A Level European History Through Questions and Answers: Marwa National Marwa National

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Marwa national
A LEVEL EUROPEAN HISTORY

Marwa national
THROUGH QUESTIONS AND

ANSWERS
WRITTEN BY: MARWA NATIONAL

CONTACTS: 0784950281, E-mail: [email protected]
MARWA NATIONAL
A LEVEL EUROPEAN HISTORY THROUGH
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
INTRODUCTION
The gist of this book is to arm a student with necessary skills to attack every history
question without hesitation. It also familiarize the student with the questioning
terminology often employed by examiners. Essay writing seems to be a challenge
among most A level students. The book shall equip learners with skills for writing a
sound and analytic essay. Where the name of the scholar is not known, the phrase
"some schools of thoughts" will be used. The writer takes responsibility of any errors
committed or omitted herein. The book deals with sections A and B. A minimum of
three questions are addressed on each topic. Topics covered are addressed in the
manner which makes the book a must have material for revision purposes. The book
covers the French Revolution up to the Germany unification. It is also accompanied
by twenty-five study questions which makes it an effective study tool. Effective
introduction, conclusion, and a question interpretation is given on each question.
APPRECIATIONS
I would like to thank the Lord God Almighty for making me who l am. My mothers,
Blessing Mashapa and Faith N, Mashayangombe, also deserve my appreciations for
the love they always have for me, my father, Mr. Nation. P. Marwa for his moral
support. l would also like to experess my appreciation to Mr Arthur Marara, whose
motivation and inspirations made this project a success. My extended gratitude goes
to the following people for their material and moral support:
Mr. D. Mufunda- My resource person who imparted skills of essay writing to me and
provided me with the neccessary resources for the success of this project.
Mr. T. Maoneke- My icon in the academic field.
Mr. L. Mutimwii- I salute you sir for developing my analytic skills.
Miss Faith Sithole- She has helped me in the development of this project.
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CONTENTS
SECTION A: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE NAPOLEONIC ERA

1). "Philosophers masterminded the French revolution of 1789." Discuss
2). Asses the role of philosophers in the outbreak of the French revolution of 1789.
3). Discuss the view that the French revolution of 1789 was caused by errors in
commission rather than errors in omission.
4). Which was the more successful revolutionary government, the National Assembly
or the National convention?
5). "A blessing and a curse at the same time" Discuss this view with refference to the
reign of terror.
6). Analyse the effects of the reign of terror to the French people and to Europe.
7). Why was France at war with other European powers between 1792 – 1802?
8). "Those who rise by the sword similarly falls by the sword." (C. Palmer). Is this a
fair comment on the rise and downfall of Napoleon?
9: "I am the revolution." To what extend is this statement a true reflection of
Napoleon's domestic policies?
10: Why did the European powers took so long to defeat Napoleon?
SECTION B: FROM THE VIENNA SETTLEMENT TO THE UNIFICATION

OF GERMANY
The Vienna Settlement and the Congress System
THE RESTORED BOBOURNS AND THE JULY MONARCH
11: Discuss the view that the restored bobourns in France learnt nothing and forgot
nothing.
12: Why despite his liberal policies did Louis Philippe's reign ended in a revolution in
1948?
13. Why despite his failure in foreign adventures and boring domestic policy did
Louis Philippe stayed in power up to 1848?
14: "His foreign policy had nothing to offer France." Is this a fair comment on Louis
Philippe's contact of foreign policy?
NAPOLEON 3 AND THE SECOND EMPIRE
15: "Napoleon 3 had a dynamic personality, pursued forceful policies and engaged in
military diplomacy." Why then did he fail?
16. "He tried to please both but satisfied neither." Discuss this view with reference to
Napoleon 3's contact of foreign policy.
ITALIAN AND THE GERMANY UNIFICATION
17: In what ways do the unification of Italy and Germany resemble and
different from other?
18: Compare and contrast the significance of 1848 revolutions for the Unification of
Italy and Germany?
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19: Assess the importance of the Zollverein and the 1848 Revolutions in the history of
the German Unification.
20. Assess the role of Bismarck in the unification of Germany.
21: "Circumstance makes the Man." Discuss the validity of the statement with
reference to the role of Bismarck in the Unification of Germany.
Questions for further discussions.
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SECTION A: CAUSES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
The French Revolution of 1789 was caused by a number of intertwined reasons. The
explosion was brewed by the French traditional form of ruling, i.e bourbo n
monarchism. This illness was nurtured up to 1789 when France experienced some
economic handicap under the leadership of Louis XVI. Political, social and economic
factors were crystallized by natural forces which led to the inevitable explosion of
1789. Philosophers were there to inform the poor of the social ills of France and made
them conscious of the oppression which they were subjected to by the bourgeoisie.
Though philosophers did not preach the revolution, they instilled a revolutionary spirit
in the minds of the poor. Philosophers created a tense atmosphere by their writings.
These writings threatened to visit prejudice to the reputation of the king. Louis XVI
risked his reputation by nursing the extravagance of his wife Marie Antoinette using
government revenues. D. Richards aptly argues that the Queen had 4 pairs of shoes
per week, five hundred maids and two thousand horses for entertainment. All these
symphoned the national coffers. D. Richards further comments that she had a
notorious frivolity for luxuries whilst the majority were languishing in the ocean of
poverty. All these extravagance assisted in inviting doom to the bourbon dynasty and
to the reputation of the king.
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QUESTIONS
1. "Philosophers masterminded the revolution of 1789." Discuss.

COMMENT
The question is a claim that the philosophers initiated the revolution. In this regard the
question is pointing an accusing finger at the philosophers for the revolution. Your
task is therefore to assess the truism of the above notion using scholarly evidence.
Substantiate whatever position you take using relevant material. Avoid generalizing
and be specific as you go down in your argument.
INTRODUCTION
A lot of ink had been spilt on the academic desk pertaining to the contribution of
philosophers to the outbreak of the French revolution of 1789. Some schools of
thought have argued that the philosophers dress much of the blame since they
conscientised the third estate on the need for reformation through their writings.
However, totally blaming the philosophers for the violent explosion of 1789 will be
tantamount to committing historical suicide as the view in question contains some
loopholes. The following account shall establish the veracity of the above assertion
which imports the idea that the French Revolution of 1789 was initiated by the
philosophers. This shall be done with the aid of scholarly evidence.
POINTS
1. They conscientised the people about the need for equality in a society. Rosseau and
his "Social Contract" deals at length with the issue of social equality.
2. They enlightened the third estate on the absolutism and autocracy of the bourbon
dynasty. Voltaire's sentiments are worth reproducing, ".........men were born free but
everywhere is in chains". The king had absolute powers and the ordinary people had
no saying in the government. Philosophers wrote books which educated the mass on
the need to revolt against such an absolute order.
3. Philosophers like Moltek preached the principles of liberty eq uality and fraternity.
They convinced the people that these principles could only be achieved through force
hence the need for a revolution. B. Stundler comments that the French philosophe rs
convinced the mass that it was only through bloodshed and violence that a just and
equal society can gain roots in France.
4. The philosophers also attacked the Roman Catholic for its extravaga nce on land
and its excessive authority in France. A. Woods comments thus, "....but the
philosophers were more disturbed by the church's authority over land whilst the
majority of the French were heavily packed in a small piece of land. D. Richards
echoed the same sentiments as he argued that the church owned 3/4 of the land in
France. The philosophers disposed these injustices to the French peasants who saw a
revolution as the only way to liberate themselves.
However:
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1. The 1788-89 poor harvests affected the French economy negatively.

2. The extravagance of the Queen drained the French coffers. R. Lipso n argues that
the queen had a veracious appetite for luxuries which brought the French economy
down to its knees.
3. The American War of Independence provided contiguous ideas to the French
soldiers on the need to also fight for their emancipation. It also drained the French
coffers as funds which were supposed to be used for drought relief were now
channelled to the American War of Independence. This further crippled the economy
of France.
NB: You can include as many points as possible but make sure you balance your
argument.
CONCLUSION:
In conclusion, the contribution of philosophers to the outbreak of the revolution is so
alarming that they can be blamed to a larger extend. It is therefore with little or no
doubt that the view in question is valid and any attempts to critique its validity may
not warrant entertainment in the circles of most historians.
Question 2: Assess the role of Philosophe rs in the outbreak of the French

Revolution of 1789.
COMMENT
The question is inviting you to contact an analysis of the contribution of the
philosophers vis-a-vis the explosion of 1789 in France. The first part of this question
is similar to the first part of the first question above. The question need to be
addressed with special attention to the role of philosophers on both sides. In this case
you are asked to evaluate the effectiveness of the works of philosophers in causing the
revolution. Most students are seduced into writing the contribution of philosophers on
their first part and then proceed to look at other factors which also contributed to the
same explosion in the second part and this is incorrect. You need to analyse the the
role of philosophers and evaluate the extend to which their works contributed to the
French revolution.
INTRODUCTION.
A number of intertwined reasons had been blamed for the calamity which befell
France in 1789 and the philosophers are also victims of this blame. Their writings
which attacked the ancient system of bobourn monarchism had been used as evidence
to blame them for the violent transformation which France experienced from 1789 to
1804. However, the works of philosophers though they greatly influenced the French
people to revolt, had their limitations. The following work exists to interrogate the
works of philosophers in light of the French revolution.
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POINTS
1. They conscientised the people about the need for equality in a society. Roseau and
his "Social Contract" deals at length with the issue of social equality.
2. They enlightened the third estate on the absolutism and autocracy of the bourbon
dynasty. Voltaire's sentiments are worth reproducing, ".........men were born free but
everywhere is in chains". The king had absolute powers and the ordinary people had
no saying in the government. Philosophers wrote books which educated the mass on
the need to revolt against such an absolute order.
3. Philosophers like Moltek preached the principles of liberty equality and fraternity.
They convinced the people that these principles could only be achieved through force
hence the need for a revolution. B. Stundler comments that the French philosophers
convinced the mass that it was only through bloodshed and violence that a just and
equal society can gain roots in France.
4. The philosophers also attacked the Roman Catholic for its extrava gance on land
and its excessive authority in France. A. Woods comments thus, "....but the
philosophers were more disturbed by the church's authority over land whilst the
majority of the French were heavily packed in a small piece of land. D. Richards
echoed the same sentiments as he argued that the church owned 3/4 of the land in
France. The philosophers disposed these injustices to the French peasants who saw a
revolution as the only way to liberate themselves.
HOWEVER
The contribution of philosophers to the outbreak of the French Revolution had been
grossly exaggerated.
1. The philosophers never preached about any revolution but simply spread liberal
ideas which could be achieved in a more peaceful manner.
2. Their ideas were limited to those who could read novels so they only helped a
handful of the oppressed since the peasants could not read understand the implications
of their ideas.
3. The philosophers' works were published long before the Revolution of 1789. By the
time the Revolution broke out, most of them were already dead.
A. Woods argues that the philosophers' works cannot be stated in isolation for the
outbreak of such a violent phenomenon led by a people who cannot even understand
the implications of their writings.
E.H. Carr echoes the same sentiments as he argues that the philosophers can be
exonerated from the blame of precipitating the revolution since the revolution broke
out when they themselves were already decomposed bodies.
CONCLUSION:
In summation, the contribution of philosophers to the outbreak of the French
revolution cannot be denied. Philosophers provided a base for the revolution. Their
ideas made people realize the injustice perpetuated against them. It is therefore unjust
to dismiss the contribution of philosophers simply because the revolution broke out
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whilst they were already dead. The philosophers therefore contributed to the outbreak
of the revolution to a larger extend.
QUESTION 3: Discuss the view that the French Revolution of 1789 was caused
by errors in commission rather than errors in omission.
COMMENT
The question is a proposition that the Revolution was caused by the situations which
the king mishandled, (errors in commission), rather than those which the king failed
to do which he was supposed to do (errors in omission). The question is generally
asking you to interrogate the contribution of the king to the outbreak of the revolution.
You therefore need to have enough information on the flaws of Louis XVI and how
they worsened the French situation and eventually plunged France into the revolution.
The fact that a proposition is made into a question does not necessarily mean that it is
correct. You are at liberty to either agree or disagree with the claim. As usual be
analytical as you go down in your essay. Avoid writing everything that you know
about the king. You need to link each material to the question.
INTRODUCTION
The verdict that the mishandling of events by the king played a more significant role
than his ignorance to undertake some certain activities which could have averted the
revolution should be regarded as valid to a larger extend. Those who support the
validity of the above assertion draw their ammunition from how the king dealt with
the able finance ministers and how he treated the third estate at the Estates General
Meeting. However, ending with such justification will be a historic misnorm as the
view in question contains some loopholes. The following work shall establish the
veracity of the above assertion accompanied by examples wherever possible.
POINTS
1. The King ill-treated the able finance ministers like Turgot and Necker. He hired and
fired patriotic finance ministers who drafted schemes which would improve the
France's economy. B. S. Weinstein argues that the king resorted to hiring and firing
finance ministers who were able to put the French economy on a sounder footing.
This worsened the economic huddles which France was already experiencing. The
peasants were the ones to be affected by this economic handicap. Hence they decided
to join up arms so as to fight for their financial emancipation. (A. Woods)
2. The king also misused the coffers of France by funding the American War of
Independence. The war drained the coffers of France and also injected some
contagious ideas on the French soldiers. D. Richards argues that France had a
ballooning debt and this was worsened by her involvement in the American war of
Independence which further drained the already empty coffers. Had the king used the
funds to offer drought relief to the ordinary people, the revolution might have been
averted or rather postponed.
3. The king also condemned the extravagance of the queen which plunged France into
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a ballooning debt. D. Richards aptly argues that the Queen had 4 pairs of shoes per
week, five hundred maids and two thousand horses for entertainment. All these
syphoned the national coffers. This had the net effect of worsening the economy of
France.
4. The king mishandled the Estates General Meeting by mixing three groups of people
with different grievances. D. Schulter argues that the king mixed the groups which
had different mumblings and this crystalized the revolutionary spirit especially among
the third estate.
5. The king also made a serious blunder of taking sides with the nobility against the
third estate on voting by estates rather than by head. This made the third estate who
only wanted some reforms to seek for a new order leading to the tennis court oath. R.
Lipson submits that the king risked his reputation by sidelining with nobility and the
clergy on the issue of the voting system. A. Chole echoes the same sentiments and his
comment is worth reproducing, ".....the king signed his death warrant by mixing
groups with different mumblings and further alienating the third estate which
constituted the working class of France and the majority."
HOWEVER
It should be noted that it is not only what he did which caused the revolution but what
he failed to do also has to be examined if we are to do justice to the subject at hand.
1. The king failed to lend his ears to the call of the day, liberty, equality and fraternity.
2. He also failed to provide drought relief to the peasants after the poor harvests of
1788-89.
3. He did nothing to curb the inflation which had infiltrated the French economy. D.
Richards comments that the price of the basics sky rocketed beyond the reach of the
peasants. E. Burke registers his sympathy for the oppressed peasants who suffered
from the economic crisis and argues thus, "......all the economic predicaments which
rocked France heavily affected the innocent peasants who did not have any
economic muscles as they were relegated to the periphery of the society."
Because of all these ignorance, D. Richards safely concluded that Louis XVI was just
but a king in name not in character. This is in turn supported by J. Thomas who labled
him a political grasshopper.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, it is indeed what the king did which largely caused the explosio n
of 1789 rather than what he failed to do. The king's failure to handle the Estates
General Meeting is enough testimony to show that the view in question i highly
justified. Any attempts therefore to criticize the validity of the above assertion may
not warrant entertainment in the circles of most historians.
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COURSE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
The French Revolution of 1789 was an important turn around in the socio-economic
political history of France. The explosion put an end to the absolutism which had been
prevailing in France for centuries, thus the overthrow of the bourbon dynasty. The
overthrow of the bobourn monarch in France was marked by the introduction of
liberal ideas such as the declaration of the rights of man which was inducted by the
National Assembly in 1792. Several liberal measures like the Civil Constitution of the
Clergy which legalized freedom of worship were also introduced. The revolution was
very violent as machines like The Reign of Terror claimed the lives of many French
citizens. Terror claimed the life of many individuals like Louis VXI, and the harmless
Madame du Berry who was Louis XIV's mistress. J. E Steward argues that terror
claimed 578 lives in Britany and 761 lives in Vendee. It even claimed the life of
Robisphere who had masterminded it. D. Richards had to comment that the Reign Of
Terror was so life claiming to the extent that it ended up devouring its own children.
However it should be noted that these radical measures were employed so as to
sustain the revolution from both external and internal threats. Various Revolutionary
governments worked tirelessly to safeguard the interests of the revolution. The
National Assembly, National Convention and the Directory worked with the
revolutionaries so as to put an end to bourbon monarchism in France.
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QUESTION 4: Which was the more successful revolutionary governme nt, the
National Assembly or the National convention?
COMMENT
The question is inviting you to conduct an analysis on the achievements and failures
of the National Assembly and National Convention and make an evaluation of which
government was more successful than the other. The question is a bit straight forward
so a comment is just given as a norm.
INTRODUCTION
Both the National Assembly and Convention had considerable achievements towards
the continuation of the revolution. The National Assembly initiated many of the
revolutionary ideas which were to be later upholder by the National convention. The
National Assembly is considered to be more successful than the National convention
because its achievements far outweigh those of the National Convention which was
characterized by repression and bloodshed. The following work exists to interrogate
the achievements of each revolutionary government and establish the more successful
government. This shall be done with the aid of scholarly evidence.
POINTS
The achievements of each revolutionary can be better understood if one considers the
environment in which they were operating. The National Asse mbly took over the
Legislative Assembly in 1791 and introduced a number of liberal measures.
1) the most important work of the National Assembly was the abolition of feudalism,
serfdom and class privileges. On 4 August 1789, one of the nobles, who was a
relative of Lafayette, stated in the Assembly that one of the reasons of the attack of
the peasants on the nobility and their property was the prevalence of inequality based
on injustice. He maintained that the remedy was not to repress the peasants but to end
inequality which was the root cause of the trouble. A resolution was moved and
passed that there should be equality of taxes.
2. Introduced the Declaration of the rights of man which guaranteed the French people
freedom of expression. This this was to be violated by the National convention which
introduced the law of suspect in which people were denied their freedom of
expression.
3). The National Assembly abolished the most hated latres de catchet in which people
were imprisoned without trial. The National Assembly abolished this system and
introduced a system of trial by jury in which people were tried in public courts
where they had the right to defend themselves. This system was again to be violated
by the National convention which introduced a law of suspect which send any
suspected individual to the guillotine.
4). The National Assembly also introduced freedom of worship through the
introduction of the Civil constitution of the Clergy. This document acknowledged
the existence of other religions in France other than the Roman Catholic. This was a
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positive move towards the revolutionary demands of freedom of worship. However,

the National Convention turned the clock back to the pre-revolutionary period by the
introduction of the worship of reason. Once again the French people were denied their
freedom of worship. J. Smith contents that the National convention mirrored the
characteristics and values of the ancient regime through its various repressive laws.
5). The National Assembly also confiscated the church land and distributed it to the
landless. W.S. Miller argues that the National assembly was hated by the clergy for
confiscating the church property and threw it into the revolutionary granary.
6). this government was also able to sustain the first coalition by voluntary military
conscription. During the time of the National Assembly, the French people were at
liberty on whether or not to join the army but this right vanished when the National
Convention assumed power (D. Thomas). The Conve ntion introduced the forced
military conscription known as the covee en masse. This violated the rights of man.
HOWEVER
The National Convention cannot be dismissed as a total failure since it also have so
achievements which are worth exploring.
1). The Convention was elected on a broader franchise than the National Assembly,
with all males over 21, in employment or receiving income, eligible to vote.
2). The Convention managed to liquidate the system of monarchism in France by
executing the King in 1792 whilst the National Assembly nursed the ancient regime
by grunting the king some veto powers. It is in this regard that A. Woods' comment is
worth reproducing, "The first achievement of the convention, on September 21, 1792,
was to abolish the monarchy. The next day, the Republic of France was founded."
3). It managed to stabilize the French economy through the induction of the law of
maximum. Noteworthy is how the prices of bread and butter were heavily quarantined
by this law so that the mere peasants could also afford. The national Assembly on the
other hand made no attempt at destabilizing the economy. The Assembly focused
much on liberty, equality and fraternity.
4). The convention also managed to defend the revolution from both internal and
external threats. A seemingly unwinnable war with Austria and Prussia was raging, the
monarchy had been abolished and the people of Paris, the sans-culottes were
becoming increasingly demanding and violent. The Revolution was in danger. E.
Burke had to comment that the declaration of sovereignty and the beheading of the
monarch were powerful motivators within France. Unfortunately, the moment of bliss
was brief, as the governmental powers quickly realized that all of their achievements
were being threatened by internal and external fighting. The danger which was posed
by external and internal threats were too serious and had to be dealt with through
radical means hence the introduction of the reign of terror.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the National Assembly was more successful than the National
Convention which was characterized by war and bloodshed. The National Assembly
set standards which were to be upholder by later leaders like Napoleon who
perpetuated the codification of the French law which was initiated by the National
Assembly. It is therefore justified to argue that the National Assembly added more to
the revolutionary granary than the National Convention.
QUESTION 5: "A blessing and a curse at the same time." Discuss this view with
reference to the Reign Of Terror.
COMMENT
The proposal is that, the reign of terror was an important instrument for the goodness
of the revolution though carrying it out was evil. The question can be paraphrased as,
the Jacobins were cruel in order to be kind. The idea behind the motive of introducing
the reign of terror was good, thus a blessing, but the methodology is a bit tough thus a
curse. D. Thompson aptly argued that the reign of Terror was actually a necessary evil.
Your task therefore is to analyze what the Jacobins did which was against the
revolutionary principles and how it helped to safeguard the revolution. This question
is tasting your analytic skills so be very analytic as you present your argument. Think
outside the box. Remember the fact that a propositio n is made into a question does not
mean that it is correct. You can take whatever position you like as long as you have
enough material to support it.
INTRODUCTION.
The verdict that the reign of terror was a blessing and a curse at the same time s hould
be regarded as valid to a larger extend. Those who support the validity of the above
assertion draw their ammunition from the fact that terror protected the revolution from
both external and internal threats. However, ending with such justification will be a
gross violation of historic justice as terror ended up devouring its own children. The
following work shall establish the veracity of the above assertion accompanied by
examples wherever possible.
POINTS
The reign of terror was employed when the Convention had perceived that radicalism
was the only means to sustain the revolution from internal and external preys.
1). The law of maximum was a curse to the business people of France as prices were
highly quarantined by the government. This however helped in curbing inflation
which had rocked France since 1789.
2). External foes of the revolution forced the Jacobins to adopt the forced military
conscription known as the covee en massee, in which every male citizens were forced
to join the army. This was a direct violation of the declaration of the rights of man
which was formulated by the National Assembly in 1789. This cruelty however
yielded positive results as it managed to repel the Austrian and Prussian forces beyond
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the French boundaries. C.A Leeds has to comment that the bad news from the front
and the Civil War further radicalized the Jacobins and they adopted the famous covee
en masse so as to withstand external siege. C.H Palmer echoes the same sentiments as
he argues the Jacobins were inwardly co nvinced that the only way to serve the
revolution was through brutal efficiency.
3). Internal trouble was increasingly brewing in France and the Convention were
forced to adopt more radical measures. The Reign of Terror was institutionalized with
the Law of Suspects, a decree passed on 17 September 1793, everyone seen as a
suspect was to be sent to the guillotine for the most trivial of reasons. C. Rudolph
actually credits the Jacobins for their radicalism amidst such great insurrection as he
submits thus, "Radical times call for radical measures and the Jacobins understood
that quite early. " This repressive law of suspect saved the revolution from internal
threats hence a necessary evil.
4). The National Convention is also on record of murdering the king together with his
wife, Marie Antoinette. This helped as it marked the end of the boborn rule in France.
Robespierre justified his radicalism and his sentiments are worth revisiting, "If the
basis of popular government in peacetime is virtue, the basis of popular government
during a revolution is both virtue and terror; virtue, without which terror is baneful;
terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror is nothing more than speedy, severe
and inflexible justice; it is thus an emanation of virtue; it is less a principle in itself,
than a consequence of the general principle of democracy, applied to the most
pressing needs of the parties."
Thus terror was used to sustain the revolution from the political instability which
France was exposed to hence it was a necessary evil.
HOWEVER
It is not in all cases that terror was employed to safeguard the ideals of the revolution.
1). Terror was now manipulated by Robespierre to secure his position as evidenced
by the unjust execution of Danton. D. Thompson laments the death of Danton and in
his somber voice submits that at this point terror was now devouring its own children.
2. The introduction of the worship of reason was a pure curse which had no blessing
in it so the view in question is not totally valid.
3. Terror claimed the lives of innocent people all in the name of peace keeping, the
harmless Madame Du Berry was also a victim of this violent life claiming
phenomenon.
CONCLUSION.
In the final analysis, the positive results yielded by the reign of ter ror had been used
as evidence to show that it was indeed a blessing and a curse at the same time.
Though some of the machineries of terror like the worship of reason had no blessings
for the people, it can be argued that the Reign of Terror was actually a necessary evil
as displayed in the above essay.
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QUESTION 6: Analyze the effects of the Reign Of Terror to the French people
and in Europe.
COMMENT
The question is a bit straight forward. It is inviting you to contact an analysis of the
impacts of the reign of terror in France and Europe at large. You need to come up with
positive and negative impacts to show understanding of the question. Avoid narrating
the results of Terror and be analytic.
INTRODUCTION
The reign of terror was a violent machinery used by the National Convention to
withstand the internal and external pressures which France was exposed to. It left a
watermark in the French society and in Europe. The following work exists to
interrogate the impacts of Terror in Europe. This shall be done with the aid of
scholarly evidence.
POINTS
1. Loss of lives:
The reign of terror led to massive loss of lives in France. It’s estimated that about
17,000 people were guillotined and this included high level persons like King Louis
and his wife Antoinette, Robespierre, Danton, and other persons of high profile were
put to death.
2. Destruction of property:
Besides, there was destruction of property and infrastructure in France. This includes
Hotel Deville and the Bastille prison which were destroyed by the mob. Several
castles and mansions including property were attacked and destroyed by the
revolutionaries. 3. Economic decline: There was general economic decline that arose
from unstable political atmosphere. Inflation, unemployment famine and starvation
reached their highest levels during the reign terror. Many industries were also
destroyed which affected the French economy.
4. Wars with other nations: The reign of terror brought war between France and other
neighboring nations .Countries like Britain and Russia formed a coalition in 1793 and
invaded France. This was because they were scared by massive loss of lives including
the king and his wife Marie Antoinette. The revolutionaries also wanted to export the
ideas of the French revolution to neighboring nations which was opposed by other
states leading to wars.
5. Rise of Napoleon to power: The reign of terror contributed to the rise of Napoleon I
to power in France. He was the young artillery officer who gained experience and
became popular when he suppressed the royalists uprising at Port Toulon. Besides, the
reign of terror led to the disappearance of important senior officers and politicians
which opened military and political space for Napoleon to rise to power in France by
1799. 6. Exile of nobles and clergy: The fear of the guillotine and the mob justice led
to self-exile of several nobles and clergy. They fled. They fled to neighboring states
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like Austria, Prussia, and from where they became Émigrés. They regrouped and
planned to attack France. The émigrés organized themselves into fighting units and
asked for assistance from these countries. 7. Rise of directory Government: The social,
economic destructions caused by reign of terror paved way for the rise of Directory
Government in France in 1795. It was instituted in 1795 as a full stop to the
destructive reign of terror in France and to end dictatorship in France.
8. End of political parties: The reign of terror led to the downfall of political clubs and
political pluralism in France. Before the reign terror, there were some political parties
that were formed such as The Jacobin under Robespierre, Cordllier under Danton and
Girondin led by Murato. But the terror machinery killed all the leaders of these
political Parties in France.
9. Other kings became more despotic: Outside France, the reign of terror made
conservative kings more conservative. e.g., the despotic kings of Austria, Russia and
Prussia became more despotic to safe guard them selves from the terrorist actions of
the French men. Even pit, the prime minister of Britain expelled all suspicious
characters and passed an act of Treason.
10. Spirit of Republicanism: Lastly, the reign of terror strengthened Republicanism

and the rise of Republican Government in France in 1792. The violence speeded up
the collapse of the Bourbon Monarchy and the execution of King Louis xvi was the
last even that ended Bourbon monarch rule in France. The rein of terror made France
a Republican government up to now.
CONCLUSION.
In summation, the reign of terror transformed France into a Republican nation. Its
effects are more inclined towards the attainment of the revolutionary ideals. The reign
of terror can therefore be evaluated within the parameters of safeguarding rather than
destroying the ideals of the revolution as elaborated in the above essay.
QUESTION 7: WHY WAS FRANCE AT WAR WITH OTHER EUROPEAN

POWERS IN THE PERIOD 1792 – 1802?
COMMENT:
It should be noted that the events of the French revolution did not go un noticed by
other European powers neither the neighboring states were left un touched by the
French revolution and its effects. The effects of the French Revolution had direct
impact on the neighboring nations and most of them looked at revolutionary France as
a great enemy.
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INTRODUCTION
The French revolution posed no mean threat in as far as the reputation of foreign
kings was concerned. Fear of revolutionary ideas, the need to help Louis VXI back to
power and the zeal of the French people to export their revolutionary ideas are among
most of the significant reasons why France had to fight endless battles during her
transition from monarchical rule to republicanism. The foregoing account shall
analyze these reasons with the help of scholarly evidence.
POINTS:
1. Fear of revolutionary ideas: Aristocrats of Europe saw the French revolution as a
threat to European monarchs. They feared revolutionary ideas of equality, liberty and
fraternity. It prompted European powers to unite and fight France to prevent the
spread of such ideas because they do not favour any despot in Europe. They had seen
how the ideas affected King Louis and how he was mistreated by the revolutionaries.
2. The need to export the revolutionary ideas: There was need to export and
internationalize the revolution by the revolutio naries. They were not contented with
the spread of the ideas only in France, but to spread it to other countries. This led to
war since other countries never wanted such. Napoleon that was seen as the carrier of
revolution to other countries was fought by the European powers and completely
defeated in 1815 at the battle of Waterloo.
3. Revolutions threatened British trade: Britain in particular was forced to declare war
on France because the French revolution threatened the British trade by attacking and
controlling her trade partners like Holland. Britain would tolerate any thing more but
not concerning her commerce and trade. That is why Great Britain had to lead all the
wars that were fought against France.
4. Fear of French domination: European powers feared that France would dominate
the European affairs. The most feared idea was of fraternity with their slogan that war
against tyrants and peace to the people. Where tyrant meant despotism. However,
there was need to suppress such a move by other powers leading to war between
France and other neighboring states.
5. The Mistreatment and killing of Louis xvi: The revolutionaries mistreated King
Louis xvi and later killed him in the cold blood in January 1793.this provoked
European kings to wage war against France. I.e., it was in a situation where King
Louis was taken as a prisoner of war in his own palace by 1793 that aroused the anger
of crown heads of Europe to mobilize war against France. Austria was forced to issue
Pilnitz declaration threatening to fight France if France did not restore the king to the
throne.
6. Prussia’s declaration: To make matters worse, Prussia too issued the Brunswick
manifesto that “If a hair of king’s head be hurt, Paris would be destroyed to the
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ground”. And to give effect to this, the allied Prussia and Austrian troops matched into
France in 1792. But could revolutionary France allow foreign dictation on their home
matters?
7. The influence of the émigrés: European countries like Prussia, Russia joined to
fight France due to strong appeal to their assistance by the French émigrés. The
France émigrés asked for arm assistance to force their way back to France to suppress
the revolutionaries and restore the ancient regime. It should be noted that the Austrian
emperor Leopold was an in law of King Louis xvi. This forced France to fight her
neighbor Austria.
8. The role of Napoleon Bonaparte: The coming of Bonaparte of the scene caused
wars. He was an army general with whom it was impossible to leave in peace because
he was too aggressive and a war monger. E.g., Napoleon Italian campaign in 1796 that
largely prompted the formation of second coalition of Britain, Russia, Austria and
Prussia against France and to drive France out of Italy, hence, fighting the
revolutionary France.
9. The declaration of the civil constitution of the clergy: The civil constitution of the
clergy forced the Catholic states to fight France. It undermined the powers and
privileges of the church and the clergy in France. The Catholic in Europe asked their
countries to fight France in order to liberate their fellow brothers and sisters in the
faith.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is now clear that the forces of the revolution were too threatening to
be ignored by the European powers. The revolutionaries we re also not prepared to
surrender to foreign invasion which would surely reinstall the ancient dynasty. These
fears make it inevitable for France to fight the revolution without foreign intervention.
Therefore, the fear of foreign powers exposed the revolution to a lot of threats as
European kings were not prepared to import revolutionary ideas.
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THE NAPOLEONIC ERA.

Rise of Napoleon to power: The reign of terror contributed to the rise of Napoleon I to
power in France. He was the young artillery officer who gained experience and
became popular when he suppressed the royalists uprising at Port Toulon. Besides, the
reign of terror led to the disappearance of important senior officers and politicians
which opened military and political space for Napoleon to rise to power in France by
1799. His first recognition by the generality of the French people came when he was
assigned to undertake the Italian adventure in command of an ill equipped and
inexperienced army. His military prowess made him to transform this army into a well
experienced and fearsome army. The Italian and Egyptian campaigns heralded more
victory for Napoleon than for the Directory which he operated under. Though the
Egyptian Campaign was a failure it still increased Napoleon's popularity back home.
He maximized the division amongst the directors to overthrow them in a Coup de tat
of Brumaire (The Coup of November 1799). His reign was characterized by peace and
economic prosperity at home and endless wars abroad. He enlarged the French
boundaries and put the whole of Europe under his feet (A. Woods).
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QUESTION 8: "Those who rise by the sword similarly falls by the sword." (C.
Palmer). Is this a fair comment on the rise and downfall of Napoleon?
COMMENT:
The interest of justice demands that you analyze the rise and downfall of Napoleon
and evaluate whether or not he came to power by violence and got from power by the
same. The question is a general accusation on Napoleon that he rode on the glories
which were founded by force and were therefore doomed to end by force. You are
therefore at liberty to argue for or against the notion. Avoid giving a narration on
Napoleon's rise to power and downfall but be analytic as you present your argument.
INTRODUCTION
The claim that Napoleon rose to prominence by force and that his career was ended
by force is a claim which needs not to be denied. The emperor rose to power by a
coup, similarly he was removed from power by the forth coalition. This has been used
as evidence to argue that the view in question is to a larger extend valid. However
ending with such justification will be tantamount to committing historical suicide as
the view in question contains some loopholes. The following account shall establish
the veracity of the above assertion which imports the idea that the emperor rose to
power by force and faced the same fate on his downfall.
POINTS
1). Napoleon's successes in the military front earned him popularity among the
French people. His career began in 1993 when he ruthlessly suppressed the royalist at
e Port Toulon. Similarly his downfall was cultivated by forceful schemes. His
several battles created more enemies than friends and this led to the emperor ’s
collapse.
2). The Italian and Egyptian campaign which he was tasked to undertake by the
Directors earned him much popularity. This pleased the French populace who viewed
him as a potential alternative for the directory. C.A. Leeds comments that In 1799
Napoleon was the most acceptable leader in France because of his success on
external front had transformed him into an invincible hero. This violence which he
used to gain popularity was to backfire since his Italian campaign created enormity
between France and Russia who also had interests in Italy. It is this enormity which
made Russia to join arms with Britain and Prussia to form the forth coalition so as
to bring him down.
3). Napoleon did not come to power by peaceful means but he did it by violence. He
betrayed the Directory by carrying out a coup in November 1799. Napoleon was also
to face the same fate as he was also betrayed by his trusted general Marshal
Bernadotte who conspired with the forth coalition against Napoleon.
4). Napoleon fought various wars to consolidate his power. In 1805 he defeated the
countries of Prussia and Austria in the battle of Austerliz.They were forced to sign the
treaty and accepted French supremacy. The Holy Roman Empire was also dissolved
and with this Pope was also come under the political supremacy of Napoleon. This
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violence upon which he laid his foundations was to work against in 1814-1815 where
all these states were compelled to go against his rule.
5).the formation of the Napoleonic dynasty and its demise is of paramount importance
if we are to do justice to the subject that is at hand. Several wars were fought to create
a dynasty. E.H.Carr argues that the dynasty was founded through massive bloodshed
and human massacres and its crumble was therefore predictable. E. Burke echoes the
same sentiments as he argues that the fall of Napoleon’s Empire was also as quick as
it emerged. Napoleon faced his fate at Waterloo in 1815.
HOWEVER
However, totally agreeing to the above proposition will be a gross violation of historic
justice as the rise of the emperor was not all in all through forceful means.
1). The weaknesses of the directory opened a gulf for Napoleon to ascend to power.
The failure of the rule of directory had played important role in creating conditions
responsible for the rise of Napoleon.
The rule of directory (1795-99) was weak and inefficient. It failed to work in cohesive
manner and this led to increasing hardships for the common masses. The rule of
directory failed to initiate any strong steps to counter the prevailing economic
difficulties. Their decision to devalue the French currency led to high inflation. The
increasing prices of necessary commodities had led to hardships in masses and they
started looking for change.
2). His administrative capability in Italy and France had inspired the French masses to
look for his leadership. He lured the support of the French people by displaying
qualitative administration abilities in times of economic strife in France (S. Steward).
This was not through forceful means as suggested by the claim in question.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, the rise of Napoleon was indeed through force and so was his downfall.
The Coup which he carried against the Directory was repaid by his fateful defeat at
Waterloo. It is therefore logical to argue that the view in question is highly valid and
any attempts to impeach its validity may not warrant entertainment in the circles of
academic scholars.
QUESTION 9: "I am the revolution." To what extend is this statement a true

reflection of Napoleon's domestic policies?
COMMENT
The question is summoning you to interrogate Napoleon's domestic’s policies and
evaluate the extent to which he preserved the ideals of the revolution. Contact an
analysis of Napoleon's reforms in France and see whether or not they reflected the
revolutionary principles. If you feel Napoleon should be castigated for betraying the
Revolution then you argue against the claim in question. As is always my advice,
avoid writing everything that you know about Napoleon's domestic policies and focus
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on addressing the demands of the question.
INTRODUCTION
Several schemes which Napoleon undertook in France's domestic affairs were aimed
at preserving the gains of the revolution. An analysis of the Emperor's civil code,
concordat, carrier open to talent, among other reforms will lead one to the consensus
that to a larger extend he was indeed the revolution itself. However totally labeling
him the revolution will be a bleach of historic justice as some of his schemes violated
revolutionary principles though this is to a limited scale. The following essay exists to
establish the truism of the question's contention.
POINTS
Most of Napoleon's schemes were a perpetuation of what had been initiated by the
revolutionary governments, the National Assembly in particular.
1). Napoleon started by codifying the French law. The code Napoleon provided
equality, liberty and fraternity. The Napoleonic code sanctified the equality of the
people, the most treasured revolutionary desire. A.Ramm argues that though political
liberty and the ability to maintain a republican government had been stripped from the
people, he afforded them in its place the assurance of individual rights. Thus he
preserved the declaration of the rights of man issued by the National Assembly in
1789.
2). Napoleon also provided religious freedom to the French people through the
Concordat. He insured religious tolerance. He recognized Catholicism as the religion
of the majority of the French, but did not make it an "established" religion like the
Church of England was in Britain. Both Protestants and Jews were allowed to practice
their religion and retain their civic rights. This was a perception of the Civil
Constitution of the Clergy issued by the National Assembly.
3). He introduced carrier open to talent in which offices were o ccupied by merit.
Languished, he promoted equality and opened all careers to those with talent. This
forced Standler to argue that Napoleon was a heir of the revolution.
3). the emperor also left the peasants in possession of the church property which they
had confiscated during the revolution. This earned him the tittle, "child of the
revolution and what the revolution sought to achieve." in the scholarly circles.
4). Napoleon made education open to everyone irrespective of social background. He
abolished the system of classes in the educational realms and all institutions in France.
D. Thompson comments that the principal of equality is one which the emperor gave
extended attention. No wonder why the French mourned bitterly when they lost him at
the Island of St. Helena.
5). Napoleon was most of all a pragmatist, willing to adapt whether his technique was
borrowed from the Revolution or from the ancient regime. He dealt with the problems
facing France in practical terms, not in the abstract. R. Lipson arguments that the
solutions Napoleon came up with leave little doubt that he was the heir and
preserver of the Revolution.
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HOWEVER
Napoleon did not totally respect the revolutionary ideals as is claimed by the verdict
in question.
1).He denied the French people their political liberty through the introduction of press
censorship in 1804. Edmund Burke laments this oppression which had again visited
the lives of the mass, Of the three key principles of the Revolution, liberty, equality,
and fraternity, it was liberty which suffered most under Napoleon. However, this view
suffers the criticism that France hadn’t established liberty before Napoleon’s rise to
power, so Napoleon hadn’t betrayed the revolution any more than his predecessors.
Whether or not this is true is purely subject to discussion.
3). The emperor also violated the revolution principles by reigning in the fashion of
the ancient, which is centralization of power. In this regard, S. Thomas' comment is
worth reproducing, "Napoleon clearly felt, like the Jacobins, that an energetic
centralized state was essential to consolidate the advances achieved by the
Revolution and, at the same time, he wished to bring about the stability many
French longed for after the upheavals of the past decade. In his eyes this meant the
need for a strong executive. Like the initial revolutionaries, Napoleon did not
believe that a monarchy necessarily conflicted with the interests of progress,
however, he did believe that ineffective rulers needed replacement. Under his
leadership, the government was centralized, and power consolidated."
4). Napoleon also created inequality between men and women. Women were not
given equal opportunities with men. Noteworthy is how education was deny to
women by the emperor. They were also denied access to property ownership. He
argued that, "......women are nothing but mere machines for producing children."
The emperor was thus turning the clock back to the pre-revolutionary period. This
forced C.H White to comment that Napoleon proved to be an amalgamation of the
Revolution and the old regime, revolutionary at heart but monarchical in practice.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the emperor indeed preserved the revolutionary ideals to a larger
extend. His civil code, the carrier open to talent and the concordat are evidence to
support the above claim without mitigation. Arguements against the validity of the
above assertion has no prospects of success in the historic circles.
QUESTION 10: Why did the European powers took so long to defeat Napoleon?
COMMENT
The question is a bit straight forward, it is asking for possible reasons why the foreign
powers could nit defeat Napoleon up to 1815. In this instance you need to analyze
both the strength of Napoleon and the weakness of his opponents. Argument your
ideas using relevant scholarly evidence.
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INTRODUCTION
A number of reasons had been put forward in trying to explain why Napoleon was on
power for such a long period of time despite his aggressive foreign policy. Among
other factors, his military genious and the weakness of the foreign powers had been
pointed as essential facts why the foreign powers found it a difficult task to defeat
Napoleon up to 1815. The following work shall discuss the possible reasons why the
European powers could not defeat Napoleon up to 1815. This shall be done with the
aid of scholarly evidence.
POINTS
Napoleon was a military genius who could utilize opportunities to his maximum
benefit.
1). His principle of divide and rule made it impossible for his opponents to join arms
against him.
2). His war method, the diamond formation of attacking the enemy at its weakest
point saw most European powers succumbing to his military prowess. The battle of
Fiedland against the Russians bears testimony to this fact.
3). The spirit of Nationalism saw Napoleon unifying disintegrated states of the same
nationality. He brought together more than 300 smaller states of Germany and created
a confederation of Rhine having 39 states. By the treaty of Pressburg Napoleon was
accepted as the savior of the confederation. These states were unlikely to revolt
against him because he was popular to them. This forced Standler to comment that,
his administrative capability in Italy and France had inspired the European masses
who were under monarchical rule to look for his leadership.
4). The revolutionary principles which Napoleon spread to the defeated states made
him to be labeled a liberator by the subject. Noteworthy is how the ltalians
welcomed the Napoleonic overloadship after their defeat in the Italian adventure.
This force C. Radolph to remark thus, "Napoleon was an epitome of peace and
order as he had proved his genius in Italy and Germany." The people could not
therefore join arms to fight against such an enlightened leader.
5). The European powers themselves were not united. There was disunity
between Russia and Prussia as Russia suspected Prussia of having interests
over the Othodox in Italy. This made it impossible to reach a consensus on how
best to deal with Napoleon.
6). The economic prosperity back home in France assisted Napoleon financially. It is
actaully argued that France enjoyed a period of economic prosperity in the period
of Napoleon. He founded the bank of France, roads were constructed and museums
were enacted. This helped Napoleon to sustain the multi- national army which he
used to carry out most of his adventures.
7). The experianced and loyal generals he used also helped Napoleon in his success
which did not work in favour of the European powers. Marshall Bernadotte is one of
the generals who gave the Austrians a hard time at Austerlitz.
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CONCLUSION.
In summation, the European powers took so long to defeat Napoleon due to both their
weakness and Napoleon's strength and military genious. The revolutionary ideas
which Napoleon was zeal to spread also helped his prolonge stay on power. This
earned him the title, "child of the revolution" in the scholarly circles.
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SECTION B: THE VIENNA SETTLEMENT AND THE CONGRESS SYSTEM.

After the defeat of Napoleon at waterloo, the European powers settled at Vienna to
decide on the future of Europe. The Great powers used the smaller states to balance
their power.
The Vienna Settlement was based on three principles, viz., restoration, legitimacy’ and
compensation. As regards the principle of restoration, it was decided to restore, as far
as possible, the boundaries and reigning families of the several European countries as
they were before the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon.
The principle of restoration was consistent with that of legitimacy which the French
statesman Talleyrand was exploiting in order to save France from further territorial
spoliation and to enable his defeated country to play an important part in the
deliberations of Europe. The Vienna Settlement restored the Bourbons in Spain,
Naples and Sicily. The House of Orange was restored in Holland.
The House of Savoy was restored in Piedmont and Sardinia. The Pope was also
restored with all his possessions in Italy. The various German princes whose
territories had been included by Napoleon in the Confederation of the Rhine were also
restored to their territories. The Swiss Confederation was also restored. The Tyrol was
restored to Austria. The right of Austria to the Austrian Netherlands was recognised
but she was allowed to exchange it for some other territory.
During the Napoleonic wars, Great Britain had captured the important Dutch colonies
of Ceylon, Cape Colony, South Africa and Guiana. Those colonies were confirmed to
her. However, with a view to compensating Holland and also to creating a strong State
on the northern frontier of France, the Austrian Netherlands were given over to
Holland. The King of Holland was made the King of the United Netherlands. Austria
was compensated for her loss of the Austrian Netherlands and shot got Lombardy and
Venetia in Italy.
One of the reasons why Prussia was given these territories was that it was intended to
make Prussia a bulwark against France. However, the result of these acquisitions was
that Prussia became the leader of Germany. These concessions added to her mineral
resources and helped her to become a great industrialized country. Prussia also
became a purely German State by the surrender of her Polish territory to Russia.
(4) With the object of maintaining the balance of power and creating a ring round
France, it was decided to enlarge and strengthen the kingdom of Sardinia. To that
kingdom, Savoy and Piedmont were restored and Genoa was added.
(5) As regards the settlement of Germany, it was decided not to restore all the petty
States which existed before the French Revolution. The Holy Roman Empire had been
abolished by Napoleon in 1806 and no attempt was made to revive it. It is true that
men like Stein advocated the unification of Germany under the supremacy of a single
Power, but Frederick William III did not show any keenness to become the leader of
Germany and Metternich had also given a promise to the Princes of South Germany
that their sovereign rights would be protected.
Neither Prussia nor Austria nor the Princes of the small German States showed any
enthusiasm for a unified Germany and so the opportunity to create a united Germany
was lost. A loose German Confederation of 38 States was established.
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There was to be a Diet at Frankfurt which was to consist of Delegates from the
various sovereign States of Germany. The Diet was to be presided over by the
Chancellor of Austria. Austria was given the right to send six Delegates to the Diet.
All the States were not given representatio n in it.
(6) Russia was allowed to retain Finland which she had conquered from Sweden. She
was also given Bessarabia which she had captured from the Turks. She also got most
of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. England occupied Heligoland in the North Sea, Malta
and the Ionian Islands in the Mediterranean, Cape Colony in South Africa, Ceylon and
other islands.
CRITIQUE OF THE VIENNA SETTLEMENT

1) However, it cannot be maintained that the Vienna Settlement was an ideal one and
many drawbacks of it can be pointed out. According to Prof Hayes, “In all these
territorial readjustments, there was little that was permanent and much that was
temporary.
The union of Holland and Belgium lasted but 15 years. The Italian and German
settlement survived but 50 years and the Polish barely a century.” Napoleon had
annexed Holland in 1811 on account of the refusal of Louis to enforce strictly the
Continental System.
However, there was no justification to group Belgium with Holland. Holland was
democratic, Protestant and Teutonic. Belgium was conservative, Catholic and the
majority of her people spoke the French language. The people of Belgium did not like
the headship of Holland and no wonder they revolted in 1830 and won their
independence.
It may be noted that England was responsib le for, this unnatural union. Her fear was
that without Holland, Belgium alone would not be able to resist French pressure and
consequently it was necessary to unite her with Holland so that France might not be
able to gobble up Belgium in one mouthful.
The union of Russia and Finland was dissolved in 1917 and that of Sweden and
Norway in 1905. The German Confederation with all its paraphernalia was destroyed
by Bismarck. The settlement of Italy was completely upset by Cavour.
(2) Another defect of the settlement was that it ignored altogether the nationalist
movement that had stirred the Poles, the Spaniards, the Italians, and the Germans. The
Polish nationalist leader Czartorysky attached himself to Czar Alexander I with a view
to securing independence for his country but he failed in his efforts. Poland was put
under the control of Russia and it was to be ruled as a separate territory.
However, it is pointed out that even one hegemony of Britain was considered
undesirable. The Congress of Vienna did not o verlook Germanic constitutionalism,
but the trouble arose on account of the reactionary policies followed afterwards by
Metternich in Germany. As regards Italy, it was pointed out that a timely devolution of
government from Vienna might have given Italy good government by Italians.
The Vienna Congress had no authority to force Austria to give Italy Home Rule. The
Congress united the kingdom of Savoy and Piedmont with republics of Genoa and
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Nice. The union appeared to be temporary and there was a lot of bitterness in Genoa
and Nice.
(3) The hopes of the liberals were frustrated. Rulers who were restored by the Vienna
Settlement set up reactionary regimes in their countries and there was repression
everywhere. This was particularly so in Spain and Naples where the Bourbons were
restored. Metternich himself tried to police Europe.Wherever liberalism raised its
head, it was crushed. Liberal ideas were regarded as daggers. The Protocol of Troppau
helped the European States to interfere in the internal affairs of other States.
Metternich’s own view was that “what the European people want is not liberty but
peace.”
(4) According to Prof Hayes, the Vienna Settlement was defective in so far as the
people were regarded as so many pawns in the game of dynastic aggrandize ment.
(5) According to Cruttwell, “It was mean and hypocritical not to extend the doctrine
of legitimacy of Republics. Both Venice and Genoa had a longer and more glorious
life of independence than many monarchs, but both were extinguished without a
murmur in the supposed interests of securing North Italy against France.”
(6) According to Grant and Temperley, “It has been customary to denounce the
peace-makers of Vienna as reactionary and illiberal in the extreme. It is indeed true
that they represented the old regime and were, to a large extent, untouched by the new
ideas. But they represented the best and not the worst of the old regime, and their
settlement averted any major war in Europe for forty years. According to their lights
the settlement was a fair one. France was treated with leniency, and the adjustments of
the Balance of Power and territory were carried out with the scrupulous nicety of a
grocer weighing out his wares.
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THE RESTORED BOBOURNS IN FRANCE.

The principle of legitimacy followed at the Vienna congress saw the restoration of the
Bobourn dynasty to the throne in France. This was done in the name of Louis XVII.
The restored bobourns were however advised to rule with a constitution so as to avoid
future revolutions in France. Louis VXII emp loyed some revolutionary ideals in his
reign whilst Charles X pledged that ".......l would rather chop wood than reign in the
fashion of the king of England." Charles X therefore tirelessly worked hard to
liquidate the gains of the revolution. This explains why his reign ended in a
revolution.
QUESTION 11: Discuss the view that the restored bobourns in France learnt
nothing and forgot nothing.
COMMENT
The view in question is an accusation that the restored bobourns reign in the fashion
of their forefathers and they adopted nothing from the revolution. The diction of the
sentiments makes the view in question highly dubious. Can we really say the
bobourns learnt nothing? If so then we will not have a two sided essay because there
wont be any critique to give. What is more appropriate is that the bobourns learnt very
little from the revolution but they forgot nothing from the ancient regime. Display
analytical skills as you address this question because it is highly critical.
INTRODUCTION.
A heated debate is still in existence as to whether or not the restored bobourns actually
learnt absolutely nothing from the revolution. The fact that they introduced repressive
measures like press censorship, lattres de catchet, and Charles X even dissolved the
Charter has been used as evidence that they indeed forgot nothing. However, the fact
that Louis XVIII ruled with a charter and carried on with some revolutionary ideas
like carrier open to talent is evidence that the view in question is unjustified. It is
more justified to argue that the restored bobourns learnt little and forgot nothing. The
following work exist to critique the validity of the above assertion which imports the
idea that the restored bobourns buried all the revolutionary ideals and reintroduced the
ancient regime.
POINTS
1). The restored bobourns are on record of pledging the resumption of the hated
latres de catchet. Political suspects were imprisoned without trial. In 1820,
Louis XVIII adopted repressive measures. Charles X when he assumed power
was too eager to turn the clock back to the pre-revolutionary period.
2). They are both on record of introducing press censorship. In 1820, Louis XVIII
abandoned his liberal reforms and adopted the ancient fashion of ruling. He
introduced press censorship in which the media was heavily censored. A. Ramm
argues that by 1816, there were about seventy -six newspapers in France but after
1820 they were reduced to nine and Charles X reduced them to three which were
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owned by the state. This was against the revolutionary principle of liberty hence the
bobourns can be said to have learnt almost nothing.
3). Charles X even went to the extremes of compensating the clergy for what they had
lost during the revolution. Standler submits that Charles X wasted the State funds by
compensating the clergy whilst the workers were complaining of salaries and this
threatened to visit prejudice to the works of the revolutionaries. This has seduced
most scholars into romanticizing the conservative nature of the restored bobourns.
4). Charles X also worked tirelessly to dissolve the 1815 Charter. He is said to have
remarked thus "l would rather chop wood than reign in the fashion of the king of
England." This shows that Charles X was not prepared to accept any lessons
from the revolution. This forced D. Thompson to argue that the restored
bobourns in France were actually new wine in old bottles.
5). Charles X also restored the Church to its pre-1789 footing. The church was given
its full authority and privileges. S. Bloomberg laments the doom which befell the
French people. His comment is therefore worth reproducing, ".....the poor peasant
were threatened by Charles X's reforms which were aimed at swallowing all the gains
of the revolution." Leeds however identified a weakness in Charles X and submit that
unlike his predecessor, Louis XVIII, Charles X failed to learn that the ancient regime
could not be established and as such he was doomed to meet the same fate as his
forefathers.
HOWEVER
It will be an overstatement to say the bobourn learnt absolutely nothing from the
revolution.
1. Louis VXIII ruled with a Charter
2). the first five years of Louis VXIII's reign were characterized by liberalism as he
allowed parliamentary debates to be published.
3). Louis XVIII also recognized freedom of worship. Though the catholic was made
the church of the state, other religions were not prohibited.
4). Carrier open to talent was recognized by these bobourns.
CONCLUSION
The view in question which presupposes that the restored bobourns learnt nothing is
foul. Its an overstatement since these bobourns learnt something from the revolution
as explored by the above essay. What is acceptable is that they learnt little and forgot
nothing. The view in question is therefore highly dubious.
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LOUIS PHILLIPE (THE CITIZEN KING): “For eighteen years of his reign,
France was bored.” (Lamartine the French poet)
Louis Philippe's government was very unstable from 1830 - 1840. It was
characterized by revolts, strikes and demonstrations. These were master minded by
republicans who felt cheated in 1830 since they had played a leading role in the
revolution of 1830. They had wanted a republican government but had failed because
of the fear of the possibility of war with other monarchial governments in Europe.
From 1830-1840, ten different chief ministers (prime ministers) held office. Adolph
Thiers was the last who resigned in 1840 because of dissatisfaction over Mehmet All's
affairs. From 1840 - 1848, Guizot's cabinet held power. His policies greatly
contributed to the downfall of Louis Philippe in 1848.
QUESTION 12: Why despite his liberal policies did Louis Philippe's reign ended
in a revolution in 1948?
COMMENT
The question is one sided. It is asking for reasons why the July monarch was removed
from power by a revolution despite his liberal policies. You need to cantact an
analysis on what angered the French people which made them to carry out a
revolution against their king. In this instance an analysis on both domestic and foreign
policies is necessary.
INTRODUCTION
A number of intertwined reasons had been put foward in trying to explain why the
French people revolted against their liberal king. Louis Philippe's inglorious foreign
policy and his simple habits has been pointed out as vital reasons. The following work
exists to explore these reasons in detail. This shall be done with the aid of scholarly
evidence.
POINTS.
1). Corruption and embezzlement of funds
Corruption, bribery and embezzlement of funds characterized Louis Philippe's 18
years reign. The middle class who dominated key government positions and the
chamber of deputies made corruption and bribery part of their lifestyle. Guizot, chief
minister (1840-1848) rigged elections and maintained a strong hold over the chamber
of deputies through bribery and corruption in awarding tenders. According to D.
Richards; Louis Philippe's government was like a joint stock company which was
using up national wealthy and whose profit was distributed between ministers,
members of the national assembly and limited voters.
2). Personality and character
Louis Philippe's humble personality and character was a personal weakness that
reduced his popularity. Consequently, he lived a very simple life style e.g. he walked
freely on streets unguarded holding a green umbrella, lit his own study fire and lived
principally on soup. This made some sections of the Frenchmen particularly the
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royalists and Bonapartists who were used to seeing their kings living luxuriously
to disown him as unworthy to be a king.
3) Inglorious foreign policy
Louis Philippe's inglorious foreign policy was a disappointment to the glory
seekers, Bonapartists, liberals, Catholics and revolutionaries. He pursued a
non- interventionist foreign policy in order to avoid wastage of resources and conflicts
with other powers like Britain. For example, he refused to intervene in the 1830
revolutions in Belgium, Italian states and Poland not excluding the Syrian war of
1831 -184 1. This made him to be regarded as a person who was incompetent of
reactivating and consolidating France's high status in Europe that had been
established by Napoleon 1.
F. Steward submits that Louis Philippe was not bellicose (warlike), he was a man
of peace who did not wish to find himself in a hostile relationship with any of his
neighbors. It should be emphasized that Louis Philippe's inglorious foreign policy
was a great disappointment to the Frenchmen. This intensified internal opposition
against his rule and by 1848 he was very unpopular even to his legislators. This
forced Lamartine, the French poet to comment that Louis Philippe's reign was
eighteen years of boredom.
4). The Belgium Revolution (1830)
The Belgium revolution of1830 was an event that put Louis Philippe in a
precarious position. The various political groups wanted Philippe to assist the
Belgians for various reasons. However, Louis Philippe knew very well that any
assistance to the Belgians would be a violation of the Vienna settlement to which
France was a signatory. He therefore decided not to assist the Belgians. This angered
the French people who were used to Napoleon's glorious foreign policy. B. Standler
submits that the Bonapartists suffered great depression during Louis Philippe's reign
which was characterized by a passive foreign policy.
5) The return of Napoleon's body
Louis Philippe's return of Napoleon's body in 1846 was a boomerang that
contributed to his downfall. To satisfy the revolutionaries and the Bonapartists,
Louis Philippe requested to be given Napoleon's body from St. Helena, brought it
to France and laid him in the most magnificent of resting places at the Invalids. Some
roads and streets were named after Napoleon. He further decorated Versailles with
pictures of revolutionary events and periods. However, this rekindled the memories of
Napoleon I's achievements and when the Frenchmen tried to compare it to Louis
Philippe's, they realized as Lamartime put it that "France was bored". In this regard, J.
Smith's comment is worth reproducing, "It aroused Napoleonic nostalgia and
strengthened Bonapartism under the leadership of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte III, a
nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte III." Thus, the event boomeranged by reducing Louis
Philippe's popularity and conditioning his downfall by 1848.
6) Middle class/Bourgeoisie oriented policy
Louis Philippe pursued middle class oriented policies and programs at the expense of
the Frenchmen. They monopolized key government positions and the National Guard.
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F. Burke argues that, Louis Philippe set up a government of the middle class, by the
middle class and for the middle class. His popularity was eventually confined to the
middle class and no wander that he fell in 1848 following desertion by the middle
class after the Spanish marriage in 1846.
7) Unrealistic Economic policy
Louis Philippe's labor policy was unfair to the working class. The government did not
restrain the middle class's exploitation and oppression in form of low payments, long
working hours, poor sanitation and accommodation. These led to poverty, famine, low
standard of living and unemployment. Trade unions that the workers had formed to
voice their grievances were banned. This ultimately invited a revolution.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Louis Philippe's domestic policies which was characterized by
corruption, neglection of workers and ignorance of peoples' needs and his foreign
policy which was passive and inglorious are vital reasons for the revolution which
chased him from power as shown in the above analysis.
QUESTION 13: Why despite his failure in foreign adventures and boring
domestic policy did Louis Philippe stayed in power up to 1848?
COMMENT
Louis Philippe was on power for fourteen years yet he added almost nothing to the
granary of France in both foreign and domestic adventures. Now the question is
tasking you to go through Louis Philippe's policies and suggest reasons why he
retained power for such a long period.
INTRODUCTION.
A lot of ink had been spilt on the academic desk in trying to explain why Louis
Phillipe retained power for such a long period despite his failures at home and abroad.
His liberal policy and economic prosperity had been pointed out as vital reasons. The
following work shall look at the July monarch's domestic and foreign adventures and
suggest reasons for his prolonged stay in power.
POINTS
Louis Philippe's government was constantly challenged right from 1830 when he rose
to power. Internally, there were revolts, strikes, demonstrations, assassination attempts
on his life and conspiracies as he observed, "It is only in hunting me that there is no
close season".
1) Louis Philippe's peaceful foreign policy was the basis for his survival up to 1848. It
made him to legitimize his power amongst European powers who were scared of
revolutionary France. Although he was opposed as a coward, his failure to interfere in
events outside France like Belgium, Italy and Poland won him the friendship of the
1815 Vienna signatories who would have fought and overthrown him the way they
did to Napoleon I.
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2) Similarly, Philippe's peaceful reign won him the confidence of a large section of
the Frenchmen who were fed up with the vicious circle of violence and bloodshed
since 1789. The peasants and workers had suffered enough in 1789, 1792 -94, 1815 -
1817 and 1830 .All they wanted was a stable and pe aceful era for economic
development. S. Standler submits that, under Philippe's administration, there was
economic progress and France was second to none other than Britain in Europe.
Although this was monopolized by the middle class, it nevertheless helped to cool
down criticism against him with the exception of the socialists.
3) Philippe's survival can also be gauged from the Anglo-Franco alliance that he
forged. He realized that France under a constitutional monarchy was bound to be
isolated from conservative and despotic powers like Russia, Austria and Prussia.
Burke argues that Louis Philippe's fear to upset European powers made him to dance
to the times of Britain and became Palmer stone's rubberstamp in Europe. It earned
him of official and diplomatic co-operation which the despotic powers could not give
him.
3). The fact that France was not declared a republic in 1830 saved Philippe from the
hostility of divine monarchs who would have fought him right from the beginning of
his reign.
4) Louis Philippe's humble personality and simple lifestyle and helped him to
consolidate his reign in France. Having suffered poverty and hard life in exile, Louis
Philippe developed a simple lifestyle that helped him to gain and retain power, e.g. he
walked freely on streets unguarded holding a green umbrella, shave his own beards
and sent his children to the common man's school. This saved French resources that
were used for socio-economic development. His simple lifestyle earned him the
support Of the common man who used to suffer excessive taxation to supplement
extravagancy of the royalists.
5) Louis Philippe's policy of neutrality on religious affairs also enabled his survival
for 18 years. He granted freedom of worship, which Charles x had undermined by
making Catholicism the state religion. The concordat that Napoleon had signed
with the Pope was maintained and the government continued to nominate Bishops
and pay salaries of the clergy. In 1831, Judaism was put on an equal footing with
Christianity. The government began to pay salaries of Jewish rabbis just as it paid
the protestant reverends and catholic priests. These gained Louis Philippe support
from different religious groups, hence consolidation of power up to 1848.
6) The absence of revolutions in Europe that would have inspired Frenchmen against
Louis Philippe also made him safe for 18 years. Metternich system was very
effective in suppressing revolutionary movements from 1830-1847. The fact that
the Frenchmen were the first to revolt (Feb 1848) following the Italians (Jan 1848)
is a clear testimony that absence of such a revolution prior to 1848 helped Louis
Philippe to survive for the 18 years.
7) Ideological difference amongst the opposition also accounts for the survival of
Louis Philippe up to 1848. The liberals wanted a more democratic and liberal
system of government, republicans demanded an expanded franchise, legitimists
desired consolidation of their privileges, socialists aspired for nationalization of
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property and establishment of state workshops and Bonapartists were nostalgic about
the revival of Napoleonic influence in Europe. F. Burke argues that these factions
could not sacrifice their ideological interest for the purpose of defeating Philippe who
was their common enemy. Apart from leaning towards the middle class, Philippe
played the opposition well. He was not an ultra-royalist as the Bourbons; neither was
he a republican, a Bonapartist nor an extreme liberal. Thus, ideological difference
amongst the opposition and Philippe's neutrality helped him to survive for 18years.
8) Although Philippe was surrounded by a cocktail of pressure groups since 1830, he
managed to survive for 18years because it was not until 1840's that they intensified
their criticism of him, Louis Blank (a socialist) gained prominence from 1840's when
the conditions of workers reached frightening levels.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Louis Philippe's liberal policies, his simple habits, and his passive
foreign policy has been among many reasons which made him to stay on power for
eighteen years. These reasons worked in unison since attempts at the king's life were
made throughout his reign.
QUESTION 14: "His foreign policy had nothing to offer France." Is this a fair
comment on Louis Philippe's contact of foreign policy?
COMMENT
The claim in question presupposes that Louis Philippe's foreign policy was a total
failure. If one tend to swim with the tide then it follows that the essay will be one
sided since there won’t be any achievements to talk about. Therefore, the claim in
question is a little bit exaggerated. What is acceptable is that Louis Philippe's foreign
policy offered the French people very little. Analyze the question along this line of
argument starting with his failures then proceeding to the little that France benefited.
INTRODUCTION
A heated debate is still in existence as to whether or not Louis Philippe's foreign
policy actually added nothing into the granary of France. It is very much unjust to
dismiss the citizen king as a total failure because he made considerable success in his
foreign adventure. What is acceptable is that his foreign policies actually offered the
French people very little. The following work shall critique the veracity of the above
assertion which imports the idea that the foreign policy of the July monarch added
nothing to the glory of France. This shall be done with the aid of scholarly evidence.
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POINTS
1). He refused to be moved by pressure from the liberals, Bonapartists and glory
seekers to intervene in the 1830 revolutions in Belgium, Italian states and Poland not
excluding the Syrian war of 1831 -1841. This made him to be regarded as a person
who was incompetent of reactivating and consolidating France's high status in Europe
that had been established by Napoleon 1. E. H. Carr argues that Louis Philippe's
inglorious foreign policy was a disappointment to the glory seekers, Bonapartists,
liberals, Catholics and revolutionaries. This neutral policy diminished the French
glory in Europe.
2). the Belgium Revolution (1830)
The Belgium revolution of1830 was an event that put Louis Philippe in a precarious
position. The various political groups wanted Philippe to assist the Belgians for
various reasons. The Bonapartists wanted Philippe to revive French military glory in
Belgium that had once been under Napoleon Bonaparte I. The Catholics hated the
Dutch Protestants and preferred Catholic control of education, press and state
amongst others. However, Philippe decided not to assist the Belgians. This
threatened to visit prejudice to his reputation at home since every section of the
French people was bored.
3). The Belgian candidature
European powers accepted the Belgium independence from the Dutch rule but
under some conditions and one was that Belgium should choose a king acceptable
to the great powers. The Belgians promptly offered the throne to Duke of
Nemours who was Louis Philippe's second son. Britain openly opposed the choice
and Louis Philippe turned down the offer in favor of Leopold Soxe Coburg (a British
choice) who was accepted by the Belgians out of their desire for freedom. This was a
diplomatic victory for Britain and a loss for France. He was criticized for bending
too low and promoting British supremacy over France.
4). The1830 revolution in Italy
Napoleon I’s conquest and re-organization of Italy had instilled the spirit of
nationalism amongst the Italians. The Vienna settlement of1815 ignored this and
instead gave Austria direct and indirect influence over the Italian states. The
Italians therefore rose in a revolt in 1830 against Metternich's unfortunate policies.
Italians and the liberals in France wanted Louis Philippe to give military
assistance. However, he was not slow to declare that he had no desire to clash with
Austria over the situation in Italy. He is said to have remarked "..........my government
is opposed to all foreign intervention in the peninsular." A. Woods aptly submits that
this was a great disappointment to the liberals and Bonapartists who viewed the
revolution as a heaven sent opportunity to rekindle (revive) French influence in Italy.
5). the 1830 Revolution in Poland
Like the Italians, Polish nationalism had been strengthened by Napoleon's
conquest and reorganization of the Grand Dutchy of Warsaw from 1807. This was
tampered with at the Vienna settlement of 1815 by the Great powers. S. White
captures how the Vienna Settlement tampered with the Polish states. his comment is
therefore worth reproducing, "Poland was shared as a wedding cake between
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Austria, Prussia and Russia." Their desire for independence took them to the
revolution in 1830. The liberals in France argued Louis Philippe to support the Poles
in their struggle. Aware of a possibility of fighting Austria, Prussia and Russia, Louis
Philippe refused to assist the Poles. So as early as 1830, the revolt died down.
Although he avoided war with the great powers, his popularity at home was
undermined. This again added nothing to the glory of France.
6). The Syrian question (1840)
In the Greek war of independence, Mehemet Ali of Egypt had helped the Sultan
of Turkey after being promised territorial rewards amongst which was Syria.
However, the Sultan did not keep his promise and Mehemet Ali occupied Syria
forcefully. The war was sparked off between Egypt and Turkey over Syria. Louis
Philippe sent French troops to fight alongside Egypt against Turkey. It threatened
other powers particularly Britain and Russia who pledged to fight Mehemet Ali and
his ally (France). This forced Louis Philippe to resort to his usual policy of "do
nothing" and withdrew the French soldiers. The 1840 London conference in which
France was not invited gave Egypt part of Syria. This intensified opposition against
Louis Philippe to the extent that his chief minister Adolph Thiers resigned his post.
This event injured French glory in Europe.
7). French imperialistic designs over Tahiti Island
In 1840, Louis Philippe conquered Tahiti one of the islands in the south pacific. This
satisfied the glory seekers and militants in France. However, Tahiti was so close to S.
America where Britain had built a commercial empire, so she threatened France to
withdraw. As usual, Louis Philippe withdrew the French troops from the island in
1843 in favor of Britain. This frustrated a large section of the Frenchmen especially
glory seekers who accused him of cowardice,
8). The 1846 Swiss Civil War
1846, a civil war erupted between Catholics and Protestants in Switzerland over
the form of government be adopted. The Protestants were secretly assisted by Britain
and the Catholics appealed for French resistance. The British foreign secretary
Palmer stone outmaneuvered Philippe by blindfolding him that was organizing a
conference to settle the Swiss crisis. Indeed before the conference sat, the Swiss
Protestants had defeated the Catholics. The French Catholics felt betrayed.
HOWEVER
1). The Spanish marriage 1846
In 1846, Princess Isabella and her sister Infanta of Spain were still not yet married.
Royalists were sought from Europe to marry them. France a nd Britain agreed that
Isabella was to be married to Francisco Duke de Cadiz, a German Prince ( favored
by Britain) and her sister Infanta Maria was to get married to Duke de
Montpensier, a French prince. However, Philippe and Guizot organized and celebrated
the marriage of Infanta on the same day (October 10th 1846) when Isabella got
married to the German prince. This was a triumph for Philippe, which so ably and so
completely satisfied the glory seekers. G. Thomas is forced to submit that Louis
Philippe took a bold stand and registered some degree of success over Palmer
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stone. This is enough evidence that Louis Philippe' foreign adventures were not
totally passive as suggested by the claim in question.
2). Louis Philippe regained some prestige when other powers gave him freedom to
repel Dutch invasion, which he successfully accomplished in 1831. Nevertheless, he
was still accused of cowardice only to act when told to do so. He should however be
credited for being bold enough to punish the Dutch which added some glory into the
French granary.
3). Control of Algeria
Algeria was colonized by France in 1830 under Charles X. He had occupied only the
coastal areas with only 20.000 settlers. However, Abdel Kader declared a jihad against
the French. Philippe sent General Bugeaud with about 100.000 troops who captured
Abdel Kader in 1847 and consequently the whole of Algeria. By 1848, the number of
settlers had risen to about 100.000. This was the beginning of the French colonial
empire. This is testimony that the view in question is highly dubious as Philipe added
something to the glory of France though it is very little.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the view that Philippe's foreign adventure added nothing to the
granary of France is highly dubious. His contact with the Spanish Princesses and the
Algerian adventure is testimony that the citizen king added something to the glory of
France. What is undeniable is the fact that he added very little to France and not
nothing. The view in question is therefore unfounded and has no prospects of success
in the circles of most scholars.
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LOUIS NAPOLEON (NAPOLEON III) “the Emperor had a dynamic

personality, pursued forceful policies and engaged in military diplomacy.”
(A. Woods)
In December 1840, the remains of Napoleon I, who had died in 1821 in exile on St
Helena, were brought back to France to be buried in Paris in Les Invalides.
Louis-Napoleon decided this was the right time to try to take power. He arrived in
Boulogne-Sur-Mer on the night of 5 to 6 August 1840, but this attempt was also a
failure. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, and incarcerated in the fortress of
Ham in the Somme (northern France). Though imprisoned, Louis-Napoleon was
allowed to read, study, and receive visits. There he wrote an important book, a
political manifesto against the poverty of the working class, entitled: “The Extinction
of pauperism.”
But, Louis Napoleon escaped from Ham on 25 May 1846.
The conquest of power: a Bonaparte president of the Republic! (1848-1852)
In 1848 a revolution caused the downfall of King Louis-Philippe I, known as the July
Monarchy. The Second French Republic was established, to be headed by a President
of the Republic elected by universal male suffrage (all men over 21 could vote,
regardless of their earnings). The president was to govern with the help of a council of
ministers; a National Legislative Assembly was to be formed in which to discuss and
pass laws. Backed by the Party of Order, Louis-Napoleon presented himself as
Presidential candidate, and on 10 December 1848 he won the election with 74% of
votes. He became President of the new Republic, for a single term of four years. In
1851, he tried to change the constitution in order to run again but the Legislative
Assembly refused. Moreover, Napoleon did not approve the Law of 31 May 1850,
which limited the universal male suffrage.
Louis Napoleon decided to organize a coup d’état (a French term meaning, the
overthrow of the government, usually by military means), and he chose the da te of 2
December 1851. This was an important symbolic date: his uncle, Napoleon, had been
crowned Emperor on 2 December 1804, and a year later, on 2 December 1805,
Napoleon was to win the battle of Austerlitz.
On 20 and 21 December 1851, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte held a referendum, in other
words, he asked French voters if they approved of the coup (voters had to answer
“yes” or “no” to the question). Seventy-six percent of voters accepted the coup and
thus confirmed Louis-Napoleon in power.
In January 1852, a new constitution gave power to the Prince President for a period of
ten years. In December 1848, Louis-Napoleon lived at the Palais de l’Elysée (the
Presidential Palace). In January 1852, he moved into the Tuileries (the New Imperial
Palace).
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QUESTION 15: "Napoleon 3 had a dynamic pe rsonality, pursue d forceful

policies and engaged in military diplomacy." Why then did he fail?
COMMENT
The question gives an overview of Napoleon's leadership personality and his contact
of policies which were similar to those of his nephew (Napoleon the great). However,
despite all these qualities and policies he still failed. You are therefore invited to
contact an analysis of the reasons for the failure of the Emperor. You need to analyze
both internal and external. Do not lose focus and end up arguing on whether or not he
had a dynamic personality or whether or not his policies were forceful. You are only
asked for reasons which made the Emperor to fail despite the qualities stated herein.
INTRODUCTION
A lot of ink had been spilt on the academic desk in trying to explain why Napoleon 3's
reign ended in a disaster despite the leadership abilities which he displayed. His
dynamism had been included amongst the reasons which are held responsible for his
downfall. The following work seeks to analyze the reasons which led to the crumble
of the second emperor. This shall be done with the aid of scholarly evidence.
POINTS
Napoleon 3's down fall is attributed to a number of intertwined reasons. Both his
domestic and foreign policy worked i unison so as to bring the emperor down from
the throne.
1). The first ten years of his reign were characterized by dictatorship which crippled
his reputation. He barned most political clubs, introduced press censorship, and used
secret police to suppress opposition. It is in this regard that C. Berliner's comment
is worth reproducing, "The first period of his reign, up to 1860, is often called the
authoritarian Empire. Members of the Legislature were mostly in favor of the
Emperor. The opposition, either republican or monarchist, did not get much of a
say, because of the censorship of the press." This authoritarian rule obviously invited
doom on his reputation as it was against the revolutionary demands.
2). Napoleon gave workers the right to strike. He thus became unpopular to the elite.
3). The Emperor's final ten years of reign which was characterized by liberalism saw
the birth of many political clubs with different ideologies which criticized him. This
visited prejudice to his reputation.
4). Napoleon 3's dynamism costed him his throne. He successfully helped the Italian
unification by defeating the Austrians at Magenta and Solferino. However he
withdrew before completing the unification. This made him unpopular among the
republicans and liberals.
5). The Franco Prussian war can also share the blame. A. White even argues that by
declaring war on Prussia, Napoleon 3 Actually signed his death warrant.
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6). His old age also made him commit serious mistakes in his foreign adventures
which brought down his empire. eg his misconduct on the Austro -Prussian war.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, both domestic and foreign policies helped in bringing Napoleon down
to his knees. Several blunders made in the foreign adventures contributed
considerably to the demise of the second empire.
QUESTION 16: "He tried to please both but satisfied neither." How far do you
agree with this view of Napoleon 3's foreign policy?
COMMENT
The interest of justice demands that we look at Napoleon’s aims in each of his foreign
adventures and see the extent to which the adventure achieved the aims of the second
emperor. In each foreign policy identify the groups which he wanted to please and
show how he failed to please either of them. You are generally interrogating the
foreign policies which were a failure. You then proceed to explore those policies
which were a success and give them as a critique to the claim in question.
INTRODUCTION
The view that Napoleon 3's foreign policies failed to achieve its aims of quenc hing
the thirst of every Frenchman should be regarded as valid to a magnified scale. The
Italian Campaign, Mexican adventure and the Franco Prussian war bears witness to
this fact. However, totally agreeing to the above claim will be tantamount to
committing historical suicide as the view in question contains some loopholes. The
following work shall establish the validity of the above assertion which imports the
idea that the Emperor wanted to please all circles in France but managed to please
none.
POINTS
1). In Italy, Napoleon III supported the efforts of Victor Emmanuel II (1820-1878),
king of Piedmont-Sardinia, to unify Italy. The French armies defeated the Austrians
at Magenta (4 June 1859) and Solferino (24 June 1859). This campaign was initially a
success and he managed to capture the support of the revolutionaries, royalists,
republicans among other groups. However, he lost the support of the Catholics since
the Italian Unification was going to disturb the peace of the Papal States and arrest the
political powers of the Pope. Napoleon was also bound to fight his garrison which
was protecting the Papal States if he continued with the adventure. In a bid to please
both the revolutionaries and the Catholics, Napoleon 3 abruptly withdrew from the
Italian unification and confiscated Savoy and Nice (March 1860). This angered both
because his dynamism was interpreted as cowardice by the French majority.
2). between 1861 and 1867, Napoleon III tried to conquer Mexico to install a regime
that would be favorable to France and help him develop his business in the Americas.
But it was a failure. He abandoned Maximillian who he wanted to assume the
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Mexican throne and this angered the royalists and the revolutionaries since this
adventure heralded American victory over France. E. H. Carr submits that the
Mexican adventure was more of a road to the second Waterloo.
3). The Austro-Prussian war was one which pleased none in France. The royalists and
the Catholics wanted Napoleon 3 to intervene in support of Austria who was also
a catholic. The revolutionaries also wanted the intervention of France simply to add
its glory. Neither of them was pleased by the Emperor's decision of neutrality.
4). The France Prussian war was one which costed Napoleon his throne. He foolishly
declared war on Prussia knowing too well that his army was ill. F. Burke aptly
captured the humiliation which France went through, his comment is therefore
worth reproducing, "Napoleon III, whose health was failing, was the head of a
badly-prepared French army, which suffered a succession of defeats. On 1
September 1870, the Prussians were victorious at Sedan and Napoleon III was
taken prisoner." This war saw the death of the second empire and the birth of the
third republican.
HOWEVER
His foreign adventures were not all in all displeasing. He engaged in forceful policies
which added glory to France.
1). In the Crimean War (1854-1856), France allied itself with Britain and the Ottoman
Empire against Russia, and won a victory that gave it an important place in
Europe.
2). The colonial Empire continued to expand under Napoleon III: in New Caledonia
(1853), Africa (Senegal, creation of the port of Dakar in 1857; Gabon, 1862),
Asia (Cochin campaign, now Vietnam, 1858-1862); and the French protectorate
Cambodia (1863-1949).
3). After a conquest which started in 1830 in which Algeria was annexed in 1848 and
divided into three provinces, which then became French departments, namely Oran,
Algiers and Constantine. Kabylie was also conquered by Napoleon 3 in 1857.
CONCLUSION.
The foreign policy of Napoleon 3 was indeed an attempt to please all circles of the
Frenchman but were not effective enough to yield the desired results. His policies
were muddled up and ended up pleasing no one. It is therefore logical, as paraded by
the above analysis, to argue that the emperor indeed tried to please both but satisfied
neither.
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THE ITALIAN UNIFICATION (Mazzini the idealist, Cavour the realist and
Garibaldi the Soldier.
During the first half of the 19th century, only aristocrats, intellectual, and upper
middle class took the cause for unification. The masses showed no concern. However,
the people with a passion for unification started to form secret societies, namely the
Carbonari. Although at first, they only demanded more rights from their respective
government, the cause began to grow. By 1820, the Carbonari were involved in
numerous failed revolutions against the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, the Kingdom of
Sardinia, Bolonga, and other Italian states. Ho wever, the Austrian Empire crushed all
of these revolutions; thus leading to more resentment from the Italians. The soul and
spirit of the Carbonari and the revolutions was a man named Giuseppe Mazzini.
Mazzini was an idealized who wanted not only wanted a united Italy, but an Italy with
a republican form of government. Mazzini brought the campaign for unification into
the mainstream when in 1831 he created Young Italy, a group created for the sole
purpose to spread the ideas unification, revolutions, and republicanism. In 1846, a
liberal pope, Pius IX, was elected who enacted numerous reforms. Soon, other states
followed but these reform movements were not enough. A series of uprising known as
the Revolution of 1848 occurred throughout Europe including France, Germany, the
Austrian Empire, and northern Italy. The revolution also occurred in the Kingdom of
Two Sicilies were the king signed a constitution. In the Papal States, radical took over
Rome, causing the Pope to flee. In the absence of the pope, Gariba ldi and Mazzini
created a republic called the Roman Republic. In Piedmont, after the insistence of
nationals, the King Charles Albert sent to Lombardy in their fight for freedom from
Austrian rule.
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QUESTION 17: In what ways do the unification of Italy and Germany resemble
and different from other?
COMMENT
The question requires one to contact an analysis on the differences and similarities
between circumstances surrounding the unifications of these nations and the methods
of unification used by Cavour and Bismarck in the unification of their respective
nations.
ESSAY
The unification of Italy, like the unification of Germany, was mainly the achievement
of one of the states in much country, namely Piedmont in Italy and Prussia in
Germany. Both of them were monarchical aristocratic governments on the outset.
However, Piedmont had a liberal constitution, and can be said of the creation of the
liberalism from 1848. Whilst Prussia remained a aristocratic monarchy under the rule
of the Chancellor Bismarck who greatly opposed the rising of the liberalism as he was
an intelligent and obedient servant of the Prussian military monarchy.
Both of the unifications were not totally achieved by Prussia and Piedmont. They
were the results of the indirect and direct conseq uence of the international affairs and
specific circumstance. Both of Cavour and Bismarck primarily aimed not at the
unification of all the states in their countries, Cavour merely wanted to build up a
northern Italy excluding of the southern Italian states whilst Bismarck merely wanted
to set up a large Prussian Empire. Both of them were anti- nationalist and
anti-revolutionary, they even wanted to prevent the cause of the unification of their
countries.
Both Italy and Germany were given a valuable chance to unity as the old order of
Europe had already been broken up by Napoleon III and Russia, the defender of the
Holy Alliance, which was strongly against the liberalism and nationalism, was
weakened by the Crimean War and thus could no longer intervene in their cause of
unification.
Both Piedmont and Prussia had a dead enemy on their ways to unification and this
was Austria. Austria continued to assert a dominant position in the German
Confederation and create considerate influence in Italy by holding the two important
state, Lombardy and Venetia. Thus both Prussia and Piedmont had to wipe out the
Austria influence in order to unify their countries. Both of them sought the assistance
of France especially Piedmont. Prussia only needed the neutrality of France for her to
deal with Austria by means of a national war---- Austro-Prussian War. However,
Piedmont was too weak to fight against Austria single-handed. Cavour had to seek the
France military assistance in the Franco-Sardinian alliance against Austria---
Austro-Sardinian War.
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Both the unification of Italy and Germany were the consequent result of the outcry of
principle of nationality since 1815 and this force was further reinforced by the
resolutions in both Piedmont and the Italian states and Prussia and the other German
states. The 1848 Revolution was a turning point in the history of both states. After the
revolutions, Prussia and Piedmont began to emerge as the leadering states of
unification especially referred to Italy. The Italian saw the task of unification of Italy
could only be shouldered by Piedmont after the Pope had refused to aid in the
Austro-Piedmontese War. However, Prussia was considered as the most and suitable
one for the task of unification only after the Austro-Prussian War which formally
excluded Austria from the North German Confederation. Prussia, though gradually in
gaining more popularity in the North was not very popular in the south states which
turned to France as their protector against Prussia, her traditional enemy. Thus this
indicated the different situations of Piedmont and Prussia in their way for unity of
their countries.
Both the unification of Italy and Germany was not very successful and they were
termed in name only. German Empire, declared in 1871, was merely a Pruss ian
Empire. It was in reality a division rather than an unification. It was because the
Germans in the Bohemia and Austrian Empire were excluded for a deliberate purpose
and there were little practical difference between the fundamental structures of the
political systems after 1866 and 1871. The liberalism was still given ways to the cause
of militarism and absolutism and the parliamentary system and the universal suffrage
was merely a political frayed and confining trick play by Bismarck who was very
clever to use the conservative countryside against the radicals in town. The Kingdom
of Italy was also as fraudulent as the German Empire. Cavour did not want the
unification of Italy accomplished in the year of 1800. He was only forced hand to do
so by the revolutionary Garibaldi's revolutionary activities in the southern Italy. The
unification of Italy actually contradicted the normal phase of the human history.
Piedmont was neither ready nor fitted to unify the southern states which were
fundamentally different in a social and economic affairs with Piedmont in 1860. Only
on very legalistic and narrowest tons that Italy was unified in 1860 since the troubles
in the following years had clearly shown the unification was a bad one.
Compared with Italy, German unification made Germany an enormous power and
benefits and this made it as a new strong power in Europe. However, the unified Italy
was as weak as ever and her power influence were declining. We can see that since
Piedmont was small, its policy always to be influenced by the other powers. Whilst
Prussia played a more active role in the unification of Germany.
Though the Italian parliament was factions and unsuccessful, it was real in the sense
of liberalism. On the other hand, the German parliament and Constitution was also
faction and unsuccessful but it was false in reality in sense of liberalism. Cavour used
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liberalism versus radicalism whilst Bismarck opposed both of them. Thus the
unification of Italy theoretically and fundamentally was a real progre ss of liberalism
whilst the German unification was merely a trick of Bismarck for alteration the
prestige and influence of the Prussian reactionary monarchy under the disguise of a
liberal constitutional reign.
In conclusion, the unifications of Italy and Germany had a lot in common. As

explored in the above essay, these unifications had a similar foundation and a similar
ending. Both unifications were led by statesmen who knew their general directions
but not their exact path. Though differences are noted in the methodology of
unification, it can however be argued that the unifications are to a larger extend
similar.
QUESTION 18: Compare and contrast the significance of 1848 revolutions for
the Unification of Italy and Germany?
COMMENT
The question is inviting you to conduct an analysis of the impacts of the 1848
revolution in the nationalism of both Italy and German. You need to display
knowledge of the powers who were in charge of the various states which were of
German or Italian Nationality. Evaluate the extent to which these revolutions helped
in the unification process. Your main task is to give similarities and differences of the
importance of these revolutions in their respective nations.
1848 was decisive, though its aims would not be achieved concurrently. In
challenging the territorial and dynastic settlements of Vienna, Prince Schwarzenberg
was by no means another Metternich. A tempered revival of Austria hegemony would
no longer prevent the reshaping of Central Europe. Rather, at the expe nse of this
rotten grant, the German and Italian nationalism made their triumph two decades later
not by the methods of 1848 but by revolutions from this time onwards, new tactics
began to take shape after the teaching of this lesson.
Both in Italy and Germany, the 1848 had a common aspiration for achieving national
unification, but to each of them, there was different nature of problems to face. To the
German states, unification was primarily an internal affair. It was conceivable at that
time to have Germany merged into two leading German states, either Prussia or
Austria. As Han Rothfels says, "For one thing... the separate German political units,
however, artificial in origin many of them were, had, in the main, a former basis in
dynastic allegiance; now was ruled by a foreigner, though the two predominant states
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were German and European at the same time." In contrast to Germany, the
unification of Italy, in nature, would be impossible if Austria was not driven out from
Italian peninsula. It was thus to Italy, more than a matter of internal affair and an act
against foreign supressors. This difference made the process of unification of Italy to
a lesser differ in stress from the German one. But nonetheless 1845 even led Austria
being the common enemy to the national unification of Germany and Italy.
The liberal movement for unification had made its temporary triumph in 1848. The
Frankfurt Assembly marked the uniqueness of having liberalism joined force with
nationalism. The Frankfurt Assembly was looked as the symbol of unification by
consent and persuasion. A federal, liberal, constitutional and united Germany was the
main concern of the Frankfurt idealists. Unfortunately, the Frankfurt Assembly was
bound to fail at the beginning because on one hand," it was a voice crying in a void",
lack of military power made the Assembly depend upon either Prussia or Austria, on
the other hand, the Frankfurt meant too liberal to both Prussia and Austria. Then, to
Germans, liberalism in this sense was incompatible to nationalism. And the complete
revolutionary failures of 1848 and 1849 made the distrust of liberalism and
parliamentary methods go further and deeper.
To choose either Austria or Prussia as the leader of unification revealed two main
conflicting programs of unification. The 'Great German' was meant national
unification under the domination of Austria and 'Little German' under Prussia.
Basically, Greater Germany was a need, conviction; Little Germany an expedient, a
temporizing with reality. The reversion of Austria back to despotism in November
1848 made her never regain the image as leader of the new 'Germany' in the eyes of
the moderates and realists, sometimes even was regarded as anti- German. Naturally,
the federal crown was offered to the Prussian king through Frederick William IV
refused to accept it. And importantly, the 1848 legacy was that an expedient policy of
'Little Germany' was chosen from that time onwards for the sake of national
unification. And it was Hitler who later tried to put the plan of Great Germans into
reality.
By 1848, Prussia began to replace Austria as the leader of national unification. On the
one hand, Austria had no initiative to sacrifice her status quo just for the purpose of
assuming leadership in a liberal 'Germany', on the other hand, the loss of Austria's
hegemony meant, in turn, the rise of Prussia. To Prussia, though militarism was
victorious in the autumn of 1848, but victorious without violence and without a beach
with Frankfurt. And the Frankfurt Assembly excluded Austria from Germany and
offered the Imperial Crown to Prussia. Though Frederick William IV refused to accept
the offer, he did hold to his romantic vision of a Prussia merged into Germany. His
proclamation of 21 March 1848 and the Erfurt union were the good evidences.
To Germans, 1848 made a clear picture that liberalism was scarified to the national
cause. In fact, it was the conflict on the national frontiers that determined the fate of
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German liberalism. When faced the problem of defending their nationa l cause in
Bohemia and in Posen, the realistic and liberals were willing to sacrifice themselves
and welcomed the assertion of Austria and Prussia military power. In the mind of the
Germans, the triumph of national cause over liberalism in 1848 had already paved the
way for the coming of an age of 'blood and iron'.
As already mentioned that national integration would be impossible driving out

Austria from Italian peninsula. To Italy, there existed a comparatively clear cut
geographical and linguistic frontiers. She did not have to face like Germany the
conflict over national frontiers. To expel the aliens was the central impulse; under
which both liberal and national demands, in contrast to Germany were mainly
directed against foreign rulers. It was rather liberalism went parallel with nationalism
to achieve one common ultimate aim of national salvation. Unlike the military defeat,
rather than caused the failure of the Italian revolutions of 1848. So did trust of
liberalism and parliamentary methods went less deeper than Germany.
By 1850, the House of Savoy became the only one that could Italy look for Salvation.
As two possible leaders of national unification --- Mazzini and Pope had destroyed
each other in Rome. The fiasco of 1848 and 1849 had finally reduced the three
possible programs of national unification into one only. Pope Pius of Papal liberalism.
And the failure of Rome Republic left constitutional monarchy of Piedmont the only
solution for salvation. As force kept Italy political force of disruption. Only the House
of Savoy had such an ability to provide this alliance between liberalism, nationalism
and militarism.
Nonetheless, the failure of 1848 Revolutions to achieve national unifications had

brought one common legacy to Italy and Germany. They began to enter into a new
age. 1848 proved that force was crucial to determine the fate in the future. A transition
from reliance upon liberalism idealism and popular enthusiasm to reliance upon
realism and power was taken place after 1848. Diplomacy and force were adopted
as the new tactics for national salvation by both Italy and Germany. But in contrast to
Italy, Prussia and the other German States were more luckily to have their economic
and financial positions stronger. These advantages allowed Pruss ia to take a more
aggressive diplomacy and enable Bismarck to bring Prussia into an age of 'blood and
iron'. Instead, Piedmont had no illusion about her actual strength. Diplomacy rather
than force were successfully manipulated to seek foreign help. The ma in purpose was
to isolate Austria and finally to expel her. Again, the Italian did much better to unit
their countries by losing wars.
It was 1848 to decide the roads for national unification. At first, Prussia and Piedmont
emerged as the sole leaders that could Germany and Italy look for national
unifications. Both of them were taught a lesson in the fiasco of 1848-9. This
experience made them successfully unify their countries without committing the same
mistakes as their precursors of 1848 Realpolitik dominated and determined the
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political theater of the coming decades. Apart, a quotation to conclude would be 'In
Italy the speed of parliamentary liberation; in Germany the triumph of the Prussia
army.'
In summation, the unification of both Italy and Germany were an influx in the
European question. The 1848 revolutions had a impact of arousing the spirit of
nationalism in the heart of both the Germans and the Italians. The impacts of these
revolutions only differed in the gravity of its impact on the respective states. The
Italians were heavily influenced by these revolutions and this saw the rise of patriotic
individuals like Garribaldi who were eager to take the unification to a higher level
even by force.
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GERMANY UNIFICATION:
Bismarck: "The great question of the day will not be decided by speeches of the
majority but by blood and iron."
German-nationally minded liberals in northern Germany were inspired by the career

of the chief minister to the House of Savoy, Camillo de Cavour (who had, in the
summer of 1859, achieved a greater degree of integration of northern "Italian"
territory under the leadership of the Victor Emmanuel II), to form, in November 1859,
the National sovereign or National Union. This soon grew into being a liberal-national
movement actively supported by several thousand parliamentarians, professors,
lawyers and journalists who exerted their diverse efforts towards the establishment of
a "German" state under sovereignty of the Hohenzollern Kings of Prussia.
In these times Bismarck was serving as a diplomat in the Prussian service and had
been accredited to the Court of the Tsar in St Petersburg since the early months of
1859. In March, 1860, whilst on leave in Berlin, Bismarck paid courtesy calls upon
the leaders of the Nationalverein in Berlin.
Early in 1861 King Frederick William IV, whose mind had failed, was replaced as
King of Prussia by his brother, who had been serving as regent, but who now came to
the throne as King Wilhelm I. Bismarck prepared a memorandum on the German
question for the consideration of King Wilhelm I, this was delivered to the King at
Baden-Baden at the end of July 1861. In this so-called "Baden-Baden Memorial"
Bismarck advocated that Prussia should attempt to exploit the growing sentiment of
German patriotism by supporting a demand "for a national assembly of the German
people".
In March, 1862, Bismarch received a new diplomatic posting that led to his becoming
Prussian ambassador to France. From his base in Paris Bismarck took an opportunity
to cross the English Channel, in June, 1862. This visit was ostensibly for the purpose
of visiting an Industrial Exhibition but Bismarck met several senior British statesmen
including Disraeli, leader of the Opposition, to whom he outlined his proposal for
bring a form of unity to Germany under Prussian leadership even if this involved a
degree of conflict with the Austrian Empire.
That evening Disrali was heard to remark "Take care of that man! He means what he
says!"
In September 1862 there was a crisis in Prussia where the Prussian Landtag, or lower
parliamentary house, was refusing to approve increased military spending in defiance
of the King's wishes. Wilhelm I was advised by his Minister of War, Roon, to send for
Bismarck as a formidable personality who might secure the passing of the budget and
the associated military reforms in the Landtag.
On the 17 September the crisis had reached such a pitch that King Wilhelm I seriously
considered abdicating his throne. That evening Roon sent by telegraph to Bismarck
suggesting that he, Bismarck, should hurry to Berlin and that there was danger in
delay. The message in French and Latin read :- Depechez-vous; Periculum in mora.
On 22 September Bismarck met King Wilhelm I and assured him that he could form a
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ministry and carry through the army reforms desired by the king, if necessary against
the will of the deputies in the Landtag. Given this assurance the King decided not to
abdicate. Bismarck was appointed acting chief minister to the House of Hohenzollern.
Bismarck made an appearance before the Landtag on the 29 September where he
spoke expressing his regret at the hostility of the deputies to passing of the military
budget and stressed the need for progress to be made on the military proposals
favoured by the king. The next day at a meeting of a Budget Committee Bismarck
went perhaps further than he his better judgement might have intended in asserting
that:-
" The position of Prussia in Germany will not be determined by its liberalism but by
its power ... Prussia must concentrate its strength and hold it for the favourable
moment, which has already come and gone several times. Since the treaties of Vienna,
our frontiers have been ill-designed for a healthy body politic. Not through speeches
and majority decisions will the great questions of the day be decided - that was the
great mistake of 1848 and 1849 - but by iron and blood".
This somewhat aggressively phrased speech caused alarm to liberal opinion in the
Germanies and beyond. This was in part attributable to subsequent reportage
amending its wording to read more pithily as “blood and iron ". This speech has since
become known as Bismarck's Blood and Iron Speech.
QUESTION 19: Assess the importance of the Zollverein and the 1848
Revolutions in the history of the German Unification.
COMMENT
The question is similar to the one dealt with previously. You are being asked to
contact an analysis on the contributions of the Zollverein and the 1848 revolutions on
the unification of German. You need to highlight whether or not the Zollverein and the
revolution were a success or a failure. Show knowledge of the topic asked herein and
critical analysis.
ESSAY
The master piece of Bismarck the conquest of Germany of Prussia or some historian
call it the 'unification of Germany' is always regarded under the direct influence of the
Zollverein and 1848 Revolution. However, this view is not so precise to the fact.
Zollverein actually obstructed the unification. The 1848 Revolutions, offered more
construction influence, but always associated with Bismarck's brilliant statesmanship.
The 1848 Revolution, including its results and consequence, were only raw materials.
For Bismarck's policy was inspired by the revolutions. On the other hand, some
effects of the revolution contributed for the foundation of German unification.
Zollverein was formed in 1834,it was a custom union between the German states.
Prussia initiated such union, naturally, she became the leader. Her rival, Austria was
excluded, some smaller states, such as Hanover, Oldenburg, Mechlenburg and the
three Hansa towns remained outside after 10 years of its formation.
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Many people suggested that the Zollverein promoted a sense of belonging within the
member states. However, the facts proved it reversely. It was a loose organization of
states, the vote rights enjoyed by the members made the negotiation of commercial of
laborious undertaking, a program of unification could hardly be a product of such an
unrooted organization.
The German sovereign states seemingly followed Prussian eco nomically but this idea
does not imply that they followed Prussia politically. In 1866, Austro-Prussian War,
most of the Zollverein members fought against Prussia. They remained loyal to their
traditional leader- Austria. The sovereign states of Germany jo ined the Zollverein
only because they wanted to pacify the radical program of the middle-class who
resented the internal tariff of Germany- which hurt their economic privilege. The
prince aimed at survival not unification. If Germany was unified, their political power
would certainly be minimized to an unacceptable extent. Again they joined the
German Empire and North German Confederation for the sake of survival in 1870 and
1867 respectively. Since they joined the Zollverein, they were suspicious to Prussia,
who joined the most benefits from the union. Once again, the suggestion that Prussia
assumed leadership from the Zollverein was disproved.
From the view of the point the post-1870 German statesmen, the unification of
Germany actually gave no share to the Zollverein. The Zollverein was actually
irrelevant the events between 1862 and 1870. Tariff was not used as weapons to
forces states to join Prussia's camp, Austria was not attacked economically, or even
France, her commerce was not boycotted by the me mbers of the Zollverein. Pure
military expedition paved the way for German's future, but never economic
inter-engagement.
Moreover, she was not trained as leader between 1834 and 1867, and was never the
leader of Germany in any aspect till 1867, in Crimean War, she echoed Austria, in the
1859 Italian War she could get rid of Austria, also mobilized to meet the demand of
Austria. In the Danish War, David Thomson says that Prussia inevitably associated
with Austria, this showed that Prussia could not formally exploited Austria's
leadership even until 1863. Though in 1848 Austrian leadership was deteriorated,
Prussia could not immediately overwhelm her.
The only seemingly acceptable view that Zollverein contributed to the unification of
Germany was that it strengthened Prussia economically. Thus its military strength was
improved. However, A. J. P. Taylor disagrees with this view, he realized that coal
production did not climb up until 1870, and before 1870 there was even no big iron
and steel industry in Germany. Only railways contributed a little, Professor Taylor's
view is reasonable since 1870, Prussia sent army to fight against Napoleon III, she
had already a considerable military strength, not only the Zollverein could improve
her.
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Practically, the Zollverein had the least importance in the history of German
unification, even if there was no Zollverein, German would have been unified.
Historians blame that the 1848 revolutions had no resolute program thus it failed, but
Bismarck's 'revolution' had a perfect program though without details. After 1849, we
can notice that several distinctive features appeared. German nationalism grew in this
period, precisely Prussian patriotism rose. The cause of the phenomenon was greatly
due to the 1848 Revolution. Bismarck knew that to make the dynasty survive, national
coloring was essential. Thus, such a kind of dynasty nationalism grew. The Danish
crisis was one of the stimulus for the national sentiment in Germany.
Liberalism and sovereignty of people's were stressed in the 1848 Revolution.

Liberalism was discredited due to the uncompromising attitude of the liberals who
caused the revolution to death. The liberals only concerned with owned privileges in
1848 but ignored other demands. So many of them abandon, liberalism and turned to
German patriotism, sovereignty of people. Bismarck diversified the masses mind from
people's sovereignty to patriotism. They were induced to put the state at their first
importance, and abandoned their demand for liberty. The glory of Danish War and
Seven Weeks' War once again made both the liberals and nationalists quiet.
Vienna Settlement and the old fashioned despotism were destroyed in the revolution
Prussia against from the engagement of Holly Alliance. Vienna Settlement opposed
German Unification, despotism, retarded German liberal and national movement.
Once the settlement was destroyed, they turned to the new slogans of 'nationalism'.
German revolution was fatal mainly because its participants were diversified in
socialist, radical or other ideas. Bismarck realised that if Prussia was divided by
ideological fragmentation, unification could hardly success. Then he simultaneously
created a feeling of nationalism by provoking foreign threat, in Danish War,
Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War, his aim was achieved, a national
sentiment grew between the people. Precisely, German nationalism began in 1863, the
1848 nationalism was pseudo- nationalism since the liberals only liberty but concerned
little for national unity. Bismarck was the creator of German nationalism.
Another feature was the rise of nationalism and Realpolitik which led to the belief of
force and war. Nationalism was caused by the failure of Romanticism in 1848 Sir
Dewis Namica realized that the 1848 revolution were dreamers, their romantic ideas
contributed nothing to the revolution. Moreover, the revolutions were crushed the ties
of people, then realized that forces could determine anything. Practically, they
believed forces more than theories after the revo lution. They all discovered the aims
of 1848 could not achieve by manifests and barricades but by blood and iron. Even
the most anti- invasion liberals also supported Bismarck after 1866, Bismarck had the
same opinion. Even he realized that the political was upheaval. Politicians like
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Castlereagh, Talleyrand could never found, they patronized peace, mutual help
balance of power and moral, however, the atmosphere of 1848 gave the politicians an
idea that military strength could achieve what they desired. Conspiracy, threat could
also be used. Thus "Realpolitik" such as Bismarck and Cavour appeared.
Prussian leadership began to be transformed from 1848 and completed in 1867. The
downfall of Metternich, caused a political vacuum, the strongest Prussia became t he
first choice though no one thought Prussia would be the leader before 1848. However,
Prussia could not succeed Metternich immediately. Until 1867, Austrian influence in
Germany was almost expelled. The Prussian army acted as a protector in the 1848
Revolution, gave confidence to the princes, since they crushed the revolution when
they had recovered. So, in 1870 the princes went to Prussia for protection when a
crisis came.
Austria was seriously weakened since she had received great disturbances in Hungary
and Italy. These two revolutions helped Prussia to assume leadership to a great extent.
Moreover, in the Frankfurt Assembly, the Archduke John was a poor leader, since the
princes had tasted the situation of leaderless, they were eager to seek one to replace
the deteriorating old man. Prussia then, largely due to the revolution of 1848, built up
the foundation of her leadership.
In the nineteenth century, no country could achieve her independence or unification

without foreign assistance. For instance, Greece, Belgium and Italy also got foreign
help. Germany was not the exception. In the 1848 revolution, the revolutionaries
failed partly because they had no foreign help Bismarck knew the importance of
foreign help especially when he wanted to expel some powerful element from the
country. At least, the foreign powers neutrality must be secured. In the Danish War,
Bismarck had Russian neutrality, in the Seven Weeks' War he had French neutrality.
Moreover, he made use of the foreigner's national pride to fulfill his destiny. He
defeated Denmark in 1863, Austria in 1866 and France in 1870. These three wars
contributed a lot to the unification of Germany, but the idea was originated from the
revolution of 1848.
Dictatorship was practised in Germany after 1862, when Bismarck came to office, he
ignored the paramount and increased the tax for army expenditure. This was also
caused by the 1848 Revolution. In 1848, the parliamentary system was discredited by
the inefficient Frankfurt Assembly. So the people tolerated the dictatorship of
Bismarck. However, Bismarck thought reversely that the Frankfurt Assembly gave a
chance for the Germans to voice their opinion, he was afraid that democracy would
grow, so he strictly controlled the parliament.
The 1848 Revolution failed, one of the reason was that the governments in Berlin and
Vienna were healthy. They had cash in hand, loyal army and the well administered
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public affairs. There had no disease to be cured. So, Bismarck changed a form of
revolution that was, he conquested the German States from above, not revolt from
below. Due to the strong army of Prussia he succeeded. But he was inspired by the
1848 Revolution failure.
German nationalism paved the way for the ultimate nation forming army strength.
Real politics were definite process to achieve unification at that time, Prussian
leadership, if not assumed, the whole story of German unification would have been
rewritten, foreign assistance, dictatorship and conquest program were less important,
but they also contributed to the unification to a certain extent. But we must remember,
these significant factors in the German unification was mainly inspired or influence
by the 1848 Revolution, this the Revolution in fact contributed a lot to the unification,
the consequence of the Revolution were raw materials, Bismarck was the
manufacturer, both have the same important role.
Conclusively, the 1848 revolutions were not a success due to strong external
opposition and lack of cooperation between indigenous people. It should however be
noted that though the revolutions failed, they provided lessons for Bismarck on how
the unification can be achieved. The unification was actually a success because of the
failures of the Zollverein and the 1848 revolutions.
QUESTION 20: Assess the role of Bismarck in the unification of Germany.
The two commonest interpretation of the events in the years 1862-70 were that:
Bismarck unified Germany; Bismarck planned the events of the sixties in advance,
and the results turned out to be what he expected. Both interpretations were not true.
They should be abandoned in view of actual events.
First of all, Bismarck did not unite Germany. He did not even want to. He annexed,
conquered or absorbed into Prussian control all the states of the old German
Confederation except Austria, in addition to Slesvig, Alsace and Lorraine and called
the result "the German Empire". It was a German Empire; but it was not the German
Empire. It excluded deliberately all the Germans living within the Hapsburg territories
of Austria and Bohemia. So Bismarck's German Empire was based on the division of
Germany, not its unification. It was little Germany not Hitler's great Germany. This
shows that Bismarck was a man with a limited objective.
Secondly, it is commonly claimed that Bismarck had a master plan for the sixties
which would lead to the unification of Germany. His plan included:
a. securing the neutrality of Russia; by assisting the Russian in the Polish affair of
1863;
b. making war with Denmark in 1864 in alliance with Austria, for the purpose of
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having a war with Austria on this issue in 1866;

c. securing Napoleon III's benevolent neutrality in the war with Austria by deceiving
him at Biarritz into thinking he would get compensation for France when the war
was over;
d. defeating Austria in 1866, but to take territory from her because he wanted her
friendship in the coming war with France; e. engineering the Hohenzollern
candidature in Spain in order to provoke France into declaring war in 1870.
This view of Bismarck as a ruthless realist planning for the unification of Germany is
based on a legend partly created by Bismarck himself, especially by way of his
Memoirs. His famous speech on 'blood and iron' is often said to show his intention of
unifying Germany by the force of Prussian arms. In fact it is a misinterpretation. It is
only said as part of a vigorous speech condemning the opposition of the Prussian
liberals to the increased army estimates. Throughout his career, Bismarck had a
cautions, clearly calculating preference for limited objectives. He used the army when
it became impossible to achieve his diplomatic purpose without it; when diplomacy
alone would suffice, he used the army as a threat.
When Bismarck came to power in Prussia in 1861, favorable circumstance awaited

him. Before 1853, any attempt by Prussia to dominate even northern Germany would
have involved war with Austria, Russia and even the German states. The Czar was
determined to maintain the Holy Alliance. From 1848 to 1851, he helped Austria to
oppose the plans of Fredrick William IV concerning the reform of Germany. In order
to fight Austria. This would mean the liberalization of Prussia herself. This was
something the Prussian King did not want. The Prussian army too, unlike the
Piedmontese army, was against liberalism. Hence, the cause of German unity was
hampered by unfavourable circumstance both inside and outside Germany before
1853.
When Bismarck assumed power in 1861, things had changed drastically. The Crimean
War had isolated Austria from Russia and had weakened Russia. The revolutionary
policy of Napoleon III in Italy helped to undermine the old order and produced an
anticipation for change. Concerted action against Prussia was also not forthcoming.
Britain was on bad terms with France, Russia and Austria. Russia was on bad terms
with Britain and Austria. Napoleon III and Russia were on good terms with each other
and both wanted to change the European system as it existed in 1862. Napoleon III
was still in favour of destroying the remnants of the 1815 settlement and Alexander II
was solely concerned with destroying the Peace of Paris. So Bismarck must make use
of the Franco-Russian entente to continue the isolation of Austria.
So the Polish Affair of 1863 was a loss to Bismarck rather than gain. For it divided
France and Russia since Napoleon III spoke in favour of the Polish rebels. Bismarck's
offer to assist Russia against the Poles was not taken well by the Russians for they
resented Bismarck's meddling in their affairs. So Russia's withdrawal of support to
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Austria against Prussia was not due to Bismarck's diplomacy; it was due chiefly to her
weakness after the Crimean War, her concentration on the abolition of the Black Sea
Clause, and her mistrust of Austria. In fact, Bismarck made a blunder with the
Alvensleben Convention in which Russia suggested a Prusso-Russian War against
France and Austria. Bismarck did not agree. So Prussia did not obtain the goodwill of
Russia.
When the Schleswig- Holstein affair arose, Bismarck intervened if he had to. So he
entered into an alliance with Austria to avoid sole identification with German liberal
nationalism and to avoid antagonizing Austria. So it was a defensive move by
Bismarck to avoid conflict with Austria rather than an aggressive step to provoke war
with Austria. Austria was willing to let Prussia annex the Duchies in return for the
Prussian cession of Silesia and her guarantee of Austria's position in Venetia and
Hungary. Hence, the Schleswig-Holstein affair would not have provoked any war
between Prussia and Austria because Austria's main concern was in Italy and Hungary.
So she would not struggle for the control of the Duchies with Prussia. Instead, Prussia
did not get the support of German national feeling for annexing the Duchies. So
Bismarck aroused the opposition of German nationalists instead of the support in the
Schleswig-Holstein affair.
Bismarck did not see through Napoleon III as was commonly claimed by some
historians. He was in fact afraid of Napoleon III for his ambitions a nd unpredictability.
Bismarck simply remained on good terms with Napoleon III and tried to get his
support for his policies, in return for certain price. Napoleon III also wanted to remain
friendly with Prussia for the make of enlisting her support in obta ining Venetia for
Italy. So he did not opposed Prussia in Denmark. The French army was in no
condition to fight. The British were in no condition to help him. His mind was already
on Mexico. The principle of nationality inclined him to side with the Germans against
the Danes. If he antagonized Prussia, he would lose his last European friend. In other
words, Bismarck did not create for deceive the French into a Franco-Prussian alliance.
Circumstance had made it for him.
When Napoleon III met Bismarck at Biarrtz, Bismarck did not want Napoleon III to
do anything. To sit still while Bismarck excluded Austria from northern Germany was
a quite acceptable program to Napoleon III. As for what he himself might get out of it,
he evidently refused to commit himself. He had made a bad mistake at Plombieres by
committing himself in advance of the event and he was not going to make the mistake
a second time. He contented himself therefore with expressing his anxiety to see
Venetia handed over to the Italians. Thus Bismarck did not deceive Napoleon III at
Biarritz. Napoleon III tried to deceive Bismarck. Bismarck was to plunge into as
uncertain adventure not knowing how big a share of the spoils Napoleon III would
demand, nor when he would demand it. The military alliance between Prussia and
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Italy in 1866 was a triumph for Napoleon III rather than Bismarck. It meant the
achievement of Napoleon's aim - the Italian acquisition of Venetia. It also meant the
end of negotiation between Prussia and Austria. Without the alliance between Prussia
and Italy, Austria could negotiate with Prussia; Duchies to Prussia in exchange for
Venetia for Austria. But the alliance with Italy meant war.
The defeat of Austria at the Battle of Sadowa did not lead to the complete unification
of Germany. Bismarck stopped at the total defeat of Austria because of his fear of
Napoleon III. He was not sure what Napoleon III's intention were. But France was
happy with the formation of the North German Confederation. It fitted in with the
principles of nationality and balance of power. It was a proper Prussian balance to the
power of Austria. By making the south German States independent of Austria, it made
them potential allies of France, their only possible protector against Prussia. It had
also strengthened Prussia against Austria; this suited the needs of France and Russia,
because they would like to see the reduction of Austrian power in Italy and the
Balkans respectively.
Hence, Bismarck was able to work against Prussian and German Liberalism and
radicalism. He was able top use revolutionary means to preserve and even extend the
power and authority of the Prussian and German conservatives. This was both the
achievement and the failure of Bismarck in terms of the historical development of
modern Germany. While Germany was united and made strong by Bismarck, that
strength was achieved without the proper check and balance of a liberal democratic
system of government based on popular sovereignty. As the economic and military
might become the instrument of ambitious and aggressive dictators like Hitler or
absolute rulers like William II, the result would be disastrous for the whole of Europe
and even the world. Bismarck in fact were more intent on controlling the
expansionism of German nationalism than on the threat to conservative power of
German liberalism. He knew that German expansion would destroy the peace of
Europe. So he was careful to maintain a policy of maintaining the friendship with
other states. This explained his system of alliance from 1871-1890. In other words,
Bismarck was not a willing ally of German nationalism and the German unification
was a result of circumstantial forces rather than Bismarck's deliberate policies and
efforts.
In the final analysis, Bismarck contributed considerably to the unification of Germany.

His diplomacy, military tactics and intelligence to utilize opportunities and outsmart
his opponents worked in favor of the unification. Bismarck is therefore the real
architect of the Germany unification and denying him that glory can force one to posit
someone of the same name.
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QUESTION 21: "Circumstance makes the Man." Discuss the validity of the
statement with reference to the role of Bismarck in the Unification of Germany.
COMMENT
To answer this question, it is logical to give a definition to the quotation. Here I
interpret the quotation as that a favorable circumstance is more important than the
contributions of man- Bismarck- in the unification of the country. In other word, no
matter what Bismarck had done, his contributions and efforts were only playing a
subordinate role. In my opinion, I only agree to part of the statement. To me, the
contributions of Bismarck were at least on the par with a favorable circumstance in
their significance.
In the course of the unification of Germany, undeniably some favorable conditions

conductive to an advantageous circumstance emerged for Bismarck to exploit. Some
of them were the blunders of Bismarck's opponents and some thorny issues. The
following account shall go through the events leading to the German unification and
display how Bismarck utilized opportunities to achieve his goals. This shall be done
with the aid of scholarly evidence.
Basically, a favorable circumstance gradually took shape for Prussia to take up the
initiative. After the 1848 Revolutions, Austria was on the way of decline. She seemed
unable to recover herself from the shock of 1848. Actually her survival from that
turmoil partly owed to the assistance from Russia. In fact, her loose control was
accompanied by her outcast from the Zollverein in which Prussia enjoyed the single
supremacy. Since the main barrier in the way of German Unification was Austria, her
military decline constituted a favorable circumstance. To move away the main
obstacle, it was essential to build up a strong army. Bismarck convinced other
Germans that Prussia had to sacrifice liberalism at whatever cost for a strong Prussian
army was the only guarantee, and that the problem could only be solved by "blood
and iron". Under his guidance, a vast military reform program was undertaken. The
effect of the reform was great, for the Prussians tasted a rapid victory over the
Austrian in 1866. Thus, the military weakness of Austria produced a favorable
circumstance, but it still entailed human efforts to make it a reality.
Another favourable circumstance appeared when Christian IX ascended to the British

throne. He was so politically native as he tried to incorporate the two German duchies,
Schleswig and Holstein, into the Danish Empire. In the past, the two places
maintained a personal union with the Danish crown only. This blunder helped the
Prussians a lot. For the status of these two German duchies was guaranteed by an
international settlement, the London Protocol of 1851. Any breach of the settlement
would provoke strong reaction. Now the Danish in fringed the rule and so no foreign
sympathy could be secured. The Prussians then had a favorable circumstance as they
now had a strong and reasonable excuse. But this favorable circumstance was fully
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exploited by Bismarck. He brilliantly ventured a joint-expedition with Austria instead

of acting on Prussian own or for sake of the German Confederation. For a
joint-expedition would serve as a test of the Prussian strength after reform and
provide a good chance to understand the opponent. Moreover, it would pave the way
to pick up quarrel in the future on the matter of trophy distribution. The Danish were
easily overcome, and Schleswig and Holstein were separately administered by Prussia
and Austria respectively.
Yet the most serious barrier, Austria, still blocked the way of unification. Again on
this point Bismarck found a favorable circumstance in front of him. Austria had little
ally in Europe; her relationship with Russia deteriorated after her neutrality in the
Crimean War. Thus, the Austrians would have great difficulties to gain assistance once
she was in trouble. But Bismarck was careful and he would not allow any small
chance to spoil his scheme. The Austrians must stood on their own in the future war.
Thus Bismarck vigorously sought allies and friends. He showed signs of good will by
thwarting the Polish refugees at the border when they showed defiance in 1863
against Russia. More important was the cultivation of friendship with Napoleon III of
France. Furthermore, Bismarck made an agreement with Italy in 1866 for mutual
benefit. Italy would obtain Venetia if Austria was defeated. Of course, in return, Italy
would offer military assistance to Prussia. By 1866 Austria was totally isolated as
result of her own diplomatic ineptness and the efforts of Bismarck. Again a favorable
circumstance was forged and combined in good form with human efforts. When
everything was settled down, the remaining task was how to goad Austrian into a war.
The result, was foreseen, but its swiftness was unpredictable for within a few weeks
the Austrians were totally subdued. The foreign powers were not ready at all to
intervene effectively. Somehow the unification scheme was intercepted. The French
made it known to the world that she would not tolerate a strong eastern neighbor with
all the southern German states annexed. Thus, Bismarck had to give a second thought
before he came to a decisive halt to his unification scheme and the Prussians were
irritated by the arrogance of France. Yet an immediate war with France was
disadvantageous since Prussia had already used up her energy in the 1866 War. So
Bismarck preferred to wait for a favourable circumstance to come.
After few years of the war preparation, Bismarck felt it the right time to strike. France
would not have any assistance from other powers as Bismarck ensured that the old
friends were maintained and the old enemy Austria was condoned. It was another
favourable circumstance to be used. In 1870 when the Spanish throne was empty, he
immediately seized the Chance. He deliberately assigned Prince Leopold chasing for
the title. The French were provoked and reacted severely. They made demands not
only asking for the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature but a guarantee that
the candidate would never be renewed. All the detail of interviews between the French
ambassador and the Prussian King was informed to Bismarck. When he received the
continent, he gave a slight touch of magic so that the telegram became inflammatory
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to provoke public opinion. To the German, the French ambassador was imprudent to
make excessive demands. To the French, the Prussian King was rude in manner. The
public furor for a war was so great that both governments had to uphold their national
prestige. The war broke out in July 1870. Everything went well with Bismarck pulling
strings from behind. He gave the story of unification his finale. With French defeated,
the German Empire came into being in January 1871.
As a conclusion, the unification of Germany owed a great deal to Bismarck who could
make use of every opportunity and favourable circumstance to achieve what he
wanted or to create a more favourable circumstance for future use. Thus, the statement
was not completely justified, in case of Bismarck.
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QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION
1). "It is Necker, rather than the king, who caused the 1789 revolution in France."
Discuss.
2). "The violent phenomenon of 1789 in France was uncalled for" Discuss.
3). Discuss the view that the end of the reign of terror was predictable.
4). "Ill- fitted from birth." Discuss this view with reference to the reign of the
Directory.
5). Why did the Directory stay on power longer than other revolutionary governments
despite failures at home and disaster abroad?
6). How far do you agree with the view that Napoleon was the icon of the revolution.
7). "Opportunities makes the man." Discuss this view with reference to Napoleon's
rise to power.
8). How far do you agree with the assertion that Napoleon's rise to power owes much
to opportunities than to plan?
9). "The most effective short term schemer but an impractical long term dreamer"
Discuss this view with reference to Napoleon's contact of foreign policy.
10). "Enough was never enough." How valid is this view of Napoleon's downfall?
11). "The congress that never was" Discuss this view with reference to the congress
system.
12). whose interests were best served by the Congress system?
13). "The balance of power was a theoretical scheme which had no p ractical sense."
Discuss this view reference to the principle of power followed at the Vienna
Settlement.
14). "New wine in old bottles." Discuss this view with reference to the reign of the
restored bobourns in France.
15). Discuss the view that the down of Charles X was predictable but the rise of Louis
Philippe was surprising.
16). Why did the fall of the restored bobourns in France followed by the reign of
another monarch?
17). "A clearly misconceived foreign policy." Do you agree with this view o f Louis
Philippe's foreign policy?
18). "Failure at home and disaster abroad." Discuss this view of Napoleon 3's reign.
19). "Political immaturity." To what extend does this statement explain the failures
which characterized Napoleon 3's foreign policy?
20). Why did France go to war with Prussia in 1868?
21). "The second empire imitated the first." Discuss.
22). Why did the 1848 revolutions failed to unify Italy?
23). "Italy shall unify herself'" Comment on this statement with reference to the
Italian unification.
24). "A bolt out of the blue" How far do you agree with this view of the Germany
unification?
25). "The statesman knows his general direction but not his exact path." Discuss this
view with reference to Bismarck and the unification of Germany.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Aten, L. E. 1977. Europe and the Napoleonic wars, Texas. Report to the National
Park Service.
Benchley, E. 1976, An Overview of the Prehistoric Resources Of the French Society.
St. Louis Area. Washington.
Berg, G. and M. Emery 1976, Revolutionary Impact on Europe; Stage One Survey,
Rensselaer County Sewer District Number 1. Ms., Rensselaer County Sewer
District, Rensselaer, New York.
Bettinger, R. 1977 An Exploratory Sampling Design for European Transformation in
the 1789 Explosion in France. New York Archeological Council, Buffalo.
Biddle. M. and D. Hudson 1973. The Future of Europe's Past. Rescue: a Trust for
European Archeology, Worcester. Bureau of Land Management, Department of
the Interior 1976 Final Environmental Analysis Record, Proposed Geothermal
Leasing. Randsburg, Spangler Hills, South Searles Lake, California. Chang, K. C.
1968 Settlement Archeology. National Press, Palo Alto,
Dincauze, D. F. and J. W. Meyer 1977, Prehistoric Resources of Europe And Britian:
A Preliminary Predictive Study. Interagency Archeological Services, Office
Historic Preservation, National Park Service, Washington, D.C. Donaldson, B. R.
1975 An Archeological Sample of the White Mountain Planning Unit,
Apache-Sitgreaves National Forest, Arizona.
Dougenik, James A. and David E. Sheehan. 1975 Symao User Reference Manual.
Nationalism And Liberalism Special Analysis to Italy And Germany Unification ,
Harvard University, Cambridge. Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Region 5 1976 Training Guide: The Archeological Reconnaissance Report
(RS-2700-37). San Francisco.
Frederickson, D. A. 1949, Appraisal of the Spirit of Nationalism in Italy and
Germany.
Gagliano, S. et. al (1977) Cultural Resources Evaluation of the History of French
Politics: From boburnism to Repubicanism , Washington D.C.
King, T. F. 1971 "A Conflict of Values Antiquity" , 36:3:255-62, Washington, D.C.
1975 Western Archeological Center, National Park Service, Washington, D.C.
Richards D. History of Modern Europe: Shivaji University, Kolhapur, Distance
Education
Smith, L. D. (1977), Europe And the French Revolution: A study of The future of
Europe's Past.
Squier, E. G. and E. H. Davis 1848 Ancient Monuments of the Napoleonic Ruins.
Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge Vol.. 1, Washington, D.C.
Steward, J. H. (1955), Theory of Culture Change. University of Illinois , Washington,
D.C. Thomas, D.H. 1973 "An Empirical Analysis for Steward's Model of Great
Britain's Economy". American Antiquity 38:155-176. 1975 "Nonsite Sampling in
Archeology: Up the Creek without a Site?" In .W. Mueller, Ed., University of
Arizona Press, Tucson.
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About the author: Marwa .n

National Marwa is a twenty-three years old young writer who studied humanities in
2013-2014 majoring in History, Divinity and Literature in English. He authored a
book entitled “ERRORS IN COMMISSION,” in which he interrogates errors
committed in ancient philosophies. He is currently working on a Family and Religious
Studies text book which also contains typical exam questions and essays. The author
is currently studying a diploma in Education at Mutare Teachers’ College majoring in
English and History. He had been invited in several High Schools for debate
workshops in B.P Style of debating.
Written by: MARWA NATIONAL
Edited by: MFUNDA D.
64 | P a g e

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A LEVEL EUROPEAN HISTORY

THROUGH QUESTIONS AND

WRITTEN BY: MARWA NATIONAL

SECTION A: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE NAPOLEONIC ERA

SECTION B: FROM THE VIENNA SETTLEMENT TO THE UNIFICATION

SECTION A: CAUSES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

1. "Philosophers masterminded the revolution of 1789." Discuss.

1. The 1788-89 poor harvests affected the French economy negatively.

Question 2: Assess the role of Philosophe rs in the outbreak of the French

COURSE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

positive move towards the revolutionary demands of freedom of worship. However,

10. Spirit of Republicanism: Lastly, the reign of terror strengthened Republicanism

QUESTION 7: WHY WAS FRANCE AT WAR WITH OTHER EUROPEAN

THE NAPOLEONIC ERA.

QUESTION 9: "I am the revolution." To what extend is this statement a true

on addressing the demands of the question.

SECTION B: THE VIENNA SETTLEMENT AND THE CONGRESS SYSTEM.

CRITIQUE OF THE VIENNA SETTLEMENT

THE RESTORED BOBOURNS IN FRANCE.

LOUIS NAPOLEON (NAPOLEON III) “the Emperor had a dynamic

QUESTION 15: "Napoleon 3 had a dynamic pe rsonality, pursue d forceful

In conclusion, the unifications of Italy and Germany had a lot in common. As

As already mentioned that national integration would be impossible driving out

Nonetheless, the failure of 1848 Revolutions to achieve national unifications had

German-nationally minded liberals in northern Germany were inspired by the career

Liberalism and sovereignty of people's were stressed in the 1848 Revolution.

In the nineteenth century, no country could achieve her independence or unification

QUESTION 20: Assess the role of Bismarck in the unification of Germany.

having a war with Austria on this issue in 1866;

When Bismarck came to power in Prussia in 1861, favorable circumstance awaited

In the final analysis, Bismarck contributed considerably to the unification of Germany.

In the course of the unification of Germany, undeniably some favorable conditions

Another favourable circumstance appeared when Christian IX ascended to the British

exploited by Bismarck. He brilliantly ventured a joint-expedition with Austria instead

QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION

About the author: Marwa .n

Written by: MARWA NATIONAL

Edited by: MFUNDA D.

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