284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Matabuena vs. Cervantes

No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.

CORNELIA MATABUENA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PETRONILA

CERVANTES, defendant-appellee.

Civil law; Donations; Donation between common-law spouses void.—

While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a “donation between the
spouses during the marriage,” policy considerations of the most exigent
character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition
should apply to a common-law relationship.
Same; Same; Reason for the rule.—If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, “to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because
of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a
prejudice

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deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el

uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,’ [according to] the Partidas (Part.
IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem
spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et
uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to
persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For
it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty
years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the
danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover,
as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), ‘it would
not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those
who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage remains
the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the
disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.
Statutory construction; Omission must be remedied by adherence to its
avowed objective.—If there is ever any occasion where the principle of
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a
part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose
discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever
omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language
used must be remedial by an adherence to its avowed objective.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon.

Yap, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez for plaintiff-appellant.
     Fernando Gerona, Jr. for defendant-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation.

We are called upon to decide whether the ban on a donation between
the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
1
relationship. The plaintiff, now

_______________

1 Art. 133 of the Civil Code provides: “Every donation between the spouses during
the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes
effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate
gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.”

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Matabuena vs. Cervantes

appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister of the deceased Felix

Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living
maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee
Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity.
The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before
defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter’s stand.
Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this
Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. 2A 1954
decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, by the
then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later
that year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be
given. The conclusion reached therein is that a donation between
common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is “null and
3
void as contrary to public policy.” Such a view merits fully the
acceptance of this Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after
stating that in plaintiff’s complaint alleging absolute ownership of
the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question
that the donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila
Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of the Civil
Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership
precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and her
marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that
when the case was called for trial on 4November 19, 1965, there was
stipulation of facts which it quoted. Thus: “The plaintiff and the
defendant assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and
stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property
in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of
Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over
the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956, which same
donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation of the
land to the defendant which took effect immediately was made
during the common-

_______________

2 50 O.G. 3679 (1954).

3 Ibid., p. 3686.
4 Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 17-19.

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law relationship as husband and wife between the defendant-donee

and the now deceased donor and later said donor and donee were
married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena
died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims
the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral
relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared 5
in her name and
paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon.”
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse
to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: “A donation under the terms of
Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses
during the marriage. When the donation was made by Felix
Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila
Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time
they were not spouses. They became spouses only when they
married on March 6
28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had
been executed.”
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil
Code considers as void a “donation between the spouses during the
marriage,” policy considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition
should apply to a common-law relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of
7
Appeals decision, Buenaventura8 v. Bautista, interpreting a similar
provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy
of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L.
Reyes of that Court, “to prohibit donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and im-
_______________

5 Ibid, pp. 19-20.

6 Ibid, p. 21.
7 50 O.G. 3679.
8 Art. 1334 of the former Civil Code was similarly worded: “All donations
between the spouses made during the marriage shall be void.”

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Matabuena vs. Cervantes

proper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply

rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el
uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas
(Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato
amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De
donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and
wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that
assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater
influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law
seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already
pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), ‘it would not
be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those
who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage
remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike
demand that the disabilities
9
attached to marriage should likewise
attach to concubinage.”“
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the
above pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of
scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a
failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials
cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated,
the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what
is just and what is right would be nullified if such irregular
relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be
attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be
susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where
the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of
the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise
the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be
attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation
purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an
adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo:
“El espiritu que

_______________

9 Buenaventura v. Bautista, 50 O.G. 3679, 3686 (1954).

 289

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mforma la ley debe ser la luz que 10

ha de guiar a los tribunales en la
aplicación de sus disposiciones.”
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to
defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff
having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of
Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant
was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is
therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance
11
and the plaintiff, as the
surviving sister, to the other half.
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965
dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned
donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant
as pro indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. The case
is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the above opinion. Without pronouncement as to
costs.

          Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,

Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
     Teehankee, J., took no part.

_______________

10 The excerpt from Yellow Taxi and Pasay Trans. Workers Union v. Manila
Yellow Taxicab Co., 80 Phil. 833, 838 (1948) reads in full: “Esta interpretación de la
ley es insostenible. El espíritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los
tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones. No deben atenerse a la letra de la ley
cuando la interpretacion literal se separa de la intencion de la legislature y
especialmente cuando lleva a conclusiones incompatibles con el objeto manifesto de
la ley. Cuando hay conflicto entre la interpretacíon literal y la interpretacíon fundada
en el proposito de la ley, la última debe prevalecer.” Cf. Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil.
1051 (1957); Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326-27, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105; Casela
v. Court of Appeals, L-26754, Oct. 16. 1970, 35 SCRA 279.
11 According to Art. 1001 of the Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of
the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. (953,
837a).”

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Matabuena vs. Cervantes

Decision reversed; case remanded to lower court for its appropriate

disposition.
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