1SANTOS VS MANARANG, 27 PHIL 209 (1914) : Institution of Heirs
1SANTOS VS MANARANG, 27 PHIL 209 (1914) : Institution of Heirs
1SANTOS VS MANARANG, 27 PHIL 209 (1914) : Institution of Heirs
MRs by the respective parties were denied by the CA for "Eleventh. The testator declares that in case the said young
lack of merit. Hence, the present Petitions for Review on men should be still engaged in study at the time of the death
Certiorari. of the testator’s wife, they shall continue to be supported at
the expense of the testamentary estate, without deducting
The Heirs of Policronio argued that, among other things, such expenses from their legacies, if they should desire to
even assuming that the Heirs of Alfonso have an interest in continue the same studies.
the Deed of Sale, they would still be precluded from
questioning its validity. They posited that the Heirs of Alfonso "Eighteenth. The testator further states that although his wife
must first prove that the sale of Alfonso’s properties to is at the present time fifty-five years of age, and
Policronio substantially diminished their successional rights consequently is not likely to marry again, as she herself
or that their legitimes would be unduly prejudiced, says, nevertheless it is possible that the opposite of what
considering that under Article 842 of the Civil Code, one who she asserts might occur, and, if so, then it is to be regarded
has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided as sufficient reason to authorize the young men Ramon and
that he does not contravene the provisions of the Civil Code Enrique, so often referred to, to separate from their aunt, in
with regard to the legitime of said heirs. Having failed to do which event they are to be supported by the testamentary
so, they argued that the Heirs of Alfonso should be estate on a small allowance of twenty-five pesos per month,
precluded from questioning the validity of the Deed of Sale. provided that they continue their studies or should be in poor
health, this without in any respect reducing the amount of known; but upon the death of her sister-in-law, Doña Luisa,
their shares." then her share shall not pass in its entirety to her male
children, except the sum of 1,000 pesos, and the remainder
Don Ramon del Rosario, one of the persons mentioned in shall be paid to her nephews, Don Enrique Gloria and Don
these clauses, brought this action in 1902 against Don Ramon del Rosario, natural children of her brother-in-law
Clemente del Rosario, the then executor, asking, among Don Clemente del Rosario."
other things, that the said executor pay him an allowance
from the death of the widow of the testator at the rate of 75 Doña Luisa died one year after Don Nicolas and two years
pesos a month, and that the executor allow him to live in the before the death of Doña Honorata, which, as has been said,
house in which the widow was living at that time. The widow occurred on July 7, 1900. Don Enrique Gloria died on July 6,
of the testator, Doña Honorata Valdez, died on July 7, 1900. 1900.
The court below ordered judgment in respect to this Don Ramon del Rosario claims in this action that he is now
allowance, and the right to live in the house as prayed for by entitled, by virtue of both wills, to a certain part of the share
the plaintiff. of the estates left to said Doña Luisa during her life, and he
asks that the defendant be directed to render accounts and
While by the eighth clause the support of the plaintiff and of to proceed to the partition of the said estates. The
Don Enrique Gloria is charged against the estate, yet the controversy between the parties upon this branch of the case
eleventh clause makes it plain that this unconditional right is as follows:
was to last only during the lifetime of the widow. After her
death the right to this allowance is made to depend on the Defendant: The defendant claims that the plaintiff is entitled
continuance of their studies. That this is the correct to nothing under the wills, because the gift to him was
construction of the will is made more plain by the eighteenth conditional, the condition being that he should be the natural
clause above quoted. In the case of their separation from son of Don Clemente, recognized by the latter as such in
their aunt by her remarriage, they were entitled to the one of the ways pointed out by the Civil Code; that he cannot
specified allowance of 25 pesos a month only on condition prove such recognition, the parol evidence presented at the
that they were pursuing, their studies or were in poor health. trial being prohibited by said Code, and that he has therefore
The plaintiff was still pursuing his studies. On the contrary, not complied with the condition.
he found that the plaintiff had fulfilled the condition by
obtaining the degree of bachelor of arts in 1898. Plaintiff: The plaintiff claims that such evidence was proper,
that both wills state that Don Ramon del Rosario is the
The right to live in the house of the widow terminated at her natural son of Don Clemente, and that in any event the
death. bequests are made to the plaintiff by name.
The seventh clause of the will of Don Nicolas is was later The court below, holding the parol evidence immaterial,
modified by a codicil, as follows: ordered judgment for the plaintiff as prayed for.
"That in the seventh clause of said testament he desires and ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled as an heir
wills that in the distribution of his property and that of his wife
among the male children of his brothers, Clemente and RULING: Yes. Where legatees are pointed out by name in
Rosendo del Rosario, and those of his sister, Luisa del the will the fact that they are referred to as the natural sons
Rosario, in such distribution his nephews Enrique Gloria and of a third person does not make the legacy conditional upon
Ramon del Rosario must be understood to be included, in proof of such relationship but is descriptive merely.
addition to the legacies mentioned in his said testament."
So far as the disposition of that part of the inheritance left in
The thirteenth clause of his will was modified by the codicil the aunt’s will to Doña Luisa for life is concerned, the
as follows: question is free from doubt. It is distinctly declared that
Ramon del Rosario and Enrique Gloria shall take certain
"That in the thirteenth clause the testator provided that upon parts of it after 1,000 pesos have been deducted. They are
the death of his sister, Luisa del Rosario, her male children pointed out by name as the legatees. It is true that they are
were to inherit from her up to the sum of 1,000 pesos, and called the natural sons of Don Clemente. But this is merely a
this he rectifies, for better understanding, to the effect that it further description of persons already w ell identified, and, if
is his will that the remainder of all her portion should be false, can be rejected in accordance with the provision of
divided into equal parts, one-third to go to his brother Don article 773 of the Civil de, which by article 789 is applicable
Clemente del Rosario and the other two thirds to be divided to legatees.
equally among his said nephews, Enrique Gloria and Ramon
del Rosario." 4BELEN VS BPI, 109 PHIL 1008, 1960
Doña Honorata Valdez made her will three days after that of
her husband. The seventh clause is as follows:
Art. 1019. The heirs to whom the portion goes by the right of
HELD: YES, it refers to all living descendants
accretion take it in the same proportion that they inherit."
Onesima cited Art 959 (old Art 751) of the Civil Code stating (b) Refused, likewise, the rule of Article 846 (reproduced
"A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's from Article 765 of the Code of 1889) providing that:
relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those "Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit- in
nearest in degree." equal parts", which would not obtain if the right of
representation were to apply;
The argument fails to note that this article is specifically
limited in its application to the case where the beneficiaries (c) Rejected finally the rule of Article 1022 (old Art. 986), that
are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such vacancies in the free part should be filled according to the
an event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer rules of accretion, or substitution (not representation); and in
to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives default of these two, ultimately inherited by the testator's own
closest to him. heirs intestate:
The ratio legis (that among a testator's relatives the closest "Art. 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of
are dearest) obviously does not apply where the accretion does not take place, the vacant portion of the
beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee) instituted heirs, if no substitute has been designated, shall
pass to the legal heirs of the testator, who shall receive it preterition because Francisco received a house and lot inter
with the same charges and obligations." vivos as an advance on his legitime.
FACTS: Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died The respondent heirs counter: (1) that it is within the RTC's
on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his widow, Ana Maria jurisdiction to reverse or modify an interlocutory order setting
Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan O. the case for probate; (2) that the petitioner failed to mention
Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O. Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O. that she did not appear in any of the evidentiary hearings to
Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier disprove their allegation of preterition; (3) that the RTC and
Maria Bautista Olondriz. His widow and children are the CA both found that Francisco was preterited from the
collectively referred to as the respondent heirs. will; and (4) that Francisco's preterition annulled the
institution of heirs and opened the case into intestacy.
Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent
heirs filed a petition with the Las Piñas RTC for the partition ISSUE: Whether or not the pretiration of one of the
of the decedent's estate and the appointment of a special compulsory heirs opens the inheritance to an intestate
administrator on July 4, 2003. succession
However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate Held: YES.
petition with the RTC alleging that the decedent left a will
dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the Preterition is the complete and total omission of a
will and for her appointment as special administratrix. compulsory heir from the testator's inheritance without the
heir's express disinheritance.
The pertinent portions of the decedent's will reads:
Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of
Upon my death, IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ shall be the preterition:
executor hereof and administrator of my estate until its
distribution in accordance herewith, x x x Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
My entire estate shall be divided into six (6) parts to be time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
distributed equally among and between (1) IRIS MORALES testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
OLONDRIZ, my children (2) ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
JR., (3) ALEJANDRO OLONDRIZ, (4) ISABEL OLONDRIZ,
(5) ANGELO OLONDRIZ, and their mother (6) MARIA If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
ORTEGAS OLONDRIZ, SR. testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to
the right of representation.
Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent. Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in
the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the
On January 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the
the probate proceedings because Francisco was preterited legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not
from the will. institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy
RTC RULING:
In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted
Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the
The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that
decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in
Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz is an heir of the
the direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise,
decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted from the
Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion of
will; and (3) that based on the evidentiary hearings,
his preterition.
Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated
Alfonso Jr. as administrator of the estate and ordered the
case to proceed in intestacy. During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the
opportunity to present evidence that Francisco received
donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime from the
CA RULING:
decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the
hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present
On May 27, 2011, the CA dismissed Morales' petition for evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching
certiorari. The CA reasoned that while probate proceedings the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.
take precedence over intestate proceedings, the preterition
of a compulsory heir in the direct line annuls the institution of
heirs in the will and opens the entire inheritance into 6NERI VS AKUTIN, 72 PHIL 322, 1941
intestate succession.
FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his
Petitioner Contends: will left all his property by universal title to the children by his
second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of
Morales maintains that the RTC committed grave abuse of the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The
discretion when it ordered the case to proceed intestate omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the
because: (1) the probate of a decedent's will is mandatory; testator with the belief that he had already given each of the
(2) the RTC Branch 254 already ordered the case to proceed children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had
into probate; (3) the order setting the case for probate abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which
already attained finality; (4) the probate court cannot touch registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land,
on the intrinsic validity of the will; and (5) there was no and an aggregate amount of money which the respondents
were indebted to their father.
partition and distribution was executed by and between
Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12, 1931, Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola, legitimate
had by his first marriage six children named Eleuterio, children of Maximo Viola and Juana Toura, where the
Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina; and by his properties left by their father, Maximo Viola, were
second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children named divided among themselves. This was granted and
Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta, Estela Maria, and Emma. terminated in 1937.
Getulia, daughter in the first marriage, died on October 2,
1923, that is, a little less than eight years before the death of In 1939, Donato Lajom filed a complaint praying that he
said Agripino Neri y Chavez, and was survived by seven be declared a natural child of Maximo Viola, impliedly
children named Remedios, Encarnacion, Carmen, Trinidad, recognized and acknowledged in accordance with the
Luz, Alberto and Minda. In Agripino Neri's testament, which laws in force prior to the Civil Code, thereby being a
was admitted to probate on March 21, 1932, he willed that co-heir of Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola;
his children by the first marriage shall have no longer any that the agreement of partition and distribution executed
participation in his estate, as they had already received their in 1935 by these three legitimate children of Maximo
corresponding shares during his lifetime. Viola be declared null and void, and after collation,
payment of debts and accounting of fruits, a new partition be
RTC: At the hearing for the declaration of heirs, the trial ordered adjudicating one-seventh of the estate left by
court found, contrary to what the testator had declared in his Maximo Viola to Donato Lajom and two-seventh to each of
will, that all his children by the first and second marriages the three respondents.
intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half
of the improvements introduced in the properties during the Respondents maintained that they are the sole heirs of
existence of the last conjugal partnership, which should Maximo Viola; that petitioner was fully aware of the
belong to Ignacia Akutin. proceedings which was terminated two years before he filed
an action and that without having previously asserted any
CA: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision right whatsoever to any part of said estate, he is now barred
with the modification that the will was "valid with respect to from doing so; and that assuming the appellee to be an
the two-thirds part which the testator could freely dispose of. acknowledged natural child of Maximo Viola, his right of
"This judgment of the Court of Appeals is now sought to be action had prescribed.
reviewed in this petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals
invoked the provisions of article 851 of the Civil Code, which The CFI Nueva Ecija rendered a decision in favor of the
read in part as follows: petitioner and was affirmed by CA on appeal. The decision
annulled the partition entered into by the respondents and
Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, or for ordered the collation of all the properties in question. The
a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proven, ... properties in question were described in an inventory
shall annul the institution of the heir in so far as it prejudices attached to petitioner’s original complaint in case No. 8077
the person disinherited; but the legacies, betterments, and and did not include a certain riceland with an area of 215
other testamentary dispositions, in so far as they do no hectares. Petitioner instituted this present case and alleged
encroach upon the legitime, shall be valid. that the said riceland should be included in the collation of
properties which was denied.
ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the
omission of heirs? Is there disinheritance in this case? It was also alleged by the petitioner that he was a victim of
preterition, and that the institution of heirs made by the
HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and deceased Dr. Maximo Viola became ineffective, and that
declared a total intestacy on the ground that testator left all Civil Case No. 8077 was thereby converted into an intestate
his property by universal title to the children by his second proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
marriage, without expressly disinheriting the children by his
first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a victim of
given them already more shares in his property than those preterition.
given to the children by his second marriage.
HELD: NO, this contention is clearly untenable. There might
Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if have been merit if we were dealing with a special
contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of a
prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of deceased person, which, in consequence of said preterition,
preterition which annuls the institution of heirs. would thereby acquire the character of a proceeding for the
settlement of an intestate estate, with jurisdiction over any
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the and all properties of the deceased.
forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither But, Civil Case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil action, and the
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Cf. 6 authority of the court having jurisdiction over the same is
Manresa, 346.) limited to the properties described in the pleadings, which
admittedly do not include the aforementioned riceland.
In the instant case, while the children of the first marriage
were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any Without prejudice to the institution of the corresponding
share in the hereditary property, without expressly being intestate proceedings by the proper party, the petition was
disinherited. It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as denied.
contended by appellants.
SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS
7LAJOM VS LEUTERIO, 107 PHIL 651, 1960
FACTS: Maximo Viola died on September 3, 1933. 1. PEREZ VS GARCHITORENA, 54 PHIL 431, 1930 -
Judicial proceedings of his testate estate were instituted
in the Court of First Instance. In 1935, an agreement of
FACTS: The amount of P21,428.58 is deposited in name of fact that by clause XI in connection with clause X, the
Carmen de Perez (Heiress), with the association known as substitution is ordered where the heiress instituted dies after
La Urbana as the final payment of the liquidated credit of the testatrix, this cannot be a case of simple substitution.
Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a fideicommissary
Defendant Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for substitution
P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of
Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff levied an attachment on DISCUSSION:
said amount deposited with La Urbana.
In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her
The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the sole and universal heiress, and provides that upon her
fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria death (the testatrix's) and after probate of the will and
Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction restraining the approval of the report of the committee on claims and
execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. appraisal, said heiress shall receive and enjoy the whole
hereditary estate.
The defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's The word sole does not necessarily exclude the idea of
universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the substitute heirs; and taking these three clauses together,
injunction. such word means that the plaintiff is the sole heiress
instituted in the first instance.
The court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to
the plaintiff's children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress shall
Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction. receive and enjoy the estate, is not incompatible with a
fideicommissary substitution (it certainly is incompatible
The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, with the idea of simple substitution, where the heiress
between the parties are the ninth, tenth, and eleventh, instituted does not receive the inheritance). In fact the
quoted below: enjoyment of the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of
fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir
Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at
gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age, the same time he preserves it in order to pass it on the
married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and living second heir.
in this same house with me, I institute her as my sole and
universal heiress to the remainder of my estate after the The fideicommissary substitution, requires three things:
payment of my debts and legacies, so that upon my death (according to the quotation from Manresa)
and after probate of this will, and after the report of the
committee on claims and appraisal has been rendered and 1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.
approved, she will receive from my executrix and properties 2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and
composing my hereditary estate, that she may enjoy them transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate.
with God's blessing and my own. 3. A second heir.
Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order To these requisites, the decision of November 18, 1918
that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving adds another, namely that the fideicommissarius be entitled
children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve to the estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to
to increase the portions of his surviving brothers (and sisters) inherit from the latter and not from the fiduciary.
by accretion, in such wise that my estate shall never pass
out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is The fideicommissum arising from a fideicommissary
legally possible. substitution, which is of Roman origin, is not exactly
equivalent to, nor may it be confused with, the English
Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen "trust."
Garchitorena, die after me while her children are still in their
minority, I order that my estate be administered by my It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the
executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default, by heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of
Attorney Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she
Ramon Salinas; but the direction herein given must not be may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct
considered as an indication of lack of confidence in my inherent in fideicommissary substitution. Clause X
nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I relieve from the expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it
duties of administering my estate, because I recognize that does not say whether the death of the heiress herein
his character is not adapted to management and referred to is before or after that of the testatrix; but from the
administration. whole context it appears that in making the provisions
contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the
has ordered a simple substitution, while the appellee transmission of her estate to the children of the heiress by
contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution. this provision, "in such wise that my estate shall never
pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so
This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of far as it is legally possible."
the three cases that might give rise to a simple substitution
(art. 774, Civil Code), only the death of the instituted heiress Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary
before the testatrix would in the instant case give place to substitution in clause X is the provision that the whole
such substitution, inasmuch as nothing is said of the waiver estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children,
of inheritance, or incapacity to accept it. As a matter of fact, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the
however, clause XI provides for the administration of the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on
estate in case the heiress instituted should die after the in due time to the fideicommissary heirs.
testatrix and while the substitute heirs are still under age.
And it is evident that, considering the nature of simple Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of
substitution by the heir's death before the testator, and the fideicommissary substitution, when a provision is therein
made in the event the heiress should die after the (b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the
testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case where aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set forth
the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the
after receiving and enjoying the inheritance. children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
RULING: FOURTH
The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the (a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that
requisites of a fideicommissary substitution, according to should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received
the quotation from Manresa above inserted, are present in the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
the case of substitution now under consideration, to wit: Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall
In this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria
the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of
will. Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar,
until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve
and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the FIFTH
estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which
provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall
(heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have
the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, said the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the
clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina
instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each
case she should die after the testatrix. year.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering ISSUE: Whether or not the testamentary institution of Dr.
defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the Jorge Rabadilla is merely a substitution and not a modal
surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza. institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil
Code.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
RULING: It is a modal institution under Arts. 882 and 883
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and of the Civil Code.
a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who
was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or
defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted.
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation Under substitutions in general, the testator may either:
to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
(1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry property shall pass in case the original heir should die before
No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to
January of 1989, more specifically, to wit: inherit, as in a simple substitution; or
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express
existing in any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or
or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, in others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.
Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of
the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two. In
compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in
years. default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease
or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986- provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr.
87, and 1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of the Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would
herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr.
price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed
total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and
(P105,000.00). turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on
on a staggered cash installment, payable on or before the this point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary
end of December of every sugar crop year. substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the
property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact
Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided
50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of
-1989. the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly
imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this
complaint. RTC finds that the action is prematurely filed as
obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his
no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose
will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."
in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance
of the command as mandated exaction from them simply
because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title The Court of Appeals did not erred in ruling that the
holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in
of the present complaint. the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of
the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point.
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It argued that Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the
defendants-appellee has an obligation under Aleja Belleza's application of the property left by the testator, or the charge
codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition
such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant. unless it appears that such was his intention.
Petitioner now contends to the Supreme Court that the Court That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at
of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give
Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and
deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or for the return of anything he or they may receive, together
prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this
Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution relatives of Mrs. Hodges). But this does not mean
referred to in the preceding article cannot take effect in the that no effect should be given to their designation,
exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with for the truth is that they were also instituted to said
in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his remaining properties. The institution of Mr. Hodges
wishes. partakes of a resolutory condition, this is really a
resolutory term, because Mr. Hodges would surely
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article die, sooner or later that is, ownership of the
882 is what is known in the law of succession as an inherited properties would end at his death (that is,
institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal while he was free, as owner, to dispose of the
institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, properties inter vivos, he was not free to do so
(2) the purpose or application of the property left by the mortis causa). The institution of Mrs. Hodges’
testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the brothers and sisters is on the other hand an
heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or institution subject to a suspensive condition (this is
legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the really a suspensive term), their inheritance having
succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary become vested at the time of Mrs. Hodges’ death,
disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order but only operative upon the death of Mr. Hodges.
for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The 2. With respect to the second issue, the allegation of
condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode the PCIB that Mrs. Hodges’ estate is 1/4 of the total
obligates but does not suspend. mass is a judicial admission of a fact (the existence
of the foreign law being a fact), and by the principle
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be of estoppel, would prevent the PCIB from alleging
gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject that Mrs. Hodges’ estate is less than 1/4.
property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise
clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the
said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver 4VDA. DE ARANAS VS ARANAS, 150 SCRA 415, 1987
one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent,
Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. FACTS: Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic
However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's Church, died. He had executed his Last Will and Testament
inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, which was admitted to probate. In said Last Will and
dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is Testament, Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated the following:
clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied
with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near
A. The return to Aniceto Aranas or his heirs of all properties
descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge
acquired by Fr. Aranas from his brother Aniceto Aranas and
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature
ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the
because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without,
testator from his parents.
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
B. The return to Carmelo Aranas or his heirs of all properties
3PHIL. COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK VS acquired by Fr.Aranas from his brother Carmelo Aranas and
ESCOLIN, 56 SCRA 266, 1974 ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the
testator from his parents.
FACTS: An American citizen from Texas, Linnie Jane
Hodges, died in the Philippines, leaving certain properties, C. The special administration of the remainder of the estate
both real and personal, in our country. In her will, she made of the testator by Vicente Aranas, a faithful and serviceable
her husband, Mr. Hodges, her only heir. She likewise stated nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the
in the will that upon her husband’s demise, the undisposed produce of said properties after deducting the expenses for
properties from her estate would be given equally among her the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to be
own brothers and sisters. Some five years later, Mr. Hodges, given to the Catholic Church for the eternal repose of the
also a citizen of Texas, died. testator’s soul. Said pertinent provision reads as follows:
Fourth. It is my will that the lands I had bought from other
The administrator of the estate of Mr. Hodges, the PCIB, persons should be converged and placed under a “special
claims that the designation of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. administrator.” Thes pecial administrator of these lands, for
Hodges was an attempted substitution, but cannot be given his office, should receive one half of all the produce from
effect because it is not a simple nor a vulgar nor a which shall be deducted the expenses for the administration,
fideicommissary substitution, and that under American law, and the other half of the produce should be received by the
the estate of Mrs. Hodges consists of 1/4 of the total Roman Catholic Church and should be spent for my soul,
conjugal estate. Vicente B. Aranas (Tingting), because he is a faithful and
serviceable nephew, should be the first special administrator
ISSUES: of said properties, without bond, until his death or until he
1. w/n the designation of Mrs. Hodges’ brothers and should not want to hold the said office anymore. Anyone of
sisters valid? NO the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the said
2. If under Texas law, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is office of special administrator, and none other than they.
less than 1/4, how much must be regarded as her Their father, my brother Carmelo Aranas shall be the one to
estate? decide who among them shall hold the said office, but upon
the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his said sons
HELD: will havepower to select the one among them ourselves. The
1. The designation of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. special administration is perpetual.
Hodges is not a valid substitution (not a simple or
vulgar substitution because the will does not say
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties under Group C of the
that said relatives would inherit if Mr. Hodges would
testate estate of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas are subject to
predecease, be incapacitated, or should repudiate
remunerative legacies by way of usufruct of the net proceeds
the inheritance; and not a fideicommissary
of 1/2 of the estate after deducting expenses for
substitution for Mr. Hodges was not obliged to
administration in favor of Vicente Aranas, during his lifetime
preserve and transmit said properties to the
and shall continue an administrator of the estate, and, who,
upon his death or refusal to continue such usufruct, may be interposes as special defenses the fact that the two parcels
succeeded by any of the brothers of the administrator as of land were ordinary unconditional devise of realties in trust
selected by their father, Carmelo Aranas, if still alive or one contained in the last will and testament of the late Luis Palad
selected by his sons if, he, Carmelo, is dead for the establishment and maintenance of a secondary
school for the continued benefit and welfare of the
HELD: Yes. It was the sincere intention and desire of the inhabitants of Tayabas; that Article 605 of the new Civil Code
testator to reward his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful (on usufruct) does not apply to the case at bar; that to give
and unselfish services by allowing him to enjoy one-half of effect to the above-mentioned testamentary grant, the
the fruits of the testator’s third group of properties until Philippine Legislature enacted Acts Nos. 3232, 3462 and
Vicente’s death and/or refusal to act as administrator in 3757 creating the Luis Palad High School to be established
which case, the administration shall pass to anyone chosen and maintained with funds coming from said two parcels of
by Carmelo Aranas among his sons and upon Carmelo’s land, which institution is still existing and being maintained
death, his sons will have the power to select one among for the benefit of the inhabitants of the said town; that the
themselves. testator intended the said testamentary grant or devise of
land for the establishment and maintenance of a high school
Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right to to be permanent and not subject to any resolutory or other
enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which condition; that the ownership of the two parcels of land had
result from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of been irrevocably vested in the province of Quezon as trustee
another’s property, with the obligation to return, at the with the municipality of Tayabas as cestui que trustent; that
designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its the plaintiffs as alleged heirs of the late Luis Palad are bereft
equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the of any interest in said lots; and that the defendants are
properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there conscientiously devoting the funds from the said two parcels
is a limitation namely his death or his refusal. for the establishment and maintenance of the said high
school in accordance with the will of the testator and they
have not enriched themselves or benefited therefrom; that
Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties
the province of Quezon had to appropriate funds for the
is limited by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does
maintenance of the said high school when the income from
not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by
the disputed lands became insufficient; that the said high
the petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not
school is not entirely self-supporting; that the alleged
prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising
average annual net income (P7,000.00) of the two parcels of
from the usufruct.
land is exorbitant and unfounded; that the claims or
demands of the plaintiffs had been released or had
Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the prescribed.
properties, the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente
Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership
In a decision rendered on December 10, 1924, the Supreme
without prejudice of course to Vicente’s continuing usufruct.
Court held that the said testamentary disposition in the
holographic will of the late Luis Palad created a trust for the
establishment and maintenance of a secondary school to be
financed with the income of the two lots aforesaid for the
5PALAD VS GOVERNOR OF QUEZON PROVINCE, 46 benefit of the inhabitants of the town of Tayabas
SCRA 354, 1972
Implementing the trust thus created, the Philippine
Plaintiffs-appellants Miguel Palad et.al, alleged that they are Legislature enacted Act No. 3232, which established the Luis
the remaining immediate heirs and/or successors-in-interest Palad Rural High School as an agricultural high school, the
of the deceased Luis Palad, they being the grandchildren of expenses for the establishment and maintenance of which
Policarpio Palad and Victor Palad, both deceased brothers of shall be paid out of the funds left by the late Luis Palad and
the late Luis Palad; that the defendant provincial governor is any other funds which may be donated by the Government
the trustee and/or administrator and the defendant or any of its dependencies or any other persons. The
municipality of Tayabas the beneficiary of the lots in Director of Education is authorized to receive from the
question; that the purpose of the trusteeship of the aforesaid provincial governor as trustee of the estate of Luis Palad the
lots as constituted by the last will and testament of Luis sums necessary for the proper operation, construction and
Palad was to erect or establish a high school in the town out upkeep of the permanent buildings of the School. Act No.
of the income of the two lots for the benefit of the said town; 3757 converted the said agricultural school into a regular
that the said trust was duly fulfilled upon the complete high school to be known as the Luis Palad High School.
establishment in 1932 of a high school now known as "Luis
Palad High School”, that the town of Tayabas has been ISSUES: W/N trial court erred in (1) holding that the
enjoying the income of the said lots as beneficiary for the last Supreme Court ruled in the case of Government vs. Abadilla
54 years since November 9, 1904 up to the present time, that the trust was a permanent one created for the benefit of
while the defendant provincial governor continues to be the the Luis Palad High School and is a perpetual charge upon
trustee and/or administrator of the two lots in violation of the land devised,
Article 605 of the Civil Code; that the aforesaid lots have a
net annual income of P7,000; and that since the (2) in not declaring the termination of the usufruct of the trust
establishment of the Luis Palad High School in 1932 or since estate as provided in Art. 515 of the Spanish Civil Code, and
November, 1904 in accordance with Article 605 of the Civil
Code, the plaintiffs were already entitled to the reversion of (3) in not ordering the dissolution of this trusteeship under
the two lots in their favor and to the dissolution and/or Art. 870 of the New Civil Code.
termination of the trusteeship.
HELD: NO
The answer filed by the provincial fiscal alleges that they
have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
As to the nature of the trust created by the last will and
as to the truth of plaintiffs' claim that they are the immediate
testament of the late Luis Palad, the law of the case is the
heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased Luis Palad,
decision in Government vs. Abadilla, et al., supra, that "the
denies the rest of the allegations in the complaint, and
testator proposed to create a trust for the benefit of a
secondary school to be established in the town of Tayabas, FACTS: This petition for certiorari, filed under Rule 65 of the
naming as trustee ... the civil governor of the province of Rules of Court, assails the Order of the Regional Trial Court
Tayabas ..." 4 and that "if the trustee holds the legal title and (RTC) of Manila which denied petitioners’ (Hilarion, Jr. and
the devise is valid, the natural heirs of the deceased have no Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr.) Motion to
remaining interest in the land except their right to the Dissolve the Trusteeship of the Estate of Doña Margarita
reversion in the event the devise for some reason should fail, Rodriguez.
an event which has not as yet taken place. From a reading of
the testamentary clause under discussion it seems quite The decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez, died in Manila,
evident that the intention of the testator was to have the leaving a last will and testament. Said will was admitted to
income of the property accumulate for the benefit of the probate and the RTC Manila approved the project of partition
proposed school until the same should be established." 5 presented by the executor of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s
will.
Article 515 of the Old Spanish Civil Code prohibiting the
creation of a usufruct for more than thirty (30) years in favor At the time of her death, the decedent left no compulsory
of any town, province or association, does not apply to the or forced heirs but some of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s
instant case; because what was constituted by the last will testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of
and testament of the late Luis Palad is a trust, not a usufruct. a trust to manage the income from her properties for
distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will, to wit:
Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any
disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the estate CLAUSULA SEGUNDA O PANG-DALAWA: - x x x
inalienable for more than 20 years, is not violated by the trust Ipinaguutos ko na matapos magawa ang pagaayos ng aking
constituted by the late Luis Palad; because the will of the Testamentaria at masara na ang Expediente ng aking
testator does not interdict the alienation of the parcels Testamentaria, ang lahat ng pagaare ko sa aking
devised. The will merely directs that the income of said two ipinaguutos na pangasiwaan sa habang panahon ay
parcels be utilized for the establishment, maintenance and ipagbukas sa Juzgado ng tinatawag na "FIDEICOMISO" at
operation of the high school. ang ilalagay na "fideicomisario" ang manga taong nasabi ko
na sa itaas nito, at ang kanilang gaganahin ay ang nasasabi
sa testamentong ito na gaganahen ng tagapangasiwa at
And even if the trust herein involved falls within the
albacea. x x x x
prohibition of the said Article 870, the same cannot be given
retroactive effect, the testator having died long before the
CLAUSULA DECIMA O PANG-SAMPU: - Ipinaguutos ko
effectivity of the New Civil Code.
na ang manga pagaareng nasasabi sa Clausulang ito ay
pangangasiwaan sa habang panahon, at ito nga ang
Appellants seem to cling to the statement in the decision in ipagbubukas ng "Fideicomiso" sa Jusgado pagkatapos
the Abadilla case that: "From a reading of the testamentary na maayos ang naiwanan kong pagaare. Ang
clause under discussion it seems quite evident that the pangangasiwaang pagaare ay ang manga sumusunod:
intention of the testator was to have the income or the
property accumulate for the benefit of the proposed school Ang lahat ng pagaaring nasasabe sa Clusulang ito (hindi
until the same should be established ." kasama ang "generator" at automovil) hindi maisasanla o
maipagbibili kailan man, maliban sa pagaaring nasa Quezon
They argue that upon the establishment of the school in Boulevard, Maynila, na maaring isanla kung walang fondo na
1932, the trust ceased, as the object or purpose thereof had gagamitin sa ipagpapaigui o ipagpapagawa ng panibago
been accomplished. alinsunod sa kaayusang hinihingi ng panahon.
CLAUSULA DECIMA SEGUNDA O PANG-LABING
The word "established" should not be limited to the initial DALAWA: - Ang kuartang matitipon sa Banco ayon sa
construction of the high school, which alone will not serve tagubilin na nasasaysay sa Clausulang sinusundan nito ay
the purpose of the testamentary disposition of the testator, if gagamitin sa manga sumusunod na pagkakagastusan; at
the maintenance and operation of the school are excluded ganito din ang gagawin sa lahat ng aking pagaare na
from its scope. To give full effect to the intention of the nasasakop ng fideicomiso at walang ibang pinaguukulan.
testator, the said portion of the decision should be read Ang pagkakagastusan na ito ay ang sumusunod:
together with the preceding statement therein that "it seems
evident that by the clause in question the testator proposed Herein the Clause 10 of the will explicitly prohibits the
to create a trust for the benefit of a secondary school to be alienation or mortgage of the specified properties.
established in the town of Tayabas," The benefit that could
be derived from a secondary school cannot be enjoyed by After almost four decades, petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico
the residents of the town of Tayabas if the school is not in Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned
operation or functioning. It can only function and operate if in Clause 24 of the decedent’s will, moved to dissolve the
the needed funds are provided therefor. This the testator trust on the decedent’s estate, which they argued had been
realized only too well and therefore willed that the income in existence for more than twenty years, in violation of
from the two lots should be utilized for the maintenance and Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code.
upkeep of the school.
The RTC then ruled which it said that:
As We ruled in the Abadilla case, the trust ceases only if the
devise fails — if the maintenance of the high school is The above-cited provisions of the civil code find no
abandoned and its operation stopped. Since the school application in the present motion to dissolve the trust created
continues to operate and is being maintained, with the by the testatrix. There is no question that the testamentary
income from the two parcels of land subject of the trust, and disposition of Doña Margarita Rodriguez prohibiting the
donations from the government and other sources, the mortgage or sale of properties mentioned in clause X of her
devise has not yet failed. Last Will and Testament forevermore is void after the lapse
of the twenty year period. However, it does not mean that the
6ORENDAIN, JR. VS TRUSTEESHIP AND ESTATE OF trust created by [the] testatrix in order to carry out her wishes
DOÑA M. RODRIGUEZ, 591 SCRA 285, 2009 under clauses 12, 13 and 24 will also become void upon
expiration of the twenty year period.
The question as to whether a trust can be perpetual, the The Court further said that it is not unmindful of its ruling in
same finds support in Article 1013, paragraph 4 of the Civil Palad, et al. v. Governor of Quezon Province, et al. where
Code, which provides that "the Court, at the instance of an we declared, thus:
interested party or its motion, may order the establishment of
a permanent trust so that only the income from the property Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any
shall be used." Hence, this petition. disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than 20 years, is not violated by the
ISSUE: WON the trusteeship over the properties left by trust constituted by the late Luis Palad; because herein
Dona Margarita Rodriguez can be dissolved applying the the will of the testator does not interdict the alienation of
Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code as intestacy applies the parcels devised. The will merely directs that the income
for her failure to institute an heir in the will? of said two parcels be utilized for the establishment,
maintenance and operation of the high school.
HELD: Yes.
But in the present case, however, the Court reached a
The Court ruled that RTC Manila was mistaken in denying different conclusion as the testatrix specifically prohibited
petitioners’ motion to dissolve and ordering the disposition of the alienation or mortgage of her properties which were
the properties in Clause 10 according to the testatrix’s definitely more than the two (2) properties. The herein
wishes. As regards these properties, intestacy should testatrix’s large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely
apply as the decedent did not institute an heir. to a trust because the ownership thereof would then
effectively remain with her even in the afterlife.
Article 782, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 960 of the Civil
Code, provides: In light of the foregoing, therefore, the trust on the testatrix’s
properties must be dissolved.
Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either
by the provision of a will or by operation of law.
CONDITIONAL TESTAMENTARY CONDITIONS AND
Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: WITH A TERM
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose
of all the property belonging to the testator. In such case,
1MORENTE VS DE LA SANTA, 9 PHIL 387, 1907
legal succession shall take place only with respect to the
property of which the testator has not disposed;
FACTS:
In herein case, apparent from the decedent’s last will and
testament is the creation of a trust on a specific set of The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:
properties and the income accruing therefrom. Nowhere in
the will can it be ascertained that the decedent intended 1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me
any of the trust’s designated beneficiaries to inherit shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa.
these properties.
2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after
The decedent’s will did not institute any heir thereto, as my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my
clearly shown by the following:
said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey
any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third
1. Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;
2. Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain
specified properties, after the necessary deductions for for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any.
expenses, including the estate tax, be deposited in a fund
with a bank; 3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin
in which the bakery is located, which is one of the properties
3. Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in belonging to me.
trust for perpetual administration (pangasiwaan sa
habang panahon); Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within
four months of the death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a
4. Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding
properties ought to be divided among, and distributed to the relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente
different beneficiaries; and
pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Tayabas in which she alleged the second marriage of
5. Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide medical
support to certain beneficiaries, to be deducted from the fund Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him
deposits in the bank mentioned in Clauses 2 and 3. abovementioned be annulled. Objection was made in the
court below by the husband to the procedure followed by the
Also, the Court found the RTC’s holding as erroneous in petitioner.
paragraph 4, Article 1013 of the same code specifically
allows a perpetual trust, because this provision of law is ISSUE: WON the will of Consuelo contained modal
inapplicable. This article is among the Civil Code provisions institution
on intestate succession, specifically on the State
inheriting from a decedent, in default of persons entitled HELD: No. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that
to succeed. Under this article, the allowance for a testamentary provisions may be made conditional and article
permanent trust, approved by a court of law, covers 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may
property inherited by the State by virtue of intestate
in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or
succession. The article does not cure a void testamentary
widower. But the question in this case is, Did the testatrix
provision which did not institute an heir. Accordingly, the
article cannot be applied to dispose of herein decedent’s intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is
properties. contained in the first clauses of the will?
It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs to collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due
that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a legacy and not
the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain a debt. As he has already attempted to show that this sum
building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not represents a debt.
marry again. To no one of these orders is attached the
condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the The testator left the total net assets of his estate, without
legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is reservation of any kind, to his children per capita. There is no
nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's indication that he desired to leave anything by way of legacy
sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building to any other person. These considerations clearly refute the
mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the property given him in suggestion that the testator intended to leave plaintiff any
the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he thing by way of legacy. His claim against the estate having
marries again he shall incur such a loss. We are bound to been a simple debt, the present action was improperly
construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained instituted against the administratrix.
therein, and with reference to such surrounding
circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered
consideration we cannot say that it was the intention of the as partaking of the nature of a legacy and disposed of
testatrix that if her husband married again he should forfeit accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive
the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there being no nothing until after all debts had been paid and the heirs by
express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the force of law had received their shares. From any point of
second marriage, we cannot say that any condition can be view the inevitable result is that there must be a hearing
implied from the context of the will. sometime before some tribunal to determine the correctness
of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons.
In order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such
condition must fairly appear from the language used in the This hearing, in the first instance, cannot be had before the
will. court because the law does not authorize it. Such debtors
must present their claims to the committee; otherwise their
2SANTOS VS MANARANG, 27 PHIL 209, 1914 claims will be forever barred.
FACTS: Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 3MICIANO VS BRIMO, 50 PHIL 867, 1927
1906, possessed of certain real and personal property which,
by his last will and testament dated July 26, 1906, he left to Topic/Doctrine: SUCCESSIONS; CONDITIONAL
his three children. LEGACY; CONDITION CONTRARY TO LAW; NULLITY
OF.— If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he
The fourth clause of this will reads as follows: respect the testator’s order that his property be distributed in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines and not in
I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed accordance with the laws of his nation, said condition is
illegal, because, according to article 10 of the Civil Code,
below, and it is my desire that they may be religiously paid
said laws govern his testamentary disposition, and, being
by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed
illegal, shall be considered unwritten, thus making the
upon with my creditors. institution unconditional.
Among the debts, two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos. FACTS: The partition of the estate left by the deceased
In his petition, asking that the committee be reconvened to Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case. The judicial
consider his claims, plaintiff states that his failure to present administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre
the said claims to the committee was due to his belief that it Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The
was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the court, however, approved it.
testator, in his will, expressly recognized them and directed
that they should be paid. The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: (1)
The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) the denial of his
He alleges that the committee on claims should have been participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion
for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4)
reconvened to pass upon his claim against the estate. It is
the approval of the purchase made by Pietro Lanza of the
clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is
deceased’s business and the deed of transfer of said
true that a debt may be left as a legacy, either to the debtor, business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are
or to a third person. But this case can only arise when the impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the
debt is an asset of the estate. approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the
deceased’s business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the
ISSUE: Whether or not the testator intended to leave the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
plaintiff a legacy or a debt?
The appellant’s opposition is based on the fact that the
HELD: The creation of a legacy depends upon the will of the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph
testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no binding force G. Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with the laws of
until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as
mere with whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt being in violation of article 10 of the Civil Code.
arises from an obligation recognized by law and once
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said
established, can only be extinguished in a lawful manner.
testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence
Debts are demandable and must be paid in legal tender. showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the
Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific articles of absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be
personal property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order the same as those of the Philippines.
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the
Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on
this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of
partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter. The refusal to give
the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does
not constitute an error, It is discretionary with the trial court.
and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find
no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
contrary to law, for article 792 of the Civil Code. And said
condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the
testator’s national law when, according to article 10 of the
Civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is
the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will
regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary
to law. All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their
dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it
not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator’s
national laws.