'A' Level Zimbabwean History Turn Up College PDF

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‘A’ LEVEL ZIMBABWEAN
HISTORY
4TH EDITION
TURN-UP COLLEGE
Turn-up College “A” Level Zimbabwean History Page 1

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Publication Staff
Publishing Director
Sam Madzingira
Copy Proof Reader

Curriculum Development Unit Zimbabwe
General Editor
C.K. Mhuri
Contributors
M. Magate
Text Printers
Chiedza Muchena; Crystabell Mudzingwa
Publisher
Turn-Up College Zimbabwe
Office 28, No. 131 Trade Centre Building
13th /14th Av; Bulawayo
ISBN 978 0 7974 4541 3

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Copyright © 2010 by Turn-Up College

First Printed 2006
Re- printed; 2009; 2010
All rights reserved; Printed in Zimbabwe. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise without prior written permission from the publisher or a
licence permitting restricted copying in the Zimbabwean Copyright Act. This study material has
been provided in good faith. It is illegal to reproduce it. Should it be reproduced, legal action will
be taken against such person(s). For further information contact Turn-Up College, Office 28; 131
Trade Centre Building, 13th and 14th Avenues, P.O.Box 2759, Bulawayo.

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Foreword
I had the opportunity of discussing this book with several educationists, teachers and students
when it was in the process of making, and I felt at once that it was likely to prove unusually
useful. It gathers together a great deal of information which must otherwise be delved for in
many books and all this is arranged judiciously and on practical lines. The authors’ outlook
might be described as one of liberal commonsense clarity, simplicity of expression, and
examination - skills - focused. Our study packs are there to offer a canvas for Zimbabweans to
showcase their best ideas to help transform the country into a knowledge- based society where
citizens are free to express their creativity, knowledge and ingenuity. We have set challenging
objectives, but we believe that only by striving to achieve the highest, can we elevate ourselves
above the elements which tend to hold our country back. However, if your see anything where
you feel we may have failed to deliver, and where we may have failed on issues such as content,
depth, relevance and usability, please let us know by using the contact numbers
(09) 61226/61247, 0773 247 358; or Box 2759 Byo; email at [email protected]. We
are here to listen and improve.
In my days as a teacher and as a student I should have welcomed this book warmly because:
(i) It approaches the syllabus wholistically
(ii) It uses simplified expression
(iii) It has an in-depth coverage of content
(iv) It provides examination skills at the earliest stage of studying.
(v) It provides local, international and commonplace examples; illustrations and case studies.
(vi) It provides intelligent questions and answers of the examination type on a chapter by
chapter basis
(vii) Last but not least, it provides a clear platform for self-evaluation as one prepares for the
final examinations.
I have no doubt that learners and educators would as well find this book to be the best. It is
certainly a manual for success. Every one would find it worthy to have his own copy. I should
not be surprised if the Turn-up College Study Pack became the best resource in school and out of
school.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 12
PREFACE ................................................................................................................................................... 13
Syllabus Interpretation: ........................................................................................................................... 14
PAPER COMBINATIONS FOR ‘A’ LEVEL HISTORY (9155)-ZIMSEC) ............................................................ 14
Assessment aims ...................................................................................................................................... 16
Assessment objectives ............................................................................................................................. 17
Generic Mark Bands for Essay Questions ................................................................................................ 17
Words commonly used in essay questions .............................................................................................. 19
BACKGROUND TO THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL AFRICA; THE ZIMBABWE PLATEAU INCLUDED ................ 19
CHAPTER 1 .............................................................................................. 21
PRE HISTORY TO 1450 ........................................................................... 21
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................. 21

BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................................... 21
GENERAL BACKGROUND ON GREAT ZIMBABWE ..................................................................................... 21
CONSTRUCTON AND GROWTH ................................................................................................................ 22
FEATURES OF THE RUINS ......................................................................................................................... 22
THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF GREAT ZIMBABWE: A STORM IN A TEA CUP .................... 23
HISTORICAL SOURCES AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GREAT ZIMBABWE ........................................... 26
THE GREAT ZIMBABWE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT ................................................................................... 27
Examination Type Questions ................................................................................................................... 28
CHAPTER 2 ............................................................................................. 30
THE LATE STONE AGE CULTURES OF ZIMBABWE ........................ 30
Chapter Objectives................................................................................................................................... 30
Definitions: The San ................................................................................................................................. 30
Who were the Khoikhoi? ......................................................................................................................... 30
THE KHOIKHOI-SAN CLASSIFICATION DEBATE ......................................................................................... 31
ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION .................................................................................................................... 31
THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE SAN ............................................................................................................. 33
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE .................................................................................................................... 34
HUNTING METHODS ................................................................................................................................ 35
THE SAN BELIEFS ...................................................................................................................................... 36
THE KHOIKHOI .......................................................................................................................................... 36
SOCIAL ORGANISATION ........................................................................................................................... 37
RELIGION AND NATURE ........................................................................................................................... 38
CHAPTER 3 ............................................................................................. 39
THE IRON AGE CULTURES OF ZIMBABWE .................................................. 39

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BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................................... 39
IRON AGE A1 – THE EARLIEST IRON AGE .................................................................................................. 40
IRON AGE A2 – MINING CULTURES .......................................................................................................... 42
LOCATIONS OF THE EARLY IRON AGE SITES. ............................................................................................ 43
IRON AGE B1 – THE FIRST BUILDINGS ...................................................................................................... 45
TRADE AT THE GREAT ZIMBABWE SITE.................................................................................................... 46
IRON AGE: B2 CHANGE IN THE BUILDING STYLE ..................................................................................... 47
IRON AGE B2: EASTERN TERRACE CULTURES........................................................................................... 50
Examinations Type Questions .................................................................................................................. 51
CHAPTER 4 ............................................................................................. 53
THE GREAT ZIMBABWE STATE .......................................................... 53

What is a State? ....................................................................................................................................... 53
The Origins of Great Zimbabwe State ...................................................................................................... 55
When was Great Zimbabwe built?........................................................................................................... 55
Architectural controversy: ....................................................................................................................... 56
The Construction controversy.................................................................................................................. 56
The African Theory ................................................................................................................................... 57
The Rise of the Great Zimbabwe state..................................................................................................... 57
Trade Hypothesis ..................................................................................................................................... 57
Cattle Hypothesis ..................................................................................................................................... 58
Religious Theory ....................................................................................................................................... 58
The fall of Great Zimbabwe ..................................................................................................................... 58
CHAPTER 5 ............................................................................................. 61
THE RISE OF THE MUTAPA DYNASTY, DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
AND ORAL TRADITIONS (CASE STUDY ON SOURCES) .................. 61

Oral Tradition: .......................................................................................................................................... 61
Who were the Mbire? .............................................................................................................................. 62
Nyatsimba Mutapa: ................................................................................................................................. 63
Documentary sources: ............................................................................................................................. 63
Antonio Fernandes accounts ................................................................................................................... 64
The first Christian Missionary to Penetrate the Zimbabwe Plateau: Father Goncalo da Silveira ............ 65
Comments on sources: ............................................................................................................................ 65
CHAPTER 6 ............................................................................................. 73
THE MUTAPA STATE ............................................................................ 73

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The rise of Mutapa state .......................................................................................................................... 73
Salt Theory: .............................................................................................................................................. 74
Expansionist Theory ................................................................................................................................. 74
Succession Theory .................................................................................................................................... 74
Cattle Theory ........................................................................................................................................... 75
Trade Theory ............................................................................................................................................ 75
Political Organisation of the Mutapa State .............................................................................................. 75
Social life of the Mutapa People. ............................................................................................................. 75
The Economic life of the Mutapa ............................................................................................................. 76
Portuguese Activities in the Mutapa State: ............................................................................................. 77
CHAPTER 7 ............................................................................................. 86
THE TORWA STATE: BEFORE 1650 ..................................................... 86
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES: ............................................................................................................................. 86

Background .............................................................................................................................................. 86
Problems .................................................................................................................................................. 86
The rise of the Torwa State 1450-1683 (Location Geography) ................................................................ 90
Examination type questions..................................................................................................................... 94
CHAPTER 8 ............................................................................................. 95
THE ROZVI EMPIRE..................................................................................... 95

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 95
The Political and Administrative Organisation of the Rozvi Empire. ....................................................... 96
The Rozvi Military power and Organisation............................................................................................. 97
RELIGION: Its Political Significance .......................................................................................................... 99
EXTERNAL TRADE AND THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE ROZVI EMPIRE ................................................. 101
THE FALL OF THE ROZVI KINGDOM ........................................................................................................ 105
Examination Type Question ................................................................................................................... 106
CHAPTER 9 ........................................................................................... 107
THE NDEBELE STATE UNDER MZILIKAZI ...................................... 107
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 107

Mzilikazi Journey- 1822-1837 ................................................................................................................ 108
Mzilikazi’s first treaty with the British ................................................................................................... 109
The Shona- Ndebele Relations ............................................................................................................... 110
Social Organisation of the Ndebele: ...................................................................................................... 111
Religion .................................................................................................................................................. 112
Political Structure of the Ndebele state:................................................................................................ 113
The Ndebele Economy ........................................................................................................................... 114

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Examination Type Questions ................................................................................................................. 115

CHAPTER 10.......................................................................................... 116
Christian Missionary Activities and their effects in Pre-Colonial Zimbabwe:116

Reactions of Africans to Christian Missionaries: .................................................................................... 117
Christian Missionaries among the Shona:.............................................................................................. 118
Activities Of Hunters, Traders, Explorers and Missionaries in Zimbabwe Between 1800 – 1890 ......... 122
Hunters and Traders in Matabeleland ................................................................................................... 122
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................... 125
CHAPTER 11 .......................................................................................... 126
THE COLONISATION OF ZIMBABWE ............................................... 126

The Moffat Treaty 1888 ......................................................................................................................... 127
Negotiated terms of the Rudd Concession During Negotiations. .......................................................... 128
Documented (Actual) terms of the Rudd Concession ............................................................................ 128
Why Rhodes managed to get the Charter. ............................................................................................ 129
The Pioneer Column, and the Occupation of Mashonaland. ................................................................. 130
The Anglo-Ndebele War: 1893-4. Long term causes of the war ........................................................... 130
Victoria Incident: Immediate causes of the Anglo Ndebele war. .......................................................... 131
The course of the war: ........................................................................................................................... 132
The Shangani river battle: ...................................................................................................................... 132
The Mbembesi Battle ............................................................................................................................. 132
Results of Anlgo-Ndebele war. .............................................................................................................. 132
CHAPTER 13.......................................................................................... 135
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA 1898-1963135

General Overview .................................................................................................................................. 135
Orders-In-Council 1898 .......................................................................................................................... 135
The Peasantisation of the African 1892-1920:....................................................................................... 136
Morris Carter Commission ..................................................................................................................... 136
The land Apportionment Act of 1931 .................................................................................................... 137
The Native land Husbandry Act of 1951. ............................................................................................... 137
The Native Rhodesia labour Bureau ...................................................................................................... 139
CHAPTER 14.......................................................................................... 142

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THE SHONA NDEBELE UPRAISING 1896-7 ...................................... 142

BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................ 142
MATABELELAND: The causes of the 1896 – 1897 risings....................................................................... 143
Some Common Causes .......................................................................................................................... 144
Causes of the 1896 – 1897 Risings among the Shona ............................................................................ 145
WHY DID THE SHONA RISE IN 1896 AND NOT BEFORE THAT DATE? ..................................................... 147
The Course of the 1896 – 1897 Risings in Matabeleland and Mashonaland ......................................... 148
The Course of the 1896 Risings in Matabeleland .................................................................................. 148
The Course of the Risings among the Shona ......................................................................................... 151
LACK OF PLANNING / ORGANISATION ................................................................................................... 153
CHAPTER 15.......................................................................................... 157
AFRICAN RESPONSES AND RESISTANCE: 1898- 1923- T.O RANGER157

Introduction. The Shona: ....................................................................................................................... 157
The Ndebele-1898- 1923: ...................................................................................................................... 159
Land issue and the Kingship movement: ............................................................................................... 159
African Responses, Resistance and The Rise of nationalism and Trade Unionism (1923- 1954) ........... 162
African Response to the Land Apportionment Act: ............................................................................... 164
Trade Unionism in the 1930’s’ ............................................................................................................... 168
The Situation After 1945 ........................................................................................................................ 170
CHAPTER 16.......................................................................................... 173
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA........... 173
CHAPTER OBEJCTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 173

Background ............................................................................................................................................ 173
Company rule to 1923: Direct rule......................................................................................................... 175
The Orders in Council-1898: .................................................................................................................. 176
The Rise and Fall of the African Peasantry: Rhodesia” 1898- 1930 ....................................................... 177
The Rise of Settler Capitalist Agriculture: 1910- 1953: .......................................................................... 181
Land-the Company’s Principal asset and Diversification of Agricultural Production; ............................ 187
State Aid and Settler Extraction of Surplus Value form Africans ........................................................... 191
CHAPTER 17.......................................................................................... 195
PRE-COLONIAL MINING ..................................................................... 195

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Background ............................................................................................................................................ 195

Nineteenth Century Expansion and Development in South – Central Africa: ....................................... 195
The Era Speculative Capitalism: 1890- 1903 .......................................................................................... 196
Hospitals and Change Houses: ............................................................................................................... 200
Food Supplies: Agriculture ..................................................................................................................... 200
How Mine Rations were supplemented: ............................................................................................... 202
Mortality and Disease: ........................................................................................................................... 202
Labour Mobilisation: Chibaro/Isibalo/Cibalo-forced Labour: 1900- 1912 ............................................. 206
Solution To The Problems: The Speculative Era 1898-1903:................................................................ 207
The Rhodes Plan: ................................................................................................................................... 208
Sources of Cheap Labour: ...................................................................................................................... 209
The plight of the Shona and Ndebele: .................................................................................................... 211
The Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau ...................................................................................................... 212
Examination type questions................................................................................................................... 214
CHAPTER 18.......................................................................................... 215
THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND .................. 215

Origins of the Federation ....................................................................................................................... 215
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION ............................................................................................................. 215
ARGUMENTS AGAINST FEDERATION ..................................................................................................... 216
AFRICAN POLITICAL SITUATION UNDER FEDERATION ........................................................................... 217
AFRICAN EDUCATION UNDER FEDERATION .......................................................................................... 218
URBAN CONDITIONS IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA DURING FEDERATION ................................................. 219
Examination Type Questions: ................................................................................................................ 219
CHAPTER 19.......................................................................................... 221
THE RHODESIAN FRONT AND THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
................................................................................................................. 221

Historical Background ............................................................................................................................ 221
Why was it Practical for the Rhodesian Front to declare the UDI? ....................................................... 223
The Specific Nature of Sanctions under the UDI : Impact of Sanctions ................................................. 226
IMPACT OF UDI ON THE POLITICS OF ZIMBABWE (1970 – 1979) .......................................................... 228
The Rhodesian Internal Settlement ....................................................................................................... 228
How did Ian Smith then change his Tactics and begin to Accommodate the Nationalists? .................. 229
The Key Provisions of the Internal Settlement ...................................................................................... 231
How did the Patriotic Front react to the Internal Settlements? ............................................................ 232
Examinations Type Questions ................................................................................................................ 233
CHAPTER 20 ......................................................................................... 234

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THE RISE OF EARLY MASS NATIONALISM IN RHODESIA: 1950 – 1965
................................................................................................................. 234

DEFINITION OF NATIONALISM ............................................................................................................... 234
WHAT ROLE WAS PLAYED BY THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENTS DURING THIS PERIOD? (1950 – 1965)235
THE REFORMED INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION (RICU): ITS ACTIVITIES ................ 236
WHICH POLITICAL PARTIES WERE FORMED DURING THIS PERIOD AND WHAT WERE THEIR ACTIVITIES?239
THE FORMATION OF ZAPU AND ZANU. ................................................................................................. 241
WHAT PROBLEMS WERE FACED BY ZAPU AND ZANU AFTER 1961? ..................................................... 242
CHAPTER 21.......................................................................................... 245
THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN ZIMBABWE (1966-1979) ..................... 245

Causes of the Second Chimurenga ........................................................................................................ 245
Prosecution of the war .......................................................................................................................... 246
1979 Lancaster House Agreement ......................................................................................................... 248
The role of the Peasants and Workers in the Armed Struggle: ............................................................. 249
The role of the international community .............................................................................................. 250
CHAPTER 22 ......................................................................................... 252
ZIMBABWE AFTER INDEPENDENCE .......................................................... 252
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS ............................. 252

GENERAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................ 252
Political Developments: Relations between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU after Independence.Error! Bookmark not
defined.
What was the Genesis of Inequitable Land Share in Zimbabwe? .......................................................... 270
What was the land-holding situation at independence in 1980? .......................................................... 271
LAND RESETTLEMENT AFTER INDEPENDENCE ....................................................................................... 273
Why did the Resettlement Programme slow down, and in some cases, stall in the 1980’s and 1990’s?273
How did the donors view the land reform exercise, as government conducted it? .............................. 275
ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME (ESAP) ............................................................. 275
How did the ruling elite worsen the negative impact of ESAP?............................................................. 278
The Second Phase of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme. ................................................ 279
How and why did the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme begin? ............................................. 280
Why was the FTLR Programme executed so intensely as from May 2000 onwards? ........................... 280
IMPACT OF THE FTLR PROGRAMME ...................................................................................................... 282

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Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to the members of Turn- Up College and other outside
contributors who researched on the contents of this book. I am also grateful to my secretaries,
Concilia Manda Mkokora and Crystabell Mudzingwa who typed the manuscript. I wish to
extend my thanks to teachers and stundents who have used the initial publication of this book
and have given constructive ideas on how to improve the book.The present state of this study
pack is therefore an effort of several positive- minded Zimbabweans.
We have taken every effort to try and get hold of the copyright holders of any information we
have reproduced without acknowledgement. We will appreciate the help from anyone to enable
us contact the copyright holders whose permission we have not yet obtained.
S. Madzingira
Director

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PREFACE
The recent introduction of Zimbabwean History paper (9155/05) at Advanced level, has
necessitated the production of study material which adequately prepares both the teacher and
student of ‘A’ Level for it. The textbooks currently on offer are meant for the ordinary ‘O’ Level
candidate, hence inadequate. Therefore, there is lack of reading material for this paper.
Apart from the scarcity of relevant reading material on this paper, there is also urgent need for
expert advice on the right approach to use in handling this paper. The topics covered in this
module are those prescribed in the syllabus. However these broad topics are broken down into
specific aspects, which will help focus both the teacher and the student on relevant issues.
It is important at this juncture to emphasize the fact that ‘A’ Level candidates should desist from
writing narrative/descriptive answers. Analysis is what is expected of them and their teachers
are encouraged to assist in this regard.
In other words, it is not adequate to simply regurgitate facts without reflecting and commenting
on them. Analysis involves the student in a number of activities, such as judgment, assessment,
appraising, comparing and contrasting, just to mention a few. Candidates should show that they
are widely read by referring to views of modern scholars on any given topic.
The motive of this Study Pack is to create a self-sufficient information base for the student. With
this aim in mind, this Study Pack provides all the necessary topical material in a simplified
manner. There after that the Study Pack provides a wide range of examination-type questions at
the end of each topic area. Topic objectives are inserted at the biggining of each chapter to guie
and focus both the teacher and the student on what to achieve by the end of the chapter.

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Syllabus Interpretation:
HISTORY OF ZIMBABWE PAPER 5
Syllabus 9155/5 is a syllabus developed for the Zimbabwean Advanced level student pursuing
studies in History. This syllabus equips the child with historical content and awareness on
Zimbabwe’s past. It develops in children national consciousness and personal awareness.
Historical content is structured thematically, meaning to say it starts with far remote events in the
prehistoric era covering primitive communalism modes of production, cascading down to the
contemporary issues. This makes this syllabus unique for it prepares the child’s understanding of
the current political, economic and social development by referring to the past because the
present is rooted in the past. Besides, the syllabus arms the student with a variety of skills
necessary for use in future.
PAPER COMBINATIONS FOR ‘A’ LEVEL HISTORY (9155)-ZIMSEC)
This European History syllabus is studied in conjunction with another different area to constitute
a complete subject at Advanced Level. For instance, European History can be studied together
with another separate Advanced Level History component such as Tropical African History
(9155/2) or Zimbabwean History (9155/3).
However, the Zimbabwe Schools Examinations Council (ZIMSEC) allows paper combinations
to follow any pattern i.e. Tropical African History can be studied in conjunction with
Zimbabwean History and or Zimbabwean History can be studied in conjunction with European
History. No single component is therefore complete in itself.
The European History Paper is code-numbered 9155/01 in the Zimbabwe School Examinations
Council (ZIMSEC) examination. Technically speaking, it is not a compulsory paper although the
majority of candidates register for it. The other papers on offer are 9155/02 (World Affairs since
1960), 9155/03 (History of southern Africa 1854-1914), 9155/04 (Tropical Africa-1855-1914)
and 9155/05 (History of Zimbabwe). The European History Paper (9155/01) can be combined
with any of the papers stated above. Below are the Advanced level History paper combinations
offered by ZIMSEC.
OPTION PAPER COMBINATIONS

A 1 and 2
B 1 and 3
C 1 and 4
D 1 and 5
E 2 and 3
F 2 and 4
G 2 and 5
Option D has clearly become the most popular in schools as evidenced by the increased
candidature. Option C is now trailing in second position. The other options have registered a
very low candidature to date.
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History of Zimbabwe is not studied in isolation. Ever since its inception in 2002, syllabus 9155/5
has been studied in conjunction with paper 1 which is European History. Paper 1 focuses on
European History from 1789 up to 1960. This paper combination is ideal for Advanced level
History students for it makes the study a complete study suitable for advanced level. It is also
ideal because it exposes the child to both national and international events giving the student a
wider menu of international events from which one can refer to when analysing events.
Topics that are included in this syllabus have been unanimously approved by the Zimbabwe
Curriculum Development Unit (CDU) together with Zimbabwe Schools Examinations Council.
(ZIMSEC)
Content:
Syllabus 9155/5 is divided into four (4) sections, each section focusing on activities of a certain
period:
Section A-Prehistory-(1450). Topics to be covered include:
-Sources of historical knowledge e.g Archaeology, written records and oral tradition. Focus is on
how each source complements the other in acquiring historical knowledge. The weaknesses of
one source are catered for by the strengths of another source.
-Early Iron Age cultures in Zimbabwe, Ziwa, Mapungubwe, Leopold Kopje, Gokomere etc
-Rise and decline of early Shona states.
Although the rise and fall of states like Mutapa, Great Zimbabwe, Torwa and Rozvi prominently
feature in Section A these states are not early iron age states.
Section B
Comprises topics like Mutapa, Rozvi, Torwa and Ndebele focusing on internal and external
impact to the growth and decline of each state. Influence of trade with foreigners is emphasised
in the study.
-Missionary Activities in Zimbabwe, Activities of hunters and traders as well as concession
seekers in the colonisation of Zimbabwe.
-Impact of European occupation on the Shona and Ndebele-1890- 1898
-Anglo-Ndebele war
-Shona-Ndebele uprising

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Section C
-Emphasis on colonial rule and the struggle for independence from 1900-1979.
-Topics include-Company rule up to 1923. Mining, farming, labour issues
-Settler rule up to 1953, colonial strategies for survival, land appropriation and dispossession.
-Mass nationalism, federation
-Rhodesia under Ian Smith-UDI
-Sanctions and their effect on Smiths government.
-internal settlement 1979,
Lancaster conference 1979.
Section D
Post Independent Zimbabwe 1980 to the present. Achievements/failures of the present
government.
-Topics include: Mugabe’s foreign policy, opposition politics in Zimbabwe from 1980 to the
present,
-The role of the media and arts in nation building and elections.
-Zimbabwe’s economic policies: ESAP, ZIMPREST, Relations with IMF and World Bank.
-Land reform programme- Successes and challenges.
Candidates are expected to answer 4 questions from at least two sections in 3 hours. Four
questions are set on each section.
Assessment aims
-The aims of the syllabus of the History of Zimbabwe were designed with the knowledge that
history is not events, but people. It is not just people remembering but it is about people acting
and living, people engaged in productive work at every stage of human development. In light of
this background knowledge of the history of Zimbabwe aims to:
-Develop an interest in and enthusiasm for the study on historical events.
-Acquisition of relevant knowledge leading to an awareness of personal and national identity.
Promote critical study of the subject.
-Promote independent thinking and make informed judgements on different issues and situations.
-Sensitize students on issues of human rights, gender and democracy.

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-To cultivate empathy with people living in diverse places and at different time frames.
Assessment objectives
By the end of the course, candidates should display the:
a) Ability to make effective use of relevant factual knowledge, to demonstrate the
understanding of an historical period or periods in outline and of particular topics in
depth;
b) The ability to distinguish and assess different approaches to, interpretations of and
opinions about the past;
c) The ability to interpret and evaluate historical evidence
d) Analyse interpret and evaluate historical evidence, points of view, opinions and value
judgements and detect bias.
e) Present a clear, concise, logical and relevant argument.
The above objectives attempt to avoid mere singing of content by focusing assessment on
objectives stated above. All essay answers should be marked in such a way that the final mark
awarded is a true reflection of attainment in the assessment, objectives. Marking should be
responsive enough to reward answers which demonstrate different combinations of argument and
historical knowledge.
Generic Mark Bands for Essay Questions
Examiners will assess which level of response best reflects most of the answer’s contents. An
answer will not be required to demonstrated all of the descriptions in a particular level to quality
for a mark band.
In band 3, markers or, examiners will normally award the middle mark, moderating it up or
down according to the particular qualities of the answer. In band 2 markers or, examiners should
award the lower mark if an answer just deserves the band, and the higher mark if the answer
clearly deserves the band.
Examiners will assess which marking band best reflects the quality of the answer. They should
not expect answers to show all the qualities included within the band description. The choice of
the mark within the band will depend on the analysis and amount of supporting information.
Essays in bands 1-3 will clearly be question focused, whereas those in lower bands will show a
primary concern with the topic rather than with the specific question asked.

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Bands Marks
Quality of the Answer
1 21-25 The approach will be consistently analytical
Or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. Essays will be
fully relevant.
The writing will be accurate, supported by appropriate
factual knowledge. The overall quality will show that the
student is in control of the argument
The best answers must achieve 25 marks
2 18-20 Essays will be clearly focused on the demands of the
Question but there will be some unevenness. The approach will be
mostly analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive. Answers
will be mostly relevant, and supported by accurate factual material.
The writing will be mostly accurate.
Bands Mark Quality of the answer
3 16-17 Essays will reflect a clear
understanding of the question, and constitute a fair attempt to
provide an argument and factual knowledge to, answer it. The
approach will contain analysis or explanation, but there may be some heavily narrative or
descriptive passages. The answer will be largely relevant. The essay may lack balance but at the
same time achieve genuine argument Most of the answers may be structured satisfactorily but
lacking full coherence.
4. 14 15
Essays will attempt to argue relevantly though often implicitly. The approach will heavily
depend on descriptive or narrative passages than analysis or explanation. Factual
knowledge may be used only to impact information or describe events without directly
addressing requirements of the question. The structure of the argument could be
organised more effectively. The writing will be accurate.
Band Marks Quality of the answer
5 11-13 Essay will offer appropriate elements but with little attempt to link factual
material to the demands of the questions. The approach will lack analysis and the quality will not
be linked to the argument. The structure will weaknesses and treatment of topics with the answer
will be unbalanced. The writing may show some accuracy but there will be frequent errors.

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Band Marks
6 8-10 Not properly focused essays fall into his band. They are characterised
by supported assertions and commentaries which lack factual support. The
argument may be of limited relevance to the topic and there may be confusion about the
implication of the question. The writing may show significant weaknesses.
Words commonly used in essay questions

1. Examine: Look at a theory viewpoint, event, closely in order to find out more about it by
describing its nature or position and finally making judgement as to suitability,
adaptability or affordability.
2. Discuss: Elaborate on the subject by tracing its development, arguments for and against,
and relationships to other facts or ideas.
3. Analyse: separate or split a theory, idea or view point into its constituent elements while
expressing thoughts and judgements about it. Also determine its essential features and
their relations.
4. Assess: Give arguments for and against an issue, point, theory or system, then take a
stand in support or against it while giving appropriate examples.
5. Define: show or explain the qualities, nature or limits of a term, subject or concept. Place
it in a category and distinguish from everything else-by stating the distinguishing
features.
BACKGROUND TO THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL AFRICA; THE ZIMBABWE

PLATEAU INCLUDED
AS P.E.N. Tindall (1983) pointed out that, the history of central Africa is fraught with
difficulties. Central Africa, which includes the Zimbabwe Plateau, is unique when compared to
Asia and Europe. Infact Africa South of the Sahara has but a short written history.
Central Africa in general and the Zimbabwe Plateau in particular, before the 16th century is only
referred to in the form of occasional comments in the writings of Arab geographers and
travellers. Also, the last four centuries are only sparsely covered by the writings of European
travelers and settlers.
African oral traditions, the customs of different ethnic groups, and the study of the derivation and
growth of African languages provide a guide to the events of the past few hundred years and cast
some light on the controversial problem of ethnic or “tribal” movements.
However, it is mainly to the archaeologist that we turn to on written history. By excavating the
sites occupied in the past and studying the remains of metal or stone implements, pottery, and the
bones of human beings and animals found there by archaeologists and gradually building up a
picture of the long pre-historic period.

20
Recently, new scientific methods of dating past events have been devised. Nuclear physicists
have discovered the rate at which certain radio-active substances disintegrate and they have been
able to use this information to date past events. One substance, potassium argon, has been used
in American laboratories. Tests have been made to date specimens of certain rocks which are
many millions of years old, but this method is of more use to geologists than to prehistorians. It
has however, been used to date rocks derived from volvanic lava at Olduvai in East Africa which
interesarchaeologists as they are associated with early stone implements and fossil skulls which
may be a millit on or more years old. Unfortunately this method is not yet proved to be reliable.
Some dates have been published but experts are not agreed on their validity.
Another substance, far more important for the prehistorian is carbon 14. This is contained in
organic matter such as charcoal and shells. Samples of these materials collected by
archaeologists from sites which they have excavated are submitted to laboratory tests and an
approximate date is worked out. Carbon 14 dates are not completely reliable, but where a
number of tests on material from the same strata provide similar results, we can be confident that
they are reasonably correct.
The method is most satisfactory for dates during the last 30 000 years; earlier than this they
become increasingly unreliable. So it has become possible to give an approximate date for many
living sites occupied in the past and build up a roughly dated sequence for the different cultures
(ie ways of living ) discovered.

21
CHAPTER 1
PRE HISTORY TO 1450
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
After studying this chapter students should be able to
1. Define the various sources of our knowledge of history i.e. oral, tradition, archaeology,
written records and anthropology.
2. Discuss the origins of Great Zimbabwe.
3. Explain the various theories behind the stone walls of Great Zimbabwe.
4. Assess the various theories on the fall of Great Zimbabwe.
5. Explain the relations between Great Zimbabwe with the Mutapa, Torwa, Mapungubwe
and Rozvi states.
BACKGROUND
Any pre-colonial study of the origins of Zimbabwe, must essentially, first focus on the pre-
history of Great Zimbabwe. Such a study must of necessity highlight the debates on the origins a
of Great Zimbabwe, illuminate the structuralist and archtecturalist arguments regarding the
settlement at Great Zimbabwe, and in the process, review the historical sources of our knowledge
of Great Zimbabwe namely, archaeology, oral tradition and written records. The Great
Zimbabwe gave rise to later settlements such as the Mutapa, Rozvi, Torwa, Khami in one way or
the other.
GENERAL BACKGROUND ON GREAT ZIMBABWE

Great Zimbabwe is a ruined city that was once the capital of the kingdom of Zimbabwe, which
existed from 1100 to 1450 AD during the country’s Late Iron Age period. The monument,
which first began to be constructed in the 11th century continued to be built until the 14th century,
spanned an area of 722 hectares (1 784 acres) and at its peak could have housed up to 18 000
people. Great Zimbabwe acted as a royal place for the Zimbabwean monarch and would have
been used as a city of their political power. One of its most prominent features were its walls,
some of which were over five metres high and which were constructed without mortar.
Eventually, the city was largely abandoned and fell into ruin, first being encountered by
Europeans in the early 16th century. Investigaton of the site first began in the 19th century when
the monument caused great controversy amongst the archaeological world, with political
pressure being placed upon archaeologists by the-then white supremarcist government of
Rhodesia to deny that Great Zimbabwe could have ever been produced by native Zimbabwean.

22
The word “Great” distinguishes the site from the many hundreds of small ruins, known as
Zimbabwes or MaDzimbabwe, spread across the Zimbabwe Highveld. There are 200 such sites
in southern Africa, such as Bumbusi, Chipadze, Tsindi, Khami in Zimbabwe and Manekweni in
Mozambique, with monumental, mortar-less walls and Great Zimbabwe as the largest.
CONSTRUCTON AND GROWTH

Construction of the stone buildings started in the 11th century and continued for another 300
years. Of course it is important to remember that the Great Zimbabwe area had been settled as
early as the fourth century. In fact, between the fourth and seventh centuries, communities now
identified as Gokomere or Ziwa cultures formed the valley, mined and worked iron, but built no
stone structures. These are the earliest iron-age settlements in the area identified from
archaeological diggings.
Its most formidable edifice, commonly referred to as the Great Enclosure, has walls as high as 11
metres, extending approximately 250 metres, making it the largest ancient structure south of
Sahara desert. The city and its state, the kingdom of Zimbabwe, flourished from 1200 to 1500
and its decline has been linked to the decline of Mapungubwe from around 1300; due to climatic
change or due to over farming, the population depleting the land resources and a decline in the
important gold trade. The settlement was mainly abandoned around 1450.
FEATURES OF THE RUINS

In `1531, Vicente Pegado, Captain of the Portuguese Garrison of Sofala in some of the earliest
written records, described Zimbabwe thus; “Among the gold mines of the island plains between
the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers there is a fortress build of stones of marvellous size, and there
appears to be no mortar joining them. This edifice is almost surrounded by hills, upon which are
others resembling it in the fashioning of stone and the absence of mortar, and one of them is a
tower more than 22 metres high (12 fathoms). The natives of the country call these edifices
symbaoe, which according to their languages signifies court”.
The ruins form three distinct architectural groups. They are known as the Hill complex, the
Valley Complex and the Great Enclosure. The Hill complex is the oldest, and was occupied
from the ninth to thirteenth centuries. The Great Enclosure was occupied from the thirteenth to
fifteenth centuries and the Valley Complex from the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. Notable
features of the Hill Complex include the Eastern Enclosure, in which it is thought the Zimbabwe
Bird stood, a high balcony enclosure overlooking the Eastern Enclosure and a huge boulder in a
shape similar to that of the Zimbabwe bird. The Great Enclosure is composed of an inner wall,
encircling a series of structures and a younger outer wall. The conical tower, 18 feet in diameter
and 30 feet high, was constructed between the two walls. The Valley Complex is divided into
the upper and lower valley ruins, with different periods of occupation.
There are different archaeological interpretations of these groupings. It has been suggested that
the complexes represent the work of successive kings: some of the new kings/rulers founded a
23
new residence. The focus of power moved from the Hill Complex in the twelfth century to the
Great Enclosure, the upper valley and finally the lower valley in the early sixteenth century. The
alternative structural interpretation holds that the different complexes had different functions: the
Hill Complex as a temple, the Valley Complex was for the citizens and the Great Enclosure was
used by the king. It will be indicated later in the chapter as local archaeologists, Pikiraryi and
Chirikure have convincingly argued, that the complexes in fact belonged to different time frames
and therefore the dating would not support this interpretation. Some researchers claim that the
ruins may have housed an astronomy observatory, but no concrete evidence has been found to
back these claims.
TRADE
Archaeological evidence as well as written records, especially Portuguese diaries mostly
presented by historian David Beach, suggests that Great Zimbabwe became a centre for trading;
with arti-facts suggesting that the city formed part of a trade network linked to Kilwa and
extending as far as China. This international trade mainly in gold and ivory, was in addition to
the local agricultural trade in which cattle were especially important. The large cattle herd that
supplied the city moved seasonally and was managed by the court. Chinese pottery shards coins
from Arabia, glass beads and other non-local items have been excavated at Zimbabwe. Despite
these strong international links there is no evidence to suggest an exchange of architectural
concepts between Great Zimbabwe and centres such as Kilwa.
The Mutapa state arose in the fifteenth century from the northward expansion of the Great
Zimbabwe tradition. Great Zimbabwe also predates the Khami and Nyanga cultures.
THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF GREAT ZIMBABWE: A STORM IN

A TEA CUP
The Portuguese traders were the first Europeans to visit the remains of the ancient city in the
early 16th century. The ruins wee rediscovered during a hunting trip by Adam Renders in 1867,
who then showed the ruins to Karl Mauch, a German geologists in 1871. Mauch refused to
believe that indigenous African could have built such an extensive network of monuments made
of granite stone.
He writes;
“I do not think that I am far wrong if I suppose that the ruin on the hill is a copy of
Solomon’s temple on Mount Moriah and the building in the plain a copy of the place
where the Queen of Sheba lived during her visit to Solomon”.
Mauch stated, later that,
“a civilized (white) nation must once have lived there”.

24
In 1890, British imperialist and coloniser Cecil John Rhodes (1853 – 1902) conquered a large
portion of southern Africa and renamed the region after him self. Rhodes equally echoed the
theme of Mauch as he argued that the Great Zimbabwe was built by foreigners. To promote his
goal of misrepresenting the origins of Zimbabwe, Rhodes established the Ancient Ruins
Company and financed men such as James Theodore Bent, who was sent to Zimbabwe by the
British Association of science. After his investigation Bent concluded in his book, Ruined Cities
of Mashonaland (1892) that items found within the Great Zimbabwe complex “proved” that the
civilization was not build by local Africans.
In 1902, the British continued with their falsification agenda as British archaeologist Richard
Hall was hired to investigate the Great Zimbabwe site. Hall asserted in his book, The Ancient
Ruins of Rhodesia (1902) that the civilization was built by “more civilised races”. He argued
that the last phase of Great Zimbabwe. Was the transitional and “decadent period”, a time when
foreign builders interbred with local Africans. Hall went out of his way to eliminate
archaeological evidence which would have proven quite easily that an indigenous African people
build Great Zimbabwe. He removed about two metres deep of archaeological remains, which
effectively destroyed the evidence that would have established an African origin of the site. This
was treasure-hunting and looting at its worst.
Nevertheless, in 1905, soon after Hall’s destructive activity, British archaeologist David Randall-
Maclver studied the mud dwellings within the stone enclosures, and he became the first
European researcher of the site to assert that the dwellings were “unquestioningly African in
every detail”. After Maclver’s assertion, which was almost equivalent to blasphemy in those
days of British imperialism, archaeologists were banned from the Zimbabwe site from the next
25 years.
It was in 1929 that a British archaeologist Getrude Caton-Thompson led the first all-female
excavation. Caton-Thompson investigated the site and was able to definitely argue in her work,
The Zimbabwe Culture: Ruins and Reactions (1931) that the ruins were of African origin. She
assessed the available archaeological evidence (artifacts, nearby dwellings etc) and the oral
tradition of the modern Shona-peaking people and compared them to the ancient sites to
determine the African foundation of Great Zimbabwe. Despite Caton-Thompson’s conclusive
evidence, the myth of a foreign origin of Great Zimbabwe continued for another half a century
until Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980.
Ian smith was the last major British colonial figure to falsify evidence of Great Zimbabwe’s
origin. During his reign archaeologist Peter Garlake was deported for publicly asserting that the
Great Zimbabwe was built by non other that Zimbabweans of Shona origin.
Peter Garlake wrote thus:
“From about the late twelfth century, diversification, expansion, affluence and a
concomitant of these, increased social, economic and functional specialization took place
in both cultures so that in the end entire settlements could, like areas within sites, be built
and used for limited functions by certain groups or clusters of people”.

25
Garlake’s evidence is corroborated by John Lliffe who noted that the expansion of the metal
trade and textile production as demonstrated by the increase of spindle whorls, Zimbabwe
became a flourishing feudal state from AD 1250 – 1750: stretching over 500 miles from the
Zambezi river to Transvaal. (Africa: the History of a Continent, 1995, p.101).
Moreover, historian D.J. Niane also affirmed the view that Great Zimbabwe was built by the
Shona. He argues,
“Most historians agree that gold was not the origin of wealth of Zimbabwe but the
considerable development of cattle on the grass plateau which was free of Tsetse fly”.
(African from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, ed. D.T. Niane, 1985, p533).
Not only that, B.M. Fagan, an archaeologist from the University of California and Oxford reports
that,
“The architecture of Great Zimbabwe is a logical extension of the large enclosures and
chiefs’ quarters which were built of grass, mud and poles in other African states but
merely constructed here in stone. The great enclosure itself was divided into a serried of
smaller enclosures in which the foundations of substantial pole-and-mud houses are to be
seen. It was presumably the dwelling place of the rulers of great Zimbabwe, an
impressive and politically highly significant structure…. With the exception of the
conical tower which is a unique structure of unknown significance, there is nothing in
Great Zimbabwe architecture which is alien to African practice”.
The Heritage of World Civilisations, a book compiled by Harvard and Yale historians, asserts
that the….
“Civilization was a purely African one sited far enough inland never to have felt
the impact of Islam”.
Historian Basil Davidson wrote the following choosing to compare Great Zimbabwe monuments
with similar archaeological and historical developments elsewhere in Africa. He wrote the
following passage on Zimbabwe’s place in medieval Africa:
“The foundation of Zimbabwe go back to much the same period as the foundations of
Ghana. The initial raising of the walls of the “Acropolis and the “elliptical building” was
not much later than the time when Mali grew strong, and Timbuletu and Djenne saw their
transformation into seats of thought and learning. The miles of careful terracing and the
hilltop forts and store-pits and stone dwellings of Niekerk and Inyanga were made while
Mohammed Askia and his successors ruled the western Sudan”.
It is important to note that the foregoing academic consensus on the origins of Great Zimbabwe
indeed served to endorse the findings of local and southern African historians on the topic.
Thomas N. Huffman who conducted extensive archaeological research on the monuments and
was based in South Africa noted, for instance, that,

26
“we know from oral tradition and written history that, like other centres in the
complex, Great Zimbabwe was ruled by Shona Kings. Indeed Shona oral
tradition, Shona custom and sixteenth to eighteenth century eyewitness accounts
help us reconstruct the spatial organisation of Great Zimbabwe and explain the
meaning of its most famous symbols - the Zimbabwe birds”.
As already highlighted, Peter Garlake has gone to lengths and breath to move that indeed the
great Zimbabwe was built by the Shona. Not to be left out of course, are David Beach, Innocent
Pikirayi, Shadreck Chirikure and many others, have convincingly argued that Great Zimbabwe
was build by non other than Zimbabweans.
HISTORICAL SOURCES AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GREAT ZIMBABWE

According to Peter Garlake,
“Any study of the Great Zimbabwe has to rely a great deal on re-examining and re-
assessing the work of early investigators, the men who removed all the most important
finds from the ruins and stripped them of so much of their deposits”.
Put differently the study of Great Zimbabwe is mostly possible through analysis of
archaeological material and equipment such as carbon dating to determine exactly when the
related pottery and arti-facts were produced.
As indicated already, the first Europeans to visit Great Zimbabwe were the Portuguese traders in
1531, meaning that all the details relating to the origins, epogee and eventual decline of the city
could not have been recorded. It becomes clear that our knowledge of Great Zimbabwe would
chiefly have to be through archaeological remains.
Oral tradition is another significant domain through which we can learn about the Great
Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, this avenue is limited, in that any data that does back more than four
centuries has to be treated with extreme caution, as D.N. Beach warned. Where then, is the place
or oral tradition in the study of Great Zimbabwe history? How significant is it?
Oral tradition does very little to explain the origins of Great Zimbabwe. We know for a fact that
as a source of historical knowledge it does a lot to explain the material culture at Great
Zimbabwe. While archaeology explains the periodisation of the monuments, that is, the Hill
Complex, (early to late 13th century); the Great Enclosure; Lower Valley Enclosures (late 13th
early 14th centuries continuing right through the 15th to mid 16th centuries). Such progression in
the construction of Great Zimbabwe actually indicates that the place was dynamic and not static;
that whereas the Hill Complex might have been the oldest, as indicated by the less sophisticated
nature of the walls, the upper and lower valley walls increasingly became more sophisticated.
Archaeology has proved that, far from events and ceremonies, being structured, as T. Huffman
had originally argued, Pikirayi and Chirikure have disapproved that, indicating that different
kings occupied different complexes at different times. In coming up, with such an analytical
conclusion, obviously written records and oral tradition play a minimal role.

27
Oral tradition, however helps to interpret the utility value of some of the key arti-facts found at
the monuments. For instance, T.N. Huffman’s “The soapstone Birds from Great Zimbabwe” in
determining the meaning and significance of the soapstone birds had to rely on oral tradition in
order to link the birds to the cultural norms and beliefs of the Shona people.
Hence Huffan cites that
“Eagles, being the largest and most powerful birds, are appropriate messengers for the
most important people”.
There is obviously a difference between Shona cultural beliefs in general and oral tradition, but
both have been passed down from generation to generation by word of mouth and the former by
practice as well.
What needs to be emphasised is the fact that the sources of our knowledge of the past are not
always mutually supportive, for instance, if prehistoric data can only be fully dated and
examined through archaeological means it may be very difficult to find written records to
support archaeological findings. However, it would almost always be easier to back up written
records and oral tradition with archaeological findings on common prehistoric grounds.
THE GREAT ZIMBABWE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In emphasising the vital importance of Great Zimbabwe to the prehistory of the Southern African
region, we do not intend to argue a new model, that the Great Zimbabwe tradition and culture
was the first to exist, that would be historically and logically impossible to prove. Beach (1980)
has written that the Shona, who migrated into Southern Africa as part of the Bantu-speaking
people, were indeed not the first Bantu people to arrive. In fact, controversy surrounds area
settlements such as Gokomere (AD 180) and Ziwa (AD 300) located in the south central and east
of the Zimbabwean plateau respectively. Beach (1980) and Taruvanago B. Et al (2008) believe
that these areas had already been settled by non-shona Bantu groups before the Shona had
arrived in the area. Therefore the Shona, in this regard, appear to have continued with the
tradition of hill settlements already set in motion by earlier Bantu groups.
GOKOMERE PEOPLE
What the Shona seemed to have perfected during the Gokomere and Ziwa culture was the
tradition of hill settlements. Hill settlements according to I. Pikirayi (The Zimbabwe culture:
origins and decline in southern Zambezian states, p. 35) marked a historical transition in the
development of the Shona people. Pikirayi sees in hill settlements the emergence of a new
complex dimension in the political and economic organisation of the shona people. He
associates the hill settlements with the emerging of an elite African ruling class on the
Zimbabwean plateau, and once settlement occurred at Gokomere and Ziwa, hill settlements in
pre-colonial Zimbabwe acquired a valence and momentum of their own.

28
By the 7th century, settlements had spread to many parts of the plateau to include settlements in
the Matopos area at Zhizo hill as well as Leopard’s Kopje (Ntabazingwe) and Manyanga
(Ntabazikamambo) in the west of the plateau. These hill settlements formed the early phase of
Zimbabwe’s pre-colonial hill settlements and they are commonly referred to as the Gokomere
phase.
LEOPARD’S KOPJE CULTURE PEOPLE

The settlers from Leopard’s Kopje included the Shona who soon spread their tradition of hill
settlements into the region of the plateau’s Shashe-Limpopo basin in the south. One such
community initially settled at Bambadyanalo hill but later at Mapungubwe at the confluence of
the Shashe and Limpopo rivers in the border area of Zimbabwe and South Africa. Thus the
Mapungubwe hill appears to have been cultivated for 70 years (AD 1220 – 1290) while the
southern terrace below appears to have been cultivated for 260 years (AD 1030 – 1290).
Taruvanango B. Et al, 2008/www.mapungubwe.com/culture. It is important to note that the
settlement at Mapungubwe itself represented the first expression of the Great Zimbabwe phase of
Shona stone buildings in the hills in which the shona soon established more settlements in the
vicinity and further north, Great Zimbabwe itself became the most notable of the hill settlements
north of Mapungubwe.
With the fall of the Great Zimbabwe during the 15th century, a new phase of hill settlements
known as the Khami phase (AD 1450 – 1640) came into being. In the west of the plateau, it was
mainly represented by hill settlements at Khami, Danamombe (Dhlodhlo), Nhandare (Naletale)
and Manyanga (Ntabazikamambo). These settlements were also linked with the Torwa state and
its successor, the Changamire/Rozvi state. In the north and in the north-east, the Khami phase
was represented by hill settlements at Chesvingo, Ruanga, Zvengombe and Tsindi. These hill
sites were closely associated with the Mutapa state. In addition, the Nyanga hill settlement and
its associated terraces appear to have been initially settled by the Sena-speaking people who were
later conquered by the Manyika in the 18th century. As a result, the tradition of hill settlements
continued until the subjugation of the shona by the Europeans in 1890. Taruvanago B., et al:
“Zimbabwe Hill Settlements in Proceeding Colonization: A study in Location Factors”, in the
journal of Pan African Studies, Vol 2, No. 3, March, 2008.
Examination Type Questions

1) To what extent has archeological evidence assisted in the reconstruction of Zimbabwe
pre-recorded history?
2) Oral tradition is a powerful tool used to pass on aspects of the rich Africa’s unrecorded
past, Discuss.
3) Evaluate the relevance of written records in the reconstruction of the Zimbabwean past
before 1450.

29
4) “The San are an integral part of the Zimbabwean past and present” Discuss the validity of
this assertion.
5) Critically analyse the written sources which have been used to recover the history of both
Great Zimbabwe and Mutapa State before 1570.
REFERENCES
1. Chirikure S and Pikirayi I. 2008 “Inside and outside the dry stone walls: revisiting the
material culture of Great Zimbabwe”.
2. Beach D.N. (1980). The Shona and Great Zimbabwe, 900 – 1850
3. Pikirayi I. (1999) “David Beach, Shona History and the archaeology of Zimbabwe”
4. Lindahl A and Pikirayi I (2010) “Ceramics and Change: An Overview of Pottery

Production Techniques in Northern South Africa and Eastern Zimbabwe During the First
and Second Millennium AD”.
5. Beach D.N. (1998) “Cognitive Archaeology and Imaginary History at Great Zimbabwe”
6. www.endingstereotypes.org/zimbabwe
7. Ampim M. “Great Zimbabwe : A history Almost Forgotten”
8. Somali Press.com “Early History of Zimbabwe”
9. Mupira P. “The case of Inyanga cultural landscape, N-E. Zimbabwe”
10. Taruvanago B. eMbenene K. (2008) “Zimbabwe hill settlements in proceeding

colonization : A study in location factors”.

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CHAPTER 2
THE LATE STONE AGE CULTURES OF ZIMBABWE
Chapter Objectives
1. Define the terms ‘San’ and ‘Khoikhoi”
2. Trace their origins in the early history of Southern Africa.
3. Explain the classification of the San and Khoi
4. Discuss the ways of life of the San and the Khoi.
Definitions: The San

The San are the oldest genetically known inhabitants of Southern Africa where they have
lived for at least 20 000 years. The term San is commonly used to refer to a diverse group of
hunter-gatherers living in Southern Africa who shared historical and linguistic connections.
The San were also referred to as ‘Bushmen’ which came from the Dutch term “bossieman”
which meant “bandit” or “outlaw”. There is on the whole approximately 90 000 San people
left in southern Africa today, with the largest numbers living in Botswana and Namibia and a
few smaller groups living in South Africa, Angola and Zimbabwe. Their distinct rock
paintings are spread across southern and central Africa although archaeologists have not yet
established which particular groups of the San were responsible for the paintings. Moreover,
archaeologists now believe that some of the rock paintings may also have been produced by
the Khoikhoi.
Who were the Khoikhoi?

The Khoikhoi – meaning “men of men” or “real people”, or Khoekhoe as the name is spelt in
Nama orthography, were closely related to the San and they lived in southern Africa since the
5th century AD. M-L. Wilson writes in the South African archaeological Bulletin that there is
current consensus among scholars that the Khoikhoi originated in a region centred around the
junction between Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. It is possible that the Khoikhoi
developed their pastoral culture about 2 000 years ago through contact with migrating Bantu
groups from the north who were travelling down through Africa with domesticated herds of
cattle, sheep and goats.
Archaeological evidence shows that the Khoikhoi entered South Africa from Botswana
through two distinct routes – travelling west, skirting the Kalahari, to the west coast, then
down to the cape. They also entered through the south-east into the Highveld and then
southwards to the coast. When the European immigrants colonised the cape in 1652, the
khoikhoi were already practising extensive pastoral agriculture in the area with large herds of
Nguni cattle. The European immigrants labelled them “Hottentots” in imitation of the sound
of the Khoekhoe language, but this term is today considered derogatory. As the Dutch took

31
over land for farms, the Khoikhoi were dispossessed, exterminated or enslaved and smallpox,
which was brought by the Boers, sharply dwindled their numbers.
THE KHOIKHOI-SAN CLASSIFICATION DEBATE

LINGUISTIC CLASSIFICATION
Modern specialists in Khoisan languages have failed to give a clear division between Khoi
languages and San languages. According to Alan Barnard, in his article “Kinship Language
and Production: A Conjectural History of Khoisan Social Structure”, published by the
Cambridge University Press (1988), there have been serious overlaps between the Khoi and
San languages. For instance, the Khoi-speaking peoples were the most numerous and the
most culturally diverse. They inhabited the central Kalahari dessert, the Okavango swamps
and other areas of northern Botswana, as well as southern and north-eastern Namibia.
Formerly there were also Khoe-speaking groups in parts of South Africa. What is important
to note is that the Botswana Khoe/Khoi are hunter-gatherers (Bushmen) whereas the
Namibian and South African Khoi are pastoralists (non-Bushmen) and the precise distinction
between these two life styles is problematic. Ethnically, the Khoi-speaking peoples include
the Khoikhoi, or Hottentots, the Damara, the Bushmen of central and eastern Botswana, the
Hai Bushmen of Etosha pan in northern Namibia and possibly other smaller groups in
Angola. The Khoe languages were therefore spoken by both the san and the Khoikhoi in
many respects.
The word “Khoe” designates the linguistic division which includes both those peoples today
commonly called Khoikhoi or Hottentots (the Khoi-speaking herders) and those peoples
central or Khoe Bushmen. As a linguistic term it also includes the languages of one or two
people not commonly classified as Khoisan, namely the Damara and perhaps the Kwadi. The
Damara speak a Nama dialect of an Angolan people who number only a few living speakers,
have a language which might relate to some Khoe-speakers.
What is clear is that the Khoisan languages were characterised by implosive consonants or
“clicks” and this made them a totally different language family from those of the Bantu
speakers. Moreover, in contrast to the San who spoke highly divergent languages, the
Khoikhoi spoke closely relate dialects of the same language. Nama, previously called
Hottentot, is the most populous and widespread of the Khoikhoi and San languages. It must
be noted, however that this is a general stand-point as the San, upon mingling with the
Khoikhoi, more often than not adopted their neighbours language and vice versa! More
painstaking research is thus still to determine the differences between these two main ethnic
groups via the language route. Fortunately, such a process is under-way already.
ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION
According to Monica Wilson in her article “The hunters and herders” published in The
Oxford History of South Africa, 1969, all the Khoisan people may be classified crudely as
either hunters or herders. The hunters include those people whose economy before contact

32
with Bantu-speakers, Khoikhoi and whites was based exclusively or mainly on hunting and
gathering or, in the case of the northern Khoe-Bushmen, on hunting and gathering and
fishing.
The herders include those people whose traditional economy was based on cattle and sheep
herding, as well as on hunting and gathering. In historical times, herders are known to have
taken to a purely hunting and gathering lifestyle, for example, if their animals were lost
through drought or theft, and archaeologists have recently reported significant evidence of
long periods of hunter-herder contact.
The ethnic division generally classified as herders were the Khoikhoi. The Khoikhoi groups
which include the Nama, the Korana or Ora and others are cattle and sheep herders. Unlike
the Bushmen, they traditionally lived in circular encampments which were made up mainly
of patrilineally related kinsfolk. Until the German colonisation of Namibia in 1885 and
subsequent warfare and subjugation by whites, their tribes, clans and lineages were
hierarchically ranked in Nama ideology and each tribe had its own independent and often
powerful chief.
The Damara as pointed out above are usually distinguished as a separate group, neither
Bushmen nor Khoikhoi and therefore not Khoisan. They are believed to have a separate
biological origin yet this is not sufficient reason to exclude a people from an area. At one
time, perhaps for centuries, the Damara worked as servants and blacksmiths for the Nama.
They also herded livestock, although various Damara groups in the late nineteenth century
lived entirely by hunting and gathering. They now live mainly in north-western Namibia.
Their language and a good part of their culture is Nama.
What is important to note, however, is that while the Khoikhoi could assume both lifestyles
of the San, and their own as cattle herders, the San rarely changed their roles as hunter-
gatherers. Their industry and technology remained primitive and their accumulation and
distribution of food narrow in scope, hence, real necessity drove them to work for even the
Boers or the Khoikhoi. As soon as they acquired what they thought was reasonable, they
would, if given the chance, abscond. Hence most of the Boer ranchers and farmers employed
them, together with the Khoikhoi on a debt-bondage system in order to perpetually retain
their labour.
Inevitably, the Khoikhoi and San competed for land. As grazing herds increased, especially
on the more marginal lands, the pastoralist Khoikhoi took the upper hand, having a more
consistent food source, a centralised and stable community, and much larger number. Bands
of San were occasionally incorporated into the Khoikhoi society, but only as clients (working
on land “owned” by the Khoikhoi and receiving limited payment in terms of cattle or sheep
or as servants, again working for the Khoikhoi but without the option of owning land or
animals. Conflict with those San who remained as hunter-gatherers resulted in their
indiscriminate “ailing” (a method also later used by the Bantu peoples and Europeans) or by
their being driven into more inhospitable lands. Either way, the San were seen as low-status
people compared to the Khoikhoi.

33
THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE SAN

The San are widely recognised as the most impoverished, disempowered and stigmatised
ethnic group in southern Africa. Yet the San have also received the attention of
anthropologists and the media with their survival and hunting skills, wealth of indigenous
knowledge of the flora and fauna of southern Africa and their rich cultural traditions.
The terms San, Khoe, Sho, Bushmen and Basarwa (Botswana) have all been used to refer to
this hunter-gather people of southern Africa. Each of these terms has a problematic history
as they have been used by outsiders to refer to them, often with pejorative connotations. The
individual groups identify by names such as Ju/hoansi and !Kung (the punctuation characters
representing different click consonants and most call themselves by the term Bushmen when
referring to themselves collectively. One broad study of African genetic diversity completed
in 2009 found the San people were among the five populations with the highest measured
levels of genetic diversity among the 121 distinct African populations sampled. The San are
one of 14 known extant ancestral population clusters from which all known modern humans
evolved. Made up of small mobile groups, San communities comprise up to about 25 men,
women and children. At certain times of the year groups join for exchange of news and gifts,
for marriage arrangements and for social occasions.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Not related to the Bantu tribes the San are descendants of Early Stone Age ancestors. Clans
and loosely connected family groups followed seasonal game migrations between mountain
range and coastline. They made their homes in caves, under rocky overhangs or in
temporary shelters.
These migratory people do not domesticate animals or cultivate crops, even though their
knowledge of both flora and fauna is vast. The San categorised thousands of plants and their
uses from nutritional to medicinal, mystical to recreational and lethal.
San men have a formidable reputation as trackers and hunters. San trackers will follow the
tracks of an animal across virtually any kind of surface or terrain. Their skills even enabled
them to distinguish between the tracks of a wounded animal and that of the rest of the herd.
At about 5AD, the Khoikhoi moved into South Africa and lived by gathering wild plants and
domesticating animals. These pastoralists were similar to the San, but were taller and moved
in larger groups than the San’s numbers of about twenty to fifty members.
Coincidentally in the eastern parts of South Africa the Bantu speaking people were moving
southward into South Africa bringing with them large herds of cattle, the concept of planting
crops and settled village communal life. Ultimately the “Hottentots” met these black-skinned
farmers and obtained from them cattle in exchange for animals skins and other items.
However it must be noted that archaeological records differ, some say that the Khoikhoi
already owned some cattle before the arrival of the Bantu speakers. No concrete carbon-
dating record has ever been established.

34
At first the San lived peacefully with the Nguni (Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi and Ndebele) who
intermarried with the San and incorporated some of the distinctive characteristics such as the
“clicks” of the San language into their own languages. The presence of similar patterns of
rock paintings all over central and southern Africa as well as parts of east Africa has
convinced the historians of another important dynamic. That the Bantu did not necessarily
find the San only restricted to Botswana and South Africa, which two countries had been the
focal point of research, rather, the San must have been progressively and systematically
pushed to the south of Africa by the more powerful Bantu groups. Hunter-gatherers could
not permanently co-exist with extensive crop farmers and larger cattle herders. Nevertheless,
the fact that the San artists started including representations of cattle and sheep as well as of
people with shields and spears in their paintings mostly in South Africa shows a greater
interaction with the Bantu in that part of southern Africa.
When, the San fought against the Bantu mostly over common grounds, they were at a huge
disadvantage not only because of their relatively smaller numbers, but also because they
lacked weapons. With the Europeans they were at an even greater disadvantage. The
Europeans owned horses and firearms. In this period, the number of the San was therefore
greatly reduced as indicated earlier, the Europeans also brought in strange diseases such as
smallpox which the San had not built immunity towards and this proved to be a shattering
blow.
Colonialism destroyed the San migratory way of life as they were no longer allowed to roam
freely and trophy hunters destroyed the vast herds of game that formed their principal supply
of food. Both black and white farmers built up huge herds of cattle that destroyed the foods
that had been the San staple diet for centuries.
Enslavement and sometimes mass destruction of San communities by both black and white
farmers followed. Many San became bondmen and unwillingly changed in their ways of life.
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE

The San have no formal authority figure or chief, but govern themselves by group consensus.
Disputes were resolved by lengthy discussions where all members involved have a chance to
make their thoughts heard until some agreement is reached. Although certain individuals
may assume leadership in specific spheres in which they excel, such as hunting or healing
rituals, they still could not achieve general positions of leadership or power. White colonists
found this status-quo very confusing when they tried to establish treaties with the San.
However, leadership roles tended to come by natural methods, those who had lived in the
group the longest, achieved a respectable age and character etc, otherwise the prevailing
ethos of egalitarian society prevailed among the San. Land was owned by a group and
claims to its inheritance were held by whole groups. There was therefore no distinct social
exploitation as in Bantu societies where tribute and retribution could be encountered.
Kinship bonds provide the basic framework for political models. Membership in a group is
determined by residency. As long as a person lives on the land of his group he maintains his

35
membership. It is possible to hunt on land not owned by the group but permission must be
obtained from the owners.
The San will eat different types of foods available – both animal and vegetable. Their
selection of food ranges from antelope, zebra, porcupine, wild hare, lion, giraffe, fish,
insects, tortoise, flying ants, snakes (both poisonous and non-poisonous), hyena, eggs and
wild honey. The meat is boiled or roasted on fire. The San were extremely cautious not to
exhaust the game or vegetables in “their” area. They were economic and game animals were
killed only when it was necessary. Hides were tanned for blackest and the bones were
cracked for marrow. More beautiful leopard skins were carefully tanned and traded with
either the Khoikhoi or the Bantu groups for grain and milk.
Water was stored in ostrich egg shells and certain wild roots known to contain moisture were
often squeezed in the dry season for water. They would also dig holes in the sand to find
water, a vital resource.
HUNTING METHODS
The San remain excellent hunters although they did a fair amount of trapping. The San
arrow does not kill the animals straightaway but it is laced with deadly poison which
eventually causes the death of the animal. In the case of small antelope such as Duiker or
Steenbok, a couple of hours may elapse before death.
For large game such as giraffe it could take as long as 3 days. Today the San make the
poison from the lavae of a small beetle but will also use poison from plants, such as the
euphobia and snake vernom. The poison is neurotoxic and does not contaminate the whole
animal. The spot where the arrow strikes is cut out and thrown away but the rest of the meat
is fit to eat.
The San also dug pitfalls near the larger rivers where the game came to drink. The pitfalls
were large and deep, narrowing like a funnel towards the bottom. These pitfalls were
cleverly covered with branches which resulted in animals walking over the pit and falling
onto the stake.
When catching small animals such as hares, guinea fowls, steenbok or duiker, traps made of
twisted gut or fibre from plants were used. These had a running noose that strangled the
animal when it stepped into the snare to collect the food that had been placed inside it. Not
only that, the San were also brilliant trackers who knew the habits of their prey pretty well.
It is important to note that hunting was a team effort and little boys as young as four years
old were initiated into the art of hunting. Women too, often joined the men in hunting and
skinning animals. The man whose arrow killed the animal has the right to distribute the meat
to the tribe members and visitors who, after hearing about the kill would arrive soon
afterwards to share in the feast. According to San tradition, they were welcome to share the
meal and would in the future, have to respond in the same way.

36
ROCK ART
Until recently, most amateur and professional anthropologists looked at the rock paintings of
the San and thought that they could decipher them without any problems. The pieces that
they did not understand were passed off as crude art or that the artist had too much to drink
or smoke! This is far from reality as San paintings have been found to convey deep religious
and symbolic meaning. For instance, painting the picture of an eland, the San’s most sacred
animal was believed to open portals to the spirit world.
The San mainly used red, brown, white, yellow and black paint, but blue and green were
never used and this is not obvious why such colours were never used. Another feature of San
art is the embodiment of action and speed. Human figures are stylised and depicted as
having long strides and the animals are either galloping or leaping or, more subtly, flicking a
tail or twisting a neck. Most of the paintings have an underlying spiritual theme and are
believed to have been representations of religious ceremonies.
THE SAN BELIEFS

The San belief system generally observes the supremacy of one powerful god, while at the
same time recognising the presence of lesser gods along with their wives and children.
Homage is also paid to the spirits of the deceased. Among some San, it is believed that
working the soil is contrary to the world order established by the gods. Some groups also
revere the moon and held danced around bon fires in full moon.
The most important spiritual being to the San was Kaggen, the trickster-deity. He created
many things, and appears in numerous myths where he can be foolish or wise, tiresome or
helpful. The word Kaggen can be translated as “mantis” and this led to the belief that the
San worshipped the praying mantis. However, Kaggen is not, was not always a praying
mantis as the mantis is only one of his manifestation. He can also turn into an Eland, a hare,
a snake or a vulture – or even an ordinary San.
The San held several dances such as Boys’ first kill, Girls’ puberty, Marriage and Trance
dance. All these had religious validity.
THE KHOIKHOI
STOCK OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

Although known as herders or pastoralists, the Khoikhoi also obtained food by hunting and
gathering. The sharing of food was an important aspect of village life. Any significant kill
was shared, and sheep or cattle killed during ceremonial feasts were eaten by all present.
Although wealth was measured in terms of livestock ownership, hunting and gathering was
open to all members of the tribe.

37
The Khoikhoi kept large herds of fat-tailed sheep, long-horned cattle and goats. Livestock
were used for milk and were slaughtered only on ritual occasions. Oxen were used as pack
animals especially when camp was moved.
There was probably a strict division of labour among the Khoikhoi. Herding cattle was
usually man’s work whilst women and children looked after the small stock. During the day
the adults might have remained in the kraal manufacturing utensils and weapons or doing
domestic chores. Men also went out hunting and the women gathered wild plant foods
(veldkos). Hence their core methods of accumulation of both wealth and food were vastly
different from that of the San.
SOCIAL ORGANISATION
The village settlement of the Khoikhoi was relatively large, often well over one hundred
persons. The basic housing structure was a round hut made of a frame of green branches
planted into the ground and bent over and tied together. This was covered with reed mats. It
could be dismantled and re-erected in a new location when grazing in the area became
depleted. Sometimes the mats were simply removed and rolled up. People left the frames
behind if they knew they would be returning to the same site. During the warm weather, it
was cool inside with the crevices between the reeds allowing the air to circulate. During
winter, the inside could be lined with skins to offer extra insulation against the elements.
Each village encampment consisted of members of the same part-lineal clan – a group of
male descendants of a particular ancestor – with their wives and children. Villages also
included some members of other clans as well as some descendants or servants. These could
be Bergdama, San or even impoverished Khoikhoi.
Each village had a headman, a hereditary position passed on to the eldest son of the founding
ancestor for every generation. Headmen made decisions such as when and where to move.
They acted as mediators or judges in criminal or civil disputes. In this way the Khoikhoi
completely differed from the egalitarian principles of the San.
Several villages were usually united into a much larger unit called a tribe by some and home
by others. Tribes had a kinship base and were made up of a number of linked clans with the
seniority of one of the clans being recognised. The head of the senior clan was recognised as
the chief of the tribe.
The extent of tribal land was defined less in terms of exact boundaries than with reference to
land around key water holes, and the tribal chiefs controlled outsiders’ access to the local
resources. The rights granted to outsiders were merely temporary users’ rights – the
willingness to share local resources in one area might be repaid in another at a later stage.
Men from one clan had to seek wives in another. Because related cans within the tribe were
geographically close to one another, it is likely that most men found wives within the tribe.
Marriage was a powerful social mechanism to invite different groups. The custom was that
the bridegroom had to spend the first months of marriage until the birth of the first child at

38
the village of his parents-in-law. Thereafter, the bride was expected to spend the rest of her
marriage in the village of her husband.
The tribal council consisted of the headmen of all the other clans and served as a body which
linked the various clans together. Such links were further strengthened in those tribes where
the older members of the various clans would act as clan “representatives” and live
permanently at the main tribal “headquarters”, the village of the superior clan.
RELIGION AND NATURE

The Khoikhoi attached special significance to the moon. The new and full moons were
important times for rainmaking rites and dancing and it seems that the moon was viewed as
the physical manifestation of a supreme being associated with heaven, earth and especially
rain.
Amongst the Nama two prominent figures stand out in their religions mythology. The first is
Tsui goab, the deity who was sometimes seen as the founding ancestor of the Khoikhoi. He
was the creator, the guardian of health, the source of prosperity and abundance and above all,
the controller of the rain and its associated phenomena of clouds, thunder and lightning.
By contrast, Gaunab, was primarily an evil being who causes sickness or death. The other
major figure is Haitsi-aibib, a folle hero and magician of great repute who could change his
form. Haitsi-aibib, according to Khoikhoi mythology died many times in different places,
but had the ability to come to life again – often being reborn in a different form.
It is important to note that the Khoikhoi were more of pastoralists than crop farmers and
because they could fall back on hunting and gathering when live-stock keeping failed and
due to the fact that the Khoi and the San had a lot of similar languages and dialects, they
were more like the San than the Bantu. The Khoikhoi’s origins and appearance can be traced
to southern Africa and were equally more light-skinned than the Bantu. They however,
differed in that they looked taller than the San.
1) Discuss the significance of archaeological evidence on the reconstruction of the history of

the San.
2) Evaluate the assertion that the Khoisan’s survival depended on their knowledge of the
environment.

39
CHAPTER 3
THE IRON AGE CULTURES OF ZIMBABWE
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
a) Describe the development of Iron Age culture in pre-colonial Zimbabwe.
b) Identify and explain the Iron Age sites.
c) Discuss the migration theory in light of the rise of Iron Age communities.
d) Assess the impact of the use of iron upon (i) Agriculture
(ii) Hunting
(iii) Warfare
(iv) Technological development
e) Demonstrate the impact of internal and external trade upon Iron Age communities.
f) Account for the fall of later Iron Age states.
BACKGROUND
The name “Iron Age” has been given to a complex of post-stone Age cultures in Zimbabwe
and Southern Africa in general. According to Roger Summers, these cultures vary quite
considerably but all are characterised by the use of iron for tools and weapons. Unlike the
sequences in Europe and the Near East, that of South Central Africa shows no copper or
bronze using stage between the stone and iron-using phases and even the Neolithic seems to
be missing from this part of the world.
The sudden appearance of iron in the archaeological record has therefore been attributed to
the arrival of metal-working people from the north and, indeed, the whole period of the Iron
Age has, somewhat loosely, been termed “the Bantu migrations”. The word “Bantu” is itself
a cause of confusion, since it is now applied indiscriminately to a group of languages, a
complex of cultures and a racial group. A century ago the word was invented to classify the
languages spoken in Southern Africa, but since we do not know the language that was spoken
by the iron-using migrants it is incorrect to use this word in reference to culture or race. For
that reason, the term “Iron Age” was introduced in 1950 when the first overall survey of the
period was made.
It is now realised and acknowledged by archaeologists that the local Iron Age can be divided
into two distinct complexes: Southern Rhodesian Iron Age A (Zimbabwean) which runs from
the earliest metal-using period, possibly 100 B.C., up to 600 AD. Although Roger Summers
(1961, p1) had stated that the early Iron Age period stretched to the beginning of the

40
nineteenth century, this misconception was corrected by later archaeologists, (T.N. Huffman,
p360). The Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) Iron Age B started around 600AD and ran right
up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, often running independently of A (R.
Summers, 1961, p1, T.N. Huffman, 1972, p360). After this terminal date, the two
complexes/periods became intermingled and were then classified as Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe) Iron Age A + B. There are of course several sub-divisions of these complexes,
to mark the Early, Middle and Later Iron Age periods. The chronology of the period is based
mainly on radio-carbon dates. These fit in well with the few dates deducible from oral
traditions and the Portuguese records.
IRON AGE A1 – THE EARLIEST IRON AGE

The first traces appear in rock shelters in the Matopo Hills where pottery of a sophisticated
type has been found mixed with stone implements of the Later Stone Age, (The Southern
Africa equivalent of the European Mesolithic period). Although this pottery, like all
Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) Iron Age ceramics, is Land-made and unglazed, it is clearly the
product of a long ceramic tradition. This earliest Iron Age culture has been called by the
name of Bambata after the cave site where its pottery was first found in 1917.
A somewhat similar ware comes from the Zambezi Valley, and to differentiate it from the
preceding, it has been named Zambezi Channelled Ware, since the principal decorative motif
is deep channelling round the necks of the pots. Ware of this type from Zambia has been
dated about AD90 by a radiocarbon test on associated charcoal. This channelled pottery is
similar to wares from Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Kasai province of the Congo, but how
these are related to Zambezi Channelled Ware is not yet fully known. This could perhaps
indicate the migratory patterns of the Bantu.
While, still on the Early Iron Age, one important issue has been pointed out by archaeologist
Gilbert Pwiti (1995, p3) that the mentioning of the phrase “Iron Age”, during this particular
period, might be misleading. This is because it gives the impression that iron was of over-
riding importance among the communities involved, when in fact we know that it was just
one branch of production and part of their livelihood. We know, for example, that farming
was a more important part of their cultures. Even though iron became important for
agricultural production, it is known that this could be achieved with wooden technologies.
Nevertheless, we keep on calling this period the early Iron Age because of lack of alternative
terms. Pwiti chose to call early Iron Age communities of the Zambezi Valley, Early Farming
Communities.
The Bambata Ware is a very distinctive pottery and as it was first described in 1940 it is
remarkable that it should have been found only in very limited areas in Zimbabwe and not at
all south of the Limpopo. One must conclude, therefore, that the bearers of the earliest Iron
Age cultures that crossed the Zambezi did not cross the Limpopo. Zambezi channelled Ware
is at present known only in the Zambezi Valley and, unlike later wares both of the earliest,
have a westerly distribution.

41
A close association between sherds of Bambata pottery and Later Stone Age artefacts has led
to suggestions that pottery was part of the material culture of the Wilton people i.e. the
Bushmen. However, this is now regarded as unlikely owing to the advanced type of pottery,
which has nothing experimental or tentative about it. The consensus of opinion now is that
pottery is an intrusive element and it is regarded as a sign of “trade” between the Bushmen
hunters and pottery makers.
Trade implies peaceful intercourse without any rivalry between the groups concerned.
Latterly this was not to be the case, for Bushmen groups were pushed into marginal and
infertile country until, in the nineteenth century, they were hunted as vernun by Hottentots,
Bantu and Afrikaner alike: the reason for this oppression is that Bush hunting lands had been
restricted and they were preying on herded cattle. At the beginning of the Iron Age
conditions were apparently different, either there were no immigrant cattle or else they were
too few to cause concern to the Bushmen. There is evidence that the earliest immigrants of
which Bantu tradition speaks were without cattle. Possibly therefore, no cattle came before
A2.
It is important to note that G. Pwiti (1996, p4) in his excavations in the Zambezi Valley near
the Musengezi and Kadzi rivers (which provided some meaningful dividers) more
information was revealed during this early Iron Age and Middle Iron Age periods. Firstly, he
noted that farming was mostly done along the river bank – thus streambank cultivation – and
that in the settlements dated to the 11th century, the excavations of a wide range of faunal
remains, including cattle, sheep and goats were made.
However, Pwiti pointed out that of all the animals kept in the Zambezi Valley areas, as early
as the 5th century, cattle were either the least in number or none at all due to the prevalence of
tsetse fly. Nevertheless, Pwiti highlights the fact that one Musengezi Tradition occurrence,
Kamukonde, is stratified above a six hectare Early Farming Community (Early Iron Age).
This indicates that the change in settlement preference is not abrupt. In general, he points
out, that the partial behaviour of the farming communities in the Zambezi valley through
time reflects a pattern which has been noted all over Southern Africa. What was
characteristic of the Early Iron Age period, wherever the settlement pattern and culture were
found, were increased hunting activities, slash and burn agricultural activities as well as
gathering of wild plant foods. These, together with wild fruits, supplement dietary patterns,
especially in drought years when crops fail. Their staple crop was sorghum.
Archaeologist C.S. Lancaster, whose work has shaped the direction of research into the Late
Stone Age and Iron Age cultures, cites four factors which determined where such
communities were to settle. These are; the availability of good soils for growing sorghum,
the staple crops, the availability of water for drinking and other domestic use; the potential
danger of damage to crops and relative security of village sites from wild game as well as
social and political factors. Now, in ranking these factors, Lancaster concludes that although
all the cited factors are relevant the overriding factors in deciding where to settle are good
sites for the subsistence agricultural economy and availability of water. Such sites are
invariably along the river and stream valleys rich in alluvial loam soils. “A major feature of
42
the settlement pattern is that almost all the villages exploit alluvial soils within convenient
daily walking distance from their sources of water, whether the sources are rivers, streams or
springs” (Lancaster, 1981, p97).
Moreover, another consistent feature of the Early Iron Age is that while political and social
factors were considered important, “such largely political population movements and
redistribution always depended on ample supplies of good temwa (field) soils and the
availability of sufficient year round drinking water” (Lancaster 1981, p76).
In the final analysis, archaeologists noted that the Early Iron Age communities tried to avoid
residential isolation and preferred crowded neighbourhoods, provided there was enough
agricultural land and water. This settlement pattern seemed to have been broadly similar to
the Later Iron Age, showing continuity in the social sphere.
IRON AGE A2 – MINING CULTURES

Some time before 300AD a new element appeared in the local archaeological records – a
new type of pottery which had the impression of a square-toothed stamp.
There are a variety of wares which bear these stamps, called from their type-sites: Gokomere,
Ziwa, Mashonaland, Leopard’s Kopje, Hillside, Northern Transvaal No. 1. These are local
variants and they are also of different dates. The earliest to appear is Gokomere i.e. before
300AD and the last are Leopard Kopje and Hillside whose earliest date is at present
unknown, but which seem to have lasted until the early nineteenth century by which time
they had lost all trace of stamped decoration.
The most characteristic feature of these cultures, and the one which gives them their generic
name, is their connection with pre-Europe and mining or “ancient workings” as they are
known locally.

43
LOCATIONS OF THE EARLY IRON AGE SITES.
Fig 1: Southern Rhodesia, showing distribution of Iron Age

A2 sites and of ‘ancient times’
These mines were primitive operations, mainly open stocks which followed the ore body
down as far as possible but open to the sky at the top. The minimum amount of surrounding
rock was cut, so the actual working was often very narrow indeed.
The ‘miners’ had no knowledge of explosives nor had they any hard steel tools, and as the
ore body consisted in most cases of quartz, it was necessary to split the rock by alternately
heating and cooling it before using soft iron picks. Despite their very limited equipment, the
Zimbabwean miners (i.e. pre-colonial) reached very considerable depths. – sometimes over
100 feet, being stopped only by water or insufficient ventilation. From the frequent
occurrence of skeletons of young females in the fillings of old workings, it appears that much
of the under ground work was done by girls.

44
Most of the mines were concerned with the mining of gold, and any ore over 3 ounces to a
tonne seemed to have been regarded as payable; poorer ore, if brought to the surface, was left
in rubble dumps untreated. “Payable” ore was, however, carried to the nearest stream,
crushed and concentrated in running water.
There is hardly a modern gold mine in modern Zimbabwe which is not on the site of an
“ancient working”, so it is clear that the “Miners” had a good knowledge of prospecting. It
has been deduced that originally the zone from the surface down to about 20 feet was
exceptionally rich in gold and it seems very probable that immense quantities of gold were
exported. India was probably the market and Indian brassware has recently been found in
some of these old mines.
Besides gold, copper was also mined, the oxide or carbonate ores being smelted with
charcoal in simple furnaces. Tin was also mined in the country and bronze alloy was made,
the tin content was, however, variable.
There is an argument, backed by both oral tradition and archaeology that these mining
cultures arose in Abyssinia, and that the “miners” migrated southwards through East Africa.
Despite the probability of the first mining cultures being immigrant, a great deal of local
development seems to have taken place in Zimbabwe and the adjoining areas west and south.
The above map shows the general distribution of the various cultural traits of A2 throughout
Zimbabwe. Gokomere was an early manifestation, but it is not yet clear what happened in
the south-eastern parts of the country after Gokomere gave rise to the development of other
A2 cultures. That area is fairly well-known archaeologically and so it seems likely that the
A2 people (for we cannot, with certainty give them a name) tended to settle in the
mineralized belts which are distributed on a NE – SW line right across the country. From
evidence deduced from ceramic typology, archaeologist Schofield suggested that this pottery
gave rise to that of the Sotho peoples of South Africa and this may be so. Sotho traditions
suggest that their group, which introduced iron to South Africa, did not begin to arrive in the
Transvaal until at least the fifteenth century. Presumably, therefore, the “miners” were
exploiting the easily available mineral wealth of Zimbabwe for at least 1 000 years before
any of them felt an urge to see fresh mines.
Although some of the “miners” may have moved southwards during the fifteenth century, the
bulk remained in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and mining activities were pursued by
these groups until well into the nineteenth century. Iron Age A, therefore lasted for at least
1500 years. However, as pointed out earlier, there was no clean break from one episode to
the next. Early Iron Age traditions survived in some respects right up to the nineteenth
century.

45
IRON AGE B1 – THE FIRST BUILDINGS

The existence of “ancient ruins” was the first item that attracted unwelcome curiosity and
attention, since the first investigators were mere treasure-hunters and plunderers who
ransacked Zimbabwe and many other ruined stone buildings for the sake of a little gold. At
one time Southern Rhodesia ruins were treated as if they were mere gold mines, thus
generating a hive of activity and thuggery. By the time this iniquitous practice was stopped,
the archaeological potential of many ruins had been greatly impaired, if not entirely
destroyed. Despite this, we still possess a great deal of useful information and it is being
added to rapidly.
During the eleventh century walls built of rough course stone were constructed. Zimbabwe
Hill and later others were built in the valley. A number of other buildings, in the south-
eastern part of the country were built about the same time.
It appears that the south-eastern area which was a good cattle country did not bear any great
population at this time, it is not surprising therefore that the “Builders” should have chosen
this as a place for their first settlements. It is here that the granite of the country rock splits
easily into regular blocks of about 6 inches thick and since earliest extensive stonework also
occurred here, it has been suggested by Whitty that this is an example of an independent
invention of stonework, arising from both gradual advancement in Iron Age technology and
building skills.
Roger Summers’ (1963, p6), earlier argument that the Zimbabwe ruins’ building method do
not appear to owe anything to other building traditions, civilised or barbarous, and that they
are peculiar to Zimbabwe has been widely supported by the subsequent researches by P.
Garlake, T. Huffman, D. Beach, S. Chirikure and of course I. Pikirayi.
The “Builders” were apparently quite distinct from the “miner”. They used different and
much plainer pottery and avoided statuettes and they had a different taste in beadwork; they
could make more sophisticated shapes out of traditional, home-made beads as well as the
modern, imported beads. Moreover, their pottery appears only on ruin sites and accordingly
it has been suggested that they were few in number.
Evidence gathered hitherto form archaeology, oral tradition and the earliest Portuguese
documents leaves no doubt that the ruins were built by the Shona-speaking people.
Nevertheless it is not clear enough who the “Miners” were and exactly what language they
spoke. Roger Summers has suggested that the “Miners” must have been equally Bantu
speaking people of Southern Africa. This is because prior to the beginning of the Early Iron
Age, the population of Zimbabwe was predominantly Bantu-speaking. Immigrants practising
more advanced cultures then began to trickle in into the area, being at first very few in
relation to the existing population. Some of these immigrants could have come as far afoot
as West Africa, Ethiopia, the Congo and Kenya. Number were, however, small when
compared to the existing Bantu-speaking population.
Of the B1 immigrants, some could have been Shona speakers, like the Zezuru who were tall,
well built with large, plain faces and large brains. These were among the earliest arrivals into

46
Zimbabwe. B2 people were, on the other hand, well-known. These were later immigrants
from South-Western Congo, Angola and West Africa.
TRADE AT THE GREAT ZIMBABWE SITE

The external trade on the Zimbabwe culture, whose main occupation at Great Zimbabwe
dates from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries was linked to world demand, especially from
India. Its primary exports were gold, ivory and copper; its major imports were cloth and
beads followed by ceramics. We do not know yet whether Early Iron Age peoples practised
reef mining in the Zimbabwe area, but the presence of small amounts of beads in inland sites
and tenth and eleventh-century Arabic references to gold trade from Sofala on the southern
Coast of Mozambique suggest that at least some gold washing and mining went on prior to
the main occupation of Great Zimbabwe.
Both reef and alluvial gold mining were in full swing between the twelfth and fifteenth
centuries, however, and by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Shona-speaking
Zimbabwe peoples were trading the metal with India. During this period Shona miners were
mining and washing and milling gold, Shona traders were taking gold to coastal parts, and
coastal Muslim Africans, whom the Portuguese, later called “mouros”, were coming inland
to buy. Some of these Swahili were light-skinned and spoke Arabic, but contemporary
sources describe most as either dark-skinned or black, apparently distinguishable from other
more-or-less Islamicised or traditional Africans principally by their style of clothing.
The gold trade was politically important because of its diplomatic prestige value; on the other
hand, both gold mining and gold washing were nearly always seasonal and secondary
occupations carried on during the lack dry period in the annual Shona cycle of subsistence
cultivation. Patron-client relations between Shona groups were often expressed through
limited symbolic tribute in agricultural labour, food, military service, slaves, gold, ivory,
cattle, wives and other locally produced prestige items which the leaders could use in
external trade, but basic control over social and political groupings seems to have been
exercised through a belief in various levels of spirit cults, ranging from the system of
individual guardian spirits (mudzimu) controlled by village elders at the level of the extended
family and descent group, through a progressive hierarchy of virtually senior, loosely
territorial land spirits (mhondoro) holding sway over the progressively larger realms of
neighbourhood leaders, petty chiefs and paramounts.
Some time after 1200, a Shona confederacy apparently grew up in this general fashion at the
nuclear site of Great Zimbabwe in association with external trade. It reached its peak in the
late fourteenth century, had fallen by 1500, and been replaced in the north, south and west by
the successor dynasties of Mwene Mutapa, Torwa and Changamire respectively. Parallel
developments on the East African coast saw the rise of cosmopolitan Swahili cities and ports
stretching south to Quilimane, Sofala and Inhambane to serve as links connecting the Shona
and other inland groups with the Indian Ocean trading system. These were largely eclipsed
after 1500 by the Portuguese conquista.

47
At approximately the same time as the Portuguese coastal victories and the fall of Great
Zimbabwe as a trading centre in the far interior, Shona trade with Sofala in the south, where
the Portuguese had focused their attention, was increasingly deflected to the northern routes
by Swihili and Shona traders passing through the Zambezi Valley and the recently
established Mwene Mutapa confederacy. This activity included the area occupied by the
well-known archaeological site of, Ingombe Ilede.
It is important to note therefore that trade was an extremely vital economic activity during
the middle and Later Stone Age periods and in turn, trade served to stimulate mining
activities across the country. Trade therefore quickened the pace of technological transfer
and change in Zimbabwe, enabling the historical movement from the Early, middle and Later
iron Age epochs,. The wealthier a group became, the greater it controlled mining claims and
the faster it laid claim to the ruler-ship of the respective area. Therefore trade, especially
external trade, by being royally controlled and centralised, had a vast political impact.
IRON AGE: B2 CHANGE IN THE BUILDING STYLE

During the fifteenth century a change in building style occurred at Zimbabwe and the earlier
rougher style was replaced by one which is not only more mannered but is technically of a lot
better quality than the earlier work. The new style shows signs of a steady improvement for
some centuries.
The change in architectural style was, but one facet of a new culture. Pottery was sometimes
profusely decorated, and there was a greater variety of beads used, copper and bronze
ornaments appeared in larger quantities and gold began to be used as an adornment both of
persons and also of objects (which were covered with gold plate). Oriental (from the Far
East) imports occur in the more important sites and altogether appears to have been a very
rich one.
Once again, the number of people enjoying this high culture seemed to have been
comparatively small and these “Builders” are now considered to have been an aristocracy.
MAPUNGUBWE AND KHAMI

Although this culture appeared in about AD1450 at Zimbabwe, it is rather earlier in the
South-West, at Mapungubwe on the Limpopo River.
Mapungubwe ceramics and certain aspects of Zimbabwe iron work connect these classical
building cultures with the Southern Congo and West Africa. These are the first such contacts
visible in the Rhodesian archaeological record, all earlier contacts having been with East
Africa.
Khami, just like Great Zimbabwe, has free standing structures/walls where the principal
stonework is concentrated on the building of platforms. Khami’s technique, however,
appears to have been an independent and probably later development. There are oral

48
traditions which connect “Khami-type” buildings with the later Rozvi Chiefs of the
Changamire dynasty and it may well be that the Zimbabwe type gave a hint to the Mwene
Mutapa dynasty which was at one time paramount over the whole area and was later
confined to the north-east.
The splendours of the Monomotapa’s court have been recorded by Portuguese writers and
many of its features, especially those relating to divine kingship, have been considered
critically by cultural anthropologists such as Sachebesta and, later Wieschhoff. Certainly the
distribution map shows that “Zimbabwe” – type buildings tend to be all over the rain areas
whereas “Khami” buildings are densest in the south-west. This distribution reflects the
division of our area into two units called by the Portuguese “Monomotapa” and “Butwa” and
when read with the distribution of gold mines given in figure 2, also shows why it was that
Butwa maintained a control over the main mines of gold production, to the detriment of the
Portuguese gold trade.

49
The Map reflecting B1 and B2 Buildings
The richness of the B2 building culture has been a matter for frequent comment. Much of
this wealth was locally produced. For instance, the spectacular gold ornaments, soapstone
carvings and although items such as glass beads and oriental ceramics do occur, the amount
of imported materials is much less compared with indigenous products.
The durable imports are naturally only a part of the whole volume, and we cannot form any
estimate of the quantity of those such as cloth which have left no mark in the archaeological
record. We can, however, look at the question from the other end, for there are Portuguese
commercial documents to show that ‘Monomotapa’ was taking comparatively small
50
quantities of cloth in 1508 – 1509 and although the quantity rose later in the century, cloth
seemed to have been second to glass beads as an import. We know less still about the trade
of Butwa, which presumably was carried through parts under Arab administration to the
north of the Portuguese area. These parts were in decline by the sixteenth century and so the
Butwana East Coast overseas trade was probably comparatively small. However, there was
inter-African trade with the Congo and West Coast. By and large, however, Butwa’s
economy under the Rozvi seems to have been very largely self-sufficient.
IRON AGE B2: EASTERN TERRACE CULTURES

INYANGA CULTURE
The terrace cultures were located in the eastern highlands, in the Inyanga Mountains. Here,
there are lots of miles of stone-faced agricultural terracing with which are associated many
hundreds of stone-walled enclosures, stock pits and a certain number of strongholds and the
remains covered about 3 000 square miles.
Unlike Zimbabwe (or Great Zimbabwe), Mapungubwe and other sites further westward,
Inyanga displays an extremely impoverished material culture – inadequately fired pottery,
very few beads, hardly any iron and a tiny scatter of copper ornaments.
Indeed one phase of this culture was so poor that there was no trace of large pots, interpreted
by the excavators as indicating that the Inyangans were too poor to brew beer. Anybody
familiar with Bantu life will appreciate what depths of poverty this implies.
The Terrace Cultures have made a great impact on the landscape of the eastern mountains of
Zimbabwe where hundreds of square miles of mountain forests have been felled or burned
out and where the hillsides have been covered from foot to summit with terraces and
accordingly they have been given a great place in the archaeological record.
During A + B periods, one finds the Inyanga type of modified buildings, spreading west-
wards but terracing along the eastern mountains. They surely make a mark in the history of
archaeology, but had little effect on the history of the country as a whole.
The interesting thing about Inyanga is that, here we can see, fossilised as it were, the life of
the ordinary people, whereas, in Great Zimbabwe and Khami we see the relics of the life of
the nobility and gentry of the realm.
Moreover the, Inyanga Culture merged imperceptibly into modern tribal cultures in that area
so that local African working as labourers on the Inyanga excavations were able to identify
every finding made, often giving the name of pots of which but a few sherds remained.
Although Inyanga lives on in the Manyika, Wesa, and other ethnic groups today, the
aristocratic Great Zimbabwe Culture has also most utterly disappeared.
It must be emphasised that Iron Age B did not surplant Iron Age A. The latter continues to
function as the culture of the “lower classes” Iron Age B cultures (except at Inyanga) being

51
of a dominant minority. From the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries the cultural difference was
also a social one.
The arrival of the railway in Southern Rhodesia in 1897 may be taken as the end of the local
Iron Age as it marked the introduction of heavy machinery and the commencement of the
“industrial revolution” among the African people – that is – in the modern sense of the word.
Technically speaking, the Later Iron Age may be marked as a period of irreversible
technological innovation in Zimbabwe and therefore not be separated from the industrial
revolution. This is because the same mines continued to be exploited and smelting
technology was enhanced to industrial levels.
Examinations Type Questions
1) How valid is the view that the survival of the Khoisan depended on their knowledge of the
environment?
2) Compare and contrast the social, political and economic features of the Khoikhoi and San
people.
3) Explain the changes that were brought to the lifestyles of the San and the Khoikhoi through
the use of iron tools.
4) Examine the various sources of evidence that were used to recover the history of any two
pre-colonial Zimbabwe states.
5) Discuss the impact of the introduction of iron on pre-colonial societies of Southern

Africa.
6) To what extent did agriculture revolutionize the economies of pre-colonial societies?
7) Iron brought wealth and a desire for Power and conquest. Discuss the validity of this
statement with reference to the rise of Iron Age states.
8) Discuss the socio-political and economic organization of Iron Age communities.
(9) What were the differences and similarities on the way of life of the Late Stone Age and
Early Iron Age people?
(10) How did the use of iron transform the social, economic and political bases of early pre-
colonial Zimbabwean societies?

52
REFERENCES
1. Roger Summers (1961) “The Southern Rhodesia Iron Age : (First Approximations to the
History of the Last 2000 Years)”
Source: Journal of African History, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp 1 -13.
2. Roger Summers (1966) “The Iron Age of Southern Rhodesia” in Current Anthropology,
Vol. 7, No. 4, pp 463 – 484.
3. Gilbert Pwiti (1966) “Settlement and subsistence of Prehistoric Farming Communities in
the Mid-Zambezi Valley, Northern Zimbabwe”
Source: The South African Archaeological Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 163 p3– 6.
4. Thomas N. Huffman (1989). “Ceramics, Settlements and Late Iron Age Migrations”
Source: The African Archaeological Review, Vol. 7, pp155 – 182.
5. T.N. Huffman (1972) : The Rise and Fall of Zimbabwe”
Source: The Journal of African History, Vol. 13, No. 3 pp 353 – 366.
6. C.S. Lancaster and A. Pohorilenko (1977): “Ingombe / lede and the Zimbabwe Culture”
Source: The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 10,

No.1, pp 1 – 30.

53
CHAPTER 4
THE GREAT ZIMBABWE STATE
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES

a) Account for the rise of Great Zimbabwe
b) Evaluate theories put forward on the construction and rise of Great Zimbabwe.
c) Assess the factors that led to the decline of the great Zimbabwe state
What is a State?
According to a Marxist view, a state is an instrument of class rule (control). It is an institution
representing the interest of the ruling class. Garlake defines a state as a small political unit. D.N
Beach outlines that the Shona were normally divided throughout their history into territories
under rulers of which many were in turn subdivided into wards under sub rulers and house heads,
each made up of a number of villages under village heads. These territories varied in size and
their rulers varied equally in their wealth and power. With this analysis, it is therefore easy to
suggest that several states existed between Zambezi to the North, Indian ocean to the east and
Limpopo river to the south, but it is difficult to draw a line between a large and powerful
territory and a small area held by a minor ruler like Luteve and Bocha. (refer to map below
adapted from Beach DN 1984).

54
Zambezi river .Tete

N
Mutapa
state .Zvangombe . Sena
1450-
Urungwe
1700
plateau
Mupfure river Budya Maungwe Barwe
Buhera Bocha Teve . Sofala
Kalahari Changamire
desert Torwa state State Great Sabi river
1680-1840 Zimbabwe
1450-1650
Khami Danangombe 1250-1450. .Great
Zimbabwe
Dande
Mape la
Limpopo river Mapungubwe
Venda Gambe
Key
Political units (authorities)
 Political headquarters (capitals)
The above territories, political units, varied greatly in size and their rulers varied equally in their
wealth and power. From the map above, it is easy to distinguish several political units that
existed between 1200 AD and the major Shona political states up to the 19th Century.
These four major states namely Great Zimbabwe, Mutapa, Torwa and Rozvi state can be termed
states because

55
(i) They were able to raise large armies that in the long run assimilated smaller territories
into their larger growing polities.
(ii) Were able to exact tribute or intervene in the politics of other territories over long
distances for long periods. Most of these, especially Mutapa and Rozvi, were under
the close control of the rulers of one dynasty. These dynasties controlled a much
larger region which expanded in size from time to time and received tributes from the
vassal chiefs.
The frequency with which the tribute was paid would have to do with the distance involved. As
more territory was assimilated into a major political unit, more tribute was also expected. The
polities that were able to subjugate the smaller states would form larger states and their
tributaries. The sheer economic, political and social strength of Mutapa and Torwa states makes
it probable to confer them with statehood title together with Great Zimbabwe because the three-
Mutapa, Torwa and Rozvi succeeded the Great Zimbabwe state from which they drew upon
economic, political and social techniques that had to a larger extent, been spearheaded by the
Great Zimbabwe state, argued D.N Beach in 1980
The Origins of Great Zimbabwe State
Great Zimbabwe lies some distance south and east of the auriferous belt. Iron Age people
occupied the hill for a period during the first millennium and after an interval, it was reoccupied
during the eleventh century for some next four hundred years. There are three controversies put
forward by historians in connection with the origins of Great Zimbabwe. These try to answer the
questions on When, Why, and who constructed the magnificent walls of Great Zimbabwe.
The state of Great Zimbabwe did not happen accidentally. Its origins are associated with the
decline of Mapungubwe (see map above) and the rise of gold trade with the east coast.
Mapungubwe probably declined as a result of the ruler’s failure to control the international trade
that brought in foreign goods. Vassal chiefs from Mapungubwe and Mapela may have
manipulated the weaknesses of their ruling class and stopped payment of tribute. They
transferred their loyalties to the new emerging Iron Age communities of Gumanye, Gokomere
and Kutama cultures. The Gumanye culture is believed to have evolved into the Great Zimbabwe
state.
Controversy A: Time sense

When was Great Zimbabwe built?
The Great Zimbabwe state started as a political unit before about 1250. Radio carbon dates for
the stone walls are 1100, 1300, 1340 and 1350, says D.N Beach in 1980. Archaeology revealed
that the few upper class huts of the rulers were basically a middle 13th century construction. The
radio carbon dates indicate that the state thrived in the 14th century. As the power of the ruling
class increased, it organised the construction of stone walls between 1000 and 1200 AD.
56
Architectural controversy:
This questions the purpose for which the walls have been constructed. Garlake argued that Great
Zimbabwe was simply a symbol of rulers’ status, prestige, honour and privacy. Phimister and
Proctor supported this view when they added that the huge stone wall was built right round the
King’s complex for privacy and ritual purposes. This interpretation suggests that the walls may
have been built for religious purposes. Archaeological evidence of bird carvings, polished clay
pots and altars are in support of the religious purpose. Mufuka. K also suggests that the upright
stone walls were associated with the religious beliefs of the Shona. The conical tower according
to him suggests that they wanted too be closer to Mwari. However, Mukanya has different views.
He argues that the colonial tower was an expression of fertility and success. He uses the shape of
the male organ to support his argument. This reveals the paternalistic nature of the Shona
societies.
Another argument describes the stone walls as meant for defensive purposes. This argument has
been dismissed by such historians like DN. Beach 1980, Garlake and Mufuka who argued that
Great Zimbabwe had no permanent enemies that threatened them to the extent of building those
complex walls. The building of other several Madzimbabwe dotted all over Zimbabwe may be
used to explain the construction as a symbol of power, prestige and honour.
The Construction controversy

There are basically two theories that have been advanced for the construction of Great
Zimbabwe. These conflicting theories try to answer the who aspect on the construction of the
great walls.
The Non- African Theory

In the early published accounts of Great Zimbabwe, Europeans often insisted that the ruins must
have had an exotic, non-African origin. To this day, some local Europeans cannot allow
themselves to credit Africans, let alone the ancestors of the modern Shona inhabitants from the
areas with the capacity to construct such elaborate buildings. This theory being Euro-centric in
nature attributes the construction of Great Zimbabwe to foreigners like Phoenicians, Greeks,
Arabs, Portuguese and Jews. Mauch , a German explorer, claimed that the ruins have foreign
origins and are copies of king Solomon’s temple and palace. Other proponents of this theory
include Hall, Wilmot, Bent, and De Barros. The latter is known for supporting Mauch’s
argument that Prestor John, King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba are instigators of the stone
buildings. Some non-African theorists suggest that the Shona people may have had long trading
contacts with foreigners like Ptolemies of Egypt who finally settled to construct the Great
Zimbabwe walls. This theory which is based on racial affiliations asserts that Africans lacked in
technological ability to build architectural structures like Great Zimbabwe. The Europeans said
the same about other impressive human achievements in Africa. However, this theory has been
challenged in that, if Europeans, Egyptians, Arabs or Jews constructed the walls, why is it that
there has not been any literature left behind on walls, stone slates or on papyrus since these were
literate societies.
57
The African Theory
This theory seeks to dismiss the non- African theory that was based on racist bigotry by
advancing the African theory. Proponents of this theory include Mufuka, Garlake, Thompson,
Robinson, Roger Summers, Huffman etc. These advance the view on local origins of the stone
walls pointing that stone walling began at Mapungubwe. It has been demonstrated by more
recent professional archaeologists like Rundall MacIver that Great Zimbabwe was The
Headquarters of an indigenous African state that flourished for hundreds of years. Archaeologists
also affirm the Shona origins of the stone structures when they indicated that artefacts at Great
Zimbabwe like pottery, huts, ceremonial axes, indicate Shona traditional culture. Mud huts
excavated at Great Zimbabwe give evidence of its local origins since they resemble the present
day Shona structures. The Euro-centric theory has finally been dismissed for lack of substantial
archaeological evidence.
The Rise of the Great Zimbabwe state
Just like its origin, the rise of Great Zimbabwe has divergent theories that try to play down one
theory against the other. Beach D.N in 1984 describes the disagreement on the accounts of the
rise of Great Zimbabwe as a ‘pendulum effect’ where one writer stresses one aspect at the
expense of other aspects, whereupon another account will react against the other account to
proceed and stress on another aspect. The process therefore continues back and forth like a
pendulum. In the light of these observations no single proven theory can effectively explain the
rise of Great Zimbabwe, but a combination of these theories.
Trade Hypothesis
This hypothesis associates Great Zimbabwe’s rise with the flourishing gold trade that became the
most important export exercise with the Arabs. The state’s monopoly of the Save river trade
route saw increased trade between the plateau and the east coast from as early as about 1100
A.D. Archaeological evidence of foreign objects like beads, plates, glassware, guns etc support
the existence of this trade.
There is also evidence that reveal trading relations between the Great Zimbabwe state with
northern Ingombe Ilede copper trader. Through the control of international trade, the rulers of
Great Zimbabwe gained valuable gifts and items through which they built alliances with their
neighbours to ensure the payment of tribute from other chiefly lineages. The rulers controlled the
gold trade from which they derived power, wealth and prestige. Ownership of foreign clothes
and ornaments was a symbol of wealth. Ceremonial hoes and spears were a symbol of status and
were restricted to members of the ruling family.

58
Cattle Hypothesis
The growth of the Great Zimbabwe economy based on large herds of cattle is used to explain the
rise of the state. The importance of cattle is evidenced by the influence cattle had on the choice
of pre-colonial settlement. Almost all Madzimbabwe were built close to the edge of escarpments
an ideal position for controlling the seasonal movement of cattle between the summer highveld
and the winter lowveld grazing. Most of the cattle belonged to the ruling class. Cattle became a
symbol of differences between the rulers and the ruled. The Great Zimbabwe people used cattle
to build up their numbers by acquiring wives, and hence, many children who developed into a
military force that protected and dominated trade routes. The Great Zimbabwe army compelled
traders from small states to pay transit tax. This increased wealth and prestige for the rulers, says
D.N Beach (1984). Young men in the state had also the responsibility of looking after royal
herds and raiding for more cattle.
However, the rise and growth of a state cannot be attributed to a single economic branch. The
Cattle theory alone cannot be attributable to the rise of Great Zimbabwe, but all braches of
production like mining, farming and trade were crucial. A combination of those economic
activities ushered an increase in imports of beads and improved huts and pottery for the rulers.
Religious Theory
This theory stresses the role of religion as a means of accumulating wealth. The ruling class at
Great Zimbabwe in particular and other pre-colonial states in general controlled important
traditional institutions such as laws and beliefs. Ceremonies in which the ancestors were asked to
increase the fertility of the land, the size of harvest, extent of rainfall and protection of the cattle
were presided over by the ruling class. As a result, people believed that they could not harvest
their crops until the king conducted a ceremony to honour the ancestors for the success of the
harvest. This gave the ruling class the chance to control the harvest and could make sure that
tribute was paid.
Religion cemented people together and guaranteed the ruling class loyalty from their subjects.
The fall of Great Zimbabwe

Various reasons have been advanced for the decline and fall of Great Zimbabwe. The obvious
explanation, however, is that the decline of Great Zimbabwe cannot have been caused by the
Portuguese or by the expansion of the Mutapa state’s power, because the Torwa state at Khami
was growing powerful at the same time using the same trade routes as Great Zimbabwe. The rise
of the Mutapa can be used convincingly as a result of the decline of Great Zimbabwe, not as a
cause for the decline of the Great Zimbabwe state.

59
a)Environmental Reason
This suggestion argues that Great Zimbabwe’s population grew too big to be supported by its
environment. The presence of so many people at a site that had the circumference of seven
kilometres would have seriously affected the ability of its site territory to supply crops, firewood,
game, grazing areas, and all other necessities of life. The increase in human population meant an
increase in households and hence an increase in animal population. This had a bearing on the
grazing land for domestic animals.
Competition for the available resources between different branches of the ruling class and their
supporters might have led to quarrels over grazing and hunting ground. The croplands and mines
became exhausted. These might well have led to civil wars that made it impossible for the state
to continue.
A (Shangwa) drought which occurred in successions at a point when the population had reached
critical levels would have destroyed the ability of the territory to support its inhabitants. In the
absence of technology that could transport sufficient supplies over longer distances, the only
alternative would have been to dispense the people or possibly move the structure itself, argued
Huffman.
b) Decline in Trade
Trade, both internal and external, had triggered the rise and growth of the powerful Great
Zimbabwe state. The fall of Great Zimbabwe has been greatly associated with the decline in gold
trade. Exhaustion of goldfields, drought and shifting of trading posts led to the failure by the
Great Zimbabwe ruling class to control and manipulate trade. This led to the fall since the inflow
of foreign goods was minimal. The expansion of Torwa and Mutapa weakened the rulers of
Great Zimbabwe as they no longer controlled and acquired wealth from trade necessary for the
sustenance of the state. Factors such as exhaustion of resources like land, woodlands, minerals
and grazing areas subsequently led to the abandonment of the Great Zimbabwe state.

1) “Oral tradition is the most important source of our knowledge of Great Zimbabwe”. How
valid is this view?
2) How important was mining to the economy of Great Zimbabwe?
3) Assess the various arguments for and against the fact that Great Zimbabwe was built by the
Shona.

60
4) How valid is the claim that due to vandalism and theft, the evidence left is too little to
reconstruct the history of Great Zimbabwe?
5) How important were written records in reconstructing the pre-history of Zimbabwe?
6) Account for the rise of Great Zimbabwe.

7) The Shona people never built Great Zimbabwe but settled into structures already in
existence: Discuss this view on the origin of the Great enclosure.
8) How valid is the claim that trade was the mainstay of the economy of Great Zimbabwe
9) Political power struggles were the chief cause of the fall of great Zimbabwe. Do you
agree?
10) Critically examine the possible reasons why the Great Zimbabwe declined as a center of
political power and wealth during the 15th Century AD.
11) What evidence is there at G. Zimbabwe which helps us better understand the history and
way of life of the Shona?
References
Beach, D.N Zimbabwe before 1900. Mambo Press Harare. 1984
Garlake, P. S Great Zimbabwe described and explained Z.P.H Harare. 1982
Garlake, P.S Great Zimbabwe ‘A’ Spartial analysis of archaeological sites form Zimbabwe. 1973
Raftopolous, B, and Mlambo, A. (Eds) Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre- Colonial
Period to 2008. Jacana Media, Johannesburg. 2009

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CHAPTER 5
THE RISE OF THE MUTAPA DYNASTY, DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND ORAL
TRADITIONS (CASE STUDY ON SOURCES)
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
a) Critically examine the type of historical evidence in the recollection of the history of the
Mutapa.
b) Evaluate the contributions of various sources used in collection of historical evidence.
From the Mutapa dynasty, oral traditions and written documents give us a much more detailed
and personal historical view. Much of African history relies on oral tradition. Hence lacking
evidence and credibility. Origins of states always have different interpretations.
Oral Tradition:
According to traditions collected by D.P. Abraham during the fourteenth century a new group of
Bantu-speakers, led by a mythical personality called Nembire, moved into Zimbabwe from the
north during the North South migration.
Abraham suggests that these people may have crossed the Zambezi in about 1235: their origins
are not known, but they probably came from the Katanga region, for copper artifacts reminiscent
of the Congo are found in Period IV levels of occupation.
For almost a century the characters who figure in the traditions of the Mbire people as they are
known, are impossible to identify as being real historical personalities.
However, at the end of the 14th century we are suddenly confronted by an individual, who though
still in the realm of mythical founders, is Chikura Wadyembeu. Genealogically, he is said to be
NeMbire’s grandson, whom traditions identify as the first mambo (great chief of the Rozvi). A
generation later, he is replaced as mambo by a man who may or may not have been his son, but
who was the very first individual to bear the praise name of Mwene Mutapa/Munhu Muatapa.
Implications
(1) One interpretation could be that here we have yet another group of chiefly invaders
establishing their rule over the earlier population of Zimbabwe (D.P. Abraham).To
support Abraham’s view, there are the Katangese type of artifacts associated with
period IV and the tradition itself. There is evidence of a decline at the end of the
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Shona period of domination at Zimbabwe.Still, none of these lead inevitably to such

conclusion.
(2) One can also argue that the new dynasty arose out of the old.
Who were the Rozvi?

The problem centres around the identity of the Rozvi who dominate the history of this
region after 1450. There are numerous conflicting traditions concerning the Rozvi and
various scholars have stood by each of these views. However, what emerges is that
the Rozvi were a special group. They were not a clan, nor were they a tribe.
(3) Edward Alpers’s interpretation of the tradition is that the Rozvi were a particular
Shona group who for some time had held positions of power, most probably ritual, in
the Shona Kingdom of Period III. They may well have been the original ruling
dynasty of the Shona. So during the warring, periods of this kingdom, a particular
family amongst the Shona rose to prominence saved the state from total disintegration
by virtue of its particular leadership skills, and eventually emerged as the ruling
dynasty of a new successor state. This would be the Mbire. It is in this light that one
should see Abraham’s more recent (1963) hypothesis that the Mutapa dynasty broke
away from the reigning Rozvi dynasty, for it is fairly based on this assumption.
(4) What interpretation (3) implies is that there was a steady stream of Bantu-speaking
peoples of Congolese origin entering Zimbabwe from about the end of the first
millennium A.D. All of those people are now known to us as Shona; but they did not
come as a single tribe. Over a number of centuries there was a continual process of
integration of peoples and ideas, beginning with the first encounter of Congolese
immigrants with the Ziwa, Leopard’s Kopje, and Period II people who inhabited
Zimbabwe.
At a certain point in time, this process gave birth to the predominantly Shona culture
of the period at Zimbabwe. This culture was not static but like any civilization was
constantly developing new ideas of its own and absorbing others which were injected
into it by more recent arrivals in Zimbabwe e.g in this case the Mbire.
Who were the Mbire?

It is immaterial whether or not they themselves were Rozvi. What is of paramount importance is
that under their leadership Rozvi ascendancy was established or re-established at Great
Zimbabwe.
If the Mbire did not necessarily create a new Zimbabwean Kingdom, they certainly revitalized
the old one. With the Mbire mambo leading this new Rozvi state we enter the great period of
expansion which resulted in the formation of the empire of Mutapa.

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Nyatsimba Mutapa:
He was the second Rozvi mambo of the Mbire line, that is successor to Chikura Wadyembeu. It
was his peculiar genius which gave rise to the empire of Mutapa.
From about 1420 to the middle of the 15th century Mutota embarked on a major military
campaign to create a vast personal empire over the entire Zimbabwe Platean.
Reasons for the campaign and/ or the rise of Nyatsimba Mutota. The traditional explanation is
that there was considerable over population in the nuclear Rozvi Kingdom in the Southern part
of Zimbabwe as well as severe shortage of salt supplies.
Our main sources of information, Abraham and Alpers do not give much credit to these
motivations. The reasons do not seem to be sufficient cause for the sort of empire building
Mutota decided to undertake. According to Abraham, Mutota was stimulated by foreign
influences. This leads us to written documents.
Documentary sources:
According to an early sixteenth century Portuguese documents, it was learned at Sofala from the
African who came from the interior “that in the land of Munhumotapa (sic) there are more than
ten thousand Moors”
Although this figure cannot be taken literally, there is no doubt that a great many Muslim traders
were entrenched throughout the entire area. The importance of their economic stake there is
attested to by their extended resistance after 1530 to Portuguese penetration into the interior.
Nevertheless, this evidence is not sufficient to warrant Abraham’s conclusion that it was Muslim
traders, seeking a wider protective political umbrella under which they could carry on and extend
their trading activities who “conceived and implanted in the wind of the Rozvi King a desire for
empire”.
Certainly this may have been a factor in influencing Mutota’s expansionist policy, but there does
not appear to be any specific confirmation for this hypothesis. Furthermore, this interpretation
leaves an unsatisfactory picture of Mutota as a passive character, who lacked a personal vision
and was only spunned to action by the provision of a group of foreign merchants whose activities
depended, in the first place, on his good will as monarch.
1. This is not the sort of man who wages for thirty years a struggle for imperial expansion.
Abraham’s suggestion seems misdirected on these grounds too. Mutota was already
milling over a considerable kingdom’s apparently an ambitions man, it is not great an
assumption to believe that he contemplated extending his territory.
2. Mutota was the descendant of a dynamic new royal family which had perhaps even
usurped power from the previous ruling dynasty of the kingdom. Such a tradition, still
fresh and vital, is surely the stuff of which imperial ambitions are made.
3. Turning to the purely economic factor, the advantages of wider political hegemony must
have struck Mutota as forcibly as they struck the Muslim traders operating within the
sphere of his patronage.
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NB: In other words, the influences which led to the formation of the empire of Mutota, like those
which had marked the earlier progress of the Shona, Kingdom centering on Great Zimbabwe, are
probably to be found within the internal dynamics of the society itself.
Antonio Fernandes accounts

In about 1511, the Portuguese decided to send Antonio Fernandes into the interior in their bid to
control sources of gold. He was instructed to find out more about gold mines, to establish
friendly relations with the Mutapa (Monomotapa) and other chiefs, and to report on ways of
improving the gold trade.
Fernandes had first come to Africa in 1500, a convict working as ship’s carpenter. He had learnt
the local languages and gained considerable influence over the people. Probably barely literate,
his report of these travels was written down by a clerk at Sofala and sent to the King of Portugal.
The report gives some valuable details of what he found in the interior of central Africa.
From 1511 to 1515, Fernades travelled extensively throughout Mashonaland. He visited some of
the gold-bearing areas and watched the gold extracted, but saw only a few small nuggets, most of
it was heavy dust. He also visited the Monomotapa’s Zimbabwe at Mbire near Musengezi river,
where he reported that he saw a fortress of the Monomotapa “which he is now making of stone
without mortar”
Fernandes next visited the Kingdom of Butua, which he noted was rich in gold. He made a
further journey across “the great river” which was probably the Zambezi. He reported seeing a
great deal of copper and described how the people bartered this for trade goods from the southern
side. They crossed the river in canoes and left their copper ingots on the southern shore and the
buyers then placed a quantity of trade goods beside them.
If the sellers were not satisfied, they left the goods untouched, and the buyers gradually added
more until an acceptable amount had been placed beside the copper. This was then taken back
across the river. Fernandes described some of these people as having light skins and big
buttocks, perhaps “Bushmen” or San survivors of the valley and also told of cannibals he had
heard of to the north of the river.
Fernandes recommended that Portuguese should develop the Zambezi route and establish a
fortified warehouse on an island in the river in an effort to break Arab monopoly of trade in the
area. As a result the Portuguese turned their attention to the Zambezi. They introduced a number
of warships on the river to check the Arab traders, and during the mid-16th century established
settlements at Sena and Tete and, somewhat later at Zumbo further up the river.
Documents from Portuguese Catholic Missionaries. Some Dominican priests went to the coastal
ports to minister to the Portuguese traders and officials.

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The first Christian Missionary to Penetrate the Zimbabwe Plateau: Father Goncalo da
Silveira
According to reports, he was with two companions and arrived at the trading station of
Inhambane in 1560. After converting a local chief, Silveira travelled up the Zambezi and on to
the Monomotapa’s Zimbabwe on his own.
It is reported in Christian documents that the ascetic priests refused all gifts of gold and rich
food, and lived frugally on millet porridge and bitter herbs. He appeared strange, but his
dominant personality and his eloquent preaching produced a quick response and after three
weeks of instruction of the young Monomotapa and 300 of his relations and leading tribesmen
were baptized.
Siveira’s success aroused the opposition of the Muslim traders at the court. They persuaded the
Monomotapa that Silveira was a powerful sorcerer, who was plotting to take his kingdom so he
sanctioned the missionary’s death. Despite being warned of the plot by Antonio Caiada, a
Portuguese trader at the court, he refused to leave resulting in his death. Silveira was secretly
strangled in the morning of 15th March 1561 and his body was thrown into the Musengezi river.
NB: Some of the documents are about the disastrous military expeditions. Sebastian, a young
ambitious ruler who came to the throne of Portugal in 1568 to avenge the murder of Silveira,
secure gold mines, and spread the Christian faith. In 1569, a military expedition kept Lisbon
under the command of Francisco Barreto.
Although the expedition was a failure, Barreto had already appointed Migued Bernandes, a local
Portuguese trader, as his envoy to the Monomotapa and sent him to the court to present his
demands for a monopoly of trade for the Portuguese. Bernandes reached the Monomotapa’s
Zimbabwe and had some discussions on this but was drowned on his return journey. However,
the Monomotapa sent his own envoys to talk with Barreto. They arrived in Sena while Barreto
was away but brought the news that the Monomotapa accepted Barreto’s request that Muslim
traders should be expelled from the Kingdom and that some gold mines should be placed under
The Portuguese. The Portuguese however, could not take advantage of these
concessions. Barreto himself died of fever on his return to Sena from the coast and the
expedition, considerably reduced in numbers withdrew to the coast without visiting the mines.
Comments on sources:
The first two chapters have taken the story up to about 1650, at least in the north and centre of
the Zimbabwe Plateau, but the account has been limited in two ways.
1. Archaeology is almost all that we have to rely on before 1450
2. The traditions concerning the north and centre from about 1450 to about 1650 have their
limitations.

66
The archaeology gives us a good idea of the economy of the plateau even if it gives no genuine
names to attach to the people of each site; the traditions, because they were so closely linked to
questions of land and inheritance, give us a great number of names of people and places but very
little else.
According to D.N Beach, we are fortunate because for nearly two centuries the northern and
central Shona were under the direct observation of Portuguese traders and priests and official
who either committed their impressions to paper or passed on to others. And, while the north and
centre of the Plateau were in effect banned to Portuguese observers by the threat of Rozvi power
after 1693, the eastern Shona and those of the Zambezi Valley remained under observations right
up to modern times.
Moreover, because a certain number of Shona from the Plateau were accustomed to the coast on
to the Zambezi, Portuguese outside the Plateau were able to pick up information from Shona
informants at first hand.
NB: It is true that the Portuguese documents have their own faults and anyone who recoils from
traditions because of their limitations will be disappointed if he seeks absolute accuracy in the
documents. Many Portuguese writers never got closer to the Plateau than Sofala or
Mozambique’s, that their accounts are hearsay, and many other who went up to the Zambezi
never crossed the linguistic boundary from over Zambezi, Tonga to Shona territory, while some
of those did neglect to indicate which society they were referring to.
Again many Portuguese writers did not know Shona- though quite a number probably did
because “they slept with Shona girls” (Beach) and even those who did had some strange
mediaeval and more familiar colonial prejudices. Those who did write had a rich assortment of
biases in their accounts, depending upon what they hoped to achieve by their writing. Finally,
many seem to have plagiarized the work of others, so that what looks at first sight like an
independent confirmation of an earlier statement could well be a copy. As with traditions there is
no easy way out of these problems; each case depends upon specific
NB: For details refer to D.N. Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe 900-1850pp87-111.
Sources of Historical Evidence

Before any scholar can write history, there is need to know the tools or ways of collecting
information to use in writing that history. Thus it is imperative that any student of history be
familiar with the different ways of collecting historical evidence. Historians use a variety of
sources to answer questions about the past. They use both primary and secondary sources.
Primary Sources:
These include actual records that have survived from the past, those relics and traces left by the
past, such as eye -witness accounts, personal letters, official reports, artefacts, photographs,
pictures and paintings.

67
Secondary Sources:
Include accounts of the past created by historians’ writing about events well after they happened
such as text books, encyclopaedia stories, drama, magazines, commentaries, journals,
newspapers etc. Inside a secondary source may be found primary sources e.g textbook or news
paper may also have pictures, direct quotes and personal accounts. This highlights the
relationship between primary and secondary sources.
Historians have a tendency to trust primary sources as more reliable than secondary sources, but
every source can be biased in some way, therefore, before using a source especially written, the
historian must ask the following questions.”
a) Who recorded the source and why?
b) Was the recorder neutral or an interested party?
c) The historian need to question where and when the writer could have obtained the
information.
African History and Historical Sources:

African history can be obtained through three main sources which are: Archaeology, written
evidence and Oral traditions. These are, however, backed by linguistics and anthropology as
subjects on the art of languages and the study of living beings respectively.
Archaeology
Is the scientific study of human past antiquities usually discovered by excavations. Beach .D.N/
in 1984 asserted that archaeology relies upon studies of the environment and geography,
including rainfall, vegetation maps, analysis of pottery types, samples of bones and seeds and
imported goods recovered from excavation e.g claypots, clay shelters (huts) arrowheads, pots,
glass beads and other relics of the past.
Advantages
 It can be precise in dating as long as artefacts are found

 It furnishes documents that cannot speak for themselves. Archaeology has been useful in
unearthing the history of pre-colonial Zimbabwe e.g Great Zimbabwe, Mutapa, Torwa,
Rozvi.
 Social activities such as burial systems, pottery making, farming, religion are usually best
explained using archaeology.

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Disadvantages of Archaeology
(1) The contribution of archaeology is weighed down by the fact that it neglects the political
and other cultural aspects e.g it does not give information on the hierarchy of dynasties.
These may, however, be obtained from oral traditions.
(2) It does not give us names of rulers unless there are inscriptions on an artefact.
Written Evidence
This is documentary evidence. It is classified under secondary sources but inside a secondary
source may be found primary sources.
Advantages
- According to Tash (2000), written records are considered more reliable for they combine
in them information gathered through other sources.
- They are created for a larger number of audiences and are widely distributed
- Pre-colonial documents e.g Portuguese accounts of the Mutapa, Rozvi, Arab writings
about Great Zimbabwe or accounts of traders and missionaries to Zimbabwe are
important as the bedrock of African History but historians must be aware of the biases
embedded in these documents. Portuguese accounts of central African states have played
the foundation from which other sources built on.
Disadvantages of written sources
 Written records, like the other discussed sources may be prone to abuse by the writer or
the historian.
 The writer may decide to distort information to advance one’s agenda.
 The writer may decide to write what he/she wants people to hear, living out what they are
supposed to hear. They depend on one’s objectivity and subjectivity.
 The purpose for which information is written may influence the writer to be either
objective or subjective
 Due to these weaknesses, written records can be used together with other sources that
will take care of these weaknesses.
Historical sources and the reconstruction of Zimbabwe’s past

Much of the history of the pre-colonial communities that is known to us has been gathered
through archaeology, oral traditions and written records. Through these sources, we are able to
reconstruct the remarkably detailed political, economic and social history of Early Iron Age
peoples of Zimbabwe.

69
Archaeology is more effective in determining the economic activities of a people Artefacts like
beads, China plates, jewellery and porcelain found at Great Zimbabwe area clear evidence of the
existence of external trade while hoes, axes and spears reveal the agrarian economy of the
people. Early Iron Age communities like the Ziwa, Gokomere, Mapungubwe, Musengezi Zhizo,
Malipati up to Great Zimbabwe have been studied exclusively through archaeology because oral
traditions could not stretch that far. The material culture of these communities e.g styles of
pottery and styles of building, terracing e.g that which is evident at Ziwa reveal more about the
economic activities of these people. Ziwa, is regarded as one of the earliest known Iron age sites
in Zimbabwe which stretched from Nyanga mountains on the eastern frontier of Zimbabwe. A
grave has been carbon dated to about 300 AD. Ziwa pottery was already made in the 11 th
century. This supports that by about 300 AD the Ziwa people were already living at that area.
Archaeological discoveries of bones, hill terracing pottery, is testimony to their agrarian
economy. Most similar sites have been found dotted around the country. Similar to Ziwa is
Gokomere, Mabveni and Zhizo communities whom archaeologists identity merely by the styles
on their pottery and places they were excavated.
It is also revealed through carbon dating that Gokomere people were the first to live at Great
Zimbabwe in about AD 320. Other Gokomere sites have been discovered at Mabveni near Great
Zimbabwe which dated AD 180. Written records have been applauded for providing useful
colonial history of African states. Pre-colonial documents most of which have been written by
Portuguese traders, Swahili Arabs and early Missionaries are important as a bedrock of African
History, but historians must be aware of the biases for these documents were written for various
purposes,
-The Portuguese exaggerated the power of the Mutapa because they claimed the right to rule
over lands that the Mutapa had given them to rule even if they knew that his state was not that
big.
-The Missionaries, explorers and settlers supplemented Portuguese documentation, but were
equally far from providing history as the people they write about saw, it but wrote to advance
their colonial agendas.
The Interdisciplinary Approach of Historical sources.

There is no single discipline which can on its own give a complete meaningful account of the
events in a country. No single explanatory system can by itself account for African societies. A
variety of specialists have to be called upon to help each other in the construction of historical
realities. A single source will always give a blurred image of historical reality. Do not rely on
one source. Oral tradition can produce its best result if combined with other sources. Before any
archaeologist starts digging, it is advisable that they first collect local tradition. Sometimes
traditions differ even in the same village. Then oral tradition should precede archaeological
evidence. The shortfall of oral tradition in dating and chronology can be taken care of by
archaeology which uses scientific dating methods.

70
-The interdisciplinary approach of sources has been helpful in the reconstruction and tracing of
the routes of the Bantu migrations. This was traced through by using Anthropology, linguistic,
oral traditions and the written records of the Arabs.
-The combination of sources is more imperative when the problems of chronology are to be
combated.
-The importance of combining sources can also be seen when one looks at the history of pre-
colonial states in Zimbabwe. Written records on their own could not be relied upon especially on
the construction of Great Zimbabwe. Early sources on this state were marred by racial biases
such that they needed archaeology and oral evidence to reconstruct the Zimbabwe’s past. Oral
traditions could also not be relied upon for they are subject to fallibility of memory because of
time. Again it appeared as if before archaeological findings ascertained the builders of Great
Zimbabwe, all early inhabitants of this area claimed association and descent from the
magnificent structures.
-In the collection of current events like the war of liberation in Zimbabwe, It would be
imperative to rely on the combination of sources because oral accounts may be faltered by
exaggerations and lies especially on battles and victories. Therefore, if history is to be a correct
reproduction of events, a variety of sources should be summoned together to complement each
other.

1) Discuss the interdisciplinary approach that is used in recovering the past.
2) Analyse the written sources which have been used to recover the history of Great
Zimbabwe.
3) Assess the importance of archaeology in recovering the history of early Iron age
communities.
References
1. Beach, D.N, The Mutapa Dynasty: A comparison of documentary and traditional
evidence, History in Africa (1976).
2. Phillipson D.W The later prehistory of Eastern and Southern Africa. London. (1977).
3. Bourdillon, M.F.C The Shona Peoples, Gweru, Mambo, Press 1998

4. Vansina, J. Oral Tradition, Routledge and Kegan Paul. London. 1961

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A Digestive Essay
Evaluate the interdisciplinary approach of Historical sources in the construction of the
past.
Introduction
There is a vast expanse of human activity which has left no surviving record. The part of their
past will remain irretrievably lost if historical sources like archaeology, written records and Oral
traditions are used to uncover this hidden past. The utility of each historical source in uncovering
the past depends on the complementary role that other courses render to address its shorts
comings. This essay will focus on the interdisciplinary approach of historical sources needed in
the retrieval of the hidden past.
There is no single discipline on its own which can give an account that can adequately give the
intricate realities of the world. A single source always gives a blurred image of historical reality
especially when one is studying a people who left no written records. Such a people’s past, can
only be accessed through the empirical method of archaeology. This is the study of numerous
remains used by people who lived in the distant past. Styles of buildings and of pottery dug up
from various levels of habitation can tell us something of the large scale movements of peoples.
Items introduced from outside, such as beads and porcelain, tell us a little about trading and may
also help us with dating. Artefacts like beads, china plates, jewellery and guns found at Great
Zimbabwe are a clear evidence of the existence of external trade, while hoes, axes and spears
reveal the agrarian economy of the people at Great Zimbabwe.
It is also through archaeology that the status of people who lived in the past can be revealed,
especially those who held positions of leadership. Members of the royal family are easily
identifiable by jewellery. Soldiers can also be seen buried with their arsenal and regalia. One
major advantage of archaeology is that it can give dates that may assist in the organisation of
events into chronological occurrence. It gives economic information on those communities that
owned property. It needs written records and oral tradition’s assistance on the political
organisation of states. Neither does archaeology have the ability to reveal a language that people
used. In this case it should be supported by other historical sources.
In each given case there is a key source which acts as a foundation to which other sources will
come and probe. In the recovery of Iron age states of Africa, archaeology has been used as a
foundation source to support or refute the written records by early European merchants like Joao
de Barros whose writings have been used to describe the geographical location of Great
Zimbabwe state.
Most written records on Shona states are recorded from Portuguese accounts of those who traded
with the interior in the 15th century. They recorded their contacts and dealings with Shona chiefs
but their accounts give an exclusively Portuguese point of view which may not be satisfactory
rather to understanding of the past. Missionaries, explorers and traders supplemented Portuguese
documentation, but were equally far from providing history as the people they write about saw it,
but wrote to advance their colonial agendas. This explains that written records though they are
more credited with accuracy, they may be influenced by the purpose for which information is

72
written. The writer may decide to be objective or subjective. The writer may decide to write what
he/she wants people to hear, living out to what they are supposed to hear. The writer may decide
to distort information to advance one’s own agenda. in the light of these weaknesses, written
records can be used together with archaeology and oral tradition to substantiate the written
evidence.
Oral tradition is the third source of information which historians use to obtain the invaluable
Shona, point of view. The source can assist in bringing chronological narrations of events,
people’s names and religious beliefs. It gives the historian information about how events took
place, names of leaders, narrations of wars and migrations. However, the kind of information
oral tradition can yield should be cautiously treated and may never be regarded as history in the
absence of other sources. It has a number of features which makes it unreliable for the
elucidation of factual history.
Oral traditions are normally recounted for a specific purpose and survive only as long as people
continue to maintain an interest in the subject. Informants tend to recite only those aspects of
their oral tradition which serve their own purpose. People select and recount those events which
suit their particular interest and even twist and distort them. Oral tradition tends to telescope
history especially when it comes to genealogies, some unimportant people and their generations
tend to get left out, as well as people who are not important to the narrator. People have also a
tendency to exaggerate information especially on victories and heroic events. They tend to tell
lies to deify themselves or venerate their heroes at the expense of historical truth. The fact that it
depends on memory implies that important facts can be lost on the way or distorted as it passes
from one generation to the next.
In spite of all these limitations, oral tradition has proved to be a remarkable source when tracing
the growth and fragmentation of various powerful states which had political and economic
influence. This means that, oral tradition as a source cannot be out rightly discredited since it
raises questions which other disciplines like archaeology and written sources can answer. The
knowledge of societies and cities can only be substantiated when it is in written records and is
supported by archaeology and oral tradition. These sources are equally important in filing each
other’s gap. Historians do not rely on a single source to gather historical reality for it will be
regarded as incomplete and unauthentic. Historical sources should always play an
interdisciplinary role as they complement each other.

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CHAPTER 6
THE MUTAPA STATE
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
a) Account for the rise of the Mutapa state.
b) Discuss the political, economic and social organisation of the Mutapa state.
c) Evaluate the contribution of the Portuguese activities on the fall of Mutapa state.
The rise of Mutapa state
The precise story of how the Mutapa state was founded remains obscure; what archaeology
managed to prove is that the culture associated with the Great Zimbabwe civilisation spread far
beyond the vicinity of the ruins. Recorded oral traditions by Portuguese writers like Alcacova
1506 and Dos Santos 1609, and traditions by travellers such as Abraham Alpers suggest that the
state of Mutapa came into existence around 1200 AD and that it was an offshoot of Great
Zimbabwe submitted by Beach (1984). This leaves historians in controversy over the concept of
time when this state came into existence. Mudenge (1984) asserted that towards the end of 15 th
century, Great Zimbabwe began to be abandoned. Power shifted southwards under the
Mwenemutapa rulers. The first Mutapa was Nyatsimba Mutota whose son is credited with the
expansion of the state, and transfer of the capital from the Great Zimbabwe to Chitako hills. The
implication for this debate and variance on the foundation of Mutapa state may be that at one
time Great Zimbabwe and the Mutapa state existed alongside each other as separate states.
Proctor and Phimister (1991) substantiated this probability by stating that the decline of Great
Zimbabwe coincided with the rise of Mutapa and Torwa states in the 15th century. These writers
argue that the Torwa and Mutapa may have been tributary states at one time, but were fully
independent by 1400. These writers continue to reveal that the Mutapa and the Torwa states
copied much of the ruling class culture from Great Zimbabwe, engaged in foreign trade and were
probably equal to their predecessor in both power and size. However, it is worth mentioning that
of all these three states, the Mutapa state survived much longer into the early twentieth century.
At its final demise, it is said to have been ruled by over 40 Mwene Mutapas.
After 1490, Portuguese sources have been used to reconstruct the Mutapa history. Before that,
oral traditions have been used, but these also are not reliable and clear as different versions on
the rise of Mutapa state have been presented. Oral tradition gives two different versions of the
rise of the Mutapa. One is that of a conquering army from the Great Zimbabwe state under
Prince Mutota swinging through Shangwe into Dande in search of salt. This salt tradition has
been passed from one generation to the next, which try to explain why Nyatsimba Mutota moved
from Great Zimbabwe to Dande.

74
Salt Theory:
It has been accounted by oral tradition that Nyakatonje who lived in Dande was a friend of
Prince Mutota. He visited his friend Mutota at Guruuswa taking with him some salt. When he
arrived at Guruuswa Mutota killed an ox to welcome his friend. Nyakatonje added salt to his
cooked portion of meat. He gave Mutota salted meat to taste, who later asked where the
commodity was found. Oral tradition says that Mutota went with Nyakatonje to the land of salt.
This theory therefore suggests that the scarcity of salt at Great Zimbabwe and its availability in
Mbire caused Mutota and his followers to migrate to Dande. This theory however falls short
when it fails to explain why Mutota never chose to settle in Gokwe, or why he ignored the richer
and more plentiful salt depositions of the Save river valley. Raf-topoulos and Mlambo (2008)
dismiss the salt theory as a paramount reason for the movement of Mutota to the north.
Mashingaidze (1990) have come to a conclusion that the so called ‘salt’ may have indicated a
general shortage in food supplies ,pastures, fuel and other resources that disrupted people’s way
of life. The second version provided by oral tradition is more dramatic. This version talks of the
rise and expansion of the Mutapa state as a much slower process of infiltration of the Dande-
Chidima and Shangwe regions by a small Karanga group led by a military man called Mutota.
This is recorded as the Infiltration theory and it asserts that Karanga hunters, refugees and
adventurers from the South came to be interested in Moslem traders coming from the newly
established sultanate of Angoche who used the Zambezi trade route into the interior of
Zimbabwe instead of the traditional Sofala overland route. The theory goes on to explain that the
Karanga strangers made friendship concessions with people in the valley for them to be
accepted. It is this theory again which talks of Mutota, originally of Moyo totem as being
believed to have changed his totem to Nzou Samanyanga after defeating the Tavara and the
Korekore. This was meant to cement the relationship between the vanquished and their ruler.
Expansionist Theory
This theory is closely linked to the infiltration theory. It attributes the expansion and rise of
Mutapa to statehood to Mutota’s military genius. His insatiable ambition to create a bigger state
for himself made him move to the north where he conquered and subjugated the Korekore.
Nyatsimba Mutota seems to have consolidated his power by taking advantage of the
decentralised nature of northern Tavara and Tonga groups. Mutota is believed to have placed
many tribes under his authority. He forced their chiefs to submit to him and sometimes appointed
his relatives to rule over the conquered area. This theory explains that after Mutota defeated the
Tonga and the Tavara, they gave him a praise name ‘Mwenemutapa’ which later became a
dynasty title for his successors. However, the Matope Mhondoro claim that the appellation,
Munhumutapa, was first applied to Matope, but since these claims are made by oral traditions,
some are factually incorrect.
Succession Theory
The rise of Mutapa state is attributed to civil wars caused by succession dispute at Great
Zimbabwe. Those who subscribe to this theory substantiate it by claiming that a civil war erupted
over succession to the rulership of the Great Zimbabwe state between Nyatsimba Mutota and
Torwa. This succession theory goes on to assert that Nyatsimba Mutota was defeated and driven
to the Zambezi valley where he established himself as a new regional paramount. Torwa drifted

75
to the west and established himself at Khami in present day Matabeleland. It is this theory which
asserts that the Torwa and the Mutapa states are offshoots of Great Zimbabwe.
Cattle Theory
It is said that at Great Zimbabwe the population for humans and live stock had grown. In Dande
there were rumours of abundant grazing pastures and fertile alluvial soils suitable land for
agriculture. The Mutapa people being agrarian in nature needed fertile land for agriculture and
grazing land for domestic animals. Cattle theorists asserted that Mutota and his people moved to
Dande mainly for pastures as cattle had a significant economic and social position to the Shona
people. This may explain why the Shona never considered the dangerous tsetse flies that infested
the Zambezi valley. Cattle were valued as a symbol of wealth as well as ideal for ritual purposes,
but cattle alone cannot have led to the movement of people to the north.
Trade Theory
The opening up of new trade routes in the north suffocated the Save river which was already
silted. International trade in gold had shifted from Great Zimbabwe to the north where
Portuguese brought in relatively cheaper goods as compared to their Arab rivals at Great
Zimbabwe. Trade centres like Sofala, Sena, and Tete became important collecting centres on the
Zambezi. It is suggested by subscribers of this theory that the availability of items of trade like
gold which was mainly extracted from river banks of Ruya and Mazowe as well as salt and Ivory
attracted the Karanga who originally lived at Great Zimbabwe to the Zambezi valley. Nyatsimba
Mutota is said to have moved to Dande so that he would monopolise both internal and external
trade. The extent to which the Mutapa monopolised trade shall be discussed later in this chapter.
Political Organisation of the Mutapa State

The ruler of Mutapa was known as “Mwenemutapa.” This became a dynasty title for the kings
who came after Nyatsimba Mutota. All senior chiefs traced their descent from Mutota. A
distinction was maintained between the ruling Karanga lineages and those of the common
people. The King was very much respected and had absolute powers. A Mutapa ruler lived at a
royal court often referred to as his ‘Dzimbabwe.’ The royal court contained many officials who
helped in the organisation of the Kingdom and appropriate ceremonies. There were religious
figures in charge of the organisation of rituals, and musicians, cooks, court chancellors, a
military commander, court chamberlain to give advice to the King. The king’s mother and the
senior wife played some important roles in the state affairs. There were other officials to
supervise all foreign trade, to collect taxes, to gather information for the ruler from subschiefs
and state officials. A spy network system was maintained. The King knew about everything that
went on in the state and it was difficult for any chief to defy authority. Total allegiance to the
King was always emphasised.
Social life of the Mutapa People.

The Shona people believed in a high god, the supreme being, Mwari, whom they approached
through Vadzimu, spirits of the dead ancestors. They believed that God was too sacred and

76
supreme to be approached directly. The people venerated the Mutapa because he had the closest
access to the medium of Midzimu spirits of his ancestors.
The King respected the spirit mediums and sought advice on political and religious matters. He
was linked to the spirit world through these mediums because it was believed that upon his death
the King would become a Mhondoro. There are such Mhondoros in Dande like the Mhondoro of
Mutota and Matope who in their lifetime were great Mutapa Kings. This shows that religion and
politics were interlinked. Religion was used as a unifying force. If the king was rejected by the
ancestral spirits, that meant ultimate rejection by the people. The Mutapa did not consult the
spirits of ordinary people, but those of superior spirit mediums. This indicates that although the
Kings of Mutapa commanded great respect from the people, they were not divine in terms of the
Shona religion, the respect they yielded on ceremonies was basically political and not religious.
Like all rulers, the Mutapa rulers’ power depended upon their ability to subdue their subjects and
those who defied them. As a result they maintained a small force that was at hand at any given
moment. This small force was headed by a military commander who reported directly to the king
about military expeditions to be undertaken or that would have been undertaken.
The King also played a role in military affairs. As a security measure, military ranks were
conferred to either members of the royal family or those related to the King through marriage.
The main duty of the army was to collect tribute and control the tributary chiefdoms of the
provinces of Barwe, Manyika, Madanda, Teve, Chikova, Chidima etc. In time of war, the
welfare of the state army was catered for by the King from the levies raised from the rest of the
land.
The Economic life of the Mutapa

The economic activities of the Mutapa state were anchored in the four branches of production
namely, farming, animal husbandry, mining and trade. The Shona people grew small grain
cereals like millet, sorghum and rapoko. Maize and beans were introduced later by the
Portuguese. They also grew cow peas, pumpkins, water melons, and groundnuts. Cereals were
used as items of exchange at local level. They traded with the Hungwe people for Iron tools and
tobacco. Farmers commanded a high position in the state and were respected. Those farmers
referred to as ‘hurudza’ could marry as many wives as they could afford, using their farm
produce to pay lobola.
The ordinary people produced all the food and valuable trade goods for the royal family. Part of
their crops and cattle were used for the payment of tribute to the king, each tributary ruler paid
according to what the land produced. Cattle was valued in the state for it symbolised wealth and
status. The more cattle one had, the richer the person was regarded. Cattle had numerous
purposes some of which included payment of tribute as mentioned earlier on, used by the king to
reward his officials for their loyalty, payment of lobola and could be used for ritual purposes.
People who mined gold and Ivory hunters for the King were rewarded with cattle. Hunting was
done by men. They hunted big game for hides and ivory. Lions and leopards were hunted by
brave men for their hides that were worn by chiefs. The regalia of the Mutapa changed into
imported cloth as the influence of trade with the Muslims and Portuguese took root in the state.

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Portuguese Activities in the Mutapa State:

From as early as 1505 the Mutapa state was exposed to merchant capitalism. Capitalism is an
economic system whose main characteristic is private ownership of property for profit. It also
entails private production of goods, but also for profit.
The Portuguese came into contact with the Mutapa after several attacks and conflicts with the
Swahili traders Vasco da Gama on his way to India attacked the Swahili settlements in 1498. In
1502 Almedia plundered the coastal settlement of the Swahili Arabs and made an attempt to take
over the Swahili trade with the Africans. One thing that attracted the Portuguese who visited the
interior was the amount of ivory and gold that the Swahili obtained from the Zambezi area. They
worked out strategies to take control of this trade and the inevitable strategy was to expel the
Swahili traders and replace them without upsetting their trade relations with the Shona. In order
to satisfy the African demand the Portuguese brought in beads, fabrics, seashells, guns and other
items that the Swahili sold to the Africans. This demonstrates that the initial aim of the
Portuguese in the Mutapa was trade in gold and ivory. They had no intention of meddling in the
politics of the region or of interfering with the land system in any way. The other aim of the
Portuguese was to convert the local Africans to Christianity as a way of keeping them away from
Muslim influence. Lastly they wanted to establish friendly relations with the Mutapa rulers and
establish an alliance with him as an equal of the Portuguese King. This is why some Mutapas
who got baptised were christened after Portuguese kings such as Sabastine. However, it was
difficult for Portuguese to satisfy these aims as they met stiff resistance from the Swahili who
could not be easily pushed out. This might be used to explain why Portuguese used force to push
their way into the interior to take control of the areas that produced gold and silver.
Barreto Expedition:1569-73
When father Gonzalo da Silveira was assassinated, the Portuguese found an excuse to invade the
Mutapa state. Barreto and his men attempted to invade the Mutapa from 1569-73. This group
was decimated by malaria and the leader, Barreto himself, was one of its victims. As a result, the
Portuguese venture was a failure. Reasons for this failure can be explained in terms of both
internal and external factors. The Barreto expedition suffered from Malaria which by that time
had no cure. Several soldiers died. Their horses died of nagana caused by tsetseflies. To make
matters worse, the Portuguese did not know the area where they wanted to attack and were not
used to mountainous terrain of the Mutapa state. The ambition to attack, the Mutapa state was
too demanding on a poor country like Portugal, especially when one considers that Portugal
wanted to exploit resources of India, develop Congo, exploit the resources of Mutapa and at the
same time controlling Brazil.
Although the invasion of Mutapa was not a success, its effects should never be underestimated.
The invasion was purely imperialist. They pushed their way into the interior and established
trading centres Sena, Tete and Zumbo which became major trade centres under the Portuguese
control. Payment of curva to the Mwenemutapas was ignored. In turn, the Portuguese demanded
tax from puppet Mwenemutapas as payment for Ousting legitimate Mwene Mutapas. Such
puppet leaders like Gatsi Rusere and Mavhura Mhande gave away land and mines to the
Portuguese in exchange for military assistance in times of disputes. As a result of this influence
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the Portuguese became lawless, and interfered openly into the political affairs of the Mutapa
state. The Mutapa Mavhura Philip became a vassal of the Portuguese. Portuguese merchants
enslaved large numbers of Africans and exploiting them especially through the credit system
which the Portuguese introduced. The Portuguese exploitation on Africans was best described by
Perdro de Resende in 1635 when he reported that Africans walked very long distances carrying
heavy trade items into the interior and barter for gold and ivory, returning with bartered items
faithfully to the Portuguese merchants for no or little reward. A number of Portuguese traders
settled permanently at some of these established market centres. Some bought large land
concessions from the Mwenemutapa. Others who helped the ruler to put down rebellions were
granted land as a reward. In this respect, many Portuguese settlers owned vast estates and owned
many African slaves. Several of these Portuguese settlers became unscrupulous and caused
trouble to other Portuguese traders and to the Mwenemutapa, resulting in episodes of violence.
It is however important to point out that the activities of the Portuguese in the interior were
detrimental to the survival of the state. The Portuguese became lawless and removed from
power, Mwenemutapas that threatened their existence in the state. Prazo owners established
small armies that were used to destabilise the Mutapa state especially when it came to land
grabbing. In the face of Portuguese political interference, the Mwenemutapa’s power and
authority was reduced. The Portuguese power finally eclipsed in 1698 by the reestablishment of
Arab power by the Sultan of Oman, who secured control of the Persian gulf and the east coast
towns. It was at this same time that the Mutapa state was invaded by the Rozvi under
Changamire. He destroyed Portuguese forts in Mashonaland and drove the settlers as far as Sena
and Tete. They extended far in land as Rozvi attacks continued. The greater part of the Mutapa
state was put under the Rozvi control. By 1855, the state of Mutapa controlled only two
provinces of Dande and Chidima.
The expansion of the activities of the Portuguese into the Mutapa politics directly shovels blame
on these intruders for inevitably causing the state’s decline. It is however imperative to point out
that the Mutapa state which the Portuguese dealt with was no longer the original state that
Mutota and Matope had founded. The Portuguese did not find a vast Mutapa state in existence.
At the time of Portuguese arrival in the interior, the Mutapa state had been split. A greater part
was ruled by the Rozvi Mambos. These had taken advantage of the fact that Nyahuma, Matope’s
son was too young and inexperienced in state politics. The Rozvi mambos took control of
provinces of Guruuswa and Mbire. In 1490, Changa and Togwa broke away from the Mutapa
state. After Nyahuma was killed by Changa, his son Chikuyo Chisamarengu became the king in
about 1494, but he did not recover full control of the whole empire. Most of Guruuswa and
Mbire was claimed by Changa’s son and successor. He later own took over Muteve and
Madanda. The Mwenemutapa state which the Portuguese found had been greatly reduced in both
size and power. The young and inexperienced Mwene Mutapas who came after Matope were not
able to control a vast state that Matope had established. The Communication system in the state
was not very efficient to the extent that it took a long time for the Mwenemutapas to punish
vassal chiefs who did not pay tribute or who broke away (rebelled) from the Mwenemutapa state.
In this respect, one is tempted to conclude that the Portuguese interference in the politics of the
Mutapa state speeded the decline of the state which already had a cracking authority and a
shaking political and economic base. This therefore means that the decline of Mutapa state can
be explained in terms of both internal and external factors.
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Overview of the Prazo sytem and its effects.

The Prazo system dated back to the last quarter of the 15th century, but it was this time (17th
century) that it became firmly rooted, and it was in this time that many of the most famous
figures of prazo-holder society of the 17th century arose. Other examples include Sisnando Dias
Bayao and Antonio Lobo da Silva who held vast lands and made vast conquests in Shona society
with their African armies.
The Portuguese government was making elaborate plans for the exploitation of the Mutapa state,
but it was the prazo-holders who carried out the exploitation in practice. The prazeros spread out
across the country pulling up fortified stockades as bases for their armies. It was at this time that
the construction of feiras reached its greatest extent with these strongholds of trade and warfare
being built well beyond the borders of the Mutapa state, on the Angwa and Umfuli rivers. They
fought the Shona rulers, took their cattle and enslaved their people. They took as many mines as
possible and although the mines were not suited for intensive working, they did succeed in
boosting their output in the first half of the 17th century, an increase that probably accelerated
what was, in any case, an inevitable exhaustion of the surface deposits.
Their methods were often deadly, that whole areas were said to have been de-populated, and
rulers did their best to conceal the presence of gold for fear of the consequences if the Portuguese
should learn of it. Moreover the Portuguese fought amongst themselves, causing further unrest,
for example, the well known Rimuka conflict. They also encroached in the cloth trade that had
previously been carried out by the rulers.
Some of these prazeros obtained their grants from the Mutapa himself, others seized them
directly, but in both cases the effect was the creation of political units. Some of these, actually,
attracted followers from old Shona dynasties, and this was a major cause of dissatisfaction with
the Mutapa on the part of sub-rulers or chiefs.
One such new dynasty seems to have been the first: Nyachuru dynasty, which ruled the land
around the feira of Dambarare towards the end of the 17th century. It is against this background
that we must see the political struggles of the Mutapa state. In 1631 the oppression of the
Portuguese provoked a major revolt in the state led by the rightful Mutapa Kapararidze, and this
spread to other areas affected by the Portuguese, Manyika and the lower Zambezi Valley. This
revolt was suppressed quickly, but Kapararidze took refuge in the Marave territory across the
river, and remained a constant threat to Mavura.
To some extent Mavura the new Mutapa followed the usual policies of the Mutapa rulers: e.g he
was reluctant to allow further concessions to the Portuguese at Chikova and he did his best to get
some sort of an equivalence to the curva, ever if he had to buy it himself but he was a Portuguese
puppet.
The Portuguese either ignored his complaints about the erosion of his authority, or did nothing
effective. He frequently called for military aid from them, and it was in his reign that the old
capital was burned and his court took up a mobile existence. It was during his time, too, that the
land of Bedza in the Zambezi valley assumed a greater importance and some of the stone
buildings there may date from his reign.

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Mavura died in 1652, and was succeeded by his son, probably the man identified in traditions as
Siti Kazurukamusapa. Like his father, he allied himself to the Dominicans and appears to have
used the occasion of his baptisms as Domingos as a test of the loyalty of his supporters. He
needed such a test, for in 1654 he faced a rebellion by his brother, which was put down only with
Portuguese help. But by this time the Mutapa state had reached almost the lowest point of its
frothiness. In 1663 the prazeros rose against the ruler and he was killed, either by his own
followers or burned alive by the Portuguese. Supported by the Dominicans and the Captain of
Dambarare, and backed by a force from Mozambique. Motuta Cupica, became Mutapa, known
to the Portuguese as Alfonso and was roughly equivalent to the Mukombwe of the Mutapa
tradition.
The “Mukombwe” Era: Revival of the Mutapa state, 1663-1704.

Background:
Historians are not in agreement on the really identity of the “Mukombwe” figure. According to
Ian Phimister, Mukombwe, who became Mutapa in 1663 was Mavura’s son and ruled until 1692.
He helped re-uniting the chiefs and people of Mutapa. With his new allies, he took control of the
highveld and rebuilt the capital of the state there. He rejected Christianity, and in some Mutapa
traditions he is remembered as being almost as important as Mutota and Matope.
According to D.N. Beach, “Mukombwe.” was a mythical figure just as Mutota and Matope could
have been according to traditions. The Mukombwe figure is linked to a “Mutata Cupica, who
became Mutapa through the assistance of Dominicans and the Captain of Dambarare, and backed
by a force from Mozambique. As shown in chapter 9, he was known to the Portuguese as
Alfonso. Beach claims that Mukombwe, historically, seems to have been the “Alfonso” the
brother of Mavura who was ruling by 1663 and who ruled until at least the early 1680s, maybe as
late as the early 1690s.
The damage done to the Mutapa state up to 1663 was too great for it to be restored to its old
condition. Portuguese power in the Mutapa state caused great suffering to sub-rulers (chiefs) and
ordinary people alike. During the period 1663-1704,(the years of the Mukombwe figure) and his
elder sons, the state was re-built into the form in which it had to continue substantially unaltered
for a further one and half centuries. The revival of the Mutapa state involved the gradual decline
of Mukaranga, with its valuable, well-watered grazing and arable land, and what was left of its
gold resources. The essentially low-land state of the post-Mukombwe period remarkably
remained more or less intact in territory for so long, and also have survived uncessant civil wars
between Mukombwe’s descendants. The fact that Mukombwe’s descendants monopolized all
political positions within the dynasty from his reign onwards is also a measure of the importance
of this period.
When Mukombwe rose to power, the state was in rapid decline as shown above. The murder of
his predecessor taught him a lesson. He was originally backed by the Portuguese, but by 1667 he
was showing that he was “crafty and cunning” and by 1683 he was recognized as” the most
intelligent and capable Prince so far in that throne.” He went some way towards reviving the

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state and gradually assumed an anti-Portuguese stance, but it must be noted that the Prazeros
were mainly driven out by the man of the state itself.
By 1667 Marvel Barreto reported widespread de-population, partly due to plagues of locusts, and
to the Mutapa and Portuguese civil wars, but mostly due to the conduct of the Portuguese
themselves. The Shona people and their rulers were reluctant to supply gold for the benefit of the
Portuguese and this resulted in depressing the entire mining economy, which required reasonably
settled conditions in which to function. Plagues further reduced the population in the 1670s, and
it seems that even though the influence of the Portuguese in the state was out of all proportion to
their numbers, there was a definite decrease in the Portuguese presence in the 1670s and 1680s.
In 1678, the Portuguese population of the major centre of Dambarare had fallen to nothing.
Three years later there were only 5 Portuguese in the centre of the state and another 26 at Tete
and Chikova. It seems that the very destruction caused by the Portuguese had made it
unprofitable for them to stay. The long-term plans of the Portuguese, as usual, involved
conquest, but as often happened, the effect of these plans was dissipated by Portugal’s overall
weakness in the Indian Ocean. Still, at the end of the 1680s there was a slight revival of
Portuguese penetration in and around the state, and more trading posts’ (feiras) were reoccupied
or opened up.
Mukombwe’s response:
His response was determined by his initial weakness. Mukombwe could not do without some
Portuguese contacts. His situation was different from the ruler of the Ngezi ruler of Rimuka, who
after the civil wars between the Portuguese stopped exporting gold and excluded the traders
completely. Apart from the commerce involved, he also relied on them for support against his
rivals. Mutapa territory was much larger, and the system of government was more elaborate.
Thus it required, or depended on imported goods.
As a result, when in 1678, he was informed that there was an intention to settle much of his state
to settlers from Europe, he or his interpreters, expressed content and sent gold as a present to
Lisbon whilst he was actual working in another direction. By 1667 his influence had reached into
Tonga country beyond the Ruenga. The Portuguese had ruled for nearly a century, and when the
Tonga rose against their rulers they looked to Mukombwe as their superior. This Tonga
resistance against the Portuguese was only put down with severity in 1672.
The real test of Mukombwe’s attitudes towards the Portuguese, however, concerned the Mutapa
state proper. In 1673 yet another rumour of silver deposits in the Chikova region aroused
Portuguese interest. As it usually was in Zambezi politics, the situation was complicated, with
various divisions between the Portuguese government and the Prazeros, and between the sub-
rulers of Chikova and their Mutapa overlord. Jao de Sounga Freire the Captain General began to
prepare for war in April, noting as he did so, that “in as much as the King deserves punishment,
so do those of our people who are to blame for such great ruin.”
Mukombwe responded immediately and in some way revolutionarily: thus, “infracted by the
unruly behavior of the moradores” he killed six of them and declared war in his state, and at the
same time he took the unprecedented step of appealing to another ruler for aid.

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Whereas his predecessor in the 1570s had been content to see Homen’s army move off towards
Teve and Manyika, and whereas the 1631 rising appeared to have been unco-ordinated,
rebellions of the Mukaranga, Manyika and lower Zambezi rulers and their people, Mukombwe in
1673 deliberately appealed to the Chikanga ruler of Manyika for support. By July the captain of
Manyika had reported that: “The Chikanga and other rulers in the area of that feira were getting
people to help the Emperor (Mukombwe) a very unexpected resolution because they have not
supported the Emperor for a long time, but the fact is that they all have reason to want us out of
these Rivers and there is no doubt that our injustices have caused us to be in this predicament.
Because of lack of government…”
The 1673 Mutapa-Manyika war against the Portuguese did not achieve a great deal, and by 1676
a force (Goa) had been sent to suppress the Shona, but it was important because it showed how
far Mukombwe had progressed in only ten years. By 1675 he was being regarded with distrust
and suspicion by the Portuguese, and not surprising, in 1678 he pointedly failed to acknowledge
himself as a vassal of the King of Portugal. By 1682 the prazos were threatened with war by the
Mutapa and it is possible that in the late 1660s, Mukombwe was encouraging the Tonga near
Sena to rebel. Clearly, between the 1660s and 1680s the balance of power between the Mutapa
and the Portuguese had altered although not reversed in favour of the Mutapa.
Politics in the Mukombwe era:

The Mukombwe appeared to have stabilised the state. Kapararidze who had been an undesirable
shadow in the Mavura era was not heard of any more. In the 1660s the Capital was still in the
Zambezi Valley where Gatsi Rusere and Mavura had taken refuge during their civil wars.
Mukombwe was able to re-established himself in Mukaranga.
Break in the Mukombwe reign

One Portuguese document of 1679 showed that Mavura, also named Phelipe, supported by the
great Prazero, Antonio Lobo da Silva, was ruling Mutapa. If the document is valid, it implies
that Mukombwe was briefly ejected from his capital by yet another Portuguese-backed claimant,
only to make a come-back to power in 1683-. The danger of civil war remained, however, and by
the late 1680s the house of Gocha had become dangerously powerful. In 1687 the Gocha ruler
went into rebellion, and by the 1690s he was excused from attendance at the annual “Mando”
(Choto) ceremony “owing to his own greatness.
The Death of Mukombwe and the rise of Nyakunembire.

Although Mukombwe’s son Pedro Mhande had hoped to rule, the throne was taken by
Nyakunembire. Pedro had been regarded as heir-apparent by the Portuguese during
Mukombwe’s reign, but he lacked support among the people as a whole, and the Portuguese did
not try to support him. This implies that Nyakunembire was not a usurper, and that there was no
real difference of policy between him and his brother Mukombwe. He was a legitimate Mutapa.
Mukombwe’s main achievements:

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1. Re-settlement of Mutapa ‘state’ set up a central area with new dynasties. This is shown
by documents on the Mutapa state which portrays a picture of a partial de-population
during his reign. Oral tradition also tells of groups which claimed origins in the area
affected by the Portuguese and which moved to the south, for example, Chimoto or
Mapungwana ‘Mbizi’ dynasty. It is said to have entered the southern-eastern highlands in
the mid-seventeenth century from the Rimuka area that had been affected by the wars
between Prazeros.
Another group that claimed to have passed through, or near Rimuka, was that of the Shiri
dynasties of Tonga descent led by Chasura and Chirwa. These later on settled on the
upper Devure and Nyazvidzi south and west of Buhera, by mid-eighteenth century etc.
This shows the extent of de-population, but the Portuguese exaggerated the issue. Groups
could have moved out of the area temporarily
2. Land grants by Mukombwe to different dynasties:
The lands which he was allocating on such a generous scale belonged to rival houses and
their followers, so that in effect they were being deprived of the economic basis for a
successful revolt against him. All those who received land from him were members of
dynasties other than the Mutapa. These owed their land to him, so they could not support
any rival. Although these dynasties became independent later, this was a result of a
gradual process of economic weakening of the state during 18th century. A view was
submitted by Professor Beach that:
NB: Given the nature of the traditions about Mukombwe, these movements may very
well have occurred in the reigns of Mukombwe’s sons. In one of the cases, it was
said that it was the Mhondoro spirit of Mukombwe, rather than the man, who
allocated land to one group. Some land grants by Mukombwe may have been
made to his relatives, but if that was the case, maybe they were forced to hide the
fact. (D.N. Beach)
The land of Romba on the middle Ruya had been under the Nyamakaranga dynasty in the
first half of the century, but Mukombwe gave it to the Magarenehwe Tembo line. May be
as stated at the beginning of the topic :Mukombwe” of this tradition could have been one
of a number of historical persons, and it is noticeable that Gupo, a son or grandson of
Mukombwe was said to have allocated the dynasty’s official head-dress and this line
could have been a branch of the main Mutapa dynasty that changed the meaning of its
totem rather than the totem itself.
West of Masapa and Mount Fura the land of Bvuma went to the “Soko/Murehwa
Madziwa dynasty. Soko/Murehwa totems were fairly common in the north of the plateau
and there is no suggestion that the Madziva dynasty came from outside the state, except
as part of the original Karanga movement from “Guruswa.”
The same was true of the Nembire “Soko/Vudzijena” house that was given the Gore or Mbire II
area on the upper Ruya, not far from the Zvogombe Zimbabwe. The history of this group has
been confused by the fact that it gave rise to much larger and more famous “Svosve

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Soko/Vudzijena-Mhondizvo dynasty Mbire III in the centre of the Southern Zambezi Plateau. It
appears in fact to have been a part of the original “Guruuswa.” Movement, possibly associated
with “Soko Chingowo” dynasty of Guruuswa across the Umvukwe range, but which had a minor
status until Mukombwe granted it land.
NB: Generally the traditions of Mukombwe as the “goveranyika” (land giver) agree with what is
known of the situation in the late seventeenth century. If these land grants mentioned above
probably involved dynasties which already belonged to the Mutapa state, and which simply
gained greater autonomy, there is strong evidence that the Mukombwe figure made use of
sizeable immigration of the following peoples from outside the state:
a) Shumba dynasties from Budya,
b) Shumba/Nechinanga Nematombo dynasty,
c) Mbare Shumba/gurundoro.
Of the three Shumba dynasties that moved into the Mutapa state, (the Northern),was mostly the
Shumba/Nechinanga group that was allocated the territory of Wedza by Mukombwe, resulting in
them gaining the title of Nowedza.
The revival of the Changamire dynasty in relation to the Mutapa dynasty had last been heard in
the 1550s when it was defeated by a Shona-Portuguese alliance. This was after it tried to take
over the state itself in 1490s.

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(1) Trace the origin and expansion of the Mutapa state.
(2) Discuss the political developments in the Mutapa state during the 16th and 17th centuries.
Why did the state nearly collapse in the 17th Century?
(3) Assess the impact of Portuguese activities in the Mutapa state from the middle of the 16th
century to 1890.
4) Describe and explain the origins of the Mutapa state.
5) Account for the internal organisation of the Mutapa state.
6) What contributed more to the fall of the Mutapa state: internal or external factors?
7) “Agriculture was more important than foreign trade to the economy of the Mutapa state”.
Do you agree?
8) Discuss the assertion that Zimbabwe’s pre-colonial past cannot be collected by reference
to only one source.
6) “Portuguese records provide the basis of our understanding of the Mutapa Empire”.
Discuss
the validity of his assertion
7) Why is it important to use different sources when studying Zimbabwe’s pre-colonial
history?
References
Alphers, E.A Dynasties of the Mutapa, London, 1982
Beach D.N War and Politics in Zimbabwe, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1986
Mudenge 1972
Ncube, G.T.A History of North Western Zimbabwe 1850-1960.Mond, Kadoma.

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CHAPTER 7
THE TORWA STATE: BEFORE 1650
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES:
a) Describe various sources used to recollect the history of the Torwa.
b) Account for the rise of the Torwa
c) Examine the contribution of the Torwa on the rise of the Rozvi Empire.
Background
Although the Torwa state was successor to the Great Zimbabwe State, it equally poses some
problems which require urgent attention. The geographical locations of the state is known,
together with its economy architecture and its material culture. Its relations with the Mutapa are
also known.
Problems
Nothing is known about the internal history of the Torwa. It is even not clear whether “Torwa”
(alien, foreigners, stranger) was the real title of its ruling dynasty or not.
Only a few families can be positively identified as having been members of the ruling class of
the Torwa State. The families identified failed to provide reliable traditions of the Torwa state
period. Reasons for lack of information:
In the southern end of the plateau, five state systems have succeeded each other – i.e
1. The Zimbabwe culture – within the 14th and 15th centuries reached into the west to build a
number of Zimbabwe.
2. The Torwa state based on Khami South Western successor of Zimbabwe Culture 15th and
17th centuries
3. The Changamire Rozvi which took over the Torwa state and culture in the late 17th
century and survived well into the 19th century.
4. The forth state was that of the Ndebele, which took over the existing Rozvi but added a
very considerable increase of population and consequently was able to impose a new
language and culture.
5. The Rhodesians who not only destroyed the Ndebele state but forced major movements
of the population, which incidentally did much to destroy traditions in that area of the
pre-Ndebele past.

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It is therefore clear why very little information is known about South West of the Plateau-and
maybe about the Torwa.
Sources of information on the Torwa/Khami culture Archaelogy/Traditions/Documents
Earlier chapters clearly showed that at the peak of the Zimbabwe culture, communities of the
Zimbabwe culture moved west to settle in the mountains marking the south of the plateau and of
the south-west part of the plateau itself.
Outlying Zimbabwe such as Umtwarte Chimnunga and Mtoli were built and this expansion of
the Zimbabwe culture westwards was probably as important as the much better known expansion
to the work of the plateau. However, the most significant cultural development in the west took
place as Great Zimbabwe was declining.
When the Great Zimbabwe state ceased to be a major centre, the focal point of its culture shifted
to the west. We do not have facts to prove that the rulers of the Great Zimbabwe led this
movement, or whether some of the ruling group broke to establish a new centre leaving the old
ruler to live in a rapidly diminishing state. It is also possible that a western provincial leader
established his independence and became the focus of new development.
According to Archaeology Great Zimbabwe ceased to be a major centre by about 1500. No
definite terminal date is known. Sterile deposits on the hill show that this part of the complex at
least was abandoned completely, while at the same time the presence of two shreds of blue- and-
white ash in unsatified deposit confirm that the site was at least visited later.
The culture that emerged in the west at the time of Zimbabwe’s fall was in every way the time
heir to Great Zimbabwe, much more so than that of the Karanga in the north, but it is not enough
to reproduce the features of the old centre. The new culture that was founded at Khami
developed the stone work styles of Great Zimbabwe in a new way.
The same principle of using naturally breaking granite was used but, it was applied to the
construction of daga-covered stone platforms on hilltop sites. Huts were then built on the
platforms. Added to the old technique of stone building was a new insistence on decoration and a
search for new patterns. The specialized pottery of Great Zimbabwe was developed in both style
and decoration.
A feature of some of the new buildings was covered passages that may have developed out of the
succession of outer walls of the Valley buildings at Zimbabwe, which eventually produced
cancelled passages, or exit out of the natural features of the ascent of the hill building above.
The most outstanding and earliest of the new culture’s centres was Khami. This was built some
time after a date of about 1410 and included old posts dated at about 1370 and 1430. It is not
clear when it was built but, it is logical that such a large building so similar to Zimbabwe would
have been built relatively soon after the establishment of the Khami’s culture. It is suggested that
Khami was not built until 1700 which leaves a strange two-century gap in major construction in
the South and other evidence suggests that Khami was most probably a 16th Century building.

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Khami was not the only building of the Khami culture. There were many others, for example, in
the river valley on the south of the plateau west of the Runde-Chamabveva, which had both stone
work and pottery that was transitional between the Zimbabwe and Khami styles, and another
building has been dated between 1530 and 1610.
Imported porcelain found in the latest occupation levels at Khami was of the Wan Li period,
which ended in 1619 and it seems probable that Khami was abandoned as a major site by the end
of the 17th century. This could have resulted from environmental and even political reasons.
Since traditions state that the Rozvi Mambo continued to rule at Khami either come from the
dissident Mutinhima house of the Rozvi which lately lived in the Mukungwane hills or far from
Khami more reliable set of traditions collected from Rozvi in the South-West in the 1950s makes
it clear that the eighteenth century Khami was in the territory of the Kalanga ruler Ndumba, the
main Rozvi capitals being east of the Bembesi.
The successor of Khami as a capital was probably Danangombe (Dhlodhlo). This was a large site
and since the imported pottery found in its lower level was the same as that in Khami’s upper
level, it implies that it was later than Khami. The stone work also shows a development from the
style at Khami.
The nearby Naletale building also shows this advance style, but it was very small with poor
water supply and was probably no more than an outer of Danangombe. Manyanga now called
Ntabazikamambo was possibly one of the Changamire’s last Capitals in the 19 th Century, during
the Mfecane. However, it may also have been an old site that was briefly re-occupied during the
last crisis of the Rozvi state. On the other hand the traditions that claim that it was a capital may
be incorrect.
The most important aspect of the Khami culture that affects us here is its identification with the
“Rozvi”. This was established on the following basis:
The Rozvi Changamire dynasty was known to have lived at the Khami-culture centre up to the
19th Century. Also, the famous pottery claimed by the Rozvi Changamire as theirs was found at
all levels in the Khami-culture buildings.This is despite the fact that the documentary and
traditional evidence suggests that Torwa dynasty commenced the Khami culture and ruled the
South-west until the late 17th century when the Rozvi Changamire came out of the central Moyo
unclear area and took over the whole area and its culture.
Traditional and documentary evidence to clash with archaeological evidence for the change
stated above is not shown in the archaeological record. The solution to this problem will come
when there is a complete archaeological record for the whole country, but there is sufficient
evidence to suggest one or two points that must be taken into consideration.
1) There is no doubt that the same pottery type was used from the beginning of the Khami
culture up to the fall of the Changamire dynasty in the 19th Century
- The “prestige” pottery of Great Zimbabwe developed into highly counred, tall necked
band - and panel pottery that was found at most Khami sites and which a hall mark of the
Khami culture

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- A single shred at Rusvingo ra Kasekete in the Mutapa state could relate to the presence
of a Changamire force there in the war of 1702
- Other such pottery found at Murahwa’s hill near Manyika in conjunction with an 18th
century import can be explained by the presence of a Changamire army near Manyika in
1870.
- Khami-type shreds of a kind were found near Bedza hill in Buhera, one of the places
held by the Chamgamire dynasty against the Ndebele in its retreat to the Save in the
1850s and 1860s
- Jiri’s section of the Changamire dynasty in Bikita identified Khami pottery as their own
in the early 20th century, at a time when such pottery would be still remembered.
2) The most important area in which archaeological evidence of the changeover from the
Torwa to the Changamire dynasty is not checked around Khami. It is sought of Bembesi
at Danangombe, Naletale, and Manyanga. Here the traditions of the Changamire Rozvi,
locate the Changamire capital.
Danangombe shows a change of some kind but it cannot yet be shown that this was due to the
arrival of new dynasty. Caton -Thompson believed that there had been a major reconstruction of
the older building, which was replaced by elaborate markings seen today on the lower terraces
N.B Two occupation levels existed on the terrace. On the lower level a wealthy woman was
buried after her body had been reduced to a skeleton after death and then her bones were burnt.
The wealthy woman was buried not only with her pots, large reddish-brown spherical pots of the
Khami culture’s common ware but also with an imported Chinese bowl and a Dutch gin bottle.
These two articles were dated to late 17th century or early 18th centuries. The date is accurate
when used to establish that the Khami culture was relatively recent and not of exotic origin.
However when the question of dynastic change is considered, it is not accurate at all and this
calls for the re-examination of these articles in order to establish the earliest possible date.
3) The function of band-panel pottery in the Khami culture. Just as at Great Zimbabwe the
prestige pottery of Khami that was found in the ruling class dwellings was used to keep
liquids, possibly water but more probably beer. This does not mean that rulers of the Khami
culture lived entirely upon beer, but rather that, since a Khami-culture centre like Great
Zimbabwe was a specialized version of a large Shona village, the main cooking was not done
in the living huts. In fact, band and panel pottery was not the only style used at Khami, the
pots found in the Danangombe burial being of a more common kind.
The Changamire conquest of the Torwa state was not a major invasion involving wholesale
killing or the destruction of the state. Traditions and documents suggest that it was quick and
easy.
The tradition of making band-and-panel pottery continued unbroken because pottery-making was
the task of women and the intermarriages between the Changamire dynasty and Torwa state
families of Tumbure and Chimunduru retained the Torwa culture. Also, the adoption of a
Kalanga dialect by the Changanire dynasty confirms this. The Changamire dynasty, after all
Shona like the Torwa dynasty, shared rather remote common origins in the Zimbabwe culture.

90
As a result the Changamire dynasty was in a position to take over and make use of an existing
state and its special pottery and buildings than the foreign Ndebele were able to do in the same
situation.
The rough stonework at Dangamombe Naletale and Zinjanya could represent the work of the
Changamire dynasty or even its prisoner, according to a Portuguese document, Changamire’s
Portuguese prisoners from the wars of 1690’s were.
‘Those who had only the obligation to look after the Palace is only called thus through being the
residence of the King…..” (D.N Beach) Changamire traditions also claim that the Rozvi added to
the buildings, making out lying cattle enclosing rather than that they built the whole structures
themselves. But there are other possible explanations for the poorer style of some of the stone
work. There may have been a shortage of granite suitable for splitting on the sites concerned,
forcing the builder to use less suitable stone. Moreover, even when Zimbabwe was at its height
as a centre and both the hill and valley were occupied, its builders did not hesitate to use rough
stone for a perimeter wall or enclosure. It is also possible that the changing economic conditions
of the eighteenth century and the occasional civil wars may have made it more difficult for the
Changamire rulers to finance the talents of the Old Torwa state in addition to the buildings.
In the end, the use for defence against the Nguni in the Mfecane led to the final abandonment of
formal stonework and to the building of rough defensive walls.
Conclusion
The archaeological problem posed by the traditional and documentary evidence on the conquest
of the Torwa State by the Changamire dynasty may not be as daunting as it first appears.
However it seems that the archaeological evidence is not yet complete while on the other hand it
may be found that the type of change implied by the evidence where one political and cultural
institution is taken over by related people, does not show itself in archaeological record to the
extent that was previously believed. This can be compared to other known changes of this kind
of archaeological studies from other parts of the world.
The rise of the Torwa State 1450-1683 (Location Geography)

It was now common knowledge that the expanding Karanga dynasties of 15th and 16th centuries
referred to the higher part of the plateau from where they came or had come from as “Guruuswa”
or land of tall grass. This was because the higher areas contained more open, grassy spaces than
the wooded valleys that ran down the Zambezi.
According to the D.N Beach, the direction of “Guruuswa” naturally depended upon the direction
of the high ground from the standpoint of the Karanga people involved. Other versions are
“Guruuswa” “Gunuvuhwa” and “Gunuvutwa” depending on the Shone dialect.
“Butna” (“Abutna”)- “Guruswa” - /Torwa “Butua” is a Portuguese shortened version of the
Tavara and Ngungwe-speaking people. The Portuguese used the term corresponded to the idea of
“Guruuswa”
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Butua was generally described as being to the south and west of the Portuguese trading posts in
the north and east, and especially on the direction of the higher ground from the stand point of
the Portuguese writer concerned.
1. Fernandes - It lay beyond the land of Mbire in the Mutapa State. He had approached this zone
by using a curving route through the Zambezi valley, so that it was to the South.
2. Santos - placed it to the north west of Manyika, but also south -west of the Mutapa
3. Conceicao-placed it beyond Chitomborwizi after mentioning the feira on the Angwa and
another nearby the former
4. Barros-described “Batua” as adjoining the “vast plains” of the Sabi-Limpopo involved with
reference to the geography of the whole southern Zambezi region.
In each case the writer was more or less following the same environmental concept of Guruuswa
The Portuguese Interest
The Portuguese interest was not geographical – it was economic. Geographical knowledge only
became handy to them in relation to the availability of minerals and other kinds of wealth.
Ethnography (the scientific description of races and cultures of mankind) was also used for the
same function that is by identifying rulers they were to deal with. In the same vein, the
Portuguese used the name “Mukaranga” to mean the Mutapa state proper although they knew
that the ruling dynasties of the north of the Plateau were called the Mutapa state as the focal
point of all the economic and political power of the Karanga.
Similarly, the Portuguese tended to concentrate upon the most important of the dynasties in
“Butua” although “Butua” was made up of many lands. Due to their mainly economic interest to
the Portuguese the most important part of “Butua” or Guruuswa, was the richest – where there
were rich gold deposits. The Portuguese were quite knowledgeable about the goldfields of the
Mutapa state, Manyika and Rimuka in the sixteenth and seventh centuries. For them, the only
major cattle-rich, gold-bearing area that corresponded to their “Butua” was the south western
part of the plateau, and the area occupied during that period by the people of the Khami culture.
It can therefore be concluded that when the Portuguese wrote of a major state of “Butua” in the
south by 1700, they were actually referring to the state centered on Khami. However, for the
later centuries, ie after 1663, they were referring to the Changamire dynasty – which they also
described as in “Butua”. There is also clear evidence from traditions that Changamire ruled later
from the centuries of the Khami’s culture.
Political economy of the Torwa Dynasty:
The rulers of the state of Butua were called Toroa (Torwa) by name, according an unknown
Portuguese in 1683, shortly before the fall of the state to the Changamire dynasty. The Torwa
dynasty ruled the Khami culture area in the 16th and most of the 17th centuries.
At the capital site of Khami, the Torwa developed a new culture expressed in the prestige pottery
and stone buildings that were descended from those at Great Zimbabwe. Like the Great

92
Zimbabwe state, the Torwa state based on Khami was ultimately reliant upon the efforts of its
people working in the fields and herding their cattle like Great Zimbabwe it made use of the
available resources in the form of goldfields.
According to Portuguese documents, cattle herds were an important source of wealth of the state.
Relations with Great Zimbabwe, Mutapa and Changamire Rozvi:
1.One Rozvi Ruler Mbava (1925) lineage from that of the Changamire dynasty-thought closely
associated with them claimed that Great Zimbabwe was the work of the Rozvi ruler named
“Togwa”. “Togwa’s” achievements as given by Mbava generally agree with the tradition about
the Rozvi as a group. This therefore implies that there was really a dynasty of this name (D.N
Beach)
2. In 1958, the medium of the Mutota’s Mhondoro spirit spontaneously, claimed that Torwa and
Chamngamire were relatives of Mutota, the founder of the Nzou - Samanyanga Mutapa dynasty-
but relationships are incorrect
Mutapa oriented dynasty tended to see everybody as subordinates and relatives of the Mutapa. In
the case of the Torwa state this claim is even more unlikely when it is realized that whereas the
Torwa dynasty came directly from Zimbabwe, the Mutapa dynasty probably developed the
northern outline of the Zimbabwe state. The totem of the Torwa remains unclear, but vague
traditions about a line of Soko Mambos could refer to them, even relationship with Changamire
is not clear whether it was of blood or marital.
Mutapa-oriented traditions in the 16th and 17th centuries often claimed that the Torwa state was
tributary to the Mutapa dynasty. This is contradicted not only by other similar sources at the
same time, but also by the archaeology of the two states. It is clear that in terms of material
culture the Khami culture was wealthier than the Mutapa state. Even if they had not been
separated by great distances, it is unlikely that the latter could have documented the former.
The Torwa state, in fact first comes to the notice of historians as the enemy of the Mutapa e.g in
about 1494 when Mutapa Chisamarengu regained his father’s throne from the first Changamire
mentioned earlier, whom he killed. The son of the latter continued with war. The Torwa ruler, as
kinsman of Changamire line, came to the aid of his northern relative, accusing the Mutapa of
Changamire’s death and threatening to kill him.
The war went on until after 1512, when Fernandos observed that the Mutapa state was as great as
the ruler of “Brua”, that is Torwa and they were always at war against each other. This was the
last heard of the Mutapa-Torwa final defeat of the first to have ended with the final defeat of the
first Changamire dynasty in about 1547- which removed its original cause.

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The Fall of the Torwa State:

Nothing is known about the Torwa from the early 16th century up to 1640s. There was a civil war
in the Torwa state. In the 1640s the Portuguese thought that it was caused by the discovery by
the Torwa that the Muslims who supplied him with cloth had hidden from the existence of the
Portuguese trading posts in the north and east. However, the trade between the Khami area and
the coast was so long-established, thus nullifying the Portuguese claim.
The real reason for the civil war, in which the Torwa ruler killed many Muslims, was maybe the
enemity between the ruler and his young brother, who was allied in marriage to a powerful
Muslim.
The elderly ruler was driven out of the state and fled to Manyika where in 1644 he asked for
assistance of one of the greatest prazeros, Sisnando Dias Bayao. His largely African army joined
with the supporters of the exiled ruler and reinstated him on the throne. Bayao left an armed
force in a fortified stockage and returned to the Zambezi Valley thus exposing the Torwa ruler to
danger. According to the Portuguese, Bayao’s achievement was nullified for his army was later
poisoned by his rivals in the feira of Laurance on his way to Sena.
Like what the Portuguese did in the Mutapa state, the civil war encouraged them in their plans to
exploit the whole region even further. For example, the Portuguese invaded Maungwe which
began during the hostilities between the Changamire and the Portuguese, the civil war which
weakened the Torwa state could have taught the Changamire Rozvi rulers the danger of letting
the Portuguese intervene in internal politics and the need to drive them off the plateau.
In the Torwa state itself the civil war, which left the Torwa ruler unsupported by the forces that
had helped him back to power was, also probably a weakening factor that encouraged the
Changamire in the 1680s to copy Bayao and seize the state for himself.
In 1683, the Torwa ruler was described as being friendly to the Portuguese, but this marks the
end of the Torwa dynasty as an effective power. By 1635, the Changamire was being described
as a “black man ruling in “Butua” by the Portuguese.
Conclusion
The people of the Torwa did not vanish from the scene when the Changamire dynasty came in
from the north-east to conquer it. On the contrary after the brief conflict-both documents and
traditions suggest that process of conquest was fairly easy. The new dynasty settled down among
the former inhabitants. Intermarriage with the Torwa families of Chiwundura and Tumbare and
with the Kalanga of Ndumba followed. Indeed the traditions stress the role of intermarriage in
assisting the conquest, and one tradition claims that the second Changamire Rozvi ruler in the
area relied upon Ndumba for support at his succession. It has been suggested that it was at this

94
time that the Leopard’s kopje people actually began to use the name “Kalanga” for themselves,
having acquired it from Changamire’s Rozvi who came from the main Karanga lands to the
north-east. Certainly, the new dynasty acquired the local “Kalanga” dialect, and the cultural
continuity of the area remained unbroken.
The Chiundura, Tumbare and Ndumba families continued to play a important part in the running
of the Changamire State, and like the rest of the people of the Torwa state they adopted the name
of “Rozvi”, which was originally used in the 17th Century to refer to the relatives and close
associates of the Changamire in the North and east and which eventually became the name of the
whole state and its people. Thus some people who called themselves Rozvi were infact
descendants of the people of the Torwa State.
Examination type questions

1) Assess the role of archeological evidence in the reconstruction of Torwa History.
2) Account for the rise of the Torwa state.
3) Critically examine the view that the Torwa was nothing but a subservient chieftainship of
the Matapa Empire
4) Assess the view that the Torwa state laid the foundation of the Rozvi Empire.
5) Explain the reasons for the survival and eventual collapse of the Torwa state.

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CHAPTER 8
THE ROZVI EMPIRE
1684 – 1834
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES

a) Describe the origins of the Rozvi Empire.
b) Analyse the internal organisation of the Rozvi state.
c) Illustrate and explain the career of Changamire Dombo 1 in the founding and
organisation of the Rozvi Empire.
d) Describe and evaluate the importance of cattle and gold mining in the Rozvi Empire.
e) Evaluate the trade hypothesis and locate it in its historical context in the Rozvi Empire.
f) Explain why the Rozvi declined and fell in the 19th century.
g) Explain the relations of the Rozvi with its neighbours and the Portuguese.
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
According to historian S.I. Mudenge, the rise of the Rozvi is most importantly associated
with the military genius of Changamire Dombo. Dombo’s first attack on the Portuguese
began at the Battle for Maungwe which took place before June 1684. During the battle,
which raged for the whole day, Dombo’s army on four or five occasions nearly defeated the
Portuguese. Apart from that, Dombo himself displayed a superb display of organisational
and military prowess which was noted by his Portuguese opponents. In fact, Father
Conceição conceded that in being so well obeyed by his men (Dombo) enjoyed a great
advantage over us (Portuguese). Dombo won this particular battle, and later on even routed
the Portuguese troops and established a formidable empire in the north-west of the country
which lasted for 150 years.
Hence, the rise of the Rozvi state was not merely due to the “trade stimulus hypothesis”
rather, it was a combination of factors, which clearly included political and military ones.
The “trade stimulus hypothesis” may be boldly summarised thus: trade allowed for a high
degree of concentration of wealth in the hands of one man, usually the chief; always
monopolised all external trade among his people; and this highly concentrated wealth and
allowed for the development and continued existence of more elaborate state systems than
was previously possible. It must be noted that often this “trade stimulus hypothesis” has

96
been applied with same justification, there is a growing tendency to apply the thesis without
any real criticism or thorough-going analysis.
Half-backed researches have tended to distort the true picture of the Rozvi state. In their
description of the basis of the power wielded by the Rozvi Mambos (emperors) previous
writers have tended to over-emphasise the importance of external trade at the expense of the
contribution of internal factors. We have, for instance, been presented with a picture of the
“unwarlike Rozvi”, (R. Summers, 1963, p96), presiding over such a loosely connected ‘tribal
confederacy’ that the Rozvi emperors could not even exact tribute from their subjects except
as a form of trade. (A.K.H Weinrich, 1969 – 70, pp394 -6). Such a picture of sole reliance
on external trade has now been proven to be exaggerated. On the other hand, the roles of
such internal factors as military, religious and administrative organisation are seen to have
been more significant than hitherto been led to believe.
The Political and Administrative Organisation of the Rozvi Empire.

1. Rozvi Kingship
The Rozvi E mpire was ruled by a hereditary ruler with the title of Mambo. Succession to
the Rozvi throne was collateral, or perhaps more precisely patrilineal adelphie, i.e. the
kingship developed from brother to brother, eventually reverting first to a son of the eldest
brother and then to a son of the next brother and so on. But this was only the principle; in
practice other factors played their part. Support at court or in the kingdom was equally
important in determining who was to succeed.
In 1695 – 1696 and again in 1768 we have contemporary Portuguese written sources showing
that sons could and did succeed their fathers. On the other hand, as is to be expected, most of
the traditional sources emphasise how faithfully the patrilineal adelphie principle was
adhered to. This form of succession could cause complex succession problems. Never the
less, while succession disputes plagued the Munhumutapa Empire in the seventeenth as well
as eighteenth centuries, the Rozvi Empire appears to have enjoyed greater stability. The only
political significant succession dispute in the Rozvi Empire was known to have taken place in
1768.
It would appear that the Rozvi were able to minimize the dangers of succession wars to such
an extent in part because of an institutional device they created to reduce the known harmful
effects of succession rivalries. According to some Rozvi traditions, when a Mambo dies and
no successor was immediately appointed, the head of one of the royal Rozvi clans with the
dynastic name of Tumbare would take over as regeant until a Mambo was elected. The
house of Tumbare, as we shall see below, used to provide the highest general of all the Rozvi
armies, who was also the Chief Collector of tribute, an office approximating that of
Chancellor of the Exchequer. This post would appear to have been hereditary to the house of
Tumbare and in effect made Tumbare the second most powerful personage in the empire
after the Mambo himself. This constitutional mechanism allowed the princes to haggle, plot
and manoeuvre for the succession without necessarily throwing the empire into a blood-bath.

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Above all, it meant that the claimant who could secure Tumbare’s support had a very good
chance of succeeding to the throne.
Although some scholars have suggested that the Rozvi rulers may have had attributes of
divine kingship, Mudenge found very little evidence to support this claim – what must be
noted is that constitutionally, the Rozvi Mambo embodied the executive and legislative, as
well as the judiciary powers within the empire. In practice, he was assisted, at his court, by a
Dare (Council of sagacious (wise) elders) of Magota (Councillors). Represented in the Dare
were such branches of the Rozvi polity as the priesthood, the military elders and provincial
governors. Leading members of the imperial houses also formed part of the Dare. Although
the Mambo would no doubt have had the last say in most issues, he nonetheless had to try to
carry his Dare with him. Some of the Magota, e.g. the priesthood, claim to have had the right
and duty to advise, warn or reprimand a Mambo who did not rule well. This provided checks
and balances to the power and authority of the Mambo.
Moreover, many of the Magota were hereditary. This meant that their position did not
depend solely on the whim of the Mambo. This safeguarded against corrupt practices.
The Rozvi Military power and Organisation

Previous writers have greatly underestimated the military capacity of the Rozvi. A study of
contemporary sources suggests a very different picture altogether. According to one
Portuguese document of 1785, “The Brozes (Rozvi) are feared even by the monhaes
(vanyai), who after these, Rozvi are more daring than anybody else. . . because of their great
prowess and daring they (Rozvi) fight fiercely and furiously in battles”.
Another somewhat biased description of the Rozvi, coming from 1789 runs as follows:
“The immediate subjects of this chief (Changamire) are much devoted to him ... but they pass
their whole lives in indolence of sensuality and the activities of spoliation, hold agriculture
and commerce in contempt, and thinking themselves a race superior to the rest of mankind,
they consider work a degradation .... six or seven of these desperadoes, will ... intimidate two
or three hundred Africans of other tribes”.
According to Abraham, the quotation ends thus: “Such are the freebooters with whose aid
Changamire has succeeded in making all his conquests and compelled the entire population
of several districts to quit their habitations and fly to the northern side of the Zambezi”,
quoted in S.I. Mudenge, 1974, p377.
Many more quotations could be given from the eighteenth-century Portuguese sources, all of
which corroborate the image of the Rozvi as a fierce, powerful and warlike people. But
before we can agree either with the Portuguese account of Rozvi fighting power or with the
more recent notion of the “unwarlike” Rozvi, we should look briefly at what is known of the
Rozvi military machine. From contemporary Portuguese sources we learn that the Rozvi
armies were organised into centuries like those of the Romans.
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A century or company of soldiers was known as a missoca (regiment). These missocas were
under the command of cabos or field commanders. Above the cabos were the inhabezes (same
rank as generals). The inhabezes were themselves below Tumbare, the highest general. At the
top was the Mambo himself who was Commander-In-Chief. Although it seems to have been
customary for the Mambos to lead their armies in person, we have oral and documentary
evidence that this was not always done. The Rozvi army had an impressive variety of weapons:
bows and arrows, daggers, assegais, shields, battle axes and cudgels. According to one
Portuguese source, the Rozvi fighters used the cudge “with such deadly accuracy that they can
throw it from a long distance away and the blow is almost always fatal”. They also possessed
guns, and in the early nineteenth century there were four small cannons at the mambo’s palace.
Although by the later nineteenth century the reputation of the Rozvi as a people possessing guns
reached as far as the modern Transvaal, we have little evidence that guns were ever important
weapons in the Rozvi armies.
On the battlefield, the Rozvi used a fighting formation which closely resembled that of
Shaka, the Zulu king. According to a Portuguese source in 1758, the Rozvi used to deploy
their men as follows: the main body of fighting men known as viatte would be in the middle,
flanked by two horns called mulomo acumba. In the nineteenth century Shaka was to use
this fighting formation with devastating effect. When the Rozvi squadrons were in battle
they were said to have been arranged in such a way that, while one was engaging the enemy,
another would be at its rear taking care of the wounded, replenishing and animating the
vanguard, as well as making certain that none of those in front could retreat.
It is also said that the Rozvi favoured close combat, face to face in an open field. But it
should not be thought that the Rozvi mode of fighting was inflexible: far from it. Elsewhere
it has been shown that flexibility and resourcefulness were an integral part of Rozvi warfare.
S.I. Mudenge, “The Rozvi Empire and the Feira of Zumbo,” unpublished Ph.D thesis,
London, 1972, pp74 – 90. In 1684 it was Dombo’s unconventional tactics that enabled him
to win the critical battle for Mahungwe. At any rate that is how Father Conceição saw it
when he wrote of Dombo’s victory thus: “He was so witty and cunning that after being
defeated by our arms, he vanquished us with his strategems”.
The Rozvi seem to have had a formalized mode of mobilising their forces. It is said that
when the Mambo wished to summon his men of war he would sound his gun and then
Tumbare would beat his war drum known as Dittiwe. At the sound of Dittiwe, criers would
go out shouting “Chisadza Mhomwe” (Muhomwe) (fill your bags with food). The mapfumo
i.e. squadrons, would then assemble at the court. When it comes to the training of the Rozvi
armies we know very little. The Portuguese sources are not very helpful on this subject. For
although they tell us of “military drill” and/or “exercises” as well as “archery training”, they
never really explain what these involved. All we are told is that the Rozvi military exercises
were called ‘pemberaçoens’ and these are said to have entailed “many leapings and multi-
articulated movements that they performed with their heads during battle or military
exercises”. But ‘pemberaçoens’, which comes from the Shona – pembera or kupembera,
(ululate) – entails singing, chanting, ululating and brandishing of spears, and is not used for
military training but as a morale rouser to build self-confidence and intimidate the enemy. It
may well be that fighting skills were acquired largely through hunting.

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Before going into battle the Rozvi armies were always doctored. Traditions abound claiming
that the Rozvi used supernatural powers against their enemies. We are told that the Rozvi could
change the colour of cattle, summon bees to fight for them if need be, and send their enemies to
sleep by magic. They could make their warriors brave by supposedly immunising them against
bullets or spears. Even Portuguese sources remark on this reputation of the Rozvi. In 1698 the
viceroy of India wrote that the Portuguese soldiers in the Rivers of Sena believed that the then
Rozvi Mambo had magic oil with which he could kill anyone simply by touching the person with
it. The viceroy implored the Portuguese king to send a new lot of soldiers from metropolitan
Portugal who would not believe in such superstition.
The Portuguese in the Rivers of Sena had reason to fear the Rozvi magic because in 1693 after
the great Rozvi Mambo, Dombo 1, had slaughtered all the Portuguese at Dambarare, he had two
Dominican priests flayed and their heads cut off and carried in front of his army. On that
occasion, it is reported that Dombo also disinterred the bones of some of the Portuguese and had
them crushed in order to prepare a powerful medicine for his soldiers. This association of the
Rozvi with the supernatural clearly gave their armies a vast psychological advantage over their
potential enemies.
Finally, we must consider the question of numbers. From Portuguese records we can deduce that
the army was quite large by the standards of that time. After Dombo had lost a vast number of
men in the 1684 battle for Mahungwe, he still had enough men to face an invasion from the
emperor Mutapa Mukombwe. Although it is not possible to state an exact number the Rozvi
army was large enough to defend their empire, indulge in extra-territorial interventionist policies,
such as supporting the Portuguese allies, both north and south of the Zambezi. It was large
enough to provide the mambo with important diplomatic and political leverage which he needed
to stay above political and military reproach. In the words of one Governor-General of
Mozambique it made the Rozvi Mambo “the most powerful (ruler) of those interiors”, or as one
secretary to the government of Mozambique says, it made the Mambo “the terror of the
hinderland. Therefore to assert that the military base of the Rozvi Mambo’s power was
politically slender or was “unwarlike Rozvi” – is to run against the available evidence and to
make these words lose all meaning.
RELIGION: Its Political Significance

Traditional religion played a vital role in the Rozvi Empire. In the first instance, the
priesthood was represented on the Mambo’s council. This enabled the Mambo and his
council to exploit the religious authorities’ more discreet sources of information about
outlying provinces. Of course such information was utilised in conjunction with other
advices of messengers who were appointed or planted throughout the empire and beyond.
Furthermore, the priesthood is said to have been involved in the coronation of some of the
vassal rulers and in this way, provided or fostered unity in the empire. Hence, by being so
closely associated with the Mambo, religion became one more integrative factor with the
empire. Yet we would be in error if we were to conceive the Mwari cult as having been no
more than a willing tool in the hands of the Rozvi rulers. Conflict between the religious
officers and the Rozvi Mambos appears to have been a perennial feature of their relationship.
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This may have been so partly because the priesthood claimed to have the right to advise and
admonish those Mambos who did not rule well. Thus the religious authorities may have been
a constitutional watch-dog on a Mambo’s theoretically absolute power. In a negative way,
the importance of the religious authorities as supporters of the Rozvi rulers is further revealed
in the fact that virtually all the known Rozvi traditions account for the fall of being a
consequence of a rupture between the religious and political leaders in the empire.
2. Provincial Administration
The Rozvi rulers accepted the principle of heredity in the administration of their provinces.
This meant that many of the provincial chiefs were hereditary rulers of their provinces/ or
regions. The only Rozvi Mambo who does not seem to have cared about the principle of
heredity was Dombo 1, who was himself a usurper. But on the whole his successors
respected it. The question that requires to be answered is therefore, how the Rozvi were able
to control these hereditary local rulers.
The first way in which the Rozvi controlled these rulers was through the investiture
ceremony known as kugadza ishe (to install and invest in a Chief). According to one source,
“if the people chose a new Chief without consulting their overlord (the Rozvi Mambo) it was
said in common parlance that they had no Chief, but the one selected or approved by the
Warozvi was held to be the true Chief”. This view is supported by many other sources, e.g.
G. Fortune, “Rozvi Text”.
The process of installing a new chief began at the local level where the practices of that
particular chiefdom would be observed. Once a candidate had been locally chosen he either
went in person to the Rozvi court to seek approval or sent a deputy to obtain the approval on
his behalf. The Rozvi could and did at times withhold approval. They could even bypass a
duly elected candidate and impose their own choice. But instances of this kind of practice
seem to have been rare.
The investiture of a new chief took place in his own kingdom. It was performed by a
representative of the Rozvi Mambo who handed the regalia. Such regalia included black and
white calico as well as a sheepskin. Through the investiture ceremony the Rozvi Mambo
conferred legitimacy and authority on the vassal chiefs. But, by being invested by the Rozvi,
a vassal Chief proclaimed his subservience to the latter. There is virtually no evidence to
show that before the 1790’s any vassal chief successfully challenged the Rozvi right to invest
subject rulers.
The other way in which the Rozvi Mambos controlled the loyalty of their subjects was by the
imposition and collection of an annual tribute (Mupeta WaMambo). Tribute collection had
important political and economic implications. Politically, the payment of tribute implied
continued allegiance of a vassal ruler to the Rozvi Mambo and refusal was regarded as an
indication of rebellion.

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The chief tribute collector was none other than the Tumbare himself. That a man of
Tumbare’s standing – the highest general of the Rozvi armed forces and possible regent to
the Rozvi Empire – should have been made responsible for tribute collection is a sign of the
importance attached to the function. According to one source, if Chikanga, the King of
Manyika, ever dared to drop paying tribute to the Rozvi Mambo, he “without doubt would
suffer severe retribution”, and the Rozvi Mambo would “bring Chikanga to his senses,
because the said Changamire and his soldiers are of a temperament so vain that they cannot
put up with defiance without seeking revenge and complete satisfaction. Oral sources too,
confirmed that any vassal Chief who did not pay his tribute was visited by Rozvi soldiers.
Tribute was paid in cloth, beads, hoes, axes, gold, ivory, skins, cattle, tobacco, foodstuffs and
whatever else the various regions could produce. Through this tribute, the Rozvi Mambo
acquired vast quantities of wealth from his empire.
Finally, another way in which the Rozvi used to control their empire was by the appointment
of regional governors or representatives. This is of such significance that it is most
unfortunate that at present we know so little about it. But we have enough evidence to
establish the existence of such officers. What we lack is precise knowledge of their
functions. Professor D. Beach found oral sources claiming that a Rozvi house by the
dynastic name of Gwangwara used to settle quarrels among the Rozvi subject Chiefs in the
present day Chivhu District. In Mahungwe at the court of Makoni the house of Tandi was
permanently stationed as a representative of the Rozvi Mambo.
A similar role for the priestly house of Nerwande may be mentioned in the Mangwende
kingdom. Dr Weinrich claims that her researches have shown that the Rozvi Empire “was
divided into provinces, and each province was administered by a royal aguate whom the
King appointed provincial governor. As quoted by S.I. Mudenge, 1974, p384. From such
evidence, though incomplete, it is clear that these governors were an important link in the
control of the Rozvi Empire.
EXTERNAL TRADE AND THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE ROZVI EMPIRE

As we have already seen, previous writers have emphasised the importance of external trade as
the chief source of the economic power and political influence wielded by the Rozvi rulers.
They have asserted that the Rozvi Mambos exercised a strict monopoly on all external trade. But
on this point, too, the results of recent research have led to some modifications. While it is true
that the Rozvi issued decrees which governed some aspects of external trade in their empire, they
did not really monopolise the whole external trade to themselves. What the Rozvi Mambos did
was to restrict the monopoly of the pure gold to themselves knowing fully well that such a decree
would be impossible to implement.
Maybe what brings out a clearer picture of the problem is if we look briefly at the trade system
between Zumbo and the Rozvi Empire. African traders known as “VaShambadzi” traded
throughout the Rozvi Empire. They were itinerant traders who moved from place to place and
chiefdom to chiefdom selling their goods. There were no special market days or market places
where trade was conducted. There is certainly no evidence to support the view that all external
trading may have been held at the court of the Rozvi Mambo.
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The nearest we come to this possibility was in 1803 when an attempt was made by the
Portuguese of Zumbo to introduce a new method by which the trade of Butwa could have been
controlled by the Rozvi Mambo’s court. On this occasion, the Portuguese requested the then
Mambo to send one of his grandees to Zumbo on the Zambezi escarpment and on the border with
Mozambique that he could accompany the Zumbo vashambadzi to and from Zumbo. The chief
function of the grandee (man of high rank) was to ensure that the vashambadzi did not trade in
the bares of Butwa before they had presented themselves at the Mambo’s court; “where the said
Changamire, in his presence, ought to entrust the said Mussambazes (vashambadzi) with their
panganaçoens to his respective bareiros, with the express command that as soon as the bartering
was over a report about the fazendas and the Mussambazes should be made to him (Changamira)
and together with the same grandee they (Mussambazes) should be sent back to this villa so that
they could give the accounts of the panganaçoens in the presence of the said grandees”.
The suggestion was never put into practice because in 1894, Zumbo (Mucariva) was destroyed.
The above document has sometimes been used to argue that the Rozvi Mambo had a monopoly
of trade. But from other Zumbo documents coming before 1803 it is clear that trading operations
did not take place only at the Mambo’s court but all over the “bares” of Butwa were found
virtually all over what is now Zimbabwe, stretching from Bulawayo to Bindura and from the
Sanyati to the Save river. Notably, the Zumbo vashambadzi traversed all that region, bartering
for gold from village to village without necessarily ever visiting the Mambo’s court.
Perhaps, one of the most revealing pieces of evidence against the view that the Mambo had a
monopoly of all foreign trading operations, especially the gold trade, is provided by the fact that
among the items in which vassal chiefs paid tribute were gold, ivory, beads and cloth. To pay
one’s tribute in gold and ivory implies possession of these items before payment. A total
monopoly would have been difficult and expensive to enforce, and was probably an inefficient
means of getting the gold. In a monopoly situation, the subject Chiefs would have had little
incentive to dig for much gold. On the other hand, getting the gold through tribute was less
difficult and served a dual purpose – economic and political.
The Mambo had a reasonably good system of enforcing payment of tribute by their vassals, but
they would have needed a much bigger bureaucratic machine than the one available to enforce
the monopoly of trade. But by allowing his subjects to engage in foreign trade, the Mambo
avoided rousing undue resentment and he allowed the profits from foreign trade to filter through
the Rozvi political machinery from the bottom to the top.
What Impact did foreign trade have on the Rozvi Empire? - An Assessment
There is no doubt that Rozvi rulers greatly valued their trading links with the Portuguese
especially those at Zumbo. Evidence for this is that in 1743, 1772 and 1781 the Rozvi sent
powerful armies to protect the Feira at Zumbo from its enemies. The Rozvi Mambos also
protected the vashambadzi against robbery while trading in Butwa. This policy of the Rozvi
prompted one Governor- General of Mozambique to write, “Changamira, the most powerful
(Chief) of those interiors is a man without many defects, except for his colour and paganism;

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because [if he had many defects] it would both be easy to understand his trading policy and the
reason why he is able to make others obey him and love the Portuguese”.
It is doubtful though whether the Changamire’s ‘saintliness’ was the sole reason for his conduct.
Enlightened self-interest seems to have been a more important reason. From the Portuguese the
Rozvi received luxury goods e.g. different varieties of beads, sombreiros (umbrellas), sea shells,
rosaries of fake coral, handkerchiefs, chinaware, brass bells, scissors, candles, cloth of various
colours and aguiadente (fire-water → some kind of wine). These foreign goods no doubt made
life at court more colourful for their imperial majesties. But these were luxury goods which
came in small quantities. At the time of the investiture of a new chief, the Rozvi Mambo used to
send black and white calico as part of the regalia of the new chief. Clearly, therefore, imported
cloth played an important part in the Rozvi political system. But it can hardly be said to have
been vitally important for the survival of the Rozvi Empire. Besides the question of investiture,
there is little else we have seen to warrant even the suggestion that the wealth of the Rozvi
Kingdom was based on external trade.
It is also apparent that not all the luxury items consumed in the Rozvi Empire were obtained
from trade with the Portuguese: some were internally produced. From the few items
archaeologists have been able to recover since the destruction and theft of the stone ruins at
Great Zimbabwe around the end of the nineteenth century, it has been deduced that the Karanga
craftsman worked iron, copper, bronze and gold. They could draw wire, make bangles,
manufacture knives, razors, rings, bracelets, chains, earrings and so on, using these metals.
In addition, the Karanga craftmen carved various objects in ivory and soapstone and made beads
from ostrich egg shells and other shells. Since well before the Portuguese ever came to eastern
Africa, the Shona have worn a highly prized cotton cloth known as “Machira”. While it is true
that the Rozvi economy was a largely agricultural one, it would be an error to assume that
externally acquired luxury trade goods always had the same effect of all forms of subsistence
agricultural economies, irrespective of the precise nature of the mode of economic production
attained within the state `in question. In the Rozvi Kingdom, some of the external luxury goods,
like beads and cloth had equally valuable internal substitutes.
We may in fact conclude that agriculture and pastoralism, especially the latter, appear to have
been the real economic basis of the Rozvi Empire. The Shona people, as one seventeenth
century Portuguese writer observed
“will not constrain themselves to seek for gold unless they are constrained by necessity
for want of clothes or provisions which are not wanting in the land for it abounds with
them, namely, millet, some rice, many vegetables, large and small cattle and many hens.
The land abounds with rivers of good water, and the greater number of the Africans are
inclined to agricultural and pastoral pursuits in which their riches consist.”
Comments on the economic importance as well as the number and size of the cattle found in the
kingdom of Butwa are scattered in Portuguese documents from the sixteenth century to the
nineteenth century. For example, in 1506 Diogo de Alcaçova wrote in about 1490 that a ruler of
Butwa offered about 4000 hornless cows to the Munhumutapa, and in 1569 Fr Monclaro informs
us that the cattle of Butwa were “as big as the large oxen of France”. But according to Fr

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Gomes, so big were these Butwa cattle in the mid-seventeenth century that one had to stand
when milking them.
The importance of cattle to the economy of Butwa was underlined by Father Joao dos Santos
who, writing at the end of the sixteenth century, claimed that the people of Butwa were less
interested in digging for gold because they “were much occupied with the breeding of cattle of
which there are great numbers in these lands”. A further indication of the numbers of Butwa
cattle is provided by the case of one mid-eighteenth century Mushambadzi from Zumbo who
collected as many as 800 head of cattle from his trading activities in Butwa (i.e. the central Rozvi
Empire).
Even in the early nineteenth century Butwa cattle were still being sold at the Feira of Manyika to
the Portuguese. The Rozvi used their cattle at that period both as baggage animals and for
riding. This was in addition to the obvious uses as drought power, meat and milk as well as a
form of storing wealth. Cattle were useful to pay the bride price (rovora). Above all, a man with
many cattle could use them to enhance his social influence by a system of “kuronzera”, in which
a man gives some of his cattle for safe-keeping to another man. The person to whom the cattle
have seen entrusted could use them in virtually any way he wished, except that he could not
dispose of them without the owner’s consent. Because the owner of the cattle could, if he
wished, take back his cattle, this naturally gave him greater influence over his “client”. Dombo 1
himself was a notable cattle baron who possibly rose to power and founded the Rozvi Empire on
the strength of this cattle-keeping activities and his ability to redistribute the cattle through the
kuronzera system.
Therefore a closer examination of the Rozvi empire reveals that most of the externally – acquired
luxury good had equally valuable internal substitutes. And in any case, the socio-political
significance of such wealth does not appear to have been nearly as great as that of the legendary
Butwa cattle. These cattle were the true savings banks and insurance policies of the ordinary
Rozvi, which the rulers used above all to distribute for safe-keeping to their subjects, who were
then entitled to use them. In this way, cattle provided visible social, economic and political
bonds between the Rozvi rulers and their subjects.
The Rozvi Empire was able to benefit from and enjoy the fruits of external trade as well as to
ensure the safe flow of that trade largely because of its power, much of which was internally
generated. Thus the Rozvi example underlines the fact that any meaningful assessment on it
must first of all look at the level of social, political and economic development it attained before
coming to any conclusion.

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THE FALL OF THE ROZVI KINGDOM

Whilst there is debate about the organisation and development of the Rozvi Empire, there is little
such argument about the fall of the empire. Clearly, a combination of natural disasters and
external invasions worked together to bring about the downfall of the Rozvi Empire.
There can be no doubt that the seasonal droughts of the late 18th century and the early 19th
century weakened the empire’s capacity to sustain itself. Whilst the natural disasters as the
drought did not necessarily lead to the fall of the empire, they weakened it and made it more
vulnerable to external threats. Moreover, due to droughts, population migrations in search of
greener pastures tended to distort political and military structures within the empire. Moreover,
goldfields got deeper and in some cases began to yield very little returns, all of which
contributed to economic exhaustion of the Rozvi Empire.
However, more important events which led to the collapse of the Rozvi Empire were the
relentless attacks which the empire faced during the 19th century Mfecane – related invasions. It
is noteworthy that the Rozvi Empire had to stomach at least six invading groups, all coming from
the south. Whilst the earlier groups were defeated, they deprived the Rozvi Empire of their
capacity to resist any longer. The first of such groups was the Mpanga of the Ndlovu whom
anthropologists believed to have been Sotho in composition. These were defeated by the Rozvi
and completely repelled.
In about the same time, the Rozvi were attached by the Ngwana of Maseko Ngoni who
originated from Venda and were in search of a homeland north of the Limpopo. However, these
were equally defeated but they obviously left a dent on the Rozvi military strength.
Successive raids on the Rozvi Empire continued unabated as Soshangana’s Shangani followed
by Zwangendaba’s Ngoni inflicted irreparable damage on an already weakened Rozvi empire.
Zwangendaba camped in the Rozvi Empire, at Satwa hill in Mazowe for two agricultural
seasons. During this rime, his warriors raided the neighbouring communities for young men and
women and for cattle.
Nyamazana’s Ngoni group arrived after Zwangendaba’s departure. She attacked the king’s
residence at Danangombe killing the last Changamire Chirisamhuru. Nxaba’s Ngoni passed
through the Rozvi Empire in 1836, taking a share of Rozvi cattle and young men. By the time
Mzilikazi crossed the Limpopo and settled around the Matopos, it was not difficult for him to
extend his political dominance over the once mighty Rozvi Empire. Although a few
Changamires such as Tohwechipi and Chizema attempted to reunite the Rozvi Empire and
launch counter-raids on the Ndebele, the empire could never be fully restored. The Ndebele
fully exerted their rule once again on the Rozvi in 1857.

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Examination Type Question
1. Evaluate the importance of the “trade hypothesis” in the economy of the Rozvi state.
2. Describe and explain the career of Changamire Dombo1 in the Rozvi Empire.
3. Discuss and illustrate the view that the Rozvi Empire was highly centralised and
militarised in its organisation.
4. What was most important in the Rozvi economy: cattle, grain or foreign trade?
5. Why did the Rozvi Empire decline and fall during the mid-nineteenth century?
6. Analyse the political and military strength of the Rozvi in relation to their neighbours
before the onset of the Nguni peoples.
REFERENCES
1. S.I. Mudenge (1974) “The role of Foreign Trade in the Rozvi Empire: A Reappraisal”. In
The Journal of African History, Vol. 15, No.3, pp373 – 391.
2. S.I.G Mudenge (1988) – A Political History of Munhumutapa, c1400 – 1902 Zimbabwe

Publishing House.
3. D. Beach (1983) “The Rozvi in search of their Past” in The Journal History in Africa Vol. 10,
pp 13 – 34.
4. E.A. Alpers (1970) “Dynasties of the Mutapa – Rozvi Complex” source: The Journal of
African History, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp 203 – 220.-

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CHAPTER 9
THE NDEBELE STATE UNDER MZILIKAZI
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES

a) Trace the origins of the Ndebele people.
b) Explain why Mzilikazi abandoned several settlements in Nguniland.
c) Discuss the political organisation of the Ndebele state and why Mzilikazi’s rule was a
protracted one.
The rise and expansion of the Zulu nation under Tshaka’s leadership during the 19th century was
followed by widespread wars and general disturbances in Nguniland (Natal). These times of
great trouble are remembered in Nguni history as the Mfecane, which literally means “the time
for ‘crushing’ or ‘grinding.’ What is of interest to us in this chapter is not the Mfecane itself, but
the emergence of states as a result of the Mfecane. Some of these chiefdoms were transformed
into large kingdoms especially the Ndwandwe under Zwide and the Mtetwa led by Dingiswayo.
According to Phimister and Proctor (1991), by about 1819, these kingdoms had been destroyed
and their populations were either scattered or incorporated into the Zulu under Tshaka. Several
Nguni groups led by army generals like Mzilikazi, Zwangendaba, Sebetwane, Soshangana and
Xaba fled from Nguniland hearding north, importing the Zulu military tactics to central Africa,
hence causing the Mfecane in areas they passed through. Of crucial concern to us in this chapter
is Mzilikazi of the Khumalo clan.
Needham and Mashingaidze (1984) assert that Mzilikazi was born in 1795. He was son of
Nompethu the daughter of Zwide and Matshobane, a Khumalo chief. Mzilikazi grew up among
the Ndwandwe. It was here that he got his military training. By then the Khumalo were living in
the Ngotshe district sandwiched between the Ndwandwe on one hand and the Mtetwa of
Dingiswayo on the other hand. The Khumalo were under Matshobane, but submitted first to
Zwide on Marital grounds. Matshobane was executed by Zwide on allegations of betrayal and
disloyalty as well as spying for Dingiswayo. Zwide then installed Mzilikazi, Matshonane’s son
as chief of the Khumalo. When Zwide’s Ndwandwe were run over by Tshaka in about 1818,
Mzilikazi transferred his allegiance to the Zulu king (Tshaka). Mzilikazi was allowed by Tshaka
to rule his own territory and have his own regiments. According to Tindal, Mzilikazi and Tshaka
coexisted peacefully until about 1820 when Mzilikazi led a successful raiding expedition against
the Basuto. As was expected, Mzilikazi was expected to surrender the war booty to Tshaka who
had sent him to drive away the Sotho. In return, Tshaka would generously reward Mzilikazi for a
successful expedition. Unfortunately, Mzilikazi defied Tshaka’s orders by not handing over the
captured cattle to the Zulu king. To make matters worse, Mzilikazi humiliated and ill-treated the
Messengers sent by Tshaka to plead with him to surrender the captured cattle to the King. This
was understood by Tshaka as an open rebellion to the King. In an informed, discourse, one C.K
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Mhuri observed that Mzilikazi was equally as dishonest and unreliable as his father Matshobane
because his father was unreliable to his father- in law Zwide, and Mzilikazi proved the, same to
his King Tshaka. Therefore appropriate military action was necessary. A regiment was sent to
punish Mzilikazi in 1821. The Khumalo were thoroughly beaten at the battle of Ntumbane hill in
Zululand. Mzilikazi gathered his small band of survivors and very little livestock and began long
heading north.
Mzilikazi’s northward March can be easily understood if illustrated diagrammatically.
Mzilikazi Journey- 1822-1837
Year Place People who clashed with Reasons for Abandoning the place
Mzilikazi
EkuPhumuleni Sotho, Pedi -It was only a resting place. Mzilikazi
never intended to make it a
1822/1823 permanent place.
(Resting Place) -Too close to Zululand and Tshaka
who was determined to punish the
Ndebele.
-The Pedi consistently raided the
Ndebele for cattle.
-Grazing land was not enough for
Ndebele cattle.
1826 Mhlahlandlela Kora, Tswana-Griqua, -Too close to Zululand, now under
Khoisan, Boers and Dingane, and was as determined as
Rolong Tshaka to punish Mzilikazi.
-The Ndebele were surrounded by
hostile groups of kora, Khoisan and
Griquas who were a threat
-Mhlahlandlela was attacked by
combined forces of Griquas and the
Rolong.
1832 Mosega Hurutshe Tlokwa, kora, -Griqua-Tswana army attacked

Rolong Griquas, Tswana, Mzilikazi’s capital
Boers -In 1834 the Kora and the Grikwa
attacked the Ndebele at Marico.
-Boers from Portgiters settlement also
fought the Ndebele.
-Zulu army sent by Dingane, attacked
Mosega in 1832.

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Mzilikazi’s first treaty with the British

In 1829, Mzilikazi signed his first treaty with the British government at the Cape. The British
were represented by Robert Moffat who later became the King’s personal friend. Phimister
(1991) suggests that by singing this friendship treaty with the British, Mzilikazi hoped to gain
support of the whites against his enemies. Little did Mzilikazi knew that his friend Moffat
regarded the Ndebele as ‘savages’ and thought that it would be a blessing if the Ndebele were
broken.
Despite having signed a friendship treaty with the British, the Ndebele continued to live under
threat of Boers, Griqua and Tswana. The 1837 attack under the Boer commander left Mzilikazi’s
army weakened.
The problems outlined above compelled Mzilikazi and his Ndebele to migrate further north in
about 1837. They moved in two groups and followed different routes. The first group comprising
women, children and old people, as well as the royal family members was led by Gundwane
Ndiweni, Mzilikazi’s senior Induna. This group settled at Gibixhegu near the Rozvi’s military
settlement of Nhava yaTumbare.
The second group led by Mzilikazi himself took a westward direction through the Ngwati
territory to raid the Kololo in Bulozi. Mzilikazi rushed to Gibixhegu enraged upon hearing the
news that the first group had made Nkulumane King in his place when they had lost hope of
linking up with the other group. Ndiweni and other chiefs who had installed Nkulumane to
power, were executed for treason at Thaba Zinduna northeast of Bulawayo. It is not clear what
happened to Nkulumane, but oral tradition recorded by Jullian Cobbing reveal that he was
secretly executed, while others say he escaped by night to South Africa when he heard about the
return of his father. Mzilikazi established his capital at Inyathi, not far away from Morden
Bulawayo.
The area into which the Ndebele moved when they crossed the Limpopo had been dominated by
the Karanga speaking people. It was easy for the Ndebele to subdue the Rozvi generals and
absorb the remnant Rozvi into his confederacy because the state had been weakened by Nguni
invaders such as Soshangana, Zwangendaba, Ngwane, Maseko and Nyamazana. After the final
defeat of Chirisamhunu by Nyamazana, the Rozvi state had been experiencing in house fighting
between the Mutinhima, Jiri Tumbare and many other houses that had claims to the Rozvi
leadership.
Mzilikazi gave a final blow to the Changamire state. However, it is important that Mzilikazi did
not completely eliminate the Rozvi state for this continued to exist alongside the Ndebele and at
isolated incidences carried out attacks on the Ndebele until 1855 when the self imposed
Changamire Chibhamu bhamu was finally captured.
Beach (1994) refutes the fact that the Rozvi state was absorbed by the Ndebele. He puts forward
the argument that those Rozvi-Karanga who lived closer to Matabeleland were assimilated into
the Ndebele state. The claim that the Ndebele replaced or succeeded the Rozvi was, according to
Beach, advanced by the British colonialists who wanted to have claims in Mashonaland and
Matabeleland after they obtained the Rudd concession. It is therefore incorrect to say the

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Ndebele controlled the whole of Mashonaland. The Shona living in areas beyond Gweru were
hardly affected by the Ndebele raids.
“Assimilation” means that some from of a compromise was reached between the Ndebele king
and the Rozvi-Karanga people who lived closer to the Matebeleland.
The Shona- Ndebele Relations

Early years of Ndebele settlement into Matabeleland were characterised by hostile relations
between the Shona and the Ndebele. The Shona (Rozvi) resisted Ndebele rule and could not
peacefully submit without military resistance. The Ndebele raided them in order to re-build their
depleted army. Shona boys who got captured were enlisted into the Ndebele army. On the other
hand, the Rozvi also carried out counter raids to replenish their herd which had been reduced
during the Nguni invasions.
The Ndebele raids focused on those Shona who lived outside the tributary circles but within the
Ndebele reach. The Shona who were absorbed and incorporated into the Ndebele as Amahole
were no longer raided. These received cattle on loan conditions to herd with limited milk and
slaughter rights. Those Shona people who lived as far as Marondera, Mazoe Muzarabani, Budja
(Mutoko) and Manyika did not experience Ndebele raids and control
Amasvina (hole) B D
A tribute.
pay
Those Ndebele state. The not
outside Karanga who lived
Ndebele on this area were did
assimilated into
influence
Ndebele as slaves they
were never and or soldiers
raided
if
if i
Constantly raided
Constantly raided if

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The circle above attempts to explain the extent to which the Shona were raided, subdued and
controlled.
Part A: The Shona who lived in an area that was made Ndebele settlement got absorbed
into the Ndebele state and, spoke Ndebele. Some adopted Ndebele names and
culture. As long as they submitted themselves to the Ndebele they were not
raided. They became part of the state labourers, herd boys and soldiers. These
areas include Gwanda, Shangani, Dorset, and Matebeleland South.
Part B: Constantly Raided especially in times of drought. These were regarded as
amahole. Payment of tribute to the king was a way to ward off Ndebele raids. The
areas include Zvishavane, Mberengwa, some parts of Masvingo, Chivi and
Shurugwi.
Part C: These were raided at limited intervals because of their geographical distance from
Matebeleland. However they were expected to pay tribute to the Ndebele king.
Ndebele language and Culture could not penetrate these areas which include-
Hartley, Nemakonde (Mash west), Marondera, and some parts of Harare and
Chitungwiza.
Part D: These were outside Ndebele influence and did not experience any raids such areas
include Chipinge, Manyika, Barwe (Murehwa) Budja, (Mutoko), Dande, Chidima
(Muzarabani). These had not felt the impact of the Ndebele. As a result, views of
Father Hartman that the Shona were on the verge of extinction in the face of
Ndebele raids are far from truth. Pikirai (2000) argued that the presentation of the
Shona as near extinct tribes was advanced by missionaries in a bid to justify the
British occupation of both Mashonaland and Matabeleland. In most cases,
Ndebele raids on the Shona were met with stiff resistance as the Shona retreated
to caves with their cattle.
Social Organisation of the Ndebele:

The Ndebele society was divided into three distinct classes. The first was the Zanzi. This
group comprised the original Khumalo and Nguni who migrated with Mzilikazi from
Zululand. These included people of totems like Khumalo, Magutshwa, Dlodlo, Mguni,
Mkwananzi and Ndiweni. This group formed the Ndebele aristocracy.They were respected
by all other members and intermarriages with groups in lower caste were forbidden.
The Enhla were the second in importance from the Zanzi. This class was made up of
elements that had been incorporated into the Ndebele nation either voluntarily or forcibly in
the course of the migration from Zululand to Zimbabwe. This class included the Sotho,
Tswana, Kora and Griqua with whom the Ndebele fought and from whom many young men
and women were captured.
The last group in the Ndebele caste system was the Hole. This group was looked down upon
and comprised of the people of the Shona and Kalanga origin who were absorbed into the
Ndebele state. It is again imperative to point out that not all Shonas were Hole. Only those

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who lived closer to the Ndebele state and adopted Ndebele culture were referred to as
‘amahole! The Shona who lived outside Ndebele periphery were never subjected to Ndebele
rule and culture. Therefore they did not fit in the caste system. The Enhla and the Hole
willingly adopted the Ndebele culture and language. Some Shona went as far as adopting
Ndebele totems or changing their Shona totems to Ndebele for example Shumba to Sibanda,
Shiri or Hungwe to Nyoni, Dziva to Siziba, Shoko to Ncube etc. The explanation for this
adoption has been given by Mukanya when he said the incorporated Hole consequently took
pride in being associated with the Ndebele. This explains that relations between the Zanzi
and hole were not of slave and master as Euro-centric historians would want to suggest.
Many young Hole boys were conscripted into the Ndebele army and could also be rewarded
after battle for their participation and loyalty. Groups that had been assimilated into the
Ndebele were often required to speak Ndebele language and imitate or follow the Ndebele
culture. Many Enhla and hole took pride in their new Ndebele Identity. There was a
remarkable degree of unity between these classes because everybody spoke Ndebele and was
officially regarded as Ndebele. The policy regarding marriage which restricted marriage
within one’s social group was often violated by individual families who allowed their
children to marry across the classes, thus creating lasting relationships between such families.
Religion
Like the Shona in the Mutapa or Rozvi, the Ndebele believed in a supreme being whom they
called ‘Unkulunkulu- Somandla. This great god was known by the Sotho as Mlimo’ and by
the Shona as ‘Mwari.’ The Ndebele also believed in the power of ancestral spirits ‘amadlozi’
which they looked up to for guidance and for bringing rain. Senior members of the Khumalo
clan were also seen as rain makers. This shows that the spirit hierarchy reflected the political
hierarchy. Important religious ceremonies were conducted every year, one of which was the
Inxwala ceremony which was presided by the king himself as a religious leader. This was a
thanksgiving ceremony for good crops to amadlozi especially the royal amadlozi. Only after
the King, “Inkosi” himself had ceremonially eaten the ‘first fruits’ of the harvest, could the
nation harvest and eat their own crops. The King was identified with the nation’s fertility and
well being. All Indunas and tributary chiefs were expected to attend Inxwala ceremony,
failure of which was regarded as rebelling against the King and was a punishable offence.
Those who lived a distance from the King’s court held their own Inxwala ceremonies
presided over by Izindunankulu.
When the Ndebele arrived in Zimbabwe, they discovered a powerful religious functionary in
the name of Mhondoro medium of Chaminuka. Mzilikazi quickly adopted the Shona ritual of
rain making ceremonies and recognised the power of shone spirit medium. He often sent
tributes to Njelele, Mabweadziva and Chaminuka. Religion cemented the Shona and the
Ndebele relations. Religion was used to save the interests of the state.
In 1859, Mzilikazi allowed missionaries to settle in his new country. He gave the London
Missionary Society a piece of land to build a mission station at Inyathi, but did not encourage
his people to accept the new religion. By 1868 when Mzilikazi died, the missionaries had not
made any single convert.

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Political Structure of the Ndebele state:

The Ndebele were led by a King whose title was “Inkosi”. He was an absolute king with
absolute and supreme power. The Inkosi’s authority was different from that of the Rozvi
Mambo or the Mwenemutapas. His authority depended upon control of cattle and captured
booty and control of land. The strength of the Ndebele political structure was determined by
the strength of its military power. Land, cattle and people belonged to the King. The Ndebele
King held the following positions.
1) King
2) Army Commander
3) Chief Judge
4) Religious leader
He was the highest military authority in the state, and he himself raised the army. The army
was organised along Nguni military structure of age regiments. Regimental barracks
surrounded the capital.
Royal amajaha or bodyguards were permanently based at the capital. Their duty was to guard
the palace and could also be called in time of peace to work in the King’s fields. The amajaha
defended the land and cattle. The King could distribute all the cattle and captives and this
gave him power to reward loyal services from the Izinduna or other figures. He allocated
land for farming, settlement and for pastures.
Though the king had power to allocate land, it was not a private property of rulers. As a
religious leader, the King presided (officiated) over important religious ceremonies like
Inxwala. The royal ancestors were the most superior national spirits guarding the welfare of
the nation.
The state’s judiciary system was under the King’s control. He alone could make major
decisions. He had the power over life and death. The King ruled with the assistance of two
advisory councils though in most cases he would override their decisions.
A three structure political set up

Umphakati King Izikhulu
-Senior and inner advisors of the King. -A lesser council of Chiefs and Indunas.
-Were consulted on major issues. -More like provincial advisory council.
-Supervised the state between the death of a -Informed the Umphakati of issues or
king and succession of by a new King. problems in various regimental towns. Did
not make decisions.
King’s relatives were in this council.
Those who sat in Izinkulu had no hereditary or ritual claims to the office. Anyone could be
appointed to be an Induna as long as his loyalty and military prowess was unquestionable.

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The King’s wives were planted as spies in different provincial towns. These could report on
Indunas whose loyalty they suspected to be questionable. Because of this, Indunas respected
the King’s wives.
Father Hartman, cited in Phimister (1991) had this to say in 1893 about the King’s Power.
Both in theory and in practice the Ndebele King was the fount of all authority.” Due to this
centralisation of power, the Ndebele state was able to stay intact for a long time.
The Ndebele Economy

The Ndebele economy depended partly upon a mixture of cattle keeping and cultivation of
crops. Both men and women were involved in agricultural activities. In each province
(isigaba) there was a special field set aside as the king’s field. This was similar to the Shona’s
zunde ramambo. The King’s field was the first to be planted, and harvests were given to the
King as tribute.
Cattle herding was the most important economic activity in the society. The whole state was
organised into fields for cattle grazing. Transhumance was practiced where herders
seasonally moved their cattle to better grazing areas. As they moved amabutho protected the
cattle from potential raiders. This explains that the Ndebele economy was enchored in cattle
production than raiding. In the past, Euro-centric missionaries exaggerated the impact of
Ndebele raids and concluded falsely that the Ndebele economy was a raiding economy. In
the early years of Ndebele settlement, raiding was meant to conquer and establish authority
in the new land. The Ndebele raided the Sotho, Kora, Griqua, Tswana, Shona etc to increase
their population which was depleted by the Zulu wars. This is why captives were assimilated
into the Ndebele state and expected to speak Ndebele. It was a way of uniting people of
different origins that had been conquered and accommodated in the state. It is not true to
conclude that the Ndebele economy was a raiding economy because at times the Ndebele
were victims of raids themselves, especially during their migration. After their settlement in
Matabeleland the Ndebele conducted raids as a way of imposing their authority on the
stubborn Changamire state. There after, raids were directed on those chiefs who resisted
payment of tribute.
Cattle were a symbol of status. Chiefs and successful subjects could acquire large herds of
cattle. This enabled them to marry as many wives as they could afford. The King had his own
national herd which he controlled. He distributed these to chiefs as rewards for service and as
well used for payment of lobola, for feeding regiments and gave some to his wives and sons
for use and for inheritance. To show that cattle were an important aspect of Ndebele
economy Mudhenge asserted that much of the violence between the Ndebele and people in
the Highveld was associated with cattle.
Like any other pre-colonial state, the Ndebele grew crops such as millet, rapoko and
Sorghum. The Ndebele warriors went on leave during planting seasons to farm. This
indicates that the Ndebele valued farming like any other Nguni states. Tribute was often paid
in grain. The Ndebele stopped at ekuPhumuleni to farm, not to raid. For those two seasons at
ekuPhumuleni the Ndebele farmed, they did not rely on raiding. This dismisses the notion
that the Ndebele depended more on raiding.
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Trade was also practiced, both internal and external trade. Inter-regional trade existed where
they obtained old fashioned guns, cloths, beads, salt, iron and gun powder. The king sent his
young men to work in mines south of the Limpopo. He obtained Iron and gold. He also sent
some people to trade on his behalf. He was the richest and most important person in the state.
The King controlled all trade with outsiders in cattle, game and ivory. The Ndebele preferred
the southern trade routes through Botswana and the Boer republics. They traded regionally
with the Ngwato and Lozi. Internally they traded with the Shona especially in times when
Matebeleland was affected by drought. They obtained grain from the Shona through trade,
while the Shona received cattle in return.
During the 1860s a number of European traders and hunters were allowed entrance into the
state. They hunted elephants in the southern parts of Matebeleland. On one of these hunting
trips evidence of gold bearing rocks at Tati and north of Gweru River were discovered. This
was followed by many prospectors into Matebeleland in 1868. By this time, Mzilikazi’s
health was deteriorating and in September that same year he died. The Ndebele state was run
by a council of three who in 1870, amid resistance from the Zanzi, conferred Lobengula as
the Ndebele King.
1) Trace and explain the origins of the Ndebele under Mzilikazi.

2) How effective did the Ndebele state deal with its internal problems during and after
Mzilikazi’s reign?
3) Account for the social, political and economic organisation of the Ndebele state.
4) How accurate is the view that the Ndebele relied more on its military system than its
political organisation for survival?
5) Why did the Ndebele state survive for so long?
6) Evaluate the assertion that the Ndebele economy depended entirely on raiding.
7) Despite having so many enemies, the Ndebele state remained intact for a long time.
Discuss.
8) Assess the problems faced by the Ndebele before they crossed the Limpopo.
References
1. Beach D.N War and politics in Zimbabwe, 1994 Cobbing J, The Ndebele under the
Khumalos 1820-1896 University of Lancashire, 1976.
2. Mashingaidze E and D.E Needham, from Iron Age to Independence, Longman Zimbabwe
1985.
3. Phimister and Proctor, People and Power, Mazongororo Paper converters, 1991
4. Tindall, PEN. A History of Southern and Central Africa, Longman, Harare 1984.
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CHAPTER 10
Christian Missionary Activities and their effects in Pre-Colonial
Zimbabwe:
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
a) Assess impact of Christian missionaries in Central Africa
b) Examine African response to Christian Missions
c) Evaluate contributions of Christian missions to the colonization of Africa.
Introduction
In other parts of central Africa Christian missionaries helped to prepare African societies for the
impact of European rule in various ways. Sometimes they acted as advisers to chiefs- and gave
them sensible and disinterested advice. Sometimes they provided education and skills which
gave the people among whom they worked a favourable position in the early stages of colonial
rule; sometimes they became so committed to “their” people that they acted as effective
spokesmen for them and defended their interests against the new colonial administrations, and
very often they prepared African for the impact of other Europeans by beginning the process of
introducing new ideas and new demands.
The missionaries in Barotseland, the missionaries among the Tonga and Northern Ngoni in
Nyasaland; the missionary advisers of Khama in Bechuanaland; all these played an important
part in lessening the shock of the confrontation of the blacks and whites in central Africa.
The activities of the missionaries had a serious bearing on the direction of African history in the
19th and 20th Centuries. Initially they usually invited their home countries to come and conquer
Africa and the patterns of Partition were greatly affected by earlier settlement of the
missionaries. Missionaries claimed to know the African better than other Europeans. Many
policies pursued by the colonizers were inspired by the reports of the missionaries (as well as
explorers or adventures). The missionary activity in Africa is viewed as the arm of imperialism.
The late 18th century had witnessed a religious revival in Europe which emphasized the duty of
the individual Christian to convert his fellows. This revived interest in conversion brought about
a resurgence of European Christian activity in non-Christian lands and especially in Africa.

117
According to M. Tidy, the “Dark” continent was erroneously considered to be lacking in religion
and as a land where Christianity could be written on a blank slate. The missionaries genuinely
believed that they had a spiritual duty to convert the Africans.
Their sincerity and courage cannot be doubted for some gave their lives in order to spread their
faith. All accepted the equation of the advance of Christianity with the progress of Western
Capitalism. They believed that the introduction of capitalism to Africa would end African
poverty. They viewed European commerce as a weapon against both the slave trade and
traditional African society, both of which would need to be destroyed if missionary work were to
have a hope of real success. They felt that if African traditional societies were subjected to alien
influence in at least one form of legitimate trade, then it would absorb an alien religion like
Christianity. The missionaries also hoped to spread European culture throughout much of Africa
as they assumed the superiority of European culture to Africans and believed that the spread of
European culture and Christianity would inevitably go hand-in-glove- in a “civilizing mission.”
Reactions of Africans to Christian Missionaries:

There were basically two types of responses:
(1) Certain rulers allowed and invited missionaries to work and gave them positive
encouragement and helped convert many people to Christianity.
(2) Certain rulers welcomed missionaries but for non- religious reasons, and placed heavy
barriers to the work of evangelization.
In the territory which became Southern Rhodesia missionaries did not play any of these roles.
This was because they could not achieve a position of influence within Ndebele society even
though they were established in Matabeleland and because they failed to establish themselves in
Mashonaland at all.
Missionary Activity among the Ndebele:

The Ndebele first made contact with missionaries as early as 1829. From 1859 missionaries of
the London Missionary Society (LMS) were permanently established in Matabeleland. These
missionaries were made use of by the Ndebele in various ways. They were used to mend guns, to
inoculate cattle and give medical treatment to men; to write letters and to interpret language. One
missionary was even used to transport the keepers of the royal charms to court and back to their
homes. But the Ndebele had no intention of allowing the missionaries to achieve influence.
Mzilikazi and Lobengula saw clearly that their teaching would undermine the basis of the
Ndebele state which depended upon raiding and the caste system; the two kings did not feel the
need for literacy since the administration of the concentrated Ndebele state was efficient without
it; and they did not feel any desire to become involved with the economic system of southern
Africa out of which the missionaries came.
In these ways they were different from Lewanika of the Lozi who wanted literacy to improve his
elaborate bureaucracy and who wanted to develop trade. Lobengula did not admire the teaching
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of the missionaries which advocated “putting everything on Christ that he would bear our sins
for us.” Such a doctrine, he thought, was suitable only for white men since he had noticed that
“whenever they did anything wrong they always wanted to throw the blame on the others.” So
missionaries were kept in a sort of quarantine for thirty years. They made friends with converts
and anyone who showed signs of becoming friendly to them was removed to another area.
Relations between Mzilikazi and Robert Moffat of the London Missionary society (LMS) dated
back from 1829 when the met at Umhlahlandlela in South Africa and became friends. In 1859
Robert Moffat visited the Matabeleland (Ndebele). He was allowed to open a mission school at
Inyathi while his son J.S. Moffat was later allowed to open another at Hope Fountain. However,
both Ndebele Kings did not welcome concession to Christianity because it would be an
alternative religion, thus threatening the Kingship (for the king was in charge of traditional
religion it would alter the religion.
Mzilikazi accepted the “Abafundisi” as trading agents with South Africa and as a source of
technical skills e.g. repairing guns. Ordinary Ndebele saw no need to accept the new religion and
abandoning their old ones especially as this was said to anger Amadlozi. Few who showed
interest were put to death by the killing Maqeba-Mzilikazi’s trusted induna and a member of the
Umphakathi in May 1862. Christianity would also (as already mentioned) interfere with Ndebele
system of raiding their neighbours.
Lobengula accepted the opening of Hope Fountain with the hope that the missionary would
persuade the Transvaal not to invade his state and to prevent the missionaries from supporting
the Zwangendaba group. The result was that as late as 1890 no Ndebele had been converted
although a few hundreds regularly attended mass in order to get some payment that is six pence
for attendance.
It was only when Morgen Thomas opened the independent station at Shiloeh Fountain in 1876
that 6 Ndebele were converted up to 1893. This was because he offered them material rewards.
The failure of the missionaries made them frustrated and angered such that men like. J.S. Moffat
and C.D Helm concluded that the Ndebele political system had to be overthrown for Christianity
to progress. This explains why both assisted the B.S.A.CO in its colonization of the country.
Christian Missionaries among the Shona:

As for the Shona, missionaries found it difficult to reach them at all. Lobengula refused
permission for mission stations to be set up in Mashonaland and approaches to Mashonaland.
Stations other than those controlled by the Ndebele king were blocked by the hostility of the
Boers and the Portuguese.
In 1877 Coillard, who later exercised such an influence over Lewanika, tried to set up a station in
western Mashonaland at the Kraal of chief Mashayamombe. He was removed by a force of
Ndebele Amabutho and taken before Lobengula who warned him not to repeat the attempt. Later
on, when it was more possible for missionaries to enter the Shona area, few thought it worth
trying to do so.
Father Denlin tells us:

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“During the years around 1880, when missionaries, traders and political agents waited with
varying purposes at Lobengula’s Kraal, only an occasional hunter had found his way on to the
vast healthy plateau of Mashonaland. The London Missionary Society under J.S Moffat…. had
arrived in 1859 but they remained always in Matabeleland. The Jesuits came in 1879, but they
too shared the general illusion that the Mashona were the object “dogs” of Lobengula and that
the only people worth converting were the invaders from the south. Consequently, when Fr
Law… with one other priest and two very able brothers, set out from Bulawayo, their only aim
was to reach the Kraal of Mzila, Lobengula’s only counterpart… Selous, the famous hunter,
accompanied them as far as the gap in the great watershed; there he turned north to his favourite
hunts on the high plateau, but he urged them to come with him and evangelise the Mashona.
Instead; they turned South through the tsetse ridden valley to Mzila’s kraal, where the two priests
died-heroically, but with nothing accomplished. The only missionary to come specifically for the
Mashona was the Anglican Bishop Knight-Bruce on an exploratory tour in 1888; but the gallant
bishop was in such a hurry and knew so little of the language that his report is not very
enlightening.”
Conclusion
The results of this were quite important. Missionaries certainly did little to modify the shock of
the confrontation for either the Ndebele or the Shona. Moffat wrote;
“The Bechwana tribes in the protectorate will bow to our advance and adapt themselves to the
inevitable without much difficulty, but not so with Matabeleland… it seems hard to understand
which of these thirty years missionary efforts should have been rejected by the Matabeleland so
utterly. Had they accepted it there might now have been sufficient enlightenment to enable them
to meet the white man half-way and to mitigate the severity of the inevitable shock “. (O
Ranger). Moreover because they were excluded from the Ndebele system the missionaries
became hostile to it. They did not give Lobengula disinterested advice; indeed there is reason to
suppose that the missionary Helm was a knowing party to deceptions of Lobengula in the
interests of Rhodes. Generally the missionaries believed that no progress could be made until the
Ndebele system was broken down and they believed that this could only be done by force. Thus
they welcomed the arrival of the British South Africa Company forces in Mashonaland in 1890.
Wrote one of them in that year;
“The hateful Matabeleland rule is doomed. We as missionaries, with our thirty years history
behind us, have little to bind our sympathies to the Ndebele people, neither can we pity the fall of
their power.” (T.O. Ranger).
The Same Missionary Wrote:

“The wrath of God; was now descending on the Ndebele for their constant and persistent refusal
of the Gospel for a whole generation. God, he rejoiced, was about to “speak in a very different
manner”, to the Ndebele than that which his missionaries had been forced to adopt.”

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Missionary support was a major source of strength to Rhodes in his advance into central Africa.
And the results of the absence of missionaries in Mashonaland before the arrival of the whites
were also important. Elsewhere in central Africa missionaries had success with the old
Agricultural peoples who now found themselves sandwiched in between aggressive and strong
intruding societies. Some people thought that the Shona interest and skill in craftsmanship their
comparatively pacific and settled mode of life, favoured missionary penetration.
Even though Shona devotion to their own religion would probably have made difficult any real
alliance with the missionaries, it is interesting to speculate on the reaction of Shona chiefs to the
prospects of an alliance with a strong missionary presence. It is interesting to speculate also
whether, if such alliances had been established, the missionaries themselves would have been so
convinced that the Shona interest lay in the occupation of their country by white settlers.
These are speculations, however, because in the event the missionaries entered Mashonaland
with the settlers and as their allies. Let us take the example of the Catholic Church. The Jesuits
had made many attempts to penetrate central Africa. In the late 1870’s they opened stations in
Matabeleland but the Bulawayo station was abandoned in 1887 and the Emphandeni: station in
1889. The Jesuit Fathers swore not to re-enter Matabeleland until the Ndebele Kingdom had
been overthrown. Instead they entered Mashonaland in the wake of the B.S.A.Co. A Jesuit
Father accompanied the Pioneer Column as Chaplain; Dominican sisters were recruited to set up
hospitals and mobile ambulances. The missionaries turned to the Shona only after they had
established themselves as preachers and nurses and teachers to the white community; to the
Shona they were completely identified with the other whites.
There was no chance under these circumstances of a real alliance with Shona chiefs. An attempt
to set up a mission station beyond the effective boundaries of company administration in Mtoko
where it would have been independent on the land grant and protection of the powerful chief was
abandoned and the Catholic stations were set up on land granted by the company without
reference to the local Shona authorities. Africans were attracted to these stations as refugees
from the authority of the chiefs and headmen. Wrote the founder of Chishawasha mission;
“Among the numerous kraals of the country, there will be some who will avail themselves” of
the opportunity “to escape the tyranny of the indunas who are bullies.”
Moreover the Catholic fathers and sisters were emotionally committed to the company
administration. Any criticisms which might be leveled against its treatment of the Shona were
balanced by missionary support of the company against the Ndebele.
In 1893 Father Prestige cabled to Rhodes in support of Jameson’s decision to make war on
Lobengula after the Fort Victoria incident.
“Dr Jameson had asked my opinion as to the justice of punishing the Amandebeles at once.
Without prompt punishment there is very little probability of the same atrocities recurring.”
The Dominican sisters, awaiting the call to set up a hospital in the newly conquered Bulawayo,
put it more simply:

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“Of course our men have taken the country and we shall follow them.” Few converts were made
in either Mashonaland or Matabeleland before 1896 and when the Ndebele and the Shona rose in
that year mission stations, alien Christian Africans and indigenous Africans loyal to the missions
were made a particular object of attack.
The Impact of Christian Missionary Activities on African Societies:

From the earliest attempt by Portuguese missionaries to introduce Christianity into various parts
of Africa in the 16th century (e.g. father Goncalo da Silverira) Christian missionaries have over
the years had a profound impact on African society.
(a) The Christian missionaries were generally closely linked with capitalist and imperialist
forces and played a major role in imposing alien- political, social and economic values on
African society. As Paul Thatcher notes: “The activities of Europeans missionaries
involved European governments more and more in African affairs and many ways paved
the way for the establishment of colonial rule.
Missionaries helped prepare public opinion for large-scale European involvement in
Africa. These missionaries thought commerce and Christianity had to go hand in hand as
commercial development would undermine the slave trade.
Infact, blatant exploitation of Africans usually followed closely in the wake of European
commerce, but as Michael Tidy notes, it is not fair to blame the missionaries entirely for
the exploitation of Africans. But notes Tidy it is fair to criticize the missionaries for
subscribing to the prevailing European belief in the absolute- moral superiority of African
peoples.
As we have seen earlier, during the colonial period in Southern Rhodesia, most
missionaries were hostile to Shona and Ndebele. D.E Needham and others note:
“J.S Moffat, first head of Inyathi Mission turned strongly against the Ndebele. Charles
Helm, Lobengula’s trusted “Umfundisi,” (Teacher) helped the imperialist, Cecil John
Rhodes, to obtain a mining concession from Lobengula by deceitful means, and did not
protest when the whites killed Africans with the Maxim gun. The catholic Father Prestige
also supported the crushing of the Ndebele in 1893.
(b) The Christian missionaries generally showed very little respect for African culture and
generally undermined traditional African society.
As Michael Tidy notes, European Christian missionaries “erroneously considered Africa
to be lacking in religion, and therefore, a land where Christianity could be written on a
blank slate.” Because of the very nature of Christianity, it had the effect of
revolutionising African society.
Michael Tidy explains:
“To Africans, Christianity was far more than a religion: it presented itself as a new and
revolutionary social ethic. Christianity, as it was brought to Africa in the late 19th century,

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was steeped in individualism. The individual African who became a Christian now saw
the person for his existence in his relationship to God rather than his family, clan or
ethnic group.”
(c) The Christian missionaries helped eliminate some evil practices in Africa, especially the
killing of twins in Zimbabwe.
(d) Many Christian missionaries actively promoted health-care advancement; built hospitals
etc.
(e) The Christian Missionaries also actively promoted educational advancement, albeit with
a heavy European bias.
P.E.N. Tindall noted that they build schools and that through these schools, missionaries did an
immense amount of work on the structure of African language, reducing them to written form
with the alphabet. They produced grammar books, translated religious and educational books
into vernacular and published such works at mission printing presses.
Activities Of Hunters, Traders, Explorers and Missionaries in Zimbabwe Between 1800 –

1890
The General Overview

The nineteenth century witnessed a growing interest in the Central African interior, first, among
the Portuguese in Mozambique and in Angola. The course of southern and central African
history might not have changed very much, had it not been for this increasing interest from
outsiders, especially Europeans. It was the activities, reports and writings of the European
traders, hunters and missionaries which helped to focus Europe’s interest in the African interior
in the nineteenth century after years of association with Africa. The result of this growing
interest in the African interior was the ultimate colonization of the continent by various European
powers.
Hunters and Traders in Matabeleland

From the mid 1850s, central Africa attracted white hunters, traders and travellers from South
Africa. The first ivory trader to enter Matabeleland was Sam Edwards and he entered
Matabeleland in the company of Robert Moffat. Moffat was a missionary and a friend to
Mzilikazi. Another white man to visit the Ndebele capital was Edward Chapman who entered
the Ndebele state in the 1860s. Chapman frequently brought mail and supplies to the London
Missionary Society Station at Inyathi. Henry Hartley also hunted in Zimbabwe regularly and is
said to have killed about 1 200 elephants in one year.
According to Mashingaidze and Needham (1985), most of these hunters’ activities were in
Matabeleland, probably because Mzililikazi did not want them to hunt in Mashonaland to avoid
the Shona from obtaining guns. However, in 1865 Piet Jacobs and Hartley were allowed to hunt

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in Mashonaland. It was during his hunting expeditions that Hartley found old gold mines that
had been abandoned. His exaggerated reports, and that of Karl Mauch, (another hunter) caused a
great deal of excitement about the possibilities of rich gold deposits in Mashonaland. The
‘second rand’ suspicion was brewed from these reports.
Thomas Baines, another fortune seeker, visited Matabeleland in 1868, and in 1871, he was
granted a concession by Lobengula. The concession allowed him to prospect for gold between
Gweru River and Hunyani River in Mashonaland. Hartley joined Fredrick Courteney Selous
who was also a hunter in Mashonaland and knew the Zimbabwean Plateau very well. This
knowledge of Zimbabwe made him to be appointed by Rhodes as the one to direct the Pioneer
column. He led the pioneer column to Mashonaland because his knowledge of the Zimbabwe
plateau was excellent. It was on Selous’ advice that a road between Bulawayo and Chegutu was
cut and cleared to facilitate easy transportation of ivory and hides.
Traders, Hunters and Explorers were followed by the more dangerous concession seekers
sponsored by imperialists such as Rhodes. The first Christian missionaries to enter into central
Africa were the Portuguese who came to the Kongo Kingdom in the 15th Century. In Zimbabwe,
father Gonzalo da Silveira, a Portuguese Jesuit managed to convert Mutapa Negomo
Mapunzagutu and the queen mother, Chiuyu. He also left a handful of royal converts before his
assassination in the 1560s.
Father Gonzalo da Silveira left an impact in the Mutapa state. The missionaries who came after
him from Portugal did not have problems converting the royal members of the Mutapa state.
Mwenemutapas, who got baptized, had their traditional names dropped in preference to
Portuguese names such as Sabastine, Pedro, Phillip etc. The sons of Mutapa who accepted
Christianity were sent to Portugal for education and civilization. None of the two that were sent,
ever returned. All in all, the earliest missionary efforts at spreading Christianity, commerce and
civilization did not achieve much, due to hostilities between the missionaries themselves and
resistance from Africans who viewed the new religion with a lot of suspicion.
The London Missionary Society entered the Zimbabwe Plateau after the Portuguese. It was led
by Dr Robert Moffat who headed a mission at Kuruman. This is the same Moffat who
established friendship with Lobengula’s father, Mzilikazi, in 1829 in Transvaal. Because of this
longstanding friendship, Mzilikazi allowed John Smith Moffat, a son to Dr Robert Moffat, to
establish a mission at Inyathi in 1859. In 1870, Lobengula allowed the establishment of a second
mission by the L.M.S at Hope Fountain. The missionaries spent their time preaching, teaching,
repairing guns and inoculating cattle. The Ndebele king also used missionaries to treat the sick
and write the kings letters. The king himself was treated of gout. The missionaries were in turn
allowed to preach to the Ndebele people. Ironically, the Ndebele king forbade his people from
accepting and following the new Whiteman’s religion. New Ndebele converts were scorned and
punished.
Christian teachings emphasized individual accountability to God alone, thus undermining
African ideologies of divine leadership. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni in Raftopoulos (2008)
the missionaries promoted the idea of equality which the caste system of the Ndebele denounced.
They dismissed African ways of worshipping God as nothing but paganism, and regarded
vadzimu (ancestral spirits) as demons and evil spirits. The LMS efforts to convert the Ndebele
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were fruitless. Missionaries working in Matabeleland for LMS included Charles Helm, David
Carnegie, Sykes and Thomson and their families.
It was well after the failure of the LMS at missionary work, that missionaries thought that the
success at ‘Christianization’ itself lay in the colonization of the Ndebele and Shona
consciousness, especially the Ndebele who had resisted conversion throughout the 1880s and
1890s before the destruction of the Ndebele state. Some missionaries began to work with the
imperial agents. They connived with them with the aim to remove the African ruling classes that
were a stumbling block in their Christian mission. The London Missionary Society’s
representative in Transvaal was sent after careful consideration by Rhodes to sign (negotiate) a
treaty with Lobengula. Several missionaries lost African trust by working with colonial agents.
John Smith Moffat was trusted by Lobengula as a man of God, but he (Moffat) regarded the
Ndebele as ‘an army of war mongers......, a nation of murderers whose hand is against every
man’. Moffat also believed, as cited in Mashingaidze, 1985, that “.......it would be a blessing to
the world if the Ndebele were broken up.” These utterances by Moffat were meant to justify
colonization of the Ndebele state.
Unaware that Moffat was no longer a good friend, Lobengula granted him a concession on behalf
of the imperialist Rhodes who had carefully chosen Moffat, knowing well that Lobengula trusted
him. Therefore he would not deny him a concession. The Moffat treaty was signed on 11
February 1888 under which Lobengula promised not to give any further concessions or to enter
into any treaties without the permission from the British. The Moffat treaty overshadowed the
Grobler treaty which Lobengula had signed with the Transvaal representative, Piet Grobler, in
1887.
A few months after the signing of the Moffat Treaty, the Rudd Concession, which justified
British colonization of Zimbabwe, was signed. Again, the trusted missionaries John Smith
Moffat and Charles Helm, whom Lobengula affectionately called ‘Umfundisi’, influenced
Lobengula to sign the Rudd Concession by giving him the impression that he was going to get
British protection against colonialism, and that no more than ten men would come to mine in
Matabeleland. This was a verbal assurance that was never included in the actual document.
What had started as genuine missionary work, was taking on a violent colonial dimension, with
Christian missionaries playing a deceitful front role.
1) Why were missionary activities more successful in Mashonaland than Matabeleland?

2) Were missionaries always vanguards of European imperialism in Zimbabwe?
3) How far did Christian missionary activities help Africans to adapt to the changes brought by
the introduction of colonial rule?
4) “The work of Christian missionaries and European colonialists were mutually supportive”.
How far do you agree?

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5) “The flag followed the cross” discuss the validity of this view with reference to the work
of missionaries in Pre-colonial Zimbabwe
6) To what extent did the Christian missionaries change the socio-economic and political
landscape of Africa politics before between 1850-1893.?
7) How valid is the view that missionary activity ought to prepare the African mind for full
colonial occupation?
8) Critically examine the various ways by which Africa re-acted to missionary work and
colonial occupation between 1880 - 1893.
(9) ‘The missionary activities in Zimbabwe before 1860 were more constructive than
destructive’ Discuss.
(10) Why did the missionaries find it difficult to penetrate Ndebele society?
(11) Assess’s the roles played by missioneries, hunter’s trades and concession scekers in the
colonization of Zimbabwe.
REFERENCES
Mashingaidze, E and D.E. Needham, from Iron Age to Independence. Longman 1985
Raftopoulos, B and Mlambo, A (eds) A history from the pre-colonial period to 2008: Becoming
Zimbabwe Jacana Media, 2008
P E N Tindall. A history of Southern and Central Africa.

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CHAPTER 11
THE COLONISATION OF ZIMBABWE
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES

a) To outline the events leading to the occupation of Zimbabwe.
b) Examine the role played by Rhodes in the colonisation of Zimbabwe.
c) Assess the extent to which Lobengula was deceived.
In our previous chapter, we noted that as early as 1868, European traders, adventurers and
hunters flocked into Matabeleland in large numbers. Rumours of gold bearing rocks at Tati and
Gwelo River had been grossly exaggerated that by late 1884, Lobengula the King of the
Matabele state was the most important ruler south of the Zambezi. When gold was discovered in
South Africa in 1886, speculation became rife that there were other Rands north of Limpompo.
Hunters, prospectors and explorers such as Hartely, Selous and Baines all confirmed evidence of
gold workings in Zimbabwe. This triggered the scramble for the occupation of Zimbabwe
between the Transvaal Boers, the British and the Portuguese. In other words, it can be said
Zimbabwe was colonised for her anticipated mineral wealth.
Transvaal Boers had an interest in the colonisation of Zimbabwe. They wanted an independent
port outside British control. The targeted port was Beira, but to have access to it they had to
control Zimbabwe. The desire by the Boers to occupy Zimbabwe created rivalry between Britain
and Transvaal. By 1884 the Cape Colony was under the British. Mozambique had fallen into the
Portuguese hands, while Namibia was occupied by the Germans. Transvaal was colonised by the
Boers, and in 1885 Britain declared Botswana, their protectorate blocking the Germans and the
Boers from advancing into the interior. Transvaal as mentioned earlier in this chapter wished to
expand northwards to have access to the port of Beira. In this regard, the occupation of
Zimbabwe by Boers would give them a geographical advantage to Mozambique. On the other
hand, the British at the Cape wished to encircle Transvaal with British colonies in an effort to
force her to accept British control.
Rhodes’ imperialist motive also rendered the colonisation of Zimbabwe inevitable. He was
determined to seize for the British as much of Africa as possible for the prestige of that country.
Rhodes’ Cape to Cairo dream meant a continuous British territory from the Cape to Egypt. This
was pure imperialism for its own sake. Due to this reason, Mukanya (1999) asserts that, minerals
or no minerals, Transvaal encirclement or no encirclement, Zimbabwe would have been
occupied all the same and very likely by the BSAC. (British South Africa Company)
In 1887, Transvaal Boers sent two representatives, Pieter and Frederick Grobler to negotiate a
friendship treaty between Transvaal and Matabeleland. The Grobler treaty was signed in July

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1887. By this treaty Transvaal was going to have representatives in Bulawayo. From
Lobengula’s point of view, the signing of this treaty was a renewal of his father’s friendship with
the Transvaal of 1853. Later, Lobengula denied ever having signed such a treaty. Fortunately for
the British, there were no independent witnesses to the treaty and of those who signed, only the
Groblers could read. The British government disregarded the Grobler treaty, but the Transvaal
went on to appoint Pieter Grobler as Consul of the republic in Matabeleland, a post he accepted,
but never worked as Consul because he died on his way to Transvaal. The death of Pierter
Grobler gave the British a leeway to disregard the Grobler treaty. However, the important feature
of this process was to culminate in the colonisation of Zimbabwe.
The Moffat Treaty 1888

The activities of Transvaal Boers spurred Rhodes to action. He had no wish to see Matabeleland
slip into Transvaal hands. He persuaded J. S Moffat, the son of Robert Moffat, and former
missionary at Inyathi to negotiate an understanding between Lobengula and the British
government. Tindall (1984) had hinted that Moffat left missionary, work to take up
administration for the British government. He was at that time stationed at Papapye in Botswana.
Moffat was a good candidate for this mission because he knew Lobengula well since his days in
Matabeleland as head of Inyathi mission. Lobengula trusted Moffat as an old good friend.
Moffat succeeded in persuading the King to cancel the Grobler treaty and to enter into a new
agreement with the British. Lobengula signed the Moffat treaty on the pretext that Moffat
represented the ‘Great white queen’ In February 1888 the King signed the Moffat treaty under
which the king agreed to be a friend of the British queen and promised not to enter into any
agreement with any other country without the consent of the British High Commissioner in
South Africa. An analysis of the terms of the Moffat treaty reveals that by this treaty Lobengula
had placed his territory within the British sphere of influence. Transvaal protested against the
treaty. By the international law accepted in Europe at that time, Moffats and Groblers agreements
had more or less equal validity, but the British government stood behind the Moffat treaty. The
white population swelled in Matabeleland. This included concession seekers, adventurers, Ivory
hunters, explorers and traders. They pretended to be friends to Lobengula in their effort to obtain
concessions from the king. The king was in a dilemma as to which group of white people to trust.
According to Mashingayidze and Needham (1971), the British hunters and explorers advised the
King that the British would be better to deal with than the Boers or Portuguese. Lobengula was
persuaded that the best way to prevent either the Boers or Portuguese from taking his country
was to grant British groups mining and trading rights, who would in return help to defend his
country. The King’s position was further complicated by the growing impatience of his
amabutho who were eager to drive the whites away. The young Ndebele soldiers were inspired
by the defeat of the British at the Battle of Isandhwana by the Zulu. They thought that they could
also defeat the British. Lobengula restrained his regiments from provoking the whites for he
feared their superior maxim guns against his inferior assegais. On the other hand the king
diplomatically tried to prevent the inevitable destruction of his kingdom.
The Moffat treaty placed the British at a better position as for as the imperial race to the north
was concerned. To make the position more secure, Rhodes despatched his own mission to
Lobengula to negotiate a mineral concession. The mission consisted of three carefully chosen

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men. These were Charles Rudd, a member of Rhodes’ De Beers Consolidated Company, Frank
Thompson, a fluent Nguni speaker and Rochfort Maguire, a lawyer who knew Rhodes from
Oxford days.
These men reached Bulawayo in September 1888 and negotiations for a treaty began after five
weeks, for it was difficult to arrange an audience with the King. They only got his audience with
the support of the local missionary, Father Charles Helm, whom Lobengula trusted as the man of
God. Lobengula was bewildered by the assertions of the rival concession seekers and could not
decide which, was the best group to work with. Sir Sydney Shippard, the then British high
commissioner, in Botswana helped to dispel the doubts which Lobengula had about the British
when he referred to the relationship between the Ndebele and the British as defined by the
Moffat treaty. He assured Lobengula that the three men represented powerful business interests
which could not be said of all the concession seekers. The king fell into a net of deception.
Shippard according to Davidson (1984) was known in Botswana as the father of lies! A few days
after Shippard’s departure, Lobengula agreed to meet Rhodes’ men.
Negotiated terms of the Rudd Concession During Negotiations.

Rudd emphasised that:
a) Rhodes would ‘protect’ Matabeleland from European colonisation
b) Rhodes would put notices in the newspapers notifying white people that they should keep
out of Matabeleland.
c) He lied that not more than ten men would come to mine in Matabeleland and that these
men would abide by Ndebele laws.
On the strength of the above lies and assurances, Lobengula put his signature on the Rudd
document on 30 October 1888. Lobengula did not know that a mine cannot be worked by ten
men. He did not have any mining experience. The negotiated promises were not in the proper
concession. Father Helm did not see anything wrong (reprehensible) in this dishonesty.
Documented (Actual) terms of the Rudd Concession

In the words of the concession, according to Tindall (1984), Lobengula gave complete and
exclusive charge over all metals and minerals situated and contained in his Kingdoms,
principalities and dominions together with full permission to do all things that they may deem
necessary to win and procure the same! Lobengula had agreed to grant no concessions to any
other whites without the permission of Rhodes.
In return, Lobengula would receive a monthly payment of £100, a thousand rifles, and a gunboat
on the Zambezi or £500 instead. Commenting on the terms of the Rudd concession Mukanya
(1999) sympathised with Lobengula and concluded that the King was a victim of calculated
deception. What was discussed and negotiated upon was not what the actual document
contained. Upon persuasion from his trusted ‘umfundisi’ Father Helm, and Lobengula’s Indunas,
Lotshe and Sikombo, Lobengula put an X on a document that had different terms altogether.
Mukanya also indicated that the gunboat was not meant for Lobengula’s comfort but it was for

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the patrol of the Zambezi and to check on the Portuguese expansion but was never delivered to
the King.
Armed with the Rudd concession which gave him the semblance of legality, Rhodes rushed to
London to get the Queen’s permission to form a company that would colonise and administer
Zimbabwe on behalf of Britain. The charter which Rhodes needed had to outline rules which the
company would abide by. Rhodes wanted to obtain a charter for his company to implement the
Rudd concession before other European nations could convince Lobengula to disregard the Rudd
concession. In 1889 the BSAC was formed. It was an amalgamation of some of the richest
companies such as the De Beers and Consolidated Gold fields.
In Matabeleland, Lobengula was later informed by Maund about the actual contents of the Rudd
document. Maund hoped to win the King’s favours for a trade concession for his own group. He
also suggested to Lobengula that he should send some Indunas to England to stop Rhodes from
obtaining the charter. Maund himself volunteered to accompany the King’s emissaries to the
Queen. In February 1889, Lobengula sent his two ambassadors, Babiyane and Mthane to
London. Rhodes got the news of Lobengula’s delegation. He sent his friend Dr Jameson to
reassure Lobengula because he feared the King might repudiate the concession.
Why Rhodes managed to get the Charter.

The British government was attracted to the policy of acquiring colonies run by commercial
companies without direct responsibility of the government. Lord Salisbury the conservative
Prime minister shared the same ideas with Rhodes, he believed in British imperialism but was
aware that the British population would not consent to another tax burden for the sake of
administering overseas territories.
To industrialists, merchants and financiers, Rhodes was both a guiding star and someone on
whom they pinned their hopes. The Indunas that had been sent to complain to the queen were
delayed in London upon Rhodes’ advice, until he obtained a charter. Maund, who had advised
Lobengula that he had been cheated, later supported Rhodes. Davidson had confirmed that
Rhodes had written to Maund in London and instructed Maund to stop assisting Lobengula’s
mission in its efforts to prevent the British government from granting the charter to the BSAC.
Thus Maund kept the two Indunas in London until such time as Rhodes had won support for the
charter. Rhodes owned millions of pounds of the DeBeers money. Mashingaidze believes that
Rhodes used his money to buy or bribe rivals and opponents in both Southern Africa and Britain.
Some, for example, W.A Elliot who at the first time were opposed to a company being granted
colonial powers for fear of exploiting the natives, were bribed into silence by Rhodes. Elliot
received 100 shares in the chartered company from Rhodes. British government granted Rhodes
the charter because they were equally reluctant to let the country pass into Transvaal or
Portuguese hands.
In 1889 Rhodes was granted the Royal Charter. It recognised Rhodes’ claim over the Rudd
concession of 1888. Rhodes was allowed by the Charter to form a company to colonise the
whole of Central Africa and to form a police force the British South Africa Police to maintain
law and order in the region.

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In Bulawayo, the atmosphere was highly charged. Lobengula was annoyed by these
developments and ordered for the execution of Lotshe for having persuaded him to sign the Rudd
concession.
The Pioneer Column, and the Occupation of Mashonaland.

After obtaining the Charter Rhodes went on to recruit the Pioneer group that was to occupy
Zimbabwe. The pioneers included English, and Africans. Two hundred men were needed and
most of them were under 30 years. They were of different trades’ e.g black smiths, carpenters,
builders, printers, bakers, miners, farmers, tailors and traders. Each of these was promised 3000
acres of land and 15 gold claims. The pioneers were to be accompanied by a police, military
force, not only to keep order among the white population but also crush any resistance by the
people of Zimbabwe. Khama of Botswana provided 200 auxiliaries. Fredrick C. Selous a hunter,
whose knowledge of the land was excellent, guided the column.
When the pioneers assembled at Macloutsie river in large numbers, Davidson assets that the
King sent his messengers protesting thus, ‘Has the King killed any white man that an Impi was
collecting on his border, or have the white men lost anything they are looking for?” (Davidson
1984:89).Jameson replied that the soldiers were not directed against Lobengula but were merely
an escort for protection on the way to Mashonaland, by the road the King had approved.
The Ndebele regiments wanted to fight, but Lobengula restrained them. Finally on 12 September,
the pioneers made their settlement at a place which the leaders called fort Salisbury, in honour of
the imperialist British Prime Minister. The company’s flag was first raised there on 12
September 1890. Thereafter, the day was celebrated as the day of Rhodesia’s foundation.
Colquhoun was to act as the company’s administrator.
The Anglo-Ndebele War: 1893-4. Long term causes of the war

Dr Jameson was appointed Resident Commissioner of Mashonaland after Colquhoun resigned in
1891. Jameson must shoulder a fair responsibility for causing the 1893-4 war with the Ndebele.
The Ndebele-White relationships rapidly deteriorated soon after he came to office. In order to
stir up a war hysteria Jameson informed the public at large about the preparations for war being
made by the Ndebele, about the approach of their troops to company forts, and about their
assaults on the Shona and on the Europeans. Every aspect of these reports by Dr Jameson was
pure fiction. These lies enabled the government to make it appear that it was forced, contrary to
its own peacefulness, to attack the Ndebele. The British government gave the company
permission to increase its own armed forces.
After the settler occupation of Mashonaland, friction between the settlers and the Ndebele was
inevitable for they pursued different interests. The Ndebele regarded the eastern parts as their
raiding grounds, while the Company and settler farmers saw it as a source of cheap labour.
Jameson thought that to delay the clash, a boundary was to be established between the area under
Company control and Matabeleland. The boundary was to be respected by both parties.
Lobengula was told not to let his warriors cross into Mashonaland, and prospectors, hunters and
company personnel were likewise informed not to stray beyond the boundary demarcated by

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Jameson. The Ndebele king could not accept the border issue since no boundary existed before
the coming of the whites. Moreover the boundary was never static, it subsequently shifted
encroaching into the Ndebele area. The boundary issue helped to heighten hostilities.
Some Shona leaders thought that the white settler occupation meant the end of Ndebele raids.
Some of them even stopped the payment of tribute to the Ndebele king. In 1891 chiefs such as
Nemakonde, and Chivi were killed by Lobengula for not paying their annual tribute to him.
These acts were not tolerable to the white settlers and farmers who thought that Lobengula was
molesting and frightening their labour force. The response of the white settlers and Jameson to
the behaviour of the Ndebele culminated in what historians remember as the Victoria incident.
Victoria Incident: Immediate causes of the Anglo Ndebele war.

Following the killing of Chiefs Chivi and Nemakonde in 1891 Jameson pleaded with Lobengula
to keep his army under strict control. Lobengula assured Jameson that whites had nothing to fear.
From 1892 a number of raids against the Shona in Masvingo took place. In May 1893 some men
under headman Gomara, cut and carried away 5-yards of telegraph wire possibly to make snares.
Gomara was ordered either to hand over the culprits or to pay a fine in the form of cattle. He paid
in cattle, which Lobengula later claimed to be his. Lobengula demanded their immediate return.
Jameson returned the cattle to Lobengula. During this same time, news reached Lobengula that
some men under the headman, Bere had taken cattle belonging to Lobengula. The already
charged Lobengula decided that the Shona in Victoria district had to be taught a lesson. A
raiding army was dispatched under the command of Manyao and Mgandani with instructions
from the king not to harm the whites. On 9 July the Ndebele army was seen killing men, driving
away cattle and women in areas of Zimuto and Bere. Within few days, white farms and mines in
Masvingo district had been deserted by their Shona labourers. Jameson was informed of
developments in Victoria. He sent instructions to captain Lendy that he should demand the return
of all cattle from the Ndebele and that the raiders should withdraw beyond the border and was
authorised to drive them by force if they proved to be uncooperative.
Jamson held a meeting with the leaders of the raiding party. He told Manyao and Mgandani that
no refugees would be returned to them and ordered them to drive their army away across the
border immediately or else he would drive them by force. Mgandani indicated that it would be
difficult to drive such a large army within the stipulated time of two hours. Lendy followed them
after 2 hours on horse back and caught up with half of the Ndebele army. Tindall explains that
this group was destroying a near-by village. Lendy gave the order to attack and a dozen
Matabele, including Mgandani were killed. Lobengula was greatly angered by this incident that
he refused to take his monthly subsidy of £100 and started preparing for a full scale war with the
whites. Jameson wanted to see the Ndebele state destroyed, for it was an obstacle to their
intended complete colonisation of Zimbabwe. They hoped to find gold in Matabeleland after
their efforts in Mashonaland had been frustrated. Jameson gave up hope of incorporating
Matabeleland peacefully under company rule and decided that the conquest of this Kingdom was
essential.

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The course of the war:

The company’s forces were divided into three groups: One stationed at Salisbury, under
command of Forbes, another at Fort Victoria led by Captain Allan Willson and a third stationed
at fort Tuli under captain Pennefather. The three columns converged at Bulawayo with the aim to
crush the Ndebele and capturing the King.
The Shangani river battle:

This was the first encounter between the company recruits and the Ndebele. The Ndebele
soldiers attacked under cover of the night but were repulsed. At dawn another attack was
launched by the Ndebele, but the company held firm. The whites suffered few casualties while
500 out of 6 000 Ndebele warriors were killed.
The Mbembesi Battle

The Company columns advanced towards Bulawayo. On 1 November the Ndebele regiments,
Ingubo , Imbizo, and Insukamini attacked. Ndebele losses were high due to the 7 pounder guns
used by the whites. The settler volunteers lost 4 men and 7 were seriously wounded. On 4
November the Company forces reached Bulawayo and found the city on fire because Lobengula
had set it on before escaping. The union Jack was hoisted in Matabeleland and this marked the
complete conquest of Zimbabwe. A column under Major Forbes was dispatched to pursue and
capture, Lobengula. Lobengula was vital for negotiations of peace and formal surrender if the
Ndebele amabutho were to accept defeat. The column gave up hope of ever finding the king after
the Allan Wilson patrol group was wiped out by the Ndebele who ambushed them at the battle of
Pupa in Shangani.
Results of Anlgo-Ndebele war.
- One important result of this war was the complete colonisation of Zimbabwe after
Matebeleland had been besieged.
- In 1895 Matabeleland and Mashonaland became known as Rhodesia
- The Ndebele lost their independence, and land. They were driven to infertile areas of
Gwai and Shangani.
- Under colonial administration the Ndebele were forced to pay a series of taxes.
The Ndebele were not allowed to elect another Ndebele king after the disappearance of
Lobengula. Ndebele amabutho were disarmed. They were forced to surrender their assegais to
the Company administrators. Finally they were given maize to plant in the semi arid areas of
Gwai where according to Davidson only stones could grow.

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1) Evaluate steps followed by Cecil John Rhodes to colonise Zimbabwe.

2) Discuss the assertion that ‘the Ndebele -Shona relations in the 19th century were far from
cordial.’
3) Analyse efforts made by Lobengula to prevent the colonisation and final destruction of
the Ndebele state.
4) Assess the view that Lobengula was a victim of deception.
5) Assess the reasons for the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893.
6) What external pressures did Lobengula face prior to the colonisation of Matabeleland?
7) Consider the view that even though the Ndebele were defeated in the 1893 war, the
Ndebele state still remained as strong as before.
8) How justified is the view that Rhodes was determined to destroy the Ndebele state
despite Lobengula’s cautious response?
References
Davidson A, Cecil Rhodes and His time Progressive Publishers, London 1984.
Mashingaidze E and Needham D.E from Iron Age to Independence, Longman Zimbabwe 1985
Phimister and Proctor, People and Power Mazongororo paper converters, Zimbabwe, Harare
1991
Tindal P,E,N. A History of southern and central Africa Longman 1984
Demonstration Essay
“Lobengula was a victim of calculated deception.” How valid is this assertion when applied to
the colonisation of Zimbabwean from 1870- 1890.
P.E.N Tindall (1984) noted that as early as 1868, European traders, adventurers and hunters
flocked into Matebeleland in large numbers. This was because of the speculation that there was
another Rand north of Limpopo similar to the Rand that was discovered in Sothern Africa in
1886. The Period 1870- 1890 clearly indicates that Lobengula was a victim of deception due to
his illiteracy in the imperialist struggle of Zimbabwe.
The first point to note is that, all treaties that were signed by Lobengula with the whites were
made by unscrupulous literate whites seeking to exploit the gold and other asserts in the northern
African lands. Lobengula was dealing with treacherous lawyers who had graduated from
Europe’s renowned Universities. Missionaries like Charles Helm and Moffat deceived
Lobengula by pretending to be men of God when in actual fact they were men of Rhodes. Tindall

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hinted that Moffat had left missionary work and taken up administration for the British
government. This was not known to Lobengula who continued to respect Moffat as a man of
God whom he could trust. When Lobengula was persuaded to cancel the Grobler treaty by
Moffat, the King, basing upon the respect he had on Moffat quickly disregarded the Grobler
treaty and nailed himself to the British through the Moffat treaty of 1888, which placed the
King’s territory within the British sphere of influence. All the whites who flocked into
Matabeleland pretended to be friends to Lobengula in their efforts to obtain concessions from the
king. The King was in a dilemma as to which group of white people to trust. The British
explorers and hunters, like Selous, advised the king that the British were better to deal with.
Lobengula was cheated that in order to prevent either the Boers or the Portuguese from taking his
country he was to grant British groups mining and hunting rights who would in turn help in
defending his country. Lobengula was a victim of deception who at the stretch of a pen and a
signature which came in the form of a ‘cross’ put on the Rudd concession unconsciously
‘sacrificed’ Zimbabwe on the altar of British colonialism.
He put an X on a document in 1888 that had different terms altogether. He fell into the net of
deception. Father Helm did not see anything wrong in deceiving Lobengula. It is clear that
Lobengula fell prey to the deceptive treaties of 1887 and 1888 and even how the Charter was
clandestinely awarded to Rhodes despite Lobengula’s protests.
Rhodes acquired both the Rudd concession and the charter through conspiracy and deception of
Lobengula. He bribed Lotshe by giving him 300 souvenirs so that as a senior Induna he would
persuade Lobengula to sign the Rudd concession, which in fact was presented conspiratorially in
two forms. Lobengula set forth conditions which were regarded as part of the agreement though
they were verbal. He agreed that the grantees would bring no more than ten white men at a time
to perform mining work in his territories and their firearms would be surrendered to Lobengula.
Mukanya (1999) concluded that the King was a victim of calculated deception because what was
promised Lobengula was not in the concession document. The document only stated that
Lobengula conceded to Rhodes and his companions “compete and exclusive charge over all
things that they may deem necessary to win and procure the same.” (Davison 1984). There was
no mention in the document that not more than ten men would come to Matabeleland and that
they would abide by the Ndebele laws. Nevertheless at the end of the text Father Helm’s
shamelessly declared, according to Davidson that “ I hereby certify that the accompanying
document has been fully interpreted and explained by me to the chief Lobengula and his full
council of Indunas and that all the constitutional usages of the Matabele nation had been
complied with prior to his executing the same.”
The Ndebele were keen to publicize the story of this fraud as widely as possible hoping to
frustrate the activities of their enemies. Unfortunately when Rhodes discovered that Lobengula
was assisted by Maund, he bribed Maund so that he would drop his habit of assisting Lobengula.

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CHAPTER 13
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA
1898-1963
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
a) Describe the nature of company administration in Southern Rhodesia up to 1951.
b) Assess African living conditions under colonial administration.
General Overview
After the suppression of the Shona- Ndebele uprising of 1896-7, the British South Africa
Company (BSAC) was strongly criticised by those who wished to see the Charter revoked. They
wanted the government to take over the responsibility for Rhodesia as a protectorate but this
would have involved the government in expenses. However, the British government could not
afford to dispense with Rhodes and the Company and felt committed to maintaining the charter.
In 1898, Southern Rhodesia was given a Resident Commissioner to act as a ‘watchdog’ of the
British government, whose duties included supervision of the police.
Orders-In-Council 1898
The Rhodesian Orders- in-Council combined Matabeleland and Mashonaland under one
administration with headquarters at Salisbury (Harare). Rhodesia was given a new constitution to
ensure a sound basis for this administration. The new constitution provided for an Executive
council and a Legislative council. In both councils, the company administrator was the presiding
administrator. The first Southern Rhodesian constitution was written by Lord Milner, who at that
time was a South African High Commissioner. A Legislative council consisting of five members,
appointed by the company, and four elected members, was established to make laws that would
be approved by the South African High Commissioner. Voting initially was made the preserve of
literate male British subjects above 21 years and who possessed property valued at £75. This
means that Africans had no rights to vote since they had no property worth the voting value. Pole
and dagga huts were and are still regarded as valueless. In 1912 voting property value was
amended to £150. In 1919 women were granted voting rights and this increased the numbers of
people on the voters roll.
Milton H.W. was company administrator from 1898 to 1914 and he set up a number of
government departments. He modelled his administration in the fashion of that of the Cape
Colony.

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Land
As early as 1894, Africans began to lose their land. After the first Chimurenga, the whites began
to alienate African land, but had no legal rights to do so, except on the basis that they had
conquered the blacks. Reserves were created for the black settlement, which were poor, tsetse
infested and prone to drought. Upon creation of these reserves from as early as 1894, the
Company administrators hoped to make the reserves temporarily on the belief that these Africans
would be absorbed in the money market. Between 1908 and 1915 the Company took 1, 5 million
acres of the best farm land away from the reserves. Boundaries for all reserves were redrawn to
exclude any areas that had rich soils, good climate conditions and that received adequate rainfall.
Many people were pushed into newly created reserves, and by 1912 those blacks who still lived
on land outside the reserves were slapped with extra taxes, for example, grazing fees’ for their
livestock. This drove many blacks to reserves most of which were far from railway transport and
road networks. Phimister and Proctor (1991) confirm that by the early 1920s, nearly 65% of the
black population in Southern Rhodesia lived in the reserves.
The Peasantisation of the African 1892-1920:

A peasant is a rural cultivator who works the land as his own, but sends his surplus to the market.
The beginning of colonialism in 1890 ushered in the rise of African peasantry. At first, Africans
wanted to go on living in their traditional ways although much of their land had been alienated to
white settlers. Africans were not used to a money economy, but as time passed by, the
introduction of several taxes compelled them to produce surplus on their small farms for sale to
find money for taxes. As long as taxes were paid, peasants were forced to sell everything they
produced. African peasants preferred to earn money through selling their crops for rents and
taxes rather than leave their homes to work for whites.
According to Ranger T.O (1970), a few black farmers became wealthy and were able to buy land
in African Purchase areas. Some of these became successful farmers and began to support the
government. The government, according to Ranger, depended entirely on food grown by
Africans. Most blacks in various districts did not have land therefore, they had to pay rent to
white farmers who did not utilise their farms very much but relied on rent collected from the
‘squatter’ peasants living on the land. The mines also provided a ready market for the black
farmers produce. However, the peasants’ fortune changed from 1903 when many farmers’
(whites) ventured intro agriculture due to frustrations on failure to find the second Rand. This
increased the demand for land by whites, and laws were passed by the government to get rid of
the African peasant. High rents were demanded by white farmers who rented their pieces of land
to ‘squatter’ peasants.
Morris Carter Commission

This commission altered native reserves and recommended that people were supposed to
continue living in reserves as they were slowly assimilated into the labour market. The Morris
Carter Commission recommended segregation of all land according to race ownership on
permanent basis. The controversy of this Commission is on whether it was to protect the interests

137
of the Africans or satisfy the Europeans. The Commission, according to Collin Leys (1977)
states that, ‘In the best interests of the two races, the commission hold that the members of the
two races cannot live together side by side, probably for generations to come ... and it is better
that the points of contact in this respect between the two races should be reduced’ As a result of
this Commission, Africans were no longer allowed to purchase land on the same basis as the
Europeans and were to be restricted to the native reserves and some to small native purchase
areas where they could buy land.
White farmers who had best land close to markets and railway lines could rapidly increase their
agricultural production and size of their cattle herds.
White farmers received financial aid from the government in the form of loans and scientific
advice about the best ways to grow cash crops. Contrary to this, Africans only received advice on
how to grow the same crops on a smaller plot. This was meant to reduce competition between
white farmers and African peasants so that more people could be forced off white owned land
and made to live in the reserves which by 1925 were becoming overcrowded and overstocked.
In 1929, the Morris Charter was accepted and enacted as the land Apportionment Act of 1930,
and came into effect on 1 April 1931, the all fools day.
The land Apportionment Act of 1931

This Act set aside half the country’s best land for settler farmers. Between 1930 and 1950 most
peasants were, forced off the land set aside for whites and even if the white owners were not
using the land. Land was set aside for unborn white children and for future use by the
government. The Land Apportionment Act was a well orchestrated move meant to reduce the
African farmers’ entry into the cash crops and also to frustrate African peasants’ efforts to buy
land from the government close to and in competition with Europeans. The, entire country was
divided into white or black with some land left for game reserves. The land apportionment act
created two separate societies, black and white. There was a two pyramid policy which rested on
the territorial separation of the two races. The Act also decreed that all Africans living on
European land had to be removed. The conditions under which the African could occupy land in
the European area were tightened. Instead of solving the problems of overcrowding in the
reserves, the act put more pressure on the already overcrowded reserves leading to land
deterioration due to overgrazing, destructive methods of cultivation and overcrowding. By 1938,
about 4 million areas of land in reserves were reported to be damaged. The acreage for damaged
land increased to 8 million by 1949. Gullies and dongas developed especially along the roads
leading to the dip tanks. This resulted in river siltation which also resulted in running out of
water.
The Native land Husbandry Act of 1951.

The Dansiger Commission of 1949 had recommended that Africans had to have a permanent
home in the reserves. The Commission also recommended that African livestock be cut down
through destocking. The Native land Husbandry Act was formed as the basis of the Dansiger

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Commission. It was meant to put right things that had gone wrong with the Land Apportionment
Act of 1931.
By the Land Husbandry Act, chiefs lost their power to allocate land. Land was now allocated by
the Native Commissioners. The chiefs reacted against the Land Husbandry Act. The act dictated
that households were to be registered. Those who were not present at the time of registration lost
their land rights automatically.
Conservation methods had to be closely monitored by the agricultural demonstrators who used
coercive methods. The attempts to stop soil erosion failed as pressure on land continued.
Individual land holdings were too small for sound agricultural programmes. About 111 000
families could not get land, so the Land Husbandry Act did much to generate racial tension and
political agitation during the 1950-60s. These land policies were segregatory, equal to apartheid
that was practiced in South Africa.
Racial segregation was perpetrated down to, crops and animals. The introduction of new
oppressive legislations like the Maize Control Act of 1921, helped to squeeze extra money from
the peasants in order to help white farmers. By the Maize Control Act, African maize was bought
by the Maize Marketing Board at a cheaper price determined by the board. On all sales, a levy
was taken on the price paid to the farmer. In most cases, the Maize was not graded, it was all put
in grade D which fetched very little for the peasant farmer. The same was also felt by African
cattle farmers.
The Cattle Levy Act of 1931.

African cattle were sold through the Cold Storage Commission, which also pegged cattle pricing
on racial grounds. The idea was to drive Africans to town for manual jobs and to stop them from
competing with white farmers. As agriculture ceased to pay, many Africans flocked to towns. In
towns, people were expected to produce passes.They also needed money to pay a horde of taxes
that had been introduced to finance the government.
Land and Nationalism

Nationalism in Southern Rhodesia can be divided into two phases. The first phase is from 1930s
to 1960s, and the other one is from 1960s to the armed struggle.
The earliest resistance to colonial administration in Southern Rhodesia appeared during the First
World War with the formation of the Railway Workers Union in 1916. This was later followed
by the Mines and General workers Association, the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association and the
Industrial Commercial Workers Union. These early movements had been led by urbanised
foreigners, especially from South Africa. In the 1930s, indigenous Rhodesians began to lead, the
likes of Reverand Douglas T. Samkange and Aaron Jacha. These two were amongst the leaders
of the Southern Rhodesian African Congress formed in 1934. The party appealed to all people as

139
opposed to the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association which only appealed to the elite. The
formation of the ANC by Masotsha Ndlovu in 1957 spearheaded African nationalism.
Independent churches like the White Bird (Shirichena) led by Mathew Zvimba opposed the land
Apportionment Act. The 1930 show a simmering of Shona discontent provoked by dipping fees
and destocking. By about 1945-1965 people began to organise political parties intended at
removing settler government. African leaders promised the reallocation of land as a matter of top
priority. The Land Husbandry act saw the expulsion of the Africans from the European lands.
Urban lands were also affected by the land policies. Africans lived in temporary make shift
houses. They resided in locations and compounds which were closely associated to the reserves.
Africans had to move to towns because of the deplorable conditions in the reserves. Due to these
problems the first African political party was formed in 1957 led by Masotsha Ndlovu. The
African National Congress talked of the people’s closeness to the soil. They called themselves
‘Vana Vevhu,’ and talked of their right to their land. They did not want to work in mines and
towns. Europeans crafted the idea of depriving Africans so that they would work in the mines.
Africans were agriculturists and they saw no reason why they had to go to work in the mines and
ultimately labour shortage resulted.
The Native Rhodesia labour Bureau

Its main task was to resolve the contradiction which arose in labour supply during the years when
industries were cutting down wages. Industries aimed at output maximisation and cost
minimisation. To maximise production there was need to expand cheap labour force. The Native
Labour Bureau had to recruit labour force from within and outside Rhodesia. The NLB secured
involuntary labour because it was competing with South Africa, Witwatersrand.
The Bureau got the labour by rounding up Africans and forcibly taking them to the mines. This
drove the flow of voluntary labour from rural areas. The Bureau also waited for economic forces
like drought to push the peasants out of rural areas. Unfortunately, Africans began to shun the
labour from the Bureau because the Chibharo workers were exploited ruthlessly than any other
African labourers. They were deployed to worst mines where they were accommodated in
compounds that were overcrowded.
The Compound System

The system was brought about by the need to control and discipline labour force as well as to
eliminate diamond theft and illicit buying and selling of diamonds and gold. The system was
rigorously applied especially in the years of labour shortage by Europeans. Sjamboks and guns
were used liberally to stop strikes. Spies and informers were planted in the compounds to report
if workers were planning to strike. From 1908 several mine strikes occurred, such as at Aryshire
mine, 1908, Wankie mine, 1913 and the most celebrated Shamva mine strike in 1927. Reasons
for the strikes were the poor working conditions, low wages that were perpetuated by the rise in
cost of living. Workers were expected to buy from their mine bosses shops which were
expensive and kept them indebted. A compound was like a prison because married workers lived

140
far away from their wives. Letters from and to workers were read by management. Workers were
frequently beaten for failing to work hard or for any resistance which the management saw.
Sometimes black workers were assaulted by white settlers at work to the extent of death, but
these were treated as minor offenses. Black mine workers lived under very repressive situations
where it was very risky to organise or express discontent openly. As a result workers had to
develop hidden forms of struggle without being caught. Examples are:
-They deliberately worked very slowly and so reduced mine owners profits.
-They quietly destroyed machinery and other mine property which would be expensive to repair
or replace.
-Desertion was also common especially from mines whose management were notorious for
ruthlessness. Many flocked to better paying South African mines. Many migrant labourers from
Zambia and Malawi only worked for some few months in Zimbabwe and deserted to the south
after they saved some money for their journey. Mine workers from Southern Rhodesia also
joined in the movement to the South ‘Wenela.’ Many workers also illegally altered their passes
sometimes. They would forge their employers’ signatures to show that they had finished their
contract when in fact they had deserted. Some also altered the wages written on the pass in order
to receive higher pay.
Farm workers were not spared from white cruelty. Their wages were even lower than mine
workers. Although they were not controlled by compound rules farm labourers were constantly
harassed and beaten like mine workers, farm workers resorted to non co-operation as forms of
resistance. Shonas and Ndebeles shunned working as farm labourers and the vast farm labour
force was drawn from Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi).

1. Describe and explain the measures adopted by the colonial regime to systematically
alienate African land between 1903 – 1931.
2. Assess the impact of the Land Apportionment Act upon African farmers in Zimbabwe.
3. “The Land Husbandry Act was better than the Land Apportionment Act in the way it
affected African” how valid is this assessment.
4. Analyse the methods which were used by colonial officials to compel Africans to work
for the settlers.
5. In what ways, and how effectively, did Africans react to the abuses of colonialism during
this period (1898 – 1963)?
6. Evaluate methods used by the settler government to protect white farmers from native
competition in Agriculture.
7. Assess the living and working conditions of early mine and farm workers. How did these
workers express their discontent?
8. Analyse the assertion that early African opposition to colonialism was triggered more by
land policies than taxes.
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References
Leys C. Underdevelopment in Kenya London 1975
Palmer R., Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia. Heinemann, London 1977.
Phimister and Proctor People and Power, Mazongororo printers Harare
Anger T.O, The African voice in Southern Rhodesia 1898- 1930 London 1970.

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CHAPTER 14
THE SHONA NDEBELE UPRAISING 1896-7
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
a) Examine the causes of the Shona Ndebele- Uprisings.
b) Assess the role of spirit mediums in the uprisings.
c) Discuss the course and results of the uprisings
BACKGROUND
There is no debate among historians concerning the causes of the Ndebele-Shona risings of 1896
– 1897. In fact, it is commonly agreed that colonial policies which were geared towards the
exploitation, marginalisation and plunder of the Africans were directly behind the historical
uprisings in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland.
Nevertheless, the organisation of the risings in Matabeleland differed from that of Mashonaland
and it is in this area where considerable controversy among historians has been registered.
Different theoretical frameworks have been advanced by historians with T.O. Ranger’s
pioneering work, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896 – 1897 forming the most important
background to the debate. Ranger argued that the risings in both Mashonaland and Matabeleland
were inspired and instigated by the Mwari Cult, and that traditional priests such as Mkwati,
Nehanda ad Kagubi were instrumental in the timing and organisation of the risings. He also
argued that the risings were both pre-planned and in many ways simultaneous.
However, it is important to note that Ranger’s thesis has been challenged and successfully
overturned by historians J.D. Cobbing and D.N. Beach. Cobbing’s research mainly focussed on
Matabeleland whilst Beach concentrated on some key areas of Mashonaland. They both argued
that the revolts in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland were really caused by settler abuses and
that the traditional priests played often insignificant roles, and in many cases their influences
were never supra-regional, but limited to the areas where they operated. It is interesting to note
that Cobbing and Beach also pointed out quite a few errors and false assumptions in Ranger’s
thesis, hence watering it down altogether.
Although this chapter may not fully exhaust all the areas of historical debate on this central topic,
it discusses the causes of the risings, highlight the key features of the debate of the role of the
Mwari cult and the “priesthood” in general, in the risings, and give a brief summary of the results
in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland.

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MATABELELAND: The causes of the 1896 – 1897 risings

The Loss of Independence
This was one of the bitterest grievances of the Ndebele in that it equated them with all other
groups and communities which they had conquered. Their over-lordship position was now lost
and they hated the idea of working side by side with the Kalanga and Shona on white-owned
mines or farms. More importantly, the Shona police carried out frequent and often cruel patrols
among the Ndebele. This included maintaining general law and order, collecting the hated tax in
cash or pursuing run-away prisoners. In the process, the Shona police usually ill-treated the
Ndebele through assaulting them or abusing their wives and daughters. This was a tactic used by
the BSA Company to divide and rule the Africans by sowing hatred between the two groups.
The loss of independence also meant that the Ndebele could no longer carry out their annual
raiding expeditions either among the Shona or among the Tswana in Botswana – Neither could
they carry their counter – raids against the Shona in order to recover their stolen cattle. There
was therefore need to restore their lost privileged status.
One important factor which inspired the Ndebele to attempt to reassert their independence was
the fact that the Ndebele were still intact as a state although they had been defeated in 1893.
Their age regiments had remained intact and so had their line of kingship, the Indunas and
Mphakathi still wielded a lot of authority among their people. Although Lobengula had died or
disappeared in 1894, historian J. Cobbing writes that he would not have been replaced before a
waiting period of two years during which “umbuyiso” ceremonies would have been held. In this
vein, Nyamanda, Lobengula’s son born in 1873 by Mbida Mkhwananzi, one of Lobengula’s
most senior wives was perfectly suitable as heir to the Ndebele throne. All these factors
invigorated the Ndebele to reassert their independence by 1896, now that Nyamanda had also
come of age by that time. He had also gained a lot of favour with Mlotshwana and Manyeu of
Nyamandlovu who were regarded as the instigators of the northern rising. This was because
Nyamanda had displayed immense military abilities, lots of leadership skills and was strongly
anti-white.
Loss of Ndebele Cattle and Land

It was known that just before the outbreak of the 1893 – 1894 war Lobengula owned 250 000
cattle but after that war the Ndebele herd of cattle stood at 40 930. The number depreciated as
settlers grabbed more and more of the Ndebele cattle. The economic and social value of cattle
among the Ndebele was far more than what the settlers could imagine and the level of
deprivation which they caused among the Ndebele by taking away their prime source of
sustenance was too hard to contemplate.
The Ndebele rightly viewed the theft of their cattle as a deliberate ploy to impoverish them and
thereby force them into labour migrance. Clearly, there was an inseparable relationship between
the loss of land and theft of Ndebele cattle: Once the Land Commission of 1894 had created the
reserves, the Ndebele had two options – either migrate to the dry and unhealthy Gwaai and
Shangani reserves or alternatively, remain on their former land as squatters compelled to provide
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“cheap, semi-slave labour in exchange for permission to remain on white property” Bhebe N et
al – From Iron Age to Independence: A History of Central Africa). Hence, both the
expropriation of cattle and land were intended to force the Ndebele into labour migrance on
white farms or mines. This phenomenon was duplicated among the Shona and was characteristic
of the worst forms of colonial economic exploitation.
Some Common Causes
There is no doubt that the occurrence of natural disasters in 1895 – 1896 in both Matabeleland
and Mashonaland was in one way or another attributed to the presence of the settlers in the two
regions. In 1895 – 1896 a severe draught killed most of the crops in both Matabeleland and
Mashonaland and those that seemed to survive were then devoured by swarms of locusts. The
result was widespread famine in the districts.
Worse still, the rinderpest epidemic killed hundreds of cattle and the settler government officials
in their efforts to eradicate the disease ordered that all cattle showing signs of rinderpest should
be killed, and people were not allowed to eat the meat of the dead cattle. While this might have
been a wise veterinary measure it came at the background of forced labour, taxation, land
alienation and a cruel and arrogant settler regime. Natural disasters immediately assumed
political significance as the entire presence of the white colonialists was interpreted as a curse
among the Africans. Bhebe, Needham and Mashingaidze in From Iron Age to Independence
wrote that the natural disasters meant that God or Mwari was angry. They add that it was
confirmed by traditional religious authorities all over the country who blamed the white people
for angering Mwari. These are said to have warned that unless the people drive out the whites
from the country, the Africans would continue to suffer. In this way, religious leaders played a
fundamental role in the war of resistance in Eastern and Southern Zimbabwe.
However, such argument as the above had been thoroughly revised and the above authors admit
that “the uprising was inevitable because colonial occupation had seriously undermined the
Shona and (Ndebele) way of life”.
It is important to further note that the role played by the traditional authorities in interpreting the
gravity of the causes has been vastly debated by J. Cobbing and D.N. Beach. We will explore
the debate later on, but at this point we will just highlight part of Cobbing’s criticism of T.O.
Ranger’s argument in Revolt in Southern Rhodesia. He writes in his article, “Absent Priesthood.
Another look at the Rhodesian Risings of 1896 – 1897”, (1977) in The Journal of African
History, Vol 18, No. 1 that the African grievances such as forced labour, cattle seizures, hut tax,
land encroachments, an inefficient and bullying administration and the cumulative disasters of
drought, locusts and rinderpest were bad enough to cause an uprising or uprisings. He asks the
question: “Is it necessary to postulate this “co-ordinating factor”, or to rummage for a “secret
history” for the wars when in most respects the nature of the risings and the manner in which
Africans fought reflected very closely the structures of participating political units?” Indeed the
gravity of the causes themselves was mutually self-reinforcing, especially taking into account the

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fact that the policies of colonial rule were not static, but progressively got worse by the day as
more severe demands were imposed on the Africans.
Causes of the 1896 – 1897 Risings among the Shona

According to D.N. Beach in his book War and Politics in Zimbabwe, 1840-1900, the capitalist
system among the Shona made itself felt in four interconnected fields. These were mining,
farming, trading and the government. In the southern Shona country all of these were present,
and in general they became much more effective from 1894 onwards. Essentially, it was the
Native Department that had the greatest effect, but the other fields were of considerable
importance as well.
Mining activities took up few of the physical resources of the country as far as the people were
concerned. Operations were concentrated on a small area around each mine, and only timber
resources were affected. But the mines required labour and wages which were not high enough
to attract more than a few volunteers. The Southern Shona had preferred to go south to the
Kimberely and Rand mines from the 1870s and 1880s and this continued up to 1896. Those who
preferred to work on local mines generally preferred surface work rather than the relatively
higher paid but dangerous underground work. The mine-owners would recruit forced labour
themselves as they did at Tebekwe before 1896, or rely upon the government to supply such
labour although until the Native Department was formed in 1894. It lacked the personnel to do so
on a large scale.
Besides that, it is important to remember that the impact of forced labour upon the Shona was
partly cushioned by the foreign voluntary labour sector, especially before 1894. However, after
1894, mining activity increased sharply. European farming settlements increased in some areas
and the Native Department coerced labour and collected tax. Consisting of one or two European
officers and a body of African “police” in each district, it rendered the Shona liable to forced
labour.
Worse still, labour coercion often took place during the agricultural work-season, and tax
exactions involved the removal of valuable livestock accumulated and protected as an insurance
against crop failure. This became a bitter inter-connected grievance.
Settler farming came as an area of exploitation and deprivation among the Africans – whether
the Shona or Ndebele. It has been noted that reserves were created in Matabeleland and the
Ndebele were systematically forced to move into them. In Mashonaland the picture was similar.
Very large tracts of land along the Highveld was granted to white farmers by 1896, especially
after 1893, and those white settlers who started farming operations also required labour and paid
even lower wages than the miners. Hence, land alienation dealt a double blow on the Shona (and
the Ndebele). Africans lost their best land and were forced to work for the new masters.

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Be that as it may, it is important to place land alienation into a more accurate historical
perspective. D.N. Beach argues that some of the very large estates granted to land companies
remained almost undeveloped before 1896 and had very little effect upon the people whose lands
had been pegged out. Moreover, Beach also argues that while the Afrikaners were the ones who
did the most to work on “their” farms, this did not automatically lead the Shona living nearby to
take part in the Chimurenga. Thus, the Afrikaners to the North West and east of Enkeldoorn
were attacked in June 1896 but those in the south and in the Chikwanda area northeast of
Victoria were not. This pattern was true across the whole country. In Melsetter, vast land
alienation had taken place by 1896, yet that district stayed out of the Chimurenga, whereas the
Hartley and eastern Matabeleland districts with very few farmers were deeply involved in the
risings.
Historians are quiet as to why the above pattern was noticed during the first Chimurenga. It is an
area which requires further research. It is of course reasonable at this stage to argue that colonial
rule affected people of different districts in different ways and in many cases the behaviour of
local white settlers made a major difference. In this vein, an interesting pattern developed during
the risings: the Shona who lived on the edges of the southern eastern lowveld and across the
southern Shona lands of Matibi, Chivi, Chirimuhanzu, Gutu, Zimuto dynasties actually fought on
the side of the British South Africa company, as they had done in 1893, basically because they
feared a Ndebele victory in spite of the fact that they had suffered severely from company
misrule. Hence, it is important to realise that while the causes of the risings were in many ways
common, the pattern of the risings themselves were complex.
Nevertheless, it was clearly the government and particularly the Native Department that affected
the people the most. The impact of the Native Department has been partly been referred to
above, but let us look at it in more detail. The government’s magistrates and police were
primarily concerned with the defence of the interest of the white community, although they did
occasionally intervene in the affairs of the Africans. Firstly, it was to help collect the cattle
formerly raided by the Shona from the Ndebele and this was done from 1894 onwards. When
combined with the fact that the hut tax was also collectable in cattle, this was bitterly resented by
some Shona communities which had fought on the side of the whites against the Ndebele in
1893.
Secondly, the Native Department was tasked with the collection of hut tax in Mashonaland
province. Closely related to this fact is that the department would supply labour to the farms and
to the mines and would also intervene in African politics and disputes, paralleling the work of
African chiefs and headmen. In order to perform such tasks, the department appointed Native
Commissioners who were each backed by a force of irregular armed African “police” or
“detectives” into as many districts as possible. These stayed in one area through out the year and
their conduct as they carried out colonial duties, such as the collection of tax and labour, was
usually worse than the Ndebele and Gaza raiders. This indeed annoyed the Africans.

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The collection of tax, for instance, was supposed to be done in cash, the idea being that this
would force men to work for long periods at low wages. But it was also collected in the form of
livestock and grain. Prices of these were deliberately knocked down to coerce families to send
members to farms and mines, and thus, for example, 80 cattle and 44 goats fetched only 146
pounds in 1895 in Charter. This reveals a grim and hated picture of exploitation as enforced by
the Native Department.
WHY DID THE SHONA RISE IN 1896 AND NOT BEFORE THAT DATE?
One of the main reasons why the Shona rose in 1896, and not earlier, is the fact that they
believed that the European presence was temporary, like that of the Portuguese between 1629
and 1693. They believed that even though the company was parcelling out their land and in
many ways abusing them through the various forms of exploitation, their stay was limited and
could be tolerated. Their entry into Mashonaland had never been requested or formalised through
treaties, requests or any such procedures. However, it was not uncommon in Shona culture to
have visitors come in on an impromptu basis, but it was common knowledge that they would
later leave. The Shona communities must have been obviously shocked to discover that their
new masters meant to completely dispossess them for good.
Moreover, many Shona rulers had found the Europeans useful in local politics. D.N. Beach
noted that many of the clashes between the Europeans and the Shona in 1890-4 were in fact
engineered by other Shona groups to their own advantage. From 1894 onwards resistance to
company rule became more noticeable, but it took the form of isolated and unconnected
incidents. What this indicates is the fact that the Shona had come to view the presence of the
whites as an important factor in the local equation of power. Local rebellions, raids and counter-
raids among the Shona as well as against the Ndebele were in many ways assisted by the whites.
The whites too, gave a hand to the Shona groups as a means of gaining a foothold on Shona
political structures.
It must be noted too that the widespread presence of the BSA Company police worked hard to
support the local Native Department staff. However, from October 1895, most of the police
force was transferred to Bulawayo where their presence was more necessary. Even in that
situation, the Shona could not rise in 1895 October for two main reasons: October marked the
serious beginning of the planting season and all communities were busy ensuring that their lands
were ready for the agricultural season. Secondly, the outbreak of locusts earlier in the year had
served to produce bad harvests after May/June 1895. It was therefore necessary to avoid a repeat
of poor harvests in the following year.
It must be noted that when the risings eventually occurred in 1896 and the Shona joined the
risings in June of that year, it made a lot of sense from the agricultural point of view. The month
of June marked the end of the harvest season in Mashonaland. News of Ndebele victories in that
month obviously served as a timely coincidence for most of the Shona groups to join in and
shake off the yoke of colonial bondage.

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Not only that, it must be remembered that before 1894 the colonial economic policies had not
become too exploitative. The Shona could still continue with their lives and in some cases where
districts were vast, the Shona experienced little interference from the white settlers. As indicated
above, the presence of voluntary migrant labour from Malawi and Mozambique to work on
settler farms and mines, and the fact that the mines and farms were still fewer and of smaller
scale, served to cushion the Shona from the demands of forced labour. However, the rising
number and size of mines and farms, as well as the formation of the Native Department in 1894
changed with the responsibility of labour recruitment, tax and livestock collection among the
Shona, naturally worsened the anger and bitterness against the colonial invaders.
The Course of the 1896 – 1897 Risings in Matabeleland and Mashonaland

The course of the Ndebele-Shona uprisings in 1896 – 1897 has sparked a lot of controversy, and
it is not the intention of part of this chapter to exhaust the debate but to highlight the major lines
of controversy to enable the young students of history to enquire deeper into the subject.
Professor T.O. Ranger’s books, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896 – 1897: A Study in African
Resistance, (1979) postulated some pioneering arguments which were, subsequently, severely
criticised and almost entirely demolished by Professor J.D. Cobbing, whose research mainly
concentrated in Matabeleland and D.N. Beach, whose research focused on some part of
Mashonaland. T.O. Ranger’s compelling book has been described as a “magnificent mosaic” by
historian Richard Werbner while both Beach and Cobbing concur that it forms a vital foundation
to the study of African resistance to early forms of colonial rule in this period.
In short, Ranger, writing on both Matabeleland and Mashonaland, vigorously asserts that the
risings in both regions were coordinated by the traditional priests, Mkwati, Nehanda, Kaguvi etc.
Moreover, Mkwati is argued to have played a more pivotal role in influencing the timing of the
risings in Mashonaland, thus making the risings regional in character. In addition, Ranger also
argues that the risings were pre-planned and simultaneous.
However, the Rangerian model of a closely-knit Ndebele-Shona religious high command

organising a pre-planned, simultaneous rising has been academically blown apart by J.D.
Cobbing and D.N. Beach. Both argue that the risings were neither co-ordinated nor organised.
They prove that the risings were not pre-planned and the influence of millenarian priests was
either limited to the much smaller communities where they belonged as in the case of
Mashonaland or totally non-existent as Cobbing’s thesis has proved for the case of Matabeleland.
The Course of the 1896 Risings in Matabeleland

One of Ranger’s false assumptions was that the Ndebele state and its political and military
structures had been either severely weakened or destroyed during the 1893 war. Ranger assumed
that the defeat of the Ndebele in 1893 led to the collapse of the military command structures,
whilst the death or disappearance of Lobengula in 1894 put the Ndebele state into political
uncertainty. This yearning gap naturally had to be filled in by Mkwati and other millenelial

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priests in co-ordinating the Ndebele state as well as inspiring them to fight on once the revolt had
broken in March 1896.
However, Julian R.D. Cobbing in his article “The Absent Priesthood: Another look at the
Rhodesian Risings of 1896 – 1897”, Journal of African History, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, 1977 has
more than overturned T.O. Ranger’s landmark publication on the risings. Cobbing shows that
the structure of the Ndebele kingdom was far stronger in 1896 than Ranger had believed, and
that Nyamanda was in fact installed as King during the rising. Whereas Ranger saw the secular
leadership as essentially subordinate to the religious leaders, Cobbing has shown how the origin
of this idea lay in the prejudices of the colonial officials whose words constitute a quotation of
about 44 percent of the three chapters on the Ndebele state.
It is important to note that the Ndebele royal family together with the lesser chiefs, the Indunas,
were the ones central in instigating the first murders, arranged for the distribution of ammunition,
organised the supply routes and sent the women and children into the hills at the time of the
outbreak of war. For instance, Cobbing illustrates that under Nyamanda, the royal family held
decisive influence from the beginning at almost every corner of the Ndebele state. Lobengula’s
uncle, Manondwana Tshabalala, led levies of the old Insuga ‘Ibutho’ around Gwelo, while north
of Gwanda “Umsolo”, who was Lieutenant of the Royal Kraal in Lobengula’s time, was the first
to openly rebel. Nyamanda’s uncles, Nyanda of Mzinyathi and Fezela of Dukada, were leaders
in the upper UMzingwani valley and Eastern Matopos, as were Lobengula’s “cousins” Umlugulu
of Eyengo and Sikombo Mguni of Intemba, who had married a sister of Lobengula.
Moreover, the Induna of Ujinga (Inyati region) Nkomo, Ndiweni’s sister, Fawe, was a widow of
Lobengula; the upper Maleme valley leader, Role Masuku, was husband of Lobengula’s famous
daughter, Famona. The initial Godlwayo outbreak had been led by Maduna Mafu, a nephew of
Lobengula. In support of Maduna were others of the old King’s nephews such as Ntembuzane
Matshazi of Ndinana in the Insiza valley and Manyagavula Masuku of Matshetshe on the upper
Umzingwane. By 1896 there were few, if any, great families in the Ndebele state not related to
the royal family in one way or another.
Moreover, in Central Matabeleland itself, Nyamanda enjoyed considerable backing on the

Bembezi from Lobengula’s formidable widow, Lozigeyi, who had distributed ammunition at the
beginning of the rising, together with about a dozen other of Lobengula’s queens, his full
brother, Tshakalisa, the only other son of Lobengula of fighting age in 1896. Nyamanda was
also supported by Karl Khumalo or Mvelani, Lobengula’s one-time “secretary”, and by former
loyal chiefs of Lobengula and the star fighting leaders of the rising, such as the brothers, Manyeu
and Mpotshwana Ndiweni of Nyamandlovu and Madliwa of Mahlokohloko. This was the
headquarters of the Ndebele rising if there was one.
Indeed none of the afore-cited chiefs, or even Nyamanda himself, were connected to the Mwari
cult or any other secret influences, as Ranger argued. More importantly, Ranger claimed that
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Umlugulu, Khumalo was a kind of “high priest” who worked hand in glove with Mwabani, priest
at the Matojeni (Wirirani) shrine. Cobbing contends that there is actually nothing to support this.
Cobbing argues that Ranger’s main error concerns Mwabani who was not priest at Wirirani in
1896. The man with whom Umlugulu was linked, Mnthwani, was not Mwabani. He was
Mnthwani Dlodlo of Ngama, brother of Lozigeyi and genuinely one of the rising leaders. In
addition, Umlugulu was only a “priest” within the context of purely Ndebele religious practices
being one of the collectors of the sacred amasi (milk) used in the inxwala ceremony, a function
performed only by royal Khumalos. Ndebele religion centred on the Nguni high God,
UNkulunkulu, the worship of ancestoral spirits (amadlozi), the inxwala and the person of the
King rather than the cult caves.
What role was played by Mkwati in the Matabeleland uprising? Ranger claims that shortly after
1893 Mkwati turned Ntabazikamambo into the dominant Mwari shrine. This was, according to
Ranger of great significance because of its association with the old Rozvi capital of Manyanga.
Mkwati is then said to have initiated the Inyati rising by issuing orders to the local Ndebele
chiefs of Inqobo and Ujinga, Mthini and Nkomo respectively and bringing into the war the Rozvi
followers of such chiefs as Uwini and Gwaybana. According to Ranger, Ntabazikamambo
became the strategic headquarters of the whole northern rising, Mkwati, despite his Shona
outlook, was working hand in hand with the Nyamanda group. Eventually, however, the
contradiction was resolved as Mkwati fell out with the Ndebele. For a time he sent round armed
gangs under his own subordinates such as Makumbi, to prevent the Ndebele from surrendering.
But he now increasingly turned his attention to the Shona proper, whom, as the Ndebele rising
flagged, he had brought into the war in June 1896, so Ranger argues.
Cobbing, nevertheless, argues that the picture portrayed about Mkwati is too exaggerated, to the
point of guesswork. For instance, research has proven that Mkwati actually went into the
Mambo Hills not in 1893 – 1894 but after the 1896 rising had broken out. It was also not due to
Rozvi enthusiasm, but because the hills were the nearest refuge to his home of Ujinga. The hills
had never previously and have not subsequently been numbered among the Mwari shrines and it
is unlikely that they were so regarded between March and July 1896. According to Cobbing, “In
all probability Mkwati was never a priest at all, but an important local “Iwosana” (cult
messenger) whose advice fitted in with the policy of the Ndebele chiefs”. Apart from the
coincidence involving Ntabazikamambo with a defunct Rozvi capital and his personal
relationship with Uwini (apparently father of his wife) there is nothing to link Mkwati with the
Rozvi. It is also likely that Mkwati also participated as a citizen of the Ndebele kingdom.
Moreover, there is no clarity whether it was not Mthini and Nkomo manipulating Mkwati, rather
than the other way round.
Moreover, it cannot be a valid argument to say Mkwati sent armed gangs to prevent the Ndebele
from surrendering. The armed gangs of the Inyathi region which were formed to prevent
surrenders were common all over the kingdom. Mpotshwana, Madliwa and Mvelani, all
close to Nyamanda, sent out patrols in the Mahlokohloko – Nyamandlovu area for the same

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purpose. As a matter of fact, Cobbing corrects that Makumbi was a Ndebele “Umlisa”
subordinated to Mthini rather than to Mkwati.
Nor is there much evidence that Ntabazikamambo was the command centre of the northern
rising. It was essentially a refugee hide-away as the six hundred women and children and a
thousand cattle were captured there after the fight of 5 July make clear.
Not only that, it is important to remember that the Ndebele on the Umguza were generally led by
the chiefs, and in so far as there was a combined strategy, and there was not much of one, it came
from the Bembezi group around Nyamanda. The picture of Ndebele armies waiting upon the
orders of Mkwati, of Ndebele warriors rushing to the attack in the belief that the white man’s
bullets would turn to water, of chiefs neglecting to defend positions in the assumption that
magical powers would prevent the whites from crossing, simply does not fit in with Ndebele
military and gun expertise going back three generations.
What cannot be doubted, as D.N. Beach has proved is the fact that Mkwati, together with other
priests at Ntabazikamambo distributed locust medicine to Mashayamombe, since the outbreak of
locusts was a serious cause for concern during this period. His connection with the actual rising
remains illusory. Both Cobbing and Beach have in fact proved that the Mwari cult had limited
relevance to the Ndebele. The priests who were mostly among the Ndebele were the ones of
Venda origin whose function had very little to do with the risings since the Ndebele state was
militarily and politically strong. They of course had their own share of disunity, for instance,
Gampu Sithole who actually fought on the side of the whites proved to be a thorn in the flesh,
mainly because his family had traditionally faced persecution from Lobengula.
The Course of the Risings among the Shona

Professor Ranger’s thesis on the 1896 – 1897 revolt centrally includes Mashonaland, and any
discussion on this subject has to refer to the scholarship that has been published. One of
Ranger’s assumptions was that the risings broke out in Mashonaland because they were
coordinated by Mkwati whose agents linked up with the local Shona Mhondoros of Kaguvi and
Nehanda. The Kaguvi medium was based in the Chivero-Nyamweda and eastern Salisbury as
well as Lomagundi. The Nehanda medium was based in the upper Mazoe valley. There can be
no doubt that these figures had some prominence in the areas in which they operated, but Ranger
is criticised for exaggerating their roles in Mashonaland.
But first, why did the Shona rise only in June 1896, and not in March”? It has been
demonstrated earlier on in the chapter, the economic reasons for the Shona’s delay in joining the
risings. Nevertheless, when the Shona eventually rose in arms in June, it was because it
appeared that the British had been sufficiently weakened such that an assertion of independence
would be profitable.

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Moreover, at the end of April, Mashonaland had been denuded of white police and soldiers as
Colonel Beal’s column went to the relief of Bulawayo. Bulawayo was still encircled by the
Ndebele towards the end of May and Beal’s force had been embarrassed first by the Rozvi and
Ndebele around Gwelo, and later at the battle of Nxa on 22 May 1896. These key incidents,
according to both Cobbing and Ranger might have been viewed as victories by the Shona. The
Matabeleland Relief Force had yet to arrive from Mafeking in decisive numbers. Hence, at the
beginning of June the Ndebele were continuing to tie down the white forces. Although the tide
of war was slowly turning against the Ndebele in that they did not win a decisive victory against
the whites, the Shona saw early June as the obvious moment to strike, if they were ever to do so.
Did an outward, rippling co-ordination of the Shona rising hinge on the Mwari cult-connected to
the epicentre of Mashayamombe’s chieftaincy in the Umfuli valley? Probably not, (historians
Cobbing and Beach, can argue). As with Umlugulu in Matabeleland, there is nothing to show
that Mashayamombe was acting under cultic order. Although the first murders of whites by the
Shona took place in Mashayamombe’s areas on 14 June 1896, the discussions for a rising had
been going on at Mahom’s far to the east, nearly a week earlier. It is simply not yet known in
which way the news, advice or orders spread in Mashona country that June, nor who was the
major instigator, if ever there was. There can be no doubt that the Shona grievances which
emanated from the abuses of colonial rule lay at the root of the risings, and that reports of early
Ndebele victories had served to partially instigate the Shona to rise. It is however, not possible
to do away with the religious factor altogether although its impact has been exaggerated.
In the first place, the Mwari cult influence did not extend into Central and North-eastern
Mashonaland – in the rebel areas; whatever influence the mhondoro mediums had, it was not as
local servants of the cult. Secondly, Ranger overestimated the contribution of Mhondoro such as
Kaguvi in the same way as he exaggerated Mkwati’s power in Matabeleland. Certainly, the
Kaguvi medium in 1896 – 1897, Gumboreshumba, had a powerful impact upon the rising in the
Hartely and Salisbury areas, but these were, as Beach again has shown, his home territory. More
importantly, white references to Kaguvi and the Mazoe valley mhondoro, Nehanda, as “Mlimos”
should not be seen as anything but a symbol of white confusion about African cults in Rhodesia.
It is important too, to understand that there was a close relationship between the religious and
political elements in the Shona society. The mediums of the Mhondoro spirits were frequently
close relatives of the ruling clans. Their job, in so far as they had a political function, was to
reflect the claims of the incumbent chief line and the opinion of the “average man” within the
chieftaincy. The Mhondoro often sanctioned the decision of the political clans, and not vice
versa. The Mhondoro gave ancestral backing to the chiefs. Be that as it may, it is important to
quickly state that the Mhondoros or priests had more influence in Mashonaland than they had in
Matabeleland.
Before proceeding to point out other areas of Shona involvement in the rising, it is important to
bring out some key areas of weakness with respect to Professor Ranger’s treatment of evidence.

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Professor Robert I. Rotberg of Harvard University, who has written a lot of articles and books on
Southern Africa, in his review of Ranger’s Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, criticises Ranger for
arguing that the risings of 1896 – 1897 were millenarian. He writes that “the assertion that these
were millenarian movements, presumably in the sense of being both messianic and apocalyptic,
remains unproved and, on the evidence presented, rather dubious”.
Beach tended to provide an even more shattering blow in his review of the same book. He points
out that one of Ranger’s weaknesses in his handling of the evidence was that he “omits important
qualifying statements, cuts and splices (joins different phrases) sentences of the original African
evidence or simply mis-regards whole documents”. Beach goes on to provide the clearest cases
where Ranger mutilates evidence. Quoting Marowa from archival documents, Ranger thus
quotes “I remember the people assembling at Mashayambombe’s kraal to get medicine for the
locusts” but omits the following sentence: “This had nothing to do with the rebellion” (page
220). This makes a huge difference because when people assembled at Mashayamombe’s
homesteads they had indeed come for anti-locust medicine and not to get intelligence related to
the outbreak of the risings in Mashonganyika’s areas.
Furthermore, Beach illustrates Ranger’s selective use or quotation of evidence when he cites
evidence from Zhanta thus, “Kagubi sent two messengers to Mashonganyika’s. They went on to
Gonda’s and told the people they were to come to Kagubi’s at once. I went with them. I thought
he would give us something to kill the locusts. When I got there... left our.... the following...... I
found he had a lot of Whiteman’s loot. He continued with the quote: He ordered me to kill the
white men. He said he had orders from the gods. He again skipped the following: Some
Matabele who were there said watch for all the police wives” (p221). In both instances, the
selective use of evidence by Ranger drives home his chosen theme that the risings were
instigated and co-ordinated by the Mwari cult leaders. Inclusion of the omitted statements would
have neutralised or weakened Ranger’s line of thought. In the first instance, the influence of
Mhondoros is clearly watered down, and the fact that the risings were coordinated by Mkwati is
totally dispelled. In the second instance, the reference to Whiteman’s loot, as Beach argues,
makes it clear that this meeting took place after the outbreak, and not before.
LACK OF PLANNING / ORGANISATION

From Beach’s research we learn that the risings indeed began in Mashayamombe’s place and that
they were not at all planned. First, concerning the killing of Hepworth on the Umsweswe
(Svosve), Dekwende, who was the medium of the local Chochata Mhondoro of Mashayamombe
declared, “The day they were going to murder the white men my eldest brother, Mashayamombe,
sent for me and told me we must kill the white men. I only sent out the Impi to murder the men I
did not go myself”. Mashayamombe’s brothers themselves did not know of the rising until the
night before it broke out and that although the mood of the people was quite ready for a hondo,
nevertheless even Kanono’s raiders did not know their real mission until very late.

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Beach further illustrates that another indication of general unpreparedness and lack of planning
was when Moony was killed. Rusere had just come from Kaguvi the medium’s village when he
found Moony being pursued, but was so unready that he had to borrow a gun from his uncle
before he could join in. This would suggest that at this early stage the medium himself had not
known of the rising – it is noticeable that none of Mashayamombe’s people claimed that they had
had any leadership from him in carrying out the killings, and it was the Mashayamombe medium
of the Choshata Mhondoro, Dekwende, who gave the religious sanction there.
Mashayamombe’s forces went east to kill the Europeans at the Beatrice Mine on 15 June,West to
the Umsweswe, and on the evening of 18 June they began the siege of Hartley. By then,
however, the rising had spread far and wide.
According to Beach, the “ripple-effect” covered a very wide area in those crucial 12 days of
June. The evidence of Zhanta’s neighbour Zawara, son of Garamombe, only confirms that the
Kaguvi medium told Chikwaha’s people to visit him, and does not suggest that this was any
earlier than June 14. The evidence from the Zvimba ruler, his brother Musonti and the people of
Lomagundi district is only that a message reached the Zvimba ruler from the Kaguvi medium
and was then passed on, not that anyone from Lomagundi went to Kaguvi’s before hand. The
evidence of the presence of Panashe, the son of Nyandoro, Muchemwa, the son of Mangwende
and the sons of Makoni at the medium’s village either before or after the rising has been proven
to be fictitious.
Notably, apart from the references to the Mushava, Zvimba and Nemakonde areas of Lomagundi
where Kaguvi sent a messenger, Ranger exaggerated his impact by assuming that Kaguvi’s role
extended to Mazoe and Gutu, and thus “virtually the whole areas of the Shona rebellion”. In fact
the Kaguvi medium was mainly influential in the Chivero-Nyamwenda area of Hartley where the
previous medium of Kaguvi Gumboreshumba’s grandfather Kawodza had been active in the
1880s and early 1890s. Hence, though there is no doubt that the Kaguvi medium played a
powerful role in these areas, there is nothing surprising about it.
A Note on the Collaborators
What showed the complexity of the 1896 – 1897 risings was a complete absence of a pattern,
which they followed. It was not always a case of the Ndebele and Shona rising against the white
settlers, but sometimes the Africans fought on the side of the settlers, especially if they thought
that the whites were a safer bet than the Ndebele, in this case. The case of Gampu Sithole has
already been cited above, but the Shona who laid in the traditional Ndebele raiding and tributary
zones either remained neutral. Those who aided the whites included the Shona of Gutu,
Chirumanzu, Chivi and Matibi – forming a huge belt between the middle Sabi and the Nuanetsi
Valley. These had been as much subjected to colonial abuses as those of and around Salisbury.
Nevertheless, Ndebele raids were more hated even before 1896. For instance, Chief Chivi
Madhlangove, having experienced relentless raids from the Ndebele had, in 1893 co-operated

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with Jameson during the invasion of Matabeleland. In 1896, Chivi chose again to ally with the
whites.
Matibi, the chief of the Pfumbi people south of Chivi, helped the Europeans for similar reasons.
He had originally paid tribute to Lobengula, but had looked to the whites as allies, and in 1896
joined the Europeans to plunder the Lemba and Rozvi tributaries of the Ndebele around
Belingwe. This was one of several local African wars that occurred as struggles within the main
struggles.
In Chirumhanzu, relations with the Ndebele had been more friendly and here the decision to
collaborate was the consequence of an internal dispute. Chirumanzu Chinyama, having illegally
seized the paramouncy in 1891 (with Lobengula’s help) stood on the fence in 1896 until the
moment that his rival, Shaka, began to fight alongside the pro-Ndebele neighbours of Banka.
This precipitated Chinyama into rising on the side of the whites. Moreover, in Gutu, further east,
Chief Makuvaza fought for the whites who had recognised him vis-a-vis a troublesome opponent
namely Chingombe.
It must be emphasised that such clearly-drawn-out divisions within the ranks of the Africans
made their defeat at the face of the white invaders more predictable. The whites, shrewd and
unsympathetic, were able to divide and conquer the African and the poor collaborators had
colonial rule equally extended on them even though they realised some piecemeal gains such as
recognition of their chieftaincy.

1. Describe and explain the measures adopted by the colonial regime to systematically
alienate African land between 1903 – 1931.
2. Assess the impact of the Land Apportionment Act upon African farmers in Zimbabwe.
3. “The Land Husbandry Act was better than the Land Apportionment Act in the way it
affected African” how valid is this assessment.
4. Analyse the methods which were used by colonial officials to compel Africans to work
for the settlers.
5. In what ways, and how effectively, did Africans react to the abuses of colonialism during
this period (1898 – 1963).

156
References
Davison, A, Cecil Rhodes and his time, Progressive Publishers, London, 1984
Mashingaidze E and DE Needham, From Iron Age to Independence, Longman, Zimbabwe 1984.
Mukanga. The Dynamics of History book 3, Longman, Zimbabwe 1999.
PEN Tindall. A History of Southern and Central Africa, Longman 1984.

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CHAPTER 15
AFRICAN RESPONSES AND RESISTANCE: 1898- 1923- T.O
RANGER
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
At the end of the study of this chapter, candidates should be able to:
a) Assess different ways in which Africans resisted colonial rule after 1897.
b) Assess the impact of early nationalist movements between1897-1930.
c) Evaluate ways in which colonial authorities dealt with nationalist movements during the
period
Introduction. The Shona:

In the period before settler rule, that is immediately after the Shona- Ndebele arising (1896-7),
the Africans responded in various ways. The Shona in the rebel areas well left in a bewildered
state after 1897. Their total commitment to the rising had failed and many of their leaders were
dead. Some turned to the missionaries for a new solution. Others took to the woods and the hills
as followers of the die hard rebels who would not surrender. Most lapsed into a dull accepted of
defeat.
It was difficult for new forms of political protest or action to grow up amongst them. There had
been virtually no Shona converts to Christianity before the risings and so there were now very
few literate Shona in touch with the new world. The educational breakthrough was a slow
process, Shona leaders were not really produced by it for twenty or thirty years after the risings.
As a result, politics in the ex-rebel areas of Mashonaland reverted to tribal politics, embittered in
many cases by hostility between those who supported the new “loyal” Chief and those who
remained faithful to the dead or deposed “rebel” paramount.
There were some signs of a desire to keep alive the ideal of a wider Shona unity expressed in the
risings. Thus chief Kunzwi-Nyandoro, a prominent rebel chief who survived into the later period,
was accepted as a leader by many Shona who lived outside his paramounting and was consulted
by them on the most effective way to demonstrate opposition to hut tax increase. Yet a man like
Kunzvi Nyandoro was unable, for all his shrewdness and courage, to offer effective leadership in
the new age; he embodied a tradition of resistance and that was important but open armed
resistance was out of question in most Mashonaland after 1897. So he spent the rest of his life,
closely watched by the suspicious administration, planning or half-planning resistance on the old
lines, in alliance with spirit mediums and hoping to take advantage of Rhodesian involvement in
the Boer or the World War.

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It is very easy to understand why the old tradition of resistance took hold on Shona imagination.
During this period Shona- speaking people were still standing out against the white man in arms.
There were a series of risings after 1897 in the Shona-Speaking areas of Portuguese East Africa,
reaching a climax in the great Makombe rising in 1917. These were not usually treated as part of
Rhodesian history. But they were part of Shona history. The peoples involved had shared the
same political experiences as the central and eastern Shona right into the 1890’s. Men from the
Shona paramounties had gone to help Makombe of Barwe against Gouveia then and they could
not be indifferent to later battles in Barwe against the Portuguese. One of these later resistances
directly affected Rhodesia and in some ways can be regarded as a continuation or an extension of
the 1896-7 revolt. This was the so-called Mapondera rising of 1900 to 1903. A brief account of it
is necessary.
Mapondera had lived in south Mazoe by 1890; his people were involved in 1896 rising.
Mapondera himself was not because he had moved out of the Company’s sphere of influence
before the rising. Mapondera was a pound man, a famous leader who had defeated even Ndebele.
He was one of those who had declared in Selous’ concession that he was independent of both
Lobengula and the Portuguese. He would not tolerate interference from the white settlers who
moved into his area and went away to Makombe’s country to fight the Portuguese until they had
moved on and Mazoe was once more left to the Shona. Instead there came the rising in which his
relatives were killed and his cattle seized by the whites. In 1900 Mapondera returned to take his
revenge. He raided into South Mazoe but found into the old Mutapa heartland. There he found
many people resentful of the white administration which was affecting them for the first time,
demanding tax, threatening disarmament, and disturbing trade patterns.
Mapondera allied himself to the last Mutapa, Chioco Dambamutupe, who lived with a well-
equipped army following just inside Portuguese East Africa. At the head of a force drawn from
the whole area of the Mutapa’s surviving influence Mapondera invaded Rhodesia and marched
on administrative centre of Mount Darwin. His attack was beaten off and Mapondera returned to
Portuguese territory to help his allies to fight the Portuguese who entered his capital; Makombe
in Barwe was defeated and his country occupied. The old Shona world was vanishing.
Mapondera returned to Rhodesia in 1903 and surrendered himself to the authorities; jailed for
seven years and died in prison while on hunger strike.
Mapondera’s adventures were not the last episode in Shona armed resistance. In 1917 a great
revolt broke out among the Shona-Speaking peoples of Portuguese East Africa in protest against
maladministration, particularly conscription for service as carriers in the war against the
Germans. Portuguese authority was swept away once more in the Zambezi valley and in Barwe
and the revolt was suppressed only after many months of hard fighting. This Shona rising of
1917 reminds us once again of the remarkable capacity of the Shona people for more or less co-
rdinated resistance.
By 1917, of course, conditions in most of Mashonaland were already very different from those in
the Shona-speaking areas of Portuguese East Africa. The Shona of Rhodesia were being drawn
more and more into a modern economy, and they were being influenced more and more by
missionary teaching and education, already in some areas, some Shona were moving towards
Christian independence as a vehicle of opposition. But as yet the leaders of political

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organizations had not supplanted the spirit mediums or the memories of the rebel chefs in the
imagination of the Shona masses.
The Ndebele-1898- 1923:

It was easier to move into more modern styles of political activity among the Ndebele- due to the
following reasons:
(1) In Matabeleland some of the most respected leaders of the rising had become recognized
induces and were able to give their people some leadership inside a new system.
(2) Ndebele politics was bound to centre upon the desire to restore the Kingship. This gave
the Ndebele a target which could be aimed at in a variety of ways- petitions, collections
of money the organization of associations etc.
(3) Many Ndebele recognized the leadership of the young sons of Lobengula who had been
sent to school in South Africa and were now by far the best educated
Africans from Southern Rhodesia. These young men, who completed secondary
education and one of whom began university, were able to attract support the old inducas
but also from the younger men, from educated Ndebele and even from Africans from
South Africa.
(4) The Kingship issue was also a good issue on which to appeal for help from outside. At
this period many Africans politicians in South Africa were lawyers and they took a legal
approach to politics, it seemed possible that something might be gained by appealing to
Britain or the world on the basis of the legal rights of the Lobengula family and on the
grounds that the company had defrauded them. In this way, the Ndebele kingship
movement attracted the support of South African Congress leaders.
(5) African politics in Matabeleland was also different from those in Mashonaland in that the
Ndebele had a more concrete and pressing grievance- i.e. land. Most Shona had hardly
begun to feel the threat of land alienation or the dangers of land fragmentation by the
early 1920s’ though some areas in Mashonaland already had serious land problems. But
the Ndebele lost virtually all their land in 1894 and did not recover it in 1896. As white
farmer began to take up land so Ndebele settlements were evicted. Among them were
important Ndebele dignitaries, senior induces, members of the royal family. These men
Rhodes had tried to conciliate in 1896; some of them were quite wealth by Ndebele
standards and owned large herds of cattle. But they found themselves and their herds and
their people turned off land and they refused to accept land in the reserves.
Land issue and the Kingship movement:

The land issue gave the Ndebele Kingship movement its wide base of support. The leader of the
movement in its significant period was Lobengula’s eldest son, Nyamanda. He became a
claimant to the Kingship after the death of one of his younger brothers and the mental breakdown
of the other. He was not an educated man as they had been. But he in 1896, had contacts with
some of the new men and was sending his sons to an independent church school in South Africa.
160
He was able to maintain the alliance with the educated and with the Congress movement in
South Africa- and was able to speak to the memories of the Ndebele.
Nyamanda’s movement became important in the years before and immediately after World War
I. Various factors helped to make this a period of activity in Ndebele politics. This was because;
(i) Land grievances were mounting
(ii) Returning Ndebele service men joined the movement
(iii) Their services in the war seemed to the Ndebele generally a good reason to expect
concessions from the whites.
(iv) At this time the whole legal question was very much in people’s minds- A legal action
was being heard in the Privy Council in London to decide the ownership of land in
Southern Rhodesia; in 1919 the Privy Council decided that the British South Africa
Company did not own the land and that it had no claim to it through Lobengula’s
concessions. It was time that the Privy Council went on to say that the British crown now
owned the land through conquest, but the whole decision seemed to reopen the question
of the rights of Lobengula’s heirs.
(v) At this time, also, whites in Rhodesia were campaigning for self government and an end
to Company rule and it was obviously important that an African view be heard.
Call for Lobengula’s ideal of Ndebele Homeland Rule:

(i) Nyamanda dreamed of a restoration of the Ndebele Kingship and of the Ndebele home-
land, his father’s ideal.
(ii) He wanted protectorate status under the direct supervision of the British Crown. NB:
According to T.O Ranger (editor) Aspects of Central African History (1973) pp 218-222:
it was not a programme that today we should call nationalist and it ignored altogether
interests of the Shona. Like Lobengula, Nyamanda was content to let the whites take
Mashonaland and a considerable bit of Matabeleland in peace. His movement was
expression of Ndebele nationalism. But at the same time it was not exclusively a tribal
conservative movement. Nyamanda enjoys the support of many of the educated Ndebele,
the preachers, teachers and others.
Nyamanda also gained the support of the South African Congress because his movement
offered a way of attacking Company claims to the ownership of land and of trying to
obstruct settler progress to self- government. He was also supported and advised by
groups of would-be modernizing Africans inside southern Rhodesia. Most of these were
migrants from South Africa who had originally been brought in as a reliable civilized
work force whose presence would act as a restraint on the Ndebele. These men were now
frustrated by the limitations placed on their ability to by and farm land. Thus they had it
in common with Nyamanda that both they and those wished to purchase and they in

161
terms of communal purchase and they in terms of individual. It was members of this
frustrated modernizing group who put Nyamanda in touch with the South African
Congress. Finally, Nyamanda’s movement enjoyed the support of bodies overseas, like
Aborigines Protection society in Britain, who welcomed it as an assertion of African
rights.
Nyamanda’s movement collected money from the Ndebele and tried to prove that it was
representative of Ndebele opinion; it joined with Congress lawyers and Ethiopian
churches in South Africa to petition the King and the High Commissioners; Nyamanda
hoped to travel to England to make a personal appeal to King George. T.O Ranger
provides quotations from two very different documents of the movement which will give
some idea of its complicated character; first, extracts from Nyamanda’s letters to the
Ndebele indunas:
(A) Letter to Indunas:
“I write this paper of mine to you , all chiefs of the Regiments. I say to you, all nations
that have been conquered by the English the government gave them Chiefs to whom they
pay their tax. Look at Khama. He has his country, and Lewanika; he has his plot. His
country is settled well and Mosheshe he has his land. Also the son of Dinizula has his
country. All natives have their bit of ground where they pay tax their taxes. They pay
taxes they know and not like you who pay for what you know not. You do not know what
is done with your money. It is like money that is lost because you pay so greatly and do
not know what your money does. At the same time you undergo tribulation… I want to
hear your word. We remain in a scattered state all the time. Even if people have been
conquered may they not abide in one place? For myself I ask of you, ye owners of the
territory, in as much as you are the nation. I do not say it is war, my compatriots, I only
inquire. You also know that all black tribes in great numbers were overcome by white
people, but they have their piece of land to stay on happily. We forsooth, pay only for
staying on white men’s arms and for what reasons? “(T. O. Ranger)
(B) Nyamanda’s petition to King George V of March 1919 speaks a different Language.
“referring to native laws and treatment, your petitioners have experienced with great
regret that High Commissioners and Governor General, who are the true representatives
of your majesty, have merely acted as disinterested spectators whilst Government parties
of various names and associations are interpreting the Laws in Class Legislation to Suit
their purpose. Your Petitioners pray that in case Rhodesia is granted any form of
Government the Imperial Government take over the Administration of Native Affairs in
that country… Your Petitioners are further aware that the Judicial Committee of
Majesty’s Privy. Council has found that the so-called unalienated land belongs to the
crown by reason of an alleged right of conquest and the de-thronment of the late King
Lobengula. The right or justification of that alleged conquest your Petitioners do not seek
to discuss here; but in the interest of might and justice and in pursuance of the fact that
the might of conquest…. Is now repudiated by the civilized world. Your Petitioners pray
that your Majesty be pleased to hand back the so called unalienated land to the family of

162
late King Lobengula in trust for the tribe according to Bantu Custom, and the right of
chieftainship therein to be restored and acknowledge.” (T.O. Ranger)
Nyamanda’s movement did not achieve any of its objectives. But it was the only African
voice to make itself heard at a key moment in Rhodesia politics- the achievement by the
white settlers of political control.
NB: we cannot consider the movement as forerunners, of territorial nationalism but just
as a pioneer of new political techniques.
African Responses, Resistance and The Rise of nationalism and Trade Unionism (1923-
1954)
The Nyamanda movement got none of the things it asked for.ie.
(i) Control of Matabeleland as the rest of Rhodesia went to a white settler
government in 1923
(ii) Control of land.
The attack of the idea of white settler government, by Nyamanda and his allies was an
attack of something which had been decided long ago. There had been white settler
representatives in Southern Rhodesia Legislative assembly since 1898; Rhodes had
promised that the territory would proceed to settler self- government; the British
Government had committed itself to the idea before the First World War. When the
Company decided to give up the administration the only real decision left war whether
the whites would to join the Union of South Africa or to run Southern Rhodesia on its
own under what was called Responsible Government.
For these reasons some Africans began to challenge the basic idea of the Nyamanda
movement. They said quite rightly that it was bound to fail and appeals to Britian would
be useless. One of these men, a South African resident in Rhodesia called Abraham
Twala, put it very clearly in a letter to the press. He wrote:
“Experience has taught us that our salvation does not lie in Downing street. I strongly by
advise out native fledglings in Southern Rhodesia, indulging in politics, to find out and
make their friends in Southern Rhodesia. When this has been done we shall see what the
harvest shall be.”
Twala was profoundly influenced by South African examples, particularly the example of
Jabava’s leadership in the Cape. In the Cape there were sufficient numbers of African
voters registered on the common roll for them to have a considerable influence in
elections; under Jabavu’s leadership this influence was used to bargain with the white
parties for concessions. In Rhodesia also the franchise was in theory colour- blind, a very
small number of Africans were already registered as voters on the common roll. Twala
and his allies, among them one or two educated Ndebele and Shona, decided to try to
organize the African voters of Rhodesia in the same way as Jubavu had done in the Cape.

163
Twala decided to offer the support of African voters to the responsible government partly
in exchange for promises of justice to Africans after they came to power. On 20 January
1925 the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association was formed in Gwelo; two white
candidates of the Responsible Government faction were present and the meeting decided
to “co-operate such as necessary with the present M.L.Cs who carried out Responsible
Govern met propaganda” and at the same time asked them for a promise that, after
responsible Government, Africans would be allowed to purchase land freely, that higher
education would be provided, that African voters should be exempt from certain
restrictions, and so on.
The founders of RBVA hoped a great deal from their organization. In June 1923 its
Ndebele secretary, Ernest Dube, wrote to Jabavu’s paper that;
In Rhodesia the year 1923 will be year of events beyond past years, for on
January 20th 1923 the brown voter of Rhodesia formed a
union……………………… to aim and strive for the betterment of the Brown
Race in school and Government… The brown people of this country are very
backward, we still await a little, a lot, a movement forward, but we hope with the
help we will get from brothers in south of Africa things will might themselves.”
The RBVA was not able to exercise the influence it had hoped. The numbers of African voters
were too small and there was no readiness on the white side to accept educated Africans as allies.
An RBVA general meeting minute in 1929: An impression is abroad that,
“… Educated and progressive natives are not in favour in some quarters.”
The new settler government was determined not to encourage the African elite to claim rights as
spokesmen for the mass of the people. So the RBVA won few concessions. And in any case it is
tempting to dismiss it as very much an elites and selfish organization trying to use its special
status to win concessions which were of interest only to the emerging middle class. To that
extent, Nyamanda’s movement was much more genuinely a mass movement directly in the line
of ancestry of modern nationalism.
This was not as simple as that, however. The RBVA was important as the first association to
focus on politics at the centre and to concern itself with the territorial parliament instead of
thinking about a Ndebele national Home or dreaming of a new Shona rising. And some of its
leaders did see themselves as speaking for the masses and made real efforts to reach a mass
audience. Here the outstanding figure was Martha Ngano, who had come to Zimbabwe
(Rhodesia) in 1897. Well, educated, an outstanding speaker and organizer Martha Ngano was the
life and soul of the RBVA in the 1920s. She took its claim seriously. In meetings in the rural
areas she attacked the leadership of drunken and illiterate chiefs calling upon Africans “to
combine in an attempt to become as clever as the white man.”
As the hopes of a fruitful alliance with white politicians foundered Ngano become more radical
in her approach. She realized that the only way in which the RBVA could become powerful was
by registering many more voters. She therefore attacked the way in which the franchise
qualifications were interpreted; in 1924 she pointed out that literacy in English was a

164
qualification but that English was not taught in African schools and that communal property
should be allowed instead of demand for a high money wage. “why can’t we vote for live-
stock?”
In Matabeleland she did succeed in setting up a number of rural branches and establishing a legal
defense fund for farmers. In appealing to this new audience, she became concerned with mass
issues; her speeches came to centre around destocking and dipping and land shortage as well as
around the need for higher education. Martha Ngano deserves to be better remembered as a
pioneer of the sort of contact between educated modernizers and the masses which developed in
later nationalism.
African Response to the Land Apportionment Act:

With all its limitations the political future seemed to lie in the 1920’s with the RBVA and the
other associations rather than with the Nyamanda movement or with Shona dreams of revolt.
Many of the Ndebele remained devoted to the ideal of national home and a restored monarchy
and the cause was taken up by the Matabele Home Society. However, after 1923 it became more
and more obviously a tribal course and commitment of the Ndebele aristocracy to it prevented
them from moving on into new forms of nationalist protest. As for the Shona, a report on
attitudes in the Belingwe (Mberengwa) area in 1923 stressed that their response to white
pressures had become one of fatalistic and despairing acceptance; the facility of old forms of
resistance was understood.
The RBVA, the Gwelo Native Welfare Association, the Rhodesia Native Association and the
others that came into existence at this time were especially open to the charge of being
unrepresentative. Unlike the native Associations of the same period in Malawi they were mainly
led by foreigners- Fingos, Sothos, and Nyasas. This was because African education in Rhodesia
legged far behind African education in Malawi in the early period of contact. Large numbers of
Nyasas were already literate before the first Shona went to school, and some sort of higher-
education was available in Malawi decades before it was available in Rhodesia. It is inevitable
that educated Africans from South Africa and Malawi should take a leading role in these early
associations. Exactly the same thing happened, for example, in the early political associations of
Zambia and Tanganyika. But it was also inevitable that this should make it difficult for them to
establish contact with the Shona and Ndebele masses; not everyone was a Martha Ngano.
The Rhodesian administration thought that it could safely disregard such unrepresentative
associations. Prime Minister Moffat thought that their pretensions were more “pathetic” than
they were dangerous. In any case, even if these associations had spoken with an indigenous
voice, the Rhodesian Government was much less likely to listen to them than the colonial
Government in Malawi.
Also to be noted is that, all these associations depended upon being listened to, they had no other
effective means of applying pressure. The Motto of the RBVA expressed the faith of them all:
“Not by might, nor by power, but by My Spirit, said the Lord of Hosts.” Southern Rhodes
showed little signs of the working of the spirit in the 1920s and 1930s.

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The land issue came as a test case for all these associations. Land was the one issue upon which
they might hope to rally wide support and the new settler government had promised British
philanthropic organizations that it would reopen the land question and seek for a final and just
settlement. One of the aims of the RBVA was to ensure African opinions were heard when the
land issue was reopened. And the other associations were equally concerned with land. They
asked for the right to purchase and freehold and they all asked for more land to be added to the
reserves to be held under community. The whites also wanted the land issue discussed because
they hoped to achieve a system of segregation.
Up until the appointment of Carter Commission in 1925 all parties were equally delighted with
the prospect of a land inquiry. The RBVA boasted that its representations had been responsible
for the appointment of a Commission and the hearings of the Commission were the most
important political event for Rhodesian Africans since the risings. Hundreds of African witnesses
testified to the commission; African views were sounded in a way that had never happened
before. Chiefs and elders and church ministers and independent church leaders and school
teachers and members of Ndebele royal family and the leaders of the new associations all gave
evidence. Their evidence varied a good deal but certain things came out of it; Africans wanted
more land and to get it they were prepared to accept the idea of segregation. The land left to the
whites was to be for whites only. Rhodesian Africans were falling once again for the old Home
Rule thick that Rhodes had played on Lobengula.
Some African voices warned against the idea of Segregations, pointing out that it would mean
that all the towns fell in the white area. But the real disillusionment came with the publication of
the commission’s report. Segregation was indeed recommended; so also was addition to African
land. But this addition was a small one. The reserves were not significantly increased, and the
new African area, the so-called native Purchase area, was to be reserved for Africans who could
afford freehold plots.
Those who had wanted to buy land were no better placed. The new Native Purchase Areas were
remote and often waterless ad unsurveyed. They suspected a swindle, and their suspicions were
fully justified since the greater part of the land remained undistributed for decades. Only 893
farmers had been settled in the Native Purchase Areas by 1939, “many of the successful
applicants were retired B.S.A policemen, evangelists and teachers from missions of them were
old and many had their origins in Nyasaland, Mozambique or South Africa.” As Roger Woods
tells us “the evidence is that progressive natives (i.e. those with capital) met nothing but
frustration in trying to acquire land.” In short, the whites had got segregation and neither the
tribal Africans nor the progressive leaders of the associations had got their share of the bargain.
As a result, in July 1929 various African associations of Southern Rhodesia held a combined
meeting in a mood of bitterness and disillusionment. On issue after issue they voted against the
“Home Rule trick,” those policies of parallel development which did not offer a fair share to the
African, which gave him no real power in his own areas, and which debarred him from education
and opportunity.
The “Congress” of associations unanimously voted to reject the land Apportionment Bill. A
Shona Speaker drove the rejection home:

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“Let us tell the Government that this bill is wrong our cattle die for want of water… Let
us tell the Government that the bill is no good. It is all for the white man. Rhodesia is big.
Let them cut the land in half and let us live on the one side and white man on the other. If
they cannot do this they should at least give us a place for reserves where there is water.”
The “Congress” went on to reject the proposed Local Councils Bill which purported to give a
measure of local self-government. Delegates objected above all to the provision that the Native
Commissioner was to be Chairman of the local council:
“He is a European, how can he understand the domestic affairs of natives? Only a native
can do that.”
And the “Congress” also attacked an educational policy which provided Government schools for
white children but not black.
“Do we not pay taxes to Government? Then we want a proper Government School, we want to
see something for our money, we want proper schooling for our children.”
Their disillusioning experience had driven the polite associations into a much radical position.
But even then they could only reiterate: “If we talk sensibly as we have done today Government
will take notice of us.”
Early Trade Unionism:

At the end of the 1920s the first attempts to organize the African workers of Bulawayo, Salisbury
and other urban centres were made. They were also inspired by the example of Union of South
Africa. There, the remarkable Nyasa leader, Clemens Kadalie, had created the most spectacular
mass movement ever known in South African Politics: The Industrial and Commercial Workers
Union. The ICU seemed to offer a solution to the essential dilemma- how to produce a modern
movement with effective mass support and with a weapon in its hands. The unity of the worker
could replace the division of the tribesman. In 1927 Kadalie Sent another Nyasa, Robert Sambo,
to start ICU activity in Rhodesia.
Sambo was an extremely interesting and unusual man. In addition to his interest in the
organization of urban workers he was concerned with the condition of the agricultural labourers
who worked on white farms in Rhodesia. This question had not hitherto interested African
organizations in Rhodesia mainly because a large proportion of this Agricultural labour force
were migrants from Nyasaland and Portuguese East Africa. Sambo, however, compiled facts and
figures about the poor conditions of work and the low wages customary on Rhodesian farms as
well as attempting to stimulate the urban trade unionism. This combination alarmed the Rhodesia
authorities who deported Sambo and did what they could to destroy the infant ICU organization
which he had created.
Sambo and Kadalie were confident that the seed had been well sown. Kadalie wrote to the
Rhodesian Prime Minister:

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“In spite of your ban, we shall find means, as we have done in the past, to get our
message to our fellow workers, and shall find men and women in your colony to raise
and uphold the banner of freedom from all forms of oppression.”
And a handful of men and women did, indeed, continue to raise the banner of the ICU, branches
were formed in Bulawayo and Salisbury and efforts were made to carry the message of the
movement into the mining compounds and townships of Rhodesia.
The ICU brought something new into Rhodesian African policies. It worked through the public
meeting; every Saturday and Sunday in both Bulawayo and Salisbury such meetings were held.
It struck a new note of radicalism, appealing to working-class solidarity, attacking the missions
as well as the government, and demanding basic rights. The following extracts from CID reports
of the early meetings of the ICU in 1929 and 1930 helps to illustrate that:
(1) “If the White people did not believe in uplifting the native, they should have left us in
darkness. We are workers suffering. You must all understand that. Your perspiration is
coming out for nothing. Everything is worked by natives. You are digging gold out of the
earth and are making holes in mines….AU roads are made by natives but if you walk
there you are arrested.”
(2) “You cannot conquer the white people because they are united. If you fight one white
man the whole group will come upon you. Do not say, “I am a Blantyre or isiNdebele.”
Then we shall obtain our country.”
(3) “Why are you black people asleep? Wake up and come to see your true God. The white
man has brought another God. The white man has brought another God. That God is
money. Everyone is praying to money. If money is our God. Let us get money. I do not
want to go to Europe for it, it is in the ground.”
(4) “I am not separating you young men into tribes. Our prophets were killed for speaking
truth. Today it is ICU.”
(5) “All the workers of the world are united and we must also unite our forces together and
so achieve something and have freedom in Africa… if they do not want us to join the
communist party and other parties not friendly to Government, they must treat us better.”
This was certainly a new voice. It seemed to offer a good chance of modernizing mass
Ndebele and Shona discontent with ICU playing the role that “our prophets” had played
in the risings of 1896-7. The ICU would succeed because it had the secret of proletarian
unity which Lobengula did not possess. But the ICU was weak in practice. In Rhodesia it
never became a strong mass organization as it did in South Africa; it attracted crowds to
its meetings but collected little in membership dues. Moreover it disavowed any intention
of using the strike weapon effectively in South Africa.
The Rhodesian ICU mocked at the polite associations.
“You must not think that Angels will come to the Europeans and tell them to give you
more wages. No, we must agitate.”

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But it did not offer any convincing alternative. If the associations believed that an
articulate statement of grievances would be heard the ICU believed that the voice of an
organized working class movement would be listened to. In any case, the fact that
African workers in Rhodesia were not ready for strike action; too few of them had roots
in the towns; too many were from outside Rhodes altogether. So the ICU was unable to
build up an effective mass support; when the Rhodesian Government moved against its
leaders in the early 1930’s and imprisoned some of them for subversion the movement
dwindled away.
Nevertheless the ICU was important in many ways. It really was not so much a trade
union as the forerunner of the urban mass, party; it expressed itself through public
meetings rather than workers’ committees. It did offer the most outspoken challenge yet
to white policies. And it did take seriously the task of overcoming tribal divisions. Thus it
used a Shona organizer, Masoja Ndlovu, in Bulawayo, and a Ndebele organizer, Charles
Mzingeli; in Salisbury. Moreover the people who entered politics through the ICU stayed
in radical politics for decades afterwards. Mzingeli as leader of the Reformed ICU
dominated Salisbury politics after 1945; Masoja Ndlovu was one of those arrested when
Congress was banned in 1959 and in 1967 is in restriction as a ZANU supporter.
Trade Unionism in the 1930’s’

By the 1930’s, the patterns of African political activity in Rhodesia had already been set.
(1) Ndebele nationalism had been expressed and had not succeeded.
(2) Exploitation of the vote had been tried and had not succeeded.
(3) Organization of the workers had been tried and had not succeeded
(4) Polite lobbying had been tried and had not succeeded.
So there was nothing much else to do but patiently to try them out again- as shown in 1930’s
Two important things also happened in this period:
(1) In the 1930’s leadership in the various associations began to be taken over more and
more by Ndebele and Shona educated men. E.g (a) Rev. Douglas Thompson Samkange, a
Shona minister of the Methodist Church who spent much time in Matabeleland.
Samkange became the leading light in the two most important elite organization’s of the
1930’s
(b) The African section of the Southern Rhodesian Missionary Conference and the Southern
Rhodesia African national Congress, founded by Aaron Jacha in 1934, became the main
exponent of the idea of concentration on territorial constitutional politics.
It did not limit its appeal to voters or potential voters but tried to organize Africans more
generally, especially in the urban areas. It was neither much bolder nor more successful than the
RBVA. But it was the first Congress movement in Central Africa. And it did survive to run into

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modern nationalism in much the same way as did the Tanganyika African Association survived
to run into TANA. When the young radicals sought in 1957 to create a radical movement of
modern nationalism they did so in the name of Congress, sought out and brought into the new
movement the surviving branches of the older organization, and accepted the leadership of
Joshua Nkomo, an office holder in the old Congress.
Congress and the origins of modern nationalism in southern Rhodesia:
Congress may be regarded as the ancestor of modern nationalism in the country. It had a
centralizing and directly role. However, modern nationalism is more than a development out of
elite associations of the 1930’s, it is also characterized by enthusiastic mass support.
The second important development of 1930’s remotely foretold such mass support. What
happened in the early 1930’s was that the Shona masses in the rural areas showed that they could
move out of their dreams of the past and break away from their old ideas of resistance, that they
could accept other visions and other leaders.
This did not mean that men like Chief Kunzwi-Nyandoro were now replaced by men like
Samkange and that the Shona masses began to support congress; there was still a long way to go
before the coming together of the masses and elite modernizing leadership. What took place was
a development among the Shona of various independent church movements: e.g.
(a) Matthew Zwimba’s Church of the White Bird- he was entrusted by the chiefs and people
of the Zwimba Reserve to act as their spokesman to the Carter commission on Land
Apportionment.
(b) Watch Tower: the Shona also got committed to movements which came from outside-like
the Watch Tower Church. This was introduced in the Shona rural areas in the late 1920’s
and 1930’s by domestic servants from Malawi and heroes like John Chilembwe and
Kenan Kamwana; its hymns were sung in Nyasa languages- so it did not make an appeal
back to the Shona past. It however promised a miraculous divine intervention which
would overturn the Rhodesian situation and put white power and wealth into the hands of
the African.
For a few years the movement swept through north-western Mashonaland, wearing
congregations which repudiated the authority of the chiefs and departed from tribal
customs. The Watch Tower influence faded again as its Nyasa leaders were deported. But
the episode had shown that Shona were responsive to radical promises of a
transformation of the Rhodesian situation and that they would follow leaders other than
chiefs and elders.
In the late 1930’s there was simmering Shona discontent in the rural areas provoked
especially by such things as destocking and cattle dipping. Every now and then this
discontent was expressed openly, as when chief Nyandoro of Chiota reserve publicly
opposed destocking in the 1930’s and was deposed for doing so. But as yet, the Shona
grievances had found no effective outlet; neither had they been harnessed to any centrally
directed political movement.

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The Situation After 1945

During the Second World War politics in Rhodesia as in other parts of east and central Africa
appeared to mark time. When the war ended the pattern of African political activity in Rhodesia
seemed much the same as it had been in the years before the war. In fact the same movements
and the tactical choices which they stood for persisted; though as shall be seen, the situation in
which they operated was being transformed.
The Matabeleland Home society still existed in Bulawayo and the Ndebele countryside. Few of
its members can any longer have expected the Kingship would be restored. The society had
become in effect the defender of Ndebele values and as such war supported especially the
Ndebele aristocracy. In Bulawayo it also acted as an urban welfare association and for this
reason attracted the membership of younger and potentially non-radical men who later left it to
join the nationalist parties.
Congress was revived in 1945 and continued with its policy of presentation of grievances to
government. It could now draw upon an increasing number of educated Rhodesian Africans. The
ICU tradition continued in the person of Charles Mzingeli. There were some developments in his
thinking also. The old idea of the solidarity of all African workers had been extended to include
the idea of the solidarity of all workers of whatever race; Mzingeli was increasingly working
with a small group of radical whites who tried to lead European labour in Rhodesia into an
alliance with African labour.
Finally Shona resentment expressed itself in the form of sporadic and scattered opposition to
destocking and dipping. And the growth of the independent church movement among the Shona
accelerated greatly. In the twenty years after the war Mashonaland became one of the major
centres of independence in Africa, until today they were probably more African members of
Independent churches in Mashonaland than members of mission churches.
The independent churches varied greatly; some were modernizing churches which copied
mission organization and forms of service; others were prophetic, faith healing, millenarian,
bringing in ideas of symbols of older Shona religion. Both types of churches had political
significance. The first type offered opportunity for African leadership and modernizing
enterprise; it was often seem as an African response to the white challenge, as proof that the
African also could run a modern institution.
Ndabaningi Sithole; who was also leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union worked for
some time as a preacher in one of these modernizing African churches. He tells us about its
founder, Rev E. T.J Nemapare.
“He was seriously accused of breaking the body of Christ, and in his defense he stated,”No
Protestant has any right to accuse me of breaking the body of Christ. It is my Protestant right to
protest, and I do not see what is wrong with exercising my birth-right.”
He remained unmoved and went ahead with his indigenous church. Sithole explained how the
teaching and hymns of churches of this type emphasized Africa’s unity and the need to plan for

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Africa’s future. In his own work for Nemapare’s church he came into contract with rural masses
as a leader he said;
“For the first time in my life I saw the rural areas away from mission stations. Great crowds
came if they heard that I was going to preach to them.”
There was still a long way to go before Sithole was to preach the political gospel of nationalism
to equally hungry crowds but there is a sense in which his political career began in Nemapare’s
church.
The million Churches, on the other hand, offered the same sort of hope to the Shona that the
spirit mediums had held out in 1896-7 and the Watch Tower leaders in the 1930’s. the most
important of these churches, the Guta Ra Jehova of the prophets Mai Chaza, turned, boldly to the
Shona past at its holy village the “Shiri Chena”, white birds of Mwari pecked the grain, Mai
Chaza was supposed to have summoned the spirits of the dead founders of “Rhodesia.”
(Zimbabwe) such as Lobengula, Chaminuka and Rhodes to Zimbabwe and there to have
reconciled them and released them from Purgatory her followers adopted uniform and looked
forward to the aid of spirit soldiers. It was no wonder that timid observers compared her to the
female religious leaders who had been important in 1896.
But these various movements seemed as far ever from being able to offer an effective challenge
to the whites and still further from being able to write in one inclusive movement.
1) For what motives and with what success did Africans oppose colonial rule between 1898 –
1923?
2) Why and with what results were Independent African Churches established in Zimbabwe
between 1898 and 1923?
3) Why did early African trade union movements achieve little during this period?
4) How far did African resistance to colonial rule rely on foreign influence during the period
before 1945?
5) How valid is the claim that after 1897, Africans offered little resistance to colonial rule.
6) Examine Shona Resistance to colonial rule between 1897- 1923.
7) Ndebele grievance after 1897 were more pronounced than the Shona grievances. Do you
agree?
8) Critically examine the impact of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 on the African
society of Southern Rhodesia.
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9) How effective were early African churches in offering passive resistance to colonial
administration?

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CHAPTER 16
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA
CHAPTER OBEJCTIVES
After studying this chapter, candidates should be able to:
a) Describe the nature of colonial administration in southern Rhodesia up to1923
b) Critically examinelAfrican living conditions under colonial administratiion
Background
The suppression of the Shona-Ndebele uprising of 1896-7 had profound effects upon the future
of Southern Rhodesia;
However, although the rebels were defeated or forced to a settlement which involved submission
to colonial rule, their rebellion compelled whites to take Africans seriously in a variety of ways
they had not done before 1896.
T.O.Ranger notes that "It bought about significant changes in the character of white colonial rule
itself. Many of these changes though not all were to the benefit of the African population in
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Thus their rebellion was not a futile gesture nor merely an
accident in Southern Rhodesia History.
However, whether their background officials sought to maintain their rule cheaply, while,
stimulating their sought to achieve both purpose of African Labour. According to A J. wills
Southern Rhodesia obtained a measure of representative government in 1896. In that year there
were already 5000 Europeans in the colony. The Rhodesia Order in Council combined
Matebeleland and Mashonaland under one administration with headquarters at Salisbury
(Harare).
A Legislative Council was established over which the administrator was to preside consisting of
5 members appointed by the company and 4 being elected. The first years of occupation were
hard ones for Rhodesia-That is for European settlers and Africans. The Africans were
undergoing the initial stages of a revolution that had been thrust upon them.
The whites columnst faced their own problems and A.J.Wills Says:
"At this time a serious obstacle facing miners and farmers, railway builders and tthose in need of
carriers for transport and treating their economic shortage of labour".
As a result, a clause in the 1897 native legislation for Rhodesia had made it compulsory for
chiefs to provide labour for public works if required to do so. In 1899, Labour Bureau were
established by the Southern Rhodesian Chamber of mines to carry out recruiting. However, they
did not obtain the desired results and according to Wills;

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"A proud and hitherto unconquered Matabele cannot be turned in a year into a useful servant by
kicks and a by cursing him for not understanding an order given in English or by being too kind
to him. The blackmen is inclined much more than the white to do nothing at all".
As a result, the chamber of mines passed a resolution in 1900 calling for the importation of
Asiatic labour. The other means included an attempt in 1901 to double a recently inaugurated
poll tax to 2 pounds per head. The tax served the double purpose of encouraging man to work or
contributing to the government revenue.
Taxes could be paid on money, ivory, gold, copper and salt the value of each being assessed. The
general imposition of tax followed the extension of the British authority of tax throughout the
protectorate after 1897. While settlers set to extend their influence over the Central government,
African wage earners in Southern Rhodesia were involved in a desperate struggle for survival.
Most were immigrant workers employed as miners or on European farms and these were paid as
single man on the assumption that their families could sustain themselves through subsistence
cultivation in their villages.
Wages tended to decrease during the period of reconstruction in the mining industry from
1903- 1912 and living conditions also deteriorated. As a number of miners increased
overcrowding became a basic feature of compound life. Hospital provision was virtually
non existent on both smaller and large miners. In 1906 the death rate among African
miners averaged 76 per 1000 and in the next years, 1907, 153 black miners out of every
1000 in Gwanda district died.
In A.D Roberts' words;
“When ever African wage earners were employed in large numbers on the railways or in
public works departments in mines, compounds were formed to facilitate labour control".
The central problem facing employers was how to coerce workers into meeting the
demands of the industry while at the same time preventing them from using collective
muscle to press for improvement in living standards hence the solution arrived in the
compound system from South Africa. Therefore one can say that though a formal
structure of racial discrimination did not exist in Southern Rhodesia until the 1930s,
many elements existed in early years of practice in the century.
Europeans provided with privileged access to land were supported by discriminatory
taxation aimed at forcing Africans into European employment. As noted by A.D. Roberts
in the Cambridge History of Africa:
" White farmers and mine owners were one in requiring regular supplies of cheap
unskilled labour, and to this end they agitated for measures that would reduce the
capacity of Africans to function as independent agricultural producers and that would
force them into taking employment with whites".
There was an informal colour bar existed throughout industry devised not only to protect
European workers from African competition but also to limit the social cost that
employers were limited to bear.
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The white farmers from African competition, but also to limit the social cost that
employers were limited to bear; The white farmers divided their attention to the needs of
the European population in the mines and towns. According to R. Hollet;
"These needs might well have been supplied at least in part by African peasant producers
for the Shona had developed a highly remarkable variety of crops"
However, Hullet goes on to say;
"By ensuring that most of the land within easy reach of minerals went to Europeans, the
locals administration gave white farmers a significant advantage-an advantage
consolidated by the subsidies and farmers with their great political influences found it
easier to secure"
Thus most African farmers in Southern Rhodesia were locked in the strait - jacket of a
subsistence economy, discouraged from producing cash crops created by the influx of
Europeans
For many villages in these marginal areas regarded as labour reserves by the colonial
authorities, small scale protests against labour recruitment and tax collection constituted
the main political response to colonial rule eg in North-eastern Rhodesia , malcontents
attempted to escape the authority of headmen, chief and white officials by sitting next to
gardens deep in the woodland.
Labour recruitment was sometimes attacked. The B.S.A. Co. rewarded the first pioneers
with grants of 3000 acre farms. Then the company set about demanding reserves for
Africans. By 1915 native reserves covered an area of 24 million acres while Europeans
owned 21 million acres leaving some 15 million acres still unallotted.
Ten years later, the settler government appointed a commission to make
recommendations about the future of these undemacated tracts of land recommendations
which were largely embodied in the result Africans tended to be left with the land
Apportionment in the left with the land of poor soil, remote from the railways and they
were specifically proven from acquiring properly in the expanding towns all of which
were regarded as European areas.
The land policy followed by the new administration in British Central Africa had then a
profound long term effect in the African rationalism.
Company rule to 1923: Direct rule.

Why did the British uphold company rule or the Charter despite heavy criticism by the
British citizens and their call to revoke it?
(1) The alternative to Company rule in Rhodesia would have been for the British to take over
direct responsibility for the Rhodesians as a Protectorate. This would have involved the
government in the great expense.The British citizens were not kin to take on additional
burdens- i.e. as tax payers, especially after their experience in Nyasaland.

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(2) Although the government never publicly admitted it, Joseph Chamberlain, the powerful
colonial secretary, had himself known something of Rhodes’ plan to invade the Transvaal
and had supported it.
For both financial and moral reasons, therefore, the British governments could not afford
to dispense with Rhodes and the Company and felt itself company's control of colonial
affairs was, however restricted in 1898 and a resident Commissioner was appointed to
Southern Rhodesia to act as the " watch dog" of the British government. His duties at
first included control of the police, but shortly afterwards another British representative
was appointed to supervise the police force which was reorganized to carry out duties
more efficiently.
The Orders in Council-1898:

Rhodesia was given a new constitution to ensure a sound basis for its administration.
Provisions:
(i) An Executive Council consisting of the Resident Commissioner and four members
nominated by the Company, and a Legislation Council which would have four elected
members in addition to five nominated ones.
(ii) The Company Administrator presided over both councils
(iii) The Legislation council could make laws subject to the approval of the South Africa
High Commissioner, who might also legislate by proclamation.
The South Africa High Commissioner: Lord Milner:
Lord Milner was the author of this constitution. He aimed; just like Rhodes to prepare
Southern Rhodesia for future union with the four self-governing South Africa countries
possibly in a federation. This would help for South Rhodesia would tip the balance in
favour of British interests over Afrikaaner nationalist ones. For this reason, Milner set
Southern Rhodesia on the road to self government by providing for the settlers to elect
some of the members of the Legislative Council.
(iv) The increase of the settlers or European population automatically resulted in an
increase in the members of the Legislative council. In 1903 there were equal members of
elected and official members and by 1907 there was a majority of elected members. This
also meant an increase in the number of voters.
(v) Initially the vote was given to male British subjects over twenty- one who were
literate and possessed an increase of £50 a year or property valued at £75.
(vi) In 1912 this was amended to either an income of £100 or properly valued at £150 and
in 1919 women were granted the franchise, which roughly doubled the numbers on the
voters' roll.
An efficient administrative system was essential if the country were to develop smoothly.

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(vii) W. H. Milton-Administrator from 1898 to 1914 recognized the civil service, hitherto
a somewhat rough and ready body-modeling it along that of the Cape Colony, setting up
a number of Government Departments and recruit capable and experienced staff.
Now that the Administrative department was a set up, the company was in a passion to
focus its main energies on economic expansion.
The Rise and Fall of the African Peasantry: Rhodesia” 1898- 1930
The Rise of the African Peasantry:

The Rise of the African peasantry in “Southern Rhodesia,” like elsewhere in Southern Africa can
be traced from the very beginning of colonial occupation; As already shown in chapters 13 and
14, colonial occupation and rule resulted in Africans being forced to work for whites to earn
money. Two labour markets emerged, that is the mining and agricultural industry.
African agriculture was also seriously affected by the rapid growth of the African population
during the 20th century, caused by the ending of local wars and raids and the introduction of
scientific health services. The African peasantry emerged from the fact that the B.S.A.Co and
other white companies were mainly concentrating on mining.
In the first 30 years of colonial rule in Southern Rhodesia, many Africans became prosperous
peasant farmers growing crops for consumption and for sale. They chose to be peasants and
refused to become migrant labourers. They developed strong peasant class-consciousness. The
African peasants wanted to have freedom to practice agriculture, growing their own crops and
keeping cattle on their own land. They wanted to be free to sell their crops at the highest prices
obtainable.
From 1898 to 1993, there was very little competition from white settlers who still hoped to find
the “Second Rand.” The mines therefore became a ready market for peasantry produce. As in
South Africa, many peasants were quite successful in the early years.
Although the settlers had appropriated huge tracts of land, most of them were more interested in
mining than in farming. Settlers made no attempt themselves. This resulted in peasants on white
owned land using it but giving some of their crops or cattle to the white landowners as rent.
Some peasants were forced to surrender half of what they produced. This left them with the other
half for their own use, that is to use it or sell it for money.
Peasants in the reserves had to pay taxes- and as long as the taxes were paid, they were free to
use or sell everything they produced. “Southern Rhodesia therefore depended almost entirely on
food grown by Africans. The African peasants earned money for rents and taxes by selling crops
they grew themselves and this was preferable rather than leave their homes to work for whites.
The successful peasants were the very people who had controlled trade, for example, chiefs or
rulers in the pre-colonial period. These naturally became the most progressive peasant farmers
when peasant farming developed. This was because they had already had wealth in cattle, and

178
many wives who provided labour for farming. It therefore follows that many ordinary people
often were not so successful in peasant farming. The poorer peasants and those further away
from the markets were still forced to go and work for short periods in the mines to raise money
for taxes.
Fluctuation of Peasantry Production:

Most peasants in various districts of the colony did not have land as already noted above as a
result of the land theft by white settlers and the company government. The African peasants had
to pay rent to white farmers, who did not farm very much. The white landowners owned land for
speculative purposes and collected rent from the “squatter” peasant living on the land.
In 1898, peasantry production was boosted by the fact that, a few people from the colony’s
districts went to work in the mines. Most of the peasants stayed on the land to grow crops to sell
to the mine owners for the up-keep of the mine workers. Most of these peasant farmers sold their
crops to shop-keepers found in different areas, who in turn sold the produce to the mines. In the
same year, it was noted that peasant farmers had prospered and were proving to be very clever
businessmen, and that they knew how to sell their produce at a great profit. The same also
applied to the sale of their livestock.
However, it was not long before the mine owners started to complain about labour shortages.
The mine owners noted that there was a huge black population in the districts only a smaller
number of men worked in the mines. As already shown in chapters 13 and 14, the natives were
reluctant to work in the mines, where conditions were deplorable and mine owners described
those who went to the mines as weak, cowardly and lazy men who did not want to work.
The mine-owners tried to get government to force peasants to work but the government reminded
them that they (mine-owners) needed the peasant’s crops. If the peasants were forced off the land
to go and work in the mines, there would be no food for the miners in the districts.
In 1903, the peasants’ luck changed. In that year the government finished building a railway line
from Harare (Salisbury) to Shurugwi (Selukwe). The trains on this line carried food from the
capital to the mines along the way. This ensured cheaper food than the peasants’ crop that the
shop keepers sold to the mines. This development seriously affected the plight of the African
peasant in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia”). The shop-keeper started to panic, for they could not sell the
crops that they had purchased from the peasants. The only answer to the middlemen- (shop-
keepers) was to sell to the mines at a cheaper price, which also meant that they had to buy from
the peasant at a cheaper price.
In 1905 the shop-keepers were able to pay only half of what they had paid in 1898 to the
peasants.so the amount of money the peasants got had dropped by 50 percent. The peasants did
not have to stop farming completely, for they still could sell cattle. It was difficult to bring cattle
by train from Harare (Salisbury), so the peasants cattle were still the cheapest.
In 1908 a colonial officer noted:

179
“… Because these farmers get so much money for their cattle they refuse to work. Most of the
peasants are not keen to leave their homes they prefer selling cattle”
On the other hand, many settlers started to produce maize and cattle in many districts and wanted
to evict the peasants from the land. The government, the white farmers and mine-owners teamed-
up together to get rid of the peasants. Laws were passed by the government e.g. the pass law,
white farmers started to demand high rents that peasants could not afford.
The other laws pushed Africans into reserves. By 1913, 40 percent of the black population were
living in reserves which were described as “rocky and not good for farming.” The peasants had
lost the struggle- for they could not farm successfully in the reserves. The peasantry could not
compete with the farmers, who were getting all the necessary support trough loans from the
company government. The peasants were proletarialised. To survive they had to work in the
mine and later white settler- farms.
Table of grain production in “Southern Rhodesia”- ie Zimbabwe (in Kilograms)
1904 1914 1918 1921
Europeans 20 884 337 322 366 378 454 454
Africans 976 554 981 094 1 132 730 1 194 020
(Adopted from Ian Phimister and Andre Proctor)
The Fall And Destruction of The Peasantry:

The proletarianisation of the peasantry mainly affected the males. Therefore, even if in the short
run, production did not suffer significantly from their absence, the long-term effect was to be an
overall. Decrease in productivity. This trend was presumably reinforced by the fact that, given
the absence of males, innovation slowed down at a moment when the transition from shifting to
continuous cultivation made a change in techniques all the more necessary.
This long-term decrease in productivity of the peasantry is confirmed by what scanty evidence in
available such as that collected by M. Yudelman:
“Utilizing the available data and adjusting the figures on the basis of the demographic sample of
1954; one can say that the de facto farm population of African areas rose from 514, 000 in 1901
to 1; 224,000 in 1950-an increase of something like 140 percent at a time when output rose by
140 to 150 percent and cultivated average was extended by 260 to 270 percent.”
Thus the per capita subsistence consumption of the peasantry could be maintained only by
considerable increases in average cultivated per family. Once this process of deterioration of
African Agriculture had started, it became cumulative since the lowered and continuously

180
decreasing opportunity cost of the peasantry in the traditional sector was bound to force an ever-
growing number of men into wage employment.
The foregoing discussion shows that, in the long run, to the growing of the wage-workers there
would necessarily correspond, not an increase, but rather a decrease in the productive capacity of
the rural areas. Therefore when the limits of land available had been, the attempts on the part of
wage labourers to realize their “savings” were to be frustrated, their security would be lost and a
proletariat arisen. This is the reason why the institutional framework established in the 1930s
would not prevent the proletarisation of part of the peasantry.
We may thus draw the conclusion that the economic implication of the institutional framework
was (a) economic stagnation and (b) formation of a proletariat (working class).
Africans lost a lot of land in the 1890s when the first African reserves were created and whites
took the best land. After 1908, the B.S.A.Co decided to try to make money by developing white
farming. They took away from African peasants even more of the good farming land. In 1914, a
commission set up by the B.S.A.Co took away another half a million hectares of the best land
near towns and main transport routes.
The government sold this land to white settlers. During the 1920s, both the miners and farmers
began to call on the government to take more land away from African peasants. The mine
owners hoped this would force peasants to work on the mines.
The Capitalist farmers wanted to end competition from peasants. They also wanted more land
and more people to work for wages. The government passed laws taking more land away from
peasants and giving it commercial white farmers. In 1930, government passed the Land
Apportionment Act, which became effective from 1931. This law set aside half the country- most
of the best land- for settler farmers. Between 1930 and 1950, most peasants were forced off this
land into even more crowded reserves. Peasants were expelled from land that the white owners
were not using themselves. The government wanted this land for future settlers. A few peasants
were later allowed to buy land in what were called “African Purchase Areas.” Some of them
became fairly successful farmers and businesspeople. A few even began to support the
government.
African peasants in the reserves had many difficulties. The land in the reserves was often poor. It
became even less fertile as more and more people were crowded in from white-owned land.
Overstocking and overgrazing caused land degradation. Land that was too intensively farmed by
traditional methods became infertile. Most of the reserves were far away from towns and
markets. It was difficult for peasants to transport crops to markets. Their cattle had to walk long
distances to the markets. When they arrived they were so thin that they could only be sold for
low prices. Peasants were no longer able to earn enough money from farming- so many were
forced to become wage earners- the proletariat.

181
The Rise of Settler Capitalist Agriculture: 1910- 1953:
Introduction:
After 1910, it was clear that there were no gold-fields as rich as the Rand in South Africa. The
B.S.A.Co encouraged many settlers to turn to commercial farming instead of mining. They were
encouraged to grow crops such as tobacco and maize and to breed cattle to supply the mines and
for export to South Africa and Britain. But the settler farmers faced difficulties. The main one
was that peasants produced crops more cheaply and efficiently than the settlers could.
The colonial government began to spend a lot of money helping white commercial farmers.
Much of this money was taken from taxes paid by peasants. The government set up a special
bank to lend money to commercial farmers. It was called the Land Bank. The government also
provided services, such as advisers, cattle- dipping, marketing and transport facilities.
According to Andre Proctor, settlers with farms made Africans living there pay higher rents and
new dipping fees. They confiscated cattle, which strayed on their land. Africans living on settler
farms were stopped from farming for themselves and forced to work for the settlers’ farms for
low wages.
According to V.C. Machingaidze, Capitalist agriculture received a tremendous boost as the
company began to focus its attention on agricultural development and the realization of “its” land
asset.’
Before examining the development of capitalist agriculture during the era of company rule,
Machingaidze noted two points. Capitalism developed in Rhodesian agriculture in two ways.
(1)`First, by internal accumulation of surplus value. White farmers (and also black farmers)
sought to build up resources of capital from profits. White farmers, as already noted, had an
advantage, in that there were a large number of resources at their disposal (taxes, compulsory
labour, pass laws, private locations etc) by which they could extract surplus value from
Africans, who increasingly were being turned into a local rural proletariat. (The contribution
of such compulsory measures to capitalist agricultural development in Southern Rhodesia has
been insufficiently recognized in the published literature). At the same time a large corpus of
legislation and practice grew up to ensure that African producer did not become capitalist
farmers competing with settler farmers.
The Chief Native Commissioner, Herbert Taylor, was reflecting government policy when he
stated in 1918:
“The native should be trained not so much to be a competitor with the white man in the business
of life, but as a useful auxiliary to help in the progress of the country.” It must be pointed out that
the estates and ranches set up by the B.S.A.Co’s Commercial Branch from about 1910 onwards
also benefited from the above repressive measures. The white farmers have had in this struggle
the inestimable advantage of political power; both during and after company rule. Through
settler agitation, the number of elected members in the Legislative council rose from 4 (against 7
company representatives) to 7 (out of 15 in 1903 and stood at (7 (out of 13) between 1908 and
182
1913. In 1914 elected members held 12 of the 20 seats in the Council. But the influence of settler
representatives on government policy, especially with regard to labour policies and the yearly
estimates, is not to be looked at merely in terms of the number of elected members vis-à-vis
nominated members, since it was in the political interest of the company to carry as much settler
support with it as possible.
(2)Secondly, the penetration of international capital is a major factor in the development of
capitalist agriculture in Southern Rhodesia. International capital was present in Southern
Rhodesia in terms of speculative financial investment might from the 1890’s in the form of
big land grants. The B.S.A.Co Manager noted in 1912 that the fifteen principal land-owning
companies in Southern Rhodesia held over 8 million acres between them, with Amalgamated
properties of Rhodesia and Willoughby’s Consolidated Co. Ltd owning 1, 544,000 acres and
1, 339 000 acres, respectively. The fact that over 6 million acres of the above land lay within
25 miles of railways lines gave this land added importance and value. It is important to note,
of course, that the B.S.A.Co, as the largest land owner in the country, had a direct role here
through its Commercial Branch, which run large estates and ranches. Throughout most of the
period of company rule these big land companies, many of which were owned by mining
capital, held their land largely for speculative purposes.
And when they did go in for farming they tended to limit themselves to the country’s
three major agricultural commodities, viz, maize tobacco and above all, cattle ranching
(which required minimal infrastructure on the farm and had an assured market at the local
mines and, from February 1916, on the Rand). There was hostility between settler
farmers and the land speculators right from the 1890’s the former accusing the latter of
“Locking up” valuable agricultural land and African labour and thereby hindering white
immigration. This hostility was manifested particularly in the tussles over the Private
Locations Ordinance (1908).
One result of the promulgation of the above ordinance was that from about 1910 the state
could take action against purely speculative interest in land and international capital was
forced to become productive (to a limited extent). It was partly this move by the state for
the benefit of settler farmers and the gradual eradication of East Coast fever and other
cattle diseases, that gave a spur to large-scale ranching the period prior to the 1921-22
cattle market crisis.
Capitalist Agriculture boosted:

Between 1906 and 1912 six major factors together boosted capitalist agriculture, so much
so that by the close of second decade of the 20th century settler agriculture had reached a
level of self-sufficiency especially in three of the country’s major agricultural
commodities, viz, maize, tobacco and cattle and after coercing the domestic market for
itself, especially food supplies to the mines hitherto dominated by African producers, had
begun to penetrate external markets in the sub-continent, and even overseas in the case of
maize, tobacco and citrus fruits. The six factors are:
(1) The Wise report of 1906

183
(2) The 1906 visit to Southern Rhodesia by a committee of the B.S.A.Co Board of Directors
headed by H. Birchenough.
(3) The reorganization of the Agricultural Department under the directorship of Dr. Eric
Nobbs in 1908.
(4) The promulgation of Private Locations Ordinance (PLO) in 1908.
(5) The company’s embarkation on a policy of developing its own estates and launches “on
strictly commercial lines for profit.”
(6) The establishment of the land Bank in 1912.
V.C Machingaidze discussed each of the above factors in turn.
C.D. Wise, an experienced British agriculturalist and the company’s land settlement
expert, left the UK for Southern Rhodesia in October 1905, with instructions from the
Board to report generally upon the current and future prospects of the agricultural
industry, the opportunities for new settlers, and the methods by which cultivating owners
could be best established upon the soil. In the same year, at the instructions of the Board,
the administration in Southern Rhodesia passed a Loans Ordinance providing for the
constitution of a public debt of 250, 000 “to be expended upon agricultural holdings.”
Although rejected by the colonial office, the ordinance nevertheless, indicates the
company’s new aggressive agricultural policy.
The Directors were impressed by Wise’s report and asked him to return to Southern
Rhodesia to start operations and prepare a central farm on one of the areas selected for
settlement, for the purpose of receiving and training settlers.” In general, in accordance
with methods submitted in his report, the Directors expounded a bold settlement policy to
their shareholders:
“It will be Company’s aim to assist settlers to take up farms already prepared for their
occupation, by the support and facilities offered them, rather than by giving them raw
land at prairie value.”--- Although the Company would not suspend the sale of
unimproved land outside the settled areas for settlement.
Each district taken up for settlement was to have an experimental farm financed by a
special grant for the Administration to assist experimental work, such as trials and
selection of seeds and trials of insecticides, under the auspices of the Agricultural
department. The Development would disseminate the experimental results on the
Rhodesia agricultural Journal, and invite farmers to insept the trial growing. As Wise
himself had noted.
“A great advantage in carrying out such trials on the central Farm is that the farms will be
in different parts of the country, and experiments will therefore be valuable, being carried
out under local conditions of that particular district.”

184
The earliest central Farms/Experimental Farms were established on the Salisbury

Commonage, at the Company’s Mazoe and Premier estates and Marondellas (Marondera)
farm.
Assistance to new settlers would include interalia assisted sea passage and free rail
passage to Southern Rhodesia, temporary accommodation and opportunities for practical
experience, and a proportion of land to be cultivated before the arrival of the settler and
assistance in providing stock. The Directors also took up Wise’s recommendation to urge
co-operation among settler farmers for the purchase and sale of agricultural materials and
produce, and the construction of better roads to connect farming districts such as
Melsetter, Enkeldon and Victoria to railway lines,” to enable them to go ahead
Recommendations adopted by the Company was that the Company should “dispose of
their land to the first settlers at a low but fair rate, according to the market value of the
land in the country today, reserving however, alternate blocks (to be sold later when
prices had risen) then should assist these men as far as possible in reason, without
spoonfeeding, and make them successful, as their success will mean the success of land
settlement and the development of the country.”
In the next few years, the Company resorted to the simple expedient of reducing the
minimum price of land to 1/6 a morgen. But commercial companies are not renowned for
their benevolence and the lowering of land prices was simply a practical move by the
Board to attract settlers and was not designed to last for very long. As the Director
enthusiastically reported to share holders in 1913.
“The average price at which land was sold by the Company in Southern Rhodesia during
the six months ended 31st September last (1912) represent an advance of 26% on the
average of the preceding year, and 53% on the corresponding figure for the year ended
31st March 1910.”
The declaration of policy issued to settlers at Bulawayo in October 1907 by the visiting
Commission of Director further confirmed the company’s adoption of Wise’s
recommendations. The Commission stated that the Company intended to pursue an active
and forward commercial policy, and to stimulate in every possible way the opening up
and steady development of the mineral and Agricultural resources of the country. As the
Directors told shareholders, the time had archived for the adoption of a vigorous policy of
development upon broad lines and the Company could incur expenditure in all the above
directions:
“The return for expenditure so incurred is to be looked for not only in direct
Profits, but also in the natural development resulting from an increase of population;
That will bring about the occupation and settlement of vast areas now lying idle, increase in the
productive power of Rhodesia, improvement in railway traffics and enhancement of the value of
the company’s land (emphasis mine).”
In order to encourage further land settlements, the visiting commission proposed, as noted above

185
a) To reduce the price of land

b) To accept cash payments for land where there was a reasonable guarantee of genuine
occupation and
c) Submitted proposals to the Chamber of Mines and Farmers’ Associations aimed at
amending the Mines and Minerals Ordinance to restrict and define the privileges of
prospectors and miners on occupied farms.
Point (c) had regard to:

(i) Access to grazing rights after mining operations had begun
(ii) Cutting timber and
(iii) The use of water
Further, the Company undertook to pay rebates on the purchase price of farms where
improvements had been carried out, in the form of fencing, planting and general cultivation. In
order to carry out the Company’s new policy, the Directors proposed the immediate issuing of 3
million new shares.
The reorganization of the Agricultural Department in 1908 by Dr. Eric Nobbs, an Agricultural
scientist from the Cape, who served as Director of Agriculture between 1908 and 1923;
revolutionized the function of the Department, thus giving a boost to capitalist agriculture. The
reorganization was planned to increase the Department’s administrative efficiency as well as its
scientific activities. From this period on, the Department consistently increased its number of
agriculturalists, tobacco and cotton experts, veterinary officers, agricultural scientists etc. In
addition to conducting experiments and disseminating the results to farmers, these experts went
out to farms regularly to give on- the-spot advice to settler farmers. Dr Nobbs regarded such
visits as the most effective method of getting progressive ideas across to farmers in a new
country “with a population so largely composed of newcomers, many of them without any
agricultural experience …” Such free state provision of Scientific and technical services to settler
farmers must be regarded as an important form of capital made available to capitalist agriculture.
The Private Locations Ordinance (PLO), which was modeled on the Cape Legislation, had its
origins in the demand of the Matabeleland branch of the Rhodesia landowner’s and Farmers’
Association to the visiting B.S.A.Co Directors in 1907 that Legislation be enacted on the lines
recommended by the South African Native Affairs Commission (1903-5), to restrict African
occupation of white-owned land. The Ordinance limited the number of African adult males on a
1,500 Morgan farm to 40, and stipulated the number of months’ work the tenant had to work for
his landlord at current rates of wages. Thus the distribution of African farm labour was not left to
the operation of “market forces”, but was actually legislated for by the state to benefit white
agriculture as the Rhodesia Herald reported, Attoney General Tredgold’s speech in the
Legislative Council declared:
“There were two ideas which must be prominent in all such legislation one was that the occupier
of land, farm owner or any other person whom it may be, should not be deprived of a reasonable

186
quantity of labour for the carrying out of such work as he was doing. The other extreme was that
the owner should not congregate upon his land so many natives that the land could not support
and they thereby become a great nuisance to neighbours, by living and praying on the
surrounding country.”
It hardly needs to be said that Tredgold’s second reason for the Ordinance was largely an
ideological justification for the first. As Tredgold himself stated, he was in total agreement with
the conclusion of the South African Native Affairs Commission that the system of allowing large
numbers of Africans on white- owned land and “Kaffir farming.”- “restricts the supply of labour
that it fills up with natives much land which would others be better utilized and developed and it
leads to the absence of due control over then.”
The PLO attacked “Kaffir farmers”, ie those rentier landlords and share- cropping interests who
were extracting capital from Africans living on their land in the form of money rents and
agricultural produce by charging 15 and 55 annually per contract for bona fide farmers actually
occupying the land and absentee landlords, respectively. The above section of the P.L.O was
bitterly opposed (without success) by land- owning interest in the Chamber of Mines, who
argued that if it was a question of revenue, as it appeared to them.
“It would be better to raise such revenue by direct taxation of the natives rather than by throwing
on the large landowners the odium of increased taxation and disturbances of might’s.”
Settler demands for PLO and the opposition to it by rentier and share- cropping interests must be
viewed in the light of the penetration of finance capital into land. Such penetration led to the
accumulation of large estates for speculative purposes, and hence also to the rise of rent-tenancy
and share- cropping and the hostility of the more commercialized settler farmers to both casual
labour tenancy agreements and to rentier landlords for “locking up” land and African labour. In
some areas the PLO merely legalized a practice that had been gaining ground for some time. As
the CNC, Matabeleland, reported in 1907.
“Agreements between owners of farms and natives occupying them are becoming more
general, but, in many instances, natives prefer moving to the reserves to binding
themselves to any definite contract.”
It must be pointed out, however that the less capitalized farmers neither initiated nor accepted the
PLO voluntarily, and in fact, those in areas such as Melsetter fought a rear- guard battle against
the PLO well after the promulgation of the Ordinance. Even among the more successful
capitalist farmers, the effect of the PLO was merely to regulate labour tenancy, not to destroy it.
The supreme advantage of the labour tenant system was that during this early development of the
cash nexus, when the “effort price” of African participation in settler agriculture was too high, it
offered capitalist agriculture the necessary coercive apparatus to regulate labour supply. By
1916, the CNC could report that the Ordinance had, had a “good effect” on labour supply, as a
whole, in that, 1,100 locations had been established under Section 3 of the Ordinance.
Although the Company Government started giving out funds to Settler farmers in the form of
fencing loans as early as 1904, there was no proper institution for the first 22 years of Company
rule to enable farmers to borrow money on easy terms, to employ a wide range of agricultural

187
activities. By 1907 settler representatives in the legislative council were demanding that the
Government establish a Land Bank, “to assist farmers with loans for purchasing stock,
agricultural machinery, seeds and generally with a view to stimulating and encouraging the
farming industry. Partly as a result of settler pressure and partly of the desire to attract new
settlers and to diversify the country’s agricultural production and thereby indirectly profit from
higher land prices and increased railway freight, the Company set up a land Bank in 1912, with a
share capital of 250 000. Approved applicants could get up to a maximum of 2, 000 of first
mortgage over ended property or an deposit of other approved security.
Repayment of Capital was spread over a period of 10 years and the annual interest rate of 6%
was below what commercial banks were charging. The Land Bank’s policy, like that of the much
larger Land and Agriculture Bank, created by the new all-settler government of 1924, was to
make credit facilities “available for persons of European descent only.”
Direct B.S.A.Co involvement in agricultural production started with the setting up of the Central
Farms under the management of C.D. Wise at the end of 1906, at Marandellas, (Marondera) and
later at Sinoia (Chinhoyi), Mazoe and Premier Estates. By early 1912 the Company was also
operating Rhodesdale Estate (in the Harley District- i.e. Chegutu), which consisted of £95, 305
acres, forming part of £118, 000 acres taken over in satisfaction of debt of £4, 698 owed by the
French South African Development Company Ltd, and had acquired other farms which were
being formed on a half-share agreement with the Company. The latter farms included the Mazoe
Citrus farm (owned by the Mazoe Syndicate), in which the Company had bought a one- third
share interest in 1909 and which the Company soon virtually owned.
Despite the financial, administrative and technical weakness of the early history of the Central
farms, in 1910. Marandellas and Premier Estate produced tobacco worth £2. 000 and £800,
respectively, and in 1991 P.S. Inskipp, the Commercial Representative, could state that the three
farms at Sinoia, Maronderallas and Premier Estate were self- supporting. Additional tobacco
plantations were being established on all three estates as the Company set out to promote tobacco
culture in the country. Early in 1910, for example, the Tobacco Company of Rhodesia South
Africa Ltd, itself a subsidiary of the B.S.A.Co, was formed to take over the operations of the
B.S.A.Co in connection with the purchase and sale of Rhodesia tobacco, including the leases of
the tobacco warehouses which the chartered Company had build for the “scientific” handling of
the country’s tobacco output. The new company also acquired “the right to select a total of 30,
000 acres of land suitable for tobacco cultivation.
Land-the Company’s Principal asset and Diversification of Agricultural Production;

In 1910 the B.S.A.Co became the first landowner in the country to develop citrus culture on a
commercial scale, first at the Mazoe Estate and not long afterwards at Premier and Sinoia
Estates, and to a lesser extent at the Marandellas farm. In January 1912, the six farms being
worked wholly by the Company totaled 76,150 acres at Sinoia and 73,941 acres at Rhodesdale
were being used for grazing. The Rhodesdale Estate, which was enlarged to over 1 million acres,
developed into one of the Company’s important ranches during the second decade of the 20 th
century, and had on it 40, 000 head of cattle by 1923.

188
From about 1910 the company’s policy towards the Central Farms began to change from
regarding them as mere training centres for settlers. As the Directors reported to the
shareholders, “The primary object in the work of these estates is the earning of profits, but their
use for secondary objects, such as the training of settlers, is not lost sight of.” While increased
settler immigration would result in increased land purchases and, therefore increased profit for
the company, by improving the underdeveloped land and showing that good profits could be
made the Company could send up the price which it could later ask for the remaining so-called
unalienated land, (i.e, land which had been expropriated but not yet granted to individuals or
companies by the B.S.A Co).
The above view was reinforced by a 1912 memorandum by H. Wilson Fox, the company’s
manager and financial expert. In a 1904 report commissioned by the company, Lt-Col Owen
Thomas stated that (at that time) the case for agriculture as a leading national industry of
Southern Rhodesia could not be demonstrated to the serious agriculturalist. He noted;
“ Frankly admit my failure to solve the problem of success in agriculture in Rhodesia, except as a
minor adjunct of stock-farming; but I… recognize the immense suitability of that country for the
pastoral branch of husbandry.”
Another expert employed by the Company, Professor Wallace of Edinbury university, a
specialist on rural economics, reported in 1908 that.
“As a supplementary branch of rural industry on livestock farms there is much scope for
agricultural extension, but as a primary means by which the country as a whole may be
developed, agriculture pure and simple is quite out of the question.”
The Director of Agriculture added weight to the above conclusions when he reported at the end
of 1911 that Rhodesia was “essentially.” The condition of the country point strongly to meet the
principal ultimate product to be elaborated off our veld… arable farming must rank before stock
farming in importance, profitability and usefulness.”
Fox concluded from the above reports and others that, if land in Southern Rhodesia was to be
valued according to the return which could, on average be derived from it when employed for the
purpose it was best adapted “that value must primarily be determined with the reference to its
value as a stock-raining country” Fox argued, and the board argued, that land must be regarded
as the Company’s principal asset, taking priority over the company’s two other major assets,
minerals and railways, and to be developed “with the object of making the maximum profit for
its owners.” He argued that even at a low figure as 5 per acre the company’s land assets, north
and south of the Zambezi, amounted to over £20 million, “a sum higher than I can assign to the
company’s mining and railway interests combined on the best assumptions that on present
knowledge I feel justified in making.”
Another Director, Lord Winchester, reinforced the above view when he stated in a memorandum
the following year that the Chartered Company’s Mines and Development Company had already
spent £20, 000 without any definite results.

189
“If this £20, 000 had been expended in the improvement of, say 10 farms, I think it would have
a better return, taking into consideration the value which each settler is to both the Customs and
Railway receipts.”
Fox reminded his fellow Directors, that, “speaking politically” time was running out for the
Company and that it was a case of now or never. The Company could not prove or realize the
true value of its estate by establishing a few highly developed estates, small in area, which no-
one would accept as samples of the country at large, or by selling land on a large scale at low
prices. The Company had already alienated 16 million acres in the most accessible districts.” For
practically nothing so far as cash return is concerned and this land remains in comparatively few
hands, and the greater proportion of it is undeveloped.”
In May 1911, on 2,140 whites were engaged in agricultural pursuits, and Fox gave a liberal
estimate of
5 000 whites upon the land, out of a population of 23, 606. Between January 1908 and July 1912
the Company itself had settled 2,849 persons on 5,210, 549 acres. Clearly the Company’s policy
of closer settlement, designed to limit farm sizes and to raise the land prices was not producing
the anticipated results and had in fact met with popular disfavor among settlers. Fox argued for a
more comprehensive policy by which the value of the Company’s vast land holdings of prairie
land could be conclusively demonstrated. How was this to be done? “My answer,” Fox stated, is
by utilizing itself large areas of average land for the purpose of which it is best suited viz stock
raising,” which would have the secondary effect of farming land, especially outside the 25-mile
railway zone, and therefore of raising its value when later taken up by new settlers. Fox
recommended that £ 1 million be earmarked for expenditure of five ranches of 500, 000 acres
each, of which four were to be in Southern Rhodesia and one in the Benchnnaland Protectorate.”
The Central Farm at Rhodesdale was to be up-graded into a ranch and the four ranches in
Southern Rhodesia were to be developed in such a way as to be fully stocked by the end of 1920.
In the memorandum of June 1913, Fox repeated his call for the vigorous prosecution of the
Company’s ranching policy and listed four areas of policy. These were that the Company should:
(i) Develop estates e.g. citrus estates

(ii) Develop irrigable land “on business lines, the object in each being case to make a profit
on the sale of improved land.”
(iii) that the above estates should provide young European settlers with opportunity of
working for wages, before launching out on their own account as tenants or proprietors- a
system that had already been tried in tobacco growing by Major Frank Johnson at the
Inyoka Estate in present- day Gokwe district but there would be “no room for trade union
wages in such cases” and
(iv) Fox urged, and the company agreed, to breed dairy and other cattle for sale to settlers.
Although not all Fox’s recommendations were fully implemented by the time the Privy
Dry Council gave its ruling on land ownership in 1918, by the close of Company rule,
apart from owning extensive ranches, the Company had planted 62, 000 citrus trees at its
Mazoe Estate, 11,000 at Premier and 8, 000 at Sinoia, had built irrigation works at all
three estates and had started to sell small irrigable holdings on these estates to settler
farmers for citrus culture.

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On returning from one of his many visits to Rhodesia, Birchenough reported to fellow
Directors and to the shareholders I 1912 of the great progress being made in settler
Agriculture. Unashamedly Birchenough succinctly stated the economic considerations
that lay behind the company’s aggressive white agriculture policy”
“When we started land settlement for the most part) we were selling prairies land to
prairie farmers who applied to it prairie methods, and the land was in fact only, worth
prairie prices to those who bought it. Now that people know the land can be made to yield
a greater variety of crops and in larger quantities than they thought, and that settlers can
be put at once in the way of raising such crops partly the successful example of their
neigbours and partly with the advice and assistance of a first rate Agricultural
Department, they are ready and willing to pay higher prices for land, for the simple
reason that it is worth more to them… The sunrest way in my opinion to increase the
value of our great asset the land of both Southern and Northern Rhodesia- is to encourage
and stimulate good farming. If we do that the price of land will rise automatically and
settlers will more and more seek us instead of our seeking them.”
It is largely in the light of the above policies that the company’s involvement in agricultural
production and in the promotion of settler agriculture in Southern Rhodesia can be properly
understood according to Victor Machingaidze, an economic Historian. However, it is important
to remember that the above policies were given added impetus by increasing settler demands for
a vigorous settlement policy.
As Fox, Birchenough and other Company officials reported, settlers were constantly complaining
that industry was languishing and that the cost of living was excessive “and rightly attributed
these evils to the scanty number of the European population.
The Company’s decision in 1907 to separate its administrative and commercial function as from
1908 gave added impetus to the controversy over land ownership, a controversy that was to
influence company-settler relations until the rulling of the Privy Council in 1918, that the
unalienated land neither belonged to the Company, the Settlers nor to the African people, but the
crown.
Settler representatives complained bitterly that monies from land sales and certain revenues (e.g
rents charged on Africans living on malienated land and fines and rents from white land owners
and tax on the mines) raised under the taxes and tariffs of the country were going to the
company’s coffers instead of the development of the country. Thus in 1908 the 7 elected
members forced a resolution through the Legislative Council, demanding that the Imperial
Government adjudicate between the settlers/and the Company.
(i) With regard to the claim of B.S.A.Co to be the private owners of all unalienated land in
Southern Rhodesia.
(ii) As to what imports or charges levied under the authority of ordinance or other laws,
constitute administrative revenue, and what expenditure should be charged against such
revenues.

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As, in the circumstances, the resolution stated it was impossible for the Council to deal properly
with the budgets submitted by the Administration. It was in part in reaction to such settler
agitation that Fox and Birchenough stressed the importance of time in the company’s realization
of its land asset, lest the Imperial Government rule against the company’s claim, hence the
recommendations that the Company itself go in for extensive agricultural production and
promotion of settler agriculture.
State Aid and Settler Extraction of Surplus Value form Africans:
The B.SA.Co’s policy towards land settlement was that settlers should be of the “right stamp,”
ie. With Capital. C.D. Wise had recommended in 1906 that the average settler should have at
least £700. This amount included passage out, erection of temporary accommodation, furniture,
implements, harness, stock, seed, wages, poultry, rent, food and £70 for extras. The Directors
reported in 1908 that an increasing number of well-to- do persons were leaving the UK to settle
in Southern Rhodesia. Statistics seemed to validate the Company’s optimism. In 1908 the
Company’s estates Department placed 949 persons on the land, with an average Capital per
family of £800. By 1913 the average Capital per family had risen to £1, 240.
A very important source of agricultural capital inflow was the ranching companies which
invested substantially in the cattle industry between 1910 and 1914. As the Director of
agriculture reported in 1912, ranches “varying as a rule from 10,000 acres to 50, 000 or
thereabouts.” were being developed all over the country, using African cattle as the foundation
stock, supplemented in some cases by grade stock from. South Africa as well as pedigree stock
from overseas. A B.S.A.Co shareholder who visited the country in 1910 reported that,
“There are a number of men who have made money at mining and putting it into
ranching.”
Some companies such as Willoughlby’s had been involved in ranching almost from the time of
Occupation, but in 1912. Dr Nobbs was commenting on the “new feature…that several
companies have been formed during the year, and these and others are embarking upon operation
on a large scale.”
The eight companies listed by Nobbs included Liebigs and the B.S.A.Co itself. All eight
companies possessed at least several hundred thousand acres, while Liebigs, the Amalgamated
Properties of Rhodesia and Willoughby held well over a million acres each. By 1912 the
B.S.A.Co’.s Rhodesdale Ranch had been extended to over 1 million acres, and in 1914 carried
over 19, 000 head of cattle. The 100, 000 acre Tokwe Ranch was being used principally as a
collecting depot and carried 4, 914 head, while the company’s 3. 590, 000 acre Nuanetsi Runch
carried 4,524 head, while the company intended to develop it “as rapidly as possible.” By 1920
Rhodesdale and Naunetsi ranches, which by now covered 1, 017, 216 acres and 2,258,165 acres,
respectively carried a total of 88, 487 head of cattle.

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But the inflow of settler and finance capital was not enough. Most settlers on the land did not
come from the monies classes in the UK. They came from South Africa, as was probably time of
Kenya during the immediate post- Anglo/Boer war period. The White population rose rapidly
between 1904 (12,596) and 1991 (25,606), and especially during the period 1907-1991, and
stood at 33,620 by 1921. Between 1904 and 1911 agricultural production more than doubted,
involving 879 white males in the earlier year and 2,067 in the latter one. Furthermore, the
Agricultural proportion of the total white population increased at a higher rate than any other
occupational class among whites. By 1911 on 8% of the farming population of Southern
Rhodesia had come directly from the UK, and in 1913 nearly 95% of white farmers and come
from South Africa. The company sought to stabilize the Agricultural population by encouraging
female settlers and improving conditions of settler existence on the land through the provision of
better communications with centres by road, telegraphs and telephones.
The Company’s policy of keeping impecunious settlers out, especially “low butch,” was never
pursued with vigour, as continued growth of the Afrikaner “Republic of Enkeldoorn,” clearly
demonstrates. There were thus a large number of settler farmers throughout the period of
Company rule with insufficient capital to farm on a large scale under Rhodesian conditions. Thus
both settler farmers and the land companies were involved in Marx’s “so-called primitive
accumulation,” of capital through rents under what Arrighi has termed semi-fendal relations of
production. However, since settler agriculture in Southern Rhodesia hardly has what can be
called “a peasant history,” it seems more correct to see primitive accumulation not as appoint of
departure for the capitalist mode of production, as Karl Marx correctly observed in the case of
Europe, but as occurring (almost) simultaneously with capitalist agricultural development. This
becomes apparent when the crucial role of the state in the development of settler capitalist
agriculture in Southern Rhodesia is examined.
Primitive capital accumulation in Southern Rhodesia went on throughout the period of Company
rule in varying degrees. The period was characterized by the violent struggle of the growing
capitalism against African subsistence and incipient peasant producers.
Repressive legislation ranging from Pass Laws, the PLO, to the native labour contracts were
enacted to facilitate settler exploitation of African labour.
Roder has observed that:
“The moment a man pegged his farm, he regarded the African villagers
On it as his serfs, who would have to work for him. The chief means of
Mobilizing this pool of labour in the first years was the sjambok or
hippo-hide whip, and after 1908 labour agreements which committed
tenants to work several months, usually three for the privilege of remaining
on their ancestral land.”
Not only did the state make agreements with other colonial states in the sub-continent to
facilitate recruitment of labour, but in period of sever labour shortage, settler farmers were able

193
to flex their political muscles and force the company government to institute measures designed
to procure labour more quickly than Rhodesia native Labour Bureau could.
Thus, in September 1911, settler farmers held a mass demonstration in Salisbury and passed,
inter alia, a resolution demanding the Government “to supply at once a minimum number of
boys, sufficient to relieve temporarily an unprecedented crisis which otherwise will prove the
main of the whole of the farming community.”
The Government responded positively by instructing Native Commissioners “to place the
position before the chiefs, which meant using chiefs to force “their subjects into contract labour
on settler farms.”
Apart from exploiting African labour and land settler farmers, land companies and the B.S.A.Co
itself benefited from unfair terms of exchange in the cattle trade. In January 1908, for example,
the Company’s Marandellas farm bought cattle from Africans in the Umtali (Mutare) district for
between £ 1.10s and £6,5s per head- thus disadvantaging the Africans.
Comments:
It is crystal clear from the foregoing chapters on agricultural development that capitalist
agriculture in Southern Rhodesia could only take off with state aid and settler exploitation of
cheap African labour. Africans were forced to subsidise capital (white settler) agriculture for
they lost their cattle, land, provided cheap labour and above all represie legislation was pt in
place to support the minority white settlers. What the company regime had put place became the
foundation from which the settler regime (1923- 1953) was to base its policies.
The land Apportionment 1930 (see chapter 29) favoured whites. The Land Husbandry Act
(1951)- In brief:
By 1950 the reserves had become so poor that they were no longer able to support the families of
workers. As commercial, (capitalist) agriculture grew, 85 000 more peasants were removed from
white” farmland. The seller government tried to improve peasant agriculture in the reserves.
This was attempted through the Land Husbandry Act which was passed in 1951. This law gave
each peasant household 4-8 hectares of land. The family then had to register this land as their
own. Common grazing lead was divided into private plots to make room in the already
overcrowded reserves for the thousands evicted from white commercial farms. All peasant
households were forced to reduce their cattle herds. They were allowed no more than six animals
each.
Although the total amount of food produced in the reserves increased, peasants were actually
poorer than before. Many were unable to get any land at all. The poor and the landless had no
choice but to work for white employers. No matter how little they were paid. As already shown
earlier, those who had land in the African Purchase Areas were better off. However, none of
them became really wealthy like the white commercial farmers. The plots sold to African

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Purchase farmers were small, between 150 and 200 hectares each whilst the average size of the
white commercial farms was between 1 500 and 2 500 hectares.
1) Describe and explain the urban living and working conditions for African in the 1930s
and 1940s.
2) How effective were the measures imposed by the colonial regime to bar competition
between the black and white farmers?
3) “Colonial agriculture was such a great success not so much because the white farmers
were experts, but because they received a lot of incentives from the settler regime”.
Illustrate and explain the validity of this statement.
4) Assess the view that colonial administration and rule “brought absolutely nothing
positive for the African in the social political and economic spheres”
5) Why was Britain reluctant to take over control of Southern Rhodesia from company rule?
6) Colonial administration ushered in an African working class that eclipsed the traditional
peasant.
7) Critically examine the effects of the colonial administration on the socio-economic
livelihood of African communities.
8) Why did the colonial administration embark on capitalist agriculture?
9) To what extent was the settler govergnemnt able to deal with the labour problems in
Sothern Rhodesia before mid 1940s?
10) What measures were taken by the settlers to frustrate African economic activities
between 1894 and 1951?
11) “The impact of colonization on local Zimbabwean culture has been totally negative
“Disucss”?

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CHAPTER 17
PRE-COLONIAL MINING
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
After studying this chapter, candidates should be able to:
a) Describe the nature of early mining in southern Rhodesia
b) Examine the living and working condition of African miners
c) Critically examine attempts by the colonial government to address the living conditions of the
Africans during this period
Background
For at least six centuries, reef mining has been practised in the area between the Limpopo and
Zambesi rivers – (ie the Zimbabwe Plateau). It is probable that by as early as 1000 AD Muslims
on the coast of Africa were trading gold with the inhabitants of the region. Certainly by the time
the Portuguese estasblished themselves on the east coast at Sofala in 1505, tribesmen, some of
them the forefathers of the modern Shona – speaking peoples , were mining gold over an
extensive area of what was to become "Rhodesia" and Mozambique territories. And it was this
gold that contributed to the development of some of central Africa's most influential pre-colonial
states, amongst them the kingdom centred on the famed site of Great Zimbabwe until it was
abondoned in the sixteenth century – (for details revisit the pre-colonial states of the Zimbabwe
plateau)
Nineteenth Century Expansion and Development in South – Central Africa:

In South - Central Africa:
In Large measure, the myth can be attributed to the reports of hunters such as Henry Hartley who
travelled widely through the area in the 19th century, and especially to the accounts of Germany
explorer Karl Mauch who visited the region in 1867. Mauch's exaggerated reports of the mineral
wealth to be found North of the Limpopo river attracted the attention of the British and South
African investing public at precisely the time that they were becoming aware of the prospects
and profits of the newly discovered Gmqualand diamond field and this resulted in the formation
and flotation of the London and Limpopo mining Company and the South African Gold Fields
Exploration company on the London market in 1868.
Capital did not really begin to flow northwards until after gold was discovered on the
Witwatersrand in 1886. Men who had made their fortunes in kKimberky, amongst them Cecil
Rhodes, now turned their attention to gold mining, and after a period of complex financial

196
maneuvering, a group of large companies, including Rhode's Consolidated Gold fields of South
Africa Ltd, came to control the deep substantial profits.
In the late 1880s the financial ambitions of Capitalists combined with cross-corments of imperial
expansion to produce a stream of concession Hunters who descended upon the ruler of the most
powerful ethnic group in the trans-Limpopo area – Lobengula of the Ndebele.
For several years Lobengula had succeeded in keeping financial opportunists at bay. In the late
1880s, however, the King had to contend not only with the pressure of concession – hunters but
also with serious political problems which made him move vulnerable than in previous years.
Among the most powerful of the negotiators that besieged the royal "Kraal" was Charles Ruud
(see earlier Chapters)
The Era Speculative Capitalism: 1890- 1903

The first ten years of the new colony's existence were punctuated by a series of political and
military disasters. In particular, the hoped – for "Second Rand" failed to materialize and the
history of the mining industry between 1890 and 1903 is a story of the fluctuating fortunes of
speculative capital.
When they entered "Rhodesia" in 1890 the settlers took to establish themselves in Masholand, an
area relatively isolated from the powerful Ndebele and inhabited by the less militaristic Shona-
speaking peoples. Mashonaland, however, was not well endowed with mineral resources, the
bulk of gthe gold deposits being located in the south in Matebeleland, this meant land
speculation, prospecting and mining relatively, small reefs. Mine-owners also found an
additional problem in obtaining and stabilizing a Shona work.
Ndebele raiding parties sent to extract tribute from Shona communities terrified local Africans
and severely disrupted both farm and mine labour supplies. The permanent solution to this
impasse had to wait until the military power of the Ndebele was produced substantial advantages
for the B.S.A Co and the mine –owner gold resources of Matebeleland but it facilitated control
over Ndebele raids.
The mining industry now seemed set for substantial uninterrupted progress. It received a boost in
1893 when the first two large mines, the Cotopaxi and the Dickens and Leander Starr Jameson,
Administer for the B.S.A. Co in the colony, with at least one eye on the stock markets
telephoned London;
"Everywhere new finds are occurring daily, crushing everywhere successfully, wonderful
developments in every district. Reefs certainly improve as depth increase.
Bolstered with such "evidence" the period between 1893 and 1895 so the flotation of a number
of new companies - a trend encouraged by the B.S.A. Co. which held a 50% share in all mining
ventures. Land and mineral-claim speculation accelerated rapidly. In 1895, the B.S.A.Co's shares
changed hands at £8 175 bnbnb on the newly opened Bulawayo stock exchange.

197
The increases in share prices of London-based companies, however, had a very different
significance for the Shona and Ndebele communities. The appropriation of African land and
stock, the suppression of the alluvial gold trade, thetax demands of the B.S.A.co and the labour
requirements that had already reached danger point when natural disaster-on outbreak of cattle
disease- precipitated a second African revolt in 1896-97. This time resistance from both Shona
and Ndebele prolonged. In particular Africans showed their detestation of the mining industry by
throwing the bodies of white miners; prospects and their foreign black labourers down mine
shafts.
The protracted revolt in any case caused the suspension of all activity in the colony and
cost of suppressing it contributed to a marked changed in the fortunes of the mining
companies. By 1898 Shonas, such as those of the Rhodesian exploration and
Development Co., which at the height of the 1895 boom were selling at G18, could be
bought at £4 and those of B.S. A. Co. had dropped from £81756d to £2 15s od.
The high price of shares had indeed largely reflected the hope of a "second Rand" rather
than the results of gold production, and some companies aware of this, took steps
immediately after the revolt to bring mines such as the Dunraven, Geeling and Selukwe
to the crushing stages as rapidly as possible. On balance, however, the company remained
the presence of speculative capital and the mining companies produced promises rather
than gold. In 1898 the Rhodesia Herald pointedly to suggest in its additional that:
"The capitalist should be encouraged; but only as a mining and industrial factor not as a
speculator pure and simple"
During the first ten years of the industry's existence the lack of a stabilized labour force,
shortages of skilled manpower and machinery, inadequate fuel supplies and the absence
of a cheap rail linkage with the more developed South could all partly account for the
South African war of 1899 and the subsequent disruption of rail transport, of machinery
and mining supplies, was really the last major excuse that could be used to justify to the
shareholders the slow growth in production and the absence of profits.
Mining Companies denied income throughout this period from a variety of subsidiary
activities, the most important of which were mmm –collecting Leather from African
tenant farmers or from settlers occupying urban premises, land speculation or trading, this
income could not hide the basic unprofitability of companies supposedly engaged in
mining. It became increasingly apparent to capitalists that the Rhodesian gold fields were
not nearly as profitable as the resuscitated Witwaterand mines. This coupled with the
problem of obtaining adequate supply of cheap labour, made investors increasingly
cautious about Rhodesian Companies during 1900-1902.
Indirectly, the B.S.A.Co acknowledged that many of the mining companies were over-
capitalized and that there were serious problems in the industry when, in 1902, it reduced
its claims of a 50% share in all companies to 30%. This was the next decade designed to
restructure the basic over – evaluation of the country's resources "and the concession of
1902 could not prevent the onset of a major financial crisis. By April 1903, the London
market for Rhodesian mining stock, had collapsed and until March 1904 the industry was

198
in a state of depression. Thus, industry by a period of reconstruction from 1903 – 1911

and consolidation and development of the mining industry – 1912 -1933 – the details of
which, are more relevant to Economic Historians.
Conditions in the Mine Compounds:
Though African wages presented the most important and obvious target for mine owners
in their attempts to minimize costs and secure the profitability of the industry, alone were
not sufficient in themselves to ensure adequate profits. Within both the state and the
mining industry it was approach proceed beyond direct expenditure on African Labour to
embrace indirect expenditure on, among other things, food, accommodation, hospitals.
and compensation for injury. Cost minimization war in short not only to reflect itself in
the compounds, but to govern, the living condition of black miners.
Compound Accommodation:
From the very earliest years of the industry, the mine owners' desire to control
expenditure on African labour produced grossly, inadequate accommodation in the
Rhodesia compounds. In the years of the speculative era before the turn of the century,
mine owners in many cases did not provide accommodation at all for black workers such
housing as there was, more often than not provided by employees themselves: newly –
armed black workers would use their "Leisure time" to construct rough grass shelter or
temporary huts which provided little or no protection from wind or rain. At an Indaba
held in 1899, the Chief Native Commissioner, who must have been aware of this and its
effects on the labour supply, assured Africans that he had extracted promises from mine
manager to build compounds. But in 1900 Africans from Nyanga district were reported to
be leaving the country to seek employment in South Africa, and it was recognized that
they undertook the journey not simply because there were sometimes higher wages to be
earned in the South (at the time many Rhodesian wages were competitive) but because of
the inadequate food and housing provided within still living in "rough grass and pole
shanties". In mid -1901 the Administrator conceded "that it was quite time the natives
were frequently not well treated, fed or housed – resulting in the following:
(1) From the late 1890s onwards, larger companies started to invest in the
construction of sizeable, square wood and then compound, -the buildings which were to
constitute. The core of African housing on the mines – cost relatively acceptable.
(2) Between 1903 and 1908, mine compounds mangers experienced their great
difficulty in getting black workers to occupy the barracks – like accommodation. It was
not simply the tighter discipline which operated in these inner compounds which workers
objected to, but a variety of other disagreeable features as well. The total absence of
privacy proved most unacceptable and in later years workers consistently attempted to
seal off rags or old blankets. In other cases; workers drawn from different cultural
backgrounds refused to share mass accommodation. More important still were the
physical discomforts.

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The iron roofs transmitted seasonal fluctuations in temperature. In summer, day time
temperatures inside the buildings were as high as 1090F. During the cold winter nights,
however, workers sleeping on damp earthen floors were forced to huddle so close to their
fires that many of them were observed to have burns on the abdomen and chest. So it was
that workers would occupy the central wood and iron compounds only as a last resort:
and at the Globe and Phoenix mine, for instance, a building designed to accommodate
800 workers had a mere 100 occupants in 1905.
(4) Black miners devoted some time and effort to providing themselves and the
families with basic accommodation.
(5) Further effort or expenditure was necessary to maintain a decent thatch roof,
make additional improvements or acquire such basic items of furniture as a bed.
(6) In 1905-6, some of larger companies did briefly experiment with a form of hut
accommodation which did involve a cash outlay – e.g. prefabricated huts with iron
sides – “kator hats” were erected in some compounds but since the huts cost 60-70
per cent more than the wattle and damp structures, and the iron made them unpopular
for the same reason as the old central compounds, they were not extensively
introduced.
(7) In 1912, with the climate of greater confidence in the industry, some of the wealthier
companies re-introduced the kator huts on a larger scale.
(8) African housing on the Rhodesian mines thus followed a general pattern through the
period between 1900 and 1933. The core of the housing complex on large mines was the
central square compound – in the earliest years built of wood and iron or stone, but later
more usually of rough – cast local material moulded in dynamite boxes and called
“Kimberly brick.”
In addition, since it was always possible for new producers to enter the Rhodesian, industry
during period of rapid expansion (and leave the sector almost as quickly once the gold had
returned to its fixed price), there were considerable fluctuations in the numbers of Africans
employed in mining- feature which did not simplify the provision of accommodation or facilitate
long-term planning. Between 1906 and 1911 the number of African workers employed rose from
17, 000 to 37,000, by 1911 it had dropped to 30, 000 but was up to 41, 000 again in 1924, it
dropped once more and in 1931 was down to 35, 000 only to rise again to 90,000 in 1937. The
accommodation for Africans on the mines, inadequate in “normal” years, was thus periodically
subjected to even greater pressure and overcrowding was a basic feature of compound life.
The overcrowding was particularly marked during the year of restriction between 1903 and 1911.
During the earlier years of this period the improper wood and iron compounds were
conspicuously under-utilized, but were crowded after 1908. The 1990s regulations governing
over-crowding were a dead letter, and the medical Director was quite handed in pointing out that
he was “unaware of any mine where conditions of housing of natives even approached the
standard laid down.” Even if these central compounds had been fully utilized throughout, it is
unlikely that they would have been able to cope with an African work force that expanded by
five times in some years. The enormous pressure on accommodation showed itself most clearly

200
in the worker- constructed housing. Huts with a twelve- foot diameter, which in traditional areas
housed 2 or at most three people, consistently housed five to six adult workers. It was only after
the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918 had killed over 3000 workers that pressure on accommodation
eased slightly. Even on the largest mines, however, there was only a relative improvement after
1918 and much of the accommodation remained basically over crowded.
Compound inhabitants with higher incomes such as “boss boys” or prostitutes could command
better than average housing and presumably felt the pressure; but in many huts there were still
five or six occupants and it was by no means exceptional for two or three males to share a single
bed and blanket.
Hospitals and Change Houses:

The unwillingness to invest money in buildings for use of black workers affected hospitals. In
August 1901 a compound inspector note:
“The mine managers and others responsible are very loath to spend money on hospitals or infact
to do anything which is really required for the sick natives.”
The inspector gave an example of the large Globe and Phoenix mine, where he noted that it took
a full year’s pressure from the administration to bring the “hospital” to the point where it could
be described as a “corrugated iron barn”, since this “hospital” also functioned as a mortuary.
However, patients at the mine frequently had to share the facilities with corpses for periods of
twelve hours or more.
At the smaller mines, what expenditure there was on “hospitals” until 1933 was always
negligible- usually it was restricted to the provision of a very modestly equipped hut. As the
mines became more profitable the situation improved slightly. Together with compounds and
hospitals, “change houses” constituted a third and important facility which mine owners could
build to provide for the welfare of their workers.
Food Supplies: Agriculture

In a colony which was expected to yield the wealth of a “Second Rand” through its mining
industry, there was little reason for commercial agriculture to constitute a development priority
either for settlers or the B.S.A.CO. Financial gains were to be made more readily elsewhere
during the speculative years, so settlers had little incentive to become farmers, and those also
often expected exorbitant prices for their produce. Similarly the B.S.A.Co, with its roots deeply
embedded in the fortunes of London- based mining companies, saw little reason to encourage
agriculture before 1903. When the London market for Rhodesian mining stock collapsed in the
year, the Secretary for Agriculture pointedly suggested to a direction of the Chartered Company
that:
“… had the Agricultural Industry received half the support, moral and financial, which the
mining industry had received in the past, the deplorable commercial stagnation obtaining today
would not be so accentuated, if it existed at all.”

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In an important sense, it was the very existence of the mining industry which accounted for the
underdevelopment state of European commercial agriculture. The poorly developed agricultural
industry meant that for the better part of the years between 1890 and 1910 while Rhodesia was
forced to import much of her food requirements, fruits and vegetables were brought from the
more developed South African industry, and in the wake of a series of cattle diseases which
devastated Rhodesian herds between 1896 and 1902, meat was sometimes imported from as far
afield as Australia.
Moreover, food imported from the more developed South was subject to the same high rail tariffs
which hampered the development of the mining industry, so that the price of meat and vegetables
in the urban centres soared.
As in the case of the mining industry, commercial agriculture had to develop within the context
of a regional economic system. Farmers in the southern province of Matabeleland found that
they had to compete with the South African Industry whose prices were lower than theirs-despite
the high rail tariffs and import costs. This meant that the province with the largest number of big
miners was poorly served by commercial agriculture. In Northern Province of Mashonaland 25
percent of white population were engaged in farming and a mere 10% in mining, but in
Matabelaland where 50% of the Europeans were engaged in mining, only 6% worked in
agriculture. The Matabeleland mining industry thus had the mixed blessing of relatively “Cheap”
imported produce during the early years of the country but it also suffered from the long-term
results of having undeveloped provincial agriculture.
Commercial Agriculture was also inhibited by the fact that the Rhodesian mines were spread
throughout the country, and that they did not constitute a concentrated market such as that in the
Witewatersrand rand. In some cases, distance alone made provision of fresh produce to miners
impossible, while in others transport costs placed prices well beyond the reach of mine managers
operating within clear profitability constraints. These factors were at their most powerful during
reconstruction, when both white farmers and mine owners operated at the margins of profitability
and the requirements of neither part could easily be met. In 1910 an official enquiry complained
of “a lack of appreciation by the farmers of Rhodesia of the requirement of and the demand by
the mines for farm produce.”
The desire of the mining industry to keep expenditure of African food to a minimum was
generally respected by the administration. Before the introduction of 1908 regulations, the
Medical Director Fleming, had noted the relatively generous ration scales on Witwatersrand gold
mines, but came to the conclusion that these would “be impossible to introduce in his country
(Rhodesia) on account of expense.” He accordingly scaled down the requirements to what he
considered to be appropriate to the resources of the Rhodesia industry but even this
recommendation was subjected to a further cut by the administration, and when the regulations
did come into force in 1908, the Administrator personally assured influential members of the
industry that the requirements would not be rigorously enforced “at the cut-set” and that there
would be some flexibility.
The original 1908 recommendations for rationing was a meat ration of two pounds per week, and
came into effect only in 1911 when the profitability of the industry had been more adequately
demonstrated. And even then the increase in meat rations from one to two pounds per week was
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accepted by the industry only in return for reduction in the mealie ration from two pounds per
day to a half a pound per day. Black workers successfully resisted further cuts in mealie meal
ration which of they persisted would have brought the 1911 allowance to half of that which had
existed in 1901.
How Mine Rations were supplemented:

The most convenient, although not necessarily the cheapest way of supplementing mine rations,
was to patronize an “eating house”, which provided simple meals on a cash or credit basis. Many
of Rhodesian mining villages, such as, Kwekwe or Bindura were owned by Asians, and formed
popular meeting places from African workers. On some of the very largest mines such as
Hwange
However, the “eating house” was run on a sub contractual basis within the compound. And in
other cases it was owned by the mining company itself. During the reconstruction period when
mining companies were seldom making profits, the temptation to recoup African wages through
the eating-house must have been considerable, so that in at least one case the Medical Director
was of the opinion that the eating-house was “little more than a force, the native being charged is
for a meal that was not worth 3d or 4d at the outside.”
Almost every mine had in addition a mine store at which workers could purchase food supplies
for cash or on credit. Most of these stores were owned either by the company or by the mine
owner himself. In the case of smaller mines, an adjacent stores-keeper often held a share in the
mining enterprise as well. Mine stores provided workers with a variety of items ranging from
simple requirements like tea, salt, sugar, mealie meal or bread through to the more expansive
commodities like tinned meat or fish- because of the modest meat issue at the mines, the latter
were particularly popular with black workers. Particularly in short supply, workers would also
share the expense of purchasing a sheep, goat or pig in order to get meat.
Mortality and Disease:

Mining has always been a hazardous occupation and the Rhodesian Industry has been no
exception: e.g
(i) Disasters- especially between 1899 and 1903 caused by careless use of gelignite e.g at the
Boso mine resulting in a series of explosions claiming 19 Black lives (a single accident)
at the Valley Mine in 1906 where a burst dam claims as many as 73 African lives.
(ii) Accidents attributed to personal carelessness or the dangerous nature of the work- the
bulk caused by the anxiety induced by the piece-work system especially those workers
who manned the drills underground.
(iii) Diseases – plathisis, syphilis, dysentery and diarrhea, scurvy, pneumonia etc

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Medical Care and Attention:

As in the case of all indirect expenditure which was not seen directly to affect the productive
process, the ruling concern of the industry in regard to the health and care of black workers
centred on economy. As long as the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (R.N.L.B) could guarantee
supplies of cheap labour to the mines, or the industry could depend on the large number of
central African migrants working their way south the higher seen for large-scale expenditure on
medical care. Humanitarian motivations for improvement could be relegated to a secondary
position and at least one senior Nyasaland administrator “… left Rhodesia (in 1901) with the
impression that, there is lack of sympathy in some quarters towards natives, and it is time that
they should be treated and considered more as human beings rather than money- making
machines.”
Appeals from the administration about the health and hospitalization of workers had to be
couched in terms of efficiency rather than sentiment. During the depression of 1931 in fact, when
black labour supply exceeded demand and ceased to be profitable for the industry to “waste”
money on any hospital expenses, the Inspector of Compounds explained candidly to the Medical
Director.
…”the position has changed and today it is economically sounder to discharge a sick native than
to incur the expense of restoring him to health, as so much labour is offering.”
The mine owners drive for economy was at its most pronounced point during the reconstruction
period, and the programme of hospital construction suffered accordingly. A retarded building
programme meant that mines rarely had sufficient hospital accommodation for black workers. In
theory they were supposed to provide hospital beds for two percent of their black labour force. In
practice even this minimum was seldom achieved and there was great pressure on any hospital
facilities that existed. Even a large mines with an extremely poor health record, such as Wankie
(Hwange) colliery, had only 25 beds for its 1, 500 employees in 1910. An enquiry in 1913 found
the hospital to be inadequate in this respect, and in 1918 yet another enquiry had to draw
attention to the same deficiency.
The quality of the service provided to black patients was also deficient, during reconstruction
there were few doctors in Rhodesia, and medical attention was sufficiently expensive to ensure
that few black miners ever profited from their skills. In 1906 the entire Gwanda division, with
thousands of black employees and probably the worst curvy problem in the industry, was served
by a single doctor. Moreover, it was the black miners who suffered first from the growing
shortage of doctors during the First World War. Most medical officers could only manage a
single weekly trip to the mines, and even then there were only 56 doctors employed by 308
operating mines in 1918. In times of emergency, as during the influenza epidemic of 1918, black
mines were well down on the list of patient priorities.
Expensive medical treatment and a shortage of doctors made the mining companies find cheaper
ways of providing attention for their black employees. Occasionally, the larger mines that could
afford it- such as the Globe and Phoenix- would employ white nurses to take care of black
patients, or, as in the case of the Panhalonga mine, a white man would be put in charge of the
hospital. A cheaper solution still was to place an educated African orderly in charge of the sick

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or dying. But cheapest of all was the practice of simply making existing mine personnel
responsible for “medical” attention- a procedure which obviated the need for any extra salaries
and wages.
Compensations:
The economics of death suited the Rhodesian mining industry because it relied not on the
capacity of a fully developed proletariat to reproduce itself but on a flow of migrant labour
created within a regional economic system. As long as the flow of cheap labour continued there
was little stimulus to pay compensation, and as long as there was no compensation there was
little incentive for any coordinated attempt to reduce disease in the compounds or accidents
underground. Between 1900 and 1912, when the African death rate on the mines was highest, the
industry offered no compensation whatsoever to workers not engaged on R.N.L.B contracts.
(i) From 1980 to 1904- mining industry was not even legally required to register the death of
black workers- though the mere act of registration would probably not in itself have
hoped to reduce a death rate that was probably as high as 10% per annum.
(2) After the Valley mine disaster of 1906, the administration had greatest difficulty in
getting the company to make an ex-gratia payment to the relatives of the 73 black miners.
A reluctant management eventually paid relatives compensation of £150 when it seemed
that the administration might sue for payment. In the wake of this disaster, the
administration unsuccessfully urged the Chamber of Mines to introduce a scale of
compensatory payments.
(3) The 1910-11 Native Affairs Committee recognized that to introduce compensation to
over-come African resistance to employment on the Rhodesian mines, compensation was
to be introduced.
Before 1912 R.N.L.B contract workers were in a slightly better position than other miners
as far as compensation was concerned. They received £3 for partial disablement and £5
for total disablement, and relatives of a deceased worker were entitled to £5- the
equivalent of maybe two months wages.
(4) The administration accepted the recommendations of the committee and in 1912 an
ordinance was passed extending to all workers the same scale of compensation which
applied to R.N.L.B workers.
(5) The Maximum compensation rates of £5 remained in force until 1922
State Intervention coordination in the Compounds: If, as has been shown, conditions in
the Rhodesian mine compounds and the health of the black workers reflected the
profitability constraints of low-grade ore mining- fundamental constraints which
remained constant- the relative improvements in housing, diet and death rates cannot be
attributed solely to the dynamic of the mining companies themselves. Indeed, judging
from their consistent opposition to the majority of reforms, it is unlikely that the mining

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companies would of their own volition have improved the living conditions of the black
workers in any substantial way for the causes of these gradual improvements one has
therefore to look beyond the confines of the industry itself, though the nature, pace and
extent of the improvements were governed by forces derived from within the industry.
(i) Mine owners in “Rhodesia never had entirely free access to their labour supplies. Many
of their workers came from adjacent British colonies in Central Africa. This together with
the fact that “Rhodesia” itself was a British protectorate before 1923 meant that the
mining industry operated within a colonial context and it was subject to a variety of
pressures from the Colonial Office in London, Even after 1923 the mining industry had to
operate within a regional economic system where the Colonial office exercised
considerable power and influence.
(ii) During reconstruction, the B.S.A.Co as the company government of Rhodesia had
particularly good reason for attempting to shake off the hold of the colonial office, since
it urgently required an expanding supply of cheap labour without the burden of heavy
indirect expenditure in African workers.
(iii) The colonial official was not entirely unsympathetic to these needs but it could not allow
the company to operate at the expense of a more important priority- the reconstruction of
the more profitable Witwatersrand mines under the Milner regime. The Colonial Office
was anxious to ensure that such supplies of cheap labour as there were within the regional
economic system would go to South Africa.
(iv) In an attempt to counteract this, the B.S.A.Co, sought to develop an independent labour
policy; but “In such independent diplomacy they inevitably came off worse. Their efforts
to pursue a distinctive policy fitted all with the colonial office view of Southern Rhodesia
in particular as an integral part of a greater South Africa”
(V) The Colonial office was thus in a strong bargaining position and could use the cover of
large-scale access to labour supplies to extract improvement in the conditions of
compounds from the Rhodesian mining industry.
(vi) As a result, the B.S.A.Co found itself acting as mediator between the demands of the
Colonial Office and the needs of the Rhodesian mining industry. As a mediator, however,
it hardly constituted a disinterested third party, and in its position as company-
government it was ideally placed to ensure that the demands of the colonial office did not
seriously jeopardize the profits of the industry in which it had a substantial share.
(vii) The particular way in which the chartered Company balanced these differing demands
can be seen by tracing the passage of labour legislation in Rhodesia, and examining the
role of the compound inspectors and courts:
(a) The Immigration Ordinance of 1901- to provide the safeguard demanded by foreign
governments before they could allow identified Africans to be recruited for “Rhodesian”
mines- but Rhodesia never did gain access to large numbers of Asian indentured
labourers.

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(b) The legislation did very little to improve the conditions of black workers-since they were
inadequately enforced.
(c) The Mines and Minerals Ordinances of 1907 and 1908.
- The gradual enforcement of the 1908 legislation did produce an overall reduction in the
death rate in the compounds, but death from scurvy and pneumonia remained high
(Legislation was on feeding and accommodation) Meanwhile, competition for labour
within the regional economic system also remained at a high level.
(d) In October 1909 Nyasaland planters held the biggest-ever settler meeting in the colony
and demanded that all recruiting for Southern Rhodesia be stopped resulting in their
administration passing the Employment of Natives Ordinance which tuned to stop the
southwards flow of labour to the mines.
(e) By 1912- 13 the settler farming population of Northern Rhodesia was exercising similar
pressure to protect its labour supplies from ravenous demands of the south.
(f) Legislation on food and housing remained unamended throughout the rest of the period
under review, and compensation rates received minor adjustments in 1922 and 1930-
others:
Native labour regulations ordinance of 1911- empowering inspectors. Native Labour
Regulations Amendments Ordinance of 1915-black workers allowed to sue for the wages
due to them, but in practice there is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that black
workers benefited from the possibility on a meaningful scale.
Labour Mobilisation: Chibaro/Isibalo/Cibalo-forced Labour: 1900- 1912

The Rhodesia mining industry was confronted with serious problems in attempting to meet its
most basic requirement- a large supply of cheap labour. In the most general terms possible these
problems derived from the functioning of the industry itself, from economic conditions within
Rhodesia, and the situation of the colony’s premier industry within a regional economic system
that embraced Southern Africa.
It is already clear that the limitations of the industry produced features which, prima facie, were
incapable of attracting labour. The curtailment of indirect expenditure made for miserable
conditions in the compounds and Africans were aware of these, and took steps to avoid them if
possible. In addition, cash wages declined steadily after the reconstruction in 1903, and this
could have made no contribution to attracting African labour.
Similarly, there were impediments to the mobilization of cheap labour which flowed from
economic circumstances within the colony.
(1) The most obvious of these was the inability to get a supply of local labour as long as the
indigenous peasantry sold large quantities of produce to the mine compounds, and this
had a relatively independent source of cash income and period between 1900 and 1912
was marked by the greatest need for cheap labour.
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(2) The industry was confronted with the fact that it was forced to operate within a regional
economic system dominated by a large more profitable and more powerful industry i.e.
competition from mines in the Transvaal- the Witwatersrand gold mines. The
Witwatersrand gold mines held out relatively more attractive labour conditions. They also
offered higher cash wages.
(3) The “Rhodesian” industry was therefore faced with the task of procuring workers at
lower wages and then of retaining the services of men who were constantly tempted to
move south.
Solution To The Problems: The Speculative Era 1898-1903:
As already shown in Chapter 14, this was the period after the African revolt of 1896- and before
the collapse of the London market for Rhodesia mining stock in April 1903. It represented a
particularly complex half- decade in the history of the industry. From the heady speculative
boom of 1985 the fortunes of the industry and the B.S.A.Co had slumped to a state of depression
by 1898.
What the industry (mining) required to demonstrate above all in the years immediately following
was solid development work in the mines themselves, rather than partially satisfactory returns
from rent-trading on property speculation.
Tangible progress in mining, however, required the services of an increasing number of semi-
skilled and unskilled black workers. This requirement was particularly difficult to meet at a time
when the local peasantry was benefiting from increased cash earnings derived from the sale of an
agricultural produce to the new markets in the colony. The resultant shortage of labour in the
face of the need for rapid development produced consistent upward pressure on African wages
between 1898 and 1903. The cash to pay for this increasing wage bill had to be raised on the
London market through the largely speculative mining companies.
The “Rhodesian” land and Mine owners’ association was wary of the trend in African wages and
its cause:
“In fact the constant insufficiency of black workers) at the mines has caused a natural, but, from
some points of view regrettable, competition for their services. If one mine invents some special
inducement, others on learning it are found to follow. Rates of wages have thus gradually
increased…”
Although the industry was dominated by speculative capital, the five year period also saw the
gradual realization that Rhodesia did not constitute the “Second Rand.” From 1901 onwards in
particular, mine managers came to perceive the need for a more realistic cost saving structure
aligned with yields from low grade are not mining. Central to this objective was the need to
merely hold to African wages, but to reduce them. As a result, between 1899 and 1902, sections
of the industry and the B.S.A.Co made progressively more determined bids to control “market
forces,” although because of the need to demonstrate development to the London market and the
shortage of labour, these efforts were largely unsuccessful.

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The limited profitability of the Rhodesian mines, the lack of success in effecting wage reductions
and the continued shortage of local cheap labour, resulted in more radical attempts to meet the
labour requirements of the industry.
These were directed at the importation of cheaper immigrant labour either from abroad, or from
the prerimeters of the regional economic system when the peasantry did not have a growing cash
income. Such cheap immigrant labour would achieve the dual objective of reducing costs
through under-cutting the relatively expensive local labour, and bargaining the labour needs of
the industry during a period when it lacked an indigenous proletariat. This resulted in the
emergence of two schools of thought for the mobilization of cheap labour (1989-1903).
(1) Proletarian School
(2) Migrant School
(1) Proletarian School/”Scheme”

There were those in the mining industry who favoured the establishment of a stabilized
African labour force resident on the mines with their wives and children.
(2) Migrant School/ “Scheme”

Those who wanted single men to be employed on a contract basis, while still attached to
families in the rural areas.
The Rhodes Plan:
Rhodes had been responsible for the introduction of the Mfengu community of South
Africa into the colony after the revolt. He had modeled his agreement with them on the
Glen-Grey Act of the Cape hoping that this would increase the supply of labour for
mines- but his hope was largely disappointed. Rhodes had hoped that the Mfengu would
either work in the mines themselves or that they could “take the place of natives (Local
Africans) who would be free to work on the mines.
The “migrant school” pressed for the introduction of a Blen-Grey-type act in “Rhodesia,”
and between 1900 and 1901, prominent mining men of the day such as colonial Heyman
and Major Heany, pressed for legislation, supplemented with increased taxation, to
supply more local migrant labour.
Other mining men elsewhere in the colony were pressing for a more stabilized labour
force. In November 1900 the Salisbury Chamber of Mines by a unanimous resolution
considered the possibility of “not only introducing natives themselves for the purposes of
working on the mines but their wives and children, so as to induce them to settle in the
country permanently- thus supporting the “proletarian school.”

209
While the two schools of thought continued to debate without resolutions, the mining
industry continued to function, albeit in a spasmodic fashion. In practice, the labour needs
of the mines were being met in a variety of ways, some at least of which drew on
elements of the plans of both the “proletarian” and “migrant” schools of thought. While
these practical activities were not consciously derived from the long- term plans of either
school-indeed many of them were pragmatic responses to a crisis- they contained within
them features of labor mobilization which were to become permanent characteristic of the
mining industry in later years.
Sources of Cheap Labour:
(1) Labour Board of Southern Rhodesia:

There were two branches- one in Bulawayo and the other one in Salisbury (now Harare).
The Labour Board helped supply the needs of the mines at a particularly difficult time for
example, the Bulawayo branch of the Board supplied Matabeleland mines over 6,000
workers in the last 6 months of 1899- thus did assist in keeping mines with the most acute
shortages in production
Problems:
a) The supplies were fluctuating seasonally. The supplies were also unreliable in the quality
of workers they provided.
(b) Workers’ desertions
(c) Large numbers of the Board’s workers remained unemployed because managers were
reluctant to employ potential deserters.
(d) Provincial rivalry resulting from the fact that each branch looked for labour further a field
and also because the northern province of Mashonaland with its generally less well
capitalized, smaller companies, had access to the numerically prepondent Shona
communities, the larger Matabeleland companies had to make do with the smaller
Ndebele communities. In practice this meant that there were relatively higher wages in
Matabeleland and this ensured a general southward movement of African labour.
However, under normal circumstances the Mashonaland mining industry actually
benefited from this southward flow of labour in the regional economic system. In 1899
the Mashonaland industry pointed out to the Administrator of Matabeleland that:
“As regards outside supplies Mashonaland is also better situated, the whole of the
Tans-Zambezi supplies in coming south to Matabeleland having to pass through
Mashonaland. In the same way Natives coming from Portuguese territory would
have to pass through Mashonaland on the route to the South West Province.”
2) Forced Labour:- supplied either through the native commissioners or the labour board.
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Problem(s)
Solution: The Pass Law- 1902
3) 1900- the labour board engaged the services of a labour recruiter whom they sent to the
Red Sea area.
1901- a party of labourers comprising.
Abyssinanians, Somalis, Arabs, Shamis and Indians were illegally shipped from Djibouti to
Beira in Mozambique.
4) The Shangani workers from Mozambique- who favoured the Selukwe (Shurugwi) and
Southern Matabeleland district- e.g. the Gwanda region.
Problems:
(a) 1903- Shangaans started an exodus from Rhodesia to the Rand after the collapse of the
Rhodesian Industry.
(b) W.N. L. A Agents: were particularly active in the region to the south of Gwanda, that is
in the area that had previously boasted Rhodesia’s best semi-skilled workers. A month
after the Rhodesian Industry collapsed semi- skilled workers were becoming so scarce in
Gwanda that Shangaans were having to teach surface workers how to use drills.
(c) Portuguese authorities encouraged their people to go to the Rand.
Why Chibaro/Forced Labour succeeded: 1903- 1912- reconstruction period:
The two fundamental objectives of the industry in this period came to be output maximization
and cost minimization. This affected the way African labour was to be mobilized:
(1) Restricting further African access to land during a period when the peasantry was
expanding its production by the sale of agricultural produce
(2) Increasing taxation (resulting in the peasants need for additional cash earnings. This was
quite logical although being unfair to the Africans.
Serious contradictions: (resulting from the need to reduce cost tended towards an opposite logic)
reduction in African wages made the mines a less attractive labour market, so the peasantry,
faced with increased cash demands, tried to expand the area it had under cultivation and increase
the sale of crops- thus reducing local labour supply.
Acting alone, these two contradictory forces- (the need for cheap labour and reduction in wages)
would have brought annual fluctuations in the labour supply- particularly between 1903 and
1908, when wages were constantly being adjusted downwards.
However, the fluctuations were made even more erratic by an additional seasonal element, and
that was the fact that Ndebele and more particularly Shona tribesmen would consider work only
in the agricultural off-season.
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Such fluctuations, both seasonal and annual, could not however be reconciled with the
requirements of an industry that desperately needed to demonstrate its profitability as the
Rhodesian land and mine owners. Association explained:
“As soon as stamp battery or other extraction plant commences to run on a mine, the
number of unskilled labourers is more than three times as great as the maximum that
could be employed on preliminary development. Unless the full number required can be
constantly maintained the rate of extraction will invariably exceed the rate of advanced
development and sooner or later production must cease.”
If then the Rhodesian industry was to regain any stability in its African Labour force after 1903 it
needed first to replace the semi- skilled Shangaan workers which it had lost to the south; and
second, more importantly, it needed to recruit a constant supply of cheap unskilled underground
labour which could augment the fluctuating local supplies.
These contradictions, by now essential to the Rhodesian mining industry’s structure and policy,
were in fact to be resolved by the R.N.L.B, which set out to provide the constant pool of
unskilled labour to enable uninterrupted production of gold. So while all African labour-local
and foreign- was called upon to pay a price for the reconstruction of the Rhodesian industry after
1903, none paid a greater price than the R.N.L.B.
The plight of the Shona and Ndebele:
1) In the years before 1903, and to a lesser but still significant extent in the years following,
Shona and Ndebele workers constituted the poorest paid and most despised group of
African miners. In part this dislike was the legacy of the two wars fought against the
during the 1890s,but it derived also from the fact that the Ndebele and Shona remained
relatively from the unpopular industry which had transformed their country and would
consider only short periods of service on the mines during the agricultural off-season .
2) Mine managers disliked these short-term workers and the impunity with which they
deserted to their adjacent forms and Kinsmen when the work or the conditions were not
to their liking. For these and other reasons, it was considered that “the Mashonaland
Matabeleland are poor workers, far inferior to both colonials, Zulus and Shangaans.
3) The numerically respondent Shona were particularly disliked by mine managers who
found them to be “awkward and useless.” Workers and 1900 the chief native
commissioner was of the opinion that:
“…it will be some time before the Mashona natives can be of much use on the mines as
they are the laziest, most ignorant, and unpromising material we have to deal with.”
4) Settler stereotypes were combined with more objective considerations, such as the length
of service offered by the worker to produce a hierarchy of wage differentials on the
mines. The hierarchy also reflected the employment preferences of managers, and before
1903 in particular, Shona and Ndebele workers were invariably the last to be hired and
the first to be fired.

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The Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau:

In a period of particularly rapid expansion of its labour requirements the mining industry
could turn to the especially created labour recruitment agency. Although the function of
that agency, the R.N.L.B, remained consistent through-out the reconstruction, the
organization actually existed in three slightly different forms between 1903 and 1912.
The Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau was first formed within three months of the collapse
of the Industry in1903 and this first R.N.L.B remained in operation by 1903 and 1906. A
shortage of funds and too few labour agents contributed to its collapse in 1906.
Then a reconstituted R.N.L.B. came into operation in 1906 and operated under the name
until early 1911 it benefited not only from tax imposed on the industry but also from
capital supplied to it by the B.S.A. Co. It too, eventually ran into financial problems and
in 1912 was replaced by the New Rhodesia Native labour Bureau. This third R.N.L.B
lasted from 1912 until 1933 when it became redundant.
The Function of the R.N.L.B
The task of the R.N.L.B through these changes however, remained essentially the same.
As an R.N.L.B chairman at an Annual general meeting of the organization put it in 1915:
“A nucleus of natives contracted to work for twelve months at a definite minimum wage
has great advantages. They form the guarantee that certain work can be carried on. They
tide employers over the wet season, when independent labour is there and they make
employers to a large extent independent of the vacancies of the casual labourers.”
1. In essence the task of the R.N.L. B was to resolve the contradiction which arose from
trying to expand the labour supply during the years when the industry was also cutting
black wages.
2. The second function of the R.N.L.B was to secure for the Rhodesian mining industry its
share of African labour within the regional economic system. It had to try to ensure that
Labour from the northern territories made its way to the Rhodesian mines rather than to
other labour markets, and Africans did not proceed to the Witwatersrand after a short
period of work.
3. The Third primary function of the R.N.L.B developed as an outgrowth of the other two. It
was to channel a supply of African labour to mines within Rhodesia, which because of
poor conditions or exploitative practices could not normally secure “voluntary” or as it
was sometimes called, ”independent labour”. Again the problem was well defined by the
manager of the Bureau who told a commission of enquiry that “if it was left to the natives
they would work at unpopular mines.”
It was in fact the task of the R.N.L.B to supply the mining industry with a supply of
cheap coerced labour between 1903 and 1912. Given this role, it can readily be
appreciated why it was that the Bureau was conversely feared and hated by black

213
workers. Throughout most of Central Africa work secured through the R.N.L.B because
known as Chibaro “slavery” or forced labour.
So to secure Chibaro –labour was neither a pleasant nor a simple task for some members
of the Bureau.
How was Chibaro Labour secured?

1. Peasants were simply rounded up by the Native Commissioner’s Africans messengers
and sent to the Board where there were handed over to the agents of the R.N.L.B and
their black assistants and then marched to the southern Rhodesian mines. Those peasants
who refused were in some case whipped by the Native Commissioner or his black
assistant or in others had their grain-stores burnt down (e.g North Western Rhodesia
between 1904 and 1910).
2. From at least 1915 onwards, some supplies of forced labour were also from within
Mozambique- despite the fact that, officially the R.N.L.B was entitled to recruit only in
Tete Province after 1914.
3. The Salisbury municipality relied on workers from Northern Rhodesia districts of
“Pemba, Maoy and Monzi” to operate the city’s sanitary works.
4. Chibaro-labour from rural areas was also linked to the other mechanisms which were
used to induce and channel the flow of black labour and settler economies- tax and passes
– more especially, during the earliest years of reconstruction, the B.S.A.Co put severe
pressure on the Northern Rhodesian peasantry to pay tax. In North Western Rhodesia
during 1904 the police raided the villages of “tax defaulters” burning homes, crops, grain
stores of those Africans who did not have the necessary cash.
These harsh actions were designed to proletorianise the peasants rapidly and to force
them to earn cash at the largest labour market chose by- the Rhodesian mines.

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Examination type questions
1. How important was mining to the colonial economy as a whole?
2. How justified is the view that the existence of colonial mines worsened the
discrimination and exploitation of Africans by colonial officials?
3. “Colonial mining policies underdeveloped the indigenous African”. How valid is this
assertion?
4. What was “chibaro” as practised by the Rhodesian settlers? How notorious was this
policy among the Africans?

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CHAPTER 18
THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
a) Explain why federation was preferred to amalgamation.
b) Discuss reasons put forward for the establishment of the federation.
c) Assess why Africans were opposed to the federation.
Origins of the Federation

The possibility of a union had always been there between the two Rhodesians, namely Northern
and Southern Rhodesia. This idea had been discussed as early as 1911. The union was preferred
for the two Rhodesians because there were features which favoured a union such as the
geographical location of the two states. The two states were ruled by the same company the
British South Africa Company (BSAC) and there was one resident commissioner for the two
territories.
Nyasaland (Malawi), not a company territory, was at first not considered for the union. Malawi
was only discussed as a potential candidate for this union when settlers in the two Rhodesias had
weighed the advantages of her inclusion against its disadvantages.
The major debate was on the form of a union between either amalgamation or federation
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION

1. The most frequently stated reason in favour of federation was that the three countries –
Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland – were economically
interdependent. The more important examples of this complementary position were
given as : the supply of Southern Rhodesian coal from Hwange to the great Copperbelt of
Northern Rhodesia; the migration of labour from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to
the mines, farms and industries of Southern Rhodesia, the supply of cotton from
Nyasaland to Southern Rhodesia and the subsequent sale of cloth and clothing to
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and, finally, the dependence of Northern Rhodesia on
the rail line through Southern Rhodesia and this line’s complementary need for the
mineral traffic from its sister country.
2. Another telling point in favour of federation was that the area would tend to develop as a
unit whereas, lacking cohesion, each country would tend to go its own way, often with
unnecessarily competing activities. This was so in the area of transportation where there

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was need for planning on a broader base, and the multi-purpose development of the
Zambezi River, the boundary between the two Rhodesians etc where unified action
would be required.
3. Furthermore, federation was argued to be necessary because of the fact that the greater
size of the unified area would make it more attractive to foreign investors, particularly to
Americans. It was also pointed out that long-term savings would result from the
unification of a number of governmental functions. Moreover, most of the economic and
physical problems of the area were common to all three countries, this would enable
centralised research while administration of such activities as forestry, geological
surveying and fisheries development would well be more co-ordinated.
4. In addition to that, it was logically argued that through federation there would be unity in
diversity. The greater the economic diversity the less vulnerable the economies would be
to economic depression. For example, Southern Rhodesia with its comparatively large
European population, was developing a diversified economy based not only varied
mineral and farming activities but also on a rapidly expanding manufacturing industry.
Northern Rhodesia with her copper deposits was developing big towns on the copper belt
but had a less diversified economy and large and backward rural areas. Nyasaland,
lacking in minerals, relied on agriculture and fisheries. She sent her big surplus
population to work as migrant labourers in neighbouring wealthier countries. During the
federal people alone, the number of Malawian migrant workers in Southern Rhodesia was
known to be around 100 000 or more. Federation would thus benefit all economies in
their diverse backgrounds.
5. Moreover, federation was construed as a compromise solution to a variety of problems
and viewpoints. Many of the Europeans in the Rhodesians had originally favoured
amalgamation which would mean the total joining of the two countries and the removal
of borders. However, the British government had preferred a federation in which each
country would retain their separate individual governments whilst at the same time
subscribing to a central federal government which would also include Nyasaland
(Malawi) as well. This is because Nyasaland was a small country lacking in resources
and her inclusion in the federation would benefit from her rich neighbours. This British
viewpoint was eventually accepted by Roy Welensky of Zambia and Godfrey Huggins of
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).
ARGUMENTS AGAINST FEDERATION

1. Many articulate Africans in the three territories bitterly opposed federation because they
were totally opposed to the idea of partnership. They viewed this as a permanent means
in which colonial rule would continue to be imposed upon them. For many years they
had interpreted their Protectorate Status as a temporary period under colonial government
until such a time as they wee ready to assume majority rule. The placing of African

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affairs under the control of the predominantly European Federal Assembly could not
foreseeably make changes in matters and demands for African future majority rule.
2. Many Africans feared that federation would mean the adoption of common racial policies
as were practised in Southern Rhodesia. A policy of racial discrimination was practised
in land allocation, labour practices, health, education and political administration.
Southern Rhodesia had, of the three territory, the worst form of colour bar and Africans
in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland did not want an extension of such policies to their
own territories.
3. Africans in particular bitterly opposed federation because they were not adequately
consulted. They felt that of around nine million they constituted nearly seven million,
whilst the whites who were in the driving seat constituted a mere 200 000, and yet the
African were predominantly left out of the decision making process. Their interests for
the development and inclusion into prime political decision for their countries were
continuously ignored and under federation African interest were set to suffer a worse fate.
AFRICAN POLITICAL SITUATION UNDER FEDERATION

Southern Rhodesia continued to apply its traditional policy of parallel development towards
Africans, with a few exceptions. Garfield Todd’s ministry (1953 – 1958) was probably the only
one which initiated some positive changes for Africans during the federal period. A five-year
education plan was introduced, but this continued to leave out the majority of Africans in a
bottleneck system of advancement of Africans.
Again, Todd initiated a home ownership scheme for African in the urban areas and the Land
Apportionment Act was amended to accommodate the ever-increasing demands for Africans.
These changes were however, modest in light of the fact that the majority of Todd’s government
were die-hards who believed in the perpetual subjection of the Africans. When Todd attempted
to widen the franchise for Africans, for example, his Cabinet resigned in December 1957,
effectively blocking the pro-African reforms. Edgar Whitehead took his place as the Prime
Minister in 1958 and African individual liberties suffered a severe drawback.
What is stunning to note more than anything is the 1961 constitution which completely sidelined
African voting rights. For instance, there was to be an A roll with high voting qualifications and
a B roll with low voting qualifications. The A roll would be for whites whereas the B roll would
be for Africans. Coloureds and Indians were an insignificant statistic. Hence there would be
fifty A roll constituencies, plus 15 new B roll constituencies.
In the A roll constituencies the system was racially designed in such a way that both kinds of
electors would vote together but the B roll votes would be limited in value to only 25 per cent of
the A roll. It clearly meant that out of 50 seats which formed the main constituencies, Africans
could only hope to achieve a maximum of 12, no matte how many of their numbers would have
turned out to vote. The situation was indeed terrible when one takes into consideration the fact
that the whites were just around 150 000 whereas the African population was well over two
million.
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In the 15 B roll constituencies, there would be the converse arrangement in which both A and B
electors would vote together but the A roll votes would be devalued to ensure that their vote
would not count no more than 25 per cent of the B roll constituencies and 38 seats in the A roll
constituencies, which came to 42 seats out of the total of 65 seats. Clearly, they were in the
minority and yet they were legally entrenched, cacoon protected to make their own decisions and
change the constitution as they saw it fit. No doubt Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole
disowned the constitution on behalf of the Africans because it represented some kind of severe
form of apartheid.
AFRICAN EDUCATION UNDER FEDERATION

Under a Minister of Native Education, a Director and Assistant Director divide school
administration between a Chief Education Officer and a Chief Inspector. Five divisions covered
the country, each with a Divisional Inspector and three or more circuit inspectors. All were
whites.
Below the above level were missionary superintendents, mainly white, school headmasters,
increasingly African, and the teaching force, 96 per cent African.
Policy was formed by an education Advisory Board with representatives from the Native
Education Department, missions and the African Teacher’s Association, and influenced by the
Missionary Conference made up of 18 denominations in the country.
Of the 7 to 15 age groups, 80 per cent were in school during the federal decade, which is a high
percentage for Africans during this period. This is attributed to the missions which under
government subsidy and supervision managed 98 per cent of all African schools. The 1960
statistics are impressive: 505 266 African children were enrolled in 2 859 schools and taught by
13 248 teachers at a cost of $11 023 600.
Sadly, however, the above figures hide the ugly facts that 90 per cent of African children had to
drop out below the eighth grade, which meant that real qualitative, higher education was a
preserve for the very few blacks, where as all whites, without much effort would proceed to
higher education.
Worse still, teacher training, a vital ingredient in the whole education system lagged far behind
the African demand for education. There was only one government teachers’ training institute
and 34 mission-based training centres. Hence, the trained teachers were much less than the
number needed. Untrained teachers, thus formed 47.6 per cent of all primary school teachers.
These lean heavily on government prepared lesson plans and must be continuously aided by
inspectors and supervisors. This meant that the quality of education in African schools was
always compromised, there were high drop-out rates and a bottleneck entry to higher grades and
forms was the main order of the day. One out of 10 000 African pupils went through to form 6
and one out of 100 000 entered a university! (F. Parker, 1961, p 293).

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URBAN CONDITIONS IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA DURING FEDERATION

The government struggled with the problem of severe overcrowding in the African townships.
Many Africans were flocking into the urban areas to work in the growing industries, but housing
had not kept up with the demand. Africans were not allowed to own freehold properties and they
squeezed in council-owned houses or shacks in the high-density suburbs. Therefore partly to
meet the urgent need for more houses and partly to meet the growing demand, Todd’s
government introduced a home ownership scheme for Africans. Some 6 000 houses, built at a
cost of £300 each were made available to permanently employed Africans at a 20 year mortgage
scheme. The scheme was begun in the government township of New Highfield and was quickly
followed by a similar one in Luveve in Bulawayo. Smaller ones were later begun in towns.
There was also some provision for Africans who wished to build more expensive houses on large
plots, provided that certain minimal conditions were observed.
Following the recommendations of the Plewman Commission appointed in 1954 to look into the
accommodation needs of urban workers, the report issued in February 1958, the commission
recommended that more married accommodation should be made available, some of it on
freehold basis.
Be that as it may, accommodation for Africans remained severely and critically short.
Overcrowding continued as the numbers who flocked into towns swelled every month and every
year. This was partly due to the fact that the Land Apportionment Act, still in force, and the
Land Husbandry Act (1951) had served to reduce the carrying capacity of the reserves and
Africans together with their livestock found it nearly impossible to subsist more comfortably.
More importantly, the colonial system of education which in many ways served to fulfil the
tenets of the “Masters and Servants’ Act” worsened urban African numbers. The bottleneck
entry to higher levels of education and the high drop-out rates at both primary and secondary
levels created a vast number of the untrained, and unemployed cheap potential labourers. Hence
it is not true that the African urban plight improved during the federal period. If it did, the
numbers were both infinitesimal and negligible.
Examination Type Questions:
1. How far did Federation benefit the Zimbabweans?
2. Discuss the reasons for and against the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
3. Why was there growing African opposition to the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland?
4. “The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland collapsed mainly because the white settlers
were opposed to it”. Do you agree?

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References
Mashingaidze, E and Needham D,E. From Iron Age to Independence, Longman Zimbabwe 1985
Tindall P.E.N, A History of Southern and Central, 1984
Shamuyarira N. Crisis in Southern Rhodesia, London, 1965.

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CHAPTER 19
THE RHODESIAN FRONT AND THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES.
1) Explain the various reasons for Ian Smith’s adoption of UDI in November 1965.
2) Describe the provisions of UDI.
3) Explain the reasons why UDI survived the regional and international opposition.
4) Explain why Britain could not contain Rhodesian Front rebellion in UDI.
5) Evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on the UDI regime.
6) Describe the role played by South Africa and Portugal in the survival of Smith’s regime
between 1965 and 1974.
7) Describe the impact of UDI upon African life and politics.
8) Describe and explain the provisions of the internal settlement.
9) Explain the African nationalists’ attitudes towards the internal settlement.
10) Analyse the reasons why Ian Smith’s government eventually agreed to negotiations for
majority rule in Zimbabwe.
The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was declared
on November 11, 1965 by the white minority regime of Ian Smith, whose Rhodesian Front Party
opposed moves to black majority rule in the then British colony.
Historical Background
Initially, it must be remembered that European settlers in Rhodesia attained their unique political
and economic position through the status granted to Rhodesia as a self-governing colony in
1923. Constitutionally, the British government retained authority to regulate the colony’s
external affairs and to intervene in internal affairs if there was any discrimination against the
Africans. However, this authority was allowed to rust by sheer disuse. Wholesale
discrimination and systematic dispossession of Africans of their land, property and security was
done through acts that were passed by the Rhodesian regime during the 1930s and onwards. The
British government did nothing to regulate or prevent these abusive pieces of legislation. For
instance, by the Land Apportionment Act of 1931, land was so divided that an African farmer

222
received an average of only a few acres whilst the European got some hundreds or, even
thousands, of acres.
The aim of this Act was threefold, as subsequent developments in Rhodesia showed;
1) To ensure an expanding supply of African labour for European farms and industries
2) To divide the economy into non-competing racial groups as the basic source of European
prosperity and;
3) To suppress the rise of an African bourgeoisie. The fear of Africans taking over semi-
skilled and even skilled jobs was at the heart of European politics. Hence, various
discriminatory laws, trade licences, the pass system etc, were introduced to reduce
Africans into a state of total dependence and servitude. It was therefore the political
machinery which helped the white settlers to consolidate their economic position and
raise their standard of living so high that it was second only to that of the United States.
The laws perfected the methods of organised racial repression which was achieved by the
whites.
Furthermore, in the early sixties when the Central African Federation began to crack the
Europeans became acutely aware of the fact that any change in their political status
would inevitably affect their economic position. Hence, they pressed for complete political
independence. In fact, the polarisation of white agrarian capitalists, workers, and petty
bourgeoisie led to the formation of the Rhodesian Front Party which obtained power in the
elections of December 1962 by defeating the “liberal” United Front Party (UFP). The British
government had attempted to bring about a negotiated compromise to head- off confrontation
between contending black and white interests, the first of many unsuccessful attempts. The
result had been a constitution of 1961 containing a Bill of Rights extending to all races. It
served as an unofficial outline of the conditions necessary before the British would grant
independence. The Rhodesian Front blamed the British for the break-up of the Federation.
In the elections of 1962, thus, the Rhodesian Front had openly campaigned on a platform of
independent white rule.
Later, when Smith replaced Winston Field as Prime Minister, the Rhodesian Front Party
demanded negotiations for independence with the British government. As historian Barber
noted, “Under Winston Field the search for independence had been the predominant issue of
Southern Rhodesian politics. Under Ian Smith it became an obsession”. Hence the advent of
the Rhodesian Front Party halted the reforms of the Federal period and all advances toward
majority rule. Under the leadership of Ian Smith the Rhodesian Front, in fact, undertook to
undermine all of the principles set forth by the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas
Home in 1964. These were as follows:
1) Unimpeded progress to majority rule.
2) Guarantees against retrogressive amendment to the constitution of 1961.
3) Progress towards improving the political status of Africans.
4) Progress towards ending racial discrimination.

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5) Guarantees against oppression of one section of the population by another.

6) British satisfaction that the total population supported any basis for independence.
It was quite obvious that the Smith regime was totally against all the above political
expectations, and would therefore press forward with their own self-serving agenda for a
Unilateral Declaration of Independence.
Why was it Practical for the Rhodesian Front to declare the UDI?
According to historian Anirudha Gupta, in the article “The Rhodesian Crisis! An
Analysis” published in the journal, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 6, 1969,
page 322, the internal developments in Rhodesia, which led to UDI in November 1965
have to be considered against the background of developments in Southern Africa as a
whole. For instance, if Rhodesia had been situated somewhere nearer to Britain, British
paratroopers might perhaps have invaded the colony; and if Rhodesia had been isolated,
and not so much backed by the Republic of South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, it
would not have survived the economic reprisals as well as it did.
In fact, the geographical and political inter-connections between the minority Rhodesian
Front regime and other colonialist regimes of Southern Africa must be analysed in order
to understand the real character of the UDI. It has to be kept in mind that the whole of
southern Africa, with a total area of 200 000 square miles and with a population of 35
million largely remained under white minority regimes. True, the territories of
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland which had just become independent were governed by
Africans. They, however, constituted some small pockets and their dependence on the
white-dominated South Africa reduced their effective independence.
Politically, all the minority regimes followed a policy of racial segregation which in
South Africa was called apartheid. It is true that the degree of segregation differed from
one territory to another. For instance, South Africa developed and pursued the
administrative and political machinery of separate development to perfection; the
Portuguese territories did not legally enforce racial segregation, but by exploiting African
labour and sending Africans as labourers to other parts, Portugal earned 25% of its annual
budget through exploiting African labour. Rhodesia too might not have legally denied
Africans the right to political participation, but the Rhodesian Front regime was, from the
early 1960’s zealously moving in that direction.
What is important to note is that Rhodesia was surrounded by sympathetic regimes whose
forte is racial discrimination. Hence, they did not find it strange or awkward that a fellow
white supremacist regime was entrenching itself in the neighbourhood through the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence.
More importantly, with South Africa being a paradise for foreign investors, little was
done by the major investing powers to apply pressure directly on South Africa so as to
indirectly strangle the UDI. For instance, as at the end of 1965, the total value of foreign
investment in South Africa amounted to US$4 802 billion (which was a huge figure by

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the currency value of those years). Of this, over three fifths was held by the United
Kingdom; the US with 12%, came second and the French and Swiss investors represented
between four and six percent of the total. The earnings from such investments actually
proved to be immensely profitable, as a UN survey in 1967 reports:
“The earnings of companies from direct investments provide a measure of the importance
of South Africa to British forms as well as an indication of its importance to Britain’s
balance of payments. Earnings from South African investments rose from $81 million in
1960 to $173 million in 1964 and the proportion of earnings in South Africa to total
earnings in South Africa ranged from 11 to 16 per cent. This proportion is considerably
higher than the ratio of investments in South Africa to the total of British private foreign
investments – a fact which may suggest a relatively high profitability of the British
investments in South Africa”.
Similarly, there was steady increase in the US earnings from South Africa. Moreover,
London’s role as South Africa’s banker was also of some political significance. Well
over 70 per cent of South Africa’s domestic bank deposits were held in British owned
banks. The Standard Bank, controlled from London, possessed South African assets
worth of 330 million pounds, and was also one of the three dominant interests in
Rhodesian banking. The National, and Grindlays Banks had major interests in both
Rhodesia and South Africa. Most leading British insurance companies and building
societies had over a share in the Republic’s £400 million insurance and £260 million in
building industries.
The above argument makes interesting speculation. It makes it obvious why Britain was
not interested in extending the trade embargo on South Africa, because this would
directly jeopardise her economic interests in that country. Hence, despite repeated
African demands, Britain and her partners in the West (USA and France in particular),
had resolutely rejected the idea of extending sanctions to South Africa and Portuguese
territories which acted as loopholes through which Rhodesia sustained herself. These
loopholes were wide enough to account for two thirds of Rhodesia’s exports in 1967.
The supply of oil to Rhodesia was a well-known fact and it was also well-known that if
such a vital supply was cut off, the UDI would not last another 24 hours! It is more
important to stress that just between 1965, when the UDI was declared, and 1970,
Rhodesia’s total trade with South Africa actually increased threefold. Hence, sanctions
were not exhaustive enough to thwart the illegal UDI regime, as indeed the regime
continued to grow in strength.
More interestingly, the ability of the Rhodesian economy to adapt to the reality of
sanctions and to continue to operate without much of the needed foreign products and
raw materials was one of the key factors which enabled the UDI to survive. According to
statistics released by the Smith regime in 1968 – 1969, the gross domestic product, after a
drop in 1966, rose in 1967 to a level of 4.9 per cent above the previous record of 1965.
The corresponding increase in gross national product in 1967 over 1965 was 6.2 per cent,
representing an increase in real terms as well as at current prices. Along with the decline
in trade, therefore, this increased national industrialization production and directly

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reduced reliance on foreign trade and products. That is why even the comprehensive
sanctions imposed by the UN could not bring about any decisive change to the political
stand-off.
Another important reason why it was practical for the UDI to survive during a hostile
international political climate was due to the fact that the white dominated regimes of
Southern Africa offered military support and political patronage to the Rhodesian Front
regime. South Africa then, with its regular armies, paratroopers, aircraft and jet fighters
constituted a huge military fortress in the continent. It was estimated that South Africa
could field about 120 000 white troops in less than two days. The country had just
finished the construction of an extensive airfield in the Caprivi Strip, bordering with
Zambia, which could be used to bomb any perceived enemies at short notice. The
Rhodesians too had some 34 000 regular troops, 6000 all-white reservists for one special
air-force squadron and 2 regular infantry battalions. In Angola and Mozambique, on the
other hand, Portugal had stationed over 100 000 troops which could at any moment come
to the aid of the Rhodesians. Compared to these, the combined military force/strength of
all independent African states in the north (Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania) appeared
insignificant when given the fact that the guerrilla movement itself was terribly divided in
the 1960’s.
The defiance to world opinion, the economic prosperity and the massive potential,
military strength and regional co-operation of the southern states, gave the Rhodesian
situation a sinister import. South Africa was anxious, on one side, not to go too far to the
aid of Rhodesia, on the other, it knew all too well that if Smith’s regime was toppled by
African guerrillas, it would not only bring the war to the threshold of South Africa, but
would also endanger the very structure of white supremacy. Hence military co-operation
between the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia actually increased within the two
years after the promulgation of UDI. A network of military defence, police and
informers was thus established to connect Pretoria with capitals of Rhodesia,
Mozambique and Angola, and also with those of the neighbouring ‘black’ states of
Botswana and Malawi. Thus, by providing economic and military help to the
Rhodesians, South Africa was increasingly gaining a measure of control over the affairs
of Salisbury.
However, the contours of the “Southern African Battle-line”, across the Zambezi had
now become clear. In one sense UDI represented a turning point in Africa’s nationalist
movements. By extending the “white” frontiers from the Limpopo northward to the
Zambezi, it had reversed, or rather, delayed the onward march of African independence.
But if one takes into account the origins and growth of white military strength in
Rhodesia and Southern Africa, then one can say that UDI had been a logical outcome of a
long process of history. In that, lies the essential contradiction of the Rhodesian
situation: It was both an outcome and a rejection of history; an outcome in the sense that
the whites had been pushing for a self-serving and perpetually entrenched independent
settlement. On the other hand, it was a rejection of history in that by its very nature, the
UDI paid a deaf ear to the ripe calls for majority rule by African nationalists and the
broader international community.

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The Specific Nature of Sanctions under the UDI : Impact of Sanctions

Having looked at the general reasons why the Rhodesian Front regime survived and the
context – politically and geographically – it is pertinent to focus more specifically on the
nature of the sanctions themselves and how they failed to have any meaningful result.
First, it must be understood that the British government’s policy on UDI was based
primarily on its negative reaction to the illegal seizure of power. However, Prime
Minister Harold Wilson resisted strong African pressure to put down the UDI rebellion
with force, and instead chose to utilise diplomatic and economic sanctions. The basic
assumption was that there existed within Rhodesia a powerful group of liberal
Rhodesians who would oppose the Smith regime out of loyalty to Her Majesty’s
government and a concern for their businesses and farms. This, however, proved to be an
over-estimate of the extent of opposition to Smith among the settlers. Nevertheless, the
original step was taken and with many such fateful decisions in the affairs of state, the
course had then to be pursued to its uncertain end.
Initially, Wilson hoped that the UK could defeat UDI within a few months by the
application of sanctions that would threaten industry and agriculture in Rhodesia. This
campaign was easily undercut by both South Africa and Portugal who facilitated the
smuggling of oil through the British blockade. The blockade thus proved of little value.
The African states intensified their demands for the use of force but again Harold Wilson
concluded that economic sanctions would provide a solution if they were widened under
the auspices of the UN to include all nations. It must be argued that part of the reason
Wilson seemed to have so much confidence in the diplomatic solution was sheer
misunderstanding and misjudging of the situation on the ground.
Nevertheless, on 16 December 1966, the United Nations Security Council evoked
mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII for the first time with France, Mali, Bulgaria and
the USSR abstaining. Several African attempts to strengthen the resolution through the
inclusion of a ban on coal were rejected, but the adopted resolution placed a mandatory
ban, in addition to oil, on asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, copper,
meat, hides and skins. The sale of all military equipment to Rhodesia was also banned.
All member states were urged not to facilitate trade or financial support for “the illegal
racist regime in the Southern Rhodesia”.
However, the widened programme of sanctions did not have the desired effect for several
reasons. Most serious, from the standpoint of the British strategy, was the tendency
among Rhodesian whites toward consolidation and support of the regime under attack.
This appeared to be a combination of patriotic feelings aroused by the international
pressures and a general belief that the sanctions could not be enforced.
Externally, a number of states even extended their trade with Rhodesia rather than
comply with the UN ban. In addition to South Africa and Portugal who had an
ideological stake in violating the UN request, France, Iran, Japan and West Germany all
increased their trade in 1967 with Rhodesia. Few countries followed the example of the
United States Government which evoked its United Nations Participation Act and

227
announced that any nationals violating the Act would be prosecuted with a fine and
imprisonment. However, US trade was in itself a minor fraction of total Rhodesian trade
and a high proportion of the loss of British trade was made up by Western European
smuggling countries.
There is considerable controversy on the real origins and extent of these sanctions’
violations. However, second and third parties have been skilfully used; Rhodesian
exports moved through South African and Portuguese ports under forged labels, with
false certificates of origin. In this way, the products could almost be sent anywhere and
British nationals were extensively implicated in sanctions violations.
One report from the Portuguese indicated that 58 out of 169 oil tankers which called at
the port of Lourenco Marques (Maputo) between April 1966 and May 1967 were of
British nationality and in the service of British companies. British authorities naturally
denied the Portuguese figures, but it could not be denied that a number of British tankers
were violating the ban. Other instances of individual British, French and European
company violations were reported in the British press, indicating widespread connivance
in London, Paris and Tokyo in forgery and black market operations under the cover of
South Africa and Portugal. For instance, a prominent American firm, Union Carbide,
was implicated in the London Sunday Times exposure of oil supplies. The Rhodesian
semi-secret agency GETH shipped 110 000 gallons every 24 hours from South Africa,
and Union Carbide, through its British subsidiary, Rhodesia Chrome Ltd, facilitated the
Portuguese shipment of 140 000 gallons a day from the refineries in Lourenco Marques.
Most important were the practical measures of support of Rhodesia undertaken by South
Africa. The Rhodesian pound was underwritten by South African banks, South African
tobacco companies purchased large quantities of Rhodesia’s chief export crop – tobacco.
On several occasions, South African police participated in counter-insurgency operations.
The supply of oil by road from South Africa played a major part in helping Rhodesia to
break the oil blockade.
It has been noted above, that without South Africa, even with the sympathy of Portugal
and France, the Rhodesians could not have survived the economic pressure exerted by
sanctions. Despite the failure of economic and diplomatic sanctions by the end of 1967
the UK continued to insist that this policy would eventually be effective. There were of
course a few signs of strain such as the sharp cut-back in tobacco plantings in Rhodesia,
but on the whole the Rhodesian pound continued to hold firm, and the country’s balance
of payments was not in a dangerous position.
The Wilson government drastically exaggerated the effect of sanctions on the Rhodesian
economy and its policy was viewed as a failure by a wide spectrum of non-white African
opinion, from Conservatives in England to the spokesmen of Communist states. Yet the
UK stubbornly refused the increasingly stringent African requests to enforce sanctions
against “violators”. Part of the reasons were given above. Sanctions failed
ignominiously.

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IMPACT OF UDI ON THE POLITICS OF ZIMBABWE (1970 – 1979)

First, it must be remembered that the African nationalist movement during the 1960’s
was indeed weak and looked up to the newly independent states for help. ZAPU mostly
dominated the political scene in the 1960’s, but ZANU was formed in 1963. UDI
enabled the Ian Smith regime to exercise what they could not before African political
parties were banned, and from 1965 onwards they were detained, tortured and harassed
on sight. The UDI therefore made the prospects for majority rule bleak in Zimbabwe.
The initial move by nationalist groups was to appeal to the OAU for assistance. African
states failed to maintain a united front, leaving Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi and
Botswana. Other independent African states initially did little to help in the late 1960’s.
However, during the 1970’s, neighbouring Zambia and Mozambique, played vital
supportive roles in the liberation struggle, to attain independence in Zimbabwe.
It has been discussed elsewhere in the book why the struggle for independence took a
more decisive route after 1971, but part of the key reason for that was that Ian Smith was
proving to be slippery and a master of prevarication and ambiguity.
The Rhodesian Internal Settlement

What is important to note is that the British had never given up on the idea of a
negotiated solution with the Smith regime in order to achieve a reasonable political
settlement in Rhodesia. One such famous attempt which occurred on 25 November 1971
resulted from the meeting between British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Ian Smith,
known as the Home-Smith Agreement, because it seemed to embrace part of the
Douglas-Home principles laid down seven years ago. The Smith regime accepted the
British proposals this time around because they seemed to represent a total capitulation or
surrender to Rhodesian demands. There was really nothing that had happened whether
internally or externally to pressure Ian Smith to accommodate the idea of majority rule.
Hence, the 1971 Agreement in fact confirmed white minority rule indefinitely in that an
African voting franchise would be dependent upon a government controlled criteria of
income and education. It was the Rhodesian Front’s regime to determine that, not the
British government, hence, the Smith regime felt like given fresh impetus to govern as it
wished.
However, the litmus test for acceptance by the African population of a Home-Smith
Agreement was yet to come. In January 1972, a 24 member British government
commission, known as the Pearce Commission was sent to Rhodesia to sample public
opinion in a series of meetings held throughout the country. It was determined that while
the agreement had been widely accepted by whites, and received limited endorsement of
Asians and Coloureds, it was overwhelmingly opposed by the African population.
Opposition to the agreement was organised in large measure by Bishop Abel Muzorewa
of the African National Council on behalf of other detained nationalist leaders.
Hence, from 1972 onwards, having noted the stubbornness of the Smith regime towards a
broader based settlement, the resistance to white minority rule entered the armed struggle.

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However, it must be noted that the fall of the Portuguese empire in neighbouring
Mozambique and Angola in 1974 and the installation of African governments hostile to
the Smith regime, beginning in 1975, lent a sense of urgency to settlement in Rhodesia
because this development politically isolated Rhodesia in the region. During that year
Smith, a master of divide, conquer and rule, entered into a series of talks with, first, one
nationalist leader and then another in an obvious attempt to further divide and weaken
them. This tactic proved rather successful as the African leadership within the country
increasingly came to see the benefits of an “internal” settlement while those conducting
the guerrilla war from outside the country became convinced of the futility of negotiating
with Smith, and thus viewed the nationalists inside the country as nothing but a bunch of
sell-outs.
Nevertheless, the calculus of the Rhodesian conflict seemed drastically altered in April
1976 when US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger delivered a speech in Lusaka pledging
American support for the principle of majority rule. He even publicly stated that the Ford
Administration would work for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment under which the US
had continued to break UN sanctions by importing Rhodesian chrome. It appeared that
US policy might be shifted away from the premise of support for white minority rule in
Southern Africa, initiated at the beginning of the Nixon Administration and toward active
support for black majority rule. Later that year, a conference was convened in Geneva
under the auspices of the British government, with US support, intended to bring all the
parties to the Rhodesian conflict together for a constitutional settlement. This achieved
little.
The repeal of the Byrd Amendment by the Carter Administration in January 1977
together with the adoption of the so-called Anglo-American plan to move towards
majority rule through elections in Zimbabwe might not have achieved much, but they
added to piling pressure on the Smith regime.
How did Ian Smith then change his Tactics and begin to Accommodate the Nationalists?
We have seen how the British government attempted unsuccessfully both before and after
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965, to negotiate with the
Rhodesian Front government for a constitutional settlement that would concede enough
to the Africans to enable Britain to recognise the independence of Rhodesia, and later on
the USA, equally putting pressure, but none of the constitutional arrangements or
proposals were adopted.
One possible answer why, from September 1977 Smith appeared to agree to the principle
of one man, one vote and a black government was to stop the guerrilla war. The
increased efficiency of the ZANU guerrilla war machine after 1975, (after Mozambican
independence) no doubt stretched the resources of the Rhodesian security forces and the
white economy. The independence of Mozambique under a FRELIMO government from
June 1975 had opened up the whole 764 miles frontier between Rhodesia and
Mozambique to penetration by ZANU guerrillas. In 1976, ZANU, which had some 15
000 guerrillas and trainees in and around Rhodesia significantly, intensified the war. The
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Rhodesian security forces lost twice as many men in 1976 as in the previous three years’
time.
Notably, in 1977 the number of guerrillas operating within the borders of Rhodesia
continued to increase, until by the end of the year there were to be about 4 000. Of these,
about 500 owed allegiance to Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU which operated from Zambia.
While in 1975 ZAPU’s guerrillas were few and insignificant in impact, two years later
Nkomo had built up a well-equipped army of about 10 000 men, which if fully committed
to action would greatly increase the Rhodesian army’s difficulties in defending the
country. This danger may have helped persuade Smith to move at the end of 1977
towards a formal commitment to black rule. The Smith government recognised therefore
that while the army might continue to hold on its own for several years longer, especially
if the divisions that existed among the guerrillas continued, the war could not be won. A
political settlement would be the only way to end the growing military threat.
More importantly, the settler minority regime of Ian Smith was probably pushed towards
political concessions more by the effects of the guerrillas on the economy than by the
mere impossibility of defeating the guerrillas. Call-up to the army after 1976 and
especially during 1977 and 1978 progressively reduced the white civilian workforce.
Men in the 18 – 38 age group, after an initial period of 18 months service in the army,
were by the middle of 1977 liable to be called up for seven months service in the army in
each year; and those from 39 to 50 years old could be called to support the army up to
three months in a year. The effects of such call-ups have been serious indeed. Some
firms had to manage with half the size of their workforce. Hence, the national product in
real terms fell by 3 percent in 1976 and a further 7 per cent in 1977. In February 1978
industrial production was at its lowest since 1971.
The deteriorating economic situation had been exacerbated by the general decline in
world trade and the accumulating effects of economic sanctions imposed against
Rhodesia, since the UDI which led to drastic shortages in foreign exchange. In 1977
Rhodesia suffered the worst terms of trade since 1965. The country was forced to
devalue its currency twice; October 1977 and in April 1978. Defence spending in 1976,
increased by 40 per cent, over the previous year, so that, it then formed 25 per cent of the
total budget. In 1978, however, this proportion rose to 40 per cent of the total budget,
which was clearly unsustainable. The war was costing at least £630 000 a day. The
expense of the loans had been partly financed by external loans, but the business
community warned that these could not be continued any longer.
Faced with a declining economy, an uncertain future and a heavy burden of military
service, many white Rhodesians emigrated during 1976 and 1977, apparently fleeing
from the deteriorating political and economic environment – Rhodesia had an excess of
white immigrants over white emigrants until 1976 when the country suffered a net loss of
7 072 from a population of about 280 000. In 1977 even more whites left with the annual
figure rising to 10 908. With these growing problems of a battered economy and a
depleted population, white Rhodesians needed either an end to the guerrilla war or

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economic help from abroad, neither of which would come without the Rhodesian Front
giving up power to a black government.
The Key Provisions of the Internal Settlement

1) Unlike the Anglo-American proposals, the internal settlement relied on no
external agent to administer the transition to majority rule. An Executive Council
(EXCO) consisted of four members who had veto power. The Parliament would
continue to function and continue to block any new laws or constitutional
amendments. Therefore, whites would continue to have the upper hand in
parliamentary concessions.
Moreover, of the 18 Ministerial council members, half were Smith’s appointees

while the other half was split among the three African delegations. Already the
dismissal of the African co-Minister of Justice, Law and Order, Byron Hove, over
the question of changing the system of justice had shown strains in the coalition
government. Hove struck out laws he called “a citadel of white privilege”.
2) Under what was called the Declaration of Rights, the constitutional arrangements
of the internal agreement preserved the privileged status of whites. Protection of
property rights made it possible for the majority government, once installed, to
undertake a policy of land reform – which was one of the chief grievances of
going to war: the need for equitable land redistribution.
3) The civil service in Rhodesia was responsible for, and left to administer the
country’s racial policies. According to government statistics there were 8 000
white civil servants compared to fewer than 2 000 blacks. There were no plans
for a crash programme to either induct or increase the number on the part of the
Africans. Whites’ jobs and pensions were guaranteed and remitted in British
pound sterling. No such arrangement was in place or promised for blacks.
4) The system of justice would remain intact, as was in place since UDI in 1965.
This will entail the retention of numerous judges appointed by Smith since UDI
and had been instrumental in sustaining the illegal regime. They had been
sentencing many guerrillas to death by handing under repressive security rules
such as the Law and Order Act. Indeed, it was precisely over the question of
repealing the act, proposed by Hove that the new transitional coalition
government suffered its first crisis. Hove’s dismissal then showed that the
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government was not yet ready to begin to dismantle the system of racial
discrimination.
5) Although the internal settlement provided for universal adult suffrage for all
above 18 years old, there were serious questions surrounding the proposed
elections. Whites, including Asians and Coloureds, would still control 25% of the
seats in the new assembly, far out of proportion to their population. They would
block the vote in such areas as private property defence, civil service and the
courts. Moreover, the fact that the elections would be held without an
international commission would make it unlikely that African voters would
escape intimidation by the Rhodesian minority regime.
How did the Patriotic Front react to the Internal Settlements?

1) First, they rejected the amnesty call because they could see that it was a forged
peace, meant to further strengthen Ian Smith’s grip on power. Although
Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole took part in the elections, the Patriotic Front
campaigned vigorously against it and hence, the elections remained a sham.
2) Some historians have argued that Mugabe and Nkomo had not taken any part in
framing the constitution of the internal settlement and therefore felt it a betrayal to
the ideals of the liberation struggle as well as the demands for majority rule.
Nothing less than unimpeded majority rule was good enough.
3) Mugabe and Nkomo could choose to abstain because they had the comfort of the
international backing on their side. Both Britain and the USA could not recognise
any settlement which excluded ZANU and ZAPU. Such a settlement was an
insult to justice and would never end the stand-off and bitter rivalry in the
country. Even South Africa, the strongest ally of Rhodesia was not in support of
the internal settlement, but a moderate settlement which would end the war, but at
the same time create a framework for good neighbourliness between the two
countries. South Africa Prime Minister John Vorster, nevertheless dreaded the
possibility of a communist regime springing up in Zimbabwe, just like what had
happened in Mozambique and Angola. That would make the South African
security situation more difficult to contain.

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4) Mugabe and Nkomo, no doubt, not having had a freer movement inside the
country, were afraid that they would not be able to make good enough the
preparations for elections. They feared to lose those elections, even if such a
process remained flawed. Hence, aluta, continua! The struggle continued until
real, all embracive talks, mediated by the British at Lancaster House in 1979
paved the generally accepted route towards majority rule through free and fair
elections.
Clearly, UDI had been an experiment in white minority rule, and a rejection of the
overdue call for majority rule. The talks at Lancaster House therefore paved the
way for the general elections of 18 April 1980 during which ZANU won by a
landslide majority.
1. How valid is the view that the Unilateral Declaration of Independence was “a blessing in
disguise” for Zimbabwean economy?
2. Why was the unilateral Declaration of Independence followed by the rise of mass
nationalism in Zimbabwe?
3. What were the advantages and disadvantages of economic sanctions upon Rhodesia during
the period 1965 to 1979?

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CHAPTER 20
THE RISE OF EARLY MASS NATIONALISM IN RHODESIA:

1950 – 1965
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
By the end of the study of this chapter students should be able to:
a) Define the term ‘nationalism’ in the context of this period.

b) Explain the main activities of the trade unions during this period.
c) Account for the rise of African resistance movements in labour, land and politics during this
period.
d) Account for the formation of the ANC, NDP, ZAPU and ZANU.
e) Illustrate the divisions in the African nationalist movement.
f) Assess the impact of African nationalist movements during this period up to 1965.
DEFINITION OF NATIONALISM
Michael Tidy in his book, A History of Africa, Vol II, has given one of the most generally accepted
definitions of nationalism. He terms it the struggle for self-determination whether political, social or
economic. When applied to the context of Southern Rhodesia (1950 – 1965) it would mean that even the
labour-related disputes led by popular black trade unionists such as Charles Mzingeli, Reuben Jamela and
Joshua Nkomo were indeed expressions of nationalism.
However, it is important to realise that labour-related protests as well as other forms of protest against,
(for instance), land alienation pre-dated this period of our study in this chapter and were as old as
colonialism itself. What must be pointed out is that the aims of such aforesaid protests were usually
limited and targeted at the achievement of reforms in the way the settlers administered the Africans in
Southern Rhodesia.
Since nationalist activities and demands certainly went beyond the realisation of reform to the colonial
administration in Southern Rhodesian (1950 – 1965). The term nationalism must, in essence, assume a
broader definition. The presence and aims of nationalist parties such as the National Democratic Party,
formed in 1959, the little-known Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP), ZAPU and ZANU clearly brought a
new dimension to the definition of nationalism. Regardless of their passive means of nationalist protest,
these political parties were aimed at the attainment of independence.
Hence, in the context of this period, nationalism must also be defined as the advocacy for political
independence. This definition takes into account the aims and activities of the political parties which
operated during this period. Historian John Day, for instance, quotes the vibrant and optimistic
proclamation of Enos Nkala in August 1960 thus, “We must get freedom by June 1961 or never”.

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Leopold Takawira, though less radical in expression than Nkala, for example, also predicted that the NDP
would either “be the Government or the Opposition by 1961”. What is important to note is that NDP
clearly advocated for political independence although such a goal remained wild optimism during this
period (1950 – 1965). It is important to remember that the thrust of these political parties was the
attainment of political independence and not mere reform.
What must be noted too is the fact that the aim to attain political independence remained consistent even
after 1965. In reality the methods of achieving such a goal were the ones that were completely changed.
After 1965, especially during the 1970s and beyond, the nationalists confronted the colonial regime by
full force of arms. This differed from the earlier methods of erratic demonstrations, appeals, debates and
constitutional protests.
What must be acknowledged, therefore, is the fact that the term ‘nationalism’ during this period could be
applied to two strands of protest which, though related, occurred somewhat concurrently during this
period (1950 – 1965). In some cases, for individuals such as Joshua Nkomo, the term underwent some
kind of evolution from passive involvement in labour related demands to more vigorous calls for
independence.
WHAT ROLE WAS PLAYED BY THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENTS DURING THIS
PERIOD? (1950 – 1965)
The two completely opposed opinions on the role of the trade union movement vis-a-vis the goal of the
independence of Zimbabwe make interesting study. Reuben Jamela, the president of the Southern
Rhodesian Trade Union Congress in the late 1950s and early 1960s was quoted by social historian
Richard Saunders after independence thus;
“It was the trade unionists who really started the nationalist political parties in the 1950s
– people like Joshua Nkomo, who was president of the party, and I was his vice. But
soon the nationalists not only ignored the worker’s leaders, but actually opposed them.
Although we union leaders had the same intentions as the nationalist politicians, they did
not want us to go directly to deal with employers on behalf of workers, but they wanted
us to go through their party. But that wouldn’t provide any benefits for our workers”.
May be an even clearer line of thought along the same opinion was expressed by Morgan Tsvangirai, who
was then the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions Secretary General in 1997, when he said,
“It is the workers who gave birth to the nationalist struggle – and not the other way
around. It is the workers who had the founding vision of national independence which
would cater for all interests in civil society, which would be plural and democratic. And
it is the workers who are still demanding this, now long after the achievement of
independence.”
The two quotes summarise the generally held opinion about the role of trade union movements, especially
before independence. Before making a full assessment of their role, it is important to first illustrate their
activities during the 1950s and 1960s.
The period under study was characterised by the establishment of a larger number of organisations which,
as before, aimed to represent the diverse needs, interest and inspirations of black people in civil society.
The majority of these associations had their social and cultural roots in rural and migrant labour
communities, including, for example, burial societies, savings groups and dance groups.

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However, with greater industrialisation and urbanisation in the 1940s and 1950s, new groups like the
township residents associations, emerged and aimed to challenge the white economic and political order,
and organised African interests in various ways around these broad goals.
What added driving force to nationalistic activities was the passing of the Native Land Husbandry Act
(NLHA) in 1951? Historian Ian Phimister has played down the overall impact of the NLHA, arguing that
due to lack of European personnel on the ground, implementation of the Act was largely left to the
traditional chiefs. His argument was re-echoed by J. Alexander whose detailed research concluded that;
“The extent to which the act achieved its ostensible goals was limited”.
Moreover, Phimister concludes that as the implementation of the NLHA was confined to approximately
42% of the reserves, “the actual impact of the act was rather less severe than previous writers have
claimed. In addition, Phimister makes the point that since 30% of African producers in the reserves were
working 63% of all cultivated land by the 1959/60 season, “a large number of better off peasants came
through the NLHA, if not exactly unscathed, then, more or less intact”.
What the above historians therefore, managed to point out is the fact that the rise of African nationalism
in Zimbabwe was not, and could not, be restricted to any single factor. A combination of factors were
indeed, at work to bring about the rise of African nationalism.
Closely following the immediate impact of the Native Land Husbandry Act, a later researcher, Brian
Raftopoulos (1995) observed that in terms of urban politics, the major effects of the NLHA were firstly to
increase the flow of indigenous Africans into the cities like Salisbury, although the extent of migration
from the rural areas differed. Raftopoulos agreed that the difference was due to the fact that the effects of
the NLHA in each rural area differed.
Secondly, the NLHA greatly affected the changes in political leadership in both Salisbury and Bulawayo.
Debates about territorial nationalism got broadened and issues such as the extended national identity got
more attention than before.
THE REFORMED INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION (RICU):

ITS ACTIVITIES
The Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union was by far the most well known labour entities
whose activities covered almost all of the country’s main city centers. During the 1930s and 1940s it was
known simply as the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union and was under the leadership of icons
such as Charles Mzingeli, Masotsha Ndlovu and Job Dumbutshena. It popularized itself in both urban
and rural mining centers.
It is important to note that the ICU, as it was known before the 1950s , was not, as often wrongly
assumed, exclusively an urban labour movement speaking against poor housing, low wages and poor
working conditions. Rather, it also delved into many non-labour-related and rural matters such as land
shortage, racial discrimination, the violence of native commissioners and other issues. This duality may
have responded to the needs of contemporary urban Africans, still steeped in both rural agrarian and
urban industrial worlds.
Indeed as observed by Jamela and Tsvangirai in the above quotations, labour movements by their very
existence and acts of protest against the colonial regime, helped to evoke nationalist feelings among the
generality of the urban and rural poor during this period.

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From the 1940s, however, trade unions became more prominent. The ICU revived itself under Mzingeli
into a single Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union mainly based in Salisbury. It co-
existed with two new organisations, the Federation of Bulawayo African Trade Unions under Jasper
Savanhu and the British African Workers’ Voice Association under Benjamin Burombo. Burombo’s
workers’ union was instrumental in the organization of the 1948 strikes.
However, it must be noted that while the strike action of 1948 revealed the high level of worker
frustration in the absence of a United African leadership, its goals were mainly limited to the demand for
higher wages and fairer dispute resolution between employee and employer, and it did not reflect a high
level of Union organization.
The Reformed ICU under Charles Mzingeli dominated African politics from 1946 to about the early
1950s, especially in and around Salisbury. Mzingeli was one of the most remarkable figures of African
politics in Southern Rhodesia. With a limited formal education, Mzingeli developed a formidable
presence in Harare politics, which earned him the affectionate nickname “the Mayor of Harare”.
Mzingeli campaigned over several areas of interest including the development of trade unions, the
problems of African businessmen and women, rights of women in the city, the restrictions on the sale of
liquor to Africans, the housing crisis, participation in local government and the development of a unified
national movement.
Mzingeli also developed regional and international links ranging from being a contributing editor to the
South African communist organ, Nkululeko and a correspondent with The Guardian, a socialist paper
mostly based in Cape Town, to an occasional contribution to the monthly journal of the Fabinn Society.
Such massive involvement by Charles Mzingeli helped in many ways to diversify the cause of African
nationalist protest during the early 1950s. Thus Mzingeli’s organizational involvements varied from
working with unions to contesting for a seat in the limited local government structures provided for
Africans, reaching for a broader alliance with the whites and ‘coloureds’ in the colony and with
progressive organisations in South Africa, and on an international level.
Charles Mzingeli’s demise followed the 1956 Bus Boycott organized by the African Youth League which
had been formed to protest against Mzingeli’s increasingly “complacent Mzingeli”. Also known as the
City Youth League, it was formed in August 1955 to challenge the dominance of the conservative
Mzingeli on the Advisory Board. In this instance, while Mzingeli, Samkange and Savanhu became
embroiled in their participation in Federal politics, a new, young leadership of men: George Nyandoro
and James Chikerema emerged in Salisbury.
The emergence of an elite group of nationalists during the 1950s and early 1960s overshadowed the
overall contribution made by the trade union movements in the early rise of African nationalism. One
could argue that African nationalism in Zimbabwe was as old as the imposition of colonial rule itself, but
the methods used to confront it were different. The aims of nationalists over the years, no doubt,
gradually evolved to become more focused.
Historian Innocent Msindo in his article “Electricity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe:
Bulawayo, 1950 – 1963”, in the Journal of African History, Vol 48, No.2, 2007, pp 267 – 290, argues that
the early labour movements such as the RICU of Mzingeli, BAWVA of Burombo, and the Federation of
Bulawayo African Trade Unions under Jasper Savanhu really accomplished little during this period under
our study, or any other period. This was due to ineptness, power-hungry leadership, diverse class
interests and personality differences. There was also little logistical support from the Union of South
Africa from which the idea of trade unionism had been imported.

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On the other hand, Msindo also says the early trade unions made some positive inputs to nationalist
development. Such organisations helped to promote broader ethnic identities in the country. Nationalist
writer, Lawrence Vambe, credited these trade unions with breaking down ethnic loyalties: he argued that
they “assailed, as no black person had done before, all forms of tribalism and those at the head of burial
societies and other tribal groupings”.
Notably, Vambe viewed these early trade unionists, such as Dumbutshena, Mzingeli and Masotsha
Ndlovu as epitomizing nationalism. He further argued that they “stand out as key figures in laying the
foundation of modern African nationalism in Zimbabwe”, and he further stated about the ICU that it was
“a militant organization embracing all the characteristics of a truly nationalistic Movement transcending
tribal differences and supplanting them with the concept of a common African crusade against white
economic, political and racial supremacy. This approach was new and unique”
Vambe’s defense of fallen heroes must be appreciated, especially since his book was produced when
nationalism faced a leadership crisis. In the mid 1970s, most African leaders were divided, ideologically
confused and power-hungry. In this collective disillusionment, intellectuals such as Vambe feeling
betrayed by contemporary nationalists, no doubt, overstated the contribution of the ICU. In fact, by the
mid 1950s, the popularity of the Reformed ICU, under Charles Mzingeli had greatly declined.
Furthermore, Mzingeli was not able to link the grievances of urban workers with their family problems in
the rural areas. As noted above, there rose in opposition to him the City Youth League in Salisbury which
in 1957 combined with the old African National Congress to form the Southern Rhodesia ANC. Unlike
their predecessors, the political organisations of the late 1950s were less concerned with wages and
employment conditions than with the political project of constructing a nation. Some historians have in
fact indicated that the formation of the ANC in 1957 in essence marked the genesis of mass politics in
Zimbabwe.
Yes, the upsurge of Zimbabwean nationalism indeed benefitted from the contributions of some leaders of
trade unions such as Joshua Nkomo (from the Railways African Workers’ Union), Jason Moyo (from the
Artisans Union) and Francis Nehwati (from Municipal Workers’ Union) and at times the new ANC
operated from the offices of the Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress (SRTUC) led by Joshua
Nkomo. It must be noted, however, that the latter brand of nationalism was not necessarily a brainchild
of trade unionists, but a phenomenon which the elite or intelligentsia borrowed from trends in the
diaspora, for example, “Africa for the Africans”, “Africans Unite”.
The above assessment was equally given credence by an earlier (1997) assessment made by Eddison
Zvobgo, a veteran member of ZANU. He noted:
“The trade union movement served the people of Zimbabwe, and at that time
served them well, but they never really tried to overthrow the regime which we
did… whatever they were doing to challenge government, it couldn’t have been
very important. They were conspicuous by their silence … the attacks on them
(colonial regime) were peanuts to the actual torment which came to us with the
advent of the Rhodesian Front”.
Far from working together as nationalistic groups, there was actually tension between labour groups and
nationalist parties. The tensions sometimes broke out into clear conflict. In one instance, Reuben
Jamela, the President of the Southern Rhodesia Trade Union congress was badly beaten up by the
nationalist youth at the funeral of Dr Samuel Parirenyatwa, the nationalist politician.

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Moreover, in the early 1960s disagreements over the “proper” political role split the labour movement and
aligned the divided, weakened parties with different nationalist parties. Such a submergence of the labour
movement within the politics of the nationalist movement led to a decline in the political and workplace
power of the trade unions.
But the main hindrance to the activities of the unions and other black civic organisations before
independence was the white Rhodesian state. The settler state used repression and many other forms of
manipulation to control the growing momentum of protest and challenge. Many restrictive laws were
introduced to this end. One of the most notorious laws was the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA)
passed in 1960 and made increasingly severe with amendments in subsequent years. It placed very tight
restrictions on rights to association, free speech and communication. It also criminalized many forms of
normal political activity, such as criticizing government policies.
In the face of such repressive laws, many civic organisations were either neutralized as effective public
fora, or forced into the underground, which defeated their representative function. This scenario affected
both the labour unions as well as the newly formed political parties.
WHICH POLITICAL PARTIES WERE FORMED DURING THIS PERIOD AND

WHAT WERE THEIR ACTIVITIES?
As noted earlier, the ANC was the newly revived political party which was formed in 1957. This was
under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo and George Nyandoro. They repeatedly drew attention to the
difference between the rich and massive white-owned ranches and the crowded African farms. The ANC
certainly talked about political independence as the solution to the country’s problems of inequitable land
distribution and racial discrimination. However, as soon as it began to make a recognizable impact, the
settler administration of Edgar Whitehead banned it in the political clampdown of 1959.
However, the banning of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress did not mean the end of
African political activity in the colony. As early as February 1959, another party, the National
Democratic Party, (NDP) was formed. The NDP had a broader appeal than the ANC. It was supported
by students, trade unionists, African traders and the landless.
The NDP leadership comprised of Joshua Nkomo, George Nyandoro and Samkange who were well-
known for articulating African grievances. The NDP encouraged resistance to the Land Husbandry Act
and it organized meetings and rallies as well as marches through cities of Salisbury and Bulawayo to
popularize the impoverished plight of the Africans. In one such meeting, for example, the NDP organized
the great march through Salisbury’s townships in July 1960. Rallies swept across cities and encouraged
massive support to the tune of twenty to thirty thousand people.
The NDP therefore mostly continued with the work of the ANC, but their call for one man one vote was
more distinct. The NDP ranks included well known figures such as Enos Nkala and Leopold Takawira
and these predicted that by 1961 the NDP would have achieved majority rule in the country, – a prophecy
that did not come true.
However, Whiteheads government refused to recognize the NDP as a legitimate political party and
showed no sign of making any fundamental concession on the constitution under which an
overwhelmingly European electorate chose an entirely European legislature. NDP’s optimism emanated
from its startling popularity and success during the first year of its existence.

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One move which heightened optimism among the NDP and African nationalists in general were the
positive steps taken by the British government in making concessions towards a new constitution.
Hoping to win support from the African nationalists from the Central African Federation in Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, the British government persuaded Edgar Whitehead to invite NDP representatives to a
conference which would consider revising the Southern Rhodesia constitution. Just the prospect of
attendance at this crucial official conference caused jubilation among African nationalist members in
Southern Rhodesia who had come to this juncture from nothing in just over four years.
The actual results of the conference, however, proved to be a serious disappointment to NDP and the
period of growing hopes was overtaken by one of frustrated bitterness. The NDP representative,
according to historian John Day, mishandled the conference which was held in January and February
1961. Demanding universal franchise, they had to swallow down a much more watered down version of
what the whites were prepared to offer. They supposedly agreed to work on a constitution where Africans
could only accept 15 seats in an assembly of 65 seats.
Almost immediately after the conference the NDP delegates, acting on massive pressure within the party,
denied that they had ever agreed to the proposed constitution. To emphasize its disapproval of the 15
African seats the NDP adopted a policy of boycotting elections under the new constitution which was
drawn up as a result of the conference. At the same time, the NDP continued to demand an all-embracive
constitution which recognized universal franchise of all the Africans; and equal political status between
the whites and the blacks.
What must be pointed out is that the 1961 constitution caused a huge rift among the African nationalists,
and those who attended the talks were increasingly viewed with suspicion and mistrust. In the extreme,
they were labeled as traitors and sell-outs. Almost all the outstanding future nationalists were members of
the NDP. This included the likes of Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe, Jason Moyo, Morton Malinga,
and as noted earlier, Herbert Chitepo, Enos Nkala, Bernard Chidzero and so on.
In the wake of the notorious Law and Order Maintenance Act, NDP was banned in 1961. But NDP had
equally failed to effectively mobilise the African population for a struggle against the settler regime.
Their main mode of attacking the settler regime was to demand a fresh constitution which was fully
representative of the black majority.
Colonial historian John Day argues that NDP’s undoing was that they issued a series of empty threats
which really scared nobody. For instance, they threatened to paralyse all industrial activities if the
industrialists stood in the way of democracy. They also threatened to call for civil disobedience to unjust
laws. Yet, none of these threats were carried out. Instead, a series of unco-ordinated violence by African
nationalist supporters did break out and the leaders were not responsive to it. They did not order violence
or claim credit for that which occurred. In that way, NDP’s methods of attempting to wrestle powers
from the colonial regime were futile.
Whilst NDP was struggling to win limited concessions for the African population, their counterparts in
Zambia and Malawi were making milestones in constitutional reforms. Being the richest of the federal
colonies, the Rhodesians were not prepared to relinquish power without a fight. Thus, while the
situations in Zambia and Malawi made local nationalists more determined to negotiate similar deals for
their population in Zimbabwe, the reverse could only be realized.
But NDP failed partly because of the poor focus which some of its cadres placed their nationalist
activities. In some areas NDP was criticized because it was concerned more with the rural than with
urban grievances and tended to sideline urban workers in their struggle for higher wages. Needham,
Mashingaidze and Bhebhe, etal, in their book From Iron Age to Independence: A History of Central

241
Africa (p 185), argued that the NDP was suspicious of Zimbabwean industry in which there were strong
British interests. They believed, with some justification that those interests would always stop Britain
from giving Africans power in Zimbabwe.
Coupled with a whole host of colonial legislation, the NDP suffered news blackouts as its main
mouthpiece newspapers such as the African Daily News and the monthly publication Central African
Examiner were silenced by LOMA’s censorship restrictions. The black-oriented print media which did
survive, like The Parade, did so by avoiding controversial political subjects. When they strayed from this
course as did the Catholic Church’s Moto in the 1970s, they too were shut down.
In addition, the state deepened its control by co-opting some civil society organisations as a way of
isolating the emerging and seemingly dynamic political parties, such as the NDP. Black residents
associations, for example, were steered towards co-operation with white local government structures
through the development of African Advisory Boards which were established as weak sounding boards
for African opinions. These boards in fact, helped muffle and contain the frustrations which the black
residents associations sought to represent and address. Such calculated infiltration in African affairs
served to dilute and silence African grievances.
In many other areas of activity too, the Rhodesian state used coercion, containment and covert
interventions to undermine the effectiveness of the early political parties. White opposition targeted not
only political parties per se. Rather, the settlers sought to confront and sniff out any sign of
insubordination among the Africans in churches, human rights groups, intellectuals, press, and even burial
societies. In such an environment, the NDP soon followed the ANC, into oblivion. It was obviously
going to take many years of struggle using a more violent approach to dislodge the whites from their
positions of entrenched power in Zimbabwe.
THE FORMATION OF ZAPU AND ZANU.

ZAPU was formed in 1961 following the banning of NDP and the new party moved a gear up in both
goals for the country’s continuity in terms of leadership between NDP and ZAPU. Joshua Nkomo was
president and many former senior members of NDP joined the new party. These included George
Nyandoro, James Chikerema, Robert Mugabe, Leopold Takawira and many other nationalist luminaries.
ZAPU continued to advocate for one man one vote, equal distribution of land, equal opportunities in
education, employment and in the social sector. The aim of independence was readily pronounced.
However, after protests in Bulawayo, ZAPU was banned and the government again passed more
restrictive legislation. Many of the ZAPU leadership was either imprisoned, restricted or went into exile.
Meanwhile, among the whites, the racist party, the Dominion Party joined with other segregationist
groups to form the Rhodesia Front in 1962. The Rhodesian Front was to be the main vehicle of white
racist opinion over the next two decades. Its policy was, “white supremacy for the foreseeable future”.
The Rhodesia Front wanted an independent white-run state, free from the intervention or control of the
British government.
Hence, in December 1962 the Rhodesia Front gained power and its leader, Winston Field became Prime
Minister. He at once began putting Rhodesia Front policies into practice. He brought broadcasting under
government control, made death the penalty for attempted treason and provided the white security forces
with the most modern military equipment to deal with the African military nationalism. It must be
emphasized that even when it was apparent that the methods of dealing with the Rhodesian Front
government, such as demonstrations, negotiations, petitions, protests and even limited violence, ZAPU
was not prepared to go beyond that. They felt that the legal restriction would not in any way provide an
enabling environment to effectively challenge the settler regime.

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The need for more vigorous action led to the formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU
which increasingly argued for the use of armed confrontation to dislodge the settler regime. That
difference in the mode of operation led to the division or split in ZAPU with Ndabaningi Sithole, Herbert
Chitepo, Robert Mugabe and others forming ZANU. ZANU was the first to send young men out of the
country to train in conventional and guerilla warfare, with the likes of Josiah Magama Tongogara, who
was trained in Tanzania and China.
WHAT PROBLEMS WERE FACED BY ZAPU AND ZANU AFTER 1961?

From 1961 the nationalist movement had to contend not only with its inability to overthrow the existing
system, but also with increasingly serious internal divisions. The African nationalists often avoided the
pain of acknowledging their disunity as much as possible, but often these re-surfaced and would paralyse
their activities.
The first major disagreement within the African nationalist movement in Southern Rhodesia was a
consequence of the NDP’s representatives’ conduct at the 1961 constitutional conference. Some
members of the party did not believe that the denial by Nkomo and his fellow representatives that they
had turned down the provision of 15 out of 65 seats for Africans was true. This serious rift in the NDP
was covered over at a special party congress in March 1961, but in June 1961 some of those discontented
with Nkomo’s leadership founded a new African Party, the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP). This did
not, however, attract much support partly because of the NDP intimidation.
Much more damaging to the nationalist movement was the split of ZAPU in 1963 into two warring
factions. Again, the cause of this division was the quality of Nkomo’s leadership which was precipitated
by his leading the ZAPU executive into exile in Dar es Salaam during the period when the party was
banned. From August 1963 two rival African nationalist parties opposed each other: the People’s
Caretaker Party (PCC) which called itself ZAPU abroad, under Nkomo and the Zimbabwe African
National Union, (ZANU) under Rev Ndabaningi Sithole.
Notably, ZANU, during its early years, never commanded as much support as ZAPU, but unlike ZNP, it
was a substantial party, until they were outlawed in 1964. The two parties fiercely attacked each other by
words and physical violence, diverting much of their energies from their avowed primary aim of opposing
the government. Even after they were declared illegal, the PCC and ZANU continued their hostility in
exile abroad.
When disputes within the nationalist movement reached the points where the dissidents formed separate
parties, those in the established parties dealt with the trauma by denying reality to the break-away parties.
A rival party was pictured as a few power seekers scheming against the united people who were
represented by the dominant party. For instance, Robert Mugabe of the NDP referred to the so-called
ZNP (if any party it be) and the Democratic Voice, the NDP organ, claimed that ZNP was non-existent.
It was true that the ZNP did not attract much political support, but the PCC made worse claims that
ZANU did not exist. Nkomo himself claimed that 99.9% of Africans supported him. In fact one of
Nkomo’s lieutenants stated in April 1964 that ZANU had failed to show public proof of its existence.
Rank and file members of the PCC followed the same track. “I for one don’t know what is ZANU”.
Some one maliciously claimed, “Myself I have never seen a ZANU man. ZANU exists only in
newspapers and nowhere else”. Four university students who resigned from ZANU articulately expressed
the popular equation of party and people which deemed the non existence of ZANU. “We are joining the
people. The PCC is the people; it is a reality, just as the people are a reality. To fight or to oppose the
PCC is to oppose a reality”.

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Of course such mud-slinging among these early nationalists played into the anxious hands of the
Rhodesian Front. Nothing worked as bad as self-betrayal among and against the nationalists. The more
the nationalists were divided and not complimenting each other’s efforts, the easier they got subdued by
the settler regime. To some extent the nationalists were their own worst enemies.
The facts of the situations in 1961 and 1963 were that the African nationalist movement in Southern
Rhodesia split into rival factions. Those who left NDP and ZAPU rejected Nkomo’s leadership, but
remained African nationalists. The rival parties still continued to share common policies and ideologies.
This was in spite of the fact that each party was accusing each other of conspiring with the European
opponents of African nationalism. On another level Mugabe, attacking ZNP, said that the people were
not prepared “to accept borrowed ideas pushed by imperialists down the throats of gullible puppets”. On
the other hand the PPC stated that ZANU might form a government with the Federal Prime Minister, Sir
Roy Welensky, an arch enemy of the nationalist cause. ZANU claimed in 1964 that Nkomo, who was
confined to a restriction camp, had a refrigerator there supplied by Rhodesian Front admirers.
What cannot be ruled out is the fact that at some point or other, Zimbabwean nationalists tore each other
down as a show of their self-seeking and power hungry scheme. While the object of destroying the settler
regime remained quite paramount, it often got side-tracked by ethnic, personality and petty
methodological differences. Such differences and de-campaigning of each other, no doubt, postponed the
goal of national independence and could have accounted for in-fightings within each political party.
Worse still, such lack of tolerance could easily betray the lack of democracy among the nationalist
movement. Ironically, while the nationalists were aiming to introduce noble virtues of democracy such as
one man one vote, and removal of all vestiges of discrimination, the same evils bedeviled their ranks and
were to follow them right up to independence.
It cannot be denied that the period before 1965 was characterized by excessive whims of dominance. The
Unilateral Declaration of Independence on November 1965 followed fears by the whites that the majority
rule which had been achieved by Africans in neighbouring Zambia and Malawi, was very likely to follow
in Zimbabwe as well. The UDI simply meant more concerted restrictions upon African nationalism in
Zimbabwe, with ZANU and ZAPU getting banned in 1964. Leaders in either detention or exile, the
political playing field became extremely uneven against the local nationalists.
While their own inter-party squabble certainly weakened them, the nationalists were more damaged by
the many heinous pieces of mis-legislation put in place by the Rhodesian Front. John Day’s argument
that divisions among the nationalists indeed did more to ruin them has accuracy, but has to be challenged
and put into more accurate historical perspective. John Day was writing in 1974/75 at the height of
colonial dominance and he argued that African related problems affected the cause of nationalists most
because he wanted to remain ideologically and racially correct during this period.
Indeed, if the colonial settlers where receptive to the calls for majority rule, as was in Northern Rhodesia
and Tanganyika, there would never have been any need for division, because negotiation, not armed
conflict, would have sufficed. Divisions came in the nationalist movement mainly due to the
stubbornness of the Rhodesia Front which puffed out any oxygen of political latitude among the
nationalists.
The international and regional restrictions too, presented nationalists in both ZANU and ZAPU with
major hurdles. Before 1964 it was impossible to dream of regional support. Both Zambia and
Tanganyika were still under British domination and therefore unable to lend the nationalists any form of
help whatsoever. The breakup of federation in 1963 and the subsequent independence of Zambia and
Malawi created allies for the nationalists to send out youths for military training in order to fight the

244
settlers and dislodge them. Whilst the idea of the liberation struggle might have been as old as
nationalism itself, its practical application to achieve the desired, results, no doubt, remained bleak for
most of the period 1950 – 1965.
Even with the independence of Zambia and Tanzania, what the best the nationalists could gain was
military training and limited infiltration of guerillas into the country. It was only after 1975, when
Mozambique had gained independence that the nationalist movement became truly massive, and troop
deployment came through the northern, western and eastern fronts. This way the Rhodesian military
machine could be meaningfully engaged.
In conclusion, it must be noted that the period 1950 to 1965 was characterized by the rise of liberationist
nationalism. Due to the heavy constraints, internally and externally, the Rhodesian Front remained
almost unscathed until after the mid 1970s when a new political dispensation really heralded itself in
Southern Africa.
1) Assess the impact of trade unions in addressing African greivances from 1950 – 1965.
2) Discuss the importance of political parties during the period 1950-965.
3) How and why did the aims of the national movements change between 1950 and 60.
4) “An attempt to provide a peaceful solution to African greivances”. Discuss the validity of
the assertion with reference to early nationalist movements.
5) Assess the factors that assisted R. Mugabe and ZANU PF to win the elections in 1980.
6) Disucss the effects on foreign investements of the transition from colonial domination to
independence.
7) Why did Trade Union Movements fail to address African political and social grievances?
8) Why, and with what results did African nationalist parties fail to unite against the settler
minority regime of Ian Smith?

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CHAPTER 21
THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN ZIMBABWE (1966-1979)
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
1) Outline the reasons why African nationalists decided to engage in mass armed
confrontation against the settler regime.
2) Describe the general causes of the second Chimurenga in Zimbabwe.
3) Explain the reasons for the formation of the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe.
4) Describe the impact of UDI upon armed uprising for majority rule in Zimbabwe.
5) Explain why nationalist guerrilla armed confrontation escalated during the second half of
the 1970’s
6) Assess the role played by ZANU and ZAPU in forcing the Smith regime to agree to
negotiations.
7) Account for the role played by the
a) International community i.e. Britain, USA, USSR, China
b) OAU
c) Southern African region – Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique.
in Zimbabwe’s drive for independence.
This is an important part of the syllabus, which requires a guided and focused coverage by the
‘A’ Level student. There is need to identify the salient aspects of the topic which will focus the
candidate on the examinable areas. Generalized study does not usually reward candidates. The
major issues to focus on included, the causes of the Second Chimurenga (Armed Struggle), the
prosecution of the war itself, especially the major highlights, the role of the masses and that of
the international community. The Lancaster House Agreement is the last part of this chapter.
Causes of the Second Chimurenga
The following are the National Grievances, which caused the Second Chimurenga.
(a) Land:- loss of land and relocation to the infertile and dry native resources. Such
legislative Acts as the Land Apportionment Act and the negative effects of the Land
husbandry Act, the Maize Control Act, etc were major causes of the war. Land was the
major means of production for the majority in Zimbabwe and a source of their livelihood.

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(b) Economic Marginalization:- Deprived of their land, the Africans were forced to look for
employment in the mines, factories and farms where the wages and working conditions
were poor. The compound system in towns and mines separated families over long
periods of time. Blacks treated as second class citizens in their own country by
foreigners.
(c) Racial Segregation:- This centred around taking the African as a sub-human species and
included denial of access to all facilities used by whites such as toilets, shops, churches,
hotels and even emotional issues such as cross-cultural and cross-racial marriages or
relationships were criminalized. The idea of apartheid i.e social stratificaion based on
race and colour.
(d) Disenfranchisement:- As third-vote citizens, Africans could not participate in politics

and were disqualified from voting. Many laws were passed to restrict the natives from
articulating their political aspirations. This closed the door for political dialogue and
finally triggered the war.
(e) Political Repression and Suppression:- The Native Affairs, Law and Order
Maintenance Act and The Emergency Powers Act, effectively prescribed African
Political activity and criminalized all political activity, even the most trivial forms of
protest by Africans.
Prosecution of the war
In this section, an inventory of the major highlights of the armed struggle will be done. It would
not be possible to include all the events of the armed struggle. A sequential order of events will
be followed. By 1963 the Nationalists had secured external bases in independent African
countries such as Egypt, Tanzania and Zambia to train their armed wings. ZANU’s armed wing
became the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and ZAPU’s armed wing
became known as the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Training also took
place outside Africa in places like Cuba, China and Russia.
In 1966 – Chinhoyi battle:- Here the first externally trained ZANLA combatants clashed with the
security forces and all the seven members of the group were killed. They were outnumbered and
ran out of ammunition. This battle is believed to have effectively marked to beginning of the
armed struggle.
1967 (August) – ZIPRA in alliance with the South African National Congress’s armed wing,
Umkhonto WeSizwe deployed four groups of 20 combatants each. The majority of the
combatants were killed in and around Wankie district. Another group of 150 was deployed and
met the same fate.
Late 1969 and early 1970 the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) fighting the
Portuguese in Mozambique formed an alliance with ZANLA and with more experience they

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provided training and logistical support which proved invaluable and led to the opening of the
eastern front. Mass mobilization became the preferred tool of the armed struggle and this met
with great success.
1970 – Formation of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) by Dambaza
Chikerema and Nathan Shamuyarira and others who broke away from ZAPU. They cited the
need to circumvent what they perceived as tribal limitations within ZANU and ZAPU, as the
reason for their break. The group gradually fizzled out and leadership either joined ZANU or
went back to Rhodesia.
1972/ December – ZANLA forces score military successes with the attack on Alterna Farm in
Centenary. In the same year, the keeps or ‘protected’ villages were introduced in order to deny
guerillas access to food and clothing from the rural peasants.
1973 – John Vorster, South Africa’s Boer Premier and Zambia’s president, Kenneth Kaunda,
initiated Detente, a policy of accommodation, which was to neutralize the armed struggle by
promoting internal reactionary African Nationalities in Zimbabwe. Muzorewa and Nkomo and
Sithole were flown from prison in Rhodesia to Lusaka and forced to sign the declaration of unity
by Kaunda on the pain of losing Frontline support.
1974 – Internal rivalry rock both ZANU and ZAPU. In ZANU, a group calling themselves
‘vashandi’ led by such people as Rugare Gumbo and Henry Hamadziripi caused major
headaches for the party.
1974 – In December. The OAU demand ZANLA and ZIPRA to unite and fight jointly. This led
to the formation of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA). It had a joint command of 18.
However, ZIPA did not last because of differences in leadership.
1975- The assassination of Herbert Chitepo on the 18th of March in a parcel bomb. Chitepo was
the ZANU chairman of the Dare ReChimurenga, on organization formed after the banning and
jailing of nationalist leaders in 1964 and his task was to prosecute the war while the leadership
was in prison. He was also a renowned Lawyer assassinated in Zambia.
1976 – Ian Smith conducted separate peace negotiations with Joshua Nkomo in March.
However, as a result of mounting criticism of these talks by African leaders, especially Julius
Nyerere and Samora Machel and following Smith’s ‘no majority rule in a thousand years’
speech, Nkomo discontinued talks with Smith. At the same time American secretary of state,
Henry Kissinger initiated the Geneva talks. ZANU and ZAPU formed the Patriotic Front (PF) to
oppose the talks.
26 September 1976 – Smith announced his acceptance of majority rule as long as the army and
police remained under white control. He also began to negotiate with internal black
collaborators, or those who had abandoned the armed struggle, e.g. Ndabaningi Sithole, Abel
Muzorewa and Chief Jeremiah Chirau.

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1976 also saw the bombing raids on camps in Mozambique. Rhodesians killed many refugees at
Chimoio and Nyadzonya in Mozambique and Freedom camp, Mulungushi and Chifombo in
Zambia.
1976-1978 – The liberation armed struggle intensified. Infact, by 1977, it had covered almost
the whole country. ZANLA forces operated from the Eastern part of the Country, while ZIPRA
entered from the West. A number of liberated zones had been opened up, where the enemy had
been driven away into the urban areas. Zimbabwe’s armed struggle was a rural based struggle.
1978 saw important military victories by both ZANLA and ZAPU. ZIPRA forces downed a
Viscount Plane in the Kariba area, while ZANLA burnt petrol tanks in Salisbury.
3 March 1978 – the so-called Internal Settlement was reached, Smith on the other hand and anti-
war black leaders such as Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau.
April 1979- the ANC’s Bishop Muzorewa was elected Prime Minister in sham elections, leading
to the temporary Zimbabwe – Rhodesia Hybrid State. This government was not recognized by
any state except South Africa.
1979 Lancaster House Agreement
The Lancaster House talks began in October. The parties to the talks were the British
government, the Patriotic Front (ZANU and ZAPU), Muzorewa’s ANC and Smith’s Rhodesia
Front (RF). The talks could not reconcile the demands of the parties especially on the land.
However, finally a compromise was reached.
(i) Land Distribution and Resettlement was agreed upon and the government of Britain was
to meet half the costs of resettlement. The Zimbabwe government was to fund the other
half. In 1980, the UK pledged an initial amount of 20 million pounds.
(ii) Land was thus to change hands through a willing seller- willing buyer mechanism, with
the white farmers who wanted to continue farming being free to do so.
(iii) The Whites had to retain 20 uncontested seats in the New Assembly.
(iv) There was to be the ceasefire and the ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas to be put in
assembly points.
(v) This was to be followed by free and fair elections, based in a one-man one-vote basis.
(vi) There was to be no constitutional amendment of those terms for a period of 10 years.

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Candidates are expected to critically and objectively analyse the implications of the Lancaster
house agreement. This was an important settlement in the history of Zimbabwe and a possible
examination area.
1980- Elections were held in March. These were internationally supervised. Results –
Muzorewa’s ANC-3 seats, ZANU (PF) –57, PF-ZAPU –20 and ZAPU-Ndonga 1. The Africans
contested for only 80 seats. The other 20 were reserved for whites. Thus on 18 April 1980,
Zimbabwe became an Independent State, with Robert Mugabe as Prime Minister. The new PM
formed a government of National Unity and offered Joshua Nkomo the position of president, but
he declined. Canaan Banana eventually took up the post.
The role of the Peasants and Workers in the Armed Struggle:
These two groups constituted the masses of Zimbabwe.
(a) Peasants:- These were in the war front since the armed struggle was a rural based one.
They bore the brunt of the war. They were the ‘men in the middle’ between the guerrillas
and the settler forces. They provided the following: - food, shelter from settler forces,
intelligence information on settler movements and location, logistics and essential cover
– e.g. according to Mao Tse-Tung – the masses were the water and the guerrillas, the fish.
The fish cannot live or survive without the water. This under scored the critical role of
the peasants in the struggle. The young men called (mujibhas) and young ladies
(chimbwidos) – carried supplies to and from bases within Zimbabwe and in neighboring
Mozambique and Zambia.
- Now recruits for guerrilla training came from the two groups
- They were also the ‘ears and eyes’ of the guerrillas.
- Peasants suffered many hardships such as brutality of government agents, collecting fines
for not reporting the guerrillas, extreme torture for harbouring the ‘enemy’, curfews,
imprisonment for supporting the guerillas and being put in ‘protected villages’. Many lost
their lives in enemy attacks and bombings of guerrilla bases.
- However the peasants who collaborated with Smith forces- the sellouts – were mostly killed
by the guerrillas.
(b) Workers:- Because of their earning power, workers were called upon to provide guerrillas
with clothes and boots, food, cigarettes, radios, money etc.
They also provided transport – teachers, nurses, agritex officials etc, used their cars to ferry
guerrillas’ supplies to designated areas.
In towns – which were tightly controlled and policed, it was difficult to organize resistance.
However, many individual workers, helped by transporting guerrillas who came to urban areas
disguised as civilians. They provided temporary shelter for them.

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Many urban workers still had contacts with their families in the rural areas and helped by
sending money, food, clothes and other items to the guerrillas.
However, the struggle could not have been won by the masses (peasants/workers) alone without
the guerrillas themselves. The war was won by the concerted efforts of both the masses and the
guerrillas.
The aim should always be to give a balanced assessment of all those who contributed to the
success of the armed struggle.
The role of the international community
Students are also expected to evaluate the role of the international community in the armed
struggle in Zimbabwe. The types of assistance ranged from military training, provision of arms
of war, providing shelter for Zimbabwean refugees, to the provision of food, medical supplies
such as bandages and medicines.
Mostly countries such as China, the Soviet Union, Cuba and other Eastern block countries
outside Africa, provided military training while in Africa, Tanzania, Egypt, Mozambique and
Zambia provided it. However, Zambia and Mozambique had additional responsibilities. They
harboured Zimbabwean refugees in camps in their own countries, thus exposing their countries
to danger of attack by the Smith regime. ZANLA forces were trained mostly in Tanzania,
Mozambique and China, while ZIPRA forces were trained in Zambia, Cuba and the Soviet
Union. Both liberation groups were trained in the use of guerilla tactics. These included
sabotaging communication lines such as railway lines and roads. They were also trained on the
importance of political education and conscientization of the masses on the aims of the armed
struggle. This led to the ‘Pungwe’ concept, used mostly by ZANLA guerrillas. This was
whereby the masses attended all night meetings where they were taught on the importance of
supporting the guerrillas. This politicization programme is what lacked in the early stages of the
armed struggle, resulting in the defeats at Chinhoyi and in the Wankie area.
Therefore an overall assessment of those of who contributed to the success of the armed struggle
in Zimbabwe must, of necessity, include the above-mentioned countries. In addition, various
organizations and agencies gave humanitarian support. These included UN agencies such as
UNICEF for refugees, FAO for food and UNESCO for education in refugee camps. The OAU
liberation committee also helped by providing both moral and military support. It was a conduit
through which assistance from the international community reached the guerrillas in
Mozambique and Zambia.

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1) Why did Africans undertake armed struggle in Southern Rhodesia in 1966.

2) The armed struggle was a direct reaction to colonial Insensitivity.” Do you agrees
3) Critically examined various method used by Africans during the second Chimurenga
(4) ‘The peasants suffered and contributed most to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe’.
Discuss
(5) ‘The terms of the Lancaster House constitution were meant to benefit the minority at the
expense of the majority.’ Discuss.
6) Lancaster was a half baked cake, dangled in front of African leaders as the only
meaningful end to war.” Discuss the validity of the assertion with reference to the pre-
independence settlement.
7) Assess the impact of guerrilla warfare on the result of the armed struggle.
8) Assess the role of foreign support in the armed struggle in Zimbabwe.
9) Critically exmine the roles played by Zimbabwean societies to gain independence from
Britain.
10) What was the impact of the armed struggle upon the rival population in Mashonaland and
Matabeleland?
11) Evaluate the role played by the international community in aiding Zimbabwe’s liberation
struggle.
12) “The outcome of the armed struggle revealed a set of compromises”. How far do you
agree?

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CHAPTER 22
ZIMBABWE AFTER INDEPENDENCE
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
1. Describe the political, economic and social status of the country at independence in 1980.
2. Explain the limitations placed on the new black government by the Lancaster House
Constitution.
3. Describe the land holding/ownership status at independence.
4. Assess the successes and failures of the first phase of the land reform and resettlement
programme in Zimbabwe.
5. Estimate the reasons for, and impact of the Fast Track Land Reform and resettlement
programme.
6. Explain the reasons why ESAP was adopted and assess its impact on the economic,
political and social situation in Zimbabwe.
7. Describe and explain the role played by the political elite in either promoting or
frustrating reform measures in land redistribution or ESAP.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
ZANU PF came to power following the election victory on April 18, 1980, under the
premiership of Robert Gabriel Mugabe. Mugabe’s most immediate task was to assure the

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divided, war-torn nation of reconciliation, national healing and economic and social
development. This helped to ease tempers among the jittery white community who had feared an
imminent racial war. Nevertheless, the biggest challenge for the new government was to chart
the way forward in the area of economic development, particularly in the area of land
redistribution. Equally needing attention were the social aspects of the country such as health
and education. Save for the towns, the situation in the rural areas was chaotic since most
schools, hospitals and clinics had been closed due to the war.
EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN POST INDEPENDENCE ZIMBABWE
When ZANU (PF) came to power in 1980 it had promised to establish free and compulsory
primary and secondary education for all children in Zimbabwe. The Ministry of Education in
actual fact managed to achieve remarkable increases in school enrolments, particularly at
secondary level. It also undertook to allow all pupils to sit the ‘O’ Level examinations after four
years of secondary schooling.
However, a bottleneck entry to Form Six was created, because there were insufficient places for
those who wished to proceed to sixth form studies. There were also inadequate vocational
training facilities, and an inadequate rate of creation of new jobs for school leavers.
Expansion of Primary and Secondary Education : 1980 – 2000

The ZANU (PF) 1980 election manifesto pledged, as one of its cardinal education principles, to
establish “free and compulsory primary and secondary education for all children” in Zimbabwe,
regardless of race, colour or creed. Given that the country’s rural education facilities had been
decimated by the civil war, and that, the educational financing of urban schools under the Smith
and Muzorewa regimes had favoured White school children, to be an easy one to fulfill.
The country was, though, fortunate in the nomination of Dr Dzingai Mutumbuka as Minister of
Education after the landslide election triumph of ZANU (PF) in March 1980. During the
Rhodesia civil war, Mutumbuka had been responsible for the education of thousands of refugee
children in Mozambique and his success in that sphere earned him the undiminished trust of the
ZANU leader, Robert Mugabe, and an uninterrupted place on the supreme Politburo of the ruling
party. The new Government’s first budget gave Mutumbuka’s Ministry of Education a
staggering Z$1,202,2 million, which represented some 17,3% of the total national budget, with
which to effect an educational miracle.
Faced with an influx of over two million refugees, many of the children, after the cessation of
hostilities in 1980, and a massive need for schools and teachers, the Ministry of Education
employed radical strategies for survival. Hundreds of expatriate teachers were flown in from
Australia, Britain and Canada. These were usually engaged on three year contracts, and were
permitted to remit part of their earnings to the countries of origin. Moreover, recruiting such

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teachers, matters of selection and travel were arranged by the teachers’ home countries. All this
was done to fill in the huge staff shortage that existed in both secondary and primary schools.
Apart from that, a system of what came to be known as “hot-seating” was introduced in which,
in many areas, half the school population was taught in the morning and the other half in the
afternoon – thereby utilizing human and material resources to the maximum.
Moreover, teacher education colleges experienced massive and rapid expansion, and the Ministry
sponsored a new form of “on-the-job” teacher training called the Zimbabwe Integrated National
Education Course (ZINTEC), which, by 1986, had fed an extra 8 000 primary school teachers
into the system. In addition, huge school building projects were initiated with local communities
encouraged to build schools that had been destroyed during the fifteen unhappy years of UDI.
As a result of the collective efforts outlined above, by 1984 the number of primary schools in
operation had increased by 73,3% from 819586 in 1979 to 2 214 798 in 1984. The figures for
secondary education were even more impressive. In the period from 1979 to 1984 the number
of secondary schools increased by 537,8%, with a four-fold rise in teacher staffing. These are
astonishing figures, and all the more so, when we consider that they were achieved in the first
four years of full independence.
Whereas in 1979 a total of 885 801 pupils were enrolled in primary and secondary schools, that
number had increased to 2 159 288 within three years and by 1986 the total school enrolment
was approaching the three million mark. At primary level, growth took place uniformly across
all grade levels. The massive 50,8% increment in total primary enrolments between 1979 and
1980 has been followed by much more modest, but consistent, percentage increases in
succeeding years. This growth rate has been sustained by the continuing return of refugee
children, and by the government’s decision shortly after independence, to make primary
education free.
However, it is in the area of secondary education that the most dramatic school population
increases occurred. Of the 182 742 pupils who completed primary school education in 1984,
83.96% went into Form 1 entrance in secondary schools the following year – compared with
only the 30,41% of 1979’s intake who entered secondary school in 1980. In 1986 the percentage
of pupils entering secondary school was 79,19 percent, only marginally less than it had been the
previous year. In addition the Government then gave an undertaking that all those pupils who
completed primary school in 1986 onwards and wish to proceed to secondary education in 1987
would be permitted to do so.
The Ministry of Education also insisted that every pupil, entering secondary schooling would
have the automatic right to sit the ordinary Level examination. This decision must have been
taken at the end of 1982 or earlier. This is because the directive initially referred to all the Form
III pupils of 1983, wishing to take the 1984 examination if they so wished.
It must be noted that Dr Mutumbuka’s positive and forceful approach to the functions of his
Ministry certainly produced remarkable quantitative results. Besides providing educational
opportunities for hundreds of thousands of children who would never otherwise have attended
school, his policies also encouraged children to stay in school. By way of comparison, the Form

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1 intake of 1977 had an average fall-out rate of 12,96 percent per annum on its journey towards
Form IV (these figures were derived from the Quarterly Digest of Statistics, December 1985). In
real terms, therefore, not only did Zimbabwean administration improve initial access to school
education at both the primary entrance point and the secondary school threshold, but it had also
enhanced opportunities for pupils to progress through the school system. This has accorded
them access to eleven years of school education and guaranteeing them the right to sit for the ‘O’
Level examination.
Problems of Mass Education Drive

The policy of automatic promotion hit serious bottlenecks at Form IV level when learners either
failed to qualify to proceed to the next levels, or that such facilities were badly inadequate. In
the three years preceding national independence a very low ratio of Form IV pupils proceeded to
Form VI education – only some 12,1%. Soon after independence, the percentage of fourth year
pupils entering the sixth form rose impressively, peaking at 22,4% in 1983. Thereafter, a strong
decline has been in evidence with the percentage of Form IV pupils entering Lower sixth
reducing to 8,3% in 1985 and to 7,1% in 1986.
In effect, a lower proportion of fourth year pupils were now entering sixth form studies than was
the case in the years immediately before independence. This was because by universalizing
primary education, the government had created a crisis of expectations. Swept along by the
system that has granted them it was easy for the ‘O’ Level aspirants to expect that successful
completion of the examination will open up all kinds of opportunities for them. Such
expectations took several forms; firstly, pupils might expect to proceed with their school
education to sixth form work; secondly, they would wish to enter pre-vocational training
programmes, and, finally after eleven years of school education, students would expect to find
employment. Sadly, the government failed to meet these expectations for most of the pupils.
The reasons for this were varied and complex and some analysis of them might be useful.
EXPECTATIONS OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PUPILS

1) Sixth Form Education
It has already been noted that the proportion of Form IV pupils entering Form VI (Lower)
has actually been on the decline since 1983. It will be noted too that although Form VI
intakes have increased by 396,6% since 1979, in the same period Form IV intakes
rocketed by 709,4%. It would take a massive building and teacher training impetus to
narrow the ever widening gap between provision and expectation in this respect. Such an
impetus could only happen if large sums of money were allocated to the Ministry of
Education. Unfortunately, expenditure on education was in decline since the 1983 –
1984 budgets. It was noticeable that while the 1982 – 1983 education budget won a 19,3
percent share of the total budget, this picture had declined in the 1985 – 1986 financial
year. During this year education got 15,4 per cent.

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Moreover, in his financial statement of 31 July 1986, Finance, Economic Planning and
Development Minister, Bernard Chidzero, only announced a 10% increase in the
education vote. This was despite the fact that inflation was running well beyond that rate.
Notably, in the same finance bill, he announced an increase of 27 percent in defense
spending caused by South Africa’s disruption of Zimbabwean exports going through
South African ports. Hence the defense of the Beira rail corridor through Mozambique
became a matter of utmost urgency. Unfortunately, attacks by the Mozambique National
Resistance (MNR) movement necessitated the deployment of more than 10 000
Zimbabwean troops inside Mozambique to protect the rail route. This was a costly but
unavoidable venture, and one which would continue until Mozambique’s civil war was
resolved. Defence, therefore, continued to take precedence over education until
Mozambique’s civil war was officially ended.
The Ministry of Education could not therefore provide the material facilities needed for
an increased sixth form intake, and even if it were possible to do so, the talks of
supplying teachers in sufficient numbers to utilize such facilities would be well beyond
the country’s current teacher training capacity. The problem was compounded by the fact
that “although all schools are fully staffed, over 40% of the teachers are unqualified” (Re-
building Zimbabwe: Achievements, Problems and Prospects. Harare : Mardon Printers
for ZANU (PF) Department of the Commissariat and Culture, 1986).
Furthermore, the importance of expatriate teachers proved difficult on two counts.

Firstly, from an ideological point of view, it rans contrary to the government’s expressed
policy of Zimbabweanisation and self-reliance. Secondly, since expatriate teachers
worked on a contract basis which allowed them to remit their earnings abroad, their
employment would place a heavy burden on Zimbabwe’s foreign exchange reserves at a
time when the threats of retaliatory sanctions from South Africa, and various other
economic circumstances were placing in jeopardy the country’s ability to earn foreign
currency.
It seemed then that no spectacular increase in sixth form provision would be possible in
light of the above inhibiting circumstances. Rather, due to the escalating demand for
sixth form places, that demand continued to outstrip supply, and that the gap between the
two continued to widen even further during the 1980’s and 1990’s.
2) Vocational Training Programmes

Since independence, the Government has made considerable strides in the expansion of
vocational training facilities available to Form IV school leavers. For instance, before
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independence there were only two technical colleges, but by 1986 a further five had been
built at Kwekwe, Masvingo, Mutare, Gweru and Kushinga-Phikelela. This brought the
total technical college enrolments up from 3663 in 1979 to 18 213 in 1985.
Equally impressive were enrolments at agricultural colleges which grew five-fold in the
five years of independence from 171 in 1979 to 888 students in 1985. In addition to this,
the number of students registered at teacher training colleges rose from 3085 in 1979 to
9504 in 1985.
But important qualifications need to be made on these statistics, encouraging as they are.
The total immediate post-independence capacity of vocational training colleges falls far
short of the demands that massive numbers of ‘O’ Level school leavers were placing
upon it. Even though, expansion in student capacity at all such colleges continued with
the addition of Bulawayo Technical College, Gwanda Zintec, Seke Teachers’ College as
well as the expansion of Belvedere Technical Teachers’ College, the demand for college
places continued to outstrip supply even beyond year 2000.
What was noticed was that by pushing every individual’s right to proceed to ‘O’ Level,
the government unwittingly encouraged what could not be sustained by facilities on the
ground. That such circumstances have evolved is ironic indeed. Deputy Minister of
Education Joseph Culverwell is on record as saying at a school prize giving day in
October 1983 that, “We should like to move away from the capitalist system of education
which lays emphasis on exams, grades and degrees” (at Nemakonde High School in
Chinhoyi). And yet quite the opposite movement has occurred. The emphasis on ‘O’
Level examinations was such that by 1984 the Zimbabwe Junior Certificate (ZJC) a
school leaving certificate available to Form II school leavers, which had acted as a
selection hurdle for ‘O’ Level candidates – had all but lost its currency in the eyes of
pupils and employers alike. Almost everyone, it seemed, had set their eyes on ‘O’ Level,
encouraging the Minister of Education, Mutumbuka’s affirmation that “It is the right of
every child to be allowed to attempt ‘O’ Level examinations”. By 1999 ZJC had been
abandoned altogether.
Scholars such as Clayton G. Mackenzie, in his article, “Zimbabwe’s Educational Miracle

and the Problems it has created” (1988) in International Review of Education, pp337 –
353, No. 34, has argued that the universal policy of automatic promotion to ‘O’ Level
bore tragic examination results for ‘O’ Level in 1985 and 1986. The results published in
1985, February showed that of the 67 962 Zimbabwean pupils who sat ‘O’ Level, only 22
986 passed more than two subjects with a Grade C or better. Although Dr Mutumbuka
declared on national television that the “results were higher than anyone would find in
other African countries”, the Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, himself declared, a few
weeks later, that “It is hardly an exaggeration to describe the results as appalling”.

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The figures that came out in 1986 were even worse. In fact, the Ministry was so shocked
by them that they delayed their release for several weeks. When they were finally
published they revealed that of the 88 532 students who sat the ‘O’ Level examinations
only 27 759 had scored more than two passes, and only 10 452 more than five. Some
38,5% of the entrants (34 121 pupils) failed to secure even a single ‘O’ Level pass.
Unfortunately too, there was little vocational provision available for those in the 16+ age
groups who had not performed well in the ‘O’ Level examinations. Most of the
vocational programmes offered by the various ministries required a minimum of four or
five ‘O’ Level passes. There were however, exceptions to the rule. The Ministry of
Agriculture, for example, offers three tiers of qualifications to degree studies (open to
candidates holding two ‘A’ Level passes) diploma studies (open to applicants with three
appropriate ‘O’ Level passes plus relevant experience) and certificate courses (open to
youngsters with a minimum of two years of post-primary education).
Since most of those who wrote ‘O’ Level in 1984 and 1985 failed to achieve more than
two ‘O’ Levels, they could qualify only for a certificate course. Yet the four agricultural
institutes that taught the three-year National Certificate in Agriculture had a total capacity
of just 725 places, with a total annual first year intake in 1985 of less than 300 students.
This clearly shows that even the vocational avenue offered little hope as an alternative to
the academic route during the first ten years after independence.
3) Employment Opportunities After Independence: 1980 – 1990
If the majority of the country’s annual crop of ‘O’ Level entrants were unable to proceed
into Form VI, or to enter vocational training programmes, their obvious alternative was to
seek employment. Here too, the outcome was quite disheartening. Rene Loewenson,
writing in a 1982 edition of Zimbabwe News, official organ of the ruling ZANU (PF)
party, noted that, “between 1980 and 1981, although the economy grew by 12,4 per cent,
employment grew by only 2,7 per cent. After 1981, employment steadily declined.
There was a net increase of only 7 000 jobs per year between 1980 and 1985, although 80
000 people entered the job market every year.
The introductory section of Zimbabwe’s First Five-Year National development Plan
(1986 – 1990, published in July 1986, admits that “one of the most disturbing issues is
that the fact that, in spite of the good performance of the economy in 1985,
unemployment has remained at an unacceptably high level”, and that the large number of
school leavers now entering the labour market each year is one of the major causes of
“the persistent and growing unemployment problem”. It is clear that the government

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planners anticipated that, far from improving, the unemployment situation in post-
independence Zimbabwe was set to worsen.
On one hand, the Plan’s (1986 – 1990) statistical tables reveal that the total number of
wage earners would increase from 1 029 000 in 1985 to 1 173 000 by 1990; on the other
hand, the population in the 15 – 64 age group would rise from 4 197 000 in 1985 to 5 097
000 by 1990. In other words, while employment opportunities would increase by about
14 percent by 1990, in the same period the number of potential employees would rise by
21,4 per cent. It seems, therefore, that Zimbabwe’s annual school leaver output of more
than 80 000 would face an extremely harsh competitive job market, and many school
leavers, perhaps even most of them, would fail to secure full time employment.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1980 – 2000

1) The One-Party state and political monopoly: ZANU (PF)
The top-down strategies and politics which were needed to win a liberation war strongly
influenced the behavior of the ruling nationalist party once it was in power. In relation to
both its members and voices in civil society, the leadership of the new party in
government soon displayed signs of intolerance which raised questions about the nature
of Zimbabwe’s emerging democracy.
The clearest example of this intolerance was ZANU (PF)’s increasing focus on the
establishment of a legal one-party state in Zimbabwe. Until ZANU (PF)’s official and
begrudging abandonment of this objective in 1990, the party leadership worked
determinedly towards its realization.
Preparations for a one-party state involved:

i. The tightening of control over debate and political expression within the ruling
party;
ii. The promulgation of the party’s views and perspectives to the exclusion of others
in the wider space of civil society;
iii. The monopolization by ZANU (PF) of the state, the bureaucracy and a range of
the public institutions.
Most importantly, it involved the marginalisation, if not eradication, of the opposition

(especially ZAPU), which was seen as the chief obstacle to one-party rule. Within
ZANU (PF), real democracy was fragile from the beginning. Ordinary party members
often found it difficult for their voices to be heard. The culture of “chefs” and military
structures seen as necessary for undertaking an armed struggle was a powerful and lasting
one. As Margaret Dongo, a ruling party cadre in the 1980s explained;

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“It was not easy during those days to criticize whatever issues within your own
party. We grew up in a command line in the struggle: when you are asked to
stand to attention, you do as what your commander says. And there was a belief
that the leaders are always correct, and you have to obey what the leaders say”
Although ZANU (PF), including (PF) ZAPU set up “civilian” political structures at
independence, the flow of power more often than not remained a distinctly top-down
affair from national to branch and cell level. Very soon there were allegations,
particularly among ZANU (PF) members that the revolution was being “hijacked” by
newcomers and opportunists without due regard to the interests of the party. These
included war veterans, many of whom were openly complaining by 1983 that they had
been “dumped” into poverty without adequate political and financial support from the
new government.
Such criticisms – and many forms of debate – were not tolerated by the party’s own
hierarchy. The party was headed by a politburo of hand-picked senior leaders far
removed from direct contact with the party base. In addition, the narrow application of
“scientific socialist” policy-making within the party, again emphasizing the leading role
of senior authorities, further helped to silence debate.
When ZANU (PF) did acknowledge weaknesses of its own leaders and the desirability of
political checks and balances, little actual headway was made to shift the balance of
power. For example, the ZANU (PF) leadership code was announced in 1984 in response
to allegations of corruption and wealth accumulation by the political leadership. Its
adoption, however, was half hearted. Indeed, this was followed by a series of corruption
scandals which demonstrated the leaderships bold non-compliance with its own rules.
The Leadership Code: 1984

In august 1984, the second ZANU (PF) National Congress formally adopted the Code as
a means of curbing avaricious behavior on the part of senior party and government
officials. The Code barred senior officials and relatives from:
 Owning property or real estates yielding rents and other incomes.

 Owning more than 50 acres of land.
 Receiving more than one salary simultaneously.
 Holding the position of a director in a private commercial company/firm.
At the time, ZANU (PF)’s President Robert Mugabe, said that acquisitive leaders would
face a choice “to quit their posts or relinquish their property”. However, by the 1989
ZANU (PF) – (PF) ZAPU “Unity” Congress, visible evidence of the Code had all but
disappeared, and it eventually died a natural death.
Attitude towards Civil Society

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In civil society, the opportunities for debates leading to an active form of national
democracy based on popular participation in policy-making appeared to shrink soon after
independence. While government tolerated and sometimes encouraged the formation of
civic organizations, it also made every effort to ensure that such organisations were
firmly on-sides with it politically. In some cases it even helped to establish these bodies.
The Monopoly of the Media Houses

ZANU (PF) moved to occupy and control the space of national debate and opinion-
making. Central to this was governments “capturing” of the leading national media: the
renamed Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and Zimpapers. Both institutions, along
with Ziana, the national news agency had closely reflected the interests and needs of the
white minority for decades. In the UDI years of 1965 – 1979, they had fallen even more
closely under the control of Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front as censorship and other
restrictions were imposed on a white-run media fraternity which was largely acquiescent
to the white government’s demands for support.
Despite claims that ZANU (PF) would reform the media so that they reflected a much
wider range of views, government in fact carried forward many of the same restrictive
practices. The Broadcasting, which since the early 1960s had given the state radio and
television a legal monopoly over broadcasting and made these services directly
responsible to the Ministry of Information, was preserved unchanged, and remained so
until 2000. Journalists approved by the Rhodesian Front were replaced with those
approved by ZANU (PF), and news coverage and commentary shifted to reflect one-party
ideology.
At Zimpapers, government established a new body, the Mass Media Trust, to take over
the South African Argus company’s controlling interests. The Trust was meant to act as
an independent holding company, a buffer between government and the only national
newspaper chain. Its Board of Trustees was legally insulated from government influence.
However, in practice, the body became both dependent upon government for financial,
political and management support. Hence, the Trust became ineffective in wielding
power inside the newspaper company, it theoretically controlled. In fact, ZANU (PF)
ensured that its loyalists were placed in strategic positions within the company and thus
giving the party leadership direct access to the key editorial, personnel and other
management decisions.
The erosion of the Trust’s independence was made more apparent by government’s
successive dismissals of four prominent Zimpapers editors for “political” offences. In
each case, the Mass Media Trust failed to intervene effectively. This called the
independence of both Zimpapers and the Trust into question. By the late 1980s, many
Zimbabweans jokingly referred to Zimpapers flagship daily, The Herald, as Pravada, a
reference to the tightly censored official state newspaper of the then Soviet Union.

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Parastatals
ZANU (PF) monopoly of public institutions was even more stately evident within the
state bureaucy and parastatals. It is common practice for a governing party to place its
officials in positions of responsibility in the bureaucracy and other public bodies. While
the political situation faced by the ZANU (PF) government demanded special measures
due to the fact that Zimbabwe was in transition from a racialist to majority rule, the ruling
party took advantage of this to cement its partisan control over much of the national state
bureaucracy to the exclusion of other interests. In other words, the government
bureaucracy in many ways was more or less absorbed to become a functionary of the
ruling party.
This was not fully evident at first as the rapid integration of blacks into the public service
proceeded. But a pattern of partisan control quickly emerged. It was seen initially, but
not exclusively, in the security and intelligence agencies which brought in the firm
control of ZANU (PF) loyalists. Soon the same tendency was recognised as widespread
in the civil service and parastatals. Top civil service posts such as permanent secretaries
and under secretaries were filled by ruling party loyalists. By the mid 1980s it was
sometimes difficult to distinguish between the votes of individuals as party and
government officers, especially in matters of policy making.
The invasion of the state bureaucracy by the party was rationalized and consolidated in
1987 with the creation of the Ministry of Political Affairs. One of only three senior
ministries in government, along with those for economic and rural development, this new
ministry formalized the link between the party and the state by placing ZANU (PF)
officials responsible for managing the affairs of the party directly on the government
payroll. With this move, for example, the bulk of the administrative and publicity staff of
the ruling party would become “state” employees. While it was argued that the Ministry
of Political Affairs was meant to serve all political parties in Zimbabwe, ZANU (PF)
leaders, including President Mugabe, repeatedly stated that it should be dedicated to
meeting the needs of ZANU (PF) only and that its staff should be loyal primarily to the
interests of the party.
Opposition Parties Under Attack

The main obstacle to a legal one-party state and the consolidation of power was the
political opposition. Chief among these was ZAPU, the other liberation movement which
commanded majority support in Matabeleland with a significant following in the
Midlands and elsewhere in the country. The other major party in parliament was Ian
Smith’s renamed Republican Front (later again renamed the Conservative Alliance of
Zimbabwe). This party had, under the Lancaster House constitution competed for 20
reserved white seats or 20% of all parliamentary seats. Both would come to represent a
block on the free exercise of power by government.
Mike Auret, a leading member of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, noted,

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“Until 1987, they faced two strong opposition parties – and some other smaller
parties. There must have been some fear in the minds of ZANU (PF) that the one-
party state could not be achieved in those circumstances, and therefore something
had to be done about it. And what was done was Matabeleland – Gukurahundi”.
At independence, senior ZAPU officials were given leadership positions as cabinet
ministers in the first government of National unity, but this did not last long. Lingering
tensions from the liberation struggle when the two parties competed for followers and
sometimes fought each other while doing so, soon erupted.
The sacking of Joshua Nkomo and three other ZAPU ministers in the wake of the
discovery of large numbers of arms cashes on ZAPU-owned farms were used as an alibi:
such action clearly added to the already ripe distrust of central government in
Matabeleland over what was considered insufficient ZAPU representation in the Cabinet
and the demotion of Nkomo from the Ministry of Home Affairs in January 1981. The
demotion and subsequent worsening of relations between the two parties led to a steady
stream of desertions from the national army by former Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary
Army (ZIPRA). Estimates of the number of disserters in early 1983 varied from 2000 to
4000 soldiers. This prompted some of them to take up arms against the government from
March 1982 which culminated in the spate of armed violence in Matabeleland during the
late 1982 and 1983. This was the so-called dissident problem.
The Dissident Problem and the Gukurahundi Backlash

A chain of events was set in motion which saw ZAPU expelled from the government of
national unity and vilified as a dissident party. Several leaders of its former military wing
were arrested and charged with treason.
The limited support, or tolerance of at least some Ndebele-speaking people for the
dissidents” led to harsh government measures against the local population to flush out
dissidents and discourage eventual supporters, yet in many cases, this merely added to
popular resentment towards the central government. The latter, seemingly not having
learnt from the independence struggle the important lesson that political problems could
not find a long-term solution by military means, in early 1982 deployed the North Korean
trained Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland in an attempt to dismantle the logistical support
which the dissidents were believed to enjoy in the rural areas. The Fifth Brigade was
composed almost entirely of former Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
(ZANLA) cadres and trained in isolation and in considerable secrecy, away from the bulk
of the national army.
Thousands of innocent civilians were killed. Many more were raped, tortured, beaten,
detained without charge and had their property destroyed. Government security forces
and primarily the Fifth Brigade which was directly accountable to Prime Minister Robert
Mugabe, were responsible for the vast majority of this violence and suffering.

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Lawyer Byron Hove, whose family was heavily involved in politics in the Midlands
during this period, recalled that:
“So many innocent people were killed. Every week we buried people. Some
burnt alive… some with heads chopped off, others bayoneted. I couldn’t imagine
that these things could happen in my country”.
ZAPU, had forewarned trouble when North Korean military trainers first arrived in
August 1981 to help establish the Fifth Brigade. At the time, Prime Minister Mugabe
announced the Brigade would be used to deal with “dissidents” and thus dubbed it
“Gukurahundi” and equally the year was code named the “Year of Gukurahundi” – or the
rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains. However, Joshua Nkomo’s
view of Gukurahundi was different. He alleged that it was ZANU PF’s militia which
was used to attack internal political opponents with the aim of quickening the setting up
of a one-party state dictatorship in the country.
1983 and 1984 a reign of terror and violence descended on Matabeleland North and later
on Matebeleland South. Curfews, detentions, house-to-house searches and terrible
physical violence were all used to attack and silence any form of ZAPU organized
community political activity.
Government also employed several repressive laws inherited from the colonial regime.
These included the Law and Order Maintenance Act, Emergency Powers Regulations and
the Indemnity and Compensation Act in July 1982 to harass ZAPU and freely persecute
its perceived supporters, all within the bounds of the “law”. Joshua Nkomo pointed to
the political motivations of governments “security operations” against “dissidents” at the
time:
“This is a curious security operation when the military gather people together
and start singing political songs, ZANU (PF) songs, and start denouncing me,
and denouncing ZAPU. What type of security operation is that?”
Prime Minister Mugabe, too, hinted at the political underpinning of the “security”
operations by the Fifth Brigade and other ZNA detachments, CIO, PISI, police and
ZANU (PF) activists:
“The situation is one which requires change on the part of the people of
Matabeleland. They must be re-oriented. Nkomo, has not accepted political
defeat”
Not only ZAPU structures and officials were targeted. Thousands of civilians were
“disappeared, killed, maimed and severely victimized. Many thousands of civilians fled
across the border into Botswana, settling at refugee camps such as Dukwe and elsewhere.
Others fled to South Africa as well. Meanwhile the ex-ZIPRA leaders charged and later
acquitted of treason remained under detention without charge. These included Dumiso
Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku. They were only released in 1986 after spending four
years in custody. Joshua Nkomo himself was placed under house arrest, and fearing for
his life after an attack on his house, fled to Botswana in March 1983.
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Nevertheless, the attacks by government on ZAPU merely wounded it as a party, but not
destroying it. The attacks did not damage its popular grassroots support. Despite two
years of violent intimidation and the arrest of its leaders and functionaries, ZAPU still
won all 15 seats in Matabeleland in the 1985 parliamentary elections.
However, the party’s political survival in the 1985 elections was a bitter sweet “victory”.
Pre-election and post-election violence and intimidation which was primarily committed
by ZANU (PF) youths and other ruling party activities left many dead, several thousand
homeless, hundreds injured. Few perpetrators were charged or admonished by the legal
system for such acts of terror.
One notable outbreak of violence against ZAPU followed a speech delivered in Harare by
Prime Minister Mugabe shortly after the elections in which he urged his supporters (in
Shona) to “go and uproot the weeds from your garden”. In the ensuing three days of
violence a losing local ZAPU candidate was killed along with several others, and
Ndebele residents were attacked, many losing their homes and property.
What was noted was that after the 1985 elections, government sponsored violence and
pressure were stepped up against the opposition. Five ZAPU MPs were arrested and
several senior ex-ZIPRA army officers were detained. The aim of all this blitz, on ZAPU
became clearer in 1986 – 1987 : to force unity or a merger between ZAPU and ZANU
(PF) which would enable a quicker transition to a formalized one-party state under the
new party.
The press played a vital part in fueling the persecuting of ZAPU supporters and anyone
construed to be a ZAPU supporter. For instance, on 2 October 1987, referring to the
dissolution of elected Matabeleland North district councils, the Herald threatened:
“Chop down a weed and it will grow again unless the roots, too, are destroyed.
And if councils and councilors serve as roots nourishing the bandits, then they too
must be destroyed”.
Not to be undone in this kind of hate propaganda were senior ZANU (PF) government
ministers whose shock speeches exploded like bombshells upon the Matabele. In 1985,
Enos Nkala, Minister of Home Affairs, said,
“We want to wipe out the ZAPU leadership. You have only seen the warning
lights. We haven’t yet reached full blast. The murderous organization and its
murderous leadership must be hit so hard that it doesn’t feel obliged to the things
it has been doing”
This speech was made in Matabeleland whilst Nkala was on tour of duty in the region.
This pressure finally succeeded in forcing the ZAPU leadership’s acceptance of unity.
On 22 December 1987, a Unity Pact was signed by the two rival parties. It was later
revealed that the deal followed two years of protracted negotiations, initiated by the then
President Canaan Banana, which brought together senior members of the two parties.

266
However, before examining the Unity Accord, it is important to give a brief summary of
the report on the Gukurahundi; compiled by Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice.
Gukurahundi: A Long “Moment of Madness”

The full details of the atrocities committed in Matabeleland and the Midlands in the
1980s will never be fully known, but recent research in just two districts, Nyamandlovu,
(Matabeleland North) and Matobo (Matabeleland South) provides documented evidence
of the deaths of thousands, and the torture injury and other abuses of many thousands
more.
The research was compiled in Breaking Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on
the disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980 to 1988, published in 1997
by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in conjunction with the Legal
Resources Foundation. The report is a public document and is on sale in bookshops
across the country.
In contrast, the findings of the Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry, appointed by
government in 1983 to investigate the first wave of atrocities were never made public.
The following summary, as aforesaid, is based on the breaking silence report. The
triggering of events which became known collectively as Gukurahundi began soon after
independence. A contributing factor was the slow pace and poor planning of the
integration of ex-combatants into the new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) in 1980 –
1981. By the end of 1980, only 15 000 former ZIPRA soldiers out of a total of 65 000
ex-combatants had been allocated places in the ZNA. Obviously this caused great
anxiety and suspicion among ZAPU ranks.
Meanwhile, skirmishes at demobilization Assembly Points between ex-ZANLA and ex-
ZIPRA combatants had led to bad feelings and simmering tensions in November 1980.
These erupted at Entumbane, near Bulawayo, where soldiers from the two guerrilla
armies were housed in close proximity. A second and more serious outbreak of violence
occurred at Entumbane in February 1981, spreading to parts of the Midlands and leading
to more than 300 deaths.
After the fighting at Entumbane there was a rising wave of desertions by ex-ZIPRA
members of the ZNA, who felt under threat and overlooked within the new integrated
army. The desertions grew after February 1982, when government “discovered” arms
caches on ZAPU farms and accused ZAPU of planning to overthrow the government by
force. This resulted in the arrest on treason charges of the ex-ZIPRA military leadership,
including Dumiso Dabengwa, Lookout Masuku and four others, and the expulsion of
ZAPU from the government of national unity.
In early 1982 government began to use Emergency Powers to impose curfews, set up
road blocks, conduct house-to-house searches and carry out other security operations in
Matabeleland. These activities escalated as banditry and dissident attacks increased.
Political tensions rose further after the ZAPU treason accused were found innocent, only
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to be immediately re-detained under Emergency Powers. Masuku and Dabengwa spent

the following four years in detention without charge. Thousands more would follow.
Furthermore, in 1983 the Fifth Brigade was deployed in Matabeleland North, along with
other security agencies including the Central Intelligence Organisation and the Police
Internal Security Intelligence Unit (PISI). Within weeks there were reports of atrocities.
Government initially denied these reports by churches, human rights groups and foreign
journalists, but later appeared to acknowledge wrong doings. The scale of the killings by
the army declined after April 1983 and the curfew was lifted, but beatings and deaths
would for the next year.
In early 1984, the fifth brigade was deployed in Matabeleland South. This coincided with
a curfew and the sealing off of the region from badly needed food aid during the drought
stricken years. Thousands were beaten, detained and interrogated at Bhalagwe camp in
Matobo District and many were killed. In late 1984, the Fifth Brigade was withdrawn for
further intensive retraining.
Dissident activity continued after the 1985 elections and government moved to other
forms of intimidation and harassment to undermine ZAPU. In 1985, five ZAPU MPs and
several ex-ZIPRA ZNA officers were detained for an extended period. ZAPU
parliamentary chief whip Sydney Malunga, MP, was charged with aiding and abetting
dissidents, but was found innocent on weak evidence.
In 1986, government banned ZAPU rallies and temporarily closed the party’s offices.
Political harassment continued until the signing of the Unity Accord in December 1987.
It is difficult to estimate the total number of those who died or suffered severe trauma
because of the disturbances. Many people were displaced others died in detention due to
extreme torture and thousands who were victimized have not been able to tell their story.
But based on its case study documentation and using reliable information from some but
not all other areas of Matabeleland and the Midlands, Breaking the Silence makes the
following conservative estimates:
1) Dead or presumed dead: confirmed dead are more than 2000; but the total dead were as
many as 10 000.
2) Confirmed homesteads destroyed: 680
3) Detention: at least 10 000
4) Tortured, wounded: not less that 7000.
The vast majority of these offences were committed by the Fifth Brigade. Dissidents and
bandits accounted for only a small proportion of the killing and destruction.
So, how many dissidents were there and what threat did they pose?
After an April 1988 Amnesty only 122 came forward to surrender. At their peak, it is
estimated the dissidents were unlikely to number more than 400. No convincing

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commanding link between ZAPU and the dissidents was ever presented to the
government.
Nevertheless, the government leadership was slow to make amends with Gukurahundi’s
victims. No compensation was paid despite repeated requests from the civic groups; and
legal and other issues involving the disappeared and the dead remain unresolved for the
most part.
At the funeral of Vice President Joshua Nkomo in July 1999, President Robert Mugabe
referred to events of the 1980s as “regrettable”. In the run up to the 2000 parliamentary
elections while campaigning in Matabeleland, he called them a “moment of madness”
and said compensation would be made. In the event, ZANU (PF) lost all but two seats in
Matabeleland in the election, and there was no further talk of compensation for
Gukurahundi victims.
The Unity Pact, December 22, 1987

The “Agreement unity between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU” or the Unity Pact as it became
known, made it clear who would enjoy the most power under the new arrangements. Its
preamble stressed that “ZANU (PF) commands a greater percentage of the overwhelming
majority of the people of Zimbabwe”, and the third clause of the agreement specified that
Robert Mugabe would be the First Secretary and President of the expanded ZANU (PF)
The other clauses in the document highlighted key policy positions for the new party:
Clause 5: ZANU (PF) shall seek to establish a socialist society in Zimbabwe on the
guidance of Marxist- Leninist principles.
Clause 6: ZANU (PF) shall seek to establish a one-party state in Zimbabwe.
Clause 7: The leadership of ZANU (PF) shall abide by the leadership code.
However, in less than three years all of these three policy guidelines were abandoned as
the party was transformed, but in unexpected ways.
President Banana underlined the fundamental and immediate value of the agreement at
the signing ceremony:
“Never again shall a Zimbabwean point a gun at another Zimbabwean. That is
intolerable, that is anti-revolutionary, reactionary and anti-Zimbabwean, anti-
progress. It must never be allowed to happen again”.

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Politics after the Unity Pact

The merger of the two largest parties brought peace but it also increased the “threat to
Zimbabwe’s fragile multi-party democracy posed by ZANU(PF)’s ambitions for a one-
party state.
In September 1987, the 20 seats reserved under the Lancaster House Constitution were
abolished by a simple majority vote of the Parliament. They were replaced by non-
constituency MPs elected by the remaining parliamentarians. All of the 20 replacement
MPs “elected” in this way were candidates nominated by ZANU (PF) since the ruling
party already had a simple majority in parliament. Significantly, the new MPs included
no obvious representatives of social interests.
By December 1987, therefore, ZAPU was the last remaining obstacle to a “constitutional
majority” in parliament – that is – a voting majority which would enable parliament to
amend the constitution by itself. The establishment of a legal one-party state, for
example, would require such a constitutional change. When ZAPU merged with ZANU
(PF) on 22 December 1987, the stage was set for the formal, legal abandonment of multi-
party democracy.
Mugabe becomes Executive President

In December 1987, Constitutional Amendment No.6 created the post of Executive
President, first occupied by Robert Mugabe on 31 December 1987. Up until then the
President of Zimbabwe had been a ceremonial position with a Prime Minister as head of
government. The new Executive President was also hurriedly given wide-ranging powers
without meaningful parliamentary debate. These powers would be extended by
legislative and constitutional changes in coming years. Included among these was the
Executive President’s right to dissolve parliament.
In 1989, Constitutional Amendment No. 9 abolished the Senate (the less powerful wing
of the legislature) and restructured the remaining legislative assembly to include 150
MPs. Of these 30 MPs (including eight provincial governors, ten chiefs and twelve non-
constituency MPs) would be appointed directly by the President.
This gave the ruling party very strong advantages. The presidential appointees meant that
a party needed to win only 40 generally elected seats in the 150 member parliament to
command a majority government (46 + 30 = 76 seats. 76 seats is already over 50% of
150 seats).
Despite these measures, ZANU (PF) was frustrated in its determination to create a one-
party state due to unforeseen circumstances. At the end of the 1980s, the international,
regional and domestic political environment unexpectedly shifted, diminishing the
prospects for one-party government. First, communist regimes of Eastern Europe fell in
quick succession to national mass democratic movements which had emerged as political
liberalization was gradually allowed. Zimbabwe, because of its close political links with
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the eastern bloc, lost much of its international political and financial support for highly
centralized government and “scientific socialist” policies. The collapse of communism
also exposed one-party state model of government as corrupt, dictatorial, unpopular and
therefore unworkable.
ZANU PF formally abandoned their objective of a one-party state in mid 1990 after
rising pressure from various interest groups in civil society. However, it still worked
hard to contain the space of multi-party politics with considerable success. As Edison
Zvobgo, ZANU (PF) legal expert and veteran Politburo member said:
“A party’s eyes are focused on one thing if it is a political party: conquest of
power and retention of power. Conquering power and keeping it – that is the
primary function of ZANU (PF)”.
What was the Genesis of Inequitable Land Share in Zimbabwe?

Much of the answer to this question has been given in the previous chapter dealing with the
nature of colonial rule in Zimbabwe. What follows, therefore, is a historical outline of land
acquisition and expropriation from the initial European settlement in the 19th century to
independence from British rule in 1980.
How the Land came under Settler Control

As early as 1879 only a small proportion of the African continent was under colonial rule.
Africa was still ruled by African governments. But in the 1880’s there ensued a “hasty and
haphazard process of enclosure” by European powers, so says historian B. Davison (1984),
Africa in History. This process was driven by suspicion of the ambitious rivals. As a result, the
Berlin Conference of 1884 – 1885 was convened to define the broad limits of territorial
expansion of each of the European powers. In line with this policy and exercise, historians R.
Oliver and J.D. Fage (1988) in their book, A short History of Africa, wrote that “The British
sphere of interest between Botswana and the Zambezi, thus Mashonaland and Matabeleland
were allocated by the European powers to the British sphere of influence”.
Henceforth in the year (1888), the Ndebele King, Lobengula, was misled into signing the “Rudd
Concession” which effectively granted Cecil Rhodes the right to occupy Mashonaland. The
British government was eventually persuaded to grant a charter to the British South Africa
Company following Cecil John Rhodes’ presentation of Lobengula’s signature to the Rudd
Concession.
The area of present day Zimbabwe was ceded to the Company in 1891 and named “Rhodesia” in
1895. Settlers, many of who had been urban dwellers of South Africa, in search of gold,
demanded land and the labour to work it. This sparked wars with the Shona and the Matabele,
with enormous casualties. Conflict between the generally white-ruled Mashonaland and the
independent black state of Matabeleland culminated in the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893 – 1894,
which gave Matabeleland to the BSA Company’s territories.
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Consequently, the settlers helped themselves to the best land, enslaved the original inhabitants or
pushed them out into the barren and thirsty reserves. The indigenous population had to pay rents
and taxes on what remained of their land and property to the BSA Company. A loose policy of
settling aside reserves for Africans became regularised and intensified in the 1920’s. In 1922 for
instance, the settlers voted to run the country (later then Southern Rhodesia) themselves with
only limited supervision by the British government. It became a self-governing British colony
the following year.
The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 “allocated fixed Reserves – generally poor, remote and
inadequate – to the people”. The settlers then alienated the best African lands and demarcated
them as “European land”. The new settler government concentrated all its policies during the
next 30 years on the promotion of further white settlement, and built up its power and economic
predominance. Through immigration, the number of white settlers increased from 80 000 to 220
000 between 1945 and 1960. Due to this increased influx of white settlers, there was a
“wholesale forced removal of African people to make room for white farming up to the 1950’s”,
wrotes Lionel Cliffe in his article, “Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Constraints and Prospects”,
published in the book The politics of land reform in Zimbabwe edited by C. Stoneman and TAS
Bowyer-Bower. (2000). Indeed, black people continued to be forced out of their land right up to
the 1970’s. White labour was “reproduced” in the African reserves, now re-labelled “communal
areas”. Competition in the market from African smallholders was prohibited.
Special designated areas for “emergent” black farmers were first established in 1930. This was
done in response to the growing pressure for arable land by proven black farmers. Hence
successful master farmers were granted portions of land of up to 100 hectares with the intention
of developing a black yeoman class. These are now called small-scale commercial farmers.
Meanwhile, in the communal areas, enormous land pressure was building up, between 1961 and
1977 the area under cultivation increased by 70%. At the same time, the carrying capacity of the
communal areas was continuously eroded by population growth as well as the steady rise in the
size of the livestock herd. This was despite colonial measures aimed at destocking in the
communal areas. It must be noted as well that in these areas no credit or financial institutions
supported the farmers. Not until 1978 was a small farm credit scheme established and this was
too little, too late.
What was the land-holding situation at independence in 1980?

When Zimbabwe won independence in 1980, it inherited a strikingly unequal, racially distorted
agricultural system. Through a systematic process of eviction, approximately 6000 white
commercial farmers came to occupy 15,5 million hectares out of 33.2 million hectares altogether.
Small scale commercial farms took up about 1.6 million hectares and the remainder was
occupied by 750 000 black families in the communal areas. The average farm size in the large
scale commercial farms was about 3 000 hectares or 12 square miles, while that of the communal
areas was about 20 hectares. This historical imbalance in the access to and ownership of the

272
most vital resource of the country lay at the root of the causes of the liberation war of the 1970s
and constituted a central policy issue after independence.
It must be noted that the expropriation of fertile land from African farmers and their settlement in
marginal areas ensured there was an enormous difference in the quality of farmland in large scale
commercial farms (white) and the communal areas (black). Land in the best agro-ecological
zones, classified as Natural Region 1 in the Eastern Highlands, occupies only two per cent of the
total area. The highly fertile Natural Region II (NR II) occupies 15%, most of which is in the
Highveld. NRIII, occupying 19% of the land is best-suited to intensive crop and livestock
production, and maize cropping is unreliable because of high-temperatures. NRs IV and V are
suitable only for extensive livestock production in the absence of irrigation facilities.
Hence, the land in NRs I and II was dominated by the white commercial farmers at independence
in 1980. While in 1983/4 only 23,5 % of the 6.58 million hectares of this land was occupied by
communal farmers, fully 66.5% was in the large scale commercial farmers. So the best areas
were, and until 2001 – 03 remained, dominated by large scale commercial farmers.
Put differently, 750 000 African households occupied less than 50% of the agricultural land, and
75% of that land was in agro-ecological regions IV and V that is drier and less fertile. There was
therefore a keenly-felt sense of historical injustice and deprivation over the question of land, and
it was one of the most contentious issues negotiated at the Lancaster House conference.
Nationalist negotiators at the conference subsequently remarked that there had been a promise by
the UK and US to contribute significantly to land purchase in order to redress the imbalances in
land ownership. Whatever the cause might have been, that promise was not enshrined in the
independence constitution which instead contained onerous clauses on the protection of private
property, including land.
At independence land reform therefore focused on settling people on land acquired from large-
scale commercial farmers on a “willing seller, willing buyer” basis. Hence the cost of land was
relatively expensive as historian Cliffe observed;
“The independence constitution tied government’s hands by entrenching property
rights so that only under-utilised land could be compulsorily purchased and only
then by immediate payment of the full value in foreign exchange”.
There were to be no changes to clauses relating to provisions in the constitution relating to land
until 1990, and this significantly restricted the government’s room for manoeuvre on the land
question in the 1980’s. It is important to note that the “willing seller” principle ensured that
whites only sold the land that had been abandoned during the war of liberation, or else was of
poor quality, thereby denying new settlers the opportunity to establish a successful economic
sector.

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LAND RESETTLEMENT AFTER INDEPENDENCE
In 1979 the post UDI government of Prime Minister Muzorewa was persuaded, together with the
Patriotic Front (PF) i.e. ZANU and ZAPU, to join the negotiation table at Lancaster House in
London. What is important is the fact that the conference laid down British terms for the legal
independence of Southern Rhodesia, then renamed Zimbabwe. Constitutional constraints for the
next 10 years (1980 – 1990) have been noted above, but the British also promised to fund half
the cost of a resettlement scheme for black farmers.
Nevertheless, the new government of Zimbabwe in 1980 set out to acquire 8.3 million hectares
of land on which to resettle 162 000 families under Phase One of its Land Reform and
Resettlement Programme. But between 1980 and 1989 it acquired only 2,6 million hectares and
resettled only 52 000 households from the congested communal areas; 70% of these had been
resettled by 1983. According to political analyst and historian Lloyd Sachikonye, the failure to
achieve the projected settlement target was due to “resource constraints and limited political
will”. Another scholar, Neil Thomas of Cardiff University, also writing on land reform points
out that part of the reason for failure to the meet target was caused by white farmers who pegged
the most lucrative prices for their properties in line with the policy of willing buyer, willing
seller.
While the purpose of the resettlement programme was to alleviate land poverty, it was also
designed to ensure that aggregate production would not be endangered. It was heavily regulated
on over what was to be produced, how much and by what methods. Leases could be revoked
unless new settlers carried out efficient commercial farming. Well over 90% of the families
resettled were in the so-called Model A schemes, in which farmers receive small plots of around
6 – 7 hectares to cultivate, and some grazing land, often held in common with other families.
Be that as it may, the broader question pertaining to reform was still whether resettlement, no
matter how significant the numbers involved, would succeed in resolving pressures on the
congested communal areas. Population projections of the central statistical office (CSO) in 1985
estimated that by year 2000, there would be an extra 500 000 rural households against a
projected resettled 62 000 households. The conditions in the communal areas were thus bound to
deteriorate rather than be ameliorated. Llyod Sachikonye believes that this was indeed the crux
of Zimbabwe’s agrarian question, which even the latter-day massive “fast-track” programme has
not addressed adequately.
Why did the Resettlement Programme slow down, and in some cases, stall in the 1980’s and
1990’s?
The reasons for the stall in land redistribution in the mid-1980’s are complex. According to Neil
Thomas, pressures to retain the Lancaster House principle of voluntarism came from the
predominantly white Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU), the civil service and foreign donors,
including the British government and the World Bank. Such pressures took different forms. The
government was persuaded that the loss of experienced commercial farmers would drain the
economy of vital export earnings, but it was also subjected to implicit threats of the withdrawal

274
of aid. At the same time recurrent, limited balance of payments deficits and the burgeoning price
of land, persuaded them to hold back on compulsory acquisition.
However, in the 1990’s there was less urgency attached to resolving the land question. This was
perplexing in view of the earlier impetus, and the expiry of the restrictive clauses of the
Lancaster House constitution in 1990. Less than 20 000 new settlers received land between 1990
and 1997, signifying a substantial slow-down in land reform. By 1997, the total number of
resettled households amounted to 71 000 a far cry from the original target of 162 000
households. A total of 3.4 million hectares, constituting about 22% of former large scale
commercial land had been made available to those 71 000, while about 500 indigenous
commercial farmers had graduated into becoming fully-fledged commercial farmers. About 80%
of these new commercial farmers had bought land from their own resources, while the remainder
rented the government’s leasehold forms which had formerly been run by white farmers.
The official explanation for the slowdown in land reform in the 1990’s was that land acquisition
through the “willing-seller willing buyer” approach significantly limited, the scope of spatially
matching land supply with demand for resettlement (L. Sachikonye, 2003, p. 231). Land sold in
small parcels was expensive to develop for resettlement. In sum, according to this position,
scarcity of land, exorbitant prices of available land in the market and the inability of the
government to pay the prices pegged limited its capacity to achieve its reform targets in the
Zimbabwe Government official policy statement, 1998. It was estimated that by the mid- 1990’s
land prices had increased three fold since the late 1980’s and that unless the amount of land for
sale increased, it was doubtful whether the government was capable of purchasing land in
sufficient quantities to implement a new programme. Although two legal developments in the
form of a Land Acquisition Act (1992) and the 14th constitutional amendment were passed
during this period, there was still little political will and momentum for land reform. (L.
Sachikonye, 2003, p231).
In general, the political pressures for land reform in the mid- 1990’s were less intense than
before. The ZANU PF had comfortably won the 1990 and 1995 elections, sweeping about 95%
of the parliamentary seats. Despite a low turn-out, President Mugabe had been re-elected by a
wide margin in the 1996 elections. Opposition parties were fragmented and weak, and thus
unable to mount a credible challenge to the incumbent party. Until 1997, there was little
organised pressure from peasants and the landless. What must be noted is that as the
government’s ruling party entrenched itself in power then opportunities for enrichment with an
increase in corruption opened up. (L. Sachikonye, 2003, p232). The government extended its
focus on land reform so that for the first time it would also cover “the emergent black large-scale
commercial farmer” (Government of Zimbabwe – “Growth with Equity: An Economic Policy
Statement) quoted by Sachikonye, p232.
A significant development in the 1990’s was the emergence of a growing group within the ruling
elite who sought access to land ownership. The political and economic environment of
liberalization was favourable to this aspiration, which found expression in leasing of state land to
cabinet ministers, parliamentarians and judges, senior civil servants and senior army officers.
Although the majority of this elite lacked farming experience and did not derive their livelihoods
mainly from land, state land was made available to them at very low rates while the more

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pressing needs of the poor and landless were given less attention. (Sachikonye, 2003, p231).
The subsequent publicity given to the list of elite beneficiaries by member of parliament
Margaret Dongo, provoked a heated discussion about the government’s commitment (or lack of
it) to a land reform programme that would benefit the poor. Notably, 90 000 householders still
needed land in order for the land reform programme to reach its original target of 162 000
householders. The main element of this process therefore was the “embourgeoisement” through
state-facilitated access to land. Inevitably, there were strong critiques of this development, due
to both the potential for corruption or cronyism embedded in the process and the resulting
deepening of inequalities.
How did the donors view the land reform exercise, as government conducted it?
The above scenario was the immediate background against which donors began to insist on
consistent transparency in any future land reform programme. For example, an international
conference with donors organised by the Zimbabwe Government in 1988 stressed that such a
programme should be implemented “in a transparent, fair and sustainable manner, with regard to
respect for the law, and broadened stakeholders as well as beneficiary participation; and that it
should be affordable cost-effective and consistent with economic and financial reforms”.
(Communique issued at the end of the International Donors Conference on Land Reform and
Resettlement in Zimbabwe, 1998) quoted in L. Sachikonye, 2003, p232. A mission which
prepared a report a year later for the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID)
and the European Union was even more emphatic when it advised that conditions should be
attached to any future financial support as it would help to “eliminate gross abuses such as the
use of funds for the purchase of land from land owners who may have been allocated state land
under an earlier process”, (L. Sachikonye, 2003, p232). This new insistence on transparency and
accountability irked the Zimbabwe Government for this appeared as part of the broader discourse
on “good governance” which the Blair government propagated with more zeal than the
conservatives under John Major and Margaret Thatcher. Hence, while donors did not contribute
as much aid as expected the government was its worst enemy in ensuring that the land reform
moved as expeditiously as expected.
ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME (ESAP)

In 1990 Zimbabwe introduced its five year Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
(ESAP). Zimbabwe had entered the decade of the 1990’s with a large fiscal imbalance and
declining tax revenues caused by declining commodity prices. This was accompanied by virtual
stagnation of the economy and record levels of unemployment. Although billed as a home-
grown adjustment programme, ESAP needed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) support for
access to US$3,5 billion in foreign exchange for its implementation.
The first phase of ESAP began in October 1990 with an introduction of trade liberalisation which
scrapped a whole lot of import controls. However, the US$700 million which was pledged for
the first phase did not become available until March 1992. By then Zimbabwe was reeling from
a balance of payments crisis which was worsened by the drought. As a result, Zimbabwe had to
make further concessions by agreeing to more stringent IMF conditionalities.

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ESAP required the government to scale back its expenditure by imposing wage restraints,
reducing subsidies and cutting social spending. The government was also encouraged to free
trade restrictions and devalue the currency. ESAP called for a more vigorous export programme
and despite claims and views to the contrary, the negative impact of the programme has been
more than a passing phase. An IMF study across a number of countries admitted that
stabilisation measures were not working as well as they had hoped, and that their impact on
gender inequality had been particularly disastrous. Zimbabwe has not been exempt from the
negative impact that the mindless application of the ESAP has had.
ESAP led to the increase in the prices of food and other basic commodities. Cuts in government
subsidies led to sharp increases in the cost of living and health and education provision.
Currency devaluation assisted the movement of Zimbabwe from a middle income to a low
income country almost immediately after the implementation of the economic reforms. The
hardships caused by economic restructuring were compounded by a culture of political
patronage, where populist measures were implemented at the cost of more meaningful reforms.
One such decision was that of buying off the challenge to the government from war veterans.
This has been particularly costly and unpopular. Thousands of war veterans were granted lump
sum payments of Z$50 000 plus a Z$2 000 a month pension. In the summer of 2000, violent
clashes erupted between veterans and white farmers over access to land.
Public expenditure had been the driving force behind Zimbabwe’s strategy of “growth with
equity” but ESAP called into question the country’s welfare provision. The adjustment
programme had been intended to boost government revenue but it achieved the exact opposite.
According to the IMF, between the financial year 1993 and 1997, Central government revenue
fell by over 27%. The main reason for this was due to a shrinking tax base resulting from the
growth of a large informal sector.
Although in 1994/1995 health care spending amounted to 8.8% of government expenditure,
compared to 8.2% in 1990/1991, the reduced size of government expenditure had meant a
decline in real terms. Total real spending in 1994/1995 amounted to Z$386,7 million against a
figure of Z$566.8 million for 1990/1991. The absolute size of the health care sector had
continued to decline since the mid- 1990’s. Its contribution to GDP declined by an average of
5.4% each year between 1996 and 1998. Preventive health delivery systems and outreach
programmes were the hardest hit. Earnings for health workers declined by nearly 30% between
1991 and 1995. Some of this loss was, however, recovered in wage increases in 1997.
Although health workers were protected from retrenchments, reductions in Ministry of Health
and Child Welfare administration and maintenance staff reduced efficiency and may have added
to a range of other difficulties. Declining life expectancy and increased maternal deaths are
symptomatic of the reduced quality of general health. Life expectancy peaked at 61 years in
1990 and fell to 52 years in 1997 and 51 in 1998. However, after 2003 it fell further to between
29 and 33 years old. Similarly, maternal deaths increased from 73 per 100 000 in 1987 to 144
per 100 000 in 1997 (World Bank Report, 1999).
Between 1990 and 1993 maternity fees in Harare were raised from Z$150 to Z$500. The biggest
jump in costs came between December 1993 and March 1994, when the burden of
comprehensive care jumped by a 164% for the average family. The average wage in the urban
277
areas at that time was about Z$300 a month, thus placing the benefits that accrued from
maternity care beyond the reach of a large number of people. Clearly, it was women who had
most to lose from changes in the health care system, not just because of maternity- associated
issues but also because of general ailments arising from under-nourishment and overwork.
The acts in health care, which resulted from ESAP, could not have come at any other worse time,
especially in light of Zimbabwe’s AIDS crisis. It is estimated by the Ministry of Health that in
1996 some 300 people a week were dying from AIDS related diseases.
INFLATION
Inflation was one of the most persistent problems since ESAP was launched. The down-ward
spiral in the exchange rate e.g. 75% decline in 1997 alone, significantly fuelled inflation. The
composite consumer price index (CPI) has risen by a factor of 4 between the start of ESAP in
1990 and December 1996. Between 1991 and 1996 the price of food more than trebled. Within
the first six months of ESAP the price of grain increased by 60%. In January 1998, the price of
maize increased by 21% compared with two earlier price increases in the preceding year alone.
In September 1998 the price of food and other basic commodities rose by another 40%. This
was followed by a 24% rise in the period up to January 1999.
What this scenario clearly shows is that ESAP meant more than good to the ordinary man in
Zimbabwe. Salaries and wages did not rise concomitantly with the price hikes which reflected
the decline in the value of the currency. Many companies shrank or closed altogether,
retrenching thousands of workers. As already noted above, ESAP was a desperate economic
policy which was meant to rescue the economy from imminent collapse. However, it led to more
economic woes.
Again, in response to a desperate situation, the government introduced policies which were
meant to cushion the ordinary consumers. Prices of basic commodities were gazetted and could
only be reviewed upwards at the discretion of the government. These measures came in place
after 2000 as IMF funds dried up. These produced included cooking oil, mealie- meal. The
impact of such measures was even more disastrous. First, a parallel but higher and more realistic
price peg was introduced by dealers on the parallel market, or “black market”. Next, shortages
of the gazetted as well as any other products became the order of the day. Shelves got empty as
products were secretly hoarded, fuel stations got dried up and the situation got more and crazier
as hyper-inflation set in after the 2008 election re-run.
Therefore ESAP was far from successful. Its targets for growth and development were missed
by huge margins and real wages fell by about 30% since its implementation in the early 1990’s.
The exclusive focus, on exporting primary products, to an increasingly hostile international
economy, that was bogged down in recession, did not generate internal economic growth in
Zimbabwe.
Furthermore, Zimbabwe had very little control over the international prices of the primary
commodities which plunged to historic lows during the 1990’s. Consequently, formal sector
employment declined and public services in health, education, and housing were cut deeply
278
thereby worsening the plight of the urban poor, and making it extremely difficult for them to
meet their basic needs. The deteriorating macro-economic climate, induced in part by the
structural adjustment programmes, eroded the limited gains which the World Bank had helped
achieve in urban housing for the low and medium income groups.
Moreover, the emphasis on the reduction or elimination of public sector spending in health,
education and housing failed to produce alternatives for addressing the needs of those on the
economic margins of the Zimbabwean society. In fact, ESAP’s budget downsizing was always
done in a way that affected the poorest, whether it was in Zimbabwe or anywhere in the Third
World.
How did the ruling elite worsen the negative impact of ESAP?
Cases of corruption and embezzlement of public funds surfaced as the general population sank
deeper into poverty. For instance, in March 1997, a major national scandal erupted when it was
discovered that Z$450 billion were ‘missing’ from the War Victims Compensation Fund, which
was set aside to compensate ex-combatants for injuries suffered during the Liberation War.
President Mugabe appointed a judicial commission of inquiry chaired by Justice Godfrey
Chidyausiku. The Commission revealed that senior officials in the political and military wings
of government including the late First Lady’s brother, had appropriated the funds. The powerful
Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association under the leadership of Chenjerai
Hunzvi staged mass demonstrations from June through July 1997, meeting with and finally
compelling Mugabe to agree to a lump sum payment of Z$50 000 to all ex-combatants who
fought in the national liberation struggle plus Z$2000 monthly allowance as pension.
Since many of these ex-combatants populate the military and police forces, Mugabe agreed to
these demands without consulting his cabinet or parliament, putting additional stress on the
country’s already weak economy. Furthermore, Mugabe announced that 1480 mostly white-
owned farms would be seized, and 20% of that land would be given to the War Veterans. On 14
November, the day also known as “Black Friday”, Mugabe’s unbudgeted Z$4 billion settlement
with the War Veterans resulted in the collapse of the Zimbabwean dollar, which fell by 75% in
just a few hours. Interest rates were increased by 6% in the course of the month, as were sales
taxes on petrol in order to help cover the costs of this scheme.
The above events no doubt sent a vicious wave of hardships towards the urban and rural poor.
For instance, Building Societies froze mortgage lendings because the economic environment was
now harsh. Given the absence of a public sector housing scheme/programme in Zimbabwe due
to the factors discussed above, the urban poor were forced to rely on their own meagre resources
once again to house themselves.
The poor, experienced additional hardships, because, of the Structural Adjustment programmes
and price hikes in the aftermath of Black Friday. Their massive and violent demonstration over
rising food prices in Harare in January 1998 left nine dead, hundreds injured and caused over
Z$70 million in damage.

279
The contempt of the ruling elites on the plight of the poor was demonstrated further by the fact
that during the same week, the government announced that it had spent some Z$60 million on
fifty new Mercedes Benz automobiles for twenty-six cabinet ministers and two vice presidents.
Worse still, instead of committing resources, to the provision of basic needs of the
Zimbabweans, the government committed troops to a foreign war in the Democratic Republic of
Congo at a cost of nearly US$I million a day.
With respect to low-income housing in particular, about Z$3 million from the National Housing
Fund and the National Housing Guarantee Fund were “borrowed” by Mugabe’s wife, Grace, in
order to build herself a 32 roomed house with three servant cottages in a rich suburb of Harare in
1998 (Edward Ramsamy – “The World Bank and Urban Programmes in Zimbabwe : A Critical
Appraisal, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 33 No. 109, p520). Nick-named
“Graceland”, the house was hardly used because the First Lady “changed here mind about living
so far away from the city centre”, E. Ramsamy, 2006, p520.
Hence, it was not merely the fact that ESAP and the World Bank’s programmes were unpopular,
the negative effects and suffering were worsened by institutionalised corruption within the ruling
elite. Post-independence history is somewhat difficult to document because most of the available
research work goes up to 2006, yet the economic blizzard actually unfolded after 2008. Some
historians feel rather nervous to open such files because real balanced analysis may be difficult
to present for obvious reasons.
The Second Phase of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme.

After the expiration of the Lancaster House agreement in 1990 the government amended the
constitution to allow for compulsory acquisition of land with “little compensation and limited
rights of appeal to the courts”. There followed in 1991 a Land Acquisition Act to facilitate the
purchase of farms. Mugabe decided that perhaps 50% of remaining commercial farming areas
would be purchased for resettlement. However, for reasons noted above, very little land
redistribution actually occurred.
Finally in 1997 the government decided to act. It launched the second phase of the Land Reform
and Resettlement Programme (LRRP2) based on compulsory acquisition, but with compensation.
It identified a number of farms for acquisition based on criteria spelt out in the 1990 Land Policy
statement. These were: where farmers owned more than one farm; the farmer is absentee; the
farm is derelict or underutilised; or borders on a communal area.
On the question of compensation, at the 1997 Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference,
President Mugabe urged the UK to compensate white farmers for the land they were to lose. In
November 1997 the government published a notice of intention to compulsorily acquire 926
commercial farms. This notice was valid for 12 months. All except 85 were legally contested,
on a variety of grounds. In September 1998, as noted earlier, the government convened an
International Donors Conference to mobilise support for the programme, and Mugabe again
asked donors to compensate dispossessed white farmers.

280
In November 1998 – 12 months after the preliminary notice, the government issued orders for
926 farms. Although this did not lead to actual dispossession, donors were upset, as this was
thought to conflict with the “spirit” of the conference. Although the compulsory acquisition of
land was not specifically prescribed by donors, it had clearly been hoped that their promise of
financial support would slow the process down.
How and why did the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme begin?
It has been noted earlier on that the rate of land transfer under LRRP2 was painfully slow, and
led to 15 major land invasions in 1997 and 1998. Occupations by war veterans began on a small
scale in 1999, but lessened after government assurances that resettlement would be speeded up.
But in February 2000 a draft constitution, which included a clause to make compulsory
acquisition easier was rejected in a national referendum. The referendum defeat together with
the withdrawal of several contested farms from the legal process angered the war veterans still
further. But the fact that between the Donors Conference in 1998 and March 2000 a mere 90
000 hectares of land were acquired for resettlement, a rate just 7% of the planned one million
hectares a year, was the real motivation behind the massive occupations from February 2000.
Donors had made their support for LRRP2 conditional on “continuous consultation, transparency
and adherence to the law”. But on the crucial question of whether they would tolerate the
compulsory acquisition of land, their language was arcane and their position impenetrable.
Throughout 1999, the government, constrained by IMF threats to withhold loans vacillated and
contradicted itself over this question. At the same time the process of judging the legality of land
acquisition was interminable and ensured once again that very little was redistributed.
However, despite the referendum defeat, the government still amended its constitution on 6 April
2000, giving it the right to acquire commercial farms. A few weeks later the government sent
here three Ministers to London to request British funding. They returned empty-handed and in
May 2000 a change of the law was announced to allow the confiscation of land. This was the
start of the government’s “Fast Track Land Resettlement (FTLR) Programme”.
Why was the FTLR Programme executed so intensely as from May 2000 onwards?
The timing of the FTLR Programme leaves no doubt in anyone’s mind that issues of political
mileage must have been seriously at stake then. The Movement for Democratic Change, a newly
formed but vibrant party seemed poised to win the parliamentary elections set for the following
month. It came therefore as no surprise that ZANU PF narrowly won the parliamentary elections
in that election. Its support being concentrated in the rural areas where the land policy would
have the most appeal, assured the party of a narrow victory. Joseph Musika on 15 July 2000 in
fact stated that “Having realised that donors and some stakeholders such as the CFU were not
genuinely interested in assisting government undertake a successful land reform and resettlement
programme . . . government is determined to go it alone using its own limited resources to settle
people”.

281
Consequently, on 31 July 2000 they announced that 2237 farms would be added to the 804
originally planned, without compensation, to be distributed, “to the landless”. According to
Lupiya and Hakata (2001), 80 000 families were resettled on 2.5 million hectares of
compulsorily acquired land between June and December 2000. A further 2.5 million hectares
were planned to be resettled by the end of 2001. Mugabe’s press secretary, George Charamba,
argued that legal hardness and the explosion in land prices ruled out any other approach to land
reform.
Furthermore, an input loan scheme of US16 million was established for the farmers before the
start of the rainy season in November 2000. After a number of European governments had
suspended aid Mugabe allocated a further US21 million at the end of 2000 to finance
resettlement. A further list of 2030 farms was gazetted for acquisition without compensation on
June 2001.
Applications for resettlement in 2001 were so great that the authorities had to take over more
white-owned farms and cut down on the size of the plots. According to the World Food
Programme (WFP) the area planted to maize increased by 14% in 2001 “mainly due to
expansions in the communal and resettlement areas”.
In January 2002, 4874 commercial farms, covering 9.23 million hectares were listed for
acquisition. But from January through April there followed the most severe drought in 20 years.
In late January the first consignment of WFP food aid arrived. Nevertheless, despite suspicions
that the programme was merely an electoral ploy, Mugabe immediately pledged the acceleration
of land reform on his re-election as President in March 2002.
In August 2000 Mugabe declared that the “Fast-track resettlement Programme is now over and
the government is now concentrating on making the new farmers productive” White farmers
would continue to own land but not large properties or multiple farms. Resettled black
commercial farmers were expected to take up land immediately, in time for the rains.
In his 2003 national budget statement in November 2002 Finance Minister Herbert Murerwa
announced a series of tax incentives for lending to new farmers. The government also
introduced soft financial schemes for inputs like seed and fertilizer. But it was hampered by
growing international sanctions. International credit lines were all, except one, cut, resulting in
severe difficulties in sourcing foreign exchange.
By the end of 2002 the resettlement scheme based on Model A was virtually completed with a
100% uptake in all the ten provinces. Government figures showed that 210 520 families had
been resettled on 3159 farms totalling 7,43 million hectares. However, a parallel resettlement
programme to stimulate competition within the commercial farming sector had “triggered the
fiercest resistance from organised white landed interest”.
Hence, as from April 2003, the FTLR programme was very advanced, although at this moment
reliable and consistent data seem to be unavailable. Large scale commercial farming was
disrupted, while small-scale farming was impeded by the relative absence of support, and much
by a combination of sanctions and a domestic economy in crisis. This critical situation was
compounded by a long-lasting and terrible drought.

282
IMPACT OF THE FTLR PROGRAMME

The political dimension of the post-referendum situation no doubt spurred an increased role for
the ‘war veterans’ under their leader, Chenjerai Hunzvi, who began to launch “land occupations”
(or land invasions as they were termed) from February 2000 onwards. Those land occupations
were accompanied by considerable violence and disorder which the police largely condoned,
presumably as a result of ‘political instruction’
In spite of the land orders issued to the ‘land invaders’ to vacate and allow for a more orderly
distribution, the occupants continued up to and after the 2000 election. More than 150 people,
including farm workers as well as 13 white commercial farmers, were killed, thousands of others
injured and displaced as a consequence of the orchestrated violence.
Worse still, the land occupiers consisted of war veterans, peasants, youth mostly belonging to
ZANU PF, but also members of the elite including the army and police officers and politicians.
There was now no clear selection criteria; it was more of a “free for all” reform programme.
It must be emphasised that the ‘fast track’ programme was much more wide ranging than
originally planned. The target actually increased by 11.4 million ha and the average farm size
ranged between 39 and 45 hectares, and in October 2002 the Lands Minister, Joseph Made,
announced that about 300 000 families had been settled under the A1 model. By the time of the
presidential election in March 2002, the ‘fast track’ programme had, by far, exceeded its original
target/objective of land redistribution. This had two negative results: first, we have already noted
above that this was at an enormous cost in terms of intimidation, violence, displacement,
lawlessness and disruption to production.
Secondly, the fact that the resettlement programme, (resettling 300 000 families) had taken place,
in such a short space of time, posed, a staggering financial burden. According to the United
Nations Development Programme, UNDP’s perspective, the programme was not likely to be
viable and sustainable. It argued that “The economic consequences of trying to implement such
a large programme, without considerably extending the time-frame would be negative because of
the resources it would drain from the government budget and private capital”. The massive cost
was indeed confirmed by the Minister of Agriculture, Joseph Made, who estimated that US$3
billion (up from US$1,9 billion) would be required for infrastructure and credit over a 5 year
period. (Herald, 28 March 2002). According to this perspective, the land reform process was
therefore riddled with problems which could potentially derail it. (L. Sachikonye, 2003, p236).
Furthermore, the land reform programme, especially the A1 scheme was really intended to
benefit the poor, the landless as well as relieving the unbearable land pressure in the communal
lands. Hence, it was supposed to recognise the complex social, gender and citizen issues, not
only in the communal lands, but even among the farm workers as well since these needed to be
prioritized in land redistribution. However, there was no systematic consideration of the social
or class interests involved in the reform process. Yes, the A1 model of resettlement largely
benefited the poor, but what was disturbing to note was that some beneficiaries were people in
the urban areas, including those in gainful, full-time employment.
Moreover, while female-headed households constitute about 35 per cent of all households in
Zimbabwe, those resettled constituted only about 16 per cent. This outcome may be because the

283
reform has been state-driven “from above”. Such a scenario, no doubt complicated and
postponed a holistic approach to the land question in Zimbabwe.
As far as the A2 model is concerned, it is clear that well-connected members of the ruling elite
took advantage of the scheme and thereby acquired commercial farms at “a song”, although the
model was meant to accommodate those with farming skills, experience and start-up capital. (L.
Sachikonye, 2003, p236). There was growing published evidence that the ruling elite had
allocated to itself some of the best land. (Daily News, 6 September 2002). Newspapers were
awash with stories of a frantic scramble for such land by Cabinet Ministers, Governors, senior
army officers, police officers, top civil servants, war veterans and others connected to this elite.
Members of the elite had become privileged through patronage or clientelism and benefited in a
process that should have been largely aimed at poverty reduction through de-congestion of
communal areas. As white farmers left for neighbouring countries or relocated to urban centres,
the ruling elite got its cut from the land reform. The sharing of spoils allowed for “instant
accumulation” with state backing, and beneficiaries were now more likely to be former members
of Zanu PF than the opposition movement which advocated transparency in the land reform
process! (L. Sachikonye, 2003, p236). However, it remains doubtful whether this increased
number of “part-time” and “cell-phone” farmers would keep the newly acquired farms
sufficiently productive to maintain the sector’s contribution to GDP growth, food security and
foreign exchange earnings. (L. Sachikonye, 2003, p236).
(1) How effectively has the Zimbabwean government solved the economic and political
problems it faced between 1980 and 1991?
(2) To what extent can Zimbabwe’s land Reform Programme since 1991 be explained in
political rather than economic terms?
3) How valid is the claim that Zimbabwe foreign policy between 1985 -2000 aimed at
maintaining the strangleholds of former nationalist movements in power
4) evaluate the Relative success of the Zimbabwean government from 1980- 2000.
5) The unity accord of 1987 ushered in a new political dispensation in Zimbabwe.” Discuss
the validity of this statement.
6) How valid is the claim that Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown of 2000-9 was a result of
the formation of the new political parties in the country?
7) “Zimbabwe shall never be a colony again” Discuss the truth of this statement with
reference to political developments in Zimbabwe.
8) To what extent has the post Independence governments addressed the Land question

284
9 To what extent has the failure in the reform process after independence been blamed on
external forces.
REFERENCES
1. Breaking Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the disturbances in Matabeleland and the
Midlands, 1980 to 1988, published in 1997 by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in
conjunction with the Legal Resources Foundation.
2. Re-building Zimbabwe: Achievements, Problems and Prospects. Harare : Mardon Printers for ZANU
(PF) Department of the Commissariat and Culture, 1986.
3. Richard Saunders - Never the same Again: Zimbabwe’s Growth towards Democracy
1980 - 2000. Edmia Spicer Productions, 2000.
4. L.M. Sachikonye: “Whither Zimbabwe? Crisis and Democratisation in Zimbabwe” in

Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 29, No. 91, March 2002.
5. Tony Rich: “Zimbabwe – Only Teething Troubles? In The World Today, Vol. 39, No. 12,
1983.
6. Lionel Cliffe: “Zimbabwe’s Agricultural success and Food Security in Southern Africa”
Review of African Political Economy No. 43, 1988, pp 4 – 25.
7. Lionel Cliffe: “The Conservation Issue in Zimbabwe”

Review of African Political Economy, No 42, 1988, pp 48 – 58.
8. Sarah Bracking: “Structural Adjustment: Why it Wasn’t Necessary and Why it did Work”
Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 26, No. 80, pp 207 – 226. June 1999.
9. Rupak Chattopadhhyay: “Zimbabwe: Structural Adjustment Destitution and Food

Insecurity” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 27, No. 84, 2000, p 307
285
– 316.
10. Edward Ramsay: “The World Bank and Urban Programmes in Zimbabwe, A Critical
Appraisal”: Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 33, No. 109, Sep. 2006,
p. 515 – 523.
11. Lloyd M. Sachikonye: “From Growth with Equity to Fast- Track Reform: Zimbabwe’s
Land Question” in Review of African Political Economy Vol. 30, No 96, June
2003, pp. 227 – 240.
12. Neil Thomas: “Land Reform in Zimbabwe” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 4, Aug
2003, pp 691 – 712.
13. James Muzondidya “Jambanja : Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and
Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe” Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol.
33, No. 2, June 2007, pp225 – 341.
14. Sam Moyo et al “Land Reform and Changing Social Relations for Farm Workers in
Zimbabwe” in Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 27, No. 84, 2000.

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1

‘A’ LEVEL ZIMBABWEAN

Turn-up College “A” Level Zimbabwean History Page 1

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ISBN 978 0 7974 4541 3

Turn-up College “A” Level Zimbabwean History Page 2

Copyright © 2010 by Turn-Up College

Turn-up College “A” Level Zimbabwean History Page 3

Turn-up College “A” Level Zimbabwean History Page 4

PRE HISTORY TO 1450 ........................................................................... 21

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................. 21

THE LATE STONE AGE CULTURES OF ZIMBABWE ........................ 30

THE IRON AGE CULTURES OF ZIMBABWE .................................................. 39

Turn-up College “A” Level Zimbabwean History Page 5

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................. 39

THE GREAT ZIMBABWE STATE .......................................................... 53

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................. 53

THE RISE OF THE MUTAPA DYNASTY, DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

AND ORAL TRADITIONS (CASE STUDY ON SOURCES) .................. 61

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................. 61

THE MUTAPA STATE ............................................................................ 73

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................. 73

THE TORWA STATE: BEFORE 1650 ..................................................... 86

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES: ............................................................................................................................. 86

THE ROZVI EMPIRE..................................................................................... 95

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................. 95

THE NDEBELE STATE UNDER MZILIKAZI ...................................... 107

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 107

Turn-up College “A” Level Zimbabwean History Page 7

Examination Type Questions ................................................................................................................. 115

Christian Missionary Activities and their effects in Pre-Colonial Zimbabwe:116

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 116

THE COLONISATION OF ZIMBABWE ............................................... 126

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 126

COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA 1898-1963135

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 135

Turn-up College “A” Level Zimbabwean History Page 8

THE SHONA NDEBELE UPRAISING 1896-7 ...................................... 142

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 142

AFRICAN RESPONSES AND RESISTANCE: 1898- 1923- T.O RANGER157

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 157

COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA........... 173

CHAPTER OBEJCTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 173

PRE-COLONIAL MINING ..................................................................... 195

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 195

Turn-up College “A” Level Zimbabwean History Page 9

Background ............................................................................................................................................ 195

THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND .................. 215

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 215

THE RHODESIAN FRONT AND THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 221

Turn-up College “A” Level Zimbabwean History Page 10

THE RISE OF EARLY MASS NATIONALISM IN RHODESIA: 1950 – 1965

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 234

THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN ZIMBABWE (1966-1979) ..................... 245

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 245

ZIMBABWE AFTER INDEPENDENCE .......................................................... 252

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS ............................. 252

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 252