Useful tips for a successful HAZOP study Page 1 of 7

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November 2016 (/magazine/2016/november-2016)

SPECIAL FOCUS: PLANT SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT
(/MAGAZINE/2016/NOVEMBER-2016#SPECIAL-FOCUS-PLANT-SAFETY-AND-
ENVIRONMENT)

Useful tips for a successful

HAZOP study
The products we use on a daily basis comprise a variety of chemicals.

Kunte, V. A. (/authors/t/tata-consulting-engineers-ltd/kunte-v-a), Sakthivel, S. (/authors/t/tata-consulting-engineers-ltd/sakthivel-s), TATA

Consulting Engineers Ltd.
The products we use on a daily basis comprise a variety of chemicals. The products increase the living
standards of billions of people across the world. Many technologies have been developed to manufacture
these chemicals. In any type of industry, such as petroleum refining, petrochemicals or fertilizer
production, specialty chemical manufacturing, or pesticide production, the handling, processing, storing
and transferring of huge quantities of volatile and flammable hydrocarbons and chemicals are inevitable.
Since hydrocarbons and chemicals are vulnerable to fires, explosions or toxic release, they can lead to
various types of accidents. The consequences of an accident could be catastrophic, which affects capital
investment, personnel safety, equipment and the environment.

These incidents can be avoided by proper assessment and management of risk. The process of risk
assessment involves not only leadership, but also those who are involved in planning, design, operations,
maintenance and safety. This process includes managers, engineers, supervisors, operators and laborers.
Typically, risk reduction involves the selection and design of proper equipment for processing and storing
chemicals. This operation involves selecting suitable piping, instrumentation and controls, electrical
aspects, risk assessments and evaluations, safety audits, onsite and offsite disaster management plans,
and safety-related training throughout the lifecycle of the plant.

PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

Risk management involves process hazard analysis (PHA) as the first step to commence the process of
hazard identification. Many methods exist for conducting PHA, such as:

• What-if checklist
• Fault tree analysis (FTA)
• Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)
• Cause–consequence analysis
• Event tree analysis (ETA)
• Hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP).

Of the above, a HAZOP study is a powerful technique for the identification of hazards. It requires that a
systematic and comprehensive procedure be followed throughout the study, and it utilizes team efforts of
experienced persons in the areas of design, operations, maintenance and safety. This article provides a
number of useful tips for carrying out a successful HAZOP study. These tips are based on the authors’
experience and subsequent analysis of a variety of HAZOP studies attended as a participant and as a
HAZOP study team leader.

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HAZOP STUDY—HELPFUL RECOMMENDATIONS

HAZOP is a systematic and structured technique commonly used in identifying potential hazards and/or
problems with plant operability, recognizing consequences arising from various causes and providing
recommendations for safety improvements in design and operations. This exercise is performed by a
properly selected, experienced and interdisciplinary team. Experienced professionals have the ability to
identify potential hazards that may otherwise escape attention during individual desk reviews. Although
this technique was originally developed and used for chemical plants, it has also been used for many other
facilities, such as water treatment plants, sewage treatment plants, water, chemical, hydrocarbon storage
and transfer systems, and pilot plants. Moreover, techniques such as SAFOP, e-HAZOP, c-HAZOP,
software HAZOP and procedure HAZOP have also been developed to identify possible errors in software,
procedures and operational sequences. In such cases, the guidewords vary, but maintain the same
intent—i.e., identifying hazards and causes for operational problems. The following points should be
considered.

Requirement of updated documents

Documents for a new or existing facility must be available long before a HAZOP study. The availability of
these documents saves time during these sessions:

1. Process flow diagrams, along with heat and material balances

2. Process descriptions with interlocks descriptions
3. Piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs)
4. Equipment layout drawings
5. Unit plot plans
6. Material safety data sheets (MSDS) for hazardous chemicals
7. Equipment and instrument datasheets
8. Project control philosophy and cause-and-effect diagrams
9. Provisional operating instructions, and startup and emergency shutdown procedures
10. Utility specifications (as applicable).

HAZOP is usually carried out once final P&IDs from the

design team are available. The diagrams are subjected to
questioning with the use of proper guidewords and
visualizing possible failure modes. Before undertaking
HAZOP of a new facility, it is essential that the latest design
considerations during the design review stages are already
incorporated in the P&IDs and other documents.

If a HAZOP study (TABLE 1) is to be carried out for an

existing facility, it is imperative that the P&IDs (FIG. 1) are
up to date. Wherever required, an operator should be
involved in updating P&IDs to reflect the as-built status.

TABLE 1 provides a sample record sheet prepared during a

HAZOP study session using different deviations for a
continuous process. FIG. 1 provides a schematic
representation of the P&ID for a continuous process. Typical
guidewords used for a HAZOP study of a batch process are
provided in TABLE 2.

(/media/2766/hp116-kunte-plant-safety- TABLE 3 provides the sample of a typical recording done

environment-table-01.jpg) during a HAZOP study session using different deviations for
a batch process. FIG. 2 provides a schematic representation of the P&ID for a batch reactor.

Realization of adequate time by

management
Since the technique of carrying out HAZOP is systematic
and thorough, it is a time-consuming activity. Hence, the
identified resources that will participate during HAZOP
study sessions must be provided in a timely manner. Since
making these resources available for the HAZOP sessions
involves drawing experienced personnel away from their

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routine activities, along with travel expenses and other

costs, management may find it difficult to allocate the
required resources for an adequate time. Therefore, these
sessions are expected to be completed by the HAZOP team
during a very limited time period. This is not an adequate
amount of time, considering the number of P&IDs, their
complexity and the volume of work. Therefore, management
must understand the time duration for such studies and
should ensure that unrealistic deadlines are not set.

Selection
of proper
(/media/2767/hp116-kunte-plant-safety-
environment-fig-01.jpg)
FIG. 1. Schematic diagram of a chemical plant for a HAZOP
study of a continuous process.
(/media/2693/hp116-kunte-plant-safety-
environment-table-02.jpg)
resources
The intention is that questions raised during the meeting should be answered immediately, instead of
having to resort to outside expertise. Therefore, depending on the type of process, personnel with suitable
backgrounds that are skilled and knowledgeable in the design, operation, commissioning, safety,
shutdown and maintenance of the plant should be part of the HAZOP study team.

If HAZOP is performed by a less-experienced team, all hazards may not be identified. The team could
generate recommendations that management may find difficult to accept.

Desired qualities of a HAZOP study

team leader
The responsibility of the team leader includes triggering the
discussions using guidewords and parameters for each of
the nodes identified, ensuring the completeness of the
analysis and maintaining the progress according to the
schedule and agenda.

A HAZOP study leader should be technically strong and

experienced. HAZOP study team participants come from
different fields of knowledge and experience. It is important
that the HAZOP study team leader is able to manage
effectively during the HAZOP study sessions, keeping in
mind the HAZOP study objectives and the set timelines. The
team leader should ensure that the atmosphere during the
(/media/2692/hp116-kunte-plant-safety-
HAZOP study sessions is open to a free exchange of ideas
environment-table-03.jpg)
and various possibilities without fear of hierarchy by the
participants. The participants should be able to express their ideas and convince other participants of
possible scenarios, causes and consequences. With the knowledge and skills of the team leader, the team
should feel that a balanced and constructive approach is maintained during the study.

The team leader should be an independent person with no

responsibility for the process and/or the performance of the
operations. Therefore, often with a new facility, a third-party
experienced HAZOP study team leader is considered.

Selection of scribe/secretary
The scribe is an important member of the team. The scribe
should be able to quickly write down numerous causes
identified by various team members for any deviations
during brainstorming sessions. Thereafter, each and every
cause is transcribed to ensure its credibility, identify
consequences and arrive at recommendations. With the help
of the team leader and participants, the scribe should

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properly record everything into simple and unambiguous

language. At the end of each deviation, the scribe should
read to the group the transcribed material. The leader and
the participants must ensure that the write-up is revised,
wherever necessary, and agreed upon. The approved write-
up should convey to each member of the group a consistent
and clear meaning, as well as provide the proper context in
which the recommendations are considered by the team.

Clear recordings are essential, as these are read at a later

stage by other personnel and management for consideration
of implementation of recommendations. Often, it is
preferable to add more words, sentences or a small sketch
to improve clarity and further define potentially ambiguous
meanings.

At present, multiple software applications are available for

recoding during HAZOP study sessions. It is important that
(/media/2768/hp116-kunte-plant-safety- both the team leader and the scribe are well skilled with the
environment-fig-02.jpg) usage of such software before HAZOP study sessions. This
FIG. 2. Schematic diagram of a batch reactor. knowledge will allow the recording to be completed quickly
and accurately. This approach helps prevent these sessions from being boring and avoids team
demoralization, which can affect the quality of the study.

Avoiding poor recordings of HAZOP study findings

During the HAZOP process, many ideas can be identified as a probable cause to a deviation. These ideas
must be captured. Each cause needs to be considered separately to determine its credibility, and
consequences should be identified for each credible cause, without initial consideration of the safeguards
provided. It is a common observation that some enthusiastic participants try to jump to conclusions and
offer recommendations without going through the systematic process.

Consequences may comprise both process hazards and operability problems. More than one consequence
from a single cause may exist, or several causes may have the same consequence. Therefore, the
consequences need to be recorded separately against each cause. Combining all consequences with all
causes for a particular deviation should be avoided. Moreover, it is necessary to clearly identify and record
whether the consequences lead to hazardous situations, loss of production, financial losses, damage to the
local or external environment, safety of personnel, etc. The team should consider, identify and record all
possible upstream and downstream consequences associated with a given cause.

The findings of HAZOP study reports are important for further safety studies, such as safety integrated
level (SIL) studies, or for consideration by management for the approval of implementation of
recommendations. Therefore, the HAZOP study team leader and the participants must be meticulous in
properly and effectively recording all information and data so that they can be used for further studies and
analysis.

Written recommendations should not be open-ended, but should be as specific as possible. The
participants must clearly identify the actionable items and the agency responsible for taking the action.

HAZOP study sessions should be time conscious

Time constraints on the team leader and team members to complete a HAZOP study of a large number of
P&IDs are always present, due to non-availability of resources and the costs involved. To complete a large
volume of work, as well as follow the systematic methodology of a HAZOP study, the HAZOP sessions
may have to be conducted for eight to 10 hours each day. Since HAZOP is a brainstorming technique,
fatigue can reduce the overall effectiveness of the team. In such cases, there is a tendency to rush the
HAZOP process and adopt some short-cut methods to more quickly complete the study.

Therefore, it is essential to schedule adequate time for the given volume of work, and to conduct the
HAZOP study sessions accordingly.

Properly executed design reviews

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At times, it has been observed that preliminary HAZOPs are performed on P&IDs for normal design
reviews. HAZOPs conducted under such considerations take a longer time. The HAZOP team is seeing
these diagrams for the first time, and must address issues to improve designs. Therefore, such HAZOPs
generate a large number of recommendations that could have otherwise been picked up during normal
design review stages.

In such cases, the final project/process HAZOP study must be undertaken only when the final design is
completed and the required documents are updated.

Substituting HAZOP for the design review process compromises the very concept of HAZOP, which is a
separate and an independent process hazard identification technique.1

HAZOP startup and shutdown procedures

It is essential that the P&IDs that will be used for HAZOP have been updated and have considered piping
and controls for normal startup, normal shutdown and emergency shutdown, bypass connections and
purge connections. The process control philosophy, startup and shutdown procedures must be well
documented and understood before HAZOP sessions. This process ensures that these procedures can be
explained in-depth during the HAZOP process. Accordingly, consequences can be identified and
recommendations can be made by the team.

The use of proper guidewords for continuous and batch processes

Since the nature of operations for continuous processes and batch processes are different, it is important
to use a different set of guidewords for these processes.

A deviation can be defined as process conditions departing from their intention. A deviation is a
combination of “guideword” and “process parameter.” Guideword is a short word to define a deviation
from the intention (e.g., more, less, no, reverse, other than). A process parameter is a relevant parameter
for the conditions of the process (e.g., pressure, temperature, flowrate, composition, etc.).

Deviations stimulate creativity and generate new ideas from the participants, which are useful in
brainstorming sessions involving multi-disciplinary, experienced and knowledgeable team members in that
field.

Proper identification of nodes

Prior to the commencement of a HAZOP study, the process plant or the portion identified for the study is
to be divided into “nodes.” Nodes are small, manageable and logical portions into which the process is
divided.

Consider the following guidelines for the identification/selection of nodes on a P&ID:

• Input streams to the equipment

• Output streams from the equipment
• Utility connections to/from the equipment
• Vent lines, drain lines, overflow lines
• Equipment, such as a reactor, tank, heat exchanger, dryer, centrifuge, etc.

Each node from each input/output stream should be marked in the P&ID, preferably with different color
codes. These nodes are normally identified by a HAZOP study team leader, with assistance from the
process engineer, well before the HAZOP study session. If time does not permit, this identification exercise
can be done at the beginning of the first HAZOP study session.

Long nodes running into two or more P&IDs, consisting of a number of lines and equipment within the
same node, are sometimes identified by team leaders. This should be avoided, as a HAZOP study is likely
to miss some probable causes and consequences, decreasing the study’s overall effectiveness.

Individuals involved in the selection of the HAZOP study team, and participants in the complete HAZOP
process, must adhere to these tips during the planning and execution stage. These steps will help ensure
the effectiveness of the HAZOP study. The suitable recordings made during HAZOP study sessions, along
with the preparation of a HAZOP study report, should serve as a beneficial tool that can be used for future
reference. These tools can also be useful for subsequent safety studies, commissioning, troubleshooting
and training activities. HP

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LITERATURE CITED

1. Jones, D., “Lessons from HAZOP experiences,” Hydrocarbon Processing, April 1992.

The Authors
Kunte, V. A. (/authors/t/tata-consulting-engineers-ltd/kunte-v-a) - TATA Consulting
Engineers Ltd., Mumbai, India
Vasant A. Kunte is senior general manager (chemical) at Tata Consulting Engineers Ltd.
(TCE) in Mumbai, India. Mr. Vasant holds an MTech degree in chemical engineering
from the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) in Mumbai. He has been with TCE for over
35 years, and has worked as a project engineer, specialist engineer, project manager,
(/authors/t/tata- HAZOP study team leader, discipline head (chemical), quality coordinator and training
consulting- manager. He has extensive experience in basic and detailed engineering of various
engineers- refinery, petrochemicals and chemical projects. He has received training in conducting
ltd/kunte-v-a) and leading HAZOP studies in a “HAZOP Study Leader’s Course” conducted by ICI UK
and ICI India, and has led many HAZOP studies for more than 23 years in India and
other countries. His areas of interest are safety and risk management, HAZID, HAZOP,
SIL, QRA and other safety-related topics.

Sakthivel, S. (/authors/t/tata-consulting-engineers-ltd/sakthivel-s) - TATA Consulting

Engineers Ltd., Mumbai, India
Dr. S. Sakthivel has been a senior process technologist at Tata Consulting Engineers
Ltd. since 2009. He completed his BTech degree in chemical engineering and an MTech
degree in petroleum refining and petrochemicals (PRPC) from Anna University (A.C.
Tech), and earned a PhD in nanotechnology from the Indian Institute of Technology
(/authors/t/tata-
Delhi (IIT-D). He has experience in chemical processes, nano and particle technology
consulting-
and renewable energy. Dr. Sakthivel has published many research and technical papers
engineers- in national and peer-reviewed international journals.
ltd/sakthivel-s)

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