The Yorùbá Ethics

BALOGUN Babalola Joseph (PhD)

Department of Philosophy
Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria
E-mail: [email protected]
Tel.: 08100657444
Abstract
The ethics of the Yorùbá, a trans-Atlantic group with their original root in the Southwest Region
of Nigeria, West Africa sub-region, is as well-rounded as any species of ethics in the world. It is
a subset of the broader African system of ethics, with its own peculiar minutiae. Like the ethics
of other African groups, the ethics of the Yorùbá is well developed and deeply rooted in certain
traditional norms founded on their spiritual worldview and motivated by the value they place on
the human life as the centre of the universe. Principally, this article explores the origin of the
ethical principles of the Yorùbá vis-à-vis their cosmology and metaphysics of the human person
in whose moral development the heaven and the earth play a significant role. Precisely, my
strategy in the article will be to explore the Yorùbá ethics in the light of its essentially
humanistic, existential, religious, rational, communal, reciprocal, and character-based
dimensions. This will be done against a two-tier cosmology of ọrun (heaven) and ayé (earth),
which, in turn, guide how a basic Yorùbá community is organized and administered, with the
Oba at the apex of a hierarchical society, drawing its basic ethos from Odú-Ifá, representing the
wisdom of Ọrunmìlà. A systematic harmonization of these nuances of the ethics will be
attempted. The article will conclude that a good understanding of these multilayered perspectives
of the Yorùbá ethics reveals it as founded on a complex thought system that is neither inferior to
any other in sophistication nor arbitrary in logic.
Introduction
Ethics is a ubiquitous human phenomenon and therefore cuts across cultural boundaries.

Different cultures of the world have their different systems of ethics. This does not necessarily

support the position of the ethical relativists because, as it were, certain ethical practices are

accepted on a global scale. No culture approves of theft, robbery, cruelty to fellow humans,

murder, breaking of promises, and other forms of immoral acts. On the other hand, all cultures of

the world approve of acts such as honesty, hard-work, love, marital faithfulness, promise-

keeping, truth-telling, among others. Neither does this advance the position of the ethical

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Universalists. This is due to the fact that, whereas there is a global repulsion of the former set of

acts, and a global acceptance of the latter, different cultures have different justifications for either

accepting or rejecting these acts. Whatever justification a culture finds in either case, there is a

unified end in view, namely, the need to make human societies conducive for human co-

habitation. In fact, this could be identified as the sole essence of ethics.

In keeping with the above backdrop, the current paper attempts an exposé of the Yorùbá

ethics as a system of morality undergirding the Yorùbá social behavioural pattern. The paper is

essentially expository; hence, it strives only to highlight some of the features of Yorùbá ethics as

a variant of the African ethical system generally, with its own peculiar nature. There are six

sections in all, sections one and six being the introduction and conclusion. Section two outlines

what it calls ‘the seven pillars of Yorùbá ethical system’. These pillars, although not strictly

unique to the Yorùbá, as the section purports to show, play major roles in the understanding of

Yorùbá ethics. The third section describes the roles of the gods and their deputies in the

formation, institutionalization, and enforcement of ethical standards, coupled with the

determination of punitive measures for offenders of moral laws. In section four, Ifá oracle is

revealed as the custodian of Yorùbá ethical vision while section five reviews Yorùbá ethics

within the context of contemporary times.

The Seven Pillars of Yorùbá Ethical System

Every system of ethics has its peculiarities. These are features that define the essence of a

particular ethical system. In the current context, there are certain fundamental features which

give substance to the ethical reasoning of an average Yorùbá person. It is apposite to restate here

that these pillars are not really peculiar to the Yorùbá alone. Yorùbá system of morality is a

subset of the African ethical thoughts generally; and as a subset, it bears some overlapping

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relations to the ethical thoughts of some other African groups, especially those to which it is

territorially proximate. It must also be stated that these seven pillars do not exhaust all there are

to Yorùbá ethical system; there may be others that future researches on the Yorùbá have the

mandate to unearth. However, those discussed below are ones that literature has since

established. I shall now proceed to discuss these pillars of the Yorùbá ethical system: humanism,

existentiality, religiosity, rationality, communality, reciprocity and quality of character.

Humanism

Yorùbá have a human-based system of ethics, that is, a system of ethics in which everything

revolves around the wellness of human beings. Theirs is not an abstract notion of good that bears

no practical relation to human concerns. All ethical considerations have human beings as the

centre of attraction. In other words, the strongest motivation to act morally is to preserve the

sanctity of humanity either in one’s own case or in others. If, as Gyekye (2010) notes, ‘the ethics

of a society is embedded in the ideas or beliefs about what is right or wrong, what is good or bad

character, etc.’ then, it would be correct to say of the Yorùbá that their standard for arriving at

these moral judgements is whether or not a piece of action so adjudged advances the cause of

humanity, promotes human welfare, or produces other unspecified beneficial outcomes for

human flourishing. As it were for African morality generally, therefore, Yorùbá ethics reflects

the logic that ‘actions that promote human welfare and interests are good, while those that

distract from human welfare are bad’ (Gyekye 2010).

It is remarkable to point out how the humanistic character of Yorùbá ethics derives from

the metaphysical status of the human person. The Yorùbá word for a person is ènìyàn. According

to Maulana Karenga (2009), ‘in the Ifá spiritual and ethical tradition, ènìyàn is a fundamental

concept that speaks to the moral status and moral considerability of the human person’.

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Etymologically, the term ènìyàn derives from the Yorùbá phrase ẹni tí a yàn (literally: chosen

one(s)). This shows the peculiar status of the human person as an object of moral consideration.

To be chosen in this context ‘has profound significance in moral anthropology for both the

conception and treatment of human beings’ (Karenga 2009). In addition to the uniqueness

conferred on the human person, the element of human chosenness presents the highest level of

humanism in its inclusion of all humans as chosen. This, as a basis for human equality, equity

and fairness, makes it morally binding on the Yorùbá, to treat all human beings with equal

respect and dignity (see Balogun 2013, 2017). A corollary moral principle inferable from this is

that, given that all human beings are morally equal – based on equal chosen status – it would be

immoral for anyone to discriminate against another on the basis of race, gender, religion, or any

such standards that divide humans into different social categories. Also, as members of the same

chosen family, it is morally obligatory for those who have the means (to do so) to come to the aid

of the less privileged ones1 to enable them cope with the vagaries of life. Hence, the Yorùbá

ethics is not only humanistic, it is also humanitarian. Failure to show a genuine concern to fellow

human beings, when it is required and the resources are available, is considered a moral

omission.

Also, the humanistic approach of the Yorùbá ethics reveals some level of flexibility in

terms of how quickly a praise-worthy action can change to a blameworthy one, if adequate

attention is not paid to its deprecating effect on human agency. It means what appears a morally

right line of action may degenerate into a socially unacceptable act if caution fails to apply (see

Lawuyi 1988).

1
Including the poor, the weak, the sick, persons with disabilities, elders, and all the vulnerable in general.

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 The concern for human beings as the centre for ethical considerations among the Yorùbá

plays a pivotal role in the way they see and relate to other (non-human) components of the

universe. In other words, the Yorùbá moral attitudes towards non-human animals, trees, rocks,

water, land, etc. are regulated and sometimes moderated by possible implications they bear on

human welfare and interests. Strictly speaking, even though these environmental components of

nature do not constitute direct objects of moral concern (as humans are), human attitude towards

them may advance or disrupt human welfare or interests. The reason for this can be found in the

relation of humans to their environment. There is no possibility of human existence outside of

the ecological confinement called the world (see Balogun 2018). Invariably, since human beings

are part of the environment, whatever affects the environment equally affects them. Hence, the

need to treat the environment as an ally that must be accorded some high level of respect in order

to allow for the fulfilment of human earthly destiny. A good world is a necessary condition for a

good life (Karenga 2009).

Communality

There seems to be a great consensus among scholars that Africans practice a communalistic

social system (Idowu 1962; Mbiti 1969, Makinde 1988, Gbadegesin 2005). Their moral world is

defined by collective concerns rather than individual concerns. This central feature of Africa

social relation finds an illustrative expression in Yorùbá moral system. Joseph Omoregbe (2005)

clarifies what it means when African ethics is said to be communalistic by averring that in such

ethics, what one does affects all the others, and to this, one should add, what all others do affect

one. Further, it ‘means to say that one is there for the community just as the community is what

gives the individual his or her fullest welfare’ (Ibid. 40).

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 The communal outlook of the traditional Yorùbá ethics is forcefully brought out by their

moral education or socialization process, which, as found elsewhere in Africa, is community-

based. The indigenous Yorùbá lived in towns and villages which were further broken down into

extended families. This social structure plays a pivotal role in the acculturation of moral ideals

into an individual, right from birth. Gbadegesin (2005) explains how a newly born child is

welcome into the waiting hands of older members of the family, amidst cheerfulness, joy and

prayers. At the appropriate time, usually the eighth day, the child is given names, determined

from circumstances predating its birth. The community assists the individual as he/she climbs the

ladder of personhood. In the traditional Yorùbá society, the task of morally molding a child is not

an exclusive responsibility of the parents alone; rather, it is a joint task of all older members of

the community. This point is supported by the saying ojú kan níí bímọ, igba ojú níí tọ (it takes a

single person to bear a child, but several persons to bring him/her up). Hence, the individual is

imbued with the sense of communal living from childhood, which naturally conditions him/her

to see self as a part of a whole, and not a whole all by himself or herself. Gbadegesin (2005) sees

this as the limit to individualism. As he writes:

Not that the community forces itself on an unyielding individual; rather the
individual, through socialization and the love and concerns which the household
and the community have extended to him/her cannot now see himself or herself as
anything apart from his/her community. Interest in his/her success is shown by
members of the extended family who regard him/her as their blood and the
community are (sic) also able to trace their origin to a common even if mythical
ancestor. There is, therefore, a feeling of solidarity among its members and this is
neither forced nor solicited (2005: 131).
Although the feeling of solidarity is neither forced nor solicited, it serves as a motivation for

acting or refusing to act in certain ways. In other words, solidarity with other members of the

community, forms part of what determines the rightness or wrongness of an action within

Yorùbá moral system. For instance, it is morally imperative that one rejoices with members of

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one’s community whenever there is a thing of joy such as the arrival of a new baby, the occasion

of the roofing of a new house, conferment of a chieftaincy title, and the likes. On the other hand,

it is expected that one be soberly when calamities strike any member of the community. In fact,

sometimes major celebrations are cancelled because of the tragedies that befall members of

families. Here, there is no personal mood; each person’s mood is determined by the general

mood of the community. Any individual who is not attuned to the prevalent mood of the

community is seen as morally deviant, selfish, and ultimately, not a person.

The socio-ethical picture painted above has a great impact on the lives of the Yorùbá

person living outside his/her immediate community. In the first place, it helps to form social

bonding with other members of the immediate community both of whom now live in a foreign

land. Abroad, all Yorùbá persons are brothers and sisters because of their common ancestral

source. Such moral outlook helps to foster the culture of cooperation, unity and nationalist

consciousness among the Yorùbá. Yorùbá detest loneliness so much as a trait that they consider

it an evil worthy of being prayed against. 2 One of their proverbs says Àgbájọ ọwọ laa fi sàn’yà

(In unity we fight a common cause). Also, the emotional attachment to the feeling of solidarity

makes it morally obligatory for members of a community resident outside to always give back to

their communities if they have means to do so. Giving back here may mean different things

ranging from owning a house in one’s community, helping in training other people’s children, to

contributing to the general welfare of the community in some other unspecified ways. It is

immoral for any individual to have the means to give back to his/her community but refuses to

do it.
2
The Yoruba have a folksong that goes thus:
A da nikan je; a da nikan mu - he/she eats alone; he/she drinks alone
A da nikan gbenu palo bi eranko - he/she lives in the parlour like an animal
Ori mi ma je n s’ada nikan gbele o! - May my Ori not make me live in the house alone.

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Religiosity

It has always been tempting for scholars to describe African moral system as religious. This

temptation is real, and the urge very strong. Some (Wiredu 1983, Oluwole 1984-85, Omoregbe

1989, 2005) have resisted the urge, and found alternative foundations for African ethics.

However, it is doubtful whether such alternative foundations can be pushed to their logical

conclusion without encountering religion on the way. The observation by J. S. Mbiti (1969) that

Africans are irredeemably religious is one that is very difficult to refute in the light of the

happenings on the African continent. One argument against this position, advanced by Omoregbe

(2005), appeals to the fact that there are people with strong moral standing in Africa who do not

profess any religion. This is correct, but never inconsistent with the claim that African lives are

pervaded with religious beliefs. The claim that Africans are religious people does not mean that

every individual in Africa is a religious person. No trait ever robs on all members of a society.

Beside the fact that irreligiosity is a current orientation in Africa (Balogun 2014), imported into

its culture through contact with the ‘critical’ attitude of the western intellectual tradition; it was

almost impossible in the African traditional society to avoid religious considerations in choosing

a course of action over another.

Writing about the Yorùbá, scholars such as Idowu (1962), and Awolalu and Dopamu

(1979) have defended the religious foundation thesis. Idowu (1962) regards morality among the

Yorùbá as certainly the fruit of religion. To Awolalu and Dopamu (1979), morality is not merely

a human invention, it is an offspring of religion. The import of these scholars’ argument is that,

among Yorùbá, religion and morality, like Siamese twins, are conceptually inextricable, with the

former providing a foundation and justification for the latter. According to Bewaji (2006), the

attitude of Idowu and Awolalu and Dopamu could be attributed to the influence of their foreign

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academic mentors such as G. E. Parrinder, R. S. Rattray, and A. B. Ellis. Makinde (1988), on his

part, does not appear to have anything against religion being the foundation of morality. For him,

In so far as reason can neither prove that God exists or not, it cannot be an offence
against reason to postulate that God, as a perfect, benevolent and the highest
good, exists and then trace the origin of our morality to His will and ideal of
moral perfection… after all, there is nothing objectionable in an obedience to the
Biblical injunction ‘love thy neighbour as thyself (1988: 8).
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Makinde is in support of the religious foundation of

Yorùbá moral system. It should be noted that the controversy surrounding the proper relationship

between religion and morality in the Yorùbá context, has to do with whether or not the former

serves as the foundation for the latter. Taken at face value, nothing seems to be inherently wrong

in religion being a basis for morality, if by this, derogation is not intended. Religion and morality

are not mutually exclusive within the Yorùbá ethical context: religion helps individual to make

correct moral choices as a way of courting friendly relationship with the Deity and other spiritual

beings. Thus, among the Yorùbá, religion is important, but, as Bewaji (2006) notes, not

necessarily as the foundation of morals, but as an instrument of ensuring the welfare of the

individual and the society. The point then is that religion has a pivotal role in Yorùbá morality,

even if this role is not a foundational one. The roles of God and other smaller deities in the

formation, institutionalization and enforcement of moral laws will constitute the central

discussion of a section below.

Existentiality

Yorùbá ethics is built on the principle of choice-based actions and responsibilities. The choices

that people make are what the essence and worth of their social standings consist in. Although

these choices are influenced, to a large extent, by the social milieu in which one finds oneself,

the choice whether on or not to be so influenced, is strictly that of the acting individual. This may

9
appear strange, and inconsistent with the communality that typifies African (Yorùbá) social

setting. In fact, some scholars have argued, sometimes with an uncut emphasis, that

individualism is strange to the African mind. On a critical look, however, there is nothing I have

said here that stands contrary to African communal existence. Against completely communalist

standpoint, scholars like Gbadegesin (2005), Ogungbemi (2007) and Famakinwa (2010) have

sought to reconcile the individual with the community by noting that the former is not crushed

under the weight of the latter. Hence, while the fact that Africans are communalistic remains

unobjectionable, the right of the individual for autonomous actions is not thereby eroded.

Although they intend the same conclusion, Gbadegesin and Ogungbemi are motivated by

different reasons for their positions. For Gbadegesin (2005), the individuals are valued in the

traditional society in themselves and as potential contributors to community survival. Extolling

the existential attribute of individuality in Yorùbá moral system, Gbadegesin writes further:

Emphasis is placed on usefulness to self and the community, and not on wealth or
strength. If individual uniqueness were not recognized, how could we have such
powerful figures as Kurumi, Latoosa, Obokun, Moremi becoming charismatic
leaders? (2005: 131).
It may be argued that the ‘historico-heroic’ figures listed above became paradigms of moral

courage for their generations and beyond because of the personal choices they made at one point

of their lives. The case of Moremi is instructive. Oral tradition has it that she came to historical

limelight as a result of the sacrificial role she played in extricating her people from the frequent

invasions by their enemies. This choice was not without its price (responsibility), which involved

the death of her only child. She has, since then, become an epitome of courage, promise-keeping,

loyalty and commitment to communal cause.

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 For Ogungbemi (2007), the belief in individuality spans through the entire life of the

Yorùbá person from his/her creation to death. At creation, it is the individual that is molded by

Òrìṣàńlá and given breath to by Olódừmarè, who proceeds to the house of Àjàlá to take his/her

orí. In all of these, only the individual features. Specifically on the choice of orí, Ogungbemi

identifies three key elements that betray the Yorùbá belief in individuality, namely, freedom of

choice, freedom of action and responsibility (2007: 122). While in the world, the individuality of

each person is well established. For example, Yorùbá idea of punishment for moral failures is

done on a personal, not corporate, basis. The proverbial saying, Ìka tó bá ṣẹ ni Ọba ńgé (It is the

finger that errs that the King cuts) attests to this observation. Punishment results from a choice

previously made; that is, it is a way of being responsible for one’s action or omission. It, thus,

follows that, by punishing moral offenders, the Yorùbá take individuals as responsible for their

actions. Were this not the case, the idea of punishment would have been significantly rendered

arbitrary.

If the forgoing were correct about the existential status of Yorùbá ethics, then there really

must be a problem with Wale Olajide’s (2011) submission that humans’ values are crafted for

them by God, and that they unconditionally must abide by these dictates. This submission is

informed by his position that each person has already chosen his/her essence within which

his/her scope for any other form of choice is simply stifled (ibid.). The implication of this on

human freedom is dire and unsustainable. Besides, it is not consistent with the belief that God

created each person with what the Yorùbá call Ifá àyà – roughly, Yorùbá equivalent of

conscience – a belief that Olajide seems to accept as true. My position is that, although the

Yorùbá concede to the existence of such ‘oracle of the heart’ in every person, the individual has

the freedom either or not to act in accordance with its dictates, which is the line between morally

11
good persons and their morally bad counterparts. Pace Olajide, there seems to be a sense in

which humans choose their values; the choice made naturally makes one either good or bad

person.

Rationality

Rationality is here used in the Aristotle’s sense of self-interestedness of action or inaction. For an

action to be rational, thus, means that the action follows from the human drive for self-interest.

What has been said about the Yorùbá ethical system so far shows that it is in the interest of the

acting agent to live a moral life. The interest talked about here is both personal interests and

corporate interests, as Oyeshile notes:

We can say that people obey moral laws to enjoy the benefit of morality on the
one hand, and to avoid sanctions that accompany the violation of such moral
rules, on the other hand. In talking about benefits, the individual tries to be
prudent in his action. He also takes actions on an expeditious basis depending on
the situation he finds himself in. What all this points to is that human well-being
in the form of individual interest and social interest, constitutes the main rationale
for being moral (2002: 95).
Balogun (2013), thus, describes Yorùbá moral outlook as an ‘end-centric’ system. Yorùbá

consider the outcomes of their actions before embarking on them. Outcomes are what confer

moral status on actions. A good action produces a good outcome; and a bad action a bad

outcome. Fundamentally, three end-related considerations underlie the motivation to be moral

among the Yorùbá. These, as identified by Balogun (2013), are: good personal name, a well-

ordered relationship with others members of the human community, and a secured place among

the ancestors after death. At the base of each of these considerations lies the self-interest of the

acting agent. A good personal name is never sought for its own sake. If a good name is better

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than silver and gold, as the Yorùbá agree, there must be something in good names that is of

higher worth than both silver and gold, to the acting agent. Also, a well-ordered relationship with

others in the human community guarantees an enabling environment that makes fulfillment of

destiny not only possible but with less social impediments. The last and the ultimate end towards

which an average Yoruba person strives is the last home, built on the religious belief and practice

of ancestors worship. Every Yorùbá elder looks to the future when they will reunite with their

departed forefathers/foremothers, and merge with the continuum of beings on the other side of

life. This is often accompanied with excitement and fear, as noted by Idowu (1962):

It is on account of After-life that we treat today hospitably, that we make good use
of the present and not abuse it. The Yorùbá aged look forward with longing or
dread in anticipation of what may be awaiting them in the new life where they are
bound to fare according to their deserts.
As an end-centric moral system, the description of Yorùbá ethics as an instance of

consequentialist moral framework is apposite (see Balogun 2013). This variant of

consequentialism, however, is not driven by the ‘end justifies the means’ motive as found in the

mainstream consequentialist doctrine. In contradistinction to the western consequentialist

theories, the Yorùbá do not differentiate between the means and the end, especially when these

are found to be causally related. Within the framework of Yorùbá belief-system, a means is an

end in process; hence, when the means is wrong, the end cannot be right (Balogun 2013). A

support for this can be found in a line from Odù Ogbeate, a verse in the Yorùbá Ifá literary

corpus, which cautions that A kìí fi ìkà di ẹrừ kó gún gégé – we cannot use evil to secure good

and expect them to be anchored firmly (Karenga 1999). Hence, the means-end dichotomy that

characterizes western consequentialism does not hold in Yorùbá consequentialist thinking.

Reciprocity

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There seems to be a consensus among scholars that Yorùbá ethical system exemplifies what is

known in ethical discourse as the Golden Rule (Oluwole 1984-85; Makinde 1988 Omoregbe

1989). The most familiar version of the Golden Rule in moral philosophy says ‘Do unto others as

you would have them do unto you’ (Puka nd). The idea of Golden Rule, therefore, urges us to

make ourselves the measure of how we ought to act in relation to others. This describes the

reciprocity that underlies Yorùbá moral philosophy. In Ifá literary corpus, the Yorùbá moral

reciprocity is called the principle of ‘share with me that I may share with you’. Karenga (1999),

citing Odù Irosun-Obara in Ifá literary corpus, reveals the essence of this principle: ‘If we

practice the principle of share with me that I may share with you, the world will be an orderly

place’ (127). The rationale for this sense of reciprocity is found in the fact that all humans are in

the same situation, that is, the human journey, and on this journey a helping hand receives help in

return (Frisvold 2016). Fair play is here being emphasized. According to Arman, quoted in

Oladipo (Oladipo 2006: 141), reciprocity is characterized by ‘giving, but only from those from

whom we receive in equal measure. Receiving, but from only those to whom we give in

reciprocal measure’. This builds a healthy culture of mutuality of benefits and burdens, and a

community characterized by mutual trust and interdependence, wherein fear is not entertained.

The saying, ‘Ọtún wẹ òsì; òsì wẹ òtún níí mú ọwọ méjèèjì mọ’ (A complementary washing leaves

both hands clean) helps further to understand this reciprocity.

Beside its prescriptive appeal, the principle of reciprocity also describes the Yorùbá

belief in attendant cosmic justice that trails individual action, be it good or bad. Consciousness of

this cosmic justice called ẹsan is a fundamental social regulatory factor in the traditional society.

Ẹsan is that which a moral agent receives as the consequence of his/her moral deed. Hence, when

one considers that ẹsan is inevitable, one will reconsiders one’s action. Thus, Yorùbá will say:

14
 ‘Ẹnití ó ṣe oore, ó ṣeé fún ara rẹ, ẹnití ó ṣe ìkà, ó ṣeé fún ara rẹ. Àti oore àti ìkà,
ọkan kìí gbé. Ọjọ àtisùn l’ó ṣòro. (The person who performs good deeds does so
for himself/herself. The person who performs wicked acts does so for
himself/herself. Neither good deeds nor wicked acts will go unrewarded. The time
of death is the hard fact that should be born in mind)’ (Gbadegesin 2005: 138).
The lesson from this is that whatever one does, one will always receive in the proper measure.

Given this principle of reciprocity, humans are encouraged to take seriously moral virtues such

as hospitality to strangers, generosity to other human beings, readiness to assist others in times of

needs, forgiveness of those that offend us, and respect for people of all age-groups. Observing

these implies throwing cold water to the ground of the future so as to tread on cold ground. The

wisdom here is that, since no one is sufficient, morally or materially, it is good to sow these

virtues so as to be their recipient when one stands in need of them in the future.

Character-Based

It is rare to see any serious discussion of Yorùbá ethics without situating it within its character-

centrality. The Yorùbá word for character is ìwà. But ìwà is an ambiguous word because it can

either mean character or existence – or, according to Abimbola, ‘the fact of being, living or

existing’ (Abimbola 1975; Roland 1983; Oke 1988; Gbadegesin 2005). It should be noted,

however, that, unlike other ambiguous words, ìwà (as character) derives from ìwà (as existence).

As noted by Roland (1983), ìwà, both as character and existence, do not just have a homophone

relationship, they are also related by etymology and one appears to be a derivation of the other.

Hence, the former is not completely meaningful without the latter. Taken as the attribute of

beingness (Oke 1988), ìwà determines the essence of a person, as existence determines the

essence of things. There is, therefore, a connection between one’s personhood (as one’s essence)

and one’s ìwà. Although there are ìwà rere (good character) and ìwà búburú/burúkú (bad

character), some Yorùbá speakers just use ìwà to denote good character, for one either has ìwà or

15
lacks it. To have ìwà is to be a person; while to lack ìwà is to not be a person. Lack of ìwà leads

to the denial of one’s existence at the level of personhood. This conceptual synchronism is very

important in understanding the role of character in the Yorùbá value system.

It, thus, follows that personhood is not a given. One learns to be a person by developing

or building one’s character in a socially acceptable manner. It is with one’s hand that one shapes

one’s character. Just as one can develop from a non-person to a person by developing one’s

character; one can also degenerate from a person to a non-person by losing one’s character. This

points to the indispensability of character in the search for a good life both on earth and after-life.

Karenga (2009: 346), quoting from Odù 31: 3, writes: ‘Character is all that is required. There is

no destiny that needs to be called unfortunate (bad) in Ifè City. For character is all that is

required’. Ìwà is to be nurtured and treasured because it is the key to sustaining one’s

achievements. For without ìwà, every good thing that a person has achieved, will automatically

become someone else’s. Yorùbá belief-system also connects the fulfilment of personal destiny to

possession of good character. In other words, that a person has good destiny as contained in

his/her orí is not a guarantee that such person will end up fulfilling such destiny; only good

character ensures fulfilment of destiny (Labeodan 2009). Even someone with bad destiny can

upturn the verdict of the gods by possessing ìwà.

Among the Yorùbá, a morally ideal person is called Ọmọlúàbí, that is, an offspring of the

source of ìwà, ‘a person who embodies all the qualities appreciated by Yorùbá people’

(Labeodan 2009: 348). There are a number of these qualities that a morally upright person is

expected to be in possession of. Idowu (1962) refers to these qualities as ‘the main components

of good character’. Among these are: chastity in women, hospitality, unselfishness, generosity,

truth-telling, protection of women, respect for others, especially elders, as well as avoidance of

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stealing, covenant-breaking, and hypocrisy. Others identified by Fayemi (2009) are good heart

towards others, bravery, hard-work and intelligence. An Ọmọlúàbí, must also be someone who is

properly nurtured, and who behaves accordingly (Oluwole 2007). There are also the qualities of

Ìfarabalẹ (to have control over one’s physical body and the mind), ìlutí (good listening ability)

and ìfẹràn (love towards oneself and others). A person with these qualities not only lives a

blissful life on earth, but also has the assurance of entering good heaven (Ọrun rere) after death.

The Roles of the Gods and their Deputies

Having itemized and discussed the seven pillars of Yorùbá ethical thought-system in the

foregoing manner, the current section interrogates the roles of the gods and their deputies in the

institution of morality among Yorùbá. There is no agreement among scholars as to the exact

roles played by the transcendental objects of worship in the moral system of the Yorùbá. As

earlier noted, there are two camps to this discourse. In holding that morality is founded on

religion, Idowu (1962) and others can be said to attribute a legislative role to the gods. This

would mean that God or gods is/are founder(s) of morality as a regulatory mechanism and an

instrument of control of behaviours of creatures in the created world. The Ifá-àyà (conscience)

hypothesis, for instance, shows that Olódừmarè (God in Yorùbá language) puts the

consciousness of the moral order in the heart of human beings to constantly guide them to make

right decisions in moral matters. Having created the individual with his/her conscience, a willful

disobedience to the dictate of it attracts divine punitive consequences, for anyone who knows

that a thing is wrong and still goes ahead to do it, is wicked and deserving of punishment.

The appeal to gods is born out of the epistemic limitations of human beings. So many

acts of wickedness go unpunished by human social agencies because the perpetrators are hidden

from human sight – wicked acts are carried out at nights. But this is not the case with God and

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the gods. They see where human sight fails. E. M. Lijadu (1923: 8) cites evidence of this in one

Ifá verse:

Olódừmarè can penetrate. It (the message) is intended for a sneaking thief who
boasts that earthly kings cannot find him out. If earthly kings cannot see you, do
you not think that the eyes of the heavenly king are on you?
Deities such as Sàngó, Sànpọnná, Ayé lála, Ògún, among others, are often consulted for justice,

when a wicked act is done against a member of the community by an unknown person. It is often

part of the processes that the priests of these gods ask the suspects in the case to confess if they

know anything about the act for which justice is being sought. Where anyone fails to confess, the

priest goes ahead with the invocation of the wrath of the deity concerned, and in due course, the

perpetrator is brought to justice, most times with irrevocable consequences. This has made some

to argue that the role of the gods is that of enforcement, rather than legislators, of the moral laws

(see Oluwole 1984). This is another justification of the role of God or the gods in matters of

religion among Yorùbá.

For the latter, reference has often been made to taboo/tabu (Yorùbá: èèwọ), which are

‘things prohibited by the Supreme Being, the divinities and the ancestors’ (Bewaji 2006). Given

this prohibitive tendency, humans are expected to avoid them in order not to incur the wrath of

the spirit being involved as the case may be. It is, therefore, clear why Yorùbá stay clear of

taboos, namely, because of their attendant adverse consequences. In cases of taboo, no

explanation is given as to why actions forbidden by taboo are wrong except that the gods hate

such things and anybody who does them would incur the vengeance of the gods (Omoregbe

2005). However, this attracts the problem of whether the gods hate the acts because they are

wrong or they are wrong because gods hate them. Although this problem has not been

sufficiently examined within Yorùbá moral system, it could be argued that if one affirms the

18
former, then one may conclude that moral institution is based on the inherent wrongness and

rightness of certain actions, which explain why those actions are frowned at both by the gods and

human beings. If, on the other hand, one affirms the latter, then morality becomes a matter of the

whims and caprices of the gods, wherein human inputs are neither necessary nor sought. There

are more to this problem than we are willing to go.

Ifá and Ethical Visions

Ifá literary corpus provides the epistemological source and motivational force for the Yorùbá

ethical system. Ifá literary corpus (Odù Ifá) is the sacred text of the ancient wisdom. It reveals

the profundity and beauty of Yorùbá spiritual and ethical tradition of Ifá, which is one of the

greatest sacred texts of the world and a classic of African and world literature (Karenga 2008).

Ifá wisdom is ascribed to a mythical personality called Ọrúnmìlà, reputed for having a perfect

measure of wisdom, which he reveals to human beings through the Ifá divination.

The ethical visions of Ifá are thoroughly cosmopolitan. Human being are sent to the

world saddled with the divine obligation to bring good to the world. Ifá teaches that our world is

broken, that we need to reassemble the shards of wisdom into their original unity, both on a

personal and global levels (Frisvold 2016). Karenga (2008) identifies four-tiered themes of Ifá as

all revolving around the theme of goodness of the human-populated world. They are ‘the

Goodness of and in the world, the chosen status of humans in the world; the criteria of the good

world; and the requirements for the good world’ (Karenga 2008). Hence, the chosen status of the

humans (i.e. ènìyàn) is not without its responsibility, to cure the world of its numerous evils such

as poverty, oppression, exploitation and general suffering of people; and therefore ensure a world

filled with sufficient good for human survival and convenience. One important element of the

chosen status of humans is that it is not bound by any classificatory paradigm such as nation,

19
race, gender, special religious relationship or promise. ‘And we are chosen not over and against

anyone, but chosen with everyone to bring good in the world’ (Karenga 2008, 2009). Ifá teaches

that all deserves the right to a good life, achievable only through obligation of shared

responsibility to make the world a good place for everyone. Hence, Ifá ethical vision is

characterised by its altruistic considerations.

Achieving a good world for all, therefore, demands that character becomes an

indispensable companion to human beings in their respective earthly spheres of existence. This

demands also permeates the length and breadth of Ifá literary corpus. As Frisvold (2016) notes,

‘Ifá is revealed ultimately to be a philosophy of character, and its diversity’. Character provides

the required light with which the individual navigates the dark terrains that the world is. Hence,

anyone without character is bound to fall into a ditch that will ultimately make the world an

unfavourable place to live in. Using Ọfún Méjì, Frisvold highlights some other ethical

requirements for peaceful co-existence among people in the world. These include possession of

inner peace, patience, love, forgiveness, compassion, generosity and charity as well as the

avoidance of greed and jealousy. At personal level, Ifá teaches ethics of cleanliness and personal

hygiene, as a force of attraction to fortunes and realization of a good destiny. It is, therefore,

plausible to surmise here that Ifá does not only provide motivations for moral living, it is also a

guide to a blissful earthly existence based on strong moral convictions.

Yorùbá Ethics in Contemporary Times

In contemporary times, the originality of Yorùbá ethical system has come under a heavy attack

by the forces of modernity and civilizations, especially those brought about by the introduction

of Christianity and Islam. While there is no significant conflict between Yorùbá morality and

these foreign religions in terms of rightness and wrongness, it could be observed that the focus

20
on the motivation for living morally has significantly shifted from a concern for healthy

humanism to considerations of a blissful after-life existence in a place called heaven, and

ultimate avoidance of hell. It is not the case that these religious beliefs were totally strange to the

Yorùbá before their contact with European and Arabian missionaries. Of course there are

equivalents of heaven and hell in Yorùbá linguistic convention: Ọrun Rere (Good Heaven) and

Ọrun Àpáàdì (Heaven of Potsherds) (Fadipe 1991). As Dopamu and Alana (2004) find out,

‘there are sufficient hints to believe that the good go to the Good Heaven of the ancestors,

divinities and God, while the wicked go to the Heaven of Potsherds’. However desirous people

were of this Good Heaven, it was not taken as the primary motivation for living morally, at least,

not above the need for good life here on earth. Now, people are more concerned about making

heaven to the manifest neglect of their duties to good life on earth. Other influences of

Christianity and Islam on traditional ethic have been chronicled by Idowu (1962: 211) as

follows:

Christianity, by a miscarriage of purpose, makes its contribution to the

detrimental changes in moral value. Somehow, it has replaced the old fear of the
divinities with the relieving but harmful notion of a God who is a sentimental old
man, ever ready to forgive perhaps even more than man is prone to sin, the God in
whom “goodness and severity” have been put asunder. So also does Islam
unwittingly create the erroneous impression that the fulfillment of the obligatory
duties and acts of penance by good works are sufficient for the purpose of
winning heaven. The result of all these is that our “enlightened” products of the
two “fashionable” religions can now steal without any twinge of moral
compunction.

This has destroyed the communalistic fervor of Yorùbá moral values. The saying Ayé la ó ṣe ká

tó ṣ’ọrun (This world first, then heaven) is an indication that Yorùbá put a premium on healthy

humanism above anything outside here. Attentions have also been shifted from Ifá to either the

Bible or Qur’an as the ultimate source of moral injunctions.

21
 Yorùbá ethics has also been impacted by the force of globalization, as other aspects of

Yorùbá culture. The Cultural Revolution brought about by globalization, more than religions, has

left Yorùbá sense of morality worse than it met it. Some of the values that were held in high

esteem have lost their place. The culture of virginity, respect for elders, hard-work, good

dressing sense, among other, that used to be the hallmark of Ọmọlúàbí, have now been replaced

by their direct opposites. What used to be shameful things are now fashionable, and vice-versa.

For example, smoking of hemp used to be a shameful thing; so it was done in the bush. It was

from this that Yorùbá term for Indian hemp Igbó (bush) originated. However, in the

contemporary Yorùbá community, hemp is now smoked among people without any sense of

moral shame attached. The rat-race to become rich has made the virtue of Ọmọlúàbí a thing of

little or no moral significance.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussions revealed a well-rounded conception of moral system as envisioned by

the Yorùbá group of Nigeria. It showed an ethic rich in considerations for the well-being of both

the individual and the community, with connecting threads spanning beyond earthly concerns to

the after-life. Both at personal and global levels, Yorùbá ethics extols human essence, which

culminates in a human-centred ethical thinking. Given the outline of the Yorùbá ethical system

attempted in this essay, it could be submitted that Yorùbá hold an optimistic view of human

nature as capable of providing solution to the world’s problems. The world’s problems are

inspired by the activities of human beings; and it takes human efforts, in terms of character, to

put an end to them.

22
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