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Procedia Earth and Planetary Science 14 (2015) 208 – 212

2nd International Seminar on Ocean and Coastal Engineering, Environment and Natural Disaster
Management, ISOCEEN 2014

Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) of Mobile Mooring System

Silvianitaa , Mohd Faris Khamidib, Imam Rochania, Dirta Marina Chameliaa
a*
Department of Ocean Engineering, Faculty of Marine Technology, Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember, Surabaya, Indonesia
b
School of the Built Environment, Herriot Watt University Malaysia, Putrajaya

Abstract

Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) is one of the approaches of risk based decision making. HAZOP will be useful as a
preliminary study to investigate the risk based decision making of mooring systems. Mooring system is a vital component for the
safety of floating structures. Floating structures use mooring system for station keeping in any water depths. The result of this study
will explain the potential causes and the possible consequences of mooring system failures using HAZOP as preliminary analysis.
©©2015 TheAuthors.
2015 The Authors. Published
Published by Elsevier
by Elsevier B.V.B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
Peer-review under responsibility of [the Department of Ocean Engineering, Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember].
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibilty of the Department of Ocean Engineering, Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember.
Keywords: Decision, hazard, operability, risk ;

1. Introduction

Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) is a qualitative method with a systematic and structured assessment of a planned or
operation in order to define and assess the issues which can cause risks to human resources or equipment 1. The
objectives of a HAZOP study are as follows2:
- To determine and deal with hazards and design insufficiency for the purpose of ensuring safety and health of
effective operations.
- To assess the performance that will satisfy SHE (Safety Health and Environment) standards.

Corresponding author. Tel.: +62-31-5928105; fax: +62-31-5928105.
E-mail address: [email protected]

1878-5220 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibilty of the Department of Ocean Engineering, Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember.
doi:10.1016/j.proeps.2015.07.103
 Silvianita et al. / Procedia Earth and Planetary Science 14 (2015) 208 – 212 209

Table 1. The Advantages and Disadvantages of HAZOP

Methods Advantages Disadvantages References
HAZOP ¾ Systematic and rigorous ¾ Requires a (Maragakis et
¾ Involves interaction of views from considerable al, 2009)3
multidisciplinary experts amount of
¾ Can be applied to a wide range of types of system preparation
¾ Creates a detailed and auditable record of the ¾ Time consuming
hazards identification process

Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) useful to identify hazards as a preliminary risk analysis in a systematic and
comprehensive manner. The problems of interest are analyzed in an attempt to determine the potential causes and their
consequence able to bring serious damage. The problem is investigated based on the main component of the system.
The purpose of the paper is to investigate the hazard of mooring system failure include their potential causes of failure,
the consequences and the safeguard action. The investigation contains a review of each system operation, determining
each of the potential causes of system failure, their consequences and how to handle it daily. This paper used mobile
mooring system of semi submersible pipe laying barge as a case study. The HAZOP result is shown in Table 3 which
is gathered from the brainstorming with the mooring engineer.
The HAZOP results are qualitative risk assessment based on the experience and knowledge of the experts
involved in the mooring system. It is as a preliminary study to identify the potential causes of mooring system and
their consequence. The importance of performing HAZOP analysis as discussed by4 are as the following:
- HAZOP defines possible hazards, failure and operational issues.
- HAZOP has been used for over 40 years by professional institutions and legislators.
- HAZOP methods are used by the majority companies handling and processing hazardous material especially
oil and gas production, flammable and toxic chemicals and pharmaceuticals etc.
- HAZOP results are integral elements of plant and safety records and also appropriate to plant modifications.
The HAZOP need brainstorming with the expert in order to enlighten the method to identify and discuss which
hazards or operational issues in the mooring system might occur. HAZOP is a preliminary risk analysis study to
investigate the problems related to mooring system. Expert opinion survey and direct interview with many people
during offshore seminars, offshore exhibition and workshops that include consultant, supplier, engineers, managers
involved in mooring system are conducted in order to get an idea and shaping the idea of the common issues and
problems related to mooring system failure. The result of the interview with the people in seminars and offshore
exhibitions are combined with the feedback from nine experts are summarized in HAZOP record tabulated in Table
3.
The first task to develop HAZOP analysis is through brainstorming session with the people involved in the system.
The brainstorming session is involving nine experts that balance in terms of experience, knowledge and disciplines.
The HAZOP teams generally consist of four to eight people to achieve comprehensive results 5. For this study, those
nine experts remain to be the main respondents. All of the experts are recognized professionals in the mooring system
with experience more than 10 years, therefore their combined knowledge and experience are sufficient to develop the
framework of risk assessment of the mooring system. These numbers are kept to ensure the maximum quality and
effectiveness during the brainstorming session6. The HAZOP study is developed through the following procedure:
(i) The experts outline the specific objective of the vessel under study and describe the general arrangements
of the mooring systems. This procedure contains the design arrangement, operational procedure, weather
condition specification, description of equipment and system descriptions.
(ii) Any related questions to the scope and concept of the system are discussed.
(iii) The main components of mooring system consisting of mooring line, anchor failure, anchor handling failure
and appurtenances connection failure are highlighted due to their main contribution in mooring system.
(iv) Any related issues about these components are then discussed and answered by the experts.
(v) The specific components are studied from this point using the HAZOP guide words. Every guide word is a
systematic list of deviation perspectives to describe certain conditions that may lead to operational problems
and even causes an accident. Then continued to investigate the potential causes and the consequence of an
210 Silvianita et al. / Procedia Earth and Planetary Science 14 (2015) 208 – 212

undesired event. When the safeguards are considered inadequate by the experts because of high contribution
of likelihood and consequences then an action should be taken.

The HAZOP is developed in a systematic method using the guidewords and deviation to consider each component
of mooring systems, their potential causes of failure, the consequences and the safeguard action. The HAZOP results
are tabulated in Table 2. The HAZOP result recorded in this study are generally in the operational and maintainable
categories. Formerly there are no significant records of potential causes that may lead to an accident. Detailed HAZOP
actions must be reviewed and recorded by the project manager to ensure that all system are fit for purpose. The
application of HAZOP can be seen in another paper namely HAZOP as one of the risk assessment method 6,7.

2. HAZOP Methods

HAZOP as preliminary hazard approach is used to identify and define the potential hazards or problems of a
system that may lead to an accident. The HAZOP result can be implemented as suggestion action to reduce the risk
and operational matters. The summary of HAZOP Step is described in Fig. 1:

Define the System / Activity

Define the Problems of

Interest for the Analysis

Yes
Apply all relevant
combinations
of guideword and deviations.
Any hazards or operating
problems?

No

Record consequence and

causes and suggest action

HAZOP Report

Fig. 1. HAZOP Procedure

The few Steps in order to carry out HAZOP are as follows:

1. Step 1: Define the system/activity
Identify and examine the system/activity that is going to be analyzed.
2. Step 2: Define the problems of interest for the analysis
Define the potential hazards and significant impact on the system by using guideword and deviation
parameters.
 Silvianita et al. / Procedia Earth and Planetary Science 14 (2015) 208 – 212 211

3. Step 3: Record outcome and causes and suggest action

Analyze the findings that focus on the critical hazards as well as critical operational problems.
4. Step 4: HAZOP record
The results of HAZOP are recorded using HAZOP spreadsheets which generally include the guideword,
deviation, possible causes, outcome, safeguards and suggestion action, etc.

3. Results and Discussion

HAZOP analysis tabulate the results into systematic worksheets. The HAZOP worksheet consists of the
components under study, guideword, deviation, potential causes, possible consequence, safeguard and suggested
actions in order to minimize the failure. Table 2 shows the HAZOP result of a mobile mooring system.
In order to implement HAZOP techniques, the brainstorming and discussion with the experts need to be carried
out and formulated into systematic record7. The HAZOP records generally consist of guide word, deviation, possible
causes, possible consequences, safeguards and action to be taken as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. HAZOP Worksheet Example

System Identification
Activity: Description of System Activity
Possible
Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Safeguard Action
Consequence

The descriptions for each column of the presented worksheet are:

a. Guide word: A keyword to create the imagination of a deviation of the system.
b. Deviation: Description of a system in which the process condition may depart from their design.
c. Possible Causes: Description of the causes why the deviation could happen that may result in the worst
possible consequence.
d. Possible Consequence: Consequence of the occurrence of the failure or the results of the deviation.
e. Safeguards: A facilities that either prevent the cause or safeguard against the consequence such as regular
plant inspections.
f. Action: description of the action that should be taken when the consequence occur. It can remove the cause
and mitigate or eliminate the consequences.

4. Conclusion

Mooring system is an important part of floating platform that may cause serious accident in oil and gas industry.
The aim of this study to integrate the risk based decision making (RBDM) for mobile mooring system has been
successfully carried out. The critical hazards of mobile mooring system using HAZOP have been accomplished as
seen in Table 3.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thankful to all the experts of mooring system for participating as respondents of this
research.
212 Silvianita et al. / Procedia Earth and Planetary Science 14 (2015) 208 – 212

Table 3. HAZOP Result

System Identification: Semi Submersible Column Stabilized Pipe Lay Barge
Activity: Moor the vessel in a working pipe lay configuration
Compon Guide Potential Possible
Deviation Safeguard Action
ent Word Causes Consequence
¾ Reduced the
mooring
¾ Uses heavier zinc coating to
capacities
enhance corrosion protection
for example
properties
the
¾ The larger diameters of wires
moorings
may use heavier zinc coatings
no longer ¾ Conduct visual inspection for
to enhance the attainable
meet their example pitting inspection in
design life
Corrosion allowable order to determine the
¾ An anti corrosion blocking
loads remaining life of the chain.
compound should be applied
¾ Decrease ¾ Perform corrosion measurement
during manufacture to increase
the mooring using ROV to measure
corrosion prevention measure.
line service corrosion potential
¾ Regular maintenance and
life
inspection in order to avoid
¾ Broken
huge damage.
wires ropes

¾ In situ water inspection is

Unable to Moorin needed to inspect the
Decrease the Uses braided jacket or sheathed
Mooring control g Line touchdown zone where rocks
service life of spiral strand wire to minimize
Line the Breaka Abrasion or debris on the sea bed can
mooring particle ingression that cause
movement ge cause mooring line abrasion
lines harmful abrasion of the ropes.
¾ In situ water inspection of wire
rope using ROV
Uses a mooring failure detector
that can be attach with mooring
ROV inspection in order to
Mooring ¾ Operation chain or wire rope inculdes a
identify if the lines are intact and
line activities power source which supply
or suffer of breakage using
clashed delayed power to a transmitter to signal
inclinometers
¾ Vessel the failure by acoustic or radio
damage frequency means.
¾ Monitored the radar plant as a
¾ Operation navigational aid and for
shutdown weather surveillance in order
¾ Vessel ¾ Checking the ARPA radar to detect and to track
Collision damage ¾ Checking the day vision weather fronts, storm clouds
radar ¾ Observe the radar with
antenna arrays to define the
anchor location match with
target acquisition

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