209.
9
White Paper on Foreigners’ Issue, n. 1, p. 8.
10
Nilanjan De, “Bengali Immigration and Renovation of the Administrative Structure of
Tripura: An Analytical Study”, International Journal of Research in Social Sciences, Vol. 2, No.
3, August 2012, pp. 130–31, available at http://www.ijmra.us/project%20doc/
IJRSS_AUGUST2012/IJMRA-RSS1429.pdf, accessed on January 23, 2015.
20 | PUSHPITA DAS
immigration while Assam’s population grew by 103.51 per cent, Tripura

registered a population increase of 195.28 per cent as against the national
average of 33.67 per cent between 1901 and 1941.11
Trends and Patterns Post-Independence

The independence of the country in 1947 was preceded by intense
violence between the Hindus and the Muslims, and led to the partitioning
of the Indian subcontinent into two dominions–India and Pakistan–
on religious grounds. Creation of India and Pakistan meant that the
movement of people which was hitherto taking place between two
provinces and was legal became movement between countries and
was therefore illegal. Despite the partition, the trend of migration of
people from East Bengal into India in search of economic
opportunities, which started in the first few years of the twentieth
century, continued. This trend was further amplified by the inflow of
the Hindu refugees who were fleeing communal riots and religious
persecution.
The unrelenting migration from East Bengal/East Pakistan (later
Bangladesh) into Assam, Tripura and West Bengal was clearly brought
out in the census data on population growth of these bordering states.
For example, in the first three decades after independence, Assam
registered an overall population growth of around 35–36 per cent,
way ahead of the national average of around 21–25 per cent, indicating
a rise of population through migration.12 In his report of 1963, the
Registrar General of Census had put the number of such “infiltrates”
into Assam at 2,20,691. The genocide perpetrated by the military junta
in East Pakistan and the subsequent War of Liberation in 1971 triggered
11
Jogesh Ch. Bhuyan, “Illegal Migration from Bangladesh and the Demographic Change
in the North-East Region”, in B.B. Kumar (ed.), Illegal Migration from Bangladesh, Delhi:
Astha Bharati, 2006, p. 79.
12
Between 1951–61, 1961–71 and 1971–81, the population of India grew from 21.64 per
cent to 24.80 per cent to 24.66 per cent. “Size, Growth Rate and Distribution of
Population”, in Census of India, 2011, available at http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-
results/data_files/india/Final_PPT_2011_chapter3.pdf, accessed on January 27, 2015.
yet another massive inflow of refugees into India. It was estimated

that close to 10 million people from East Pakistan had entered India.13
To make matters worse, most of the migrants who were deported
from Assam in the 1960s re-entered the country. This trend was reflected
in the census figures of 1971 for Assam, which revealed an increase of
820,000 Muslims–424,000 more than that could be accounted through
natural increase.14 The steady rise of Muslim population in the state
from 24.68 per cent in 1951 to 28.43 per cent in 1991 to 34.2 per cent
in 2011 is also taken as an indication of large-scale migration from
Bangladesh;15 an assertion further reinforced by the increase of Muslim
population in the bordering districts of Goalpara, Nowgong and
Cachar, from 42.94 per cent, 34.18 per cent and 38.49 per cent in 1951
to 51.31 per cent, 38.42 per cent and 45.47 per cent respectively in
2001.16
Post-independence, Tripura also witnessed massive inflow of people
from East Pakistan, a majority of whom were Hindus. As a result, in
the first decade after independence, the state’s population increased
from 6.39 lakhs to 11.42 lakhs, registering a growth of 78.71 per cent,
which was highest in the country. In the subsequent three decades, the
population growth rate continued to hover around 30–35 per cent.
13
Seventy Third Report of the Committee on Petitions, Rajya Sabha, New Delhi, March 22, 1982,
p. 4.
14
Myron Weiner, “The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-immigrant Movement”,
Population and Development Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 1983, p. 285.
15
According to the white paper on illegal migration, it is believed that illegal migrants
coming from Bangladesh have been exclusively Muslims; see White Paper on Foreigners’
Issue, n. 1; “Census 2011: Assam Records the Highest Rise in Muslim Population”, The
Times of India, New Delhi, January 22, 2015, available at http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Census-2011-Assam-records-highest-rise-in-
Muslim-population/articleshow/45972566.cms, accessed on January 27, 2015.
16
White Paper on Foreigners’ Issue, n. 1, p. 45. The district-wise census data on religion have
not been released. Assam, however, registered an increase of 34.22 per cent. “Assam
Population 2011”, available at http://www.census2011.co.in/census/state/assam.html,
accessed on January 27, 2016.
22 | PUSHPITA DAS
The share of tribal population in the state, on the other hand, decreased
from 53.16 per cent in 1941 to 31.50 per cent in 1961, which further
decreased to 28 per cent in 1981.17
Similarly in West Bengal, the census estimated that between 1951 and
1961, approximately 4.5 lakh migrants from East Pakistan, mostly
Hindus, entered the state.18 As a result, the population of the Hindus in
the state registered a marginal increase from 78.45 per cent in 1951 to
78.80 per cent in 1961. Since the 1960s, the population of the Hindus
in the state has been steadily declining. The proportion of Muslims, on
the other hand, registered an increase of 0.46 per cent in 1971, which
grew further to 5 per cent in 2001. Between 1991 and 2001, North 24
Parganas, Murshidabad and Malda, bordering Bangladesh, registered
a population rise of 22.64 per cent, 23.70 per cent and 24.77 per cent
respectively–a growth rate which was higher than the state’s average
of 17.84 per cent. On the whole, between 1951 and 2001, while the
growth rate of Hindus was 198.54 per cent, the Muslims recorded a
growth rate of 310.93 per cent. This significant upswing in population
growth of the Muslims in the state is attributed to illegal migration
from Bangladesh.19
While the three states of Assam, Tripura and West Bengal received the
bulk of illegal migrants from East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) in the
initial decades of independence, in the later years, the other states of
the North-East also started registering their presence. For example,
Nagaland recorded the highest rate of population growth in India,
from 56.08 per cent in 1981–91 to 64.41 per cent in 1991–2001, with
Dimapur bordering Assam recording an exceptionally high rate of
17
Subir Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossfire: Northeast India, New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1996,
p. 78.
18
Government of Assam, “Infiltration and Deportation of Pakistanis”, Directorate of
Information and Public Relations Press Note No. 137, July 27, 1965, Shillong, available
at http://online.assam.gov.in/documents/218410/316853/Annexure-2-17A-except-9-
and-12.pdf, accessed on January 28, 2015.
19
Bimal Pramanik, “Illegal Migration from Bangladesh: A Case Study of West Bengal”, in
Kumar (ed.), Illegal Migration from Bangladesh, n. 11, p. 140.
population growth. This rise in population has been attributed to the

illegal influx of Bangladeshi migrants into the state.20 Likewise, Arunachal
Pradesh, Meghalaya and Mizoram also registered substantial population
growth rates in the past three decades, which was above the national
average.
If an increase in the Muslim populations is to be taken as an indicator
for illegal migration from Bangladesh, in almost all the north-eastern
states of India, barring few exceptions such as Manipur, Muslim
population has shown a substantial growth. For instance, in Mizoram,
between 1981 and 1991, the Muslim population grew by 105.8 per
cent as compared to 42.89 per cent for the Christians. Similarly, Muslim
population registered a growth of 135.01 per cent during the same
decade in Arunachal Pradesh. In the subsequent decade, Muslim
population grew by 122.54 per cent in Mizoram and 73.40 per cent in
Arunachal Pradesh. Meghalaya also registered 61.35 per cent growth
in its Muslim population compared to 42.31 per cent for Christians.21
Significantly, since 2001, all the states in north-east India started recording
low population growth. For instance, in Assam, the decadal population
growth rate declined from 18.90 per cent to 16.90 per cent in 2011,
that is, 0.6 per cent below the national average of 17.50 per cent.
Arunachal Pradesh’s population growth rate declined from 27 per cent
in 2001 to 25.90 per cent in 2011. Similarly, Meghalaya’s population
growth rate reduced from 30 per cent to 27.80 per cent in the same
decade. Interestingly, Nagaland registered a negative growth rate of -
0.50 per cent in 2011 from 64 per cent in 2001.22 As mentioned earlier,
in absence of any authentic official data on the number of illegal
20
M. Amarjeet Singh, “Illegal Migration into Northeast India: The Case of Nagaland”,
IDSA Occasional Paper No. 8, November 2009, p. 18.
21
“State/UT Population and Percentage Distribution of Population by Religion in
Census 1991–2001”, available at http://socialjustice.nic.in/pdf/tab102.pdf, accessed
on April 23, 2015.
22
“Size, Growth Rate and Distribution of Population”, n. 12.
24 | PUSHPITA DAS
migrants, the census data on population growth rate have always been
presented as an indicator of the large-scale illegal migration from
Bangladesh into India, especially in the North-East. But in the light of
reducing population growth in the north-eastern states, as apparent
from the census data, political parties espousing the cause of the illegal
migrants argue that illegal migration from Bangladesh is a phenomenon
of the past and no such movement of people from Bangladesh is
taking place at present. This argument is, however, contested by an
empirical survey which was conducted in Karbi Anglong district close
to Dimapur. The survey revealed that unauthorised colonies have come
up in the area in recent years and 26 per cent of the settlers in these
colonies are illegal migrants who entered India in the late 1980s and the
early 1990s. In addition, a number of squatter colonies populated by
Bengali Muslims have also come up in the urban centres of Assam, as
well as in the rest of India, indicating the steady illegal inflow of
Bangladeshis.23
Meanwhile, the saturation of Assam, West Bengal and other north-
eastern states by the illegal migrants from Bangladesh resulted in paucity
of land for cultivation as well as low skilled and unskilled jobs in these
states. These factors pushed the new arrivals to other urban centres of
India, such as Delhi, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Ahmedabad and Chennai.
Thus, these cities started witnessing their surroundings being inhabited
by undocumented Bangladeshis and their unskilled labour markets being
populated by these foreigners. The resultant protests and agitations
against illegal migration forced the city law enforcement agencies to
deport the undocumented Bangladeshis. For example, the Gujarat Police
identified and deported 440 Bangladeshis who were illegally staying in
Ahmedabad since 2009.24 The Delhi Police claimed to have deported
23
“We are in Denial, but Bangladeshis are still Flooding India’s Northeast”, rediff.com,
March 12, 2014, available at http://www.rediff.com/news/column/bangladeshis-are-
still-flooding-indias-northeast/20140321.htm, accessed on April 24, 2015.
24
“Be Right Back: Bangladeshi Deportees Show Stoic Resolve”, The Times of India,
Ahmedabad, January 29, 2013, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/
ahmedabad/Be-right-back-Bangladeshi-deportees-show-stoic-resolve/articleshow/
18230619.cms, accessed on April 23, 2015.
more than 45,000 Bangladeshis who were illegally staying in the national
capital since 1991.25 The Mumbai Police, in 1998, tried to deport illegal
Bangladeshi migrants, but met with resistance in Kolkata.26
The trend of movement of Bangladeshi migrants to the rest of India,
which was increasingly noticed in late 1980s, has increased in the last
two decades. According to the media quoting Uttar Pradesh officials,
in 2010, approximately 8,500 Bangladeshis were illegally staying in the
state, of which 6,000 were living in Meerut, 1,800 in Lucknow and
350 in NOIDA.27 Katihar, Kishanganj and Purnea districts of Bihar
have also recorded illegal presence of Bangladeshis. In July 2013, 6,000
persons were accused of being Bangladeshis in the state and were
handed over notices to prove their Indian citizenship or leave India.28
In the same year, the Odisha government identified nearly 4,000
Bangladeshis in the state.29 These were alleged staying in the districts of
Kendrapara, Jagatsinghpur, Malkangiri and Bhadrak. Presence of
Bangladeshis has also been observed in coastal states of the country,
such as Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
25
“Over 40 K Illegal Bangladeshi Migrants Deported: FRRO to Court”, Business Standard,
New Delhi, August 20, 2013, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/
pti-stories/over-45k-illegal-bangladeshi-migrants-deported-frro-to-court-
113082000822_1.html, accessed on January 30, 2015.
26
“Political Pawns”, India Today, August 10, 1998, available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/
story/shiv-sena-bjp-govt-launches-operation-in-mumbai-to-push-illegal-bangladeshi-
immigrants-back/1/264716.html, accessed on January 28, 201).
27
“Nearly 8500 Bangladeshis Living Illegally in Uttar Pradesh”, dna, Lucknow, June 11,
2010, available at http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-nearly-8500-bangladeshis-
living-illegally-in-uttar-pradesh-1395139, accessed on April 23, 2015.
28
“Bihar: Borderline Cases”, India Today, July 13, 2012, available at http://
indiatoday.intoday.in/story/now-bihar-sees-agitation-against-illegal-immigrants-from-
bangladesh/1/372111.html, accessed on April 23, 2015.
29
“Government Identifies 3, 987 Bangladeshi Infiltrators in Odisha”, The Economic Times,
Bhubaneswar, March 18, 2013, available at http://
articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-03-18/news/37814738_1_infiltrators-
bangladeshi-nationals-minister-naveen-patnaik, accessed on April 23, 2015.
26 | PUSHPITA DAS
Estimates of Illegal Migrants in India

While it is an established fact that illegal migration from Bangladesh
has been taking place unabated over the decades, there are no authentic
official statistics to ascertain the actual number of illegal migrants in
India. One of the frequent refrains of the Government of India on
the lack of data on illegal migration is that since illegal migrants enter
the country clandestinely and surreptitiously, it is impossible to have
data on Bangladeshis illegally staying in various parts of the country.30
Nonetheless, the Government of India has periodically provided
statistics on the estimated number of illegal migrants in India. For
example, in March 1992, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) revealed
that till 1991, more than 7 lakh Bangladeshis were identified as staying
illegally in different border states of the country. The break-up of the
data being: West Bengal, 2,40,446; Assam, 1,35,656; Meghalaya, 14,268;
Tripura, 29,382 (1983–91); and Mizoram, 3,18,731.31 On May 6, 1997,
Mr Inderjit Gupta, the then Home Minister of India, stated in the
Parliament that there were 10 million illegal migrants from Bangladesh
residing in India. Quoting MHA/Intelligence Bureau sources, the August
10, 1998 issue of the India Today magazine gave the details as follows:
West Bengal, 5.4 million; Assam, 4 million; Tripura, 0.8 million; Bihar,
0.5 million; Maharashtra, 0.5 million; Rajasthan, 0.5 million; Delhi, 0.3
million–a total of 10.83 million.32
The Task Force on Border Management, in 2001, quoted the figure on
illegal migrants as 15 million.33 In 2004, Shri Sriprakash Jaiswal, the
Minister of State for Home Affairs, stated in Rajya Sabha that as on
December 2001, an estimated 12 million illegal Bangladeshi migrants
30
“Infiltration of Bangladeshis in India”, Unstarred Question No. 2968, Rajya Sabha,
August 6, 2014.
31
“Internal Note Prepared by the Home Ministry, Government of India, March 1992”, in
Kumar (ed.), Illegal Migration from Bangladesh, n. 11, pp. 243–57.
32
“Political Pawns”, n. 26.
33
“Reforming the National Security System”, Recommendations of the Group of
Ministers, New Delhi, February 2001, p. 60.
were staying in the country, including 5 million in Assam and 5.7 million
in West Bengal.34 The statement was later withdrawn. Crossing the
border illegally and entering India surreptitiously is not the only way in
which undocumented Bangladeshi nationals settle down in the country;
a large number of Bangladeshis arrive with valid documents but do
not return and continue to reside in India illegally. According to the
government data, between 1972 and 1997, a total of 9,91,031
Bangladeshis entered India with valid documents but did not return.35
The latest data on such visa violators, as on December 31, 2012, reveal
that 16,350 Bangladeshis who came on valid travel documents were
overstaying in India.36
Reasons for Illegal Migration

The reasons for a person to either migrate voluntarily or being forced
to leave his home are complex and intertwined. Social, political,
economic and environmental compulsions back home, or even personal
whims, could affect a person to cross the borders and settle in a new
country. In the case of Bangladesh, a host of political and economic
factors, such as political upheaval, religious persecution, social insecurity,
economic stagnation and absence of job opportunities, demographic
pressures and environmental crises, have pushed its nationals to leave
their homes and migrate to India. At the same time, availability of
land, better economic opportunities, education and health facilities and
a similar cultural landscape have attracted these migrants to settle in
India.
34
“Lots of Bangla Migrants, How Many We don’t Know: Jaiswal”, The Economic Times, New
Delhi, February 20, 2009, available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/
2009-02-20/news/27638067_1_bangladeshi-infiltrators-illegal-bangladeshi-migrants-
border-districts, accessed on January 28, 2015.
35
“Writ Petition (Civil) No. 125 of 1998, All Indian Lawyers Forum for Civil Liberties
(AILFCL) & Another Vs. Union of India and Others, Counter Affidavit on behalf of
the Respondent No. 3”, in Kumar (ed.), Illegal Migration from Bangladesh, n. 11, pp. 140, 271.
36
“Infiltration of Bangladeshis in India”, n. 30.
28 | PUSHPITA DAS
Political Factors
Political factors have been one of the major reasons in forcing the
Bangladeshi Hindus out of the country and into India.37 The movement
of the Hindus from East Bengal happened in waves and coincided
with communal riots of the 1950s and 1960s. The riots of January
1950 in Khulna district were perhaps one of the worst cases of state-
orchestrated persecution against the Hindu minority in East Pakistan.
Thousands of Hindus were killed in the riots and lakhs fled to India.
In fact, in just three months, starting from May to July 1950, 7.5 lakh
Hindus refugees took shelter in West Bengal.38
The forced migration of the Hindus from East Pakistan into India
continued throughout the 1950s. According to MHA data, between
1946 and March 1958, 41.17 lakh migrants had come to India, out of
which 32.32 lakh were settled in West Bengal.39 The riots of 1964 and
the India–Pakistan War of 1965 yet again resulted in the out-migration
of large numbers of Hindus from East Pakistan. Another massive
out-migration from East Pakistan was triggered in 1971 when the
Pakistani military establishment tried to suppress Bengali nationalism
through brutal military force. An estimated 10 million persons, including
6.7 million Hindus, were forced to take refuge in India.40
Besides riots and war, discriminatory land laws were another
manifestation of the state repression against the religious minorities. A
series of property laws enacted since 1947, such as the East Bengal
Requisition of Property Act of 1948, the East Bengal Evacuees
(Administration of Immovable Property) Act of 1951 and the East
37
Pranati Datta, “Push–Pull Factors of Undocumented Migration from Bangladesh to
West Bengal: A Perception Study”, The Qualitative Report, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 2004, p. 348.
38
Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora (eds.), Partition of India: Indo-Pak War and the UNO,
New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1999, p. 53.
39
Government of India, Annual Report 2014–15, New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs,
2015, p. 236.
40
Meghna Guhathakurta, “Amidst the Winds of Change: The Hindu Minority in
Bangladesh”, in Tanweer Fazal (ed.), Minority Nationalisms in South Asia, South Asian
Culture and History, New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 128.
Pakistan Disturbed Persons Rehabilitation Ordinance of 1964, created

ways for the state to intervene, manage and even transfer property of
persons displaced by communal riots. These laws were further
manipulated by vested interest groups and corrupt administrators to
dispossess and alienate the Hindus from their own land and property.41
The emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 as an independent country, with
secularism as one of the pillars of the constitution, did not change the
fate of the Hindus in that country. In fact, with each succeeding year,
the Bangladeshi political regime was growing more hostile to the
minority communities. To begin with, immediately after the liberation
of Bangladesh, the government promulgated the Bangladesh Vesting
of Property and Assets Order in March 1972, which stated that the
property left by the Pakistanis and other displaced people should be
considered as one segment. In 1976, the government repealed the
previous Act only to consolidate it even more by taking over all rights
to administer, manage, dispose and transfer such properties.42 These
laws paved four ways by which a person was dispossessed from his
property and forced to migrate: first, forced occupation; second, leasing
out of the said property by the government to the third party; third,
nominal occupation but legal alienation; and fourth, extreme feeling
of insecurity regarding loss of property.43 According to one estimate,
between 1965 and 2006, approximately 1.2 million Hindu households
or 6 million Hindus were directly and severely affected by the Enemy/
Vested Property Act and lost 2.6 million acres of their land.44
41
Ibid., p. 131.
42
Abdul Barkat, “Political Economy of Deprivation of Hindu Minority in Bangladesh:
Living with the Vested Property Act”, in Abhijit Dasgupta, Masahiko Togawa and
Abdul Barkat (eds.), Minorities and the State: Changing Social and Political Landscape of Bengal,
New Delhi: Sage, 2011, p. 93.
43
44
Barkat, “Political Economy of Deprivation of Hindu Minority in Bangladesh”, n. 42,
p. 104.
30 | PUSHPITA DAS
The post-1975 Islamisation of the constitution by the military regimes

of General Zia and General Ershad increased anxieties among the
Hindu population in Bangladesh. The declaration of Islam as the state
religion in 1988 emboldened the communal forces and Islam became
an important political factor.45 The concept of an “Islamic State” found
positive response from the general populace and helped in the rise of
religious fundamentalism.46 The widespread communal violence and
destruction and desecration of temples in 1989, 1990 and 1992 as a
reaction to Ram Janmabhoomi–Babri Masjid issue in India are cases in
point. Ushering in of democracy in Bangladesh did not help either as
the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and its ally, Jamaat-e-Islami,
continued to harass the Hindus branding them as Awami League
sympathisers. Post-election violence, especially in 1991, 2001 and 2014,
targeting the Hindus became the norm. Rise of Islamic terrorist groups
such as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), during this time, further
exacerbated the atmosphere of fear and hostility in Bangladesh as these
groups attacked religious minorities, secular intellectuals and journalists.47
This forced emigration of Hindus gave birth to the phenomenon of
“missing Hindu population” in Bangladesh. It is estimated that the size
of the “missing Hindu population” was 705 persons per day during
1964–71; 521 persons per day during 1971–81; 438 persons per day
during 1981–91; and 767 persons per day during 1991–2001.
Consequently, the estimated total number of Hindus missing between
1964 and 2001 in Bangladesh was 8.1 million.48 This fact is also
45
Bertil Lintner, “Religious Extremism and Nationalism in Bangladesh”, in Satu P. Limaye,
Mohan Malik and Robert G. Wirsing (eds.), Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia,
Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004, pp. 414–16.
46
Samir Kalra, “Diminishing Hindu Population in Bangladesh from the Perspective of
Ethnic Cleansing: A Conscious Unawareness?”, The Haf Blog, January 6, 2015, available
at http://hafsite.org/blog/diminishing-hindu-population-in-bangladesh-from-the-
perspective-of-ethnic-cleansing-a-conscious-unawareness/, accessed on December 18,
2015.
47
Lintner, “Religious Extremism and Nationalism in Bangladesh”, n. 45, p. 416.
48
Bimal Pramanik, “Infiltration from Bangladesh: A Critical Analysis”, Dialogue, Vol. 10,
No. 2, 2008, available at http://www.asthabharati.org/Dia_Oct%2008/B.%20Pram.htm,
accessed on December 18, 2015.
corroborated by the sustained drop in the proportion of Hindu

population in East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) since the 1940s, as
recorded by successive censuses in Bangladesh. In 1941, the census
recorded 28 per cent of the people of districts that became East
Pakistan as Hindus. In 1951, the share dropped to 22 per cent and in
1961, it was 18.50 per cent. The out-migration of Hindus continued
even after the creation of Bangladesh, which was reflected in the first
Census of Bangladesh in 1974. The census data revealed that the
proportion of Hindus had further reduced to 13.5 per cent and it
went on to fall in three subsequent censuses: 12.2 per cent in 1981; 10.5
per cent in 1981; and 9.5 per cent in 2001. The current share of the
Hindu population in Bangladesh is 9.64 per cent registering a marginal
increase.
Economic Factors
While political factors have been largely responsible for driving the
Hindus out of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), a number of economic
factors have also forced Bangladeshi nationals, both Hindus and
Muslims, to abandon their home and illegally migrate to India. Land
alienation and absence of economic opportunities in Bangladesh are
the twin factors propelling illegal migration from that country into
India. While Enemy/Vested Property Act is responsible for
dispossessing a large numbers of Hindus of their ancestral property in
Bangladesh, growing population pressure and environmental disasters
are equally responsible for land alienation among the Hindus and the
Muslims in Bangladesh. Growing population creates greater demands
on resources such as land, food, energy, water and forest products,
and their consequent overuse results in deterioration of quality. This
process, in turn, encourages inequality in resource distribution among
the rich and poor as the rich corner them and deny the poor their
share. The shifting of resources in the favour of the rich pushes the
poor to greater misery triggering out-migration.49
49
Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence
from Cases”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, pp. 9–10.
32 | PUSHPITA DAS
Bangladesh is an agriculture-based economy with approximately 60

per cent of its land under agriculture.50 The agriculture sector contributes
about 17 per cent to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and
employs more than 45 per cent of the total labour force.51 While net
cropping, gross cropping and multiple cropping areas have increased
over the years, the total population in the country has also increased
substantially. The population of Bangladesh has grown over the decades
from 70.88 million in 1974 to 159.80 million in 2011. The growing
demand of the ever-increasing population of Bangladesh for more
food has created pressure on the agricultural land. Increasing intensity
of cropping to meet the growing demand for food has resulted in
depriving the soil of much-needed organic matter leading to degraded
land and lower productivity. In fact, agricultural production is already
reaching saturation and the agricultural sector is finding it impossible
to absorb further increases in rural labour force thereby forcing rural
residents to out-migrate.
Analysts have argued that more than population pressure, it is
“agricultural impasse” caused by factors such as smaller landholdings,
lack of access to water for irrigation, traditional agricultural practices
and fluctuations in main crop which is inducing migration from rural
areas of Bangladesh to either urban areas or across the border into
India.52 It is noteworthy that Bangladesh is one of the densely populated
countries in the world with 1,015 persons per sq km.53 As a result of
increasing man to land ratio, the farmlands are getting fragmented into
smaller landholdings. Presently, 84.30 per cent of the total farm holdings
50
Md. Hasibur Rahman, “Agricultural Land Use and Land Susceptibility in Bangladesh:
An Overview”, available at http://globalcommunitywebnet.com/GlobalFiles/
agriculturallanduse.pdf, accessed on December 18, 2015.
51
Government of Bangladesh, Year Book of Agricultural Statistics—2013, 25th Series, April
2015, Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, p. 3, available at http://www.bbs.gov.bd/
WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/LatestReports/AgriYearbook-2013.pdf, accessed
on December 18, 2015.
52
Samaddar, The Marginal Nation, n. 43, pp. 155–57.
53
Population and Housing Census of 2011, , available at http://203.112.218.66/
WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/Census2011/Bangladesh_glance.pdf, accessed
in Bangladesh are small holdings,54 with 51.70 per cent comprising

holdings below 1 acre. Small landholding results in smaller agricultural
outputs, which cannot sustain a family the year round. The situation is
further aggravated by seasonal floods and droughts, which results in
scarcity and famine condition triggering out-migration. One of the
most glaring examples of such migration is the floods of July 1974
which “aggravated conditions of scarcity and hardship” for the poor
and landless resulting in migration of thousands of Bangladeshis into
neighbouring states of India, particularly West Bengal. Between July
1974 and March 1975, approximately 39,000 Bangladeshis who were
trying to enter India were intercepted at the border by the Border
Security Force (BSF).55
Another factor for large-scale emigration from Bangladesh is a lack of
adequate job opportunities. Bangladesh has been low on industrialisation
index with industrial sector contributing 29.61 per cent of the GDP.56
Industrialisation is essential for a country as it contributes to poverty
alleviation through employment and income generation, provides
consumer goods and capital goods and increases the GDP of the
country. Bangladesh has a higher proportion of working-age population,
with the labour force increasing at the rate of 3.39 per cent per annum.57
Industrialisation in the country has, however, not been able to keep
pace with the growing labour force and as a result, the unemployment
rate stood at 4.50 per cent in 2010.58 The working-age people who are
unable to find jobs in the country look outside for employment
opportunities.
54
Government of Bangladesh, Year Book of Agricultural Statistics—2013, n. 51, p. 259.
55
“Reported Recent Influx of Refugees from Bangladesh into the Eastern Parts of the
Country”, Rajya Sabha, New Delhi, May 9, 195, in Avtar Singh Bhasin, India–Bangladesh
Relations, Vol. I, New Delhi: Geetika Publications, 2005, p. 2390.
56
“Bangladesh Agriculture’s Contribution to GDP Drops”, bdnews.com, Dhaka, March 2,
2015, available at http://bdnews24.com/economy/2015/03/02/bangladesh-
agricultures-contribution-to-gdp-drops, accessed on December 18, 2015.
57
Government of Bangladesh, Report on Labour Force Survey 2010, Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau
of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, August 2011, p. 6.
58
Ibid.
34 | PUSHPITA DAS
Lack of job opportunities in the country has induced the Bangladesh

government to devise programmes to send its working population
abroad after equipping them with some skills. Today, lakhs of
Bangladeshis are employed in low-skilled jobs in a number of countries.
Consequently, worker’s remittances comprise the second highest source
of foreign exchange earnings of Bangladesh after the garment industry.
Interestingly, the country does not seem to have any employment
generation scheme for the unskilled labourers who, because of lack of
employment opportunities in their country, are forced to cross into
India illegally for better avenues. It must be noted that almost all the
migrants who cross over into India clandestinely are unskilled or low
skilled, and their movement into India is therefore not a response to
labour demands in India but more a migration for survival.
Thus, illegal migration from Bangladesh is rather a “self-rescue”
migration,59 that is, fleeing from poverty, hunger, political and religious
persecution, governmental apathy and a dark future in Bangladesh,
than a response to a demand for labour in India as argued by many of
the scholars and analysts. The migrants prefer to travel to India as it is
cheaper for them to cross the border and they are assured of a job.
They also prefer to cross it clandestinely because it costs them less than
to procure passports and visas, which are costly and do not guarantee
a long-term stay in India.60 The work profile of the illegal migrants
also reinforces that most of Bangladeshis who migrate take up any job
that they can lay their hands on. As a result, almost all of them work as
agricultural labourers, construction workers, rickshaw pullers, hawkers,
weavers, domestic helpers, ragpickers and scavengers.
One of the negative fallouts of this migration for survival is the
increasing trend of human trafficking. In the recent decades, trafficking
59
Anthem Press, 2005, p. 211.
60
Labour Migration Trends and Patterns: Bangladesh, India and Nepal, 2013, Nepal: The Asia
Foundation, 2013, p. 46, available at https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/
LabourMigrationTrendsandPatternsBangladeshIndiaandNepal2013.pdf, accessed on
December 21, 2015.
of women and human smuggling have become quite rampant across

the India–Bangladesh border. Poverty and hunger forces either the
parents to sell the girls to traffickers or the girls themselves leave home
and fall prey to traffickers. Most women also leave home to escape
from domestic violence and torture. It is estimated that 10,000–15,000
girls and women are trafficked through the border into India every
year.61
Facilitating Factors
Several factors influence the decision of a person or a community to
migrate. These are age, gender, a sense of impeding calamity in the
home country, availability of land, adequate economic opportunities, a
sense of security attached to the intended area of migration and family
and kinship networks. In the case of Bangladeshi migrants, while religious
persecution, economic deprivation and non-availability of economic
opportunities have forced people to migrate illegally to India, factors
such as a porous and easy negotiable border, social networks and vested
political interests have facilitated in their clandestine journey across the
border and permanent settlement in India.
India shares a 4,096.70 km long and porous international border with
Bangladesh. The border traverses a range of natural and cultural
landscapes, which pose a challenge to its effective management. The
terrain along the border is a mix of hilly and jungle tracks, plains, rivers
and low-lying land. This diverse mix of topographical features makes
the border extremely porous.62 The riverine borders are particularly
vulnerable to infiltration as it is almost impossible to guard every stretch
of the border. There are numerous illegal border crossing points, known
61
Combating Trafficking of Women and Children in South Asia, Regional Synthesis Paper for
Bangladesh, India and Nepal, April 2003, p. 24, available at http://www.adb.org/sites/
default/files/publication/30364/combating-trafficking-south-asia-paper.pdf, accessed
62
Pushpita Das, “India–Bangladesh Border Management: A Review of Government’s
Response”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 3, May–June 2008, p. 369.
36 | PUSHPITA DAS
as “ghats”, along the riverine border providing easy ingress.63 The “chars”
formed on the river beds also are vulnerable to infiltration as they act
as springboards for the illegal migrants to access the Indian mainland.
Furthermore, the flat and fertile land along the border supports dense
human settlements right up to the border. There are more than a hundred
villages located right along the zero line, with many houses opening
into Bangladesh. The ethnic composition of the people is similar on
both sides of the border and it is quite difficult to differentiate between
the citizens of India and Bangladesh. Traditional transborder ethnic
and socio-cultural ties continue even today. The social networks
established between the old immigrants and new immigrants over
decades is extremely vital for the clandestine movement of people
across the border as “it determines who enters from which area to
whom and for what kind of job”.64 The matbars or the rich landlords
who have migrated to India at an earlier time are the main source for
food and shelter to the new migrants. In course of time, they help the
migrant find a job and even provide him/her with the required official
documents to settle permanently in India.65
While a porous border and social networks lower the cost of irregular
migration for the potential illegal migrants, vested interests within India
make their stay in this country more attractive. The BSF personnel
have been notorious for demanding money from Bangladeshi migrants
to look the other way when these undocumented migrants cross the
international border. The border-guarding personnel also collude with
the smugglers and touts for economic benefits. It is a known fact that
each tout or smuggler is “assigned specific patches along the border,
locally called the ghats, to facilitate border crossings by prospective
immigrants and smugglers”.66 These smugglers, known locally as dalals,
63
Samaddar, The Marginal Nation, n. 43, pp. 121–22.
64
Ibid., p. 75.
65
Ibid., p. 145.
66
Chandan Nandy, “Illegal Migration from Bangladesh to India: The Emerging Conflict”,
Mellon–MIT Foundation on NGOs and Forced Migration, November 20, 2005, p. 85.
charge a sum of Bangladesh Taka 3,000–5,000 from the prospective

migrants to facilitate clandestine border crossings, arrange for food
and shelter and provide employment to them. The money which is
collected is then shared equally among the border-guarding forces of
India and Bangladesh and the dalals.67 According to one dalal, “transfers
and postings of high officials in the Indian border guard had a direct
bearing on the flow and pattern of irregular migration”.68 Most of the
dalals are labour contractors who lure Bangladeshis from their villages,
smuggle them to India with promises of good jobs and retain 10–20
per cent of their wages.69
Political patronage given to illegal migrant is yet another factor which
has encouraged millions of undocumented Bangladeshis to settle in
India illegally. Political parties have always exploited the vulnerability
of the illegal migrants for their own vested interests and benefits. In
the pre-independence era, the Muslim League government of Saadullah
encouraged thousands of Muslims from East Bengal to settle in Assam
with the objective of transforming the demography of Assam and
making it a Muslim-majority province which could be claimed by
Pakistan.70 Post-independence, the situation did not change much.
Although there were periodic demands for the expulsion of illegal
migrants, the process of detection and deportation itself was not robust
enough and crumbled under political pressures. In fact, efforts to deport
illegal migrants encountered protests from political parties, who blamed
the executive for harassing Indian Muslims in the garb of expelling
Bangladeshis staying illegally in the country.71
The main reason that the political parties protect the illegal migrants is
that they consider the illegal migrants as potential vote banks that need
67
Labour Migration Trends and Patterns: Bangladesh, India and Nepal, 2013, n. 60, p. 47.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid., p. 51.
70
Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace in India’s Northeast, New Delhi:
Penguin, 1994, pp. 56–57.
71
Ibid.
38 | PUSHPITA DAS
to be nurtured and sustained. For this purpose, they have facilitated the
stay of the illegal migrants in India by providing them with fake voter
identity cards and ration cards, which establish that they are Indian
citizens with voting rights. And whenever there has been a demand to
deport the illegal migrants, politicians of almost all affiliations have
protest against it. In fact, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal, Shri
Jyoti Basu, even claimed that there are no illegal migrants in his state.
The massive inflow of Bangladeshi citizens (erstwhile East Bengal/
East Pakistan) into Assam, West Bengal and Tripura, and subsequently
to rest of India, has been a recurring security concern plaguing the
country since independence. Such a huge influx of illegal migrants has
had grave consequences on the socio-cultural, economic and political
life of the receiving states. Highlighting the adverse consequences of
the huge influx of illegal migration, the Supreme Court of India, while
striking down the illegal migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act,
1983 on July 12, 2005, pronounced that Assam faced “external
aggression” and “internal disturbance” because of massive influx of
illegal Bangladeshi migrants as enjoined in Article 355 of the Constitution
of India.72
On December 17, 2014, the Honourable Court observed that illegal
migration has resulted in “periodic clashes between the citizens of India
and migrants”, leading to loss of life and property, and thereby violating
the constitutional rights of the Assamese people. It reaffirmed that
illegal migration had eroded the cultural way of life of the Assamese
people as they were being swamped by the illegal migrants who had
no right to be in India.73 The next chapter discusses various internal
72
Writ Petition (civil) No. 131 of 2000, Sarbananda Sonowal vs Union of India & Anr., July
12, 2005, Supreme Court of India, p. 34, available at http://judis.nic.in, accessed on
December 18, 2014.
73
Writ Petition (civil) No. 562 of 2012, Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors. vs Union of
India & Ors. with Writ Petition (civil) No. 274 of 2009, Assam Publics Works & Ors. vs
Union of India & Ors. with Writ Petition (civil) No. 876 of 2014, All Assam Ahom
Association & Ors. vs Union of India, December 17, 2014, Supreme Court of India, p.
33, available at supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/wpc_562_2012.pdf, accessed on
December 21, 2014.
security threats and challenges that India has been grappling with as a
result of large-scale illegal migration from Bangladesh. It also analyses
whether the issue of illegal migration is merely politicised in India or it
is securitised for the Union government to take “extraordinary”
measures to tackle the problem.
40 | PUSHPITA DAS
CHAPTER - 2
Impact on Internal Security and the

Securitisation
Migration into a region has always altered the socio-economic and

cultural fabric of the receiving society. The impact of illegal migration
from Bangladesh on India’s security can be identified through two
indicators. First, conflict over scarce resources, economic opportunities
and cultural dominance ensues between the locals and migrants, along
with the resultant political instability caused by the mobilisation of
popular perception against the migrants by the elites to grab political
power. In Assam and Tripura, resistance to Bengali migrants had both
socio-economic and cultural dimensions, which was politically mobilised
and which brought forth the issue of ethnicity and migration to the
fore.1 Second, the rule of law and integrity of the country are
undermined by the illegal migrants engaged in illegal and anti-national
activities, such as entering the country clandestinely, fraudulently acquiring
identity cards, exercising voting rights in India despite being a Bangladeshi
and resorting to transborder smuggling and other crimes.
In case of Assam, the monopoly of the Bengali Hindu migrants in
administrative services and other professions, along with the imposition
of Bengali as the official language, was resented by the Assamese since
the colonial times. Added to this was the fear of losing their land to the
“land hungry Mymensinghias” and becoming a minority in their own
land.2 After independence when the Assamese elite came to power,
they asserted their cultural dominance by making Assamese the state’s
official language and by preferring Assamese locals in administrative
1
Myron Weiner, “The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-immigrant Movement”,
Population and Development Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 1983, pp. 283–84.
2
1947, New Delhi: Tulika Books, 2006, p. 213.
and other professions, which brought them in direct conflict with the
Bengalis.
Throughout the 1960s, both the communities clashed with each other–
sometimes violently–over the issue of official language. The imposition
of Assamese language also did not go down well with the hill tribes,
who, fearing that their cultural identity will be compromised, vehemently
opposed it and agitated for the creation of newer states within Assam.3
In 1972, a major “language riot” took place over the issue of making
Assamese the only medium of instruction in state colleges.4 Importantly,
all these clashes were between Assamese Hindus and Bengali Hindus,
and did not involve the Bengali Muslim migrants who decided to side
with the Assamese in their efforts to assert their cultural supremacy.5
This cosy relationship was broken in the late 1970s, when the “anti-
foreigner” agitation against the illegal migrants rocked Assam. The
trigger for the widespread protests was the discovery of more than
45,000 illegal names in the electoral roles of the Mangaldoi constituency.
This revelation fomented the already simmering discontentment in the
general populace against the large number of Bangladeshis illegally
residing in the state.6 The Assamese feared that if Bengali Hindus and
Bengali Muslims joined hands, they could be politically outnumbered,
and so demanded that not only the names of the Bengali Hindus and
the Bengali Muslims be deleted from the voter’s list but also the
foreigners be expelled. The decline of Assamese-speaking population
between 1961 and 1971, as recorded in the 1971 population census,
further increased their anxieties.7
3
Udayon Misra, North-East India: Quest for Identity: A Collection of Essays on Socio-political
Topics, New Delhi: Omsons Publications, 1988.
4
Nabanipa Bhattacharjee, “Language of Love and Death: Fifty Years of Assam’s Language
Movement”, Mainstream, Vol. L, No. 9, February 22, 2012, available at http://
www.mainstreamweekly.net/article3269.html, accessed on January 29, 2015.
5
Weiner, “The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-immigrant Movement”, n. 1,
p. 285.
6
Seventy Third Report of the Committee on Petitions, Rajya Sabha, March 22, 1982, New Delhi,
p. 4.
7
Weiner, “The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-immigrant Movement”, n. 1,
p. 286.
42 | PUSHPITA DAS
When the Union government and the agitating Assamese leaders could
not arrive at a consensus for determining who was an Indian citizen,
the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana
Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) started a statewide agitation known as the
“Assam Movement/Anti-foreigner Movement” in 1979. The agitation
did not remain confined to the Bangladeshis but included Nepalis too
who had settled in the state since long.8 Soon, the Anti-foreigner
Movement turned violent and numerous ethnic riots broke out in the
state, the most brutal being the Nellie massacre where a large number
of Muslims were killed by the Lalung tribesmen. The magnitude of
the movement was so intense and widespread that it crippled Assam’s
economy as well the administrative machinery. It also took an anti-
India and secessionist hue, with some members of the Jatiyatabadi
Dal and the Purbanchaliya Lok Parishad secretly advocating secession
of the entire North-East from India. More importantly, the agitation
spilled over its borders into the adjoining states of Manipur, Meghalaya
and Tripura where Bengalis, Biharis and Nepalis were attacked in the
name of “foreigners”. Thus, the entire north-east India was set aflame
by agitations by the locals against migrants from within the country as
well as across the border.
The “Assam Movement” ended after six years with the signing of a
tripartite agreement between the AASU, the AAGSP, the Assam
government and the central government on August 15, 1985.
Unfortunately, agitations against illegal Bangladeshis did not stop. In
fact, the peace accord sowed the seeds for further and more intense
separatist movements in the state. The United Liberation Front of
Assam (ULFA), which was formed months ahead of the Assam
agitation in 1979, became a leading separatist organisation, with an
agenda to “cleanse the Assamese society by driving away the foreigners
(read Bangladeshis) by force”. Interestingly, the ULFA changed its anti-
8
“1979–1985: The Foreign National Movement”, All Assam Students’ Union, available at
http://www.aasu.org.in/contribution/activities/foreign_movement.html, accessed on
January 29, 2015.
Bangladeshi rhetoric in the 1990s when its cadres found shelter in

Bangladesh following military operations against them in Assam. It
started praising the “contribution” of the Bengalis–Hindus and Muslims
alike–in the growth and development of Assam,9 only to revert to its
earlier anti-illegal migration stance once again after being chased out
of Bangladesh in the late 2000s.10
The Bodo insurgency, which began as a reaction to the “Assamese
domination” after the Assam Accord,11 and which continues to rage
even after signing of two peace accords in 1993 and 2003, has
periodically targeted Muslims, perceived as Bangladeshis, in lower
Assam. The violence against the Muslims, in particular, stems from
their fear of being rendered a minority in their own area given the
perceived rapid rise of Muslim population. Bodo militants also believe
that Muslim settlers support illegal migrants who continue to arrive
through the riverine areas and encroach upon land belonging to their
community, thus justifying retaliation.12 Although the Bodo organisations
have a history of attacking the Muslim settlers since the 1950s, the
episodes of violence against Muslims in 201213 and again in 2014 have
been particularly intense. A major fallout of these attacks was the
mobilisation of the Muslim community and revenge attacks on people
from the North-East in the rest of India.14
9
Subir Bhaumik, “Ethnicity, Ideology and Religion: Separatist Movements in India’s
Northeast”, in Satu P. Limaye, Mohan Malik and Robert G. Wirsing (eds), Religious
Radicalism and Security in South Asia, Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,
2004, p. 228.
10
“ULFA Threatens to Use Arms against Illegal Migrants from Bangladesh”, rediff.com, July
28, 2014, available at http://www.rediff.com/news/report/ulfa-threatens-to-use-arms-
against-illegal-migrants-from-bangladesh/20140728.htm, accessed on January 30, 2015.
11
Sudhir Jacob George, “The Bodo Movement in Assam: Unrest to Accord”, Asian
Survey, Vol. 34, No. 10, October 1994, p. 883.
12
“Assam Violence: 5 Key Facts about Bodo–Muslim Conflict”, First Post, May 4, 2014,
available at http://www.firstpost.com/india/assam-violence-5-key-facts-about-the-
bodo-muslim-conflict-1507865.html, accessed on January 30, 2015.
13
“A Timeline of Bodo–Muslim Violence in Assam”, First Post, July 26, 2012, available at
http://www.firstpost.com/india/a-timeline-of-bodo-muslim-violence-in-assam-
391475.html, accessed on January 30, 2015.
14
“Fear of Reprisals Forces Assamese Exodus”, India Today, September 3, 2012, available
at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/workers-from-assam-fear-for-their-lives-flee-
mumbai-bangalore/1/214582.html, accessed on April 24, 2015.
44 | PUSHPITA DAS
The persistent attacks against the Muslims perceived as illegal migrants

in Assam has given way to radicalisation within certain sections of the
Muslim community with the formation of militant organisations, such
as the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) and the
Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA), professing jihad
against India to avenge the attacks.15 The arrest of some of the MULTA
cadres and their subsequent confessions have revealed that they had
received training at the al-Qaeda and Taliban camps. These confessions
have also disclosed their close links with Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) and Sunni radical groups, such as Sipah-i-Sahaba
Pakistan (SSP), HUJI and Islamic Shashantantra Andolan.16 The
participation of MULTA in the Bangladesh Islamic Manch, which
proclaimed that they will work towards the merger of Muslim-
dominated areas in Assam and Arakan with Bangladesh, has reinforced
the fear expressed by generations of Assamese that the influx of Bengalis
Muslims in Assam is a design to merge Assam with Bangladesh and
create Greater Pakistan/Bangladesh.17 The formation of the “al-Qaeda
in the subcontinent” to wage jihad in India and the mention of Assam
as one of their target areas has also raised alarm among the intelligence
and security establishments in India. It is speculated that given the
periodic attacks on the Muslims in Assam, militant Muslim organisations
in the state might become affiliates to the new outfit and threaten the
integrity of the country.18 These events signify that the issue of illegal
migration in the state is not going to die down and will continue to
pose a challenge to the country’s internal security.
15
“Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam”, South Asia Terrorism Portal, available at
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist_outfits/
MULTA.htm, accessed on February 9, 2015.
16
Bhaumik, “Ethnicity, Ideology and Religion: Separatist Movements in India’s Northeast”,
n. 9, p. 243.
17
Ibid.
18
“Al Qaeda Trying to Enter Assam, says Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi”, The Indian Express,
Guwahati, September 20, 2014, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/
india-others/al-qaeda-trying-to-enter-assam-says-chief-minister-tarun-gogoi/, accessed
on February 9, 2015.
Another state where resistance to illegal migration from East Pakistan

(later Bangladesh) morphed into a full-fledged insurgency is Tripura,
where the tribal community has been reduced to a minority because
of the large-scale influx of Bengalis. The tribal community has been
resisting the settlement of Bengalis from East Bengal/Pakistan, and
later Bangladesh, in their land since independence. The first anti-Bengali
and anti-refugee political group called Seng-krak was established in
1947 itself.19 Sang-krak, along with a clutch of tribal organisations,
carried out a large number of violent protests against the Bengali settler
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, forcing the Tripura government to
enact laws against land alienation of the tribal population of the state.
Resentment against the Bengali migrants, however, did not abate and
tribal organisations, such as the Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS),
Tripura Sena and East India Tribal Union, agitated over a number of
issues to assert their identity and demanded land rights for tribals and
Kokhorok as the state official language.20
It was, actually, the formation of the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV)
in 1978 that transformed their political agitation into an insurgent
movement.21 The intensified attacks against the Bengalis brought them
in direct conflict with “Amra Bangali”, a radical organisation formed
by the Bengalis to counter violence against them by the tribal militants.
The clashes between these two organisations led to widespread violence
in the state throughout the 1980s. Although the TNV reached a political
settlement with the Union and state governments in 1988, militancy
did not subside in Tripura. The signing of the peace accord was
immediately followed by formation of two new militant organisations–
19
Anthem Press, 2005, p. 195.
20
For details, see Subir Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossfire: North-East India, New Delhi: Lancer,
1996, p. 86.
21
Bhaumik, “Ethnicity, Ideology and Religion: Separatist Movements in India’s Northeast”,
n. 9, p. 231.
46 | PUSHPITA DAS
the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the All Tripura
Tiger Force (ATTF) 22–in 1989 and 1990 respectively. These
organisations continue to struggle against the Indian state even today,
albeit in a feeble manner.
Interestingly, West Bengal, which received most of the illegal migrants,
did not witness any intolerance leading to socio-political agitation against
them. This could be because both the host population and the
immigrants belong to the same ethnic and linguistic background.
Similarity of language and culture generated a feeling of “oneness”
among the local people and induced them to sympathise with the
tribulations of the immigrants. This cultural similarity also helped the
illegal migrants to mingle freely with the local population and merge
with them seamlessly. Yet another contributory factor to the absence
of political opposition to illegal migration in the state was the patronage
that the ruling party had given to the immigrants from Bangladesh. In
a survey carried out by intelligence agencies in West Bengal, it was
revealed that a number of local and state-level Communist Party of
India-Marxist (CPI-M) politicians had been providing citizenship
documents to the illegal migrants from Bangladesh to make them their
captive vote bank.23
The political patronage extended to illegal migrants helped successive
streams of migrants to cross the border easily, find shelter and jobs in
India, and finally settle down permanently. One of the fallouts of
large-scale illegal migration of Bangladeshis has been that the border
areas, especially in West Bengal and Assam, which earlier had a mixed
composition of population, that is, both Hindus and Muslims
cohabited, are giving way to new settlements based on exclusive religious
22
The leader of ATTF, Ranjit Debbarma, was arrested in February 2013. For details, see
“Tripura Rebel Chief Detained under NSA”, The Hindu, Agartala, February 9, 2013,
available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/tripura-rebel-chief-
detained-under-nsa/article4394376.ece, accessed on January 30, 2015.
23
For further reading on CPI-M’s patronage of illegal migrants from Bangladesh, read
Chandan Nandy, “Illegal Migration from Bangladesh to India: The Emerging Conflicts”,
Mellon–MIT Foundation on NGOs and Forced Migration, November 2005, p. 129.
identities.24 In fact, the peopling of the border belt by Bangladeshi

illegal migrants has led to the Hindu inhabitants migrating further into
the interior of the state and the Muslims migrants gradually filling up
the vacant space. In a number of cases, it has been observed that
much of the migration is forced as Muslim migrants, who have become
demographically preponderant in the border region, use force and
intimidation to evict the Hindus.25 Thus, a wide section of border is
inhabited by a people having identical ethnic, linguistic, cultural and
religious background.26
Another outcome of the large-scale settlement of illegal migrants is
that a number of mosques and madrasas have come up to cater to the
needs of the migrant population in these areas. The construction of
mosques and madrasas demonstrates the cultural and religious assertion
by the illegal migrants who are overwhelmingly Muslims. The locals,
especially the Hindus, believe that these mosques and madrasas, funded
by money from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bangladesh, etc., propagate
anti-Hindu and anti-India sentiments. It is believed that these activities
are conducted by Jamaat-e-Islami members who clandestinely cross
over from Bangladesh.27 These developments have created resentment
against the illegal migrants among the local population, who feel that
they are getting marginalised in their own land.
Commenting on the attacks on the United States (US) Consulate in
2002, Budhhadeb Bhattacharya, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal,
linked illegal migration to the alleged anti-India activities of the ISI and
its nexus with insurgent groups such as the Kamtapur Liberation Army
24
25
Bimal Pramanik, “Infiltration from Bangladesh: A Critical Analysis”, Dialogue, Vol. 10,
No. 2, 2008, available at http://www.asthabharati.org/Dia_Oct%2008/B.%20Pram.htm,
26
Ibid.
27
Nandy, “Illegal Migration from Bangladesh to India: The Emerging Conflicts”, n. 23,
pp. 172–73.
48 | PUSHPITA DAS
(KLO) and the ULFA, all of which operate from bases in Bangladesh.
He also highlighted the threat from mushrooming madrasas and
mosques in the border belt and said that these were being exploited by
the ISI to teach jihad against India.
The fact that the mosques are fast becoming centres for indoctrination
and recruitment of terror operatives and modules for terrorist
operations was proven by the bomb blast in Burdwan on October 2,
2014. The ensuing investigations revealed that some of these madrasas
and mosques, such as the Simulia mosque, are indeed disseminating
religious hatred and intolerance.28 Incidentally, many of these seminaries
have Bangladeshi teachers who have acquired Indian citizenship
fraudulently.29 These teachers highlight the alleged atrocities on Indian
Muslims through videos and other provocative materials in order to
alienate and radicalise the students. The arrest of a Jamaatul Mujahideen
Bangladesh (JMB) operative from Assam revealed that the top JMB
leaders had visited one madrasa in Nalbari to conduct motivational
training for the youths to join the outfit with the objective of creating
terror modules in Assam and West Bengal, which have fairly large
concentrations of Bangladeshi illegal immigrants.30 Although the
Burdwan blasts and the subsequent investigations have revealed that
the terrorists and their ideologues were exploiting the vast pool of
illegal Bangladeshi migrants in the border areas to target their own
country, it does not mean that these terror operatives would not join
hands with their Indian counterparts in future to attack India. It is
needless to underline that the Indian security and intelligence agencies
have to remain alert for any eventuality in the future.
28
“NIA Makes First Arrest in Bardhaman Blast Probe”, The Times of India, Bardhaman/
Birbhum, October 16, 2014, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/
NIA-makes-first-arrest-in-Bardhaman-blast-probe/articleshow/44831211.cms, accessed
29
“Bangladeshi Instructors Indoctrinating Young Muslims in Madrassas: Study”, The Time
of India, New Delhi, November 12, 2014, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
india/Bangladeshi-instructors-indoctrinating-young-Muslims-in-madrassas-Study/
articleshow/45126069.cms, accessed on December 28, 2015.
30
“Burdwan Blast: ‘JMB Tried to Induct Boys from Assam Madrasa to Create Modules’”,
The Indian Express, Guwahati, December 7, 2014, available at http://indianexpress.com/
article/india/india-others/burdwan-blast-probe-key-suspect-shahnoor-alam-arrested/
, accessed on December 28, 2015.
Elsewhere in the country, intermittent protests against Bangladeshis by

some political parties have been recorded, especially in the urban centres.
In most of the cases, the political parties accuse the illegal migrants of
taking away jobs from the local communities. The local political elites
and the media also paint them as criminals and delinquents contributing
to the rise of crime levels in the cities and brand them as a societal and
cultural danger. News reports have periodically highlighted the
involvement of Bangladeshis in criminal activities such as robberies,
murder and dacoity, reifying the image of the migrants as criminals.31
Passions against illegal migrants are also whipped up by alleging that
their presence strains scarce civic amenities, thereby depriving genuine
citizens of their rightful share in the resources. Swayed by such persistent
political pronouncements, the city dwellers demand the deportation
of the illegal migrants–demands which have been complied by the city
authorities, sometimes successfully and sometimes not.
As stated earlier, the presence of a large number of illegal migrants in
the border areas has created a 5–10 km zone peopled by Bangladeshis,
and therefore has blurred the international border–making it a breeding
ground for criminals and anti-national elements. Lax law enforcement,
corrupt and indifferent administration, pervasive underdevelopment
and lack of economic opportunities also substantially contribute towards
aggravating the situation. The mafias operating in these grey zones
solicit the illegal migrants to act as their couriers, who happily collude
with them in turn for easy money or a hassle-free stay in India. They
smuggle cattle, consumer items, drugs and narcotics, arms as well as
human beings across the border through the well-established smuggling
networks.32 While efforts to curtail these criminal activities by the BSF
31
“Bangladeshi Criminal Gangs New Challenge for Delhi Police”, Yahoo! News, New
Delhi, July 22, 2013, available at https://in.news.yahoo.com/bangladeshi-criminal-gangs-
challenge-delhi-police-103908012.html, accessed on January 30, 2015; “Bangladeshi
Migrants behind Mumbai’s Rising Crime Graph: Shiv Sena”, ibnlive, Mumbai, August 23,
2013, available at http://ibnlive.in.com/news/bangladeshi-migrants-behind-mumbais-
rising-crime-graph-shiv-sena/416478-3-237.html, accessed on January 30, 2015.
32
Nandy, “Illegal Migration from Bangladesh to India: The Emerging Conflicts”, n. 23,
pp. 140–41. Also, see van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland, n. 19, pp. 226–29.
50 | PUSHPITA DAS
and the state police have often been met with violence,33 the fact is also
true that controls at the border are reduced because of the complicity
and connivance of the border guards. As mentioned earlier, it has
been well established that some BSF personnel allow the Bangladeshis
to enter into India after accepting bribes ranging from Rs 500 to Rs
3,000 per person.34
Securitisation of Illegal Migration

Before discussing the means and methods that the Indian government
has undertaken over the decades to tackle the issue of illegal migration,
it is important to discuss whether the issue of infiltration or illegal
migration from Bangladesh has been securitised in India or is it merely
politicised? An answer to this question would provide a better
understanding of the imperatives that have shaped the Indian
government’s response to the issue of illegal migration from Bangladesh
and the corrective measures it has employed from time to time to
tackle the problem.
Politicisation and securitisation essentially constitute a continuum. When
an issue is politicised, “it is part of public policy requiring government
decision and resource allocations, or more rarely, some other form of
communal governance”.35 On the other hand, when an issue is
securitised, “it is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency
measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of the
33
Shikha Bose, “Victims of a Security Dilemma: Chakmas and Refugees from Bangladesh”,
in S.D. Muni and Lok Raj Baral (eds), Refugees and Regional Security in South Asia, Colombo:
Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 1996, p. 117.
34
“Paid Bribe to BSF Man to Enter India, Says Nun Rape Accused”, The Indian Express,
Ludhiana, April 4, 2015, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/kolkata/
paid-bribe-to-bsf-man-to-enter-india-says-nun-rape-accused/, accessed on April 24, 2015.
Also, see “We Bribed BSF Jawan to Enter India: SIMI Suspects”, The Times of India,
Mumbai, August 16, 2006, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/We-
bribed-BSF-jawan-to-enter-India-SIMI-suspects/articleshow/1896365.cms, accessed on
April 24, 2015.
35
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis,
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 23.
political procedure”.36 Securitisation involves consensus and shared

understanding of that particular phenomenon or power which poses
an existential threat and demands or legitimises extraordinary measures
to tackle the issue. Every securitisation act involves political decisions.
It is, however, not always necessary that the state alone can politicise or
securitise an issue; social entities can raise the issue to the level of general
consideration.37
As regards infiltration or illegal migration from Bangladesh into India
is concerned, the issue underwent a gradual process of transformation
from politicisation to securitisation over a span of decades. In the
initial years after independence, undocumented migration from Pakistan
was tolerated, even welcomed, because it was seen as part of the
dominant narrative of “homecoming”.38 The partitioning of the Indian
subcontinent into Muslim Pakistan and secular India resulted in a forced
as well as a voluntary migration of approximately 14 million Hindus
and Muslims across the borders.39 As a part of this population exchange,
substantial number of Hindus migrated from East Pakistan to the
border states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura in the
first decade after independence.40 These people were seen as victims
of religious persecution and therefore, treated as “sons and daughters
of the nation coming home”.41
Later on, as more and more migrants continued to pour into these
border states, and as competition between the local people and migrants
for land and other scarce resources started, the mood of
accommodation gave way to hostility. Thus, while the Muslim migrants
36
Ibid., pp. 23–24.
37
Ibid.
38
Van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland, n. 19, p. 192.
39
“Rupture in South Asia”, in The State of World Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian
Action, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, January 1, 2000, p. 59.
40
About 41.17 lakh people came from East Pakistan between 1946 and March 1958.
2015, p. 236.
41
Van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland, n. 19, p. 193
52 | PUSHPITA DAS
were not at all welcomed, resentment against the Hindu migrants was
also growing manifold. The intense competition and conflict over
control of the socio-political, economic and administrative spheres in
the receiving states, especially in Assam and Tripura, gradually changed
the narrative of “homecoming” to infiltration. The fact that the ethnic
and religious composition of the migrants was quite different from
the local population further exacerbated the atmosphere of intolerance.
In fact, it also created a divergence of opinion between the central and
the state leaderships. While the central leadership was still accommodative
to the migrants, the state leadership was up in arms against them. For
instance, when Gopinath Bordoloi’s government mulled over placing
restrictions on the unauthorised movement of people across the
international border with East Pakistan in Assam, the Union government
was of the opinion that since the restrictions were intended to be
reciprocal, they would put the Hindus in East Pakistan in a
disadvantageous position.42
The revelation of the 1961 population census, that a large number of
East Pakistanis, mostly Muslims, had entered Assam illegally, hardened
the state government’s stand even further. In 1962, the Assam Pradesh
Congress Committee adopted a resolution stating that it was “of
conformed opinion that the infiltration of Pakistani nationals without
valid travel documents into Assam is likely to endanger the security of
the country”.43 In other words, the local leaders of Assam were
interpreting illegal migration from East Pakistan as an existential threat
to their society. Consequently, much of their political capital was spent
on clashing with the Bengalis over gaining control over the political,
administrative and economic spheres. Incidentally, this was also the
time when the word infiltration entered the national lexicon when
42
Government of Assam, “Annexure 4—Infiltration and Deportation of Pakistanis”,
Directorate of Information of Information and Public Relations, Press Note No. 137,
Shillong, July 27, 1965, in White Paper on Foreigners’ Issue, Home and Political Department,
Government of Assam, October 20, 2012, p. 56.
43
Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, The Tussle between the Citizens and Foreigners in Assam, New Delhi:
Vikas, 1986, p. 86.
references to undocumented migration from East Pakistan were made

in the Parliament.44 Deteriorating relations with Pakistan in the mid-
1960s also forced the Indian government to harden its position on
migration from East Pakistan. Subsequently, on the directives of the
central government, massive drives against illegal migrants were
launched by the Assam government throughout the 1960s.
The issue of illegal migration, till then, remained largely politicised as a
major angst of the Assamese people was removed by making Assamese
the state official language, thereby eliminating their fear of being
overshadowed by an alien language. This argument is substantiated by
the fact that the political parties also arrived at a tacit understanding
that they would not to rake up the “explosive” issue.45 It was in the late
1970s that the issue was securitised when “an ad hoc coalition of a few
regional political and cultural organizations headed by AASU and AGSP,
sponsored a campaign drawing attention to the problem of illegal
immigration into the state, mostly from Bangladesh”.46 These groups
fomented the fear of being “swamped by foreign nationals” and
articulated the narrative of change in the demographic profile of the
state because of unhindered and large-scale infiltration. The AASU
and Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AGSP) presented illegal migrants
from Bangladesh as an existential threat to the Assamese identity and
economic well-being of the Assamese people. The rhetoric against
illegal migration by the AASU and the AGSP was only a politicising
move, but the issue was finally securitised when the Assamese masses
44
Van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland, n. 19, p. 195.
45
Sanjib Baruah, “Immigration, Ethnic Conflict, and Political Turmoil—Assam, 1979–
1985”, Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 11, November 1986, pp. 1190–191.
46
Ibid., p. 1184.
47
Sujata Ramachandran, “Of Boundaries and Border Crossings”, Interventions: International
Journal of Postcolonial Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1999, p. 239.
48
Priyankar Upadhyaya, “Securitization Matrix in South Asia: Bangladeshi Migrants as
Enemy Alien”, in Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitav Acharya (eds),
Non-traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, pp.
25–27.
54 | PUSHPITA DAS
overwhelmingly accepted this rhetoric and demanded extraordinary

measures to prevent the illegal migrants from entering their state from
across the international border.
Eventually, the anti-foreigners issue moved from the border states of
the North-East to the national arena during the late 1980s with the
emergence of majoritarian Hindu nationalism. The Hindu right political
parties and groups–the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)–
espousing the Hindu ideology, tried to elicit the solidarity of the Hindu
community by reiterating the vulnerability of the Hindu space.47 Threats
to the Hindu rashtra were identified; and among others, the “silent
demographic invasion” of the Bangladeshi nationals. Thus, illegal
migrants from Bangladesh, most of whom were Muslims, became
the rallying point against which the BJP and its allies tried to mobilise
the Hindu votes. Through sustained rhetoric of “demographic
aggression” by the “infiltrators” and “demand of Lebensraum by the
Muslim Bangladeshis”, the Hindu right was successful in presenting
illegal migration from Bangladesh as a threat to national security.48
In fact, by criticising the establishment of being complicit to the
infiltration, the BJP and its allies goaded the Union government to
undertake “extraordinary” measures to check unauthorised border
crossings. Singed by such strident criticism, the Narasimha Rao
government formulated an “Action Plan” of detection, identification
and deportation of infiltrators from Bangladesh.49 While the central
government hesitated in implementing the plan, the BJP-led state
governments in Delhi and Maharashtra launched special drives in the
early 1990s to detect and deport Bangladeshi infiltrators.
The rhetoric of demographic invasion from Bangladesh became so
powerful that it forced the central government as well as a few state
49
Sujata Ramachandran, “‘Operation Pushback’: Sangh Parivar, State, Slums, and
Surreptitious Bangladeshis in New Delhi”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 7,
February 15–21, 2003, p. 638.
governments to change their narratives. Acknowledging the adverse

consequences of illegal migration, the Union Minister of State P.M.
Saeed said in Lok Sabha in August 1995, “there has been continuous
influx of Bangladeshi nationals into India for a variety of reasons,
including religious and economic considerations. The demographic
composition of the border areas has been altered with new entrants
flooding the areas and the local migrating into the interior.”50 Even the
West Bengal government–which had hitherto denied any illegal
migration into the state–finally accepted, under intense pressure from
local people, that large-scale migration had indeed taken place in West
Bengal.51
Besides political parties and pressure groups, officials and judiciary
also started endorsing the argument that illegal migration does pose a
threat to the national security. S.K. Sinha, the Governor of Assam,
painted an alarming picture where the indigenous Assamese were being
reduced to a minority with their political, economic and cultural survival
being jeopardised because of the migration of Bangladeshi nationals.
He also warned that once the foreigners are in majority, they will demand
the creation of Greater Bangladesh by merging the border belts of
Assam with Bangladesh and that international Islamic fundamentalism
would be the driving force.52 The Group of Ministers Report of 2001
states that because of large-scale illegal migration from Bangladesh,
“demographic changes have been brought about in the border belts
of West Bengal, several districts of Bihar, Assam, Tripura, and
Meghalaya”.53 The report goes on to say that “the massive illegal
50
Avtar Singh Bhasin, India–Bangladesh Relations, Vol. 1, New Delhi: Geetika Publishers,
2003, p. xciv.
51
Upadhyaya, “Securitization Matrix in South Asia: Bangladeshi Migrants as Enemy Alien”,
n. 48, p. 29.
52
S.K. Sinha, Report on Illegal Migration into Assam, Raj Bhavan, Guwahati, November 8, 1998,
available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/documents/
papers/illegal_migration_in_assam.htm#PREVENTING INFILTRATION, accessed on
December 16, 2015.
53
Reforming National Security System, Recommendation of the Group of Ministers, February
2001, p. 60.
56 | PUSHPITA DAS
immigration poses a grave danger to our security, social harmony and

economic well-being”.54 Echoing similar sentiments, the Delhi High
Court averred that the influx of Bangladeshi nationals, who have illegally
migrated, poses a threat to the integrity and security of India.55
Given the unabated flow of illegal migrants from Bangladesh since
independence and given that the issue is being debated and discussed
as a threat to national security, the Government of India has undertaken
a number of measures to check illegal migration from across the border
from Bangladesh. The next chapter analyses the measures implemented
to stop illegal migrants, as well as the circumstances which have shaped
the government’s decision to implement particular measures and their
outcomes.
54
Ibid.
55
Verdict of Delhi High Court, Writ Petition (Crl.) 677/2008, Razia Begum & Ors. vs.
State & Ors, August 12, 2008, available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/50020865/,
CHAPTER - 3
Tackling the Problem

Government’s Response
Land alienation among the indigenous groups in the migrant-receiving

border states, growing resentment against the Bengali migrants,
polarisation of the society along communal lines, politicisation and
securitisation of the issue of infiltration/illegal migration, growing
societal intolerance and subsequent violence were some of the major
challenges that Indian state had to grapple with as a consequence of
continuous illegal migration in the country. Since the threats and
challenges to the stability and security of the country as a result of
illegal migration were varied, the state response to them was also a mix
of targeted interventions. To begin with, one of the urgent issues that
the government had to respond to, at the earliest, was the increasing
land alienation among the local people, especially among the tribal
people of Assam and Tripura. Legislations pertaining to land acquisition
to provide tenancy rights to the indigenous people of Assam were
therefore enacted to grant tenancy rights to the tribal population of
the state and, at the same time, deny the illegal immigrants an incentive
to cross the border into India and settle permanently.
The second set of measures was to identify and deport all the foreigners
who had entered the country illegally after a stipulated date. For this
purposes, a drive to detect and deport them was undertaken. Special
programmes against illegal migration were launched and tribunals were
set up to take cases relating to violation of the Foreigners Act of 1946.
Despite the implementation of these measures, the flow of illegal
migrants continued unabated. While political interference and half-
hearted implementation of the measures by the executive were reasons
for the grim situation, the Union government soon realised that all the
measures were targeted against illegal migrants who had already entered
the country.
No schemes or interventions were formulated for intercepting the
illegal migrants at the international border itself to deter them from
58 | PUSHPITA DAS
crossing the border illegally. This lack of border controls was, in fact,
facilitating many illegal migrants to re-enter the country even after being
deported by the state police. Hence, tightening of the international
borders against the unauthorised entry of persons from neighbouring
countries was the third important measure that the Union government
undertook. For the purpose of better border management, the strength
of the border-guarding force was augmented, fences and roads were
constructed along the border and a scheme of issuing identity cards to
the border people was initiated.
The following sections discuss and analyse various sets of measures
undertaken by the Union and the state governments and assess how
far they were successful in preventing illegal migration from Bangladesh.
The Land Acquisition Acts

The issue of land alienation in Assam had emerged as a major problem
during the colonial days when it was observed that immigrants from
East Bengal were either granted tenancy rights by the administration or
the immigrants themselves encroached upon forested land and reclaimed
wasted land thereby divesting the tribals of their land. The tribal people,
under the banner of Central Organisation of Assam Tribes, had agitated
against the large-scale land transfer from the tribal peasants to the East
Bengali immigrants and, in 1945, demanded that the Assam government
should evict the migrants from East Bengal from the reserved forest
and other areas, end all encouragement to migrate from East Bengal
and redistribute land to the landless tribal people of the state.1
After independence, keeping the concerns of the tribal population in
mind, the Assam government amended that Assam Land Revenue
Regulation of 1886 (the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation
Amendment Act, 1947) and institutionalised the decision taken in 1946
to reserve land for the tribals by creating tribal belts and blocks.2 Under
1
Arupjyoti Saikia, A Century of Protests: Peasant Politics in Assam since 1900, Oxon: Routledge,
2014, p. 201.
2
Chandan Kumar Sharma, “Tribal Land Alienation: Government’s Role”, Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 52, December 29, 2001–January 4, 2002, pp. 4793–94.
the Act, villages with 50 per cent or more of tribal population and
backward communities were brought under the jurisdiction of the
tribal belts and blocks, and in some instances, for the sake of
geographical contiguity, even villages having less than 50 per cent of
tribal population were clubbed with the reserved areas.3
Contrary to expectations, the initiative hardly addressed the problem
of land alienation amongst the tribals as the lands earmarked for them
were in remote and barren areas. Further, the interests of capitalists,
tea plantations, landlords and non-tribals inhabiting the tribal land
remained legally protected as they were granted permission to retain
land in the tribal areas. Consequently, the tribals not only were deprived
of land tenancy rights but were also compelled to migrate to remote
and inhospitable areas of the state. In later years, the enactment of a
couple of land acquisition acts–such as the Assam Acquisition of Land
for Flood Control and Prevention of Erosion Act, 1955 and the Assam
Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and Prevention of Erosion
(Validation) Act of 19594–further added to the woes of the tribals in
terms of land alienation.
Since these Acts permitted the Assam government to acquire land to
resettle persons displaced by floods and earthquakes, it benefited the
Bengali immigrants instead of the tribals because the Bengali immigrants
were the ones who inhabited the low-lying areas, such as chars and
chaporis, which got inundated during annual floods,5 and were settled in
government-acquired land and given tenancy rights. Since these Acts
did not address the land alienation grievances of the tribals, they were
challenged in the court and once the Assam Land (Requisition and
3
Ibid.
4
For details, see “Introduction”, The Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act of
1964, Directorate of Land Requisition, Acquisition and Reforms, Government of
Assam, Guwahati, March 27, 1991, p. i.
5
Arnab Pratim Dutta, “Land of Discord”, Down to Earth, August 31, 2012, available at
http://www.downtoearth.org.in/coverage/land-of-discord-38893, accessed on
December 10, 2015.
60 | PUSHPITA DAS
Acquisition) Act of 1964 was legislated, these Acts were repealed. Thus,
because of faulty policies, vested political interests and bureaucratic
apathy, legislations which could have discouraged further immigration
from East Bengal/Pakistan by denying them rights to land in Assam
ended up giving them land rights, thereby encouraging further illegal
migration.
Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act of 1950

The Constitution of India had fixed July 19, 1948 as the date for
migrants from Pakistan to claim Indian citizenship, but this date could
not be adhered to as post-partition communal riots in both the countries
forced people to flee across the borders. Subsequently, a new date of
December 31, 1950 was decided under the Nehru–Liaquat Pact, which
was signed on April 8, 1950, to protect the rights of minorities to
immovable property in each other’s country.6 The pact facilitated the
return of net 1,61,360 people into Assam and many more in West
Bengal and Tripura.7
Meanwhile, detection and deportation of foreigners was being carried
out in the border states according to the Immigrants (Expulsion from
Assam) Act of 1950, which came into effect from March 1, 1950.8
The Act provided for expulsion of any person who had been residing
outside India but had entered India before or after the enactment of
the Act and whose presence was detrimental to the interest of the
general public or any section of the Scheduled Tribe (ST). The Act,
however, barred expulsion of refugees who had fled Pakistan because
6
Sanjib Baruah, India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality, New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1999, p. 119. Also, see “Agreement between India and Pakistan on
Minorities”, in White Paper on Foreigners’ Issue, Home and Political Department, Government
of Assam, October 20, 2012, pp. 49–52.
7
8
Section 2 of the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950, Act No. 10 of 1950,
March 1, 1950, available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1523917/, accessed on February
9, 2015.
of civil disturbances or fear of such disturbances.9 In addition, a National

Register of Citizens (NRC), containing information for each individual
such as the father’s name or husband’s name, nationality, sex, age, means
of livelihood or occupation and house or holdings, was being prepared
by the Assam government. The NRC was aimed to help identify and
verify genuine Indian citizens and repatriate foreigners.
The process of identification and deportation of illegal migrants during
the 1950s was ineffective because, first, passport and visa regulations
between India and Pakistan came into operation only from October
1952. Second, Pakistan as a foreign country, and its nationals as
foreigners, was not defined till 1957. It was only in January 1957 that
Section 2(a) of the Foreigners Act of 1946 was amended to define a
Pakistani national as a foreigner. So, in practice, the provisions of
Foreigners Act of 1946 were not applicable to illegal migrants from
East Pakistan. In addition, the Pakistani nationals were also not required
to register themselves with the district magistrate if they entered India
through valid visas.10 So, there were no means to trace a Pakistani national
who had entered Indian through legal process but did not return to
his/her country after the expiry of the visa duration.
Prevention of Infiltration of Foreigners Scheme

After the 1961 population census assessed that 2,20,691 illegal migrants
had entered Assam, the Union government launched the Prevention
of Infiltration into India of Pakistani Nationals (PIP) scheme in June
1962. The aim of the scheme was to deter the illegal entry of fresh
migrants from East Pakistan by keeping a strict watch on the immigrant
settlement colonies in the border districts of the states of Assam, West
Bengal, Meghalaya and Tripura. In later years, the scheme was extended
to few of the interior districts as well. Under the scheme, the police
was vested with the responsibility of setting up observation posts in
immigrant settlement areas so as to identify and deport any new migrant
9
10
Ibid., pp. 7–8.
62 | PUSHPITA DAS
and act as a second line of defence along the international border.

Border Police in Assam and Meghalaya and Mobile Task Forces in
West Bengal and Tripura were constituted to carrying out the specific
job of detection and deportation of illegal migrants.11 This time around
the detection and deportation of illegal migrants proved to be
successful, which is evidenced by the fact that between 1961 and 1966,
1,78,952 migrants were either deported or induced to leave Assam.12
Soon after, however, some local political parties as well as other vested
interest groups started opposing the process to deport illegal migrants
by the state government by expressing sentiments that “they are our
own people”. These vested interest groups also alleged that genuine
Indian Muslims were being harassed by the police. Even Pakistan
threatened to drag India to the United Nations (UN) if it did not stop
“pushing Indian Muslims into Pakistan”. Under intense political pressure,
the Union government took away the powers to deport from the
deputy commissioners (DCs) and the superintendents of police (SPs)
and vested it in the Foreigner’s Tribunals, which were established in
September 1964.13
With the emergence of Bangladesh as a separate nation in 1971, the
Indian government had to improvise the scheme. First, the scheme
was renamed as Prevention of Infiltration of Foreigners (PIF). The
scheme was, however, not implemented continuously but extended
from time to time. However, with growing concerns that illegal
migration from across the border had not abated even after the creation
of Bangladesh, the Union government restored the power to evict
Bangladeshis to the DCs and the SPs in 1976. They were, of course,
instructed not to apprehend persons who had entered India before
11
“Influx of Infiltrators, July 23, 1996, Lok Sabha”, in Avtar Singh Bhasin, India–Bangladesh
Relations, Vol. 1, New Delhi: Geetika Publishers, 2003, p. 2573.
12
13
Ibid., p. 15. Also, see K.P.S. Gill, “Illegal Infiltration in the North-East: India’s Internal
Security Perspectives”, in B.B. Kumar (ed.), Illegal Migration from Bangladesh, Delhi: Astha
Bharati, 2006, pp. 93–94.
March 25, 1971.14 Furthermore, in 1987, additional posts were

sanctioned for police departments of the concerned states under the
PIF scheme so that adequate manpower could be provided to
apprehend illegal border crossers. For example, 3,153 posts for Assam,15
165 posts for West Bengal, 144 posts for Tripura and 194 posts for
Meghalaya in the police were sanctioned.16 The PIF scheme did achieve
some success in detecting and deporting illegal migrants but did not
deter the Bangladeshis from illegally crossing the border. The failure
of the PIF scheme was primarily because of temporary nature of the
scheme, manpower and infrastructure shortage and political pressures.
The Foreigner’s Tribunals of 1964

Following intense political pressure against the detection and deportation
process and to counter allegations of arbitrariness and harassment by
the executive, the Union government created the Foreigner’s Tribunals
under Clause 2 of the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order on September 23,
1964. These tribunals had the power to take up cases to decide whether
a person is foreigner or not, as specified in the Foreigners Act of 1946.
The idea to appoint members with judicial background to the tribunal
was to allow persons who were served “Quit India” notices to make
representations to these tribunals and expect fair hearing of their cases.
Accordingly, the process was relaxed so that the alleged infiltrator got
enough time to challenge the police case in the tribunals if he desired
to do so. The police was further instructed that suspected illegal migrants
should not be harassed and a thorough probe against an infiltrator can
be carried out only if it was ascertained that the person was an illegal
14
“Foreigners Act, 1946—delegation of powers under Section 3(2) thereof to civil
authorities, February 17, 1976, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India”, in
White Paper on Foreigners’ Issue, n. 6, pp. 64–65.
15
“Assam Accord”, Unstarred Question No. 3403, Lok Sabha, March 17, 2015, available at
http://mha1.nic.in/par2013/par2015-pdfs/ls-170315/3403.pdf, accessed on December
14, 2015.
16
“Annexure X—Internal Note Prepared by the Home Ministry, Government of India in
March 1992”, in Kumar (ed.), Illegal Migration from Bangladesh, n. 13, p. 259.
64 | PUSHPITA DAS
migrant. In 1964, four tribunals were constituted and 35,080 cases

were referred to them.17 Between 1964 and 1968, few more tribunals
were constituted but they were gradually wound up by 1973 as most
of the infiltrators were successfully deported. The tribunals were again
revived in July 1979 and 10 tribunals were set up to detect and deport
illegal migrants.18
Like the PIF scheme, the Foreigner’s Tribunals proved to be ineffective
in deporting illegal migrants. One of the major reasons for their failure
was the elaborate processes of detection of infiltrators, which caused
excessive delays in identification and deportation of illegal migrants.
Failure of the above-mentioned schemes in detection and deportation
of illegal migrants also contributed towards an increasing trend of
unauthorised crossing of the border from East Pakistan (later
Bangladesh) as the illegal migrants realised that the chances of them
getting deported back to their country were rare.
One of the obvious fallouts of the presence of a large number of
illegal migrants was the politicisation of the issue in Assam, leading to
the launching of anti-foreigners agitation targeting the illegal migrants
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In later years, there was increasing
securitisation of the illegal migration issue, especially after the Assam
agitation compelling the Indian government to undertake a series of
extraordinary measures. In addition to legal provisions for detection
and deportation of Bangladeshi nationals illegally residing in India,
forcible deportation of illegal migrants, construction of border fences
to stop unauthorised crossings at the border and issuance of
multipurpose identity cards to identify Indian citizens were some of
the “extraordinary” measures undertaken in response to the threat of
illegal migration.19
17
18
Ibid., p. 16.
19
“Influx of Infiltrators, July 23, 1996, Lok Sabha”, n. 11, p. 2572.
Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act of

1983
The functioning of the Foreigner’s Tribunals in Assam, set up under
Foreigners Act of 1946, faced a lot of criticism from political parties
and other groups. One of the allegations was that the Act gave unbridled
powers to police who abused it to declare any person as foreigner
(East Pakistani or Bangladeshi) and detain and deport him. Further, a
person so accused did not have any legal recourse in these tribunals
and had to prove that he was not a foreigner all by himself.20 Many
political parties espousing the cause of the minority community alleged
that that genuine Indian Muslims were harassed and forced to flee in
the name of deportation.21 Therefore, on December 25, 1983, the
Union government enacted the Illegal Migrants (Determination by
Tribunals) (IMDT) Act, which was aimed at addressing these complaints.
The IMDT Act provided for judicial tribunals to determine, “in a fair
manner”, whether a person was an illegal migrant or not so that the
Government of India could expel him/her from the country because
the continuance of such foreigners in the country was detrimental to
the interests of the public.22 The Act provided for an administrative
screening committee, which would examine the complaints under the
Act and reject complaints found to be frivolous. Twenty tribunals were
set up by the Assam government under the provisions of the Act and
these tribunals took up cases regarding suspected illegal migrants entering
into India after March 24, 1971. The Foreigner’s Tribunals continued
20
Prashant Bhushan, “An Unconscionable Judge”, available at http://bharatiyas.in/cjarold/
files/AN%20UNCONSCIONABLE%20JUDGEMENT.pdf, accessed on December 8,
2015.
21
Sanjoy Hazarika, Rites of Passage: Border Crossings, Imagined Homelands, India’s East and Bangladesh,
New Delhi: Penguin, Books, 2000, p. 70.
22
The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, Act No. 39 of 1983,
December 25, 1983, available at http://www.india-eu-migration.eu/media/legalmodule/
Illegal%20Migrants%20Act%201983.pdf, accessed on December 8, 2015.
66 | PUSHPITA DAS
to function along with IMDT tribunals and were entrusted with the
responsibility to dispose cases of suspected Bangladeshis before March
24, 1971.23
The IMDT Act was not without its faults. Critics described the Act as
“toothless” as it failed to detect and deport illegal migrants effectively.
One of the main reasons for its failure was that the Act gave right to a
private person to lodge a complaint against someone about whom he
had the information that the concerned person was an illegal migrant.
The right was however limited by the provision that both the
complainant and the person accused should reside under the same
police station.24 In addition, unlike the Foreigners Act of 1946, the
onus of proving that a person is an illegal migrant was on the
complainant instead of the accused. The reason for such a clause was
ostensibly to discourage frivolous cases.25 Given these issues, the
functioning of the tribunals under the IMDT Act remained suboptimal.
Till July 2005, of the 1,12,791 cases referred to the tribunals, 88,770
cases were pending and only 12,846 were declared as illegal migrants,
of which 1,547 could be deported or pushed back across the border
into Bangladesh.26
In 2005, the Supreme Court struck down the IMDT Act describing it
as ultra vires.27 Following the judgement, all the IMDT tribunals and
appellate tribunals ceased to function. All the pending cases were
transferred to the existing Foreigner’s Tribunals of 1964. The Foreigners
Tribunals Act of 1946 was amended in 2012, which provided that all
cases were required to be disposed within 60 days from the day of
reference received from competent authority. Thirty-six Foreigner’s
23
24
Ibid.
25
Hazarika, Rites of Passage, n. 21, p. 70.
26
27
“IMDT Act is the Biggest Barrier to Deportation, says Supreme Court”, The Hindu, New
Delhi, July 14, 2005, available at http://www.thehindu.com/2005/07/14/stories/
2005071405551200.htm, accessed on February 9, 2015.
Tribunals were set up in Assam and 64 additional tribunals were

sanctioned by the MHA to expedite pending cases.28 The Foreigner’s
Tribunals have declared more than 38,000 persons as illegal Bangladeshi
migrants in Assam since 1985, but the state administration faces problems
in deporting them because most of the illegal migrants are either
absconding or dead. A bigger problem is Bangladesh’s constant refusal
to acknowledge these illegal migrants as its citizens, thus stonewalling
any meaningful cooperation to deport the illegal migrants back to their
country.29
This problem has arisen because India does not have any agreement
with Bangladesh to deport its nationals who have illegally entered India.
The only agreement that India has with Bangladesh is the repatriation
of trafficking victims, which was arrived at following years of discussion
and negotiations. For repatriation and rehabilitation of these victims, a
task force was constituted between India and Bangladesh in 2009.
Bangladesh accepts those Bangladeshis who are deported for violating
visa norms and overstaying. A total of 18,532 Bangladeshi nationals,
found to be overstaying in India between 2011 and 2013, have been
deported.30
“Operation Push Back”

One of the most controversial measures that the Union government
had employed to tackle the problem of illegal migrants in the 1990s
28
“Foreigner’s Tribunal”, Unstarred Question No. 4713, Lok Sabha, August 12, 2014,
available at http://mha1.nic.in/par2013/par2014-pdfs/ls-120814/LS%204713.pdf,
accessed on April 24, 2015.
29
“Assam Police Seek Info from Public on Bangla Immigrants”, The Indian Express, Guwahati,
April 23, 2015, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/assam-
police-seek-info-from-public-on-bangla-immigrants/ accessed on April 24, 2015.
30
“SOP for Repatriation of Rescued Victims and Illegal Migrants”, Unstarred Question
No. 721, Rajya Sabha, December 11, 2013, available at http://mha1.nic.in/par2013/
par2013-pdfs/rs-111213/721.pdf, accessed on December 15, 2015; “SOP for Repatriation
of Illegal Bangladeshi Immigrants”, Press Information Bureau of India, July 23, 2014, available
at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=107327, accessed on December
15, 2015.
68 | PUSHPITA DAS
was the forcible deportation of illegal migrants under “Operation Push

Back”. Such an extreme measure was undertaken following growing
apprehensions in the 1980s about relentless illegal migration from
Bangladesh in various parts of the country. Various political parties,
especially the BJP, had been vociferous about the adverse impact of
their presence in the country. Taking cognizance of the growing disquiet
against illegal migration, the then Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao,
decided to take concrete action. In 1991, his government formulated
“Operation Push Back” as part of an “Action Plan” against Bangladeshis
illegally residing in India.31 The fundamental objective of “Operation
Push Back” was to deter any potential Bangladeshi migrant from
illegally crossing the border and settling in India. The Action Plan had
three steps: (i) detection; (ii) identification; and (iii) deportation.32
While “Operation Push Back” was to be implemented all over India, it
was in New Delhi–the national capital territory–where most of the
action took place. The first operation took place in September 1992,
when 132 men, women and children from the slums of New Delhi
were rounded up and deported to Bangladesh.33 The authorities
allegedly shaved off the heads of the deportees so that they could be
easily recognised if they tried to sneak back into India immediately.
Expectedly, Bangladesh decried Indian government’s “‘unilateral, illegal
and unfortunate” action of forcibly pushing in Bengali-speaking Indian
Muslims into Bangladesh. Even the West Bengal chief minister declared
that his administration and party will not allow the alleged illegal migrants
to be pushed through the state’s borders.34 Under growing national
and international pressure, the Indian government had to suspended
“Operation Push Back” in November 1992.
31
Sujata Ramachandran, “‘Operation Pushback’: Sangh Parivar, State, Slums, and
Surreptitious Bangladeshis in New Delhi”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 7,
February 15–21, 2003, p. 638.
32
Ibid., p. 639.
33
“India Sends Bangladeshi Home”, The Christian Science Monitor, November 19, 1992,
New Delhi, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/1992/1118/18061.html, accessed
34
Ramachandran, “‘Operation Pushback’”, n. 31, p. 324.
However, operations of similar nature, albeit under different names

such as “Operation Flush Out”, were undertaken sporadically in later
years.35 More than 45,000 Bangladeshis were claimed to be deported
under various operations conducted by the Delhi Police in the national
capital since 1991.36 Similarly, in the late 1990s, when the BJP–Shiv
Sena combine was in power in Maharashtra, it launched several exercises
to evict illegal Bangladeshi migrants from Mumbai. In one such
operation, the Mumbai Police tried, unsuccessfully, to deport a group
of 34 Bangladeshis but met with stiff resistance from Forward Bloc
cadres in Kolkata, who “snatched away” the Bangladeshis from the
Mumbai Police.37 In 2005, again, 98 Bangladeshis were detained in
Mumbai as part of “Operation Flush Out”.38
Tighter Border Controls

The first step towards addressing the issue of illegal migration is not to
allow persons to cross the international border without authorisation.
For this purpose, border controls had to be made tighter to deter
aliens from illegally crossing the borders. Towards this end, the Indian
government implemented a series of schemes, such as augmenting the
manpower of the border-guarding force, increasing the number of
border outposts along the border, constructing fences and issuance of
multiple identity cards to border population.
35
Ibid., p. 325.
36
“Over 40 K Illegal Bangladeshi Migrants Deported: FRRO to Court”, Business Standard,
New Delhi, August 20, 2013, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/
pti-stories/over-45k-illegal-bangladeshi-migrants-deported-frro-to-court-
113082000822_1.html, accessed on January 30, 2015.
37
“Political Pawns”, India Today, August 10, 1998, available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/
story/shiv-sena-bjp-govt-launches-operation-in-mumbai-to-push-illegal-bangladeshi-
immigrants-back/1/264716.html, accessed on December 15, 2015.
38
“98 Illegal Bangladeshi Nationals Detained”, DNA, Mumbai, October 25, 2005, available
at http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-98-illegal-bangladeshi-nationals-detained-
7109, accessed on December 15, 2015.
70 | PUSHPITA DAS
Strengthening Border Surveillance

Despite experiencing continuous illegal migration, India’s border with
East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) had remained poorly guarded. While
some efforts for strengthening border controls along the border were
envisaged during the 1960s, no concrete steps were taken to secure the
border against illegal migration. The diverse and difficult terrain, together
with a lack of resources to raise adequate border-guarding forces and
accompanying security infrastructure, contributed to the precarious
situation. The fact that the Indian government did not perceive any
conventional threat from Bangladesh was another reason for leaving
the India–Bangladesh border poorly guarded. A gradual change in the
perception of the policymakers towards the Bangladesh border started
after certain events unfolded that threatened national security. Prominent
of them being the Assam agitation, the Kargil War and a series of
terrorists attacks in the country’s hinterland. While the Assam agitation
and the subsequent peace accord provided the framework to tighten
border controls in Assam, the Kargil War highlighted the importance
of an effective border management against infiltration, and the terrorist
attacks in the country emphasised the urgency of stricter border controls
to prevent the terrorists from sneaking in and out of the country
unhindered.
Accordingly, the Government of India periodically started taking steps
to strengthen border controls. To begin with, in January 1986, a 5-year
expansion plan for the BSF was sanctioned by the Union government.
Under this plan, the deployment pattern of the BSF was redesigned to
increase the number of border outposts (BoPs) for a better surveillance
of the border.39 The BoPs are crucial components for border guarding
as it is from these BoPs that patrol parties are regularly dispatched to
keep a vigil along the border to detect and deter illegal crossings. The
patrol parties also gather tactical intelligence about infiltrators and
infiltration routes by studying the terrain of the border and interacting
with the local people. Initially, the inter-BoP distance along the Indo-
39
“Annexure X—Internal Note Prepared by the Home Ministry, Government of India in
March 1992”, n. 13, p. 258.
Bangladesh border was approximately 9 km, making it extremely

difficult to effectively man the border, but over the years, with increased
deployment of the BSF personnel and establishment of 802 BoPs, it
was reduced to an average distance of 4–4.5 km.40 In 2009, the Union
government approved a proposal to construct 383 additional BoPs to
further reduce the inter-BoP distance to 3.5 km.41 The project was
scheduled to be completed by 2013–14, but because of delays in land
acquisition, clearances from various ministries and protests by local
people, it could not be completed in the stipulated time.42
Augmenting the presence of the BSF along the border to effectively
man the border is another step towards better border surveillance.
The Union government has increased the number of BSF battalions
deployed along the border over the years. In 1991, 40 battalions of
BSF were deployed along the Bangladesh border. In the next decade,
the strength of the BSF was increased to 60 battalions and presently,
80 battalions of BSF are guarding the India–Bangladesh border. To
guard the riverine stretches, which are most vulnerable to infiltration
and smuggling, the water wing of the BSF has been strengthened with
the deployment of additional floating BoPs. These floating BoPs are
supported by fast patrol boats for inspection and interception along
the riverine border.43 To further strengthen patrolling in the creek areas
of the Sunderbans, which is increasingly becoming prone to illegal
migration and piracy, the Union government has sanctioned three more
floating BoPs to be deployed there.44 Various electronic devices, such
40
Pushpita Das, “India–Bangladesh Border Management: A Review of the Government’s
Response”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 3, May–June 2008, p. 374.
41
2015, p. 31.
42
Ibid., p. 32.
43
“Floating Outposts Give BSF Strategic Edge”, Business Standard, February 23, 2015,
Hasnabad, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/floating-
outposts-give-bsf-strategic-edge-115022300623_1.html, accessed on December 15, 2015.
44
“Government Sanctions 9 Floating Vessels for BSF along WB, Gujarat”, DNA, New
Delhi, April 30, 2015, available at http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-government-
sanctions-9-new-floating-vessels-for-bsf-along-wbgujarat-2082104, accessed on
December 15, 2015.
72 | PUSHPITA DAS
as hand-held thermal imaginaries, night vision goggles and direction

finders, are also being used to enhance remote surveillance of the border.
In addition, the Indian government has also solicited the cooperation
of the Bangladesh government to prevent illegal migration and other
transborder crimes. As part of the Coordinated Border Management
Plan, the BSF and its counterpart, the Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB),
have identified 39 vulnerable stretches along the international border
and conduct coordinated patrolling to enhance vigil along these
stretches.45 Furthermore, standard operating procedures (SOPs) for
arrest of illegal migrants have also been finalised in 2009, which were
revised in 2011 and again in February 2013. Under its provisions,
infiltrators caught at the international border by the BSF are sent back
immediately, and those who are arrested inside the country are deported
to Bangladesh after taking legal action against them.46
The India–Bangladesh Border Fence

Fences or barriers are described as “fortified boundaries” and are
constructed for enhanced border controls.47 They are asymmetrical
physical barriers constructed not to completely stop the cross-border
movement of illegal immigrants, insurgents, terrorists, smugglers and
traffickers but to impose costs on the would-be infiltrators, and in so
doing deter or impede infiltration.48 The idea is that the fence will slow
down the movement of the infiltrator, thus making it easy for the
security forces to apprehend him. These fences are a combination of
45
“B’desh No Longer has Rebel Training Camps”, The Times of India, Shillong, February 6,
2015, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/Bdesh-no-longer-
has-rebel-training-camps/articleshow/46136666.cms, accessed on February 10, 2015.
46
“Illegal Migrants”, Unstarred Question No. 6211, Lok Sabha, May 5, 2015, available at
http://mha1.nic.in/par2013/par2015-pdfs/ls-050515/6211.pdf, accessed on December
15, 2015.
47
Ron E. Hassner and Jason Wittenberg, “Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified
Boundaries and Why?”, March 10, 2011, p. 2, available at http://
www.jasonwittenberg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Barriers-to-Entry.pdf,
48
Ibid.
obstructions, such as barbed wires, concrete walls and ditches, along

with watch towers, sensors, cameras, and are patrolled by a semi-
militarised force.49
A country which builds fences along its borders tends to do so after
perceiving such threats as illegal immigrants, smugglers, insurgents or
terrorists entering its territory from the neighbouring country. More
often than not countries construct border fences unilaterally in response
to perceived threats because their neighbours are either unwilling to or
incapable of stopping the egress of unwanted persons and goods
from their territory.50 Thus, countries who built fences have to brave
protests from neighbours and affected parties as well as criticism from
international community.
India is perhaps the first country which has built a border fence to
prevent illegal migration. The idea of fencing the border with
Bangladesh to stem the tide of illegal migrants was first put forward in
January 1965. The proposal was to erect barbed wire fences along
some vulnerable patches of the international border with the approval
of the centre, but shortage of barbed wires and inability to clear a
mile-deep area of habitation along the border prevented the fencing
project from being implemented.51 The idea, however, did not fade
away and resurfaced during the Assam agitation against foreigners.
The widespread violence unleashed during the agitation, especially the
Nellie massacre in February 1983, and repeated petitions by state
representatives to build a fence along the Bangladesh border compelled
the Union government to debate the possibility of fencing the country’s
international border with Bangladesh to prevent illegal migration. After
much deliberation, the central government decided to start constructing
the fence in April 1984. The commencement of work on the fencing
infuriated Bangladesh, leading to clashes at the border. Subsequent firing
49
Ibid., p. 6.
50
Ibid., p. 7.
51
74 | PUSHPITA DAS
by border security forces of both the countries resulted in the death

of a few BSF personnel and members of survey team and as a result,
the construction of the fences had to be suspended temporarily.52
Border fencing as a potential tool to prevent illegal migration found
mention a year later in the Assam Accord of 1985. Clause 9 of the
Accord stipulated, “[T]he international border shall be made secure
against future infiltration by erection of physical barriers like walls,
barbed wire fencing and other obstacles at appropriate places.”53 It
further stated that roads should be constructed to facilitate patrolling
by the security forces and all effective measures should be undertaken
“to prevent infiltrators crossing or attempting to cross the international
border”.54 Accordingly, the project for constructing fences and roads
along vulnerable stretches of the border in Assam started in 1986.
Construction of fences along the India–Bangladesh border has not
been easy. One of the major hurdles in the process has been the hostile
attitude of Bangladesh. As mentioned earlier, Bangladesh had raised
serious objections against India’s decision to build a fence along their
mutual border. In August 1983, while interacting with Indian media
persons, General Ershad said, “I do not accept this theory of infiltration.
There is no reason either to have a wall or a fencing.”55 He claimed that
Bangladesh felt humiliated and belittled and expected to be consulted
before the fencing was built.56 Responding to Bangladesh’s protests,
India initially declared that since the fences will be constructed on the
Indian territory, there was no reason to “bilaterilise” it. Later, in March
1983, India backtracked and sent its foreign minister to hold parleys
with his Bangladesh counterpart, but Bangladesh remained
52
Partha S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia, Delhi: Manohar, 1989, p. 85.
53
“The Assam Accord of 1985”, p. 2, available at http://aasc.nic.in/
acts%20and%20rules%20(goa)/Implementation%20of%20Assam%20Accord%
20Deptt/Assam%20Accord.pdf. Accessed on December 5, 2015.
54
Ibid.
55
Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia, n. 52, p. 84.
56
Ibid.
uncooperative.57 Faced with Bangladesh’s intransigence, India decided

to unilaterally construct the fence in April 1984.
As expected, India continued to face stiff resistance from Bangladesh
as it objected to the construction of fences on the grounds that the
construction of any defensive structure within 150 yards of the
international boundary is not permitted under guidelines agreed to in
1975, referring to the border fencing as a “military wire obstacle”.
India maintained that the fence is not a defensive structure as it cannot
impede the movement of military vehicles. India also maintained that
it is demolition of defensive structures and not construction of fences
that forms part of 1975 guidelines. India further argued that the 1975
agreement provided for a stop to unauthorised immigration and
smuggling and that the fence will help do both. India also faced stiff
resistance from Bangladesh at 265 disputed spots as the security forces
of both the countries differ on their perception of the location of the
boundary.58
Despite facing stiff opposition, India carried on with the project of
building fences along the borders with Bangladesh. Construction of
fences was undertaken in two phases, with Phase I sanctioned in 1987
and Phase II in 2000. Under Phase I, only 857 km (20 per cent) of the
border was fenced because the decision was to fence the most
vulnerable stretches of the border and not the entire border.59
Accordingly, fences were constructed only in some patches along the
international border in Assam, West Bengal and Meghalaya. But
increasing cases of illegal migration, cross-border movement of
insurgents and smuggling were reported and the Union government
realised that piecemeal fencing will not resolve the problem as a
substantial portion of the border remained vulnerable to infiltration
by Bangladeshi nationals. Consequently, the High Level Empowered
57
Bhasin, India–Bangladesh Relations, Vol. 1, n. 11, p. xcv.
58
Das, “India–Bangladesh Border Management: A Review of Government’s Response”,
n. 40, p. 376.
59
2001, p. 54.
76 | PUSHPITA DAS
Committee monitoring the implementation of Phase I of fencing, on

October 14, 1999, approved a proposal for constructing additional
2,429.5 km of fences along the entire border.60 On June 12, 2000, the
Union government sanctioned Rs 1,335 crore for the construction of
additional fences under Phase II.61 A proposal to re-erect the fences
constructed during Phase I, which were damaged as a result of faulty
construction designs, repeated submergence and vagaries of weather,
was also approved. Accordingly, 861 km of new fences are being
erected under Phase III. Off the total of 3,326.14 km of fences along
the India–Bangladesh border, which was finally sanctioned, 2,828 km
had been constructed by the end of 2014 and another 78.8 km will be
completed by 2016. Of these, 1,874 km is illuminated with floodlights
during night to provide better visibility of the border.62
It is, however, important to note that the entire India–Bangladesh border
cannot be fenced because the terrain–at places riverine, or hilly or
marshy–does not permit the construction of fences. Moreover, building
fences is not an easy task and is fraught with major hurdles. One of the
biggest hurdles is delays in the acquisition of land. In addition, vested
political interests, the lackadaisical and uncooperative attitude of state
governments, stringent environmental laws, paucity of funds and
protests by local people and unwillingness on their part to relocate
have all contributed towards stalling the process of fencing.63 Disputed
and non-demarcated patches of the border and resistance from
Bangladesh further complicated the fencing effort.
While fencing has been successful to some extent in preventing easy
access, it has not altogether stopped people from illegally entering India.
60
2000, p. 30.
61
n. 59, p. 55.
62
Government of India, Annual Report 2014–15, n. 41, pp. 32–33.
63
Ibid. Pushpita Das, “Border Fencing Will Not Stop Illegal Migration”, IDSA Comment,
December 26, 2014, available at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/
BorderFencingWillNotStopIllegalMigration_pdas_261214, accessed on December 6,
2015.
This is because the migrants have devised means to surmount the fence
or circumvent it. There are numerous reports of migrants either cutting
the fences or placing wooden ladders and planks to climb over them.
The unfortunate incident of Felani Khatun is a case in point. Migrants
also exploit the poorly guarded Sunderbans and the sea route to enter
India. Fences have also proven ineffective in areas where they cut through
villages and houses because inhabitants of the houses and villages
provide shelter to the illegal migrants. Thick forested tracts and marshy
and low-lying areas, coupled with the faulty design and use of
substandard material, have further reduced the effectiveness of fences.64
That the fence was never meant to completely stop illegal migration all
by itself was not lost on the policymakers. In fact, the Minister of
External Affairs, Mr Jaswant Singh, had told the Rajya Sabha in March
2002:
The nature of the Indo-Bangladesh border is such that it is
very difficult to fence the entire border. Out of 4000 km of
the border, there is a proper fencing only in a fraction of it. A
large part of this border is riverine, a large part of this border
keeps changing as the rivers keep changing their course. On
account of these various factors infiltration cannot be stopped
simply by putting barbed wire fences on this very difficult terrain,
on this very difficult border. There are complex social and
economic reasons behind infiltration, the illegal infiltration from
Bangladesh. There are economic factors; there are factors of
land and unless all these are taken into account it will be
impractical and unwise to address it in one particular manner.65
Despite these shortcomings, the fence has proved to be effective in a
number of ways. First of all, being a border obstacle, it has served the
BSF and the border population well. By slowing down the movement
64
Ibid.
65
Bhasin, India–Bangladesh Relations, Vol. 1, n. 11, p. xcvi.
78 | PUSHPITA DAS
of the border crossers effectively, the fence has given enough time to
the BSF personnel to intercept infiltrators and in the process, helped
the BSF to control the movement of petty smugglers, illegal migrants,
anti-national elements as well local people across the border. For the
border population, the fence has acted as a security net as they can
pursue their agricultural activities in peace and miscreants and criminals
from neighbouring villages of Bangladesh now find it difficult to access
their standing crops and forcibly harvest it. Fencing has also made it
harder for the criminals to loot the property of the farmers and
smuggle their cattle across the border.66
Multipurpose Identity Card

In 1965, the Union government considered introducing a scheme of
providing identity cards to the people residing along the India–
Bangladesh border belt. The purpose was to identify and differentiate
Indian citizens from foreigners. Persons who were issued identity cards
were required to carry the cards voluntarily so that they could be easily
identified as genuine citizens and not harassed by the police checking
people against illegal migration. Incidentally, the proposal of issuing
identity cards to border people was cancelled a year later after it was
found that the proposal was not feasible.67
The project of identity cards was again revived in 1991 when the
Government of India approved a “scheme for issue of identity cards
in the specified areas in the states of Assam, Mizoram, Tripura, and
West Bengal to check illegal migration”.68 The project was not, however,
taken up in earnest for a long time as the administration concluded that
“creating database of 1 billion people is a gigantic exercise”.69 In 1999,
the Union government commissioned a detailed feasibility study for
66
Dr Surindur Singh, Growth and Functional Dynamics of Border Security Force, Jammu: Trikuta
Radiant, 1998, pp. 309–10.
67
68
1992, p. 13.
69
Government of India, Annual Report 1999–2000, n. 60, p. 12.
implementing National Identity Card Scheme (NICS), which submitted

its report in March 2000. Finally, in April 2003, the Union government
launched a pilot project of granting multipurpose identity cards in “a
few selected sub-districts of 13 States and Union territories, namely,
Jammu & Kashmir, Gujarat, Uttranchal, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh,
Assam, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Tripura, Goa, Tamil Nadu,
Pondicherry and Delhi covering a total population of 30.5 lakh”.70
The project was completed in March 2009.71 Unfortunately, the project
could not be implemented in Assam because the verification of citizens
in the state had not been completed.72
The NCIS envisages granting identity cards to all citizens above 18
years of age and continuous updating of the NRC by linking it up
with the Births and Deaths system. To provide legal sanction for the
project, the Citizenship Act, 1955 has been amended and a specific
section (14A) on registration of citizens and issuing cards has been
included in the Act. The section provides that the “Central Government
may compulsorily register every citizen of India and issue National
Identity Card to him.”73 For implementing this scheme, the Citizenship
(Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules,
2003 was notified on December 10, 2003.74 Gaining from the experience
of the pilot project, the Government of India decided to prepare a
National Population Register (NPR) which would be the first step
towards providing identity cards to all the citizens of India. In 2010, a
project called “Aadhar” was launched to provide a unique identity
number to each resident of India and the Unique Identification
70
2004, p. 5.
71
2010, p. 177.
72
2007, p. 42.
73
74
80 | PUSHPITA DAS
Authority of India (UIDAI) was set up to implement the project.75 As

of now, “the NPR data of more than 23.51 crore persons has been
sent to UIDAI for de-duplication and generation of Aadhar number.
Out of these, UIDAI has generated 19.67 crore Aadhar numbers.”76
However, doubts have been cast on the effectiveness of these projects
to differentiate between genuine citizens and illegal migrants. The slow
pace of preparing the NPR for the whole country and upgradation
the NRC in Assam have delayed the process of providing identity
cards to the citizens of the country. Moreover, there are allegations
that Aadhar cards are being indiscriminately issued to the residents,
including the illegal migrants, without properly checking their antecedents,
thereby creating a national security risk.77
Conclusion
In sum, the different measures that the Indian government has
undertaken to prevent illegal migration from Bangladesh have not been
entirely successful. While legislations for addressing land alienation among
tribals have been entirely ineffective, the schemes for detection and
deportation of illegal migration did yield some positive results initially,
but also failed once political pressure against them became intense.
Similarly, the scheme to issue identity cards to citizens of India to
differentiate them from illegal migrants has not taken off fully because
of administrative and resource constraints. Increasing surveillance and
border fences have helped in thwarting and deterring illegal migration
to some extent, but again, corrupt BSF personnel, vested political and
economic interests and ingenuity of the illegal migrants have reduced
the effectiveness of border controls. Confronted with the fact that
75
Government of India, Annual Report 2009–2010, n. 71, pp. 177–78.
76
77
“Don’t Give Aadhar Cards to Illegal Immigrants: SC”, The New Indian Express, New
Delhi, September 23, 2013, available at http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/
Dont-give-Aadhar-card-to-illegal-immigrants-SC/2013/09/23/article1799563.ece,
despite the employment of diverse measures, the Indian government

has not been able to prevent the relentless illegal migration from
Bangladesh, some analysts have suggested adopting schemes such as
providing work permits and mass amnesties to resolve the problem.
The following chapter will discuss these schemes and analyse the
effectiveness of these two proposed schemes in stopping illegal
migration from Bangladesh.
82 | PUSHPITA DAS
CHAPTER - 4
Work Permit and Mass Amnesty

An Assessment
Analysts studying the subject of illegal migration have proposed issuing

work permits1 to Bangladeshis as a possible measure to prevent illegal
migration from Bangladesh.2 Arguments forwarded in favour of
introducing a work permit scheme for Bangladeshis in India can be
summed up under four strands. First, the large-scale illegal migration
from Bangladesh is a response to the demand of labour in India.
Proponents of work permits argue that India’s relative prosperity has
always generated a strong “pull factor” for the Bangladeshi citizens
who are desperately looking for better economic opportunities across
the border. With the liberalisation of the Indian economy and its steady
and robust growth since the 1990s, this attraction has risen manifold.
A growing economy, according to them, invariably leads to concomitant
growth in employment opportunities as demand for labourers across
the sectors, be it agriculture, construction, low-skilled industries or other
services, rises. It is this demand for labour that is luring Bangladeshis to
enter into India illegally and take up jobs here. By establishing this link
between demand and supply, the pro-work permit advocates plead
that the Indian policymakers should recognise this dynamics of labour
market and labour flow and implement a prudent policy of issuing
work permits to Bangladeshi migrants.
1
A work permit is an official document that allows foreigners to live and work inside
a country for a set period of time, ranging from a few months to few years.
2
Sanjoy Hazarika, Rites of Passage: Border Crossings, Imagined Homeland, India’s East and Bangladesh,
New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000, pp. 261–62. Also, see Bibek Debroy, “Work Permits
for Bangladesh”, The Indian Express, New Delhi, December 10, 2013, available at http:/
/archive.indianexpress.com/news/work-permits-for-bangladesh/720024/, accessed on
November 20, 2015; Sanjib Baruah, “Immigration, Ethnic Conflict, and Political
Turmoil—Assam, 1979–1985”, Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 11, November, 1986, p. 1206;
and Bidisha Banerjee, “The Great Wall of India”, Slate, December 10, 2010, available at
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/green_room/2010/12/
the_great_wall_of_india.single.html, accessed on November 20, 2015.
Second, work permit would provide a legal option to Bangladeshis

entering India purely for economic reasons and would help them escape
the ignominy of being termed as illegal migrants or infiltrators. It would
also allow low-skilled labourers, a significant proportion of which are
seasonal migrants engaged in agricultural sector in India, to return to
Bangladesh with the assurance of re-entry in the next season. This would
eliminate the root cause of protests against illegal migration from
Bangladesh. Third, work permit will encourage skilled workers to
migrate to India.3 Fourth, it would provide an opportunity for the
Indian establishment to keep a tab on the number and kind of
Bangladeshis entering India.
Detailing the criteria of the work permit programme, Sanjoy Hazarika,
the foremost proponent of the idea, states that work permits should
be issued to groups of 15–20 persons and not to individuals. These
permits should be issued for a limited time period depending upon
the nature of the work, and would be like passports having the details
of individuals, employers and how long the group is going to stay in
India. The validity of the permits could be extended for a period of
two years. These workers will not enjoy any political rights such as
right to vote, buy property or settle in India, but will have human
rights and can approach courts and labour commissions in case their
labour rights are violated.4 For smooth implementation of this
programme, Hazarika emphasises the need for garnering political
backing from all levels–centre, state, districts as well as panchayats. He
further asserts that the cooperation of local politicians is a must because
they are the ones who are providing patronage to the migrants in order
to exploit them as captive vote banks.
While it is true that the Indian economy has been growing steadily over
the decades, it is equally true that the growth has largely been a jobless
growth. The Indian economy grew at the average rate of 5.7 per cent
3
n. 2.
4
Hazarika, Rites of Passage, n. 2, p. 261.
84 | PUSHPITA DAS
per annum during the 1980s, 6 per cent per annum during the 1990s
and reached 7–8 per cent in the 2000s. Unfortunately, this growth in
economy did not result in growth in employment. In fact, as figures
reveal, employment growth rate decelerated over the decades.
Employment growth rate was 2.44 per cent per annum during the
decade of 1973–83 when the GDP grew at the rate of 4.7 per cent. It
fell to 2.02 per cent in the next 10 years when GDP grew at 5 per cent;
and further to 1.84 per cent per annum during 1993–2003 when GDP
grew at 6.3 per cent. Employment growth registered a sharp rise at
2.81 per cent during 2000–05.5 This increase was because of rise in
self-employment in unorganised sector and not because of demand-
led employment growth.
The trend of decelerating employment growth and accelerated GDP
growth was seen in the next four years (2005–09), that is, employment
growth rate was 0.22 per cent, whereas GDP grew at 8–9 per cent.6
Since 2009, employment generation has been steeply declining in India.
For example, while in 2009 12.56 lakh jobs were created in organised
sector, in 2011, it fell to 9.30 lakh and further declined to 1.35 lakh jobs
in 2015. Latest statistics released by the Bureau of Labour state that
while no jobs were created in any sectors during quarter ending
December 2015, eight labour-intensive sectors registered a decline of
20,000 jobs.7 In short, India has been experiencing a “jobless growth”.
Many analysts have termed this growth as “capital intensive, not labour
intensive”.8
5
T.S. Papola and Partha Pratim Sahu, “Growth and Structure of Employment in India:
Long-term and Post-reform Performance and the Emerging Challenge”, Institute for
Studies in Industrial Development, New Delhi, March 2012, p. 26, available at http://
isidev.nic.in/pdf/ICSSR_TSP_PPS.pdf, accessed on June 17, 2016.
6
Ibid., p. 5.
7
“India’s Job Growth Lowest since 2009: Where are the Jobs PM Modi?”, First Post, New
Delhi, April 16, 2016, available at http://www.firstpost.com/business/where-are-the-
jobs-mr-modi-2731002.html, accessed on June 17, 2016.
8
Shweta Punj and M.G. Arun, “Where are the Jobs?”, India Today, April 20, 2016, available
at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/employment-scenario-job-crunch-jobless-growth-
economy/1/647573.html, accessed on June 17, 2016.
While employment generation in the organised sector has decelerated

with the exception of information technology sector, the unorganised
and informal sector has witnessed some growth in employment
generation. The unorganised sector, which accounts for 50 per cent of
the national product and 90 per cent of the workforce,9 is characterised
by predominant unskilled nature of work, with employer’s recruiting
casual labourers, extreme poverty of the workers and unregulated work
with loosely structured labour market.10 Here, agriculture continues to
generate the maximum number of jobs in unorganised sector,
accounting for 99.9 per cent of all the agricultural jobs.11 Manufacturing
is a close second with 87.7 per cent of jobs in unorganised
manufacturing. Thus, agriculture and manufacturing together account
for 98.2 per cent of the jobs in the unorganised or informal sector.12
Given that these jobs do not require any special skills, it can be assumed,
in the absence of official data that demand for labour in this sector is
attracting the unskilled illegal migrants from Bangladesh. However,
India is a labour-surplus country with huge numbers being continuously
added to the existing labour force every year. Under such circumstances,
it is hard to accept that the available domestic labour pool is unable to
fill the demand for labour and the country has to import foreign labour.
In fact, majority of the Bangladeshis coming to India illegally are not
responding to labour demand but are driven out of their country
because of absence of livelihood opportunities. Once in India, they
pick up odd jobs in cities and rural areas to escape poverty and
9
Government of India, Report on Employment & Unemployment Survey, Vol. I, 2013–14,
Chandigarh: Ministry of Labour & Employment, Labour Bureau, 2015, p. 5, available at
http://labour.gov.in/sites/default/files/Press_note_4th_EUS.pdf, accessed on June
17, 2016.
10
Barbara Harris-White and Nandini Gooptu, “Mapping India’s World of Unorganised
Labour”, in Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (eds), Socialist Register 2001: Working Classes,
Global Realities, London: The Merlin Press, 2000, p. 90.
11
Government of India, Report of the Committee on Unorganised Sector Statistics, New Delhi:
National Statistical Commission, February 2012, p. 28.
12
Ibid.
86 | PUSHPITA DAS
starvation. These jobs, such as ragpicking, rickshaw pulling and domestic

help, are menial in nature and do not have any express demand in the
country; implying that the Indian economy would not be adversely
affected if these services are not rendered.
At the same time, a sizeable number of Bangladeshis are believed to
be also working as casual labourers in agriculture, construction and
other allied sectors. Employers in India hiring illegal migrants argue
that they are unable to get domestic labourers because local labourers
are unwilling to take up these jobs. In reality, however, there is no lack
of domestic labourers, but it is the employers who refuse to pay wages
at the market rate. Instead, they hire these illegal migrants who are
willing to work at lowers wages and for long hours. Besides, the illegal
status of the illegal migrants provides opportunities for the employers
to exploit them. The employers take advantage of the vulnerability of
the illegal migrants by paying wages below the market rates and forcing
them to work and live under poor conditions.
Thus, by accepting to work for low wages and under deplorable
conditions, these illegal migrants not only depress wages throughout
the unorganised sector in the country but also discourage demands by
domestic labourers for improvement of working and living conditions.
More significantly, these illegal migrants, comprising substantially of
unskilled labourers, compete for job with those sections of Indian
workers who are unskilled, illiterate and insecure, thereby jeopardising
their economic future and their very existence.
In sum, given that the Indian economy is not generating surplus
employment resulting in demand for labour and given that the illegal
Bangladeshi migrants are competing with poor and unskilled Indian
workers as well as depressing wages in India, welcoming Bangladeshi
workers into India would aggravate the economic well-being of the
Indian workers and would prove harmful for the country in the long
run. Therefore, the rationale for introducing work permit for
Bangladeshis does not exist.
Furthermore, arguments for work permit are premised on the belief
that the Bangladeshi workers entering India with work permits would
willingly return to their country once the validity of the work permits
expires. Assurance of guaranteed jobs in India would provide the
required incentive for them to go back. As stated earlier, illegal migration

from Bangladesh is a “self-rescue” migration of people fleeing abject
poverty in that country and looking for a better future in India.
Therefore, in all probability, these migrants will be intensely reluctant
to return to their country once their tenure gets over. Reluctance to
return is also reinforced by the fact that wages for unskilled workers in
India are not so high that the migrant workers can live off it for the
rest of the year. Moreover, there is also no assured employment for
migrant workers in their country for the intervening period till their re-
recruitment in India. Experiences in many countries which had
introduced guest workers programmes have shown that guest workers
seldom return to their countries of origin after their permit expires
because they are either unwilling to go back or the employers themselves
retain them. This trend has resulted in the formulation of the aphorism,
“there is nothing more permanent than temporary foreign workers”.13
Interestingly, an example of labour migration in Andaman and Nicobar
Islands also reinforces this argument. Andaman and Nicobar Islands
have always faced a shortage of labour and this demand has been met
by importing labour from the Indian mainland. The trend of importing
labour from the mainland picked up, however, during the post-tsunami
rehabilitation and reconstruction work. Workers were brought in by
local contractors in large numbers from the mainland, mainly from
West Bengal. These workers were, in fact, Bangladeshi citizens who
had entered India illegally. Though the stated policy is to send them
back after a project is completed, the dearth of construction labourers
has meant that instead of sending these workers back, contractors
either retain them for other projects or they are transferred to another
contractor for re-employment. In absence of compliance by the
contractors or strict enforcement of the terms by officials, these migrants
13
Philip Martin, “There is Nothing More Permanent than Temporary Foreign Workers”,
May 2001, available at http://cis.org/TemporaryWorkers-Overstays, accessed on October
20, 2015.
88 | PUSHPITA DAS
have continued to stay on the islands and are settled there permanently.14
If this is the reality, the argument that the migrant workers could be
induced to go back does not any hold ground.
The argument that work permit would encourage skilled persons from
Bangladesh to migrate also needs to be critically analysed. Studies suggest
that income distribution in source and destination countries has a
significant influence on migration. If the income distribution in the
destination country is highly unequal, it would induce “positive selection”
of migrant workers, that is, the migrant workers will be more educated
and more skilled than local population. In contrast, if the income
distribution is more equal in the destination country, it will propel
“negative selection”, implying that migrant workers will be uneducated
and low skilled.15 In the case of India and Bangladesh, income inequality
in both the countries is more or less the same. According to the World
Bank, Gini’s coefficient for income inequality for India was 0.32 and
for Bangladesh, it was 0.31 in 2014.16 In such a scenario, it is difficult to
conclude that India would be able to attract more skilled workers
from Bangladesh. Furthermore, Bangladesh might not cooperate with
India given that a policy of sending high-skilled workers to India instead
of low-skilled workers will also not be in its economic interests.
In any case, the idea of issuing work permits to Bangladeshi migrants
has, till date, received mixed reactions from the Indian government.
The governments formed by the Congress and other parties have not
entertained this proposal and therefore, there has been an absence of
any statement on work permits by them during their tenure. In contrast,
the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) governments, which
have been vociferously protesting against illegal migration from
14
Pushpita Das, “Securing Andaman and Nicobar Islands”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 35, No.
3, 2011, p. 469.
15
Steven J. Gold and Stephanie J. Nawyn, Routledge International Handbook of Migration
Studies, Oxon: Routledge, 2013, pp. 14–15.
16
“Bangladesh Doing Well in Tackling Inequality: WB”, bdnews24.com, December 9, 2014,
available at http://bdnews24.com/economy/2014/12/09/bangladesh-doing-well-in-
tackling-inequality-wb, accessed on July 20, 2016.
Bangladesh, appear to be positively inclined towards this. In May 2001,

the then Prime Minister, Vajpayee, while speaking in a rally in Silchar,
had declared, “The Centre is considering seriously the proposal to
issue work permits to Bangladeshi migrants suspected to be foreigners
but could not be evicted due to a host of legal and constitutional
problems.”17
More recently, on the eve of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state
visit to Bangladesh in June 2015, the media had speculated that the
proposal of giving special permits to Bangladeshi nationals who want
to work in India is in the offing. Apparently, the proposal was first
mooted a year earlier during the visit of India’s Foreign Minister Sushma
Swaraj to Dhaka.18 However, nothing regarding this issue was
announced after the conclusion of the visit, highlighting the fact that
Bangladesh may still continue to deny that Bangladeshis are illegally
entering into India.
The proposal of issuing work permits to prevent illegal migrants from
entering India illegally is not a new concept. Many countries such as the
US, Germany, Spain and Italy have implemented guest programme
schemes in various forms to fulfil labour shortages in their countries
and, at the same time, prevent unauthorised entry of aliens and prevent
them from settling down permanently. The following section is devoted
to analysing the experiences of select countries in understanding the
effectiveness of work permits as a measure to prevent illegal migration.
Guest Worker Programmes in Select Countries

The United States of America (US)
In the US, the guest worker programme was started to meet the
demand for labour in the industrial and the agricultural sectors during
17
“Work Permits for Bangladeshi Migrants: PM”, The Tribune, May 7, 2001, Chandigarh,
available at http://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20010507/main3.htm, accessed on
November 20, 2015.
18
“PM Narendra Modi in Bangladesh: Special Permits for Bangladeshi Workers on the
Table”, The Indian Express, Dhaka, June 6, 2015, available at http://indianexpress.com/
article/world/neighbours/modi-in-bangladesh-special-permits-for-bangladesh-
workers-on-the-table/ accessed on November 20, 2015.
90 | PUSHPITA DAS
the two World Wars and the Korean conflict. The first guest worker
programme, called the “Bracero Program”, was started in 1917 as
one of the extreme policies of the National Defense Policy of the
US.19 Under the programme, foreign workers from the Western
hemisphere (read Mexico) were allowed to work in the agricultural
fields and select non-farm sectors. At the same time, rules of the
programme stipulated that the workers should return to their native
country as soon as their contract in the US was over.
The objective was “to add workers to the labor force without adding
permanent residents to the population”.20 While the programme was
able to fulfil the objective of supplying workers to the US industries
and agriculture, it failed to send back the migrant workers to their
country as the rules could not be enforced strictly. As a result, a large
number of Mexicans stayed back in the US spawning illegal migration.
Statistics reveal that between 1917 and 1922, 76,862 Mexican workers
were admitted into the US; however, only 34,922 returned and the
rest, accounting for more than 54 per cent of the migrant workers,
remained in the US. There were also reports that many Mexican migrants
were arriving in the US outside the programme as well.21
The second Bracero Program was started during the Second World
War to fulfil the putative shortage of manpower in the farm sector
caused by the war. In 1942, under pressure from growers, the US
government signed a bilateral agreement with the Mexican government
to bring Mexican labourers into the US. This agreement started the
second Bracero Program. While the recruitment of Mexican workers
should have stopped with the end of the war and the programme
19
Vernon M. Briggs Jr, “Guest Worker Program for the Skilled Workers: Lessons from
the Past and Warnings for the Future”, Testimony before the Sub-Committee on
Immigration and Border Security of the Judiciary Committee of the US Senate,
February 5, 2004, available at cis.org/node/536, accessed on November 20, 2015.
20
Martin, “There is Nothing More Permanent than Temporary Foreign Workers”, n. 13.
21
Briggs, “Guest Worker Program for the Skilled Workers”, n. 19.
should have expired, it continued in a new form (Public Law 78) for
the next 22 years as growers continued to employ workers from
Mexico.22
Like its first edition, the second Bracero Program also stated that
migrants were required to return after their contract was over. But, yet
again, the US law enforcement agencies were not able to force the
migrant workers to return to Mexico once their contract had expired.
It is estimated that between 1942 and 1964, approximately 4.6 million
Mexicans were admitted to do farm work.23 Many Mexicans returned
to their home country permanently when the programme was
terminated in 1964, but about 1–2 million who had gained work
experience in the US decided to stay back. Moreover, the Bracero
Program could not prevent illegal migration as thousands of Mexicans
continued to arrive in the US without valid documents for work in the
farms outside the programme. In fact, over the years, the proportion
of illegal migrants to the braceros increased substantially. In 1950, there
were 458,215 illegal Mexicans and 67,500 braceros and by 1954, those
numbers rose to 1,075,168 known undocumented aliens and only
309,033 braceros.24 In total, 5.3 million Mexicans were apprehended at
the US–Mexico border and half a million illegal Mexicans immigrants
entered the US during the 22 years of the Bracero Program.25 Most of
the 50,000–60,000 Mexicans who were illegally admitted every year
got immigrant status because the US farmers offered them jobs.26 Thus,
while both the Bracero Programs helped the US to meet the demand
22
Kristi L. Morgan, “Evaluating Guest Worker Programs in the US: A Comparison of the
Bracero Program and President Bush’s Proposed Immigration Reform Plan”, Berkeley
La Raza Law Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2004, p. 127.
23
24
Morgan, “Evaluating Guest Worker Programs in the US”, n. 22, p. 128.
25
26
Phillip L. Martin, Promise Unfulfilled: Unions, Immigration and the Farm Workers, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2003, p. 47.
92 | PUSHPITA DAS
for labour successfully, they also triggered the trend of illegal migration
from Mexico because they created dependency for the Mexican
workers in the US.27
The Bracero Program, which was initiated following demands from
the growers’ lobby for farm workers, was finally terminated in 1964
after widespread criticism. Americans were appalled by the deplorable
working conditions of the braceros. But more than the working
conditions of the braceros, it was the adverse effect of the programme
on the wages as well as the employment opportunities of domestic
workers that outraged the local people who demanded that the
programme be terminated.28
Incidentally, the termination of the Bracero Program resulted in an
overwhelming increase in illegal migration from Mexico in the 1970s.
Acknowledging the problem as a major national concern, the US
government toyed with the idea of restarting the guest worker
programme to draw in the illegal migrants into legal channel, thus
preventing illegal migration. However, taking into account the adverse
consequences of the earlier two guest worker programmes, it
constituted two commissions–the National Commission on Manpower
Policy and the Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy–in
August and October 1978 respectively, to investigate the feasibility of
introducing a guest worker programme as a measure to prevent illegal
migration. Interestingly, both the commissions rejected the proposal
of guest workers and forwarded following arguments against the guest
workers programme:29
1. A guest worker programme would not be a completely open
programme and would have limits, such as who would be eligible
for what kind of jobs and how long they could stay. The issue
of who will enforce the terms and how capable such a body
will be in performing the tasks remains unclear.
27
Morgan, “Evaluating Guest Worker Programs in the US”, n. 22.
28
Ibid., p. 129.
29
Briggs, “Guest Worker Program for the Skilled Workers”, n. 19.
2. It would make some economic sectors dependent on foreign

workers.
3. Certain jobs would be identified with the foreigners which would
effectively stigmatise such jobs.
4. Without strict enforcement of employers’ sanctions against hiring
other illegal immigrants, a temporary worker programme would
stimulate new migration pressures in the long run.
5. Guest worker programme would depress wages for unskilled
native labourers.
6. Foreign workers are often more exploitable than native labourers,
particularly given the ability of employers to threaten deportation.
7. Presence of large numbers of guest workers in rural areas would
increase the cost in housing, schooling and other basic
infrastructure.
8. Guest worker programme would fail to reduce unauthorised
migration as it is likely to encourage and exacerbate illegal
movement that persists long after the programme ends. Guest
workers often stay permanently and illegally in the country in
violation of the conditions of their admission.
Despite the rejection of the guest worker programme, it has remained
an attractive proposition for vested interest groups as well as
policymakers in the US. For example, the powerful “growers’ lobby”
in the US has been trying to introduce the programme at different
times and in different formats. Many politicians–both Republicans and
Democrats–have also been extending support for the programme.
Their sole motive for supporting the guest worker programme is the
hope that it will help them build constituencies that would support and
vote for the values they stand for.30
30
Philip L. Martin and Michael S. Teitelbaum, “The Mirage of Mexican Guest Workers”,
Foreign Policy, November/December 2001, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/mexico/2001-11-01/mirage-mexican-guest-workers, accessed on November
23, 2015.
94 | PUSHPITA DAS
Over the years, successive attempts have been made to reinstitute the
guest worker programme by the administration and by individual
representatives/senators, but none succeeded because of the Bracero
experience of substantial number of Mexican workers staying back.
In 1996, two Californian Congressmen, Elton Gallegly and Richard
Pombo, introduced a bill in the House of Representatives which called
for an enlarged guest worker programme to be introduced.31 The
Congressmen argued that a significant percentage of illegal immigrants
are employed in the agricultural sector and a strict enforcement of
rules against hiring unauthorised workers will lead to a shortage of
labour. They also argued that the requirement of foreign workers arises
because domestic workers either do not show up or work hard or
stay with the employers.
The US labourers associations, on the other hand, argued that there is
no shortage of workers in the country, but there is a shortfall of decent
wages, benefits and working conditions. They asserted that growers
prefer foreign workers because they can be held captive and paid lower
wages.32 The labour and immigration departments also opposed the
bill on the ground that they would have less control over the workers
entering the US. Many experts and academics presented counter-
arguments for recruiting foreign workers saying that the US farms can
adjust to labour shortages by introducing mechanisation, as evidenced
after the end of the Bracero Program.33 Significantly, the Clinton
administration opposed the bill arguing that it would increase illegal
migration, reduce job opportunities for US workers and depress wages
of native workers. Subsequently, the House, on March 21, 1996, rejected
the bill by a 242–180 vote.34
31
John Weber, From South Texas to the Nation: The Exploitation of Mexican Labor in the
Twentieth Century, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015, p. 183.
32
Martin, Promise Unfulfilled, n. 26.
33
Ibid.
34
“Congress Move to Curb Illegal Immigration”, Migration News, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 1996,
available at https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=916, accessed on
November 24, 2015.
President George W. Bush also attempted, unsuccessfully, to reintroduce

the guest worker programme when, in January 2004, he presented the
Fair and Secure Immigration Reform Bill. The bill proposed to “match
willing foreign workers with willing U.S. employers when no Americans
can be found to fill the jobs”.35 Though the bill was passed by the
Senate in May 2006, it was allowed to lapse as the House of
Representatives did not take any action on it. Again in 2007, under the
Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act
of 2007, an attempt was made to create a temporary workers
programme in which workers were required to return after two years,
apart from allowing millions of unauthorised immigrants to work
legally. The bill, however, could not get any support from the Senate
when it was put to vote on June 7, 2007 and was allowed to die.36
President Obama attempted to revive the Immigration Reform Bill
of 2007 by introducing a revised form of the bill, called the “Border
Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act
of 2013”, on April 17, 2013.37 The bill proposed to create a new class
of w-visas for low-skilled workers and a Bureau of Immigration and
Market Research. According to the bill, these workers would be working
in “registered positions” for “registered employers” who have paid a
fee to the Bureau. The bill was passed by the Senate in June 2013, but
no action was taken on it by the House of Representatives.38
35
“Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform”, The While House, January 7, 2004,
available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/28079.htm, accessed on November
24, 2015.
36
“Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S.1348 (proposed)”, Council for
Foreign Relations, May 9, 2007, available at http://www.cfr.org/immigration/
comprehensive-immigration-reform-act-2007-s-1348-proposed/p13571, accessed on
November 24, 2015.
37
“Bill Summary & Status, 113th Congress (2013–2014) S. 744 All Information”, The
Library of Congress, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d113:SN00744:@@@L&summ2=m&, accessed on November 24, 2015.
38
“Immigration”, The White House, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/
immigration, accessed on November 24, 2015.
96 | PUSHPITA DAS
The main argument against these two bills was that importing migrant
workers would diminish wages and employment opportunities for
domestic workers. As the Bracero Program demonstrated, wages
tended to either fall or stagnate in areas where braceros were employed.
This phenomenon left the domestic workers with no choice but to
accept lower wages. Furthermore, unskilled immigrants and high school
dropout natives were “perfect substitutes” for each other and therefore,
they directly competed for the same jobs.39 Moreover, the domestic
workers also lost their bargaining power because the surplus immigrant
workers kept workers strikes and protests from generating lasting
collective bargaining agreements. The long-term budgetary fallout of
the guest worker programme was also seen as a huge cost that the US
citizens had to bear in the long run. It was argued that guest workers,
over the course of time, bring their families, relatives, friends,
acquaintances, etc., to the host country. Many of them arrive unmarried
but eventually marry US citizens and bear children. Settlement of these
migrant workers along with their families and friends would invariably
result in enormous costs which the citizens of the US had to bear.40
Most importantly, it was argued that guest workers not only do not go
back home but they also induce others to enter the US illegally. The
Bracero Program demonstrated that despite inducements such as saving
account provisions and family roots in Mexico, many braceros either
abandoned their contracts and stayed back in the US or went back
only to return to the US illegally.41 Networks established among the
migrant workers and their families and friends back home also provided
the required information about job opportunities in the US and means
to reach the US, thus fuelling illegal migration. In January 2011, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had estimated that 11.5
39
Mark Krikorian, “Flawed Assumptions Underlying Guestworker Programs”, Center
for Immigration Studies, February 2004, pp. 3–4.
40
Morgan, “Evaluating Guest Worker Programs in the US”, n. 22.
41
Ibid., p. 138.
million unauthorised immigrants were residing in the US, of which

6.78 million (59 per cent) were from Mexico.42
Germany
Germany (Federal Republic of Germany [FRG]) recruited low-skilled
guest workers (Gastarbeiter) from abroad to meet the shortage of
workers in the industrial sector during the 1950s.43 The programme
was promoted as temporary, mutual and beneficial, with the stipulation
that under rotating labour markets, the guest workers would return to
their home country after two years with enough savings and skills. The
signing of an agreement with Italy on December 20, 1955 marked the
first step by the German government towards admitting foreign
workers in the country. In later years, Germany signed similar
agreements with other countries: Spain and Greece in 1961; Turkey in
1961; Morocco in 1963; Portugal in 1964; Tunisia in 1965; and
Yugoslavia in 1968.44
Initially, guest workers were recruited from Italy and Yugoslavia but
later, the bulk of the guest workers came from Turkey. Poverty, lack
of job opportunities in their home country and an assurance of better
wages pulled a number of people from the rural areas to avail the
guest worker programme in Germany. By the 1970s, there were 2
million guest workers in Germany constituting 65 per cent of the 3
million foreigners in that country. The number of guest workers peaked
42
Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina and Bryan Baker, “Estimates of the Unauthorized
Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2011”, Population Estimates,
March 2012, available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
ois_ill_pe_2011_0.pdf, accessed on November 23, 2015.
43
Cuneyd Dinc, “From ‘Gastarbeiter’ to People with Migration Background: A Critical
Overview of German Migration Sociology”, Sosyoloji Dergisi, Vol. 3, No. 22, 2011, p. 255.
44
Heinz Fassmann, Ursula Reeger and Wiebke Sievers (eds), Statistics and Reality: Concepts
and Measurements of Migration in Europe, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009,
p. 132.
98 | PUSHPITA DAS
in 1973 at 2.6 million.45 Between 1955 and 1973, Germany recruited

approximately 14 million guest workers.46
The profitable situation for guest workers did not last long and took a
turn for the worse in the 1970s. The oil shock in 1973 and the subsequent
slowing down of the German economy and increasing unemployment
forced the German government to stop recruiting foreign workers
from non-Economic Commission countries by the end of November
1973.47 Though a majority of the guest workers had returned to their
home country before 1973, around 2.7 million stayed back even after
the termination of the guest worker programme. The main reasons
that forced the guest workers to continue residing in Germany despite
rising unemployment were: a ban on re-entry of these guest workers
in Germany; and the knowledge that job prospects as well as social
security for them back home are extremely bleak.48 Thus, over time,
these guest workers, who were brought in on a temporary basis, became
permanent residents in Germany.
In addition, by the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, there was a
trend towards subsequent immigration of family members of the guest
workers into Germany. This trend accelerated following the halt in
fresh recruitments as the existing guest workers exercised their right to
family reunification on the basis of living in Germany for long and
invited their families to join them in Germany, despite efforts by the
German government to send them back.49 In their bid to stay back in
45
46
“History of the Guest Workers—Immigration of Foreign Workers”, German Mission
in the United States, available at http://www.germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/
04__W__t__G/02/03/Feature__3.html, accessed on November 23, 2015.
47
Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Klaus-Werner Schatz and Kar-yiu Wong, “The West German
Gastarbeiter System of Immigration”, European Economic Review, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1984, p.
282.
48
Fassmann et al. (eds), Statistics and Reality, n. 44.
49
Daniel Gonzalez, “Guest Workers become Issue for Germany”, The Arizona Republic,
Berlin, n.d., available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/global-immigration-
germany.html, accessed on November 24, 2015.
Germany as well as bring in their families, these guest workers were

aided by the German Basic Law and Constitutional Courts which upheld
the individual rights of the guest workers over state sovereignty and
ruled in favour of the rights of the guest workers.50 Consequently, the
number of foreigners increased to 82 per cent between 1973 and
1999, while the number of foreign workers reduced to 23 per cent.51
The German Democratic Republic (GDR), similarly, employed a large
number of low-skilled “contract workers” (Vertragsarbeiter) to work
in their industries. These guest workers were allowed to stay in the
country only for three years. In 1963, the GDR signed the first contract
with Poland. These workers came from poorer socialist and communist
countries, such as Vietnam, Cuba, Mozambique, Poland and Hungary.52
Their numbers were less in comparison to the FRG as much of the
recruitment was made in the 1980s. By 1989, 91,000 contract workers
lived in GDR, with 60,000 Vietnamese workers comprising the bulk
of foreign workers. Workers from Mozambique were second largest
at 15,000.53 After the reunification of Germany in 1990, most of the
contract workers were asked to leave Germany by the home country’s
governments amidst rising intolerance against them. Only workers from
Vietnam and Mozambique stayed back as their governments refused
to take them back, compelling Germany to treat them as illegal
migrants. However, by March 1990, the number of Vietnamese and
Mozambique contact workers living in GDR had reduced to 21,000
and 2,800 respectively.54
50
Christian Joppke, “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration”, World Politics,
Vol. 50, No. 2, January 1998, p. 282.
51
52
Eva Kolinsky, “Former Contract Workers from Vietnam in Eastern Germany between
State Socialism and Democracy 1989–1993”, GFL Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2004, p. 84,
available at http://www.gfl-journal.de/3-2004/kolinsky.pdf, accessed on November
26, 2015.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
100 | PUSHPITA DAS
In 2000, Germany had 7.3 million foreign residents, which was ten
times the number of 686,000 foreigners in 1960, when the guest worker
programme started in earnest.55 Six years later, in 2006, the Federal
Statistics Office figures showed that in Germany, 15.3 million people,
that is, 19 per cent of the total population, were of migrant
background.56 In 2013, their numbers rose to 16.5 million, comprising
20.5 per cent of the total population. The Turks comprise the largest
segment of migrant population with 2.5 million people, followed by
Italians, Greeks and Poles.57 The German experience with guest workers
is neatly captured in the aphorism of Max Frisch, “We asked for
workers, and we got people”.58
Spain
Traditionally a migrant-sending country, Spain became an immigrant-
receiving country from the 1990s onwards.59 Being economically and
geographically proximate to the sender countries in North Africa, Spain
was a transit stop for the migrants heading for northern European
countries, such as France and Germany. The end of guest worker
programmes in these countries and stricter border controls imposed
against non-European Union (EU) countries meant that the migrants
who were heading northwards in search of jobs were left stranded in
Spain. Spain had also been liberal with admitting foreigners and until
1985, it followed an “open door” policy for immigrants as it was
assumed that the migrants would live in Spain for a short while before
they moved northwards into other parts of Europe. In fact, the
immigrants were not required to get a visa to enter into Spain.60 Even
55
56
Fassmann et al. (eds), Statistics and Reality, n. 44, p. 135.
57
“History of the Guest Workers—Immigration of Foreign Workers”, n. 46.
58
59
Nieves Ortega Pérez, “Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy”, Migration Policy Institute,
February 1, 2003, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/spain-forging-
immigration-policy, accessed on November 26, 2015.
60
Susan E. Mannon, Peggy Petrzelka, Christy M. Glass and Claudia Radel, “Keeping
Them in Their Place: Migrant Women Workers in Spain’s Strawberry Industry”,
International Journal of the Sociology of Agriculture and Food, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2012, p. 87.
for the Moroccans and the Latin Americans, who form the largest
segment of illegal migrants in Spain, visa restrictions were imposed
only in 1991 and 1992 respectively.61
Furthermore, a series of incidents in the 1980s made Spain a net
migrant-importing country. First, during the 1980s, Spain experienced
a dramatic decline in its birth rate, making it a country with one of the
lowest fertility rates in the world. Second, Spain joined the European
Economic Community in 1985, and consequently experienced a major
economic boom. As a result of the economic growth, industrial,
construction and agricultural sectors in Spain experienced a surge in
labour demand.62 At the same time, it was observed that Spain had a
huge demand for low-skilled foreign workers as the native workers
preferred to wait out for better job opportunities. Soon migrants from
African countries, especially Morocco, started arriving in Spain in
response to the demand for low-skilled workers.63 To begin with, Spain
did not issue any work permits to these migrant workers and they
were let into the country without any documents. But soon it had to
grapple with the problem of undocumented migrants in the country
and the need to control it. Spain’s accession to the Schengen Agreement
in 1995 also created tempting opportunities for migrants from sub-
Saharan Africa to enter the European mainland through the Spanish
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.
To manage the problem of illegal migration as well as the demand for
foreign workers, Spain introduced the temporary work permit system
(Contingente) in 1993.64 The Contingente system has two types of permits:
“temporary permits”, which are issued for jobs with maximum
61
Susan F. Martin, Philip Martin and Patrick Weil, Managing Migration: The Promise of
Cooperation, Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006, p. 129.
62
Ibid., pp. 86–87.
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid., p. 131.
102 | PUSHPITA DAS
duration of one year, and with the stipulation that the employers will
maintain good working conditions for the workers and provide
transportation for the workers from source country and back; and
“stable permits”, which are issued for non-permanent jobs of one
year duration.65 Under this system, the Government of Spain fixed
foreign labour quotas or contingente every year, which reflected the labour
deficiency at the provincial levels. The purpose was to channel labour
specifically to those areas which had a high labour demand. This system
encouraged migrants, both documented and undocumented, living in
Spain to apply for work permits and between 1994 and 1999, around
20,000 – 40,000 work permits were issued to migrants present in Spain.66
Thus, instead of managing inflows of workers from source countries,
the temporary work permit system functioned as a means for regularising
the undocumented migrants residing in Spain.67 Moroccan workers,
who had become a sizeable migrant community in Spain, benefited
the most from the system.
In 2000, Spain tried to overhaul its immigration policy by enacting a
new immigration law. Consequently, it signed bilateral agreements with
a number of countries who agreed to assist Spain in controlling illegal
migration. In exchange, Spain assured to give preferential treatment in
issuing temporary work permits to workers from these countries. In
the years 2000 and 2001, Spain signed bilateral agreements with
Morocco, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Ecuador, Romania and
Poland to admit low-skilled workers to work in its agricultural and
other sectors.68 Unfortunately, the Contingente system did not prevent
illegal migration into Spain. Despite the stipulation of the system that
guest workers shall return home after the completion of the work and
65
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OCED Economic Surveys
2002–2003: Spain, Paris: OECD, 2003, p. 140.
66
Ibid., p. 135.
67
Ibid.
68
Mannon et al., “Keeping Them in Their Place: Migrant Women Workers in Spain’s
Strawberry Industry”, n. 60.
report to the Spanish consulate if they wish to return to Spain legally

the next year, 40 per cent of the seasonal workers did not return to
their home country and resettled in Spain as illegal migrants.69 Studies
conclude that there were about 900,000 irregular migrants in Spain
before the regularisation of illegal migrants took place in 2005.70
Summary
Guest worker programmes were initiated by countries to meet the
demands of labour shortage at home by temporarily importing
workers from abroad to avoid adding to the host population. These
programmes entailed that governments take voluntary steps to induce
and organise immigration of foreign workers, and often their families.
Experiences in the countries initiating guest worker programmes have
shown that these programmes were elaborate and extremely complex.
One of the unintended consequences of these programmes was the
presence of a large community of unintegrated and undesired
population in the host countries.71 The failure of the concerned countries
to plan for and carry out return of the migrants is the primary reason
for the presence of large numbers of illegal migrants. When guest
worker programmes were started, it was expected that the migrants
would return after the work was completed, but, in reality, most of
the migrants stayed back even if they faced widespread
unemployment.72 Besides, a number of migrants had children who
were either born or reared in the host country, who were even less
69
Philip Martin, “Temporary Workers Program: US and Global Experiences”, available at
http://canada.metropolis.net/policypriority/migration_seminar/
PhilipMartinsPaper_e.pdf, accessed on November 26, 2015.
70
J. Arango and C. Finotelli, “Past and Future Challenges of a Southern European
Migration Regime: The Spanish Case”, IDEA Working Paper No. 8, May 2009, p. 15,
available at http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP8_Spain.pdf, accessed on
November 27, 2015.
71
Gary P. Freeman, “Can Liberal States Control Unwanted Migration?”, The Annals of
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 543, Strategies for Immigration Control:
An International Comparison, July 1994, pp. 25–26.
72
Ibid.
104 | PUSHPITA DAS
likely to return. Governments’ efforts to provide monetary inducements

to the migrants to go back to their home countries did not succeed, as
also their ability to forcibly evict the illegal migrants as they were
constrained by political, legal and diplomatic considerations.73
Guest worker programmes also do not help prevent illegal migration
because studies have shown that instead of selecting workers who
would migrate illegally, countries would like to push those workers
who would not otherwise migrate through such schemes. The main
reason behind this act is that the source country would not benefit
significantly by substituting illegal with legal migrants.74 Furthermore,
illegal migration is individual centric and long term, whereas the guest
worker programmes are temporary in nature and target groups of
workers. If the guest worker programme was to target individuals, it
would require information about the potential migrants from the source
country, which is unlikely to come because while the intention of the
host country is to draw in all or as many illegal migrants as possible
under the guest worker scheme, the source country would push the
migrants who would otherwise not migrate.75
More significantly, guest worker programmes or work permit schemes
introduce distortion and dependence in the domestic economies and
labour markets.76 The availability of foreign labourers encourages
employers to make investments in areas that assume migrants would
continue to be available for work. Simultaneously, it also dissuades the
employers from carrying out innovations and introducing mechanisation
and automation to eliminate labour shortages. Absence of innovation
and mechanisation stagnates productivity, which, in turn, negatively
impacts economic and wage growth.77 Work permits also create
73
Ibid.
74
Mohammad Amin and Aaditya Mattoo, “Can Guest Worker Schemes Reduce Illegal
Migration?”, World Bank Policy Research Paper 3828, February 2006, p. 14.
75
Ibid., p. 32.
76
Philip L. Martin, “Guest Worker Policies: An International Survey”, in Ann Bernstein
and Myron Weiner (eds), Migration and Refugee Policies, New York: Pinter, 1999, pp. 65–66.
77
Ibid.
dependency for foreign workers in the host country in such a way that
government pronouncements for termination of such schemes are
met with vehement protests from employer groups, which argue that
labour shortages will force them out of business and adversely affect
the economy. Dependency is created among individuals, families and
communities in the sender country as well, as they too need the earnings
from abroad to sustain themselves. In the case of Bangladesh, as
explained earlier, the country is hugely dependent on foreign remittances
as it plays an important role in the country’s economic development
and poverty alleviation.78
At present, most countries in the world have guest workers
programmes, but almost all of them give preference only to high-
skilled workers. Only developed countries such as Australia, Canada,
the US, the EU and Gulf countries, that are facing labour shortages,
have small numbers of programmes for low-skilled workers that limit
their employment to specific sectors such as agriculture, horticulture
and tourism.79 Developing economies with surplus labour, such as
China, Brazil and Mexico, are particularly strict on the import of low-
skilled workers and, therefore, do not have any programme to admit
them.80
Granting Temporary Amnesties to Illegal Migrants

Yet another measure to resolve the issue of illegal migration is granting
amnesty and citizenships to the illegal migrants. A number of countries
across the world are facing the problem of illegal migration have
adopted this measure with little or no success. In India, too, there are
scholars and practitioners who have advocated these schemes as possible
solutions. According to Sanjoy Hazarika, temporary amnesty could be
78
Shiekh Abdur Rahim and Md. Asraful Alam, “Foreign Remittance Income in Bangladesh:
Opportunities and Challenges”, Asian Business Review, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2013, p. 22.
79
“Guest Worker Programs”, The Law Library of Congress, February 2013, pp. 2–4,
available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guestworker/index.php, accessed on
November 27, 2015.
80
Ibid.
106 | PUSHPITA DAS
given to all the Bangladeshis who have illegally entered India between
1971 and 1991 provided they declare their illegal status. These illegal
migrants could be allowed to stay for a year to complete their process
to return to Bangladesh. Once they return to their home country, they
can be readmitted through work permits if they desire to work in
India.81 The argument for such a move is to prevent further radicalisation
and communalisation of the issue and to make the illegal migrants
stakeholders in India’s peace and prosperity.82
However, the fact is, like the guest worker programmes, granting
amnesty and citizenships does not help stem the tide of illegal migration,
and this is evidenced by the case histories of the countries who have
granted amnesties to their illegal migrants. European countries, such as
Spain, Italy and Portugal, have been regularising illegal migrants since
the 1970s. Between 1996 and 2007, these countries have regularised 5
million illegal migrants through various programmes. One of the
reasons for such amnesty processes in these countries is the argument
that Italy, Spain and Portugal do not possess the administrative capacities
to admit large-scale legal migrants, nor do they have the wherewithal
to effectively secure their borders against the illegal migrants entering
their territories mostly from Africa.
Spain
In fact, between 1986 and 2002, Spain conducted four regularisations,
in 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2000–02. According to the International
Organization on Migration (IOM), since the mid-1980s, Spain alone
has regularised 700,000 illegal migrants. Yet, in 2004, it had 800,000
illegal immigrants.83 One of the reasons for this phenomenon, besides
large-scale illegal migration, is the regularisation process which only
makes the illegal immigrants legal workers with work permits but does
not grant them citizenship. The aim of the regularisations was essentially
81
n. 2, p. 69.
82
Ibid.
83
Martin et al., Managing Migration, n. 61, p. 130.
to pull out illegal migrants from Spanish black economy to over-ground

sectors to generate more taxes, with the condition that they are employed
and their employers pay taxes for social security. Towards this aim, the
regularisation programmes were economic successes as they generated
US$ 123 million in tax returns and another US$ 123 million in social
security revenues. Granting amnesty, however, did not solve the problem
of illegal migration. Instead it incentivised illegal border crossers and
scores of migrants to continue to enter Spain illegally.84 This is evidenced
by reports of an increasing number of migrants being apprehended at
the Spanish borders. In 2013, 7,472 persons were detained at the country’s
borders, and the number rose to 12,549 in 2014, a jump of nearly 70
per cent.85
These regularisation processes, however, have not been welcomed by
other rich European countries as they fear that this would have a
spillover effect into their territories because the regularised migrants
would upgrade their status as legal workers and migrate to their countries
and take up employment. They further emphasise that such regularisation
would attract more illegal migrants into Europe.86 Fearing large-scale
influx of illegal migrants from less developed countries into Europe,
and consequently jeopardising the concept of free movement of labour
in the Union, the EU, in 2008, persuaded its members to sign a pact
agreeing not to hold such amnesties for illegal migrants. The pact,
however, fell through soon after as, in 2009, Italy and Belgium regularised
a number of illegal migrants.87
84
Ibid.
85
“Illegal Immigration in Spain up 70 per cent in 2014”, The Telegraph, Madrid, April 15,
2015, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/
11539439/Illegal-immigration-in-Spain-up-70-per-cent-in-2014.html, accessed on July
27, 2016.
86
Dan Nowicki, “Spain has Granted Amnesty, but Not without Controversy”, The Arizona
Republic, available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/global-immigration-spain-
amnesty.html, accessed on November 27, 2015.
87
Ibid.
108 | PUSHPITA DAS
The US
The US has also regularised illegal immigrants under the Immigration
Reforms and Control Act (IRCA, aka the Simpson–Mazzoli Act) of
1986. The Act had two components: first, to legalise undocumented
migrants present in the US; and second, to deter further immigration
into the country. For legalisation of illegal migrants, the law stipulated
that those illegal migrants who have stayed continuously in the US
since January 1, 1972 would be given immediate citizenship. For the
rest of the illegal immigrants, two programmes–the Legally Authorized
Workers (LAW) programme and the Special Agricultural Workers
(SAW) programme–were launched. Under the LAW, amnesty was
granted to those undocumented immigrants who could prove that
they were in the country prior to January 1, 1982. After 18 months
when their applications were approved, these illegal migrants became
legal permanent residents by fulfilling a few other requirements.
Under the SAW programme, illegal immigrants had to prove that they
had worked in the US for 90 days during each of the previous three
years to receive legal permanent resident status for two years.88
Incidentally, surveys conducted in Mexico found that illegal migrants
had resorted to widespread fraud while filling their applications as
they did not meet the minimum criteria for amnesty.89 This implies that
many migrants may have crossed over after the IRCA was enacted in
November 1986.
For deterring illegal migration, laws were passed to make the employers
responsible for verifying and keeping records of the workers that they
employed after November 1986. Employers’ sanctions were imposed
wherein employers found recruiting undocumented migrants would
88
Pia M. Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny, “Do Amnesty Programs Reduce
Undocumented Immigration? Evidence from IRCA”, Demography, Vol. 40, No. 3, August
2003, pp. 438–39.
89
Seventy-three per cent of LAW applications and 40 per cent of SAW applications were
fraudulent; ibid., p. 439.
have to pay hefty fines and face imprisonment. In addition, provisions

were made to tighten control of the US borders by deploying more
manpower and resources and strengthening border patrolling.
Mass amnesty process, which began in 1987 following the signing of
the IRCA Bill by President Ronald Reagan in November 1986, thereby
making it an Act, legalised over 2.7 million illegal migrants–stwo-thirds
of who were Mexicans.90 Contrary to the belief that naturalisation
process would reduce illegal migrants in the US, it fuelled further illegal
migration into the US. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) data revealed that the amnesty programmes did not affect the
trend of illegal migration because, in 1992, the US had an estimated
3.4 million unauthorised migrants. In addition, migrants continued
crossing the border illegally, with a net inflow of 500,000 immigrants
during the 1990s.91
Despite dismal outcomes, President George W. Bush tried twice, during
his tenure, to introduce bills granting mass amnesties. The first attempt
was in 2001, when Bush contemplated granting legal residence to 3–4
million illegal migrants–a move strongly supported by Mexican
President Vincente Fox.92 The second attempt to introduce legalisation
bill was made in 2004, but in both the cases he had to withdraw after
a public backlash. Almost a decade later in June 2012, under Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programme, President Obama
granted a temporary two-year legal status and work permits to
immigrants who were brought to the US illegally as children and who
90
Fred Barnes, “The Amnesty Next Times”, The Weekly Standard, Vol. 18., No. 34, May 20,
2013, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/keyword/Simpson-Mazzoli,
accessed on November 27, 2015.
91
“Estimates of Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: 1990
to 2000”, Office of Policy Planning, US Immigration and Naturalization Service,
available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/
Ill_Report_1211.pdf, accessed on November 27, 2015.
92
Orrenius and Zavodny, “Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocumented Immigration?”,
n. 88, p. 437.
110 | PUSHPITA DAS
attended school in the country. By June 2016, around 730,000 young

unauthorised immigrants had been provided with two-year deferred
action and work authorisation.93
In 2014, Obama tried to expand the ambit of the existing DACA
programme to include the parents of the US citizens and lawful
permanent citizens under a programme called Deferred Action for
Parental Accountability (DAPA). Towards this purpose, he announced
two programmes under the “Immigration Accountability Executive
Action” on November 20, 2014. 94 Unlike the earlier DACA
programme, these two programmes were challenged by Texas and 25
other states in the court on the grounds that Texas would incur additional
costs to issue drivers’ licences to immigrants granted deferred action
and that the federal government had overstepped its bounds and
contravened the Congress’s powers by rendering deferred action
beneficiaries eligible to work.95 The court issued an injunction preventing
the government from implementing these programmes. Significantly,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the injunction arguing that
states could not bear the costs by issuing licences96 and the deadlock in
93
Muzaffar Chishti and Faye Hipsman, “Supreme Court DAPA Ruling a Blow to Obama
Administration, Moves Immigration Back to Political Realm”, Migration Policy Institute,
June 29, 2016, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/supreme-court-dapa-
ruling-blow-obama-administration-moves-immigration-back-political-realm, accessed
on July 28, 2016. Also, see Mark Hugo Lopez and Jens Manuel Krogstad, “5 Facts about
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program”, Pew Research Center, August
15, 2014, available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/15/5-facts-about-
the-deferred-action-for-childhood-arrivals-program/, accessed on November 27, 2015.
94
“Understanding the Legal Challenges to Executive Action”, American Immigration
Council, available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/understanding-legal-
challenges-executive-action, accessed on November 27, 2015.
95
Lomi Kriel, “Supreme Court to Hear Texas’ Challenge to DAPA”, Houston Chronicle,
April 17, 2016, available at http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/
houston/article/Supreme-Court-to-hear-Texas-challenge-to-DAPA-7254118.php,
accessed on July 28, 2016.
96
Ibid. Also, see “Immigration News: DAPA, DACA Expansion Blocked by Fifth Circuit
Appeals Court”, Latin Post, November 10, 2015, available at http://www.latinpost.com/
articles/93527/20151110/immigration-news-dapa-daca-expansion-blocked-fifth-circuit-
appeal-court.htm, accessed on December 2, 2015.
the Supreme Court effectively blocked the implementation of Obama’s

amnesty programmes.97 The strong reactions against Bush’s and
Obama’s plans to grant amnesties to millions of illegal immigrants
prove that there is a growing realisation in the US that granting temporary
amnesties does not address the problem of illegal migration but
encourages many migrants to cross the border illegally.
India
For its part, India had, in fact, granted permanent amnesty in 1971 to
lakhs of East Bengalis/East Pakistanis who had crossed over to India
during the 1950s and 1960s. The move was not initiated to curb illegal
migration, but was more a friendly gesture to a new country. As part
of extending all possible political and economic assistance to
Bangladesh, India had agreed to Bangladesh’s request that only those
who entered India as refugees after its declaration of independence
shall be repatriated to Bangladesh.98 In other words, Bangladesh refused
to accept those persons who entered India illegally prior to or on
March 24, 1971 as its citizens. The Bangladeshi refusal to accept illegal
entrants as its own citizens left India with no option but to agree to
take the responsibility of the illegal migrants and grant them Indian
citizenship. This regularisation of Bangladeshis illegally staying in India
by the central government was later formalised in the Assam Accord
of 1985.
The Assam Accord set “January 1, 1966 as the base date set for detection
and deletion of foreigners”.99 The Accord declared that all persons
97
“Supreme Court Tie Blocks Obama Immigration Plan”, The New York Times, Washington,
June 23, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/us/supreme-court-
immigration-obama-dapa.html?_r=0, accessed on July 28, 2016.
98
“Joint Communique Issued at the End of the Visit of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to India, Calcutta, February 8, 1972”, in Avtar Singh Bhasin,
India–Bangladesh Relations: Documents 1971–2002, Vol. I, New Delhi: Geetika Publishers,
2003, p. 2651.
99
“Problem of Foreigners in Assam”, Memorandum of Settlement, p. 8, available at http://
aasc.nic.in/acts%20and%20rules%20(goa)/Implementation%20of%20Assam%20
Accord%20Deptt/Assam%20Accord.pdf, accessed on December 8, 2015.
112 | PUSHPITA DAS
who came to Assam prior to January 1, 1966 and all those whose
name appeared in the 1967 electoral list will be given Indian citizenship.
The names of those persons who came between January 1, 1966 and
March 24, 1971 will be deleted from the electoral list and they will be
required to register themselves under the provisions of Registration
of Foreigners Act, 1939 and Registration of Foreigners Rules, 1939.
They will be granted full Indian citizenship with full voting rights after
a gap of 10 years.100 The provision to grant Indian citizenship to
Bangladeshis who entered India before March 24, 1971 has now been
challenged in the Supreme Court, which has referred the case to a five-
member bench for final decision.101 As the history of Assam agitation
shows, regularising lakhs of East Bengalis/Pakistanis did not result in
addressing the issue of illegal migration. On the contrary, it acted as a
catalyst for further unauthorised crossings into India. In fact, the
Government of India realised as early as 1974 that illegal migration
from Bangladesh had restarted. Statistics released by the Indian
government revealed that between August 1974 and April 1975, 41,576
Bangladeshis were detected at the border and sent back. But between
April and September 1974, 15,278 Bangladeshis crossed over to India
and their numbers jumped to 38,445 in 1975.102
Conclusion
From the discussion, it can be conclusively argued that neither issuing
work permits nor granting mass amnesties to illegal migrants, as
suggested by various analysts, would prevent migrants from Bangladesh
to illegally enter India and settle here permanently. In fact, experiences
of various countries who have implemented these two measures
100
Ibid., pp. 8–9.
101
Writ Petition (civil) No. 562 of 2012, Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors. vs Union of
India & Ors. with Writ Petition (civil) No. 274 of 2009, Assam Publics Works & Ors. vs
Union of India & Ors. with Writ Petition (civil) No. 876 of 2014, All Assam Ahom
Association & Ors. vs Union of India, December 17, 2014, Supreme Court of India, p.
33, available at supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/wpc_562_2012.pdf, accessed on
December 21, 2014.
102
Bhasin, India–Bangladesh Relations: Documents 1971–2002, Vol. I, n. 98, p. xc.
showed that they have not been successful in preventing illegal migration
into their territories. Various studies and statistics have proven that instead
of preventing illegal migration, these programmes have, in reality,
proved to be an incentive for migrants to cross the border illegally,
find work and settle down in these economically developed countries.
The Indian government, therefore, has to take into account the adverse
consequences of issuing work permits or granting amnesties to illegal
migrants before thinking about adopting and implementing these
programmes.
114 | PUSHPITA DAS
Conclusion
Illegal migration from East Pakistan, later Bangladesh, into India has
continued unabated since independence. It brought in its wake not
only socio-economic and political turmoil in the migrant-receiving states
but also strained bilateral relations. As lakhs of undocumented migrants
fleeing either politico-religious persecution or economic deprivation in
East Pakistan/Bangladesh crossed the border and settled in the border
states of India, it created conflict between the host population and the
immigrants. Competition over land, job opportunities and cultural
supremacy between the natives and immigrants became more intense.
The numerical preponderance of the illegal immigrants also resulted in
altering the demographic profile of Tripura and many border districts
of Assam and West Bengal. The loss of political power by the natives
to the immigrants and the fear of being marginalised in their own
territory fomented secessionist tendencies among the people in the
border states, with ULFA and Bodo militant groups in Assam and
TNV, NLFT and ATTF in Tripura emerging as major insurgent groups.
While the Indian government was still grappling with the insurgencies
in the North-East, the BJP and its allies, emerging as a strong force at
the centre, projected the issue of illegal migration as an existential threat
to India. In an attempt to garner Hindu votes and establish itself as a
“nationalist” party, the BJP portrayed the illegal migrants from
Bangladesh as Muslims who are entering into India to take away jobs
from the local people. The BJP also alleged that most of them had
connections with Islamic fundamentalist organisations in Bangladesh
and their motive was to create socio-political unrest in India and
ultimately merge parts of Assam and West Bengal with Bangladesh to
create “Greater Bangladesh”. Branding illegal migrants as a security
threat also echoed the then worldwide trend of growing intolerance
against migrants.
Given these challenges, the Government of India tried to contain illegal
migration through a mix of laws and executive interventions aimed
not only at expelling the foreigners from the country but also deterring
potential migrants to cross the border illegally. Towards this end,
detection, disenfranchisement and deportation of foreigners remained
the prominent scheme. Under this scheme, the illegal migrants were
identified under the Foreigner’s Act, their names deleted from electoral
roles and then they were deported from India. While the aim and
intent of the scheme was right, it could not achieve the desired results
as a number of factors prevented its effective implementation. First,
given the circumstances under which the people were fleeing their homes
in East Pakistan and later Bangladesh, the central leadership adopted a
more humane attitude towards them and despite pressure from the
local leadership, instructed the state governments to be lenient towards
those who have crossed the border irregularly.
Soon the state leadership realised that no matter how much they disliked
the illegal migrants, their political survival hinged upon the votes cast in
favour of them by these illegal migrants. So, they also started cultivating
the leaders among the migrants and extended political patronage to
the illegal migrants. These political parties not only provided the illegal
migrants documents to prove their Indian citizenship and enlisted them
in the electoral roles, but also protested vehemently alleging harassment
towards the Indian Muslims whenever the police tried to evict the
undocumented Bengalis. Such was the support for the illegal migrants
amongst the politicians that they even enacted the IMDT Act, which
made it impossible to carry on the process of detection and deportation
of illegal migrants. The dismal record of the tribunals formed to evict
undocumented Bangladeshis from Assam proves the point. Besides,
Bangladesh’s denial that its citizens had indeed migrated to India and
were staying there illegally made deportation impossible. Bangladesh
consistently maintained that the conditions of the Indian states bordering
Bangladesh were no better than those in Bangladesh and therefore, the
Bangladeshis did not have any reason to cross into those states. Whenever
India tried to forcibly “push back” the illegal migrants, Bangladesh
government refused to cooperate arguing that India was trying to “push
in” Bengali-speaking Indian Muslims into the country.
The second most important measure that was undertaken to check
illegal migration was strengthening border controls. For this purposes,
the government augmented the strength of the BSF and constructed
additional border check posts to keep a strict vigil along the border.
The BSF personnel were also provided with state-of-the-art surveillance
devices for enhancing their remote surveillance capabilities. In addition,
116 | PUSHPITA DAS
the Indian government decided to construct a barbed wire fence along

the international border to deter as well as prevent Bangladeshis from
crossing the border illegally. Despite stiff resistance from Bangladesh,
India was able to fence a substantial section of the India–Bangladesh
border. Border roads were also built for easy mobility of the border
guards. The Union government also launched a scheme of providing
identity cards to its citizens so that foreigners staying illegally in India
could be easily identified and deported.
Doubts regarding the effectiveness of greater border control measures
in preventing illegal migration have been raised periodically. It also has
to be borne in mind that fencing, in itself, is a suboptimal measure
because the illegal migrants have been able to circumvent the hurdle in
various ways. In addition, government apathy at state level, local protests,
difficult terrain and corruption have contributed in reducing the
effectiveness of the fences. The dearth of authentic official data on the
number of illegal border crossing makes it is near impossible to judge
the outcome of these border control measures. But if the BSF
apprehension figures over the years are to be taken as an indication of
the trend, then it appears that the border fence, along with increased
presence of border guards, has indeed increased the costs of illegal
border crossings and lesser number of people are attempting to cross
it illegally now. It is important to understand that border controls in an
ongoing process. It will take a developing country like India huge
amount of resources, time as well as determined political will to
effectively manage its international borders.
Given that the issue of illegal migration has generated emotional and
violent reactions in the country and given the fact that the Indian
government has not been able to successfully check infiltration, many
scholars and analysts have argued that it is time to desecuritise illegal
migration. They emphasise that an overwhelming proportion of illegal
migrants are economic migrants, who come to India to earn a living.
By taking up unskilled jobs, these illegal migrants are not only fulfilling
an existing local demand at a low cost but also contributing to the
Indian economy meaningfully. Since these migrants remain focused on
earning a decent livelihood, it is unlikely that they would indulge in
terrorism and crime, which would bring attention to their status and
deprive their community of a livelihood in India. This argument is
reinforced by the fact that despite visible discrimination, these illegal

migrants, especially in the urban areas, have remained preoccupied with
their niche occupations and have not forged links with other
dispossessed lots and recent arrivals to organise rebellion against the
state. Even in Assam, where there have been widespread riots against
the migrants, there has been no major backlash against the Assamese
community by the Bangladeshi migrants.
Against this background, a proposal for issuing work permits for the
Bangladeshis who wish to work in India has been forwarded. The
analysts argue that a work permit would provide the economic migrants
respectability as legal workers in India and eliminate the root cause of
political protests against them. Work permits would also reduce the
cost of crossing the border irregularly for the migrants, who otherwise
were giving out hefty amount to the smugglers. For the country, work
permit would help ascertain the number of Bangladeshis actually
crossing the border. The migrants would supply cheap labour and the
country would economically benefit. The government of the day has
bought into the argument and is seriously deliberating implementing
the proposal for work permits.
However, before issuing work permits as a means to prevent illegal
migration into India, a thorough assessment of the proposal has to be
carried out. To being with, it has to be conclusively established through
meticulous survey that the illegal flow of migrants across the border
from Bangladesh is truly a response to demand for labour in India.
Countries which have active work permit programmes are the ones
who face the problem of domestic labour. As far as India is concerned,
it is a labour-surplus country, with 12 million youth entering the
workforce every year; therefore, it is difficult to conclude that such a
demand for labour exists in the country. If the demand for labour is
not there, then issuing work permits to Bangladeshis would result in
depressing wages in the unskilled labour markets in the country and
will add to the existing societal hostility against illegal migration.
The fact that most of the Bangladeshi workers are engaged in
unorganised sector and given that this sector is beyond the pale of
government’s purview, it would be difficult to generate data on the
number of Bangladeshis actually employed in the country, thereby
118 | PUSHPITA DAS
defeating the purpose of keeping a tab on them. Furthermore, it is

generally observed that most of the Bangladeshi citizens who have
entered India have been either hounded out of the country by religious
bigots or have lost all means to earn a livelihood. Under such conditions,
almost all of them have come to India to settle in the country
permanently. If this is the predominant template, then these illegal
migrants cannot be categorised as seasonal workers and hence, providing
work permits to them will not resolve the problem.
The way forward in managing the problem of illegal migration from
Bangladesh is, first, to objectively assess the number of migrants illegally
crossing the border as well as staying in the country and make such a
database publicly accessible. This would free the issue from speculation
and provide a clearer perspective on the problem. Second, borders
have to be tightly controlled through a judicious mix of fences and
better human and electronic surveillance. In this effort, support of the
local people is also necessary. Third, serious and sincere efforts should
be made to identify illegal migrants, who are not considered morally
and legally entitled to stay in the host country, and arrange for their
repatriation. For this purposes, Bangladesh has to be brought on board
on this issue sooner or later by pursing a vigorous diplomatic
engagement. Lastly, India should put in place an immigration policy
that would clearly state terms for granting citizenship and asylums and
put to rest ambiguity, bureaucratic discretion and political calculations.

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ILLEGAL MIGRATION FROM BANGLADESH...

IDSA Monograph Series

Illegal Migration From

Cover Ilustration : The Cover depicts Border Fence along India-Bangladesh

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a

First Published: December 2016

AAGSP All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad

IOM International Organization on Migration

TNV Tripura National Volunteers

The history of the world is the history of migration. Migration has

intermittent conflict arising out of competition over resources between

mobilised troops in March 1950 to compel Pakistan to act against the

Illegal migration from Bangladesh, which was hitherto seen as a regional

limited set of recommendations, including giving work permits and

and suggestions on the reasons and the extent of illegal migration. It

India has been witnessing immigration since independence. People who

Trends of Migration during British Raj

attraction of tilling their own land, agriculturists from East Bengal

immigration while Assam’s population grew by 103.51 per cent, Tripura

Trends and Patterns Post-Independence

yet another massive inflow of refugees into India. It was estimated

population growth. This rise in population has been attributed to the

Estimates of Illegal Migrants in India

Reasons for Illegal Migration

Pakistan Disturbed Persons Rehabilitation Ordinance of 1964, created

The post-1975 Islamisation of the constitution by the military regimes

corroborated by the sustained drop in the proportion of Hindu

Bangladesh is an agriculture-based economy with approximately 60

in Bangladesh are small holdings,54 with 51.70 per cent comprising

Lack of job opportunities in the country has induced the Bangladesh

of women and human smuggling have become quite rampant across

charge a sum of Bangladesh Taka 3,000–5,000 from the prospective

Impact on Internal Security and the

Migration into a region has always altered the socio-economic and

Bangladeshi rhetoric in the 1990s when its cadres found shelter in

The persistent attacks against the Muslims perceived as illegal migrants

Another state where resistance to illegal migration from East Pakistan

identities.24 In fact, the peopling of the border belt by Bangladeshi

Elsewhere in the country, intermittent protests against Bangladeshis by

Securitisation of Illegal Migration

political procedure”.36 Securitisation involves consensus and shared

references to undocumented migration from East Pakistan were made

overwhelmingly accepted this rhetoric and demanded extraordinary

governments to change their narratives. Acknowledging the adverse

immigration poses a grave danger to our security, social harmony and

Tackling the Problem

Land alienation among the indigenous groups in the migrant-receiving

The Land Acquisition Acts

Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act of 1950

of civil disturbances or fear of such disturbances.9 In addition, a National

Prevention of Infiltration of Foreigners Scheme

and act as a second line of defence along the international border.

March 25, 1971.14 Furthermore, in 1987, additional posts were

The Foreigner’s Tribunals of 1964

migrant. In 1964, four tribunals were constituted and 35,080 cases

Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act of

Tribunals were set up in Assam and 64 additional tribunals were

“Operation Push Back”