U. S.

NAVAL AVIATION
in the
PACIFIC

I
Issued by
The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
UNITED STATES NAVY
1947
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
CHAPTER I
Mission and O r g a n i z a t i o n of Naval Aviation 1

CHAPTER II
Components and Weapons of Naval Aviation

CHAPTER III
Special Aspects of the Air War. . . . . . . . 9

CHAPTER IV
The Japanese Offensive-Pearl Harbor to Midway.

CHAPTER V
Offensive-Defensive—Guadalcanal to Bougainville. . . . . . . . 25

CHAPTER VI
The United States Offensive--Tarawa to Tokyo. . . . . . . . . 29

CHAPTER VII
Tactical Effectiveness of Naval Aviation. 43

CHAPTER VIII
Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
PREFACE
The purpose of this review, which was prepared by officers on duty in the Opera-
tions Division, including Air Combat Intelligence officers with extensive service in the
Pacific, is to analyze the relation between air and sea power. It is based upon the
experience of naval aviation in the war against Japan as recorded in the files of the
Navy Department. Reports of the United States Strategic Bombing: Survey have also
been consulted and the chart of the progress o f the war has been taken from one
of them.
The danger inherent in any report confined to one aspect of the war is that it
may mislead the reader into forgetting that the conflict was won by a combination
of ground, naval, and air forces, each of which carried its share of the common
burden. All operated within the framework of strategic plans, and it is the aim of
this analysis to show how naval aviation fulfilled its part of those plans.
Since it is from the lessons of experience that plans for the future must be
derived, the report is presented in the hope that it will prove of some value to those
responsible for thc future security of the United States.

FORREST SHERMAN,
Vice Admiral, U. S. N.,
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

v
FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE
I MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL AVIATION

The wartime mission of the Navy is control of Allied campaign based on sea power and on air
the sea. Twice in the twentieth century the power supported by water-borne transport.
United States Navy has accomplished this mis- The activities of the Navy had no other pur-
sion with enemies overseas. Each time it has pose than to obtain or maintain control of the
been able to move troops, equipment, and sup- sea. First, it was the function of the Navy to
plies wherever it desired and to draw vital raw destroy enemy submarines, war vessels. and air-
materials from all over the globe. Although craft by any means, including the capture or
complete destruction of enemy naval units was destruction of the bases from which they oper-
not possible, and although areas close to hostile ated. Second, the Navy sought either to sink
shores remained under enemy control, such su- and capture or to contain in port the enemy’s
premacy was attained as to permit United States merchant vessels so as to deprive him of raw ma-
and Allied forces freedom of movement and to terials and to prevent him from transporting his
deny the same faculty to the enemy as well as to troops and supplies. Third, the Navy protected
cut him off from strategic resources. its own and Allied ships engaged in carrying
In two wars with Germany this meant mainte- men, equipment, and raw materials. Fourth, if
nance of an effective blockade and holding the the accomplishment of other objectives required
submarine menace within bounds. Against Ja- it, the Navy by amphibious landings seized and
pan the naval war was vastly more complex and developed advanced bases. Fifth, when offen-
difficult because in the opening stages Japan sive land operations were made against hostile
gained control of the Western Pacific in the area shores, the Navy provided transportation for
north of Australia from the Indian Ocean to the troops and equipment and supported landing
Gilbert Islands. When the Japanese failed at forces until a bridgehead sufficient for the oper-
the Battle of the Coral Sea to extend their sway ation of land-based air and artillery had been
southward and at the Battle of Midway to extend established; and the Navy continued to assure
it to the Eastern Pacific, they, in effect, lost the the safe arrival of ships with supplies and re-
war. Behind the shield of sea power the United placements. Sixth, the Navy rendered enemy
States built the ships, planes, and equipment; it garrisons on bypassed islands ineffective by cut-
trained the land sea, and air forces that ulti- ting off supplies and bombarding installations
mately beat down the enemy’s navy, drove him and prevented the removal of personnel to other
from strategic bases, cut off his supplies of raw theaters. Seventh, the Navy furnished the
materials, and placed Allied forces in position necessary facilities for the logistical support of
to launch final air and amphibious offensives its own units. Eighth, the Navy provided for
against his homeland. Having lost control of the collection of intelligence, the rescue of per-
the sea and of the air, the Japanese found them- sonnel, and such other services as needed to keep
selves open to mass bombing and unable to re- it operating efficiently.
place their nearly exhausted supplies of fuel and In all these activities aviation played a part
industrial materials. Rather than wait for the and in none did it have an independent role.
inevitable defeat on land, they surrendered—an For example, the destruction of enemy sub-
eloquent testimonial to the effectiveness of the marines was accomplished by surface vessels,
1
aircraft,
f and friendly submarines. Enemy war of the over-all task. the entire force could be
and merchant vessels were attacked by surface reorganized and a new task given it. The es-
ships, aircraft, and submarines operating either sence of the system was integration and flexibil -
-
independently or in cooperation. Aircraft were ity which permitted the maximum efficiency in
shot down either by other aircraft or ships’ gun- the assignment of all components, including
fire. Accuratee information on enemy move- aviation.
ments came from patrolling aircraft, submarines, The task-force system assumed that all units
and surface vessels. Amphibious operations re- of a given type were similar in equipment and
quired close support of ground troops both by training. An analogy to the formation of a task
plane and nava 1 gunfire, and the neutralization force may be found in building with prefabri-
of bypassed islands was accomplished through cated units. Just as in any piece of construc-
air and surface bombardment. In the course of tion a definite number of units of specified design
a campaign—sometimes during a single day— are required, so a task force was composed of
naval units carried out two or more of these ships, aircraft, and ground troops each in suf-
operations in rapid succession. The same car-- ficient number for the mission assigned.
rier whose planes supported ground troops might To assure uniformity was the function of type
attack enemy fleet units, search out a hostile sub- commands of which there was one for each kind
marine, or intercept an enemy air raid. of ship. Prior to the war the situation in avia-
Naval aviation had no separate mission and tion was not so simple. Combat units were di-
no separate operational organization. It was an vided into two categories—carrier and patrol
integral part of the naval forces contributing to planes. Utility planes were organized sepa-
the control of the sea in cooperation with surface rately, and battleship and cruiser aircraft came
vessels, submarines, and Marine ground troops. under the type commanders for the respective
For operations aviation units were assigned to classes of ships. In the Pacific theater a single
task forces. The naval task force was simply type command was established on 1 September
an assemblage of naval units of the right type 1942, and given the title of Air Force, United
and in sufficient numbers for the accomplishment States Pacific Fleet. This command provided a
of an assigned task. Such a force could em- permanent administrative organization for the
phasize whatever element was best suited to carry handling of aviation personnel, equipment, and
out its mission and might well have consisted of ships. It received planes from the Bureau of
carriers with supporting surface vessels or it Aeronautics and men from the aviation-training
might have been a force built around heavy bat- commands and assigned them to squadrons, pro-
tleships with the necessary air support. In am- vided for squadron training and the shakedown
phibious operations all elements supported the of ships, and saw that all units were maintained
landing troops who became the primary respon- in a state of combat readiness. Although utility
sibility. A task force was customarily composed squadrons and battleship and cruiser aviation
of numbered task groups which were further sub- remained administratively apart from the type
divided into task units and so on right down to command, both depended upon it for logistical
the individual aircraft squadron or ship, which and material support. The Atlantic Fleet
also received a task designation. A group, unit, adopted a similar organization on 1 January
ship, or squadron might be withdrawn at any 1943. The uniformity of training and equip-
time that it had fulfilled its task and be reas- ment and the administrative stability assured by
signed to another mission. With the completion the type commands guaranteed to the task-force

2
commander that a unit assigned would be of a always under the direct command of aviators.
known size and capable of the predetermined When an operation was expected to be conducted
kind of operation for which it had been trained. largely through the air. i. e., a series of raids
For purposes of command the system pro- by a fast-carrier task force, the Commander was
vided admirably for all types including avia- a naval aviator. In support of a landing the
tion. Commander Air Force, United States Pa- same carriers would be integrated into a task
. . .
cific Fleet, was a nava l aviator who had charge force under an amphibious-force commander
of technical matters pertaining to aviation and whO indicated the part that aircraft should play
served as advisor to the Commander in Chief of and issued orders which were then carried out
the Pacific Fleet. In operations air units were by the air units under direct control of aviators.

3
A HELLCAT EAGER FOR BATTLE
A Carrier Strike Is Launched
II COMPONENTS AND WEAPONS OF NAVAL AVIATION

Both combat and noncombat activities were cruisers, and 12 to 20 destroyers, all under a
carried on by naval aviation. The first included single command. Two to five task groups com-
carrier, Marine, and patrol aviation and two posed a fast-carrier task force, such as Task
lesser types: battleship and cruiser aviation, con- Force 58. The fast-carrier task force which
sisting of small seaplanes used primarily to di- made the first assault on the Philippines in Sep-
rect ships' gunfire and coastal-patrol aviation tember 1944 had 730 planes; for the Leyte land-
employing small land and seaplanes to protect ings a month later, 1,060; and for the Tokyo
port areas and coastal convoys against submarine raid of February 1945, 1,220.
attack. Noncombat functions were performed Escort carriers provided air and antisub-
by utility squadrons and the Naval Air Trans- marine defense of invasion convoys and beach-
portation Service. In addition, the Coast Guard head areas and close support of invasion troops
operated as part of the Navy during the war, until such time as these functions could be taken
and its air units were employed in antisubmarine over by shore-based aircraft. The carriers
warfare and air-sea rescue work. themselves were smaller, slower ships of about
30-plane capacity, on which were based squad-
Carrier Aviation rons of fighters and torpedo bombers. In am-
phibious operations escort carriers were nor-
Carrier aviation may be considered in three mally employed in formations of 4 to 7 carriers
parts: the fast-carrier striking forces, the escort- with 6 to 12 destroyers and destroyer escorts.
carrier forces, and Marine-carrier aviation. but single carriers with fewer escorts were used
The functions performed by the fast carriers for specialized antisubmarine or convoy-escort
included offense, defense, and reconnaissancc operations. The invasion of Leyte was Sup-
against enemy aircraft, warships, merchant ves- ported by a task group of 18 escort carriers in 3
sels, and beachhead targets. They were prima- task units with a total of 500 planes. The group
rily an offensive weapon used to gain control of for the Lingayen landings had the same number
vast sea areas and to destroy enemy forces which of carriers but was divided into a larger number
threatened friendly fleet or amphibious opera - of units with a total of 570 planes.
tions. These functions required mobility, flexi- Marine-carrier aviation was of two kinds. In
bility, aerial power, and defensive armament. the first place, the marines were expected to act
The fast carriers included both large, fast, as a reserve for naval aviation, and, although
100-plane carriers and light, equally fast: 33- this function was not exercised in the early part
-
plane carriers. Fighter, dive-bomber and tor- of the war, a few Marine Corps pilots were
pedo-bomber squadrons were organized in car- aboard an escort carrier off Attu in May 1943,
rier air groups and trained to operate together and, beginning in December 1944, a number of
as coordinated striking units. Specialized Marine fighter squadrons were used on the fast
night-fighter aircraft and high-speed photo- carriers. In the second place, during the same
graphic planes also flew-from fast carriers. year, the decision was made to employ marines
Fast carriers were normally operated in task from escort carriers in support of amphibious
groups of 3 to 5 carriers, 4 to 6 battleships and operations, and the first two such carriers were
5
present during the Okinawa campaign in the Europe, had insuficient planes available for the
spring of 1945. Training and techniques were Pacific theater. Such a substitution was in ac-
identical with those employed by Navy squad- cord with the agreement of 1935 between the
rons engaged in the same sort of work. Army and Navy which specified that when
The aircraft used in carrier aviation were of needed each service would operate in lieu of
three major types. Designed primarily for the other. Similarly Marine air units supported
combat with enemy aircraft, fighter planes Army ground troops on Guadalcanal and in the
equipped with machine guns, bombs, and rockets Philippines, where they won the highest praise
were also employed as offensive weapons against of Army officers. As an extension of its work
ships and land targets. Dive bombers partici- as a garrison air force. Marine aviation con-
pated in coordinated attacks with fighters and ducted numerous raids on enemy installations at
torpedo plane and were the most accurate of all New Britain and in the islands of the Central
bombers. Torpedo planes made torpedo attacks Pacific to prevent by-passed Japanese garrisons
only occasionally and were more often used as from interfering with Allied communications.
versatile light bombers capable of carrying a ton While engaged in their many activities, shore-
of bombs plus rockets. Because of their inher- based Marine squadrons shot down over 1,900
ent characteristics, they proved valuable for Japanese planes.
short-range search and sea patrol particularly Because of their position as a fleet reserve, the
against submarines. Marines used the same types of aircraft as the
Navy and received similar training with in-
Marine Aviation creased emphasis on close air support. The as-
sumption of garrison air force duties resulted in
Marine aviation was organized administra- the addition to Marine plane types of a two-
tively as part of the Marine Corps. The basic engined bomber, the Mitchell (Army B-25,
unit was the squadron of 12 to 32 planes, 2 or Navy PBJ), which was employed for search and
more of which constituted a group. Likewise 2 interdiction.
or more groups with headquarters and service
units made up a wing. Although it was orig- Patrol Aviation
inally planned that each division of ground
troops should have a supporting wing bearing the Patrol aviation had as its basic function to
same number, the exigencies of war made it im- discover and report the location, nature, and
possilbe to carry out this scheme, and Marine movements of enemy forces. By a natural ex-
aircraft, like all others, were assigned where tension this came to include photographic mis-
they were most needed. For logistical and ma- sions against enemy installations in advance of
terial support, Marine air units depended upon carrier and amphibious operations. Whenever
naval commands. it was possible and would not interfere with the
Besides its carrier functions, Marine aviation basic reconnaissance duty, patrol planes attacked
served ashore both in support of Marine ground enemy shipping. This was especially successful
troops and as a garrison air force to protect bases against unescorted surface vessels and sub-
and other installations. Although the latter was marines. In the Atlantic, and to a lesser degree
more properly the task of the Army, the marines in the Pacific, antisubmarine warfare became a
took it over because the Army Air Forces, con- highly specialized activity that called for inten-
centrating on the primary strategic objective in sive training and complicated equipment. Pa-

6
trol aviation also acquired many other miscel- organization, Fleet Air Wings acquired opera-
laneous functions including air-sea rescue, mine- tional as well as administrative and logistical
laying, defensive patrols around surface forces functions and were closely integrated with other
far at sea, and diversionary, harassing attacks elements of the fleet.
against enemy bases and islands.
Prior to the war the Navy depended upon Noncombat Aviation
large flying boats for patrol work. All these
aircraft were distinguished for range, relatively Created immediately after the outbreak of
slow speed, and light armament. Since flying war in the Pacific, the Naval Air Transport Serv-
boats could be based upon tenders anchored in ice adapted the methods of commercial air lines
harbors, sheltered coves, and open sea, they pos- to meet the demands of the Navy’s forces the
sessed great mobility and were employed in ad- world over. Familiarly known as NATS, it
vance positions before the capture or construc- played a major role in the Pacific War. The
tion of airfields was possible. Between 1939 cargoes it carried sent damaged ships and sub-
and 1941 the neutrality patrol demonstrated the maries back to sea weeks before surface trans-
need for land-based aircraft to operate in north- port could have delivered the required materials.
ern latitudes during winter weather, and the It supplied fighting units throughout the Pacific
first months of the war indicated the need for with critical implements of war and brought as
more speed and armament in a plane that was much as 1,000 pints a day of life-giving plasma
expected to operate singly in close proximity to and whole blood to forward areas. It evacuated
enemy airfields. Since it was impossible to casualties from the active fighting fronts. At
provide the necessary characteristics in sea- Okinawa begining 6 days after the initial land-
planes, the Navy obtained land types from the ing, 9,871 patients were moved in 329 flights.
Army. Before an Army high-altitude bomber The importance of such service was only partly
could be effectively employed for search and measurable in statistics; it also lay in the short-
reconnaissance, however, 50 percent of its in- ened convalescence and improved morale of each
ternal arrangements had to be altered and special casualty and in the lightened burdens and re-
equipment installed. Because this modification sponsibilities of medical units in the battle area.
required virtually as many man-hours as the A measure of the size and scope of NATS ac-
construction of a new plane, the Navy began tivities can be gained from the following statis-
designating new patrol aircraft to meet its special
tics. In August 1945 NATS flew a total of 39,-
requirements.
732,000 miles carrying 11,400 tons of cargo and
As in other types of naval aviation the basic
mail and 85,000 passengers over a network of
unit was the squadron. Since the planes usually
63,251 route miles. Four hundred and twenty-
flew alone and were frequently operated in three-
or six-plane detachments from tenders, the nine aircraft and a total personnel of 26,604
squadrons remained largely an administrative were involved in this enterprise.
unit. Squadrons were organized into Fleet Air Utility squadrons supplied the fleet with spe-
Wings which also included coastal-patrol squad- cial aircraft services. Before Pearl Harbor it
rons and headquarters and service units. Patrol had become obvious that, if gunnery training
squadrons were assigned to task groups and were to keep abreast of new developments in
forces for operations and since it was common fire-control, the utility squadrons would have to
practice to employ wing commanders in the task expand and increase their scope of operation.

7
Radio-controlled target aircraft were developed Other activities included coverage of submarines
and personnel trained to place this target at the engaged in training, aerial mapping and surveys,
disposal of ships in training. Aircraft better local rescue work, and itinerant air transport.
adapted to towing target sleeves were obtained. Utility squadrons everywhere in the Pacific
Throughout the first war years new squadrons contributed to the effectiveness of antiaircraft
were formed to bring these devices to the fleet fire. Nowhere did the practice afforded the
and shore establishments. gunners better reveal its usefulness than during
Utility squadrons moved into forward areas the long campaign for the capture of Okinawa.
with their tow equipment and radio-controlled The ability to shoot down Kamikazes that had
drones to give advanced training to ships, bases slipped through the protective screen of fighters
and fighter aircraft. These services were pro- helped immeasurably in the ability of the fleet
vided not only for Navy and Marine Corps hut to stay until the troops no longer required its
also for Army units in the Southwest Pacific. support.

8
III SPECIAL ASPECTS OF THE AIR WAR

Naval warfare included more than the con- after landing fields had been knocked out. The
tacts between rival fleets and their air compo- lessons learned were applied elsewhere as fast
nents. It involved constant surveillance of en- as aircraft, equipment, and trained crews could
emy movements and bases, destruction of ship- be obtained.
Air- Although naval search planes were not avail-
sea rescue, which kept personnel losses to a min- able for the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942,
imum, preserved that element of military power the following month at Midway a Catalina was
most difficult to replace and bolstered the morale the first to report the Japanese fleet. When the
of all fighting men. In all these activities avia- same type of flying boat was used in the Solo-
tion participated and for their accomplishment mons, its limitations rapidly became apparent.
developed special techniques, a knowledge of The surprise and sinking of four Allied cruisers
which is necesary to an understanding of vic- at Savo Island on the night after the landings on
tory in the Pacific. Guadalcanal might have been avoided if recon-
naissance had been complete. In the weeks that
Naval Air Search and followed, concentration of enemy fighters made
Reconnaissance impossible the use of Catalinas in the area north
of Guadalcanal. Although Army Flying For-
Pearl Harbor showed the need for air patrols. tresses were employed for patrols, lack of special
The Japanese Fleet whose planes did such dam- equipment and training restricted their useful-
age on the morning of 7 December 1941, were ness. Late in 1942 the Navy began receiving
within range the evening before. Had enough Liberators, which after extensive modification
Catalinas been out, the fleet might have been dis- and time for training the naval crews appeared
covered, but the ability of United States forces in the Solomons early the following year. This
to surprise the enemy on many occasions later plane had both the range to reach the centers of
in the conflict indicated that more than planes in enemy activity and the firepower needed to oper-
the air were needed to conduct an adequate ate singly.
search.
1 Above all it required special radar The possession of such a plane also made pos-
equipment and thorough training which Amer- sible the development of photographic reconnais-
ican forces did not possess inl 1941. Admiral sance. Because the Japanese had for years ex-
Hart in the Philippines commented on the vast cluded foreigners from military areas and espe-
amount of misinformation he received over the cially from the mandated islands, Allied intelli-
warning net. Before that ill-fated campaign in gence knew very little about the nature or extent
the East Indies had ended, the patrol-plane pilots of installations. In the spring of 1943 the first
and crews had learned their business the hard photographic squadron , accompanied by expert
way. During the latter stages of the Japanese personnel for processing and interpretation,
advance the only information available to Allied reached the South Pacific. From that time for-
commanders came from the Catalinas of Patrol ward, extensive photographic reconnaissance
Wing 10 operating from tenders whose almost was made in advance of every major operation.
daily moves enabled them to service their planes In addition to specially equipped units, every
9
search plane carrried a camera and was able to high degree of proficiency maintained through
supplement visual sighting with photographic training.
evidence. The camera and radar enormously As the United States offensive moved across
increased the effectiveness or naval patrol the Pacific, patrol aviation accompanied it.
aircraft. Search and photographic planes checked and re-
Although the first function of patrol aviation checked enemy installations and movements.
was to sight and report, naval planes frequently When the carrier forces moved against an objec-
discovered enemy merchant shipping alone or tive, they desired to achieve surprise. If Jap-
with only light escort. Since the aircraft car- ansee search aircraft encountered carrier planes,
ried machine guns, bombs, and, in the latter part they could have inferred the presence of carriers
of the war, rockets and guided missiles, they and transmitted the fact before being shot down.
made sucessful attacks on cargo vessels and In the invasion of the Marianas and later opera-
contributed to the effort that ultimately strangled tions, Navy Liberators flew along the flanks and
Japanese industry. in advance of the carrier force, shooting down
Antishipping operations also possessed direct enemy search planes. Prior to the landings in
military importanance. In the South and South- the Philippines they knocked off Japanese picket
west Pacific areas the enemy frequently at- boats east of Formosa.
tempied to move troops and supplies at night in During the critical periods when amphibious
small vessels and barges, ducking in and out forces were establishing a beachhead, naval com-
among the numerous islands and hiding in coves manders needed accurate knowledge of ap-
by day. In detecting these clandestine ship- proaching enemy units. For this purpose tend-
ments, the slow speed of the Catalinas became ers accompanied the invasion fleet and com-
an asset and darkness provided adequate protec- menced operating seaplanes immediately. Al-
tion for their vulnerability. With special paint though this remained a dangerous activity so
and equipped with radar they became Black Cats long as the enemy had aircraft and fields in use
searching out enemy vessels and barges wherever it was necessary and by 1943 the Navy had
they could be found. Not only did they them- available the Mariner (PBM), a faster, longer-
selves strike but they also worked out techniques ranged flying boat with more firepower than the
for guiding motor torpedo boats, destroyers, and Catalina. At Okinawa the Mariners conducted
other light vessels to Japanese convoys. The their first searches at the main objective even be-
Black Cats made reconnaissance a 24-hour-a-day fore the troops went ashore and on 7 April 1945
job. had an opportunity to demonstrate their value.
In the Atlantic, patrol squadrons devoted their A United States submarine the previous day
principal effort to antisubmarine warfare. Be- sighted a Japanese force built around the
cause the Japanese directed many of their under- Yamato, the world’s largest battleship, headed to-
water craft to supply garrisons on bypassed ward our invasion fleet. Search planes immedi-
islands, antisubmarine activities were over- ately took off and some hours later spotted the
shadowed by other phases of patrol aviation in enemy and guided carrier planes into the attack
the Pacific. All squadrons, however, were given which resulted in the destruction of the Yamato,
instrction in the special techniques of this type a light cruiser, and four destroyers. The Mari-
of warfare, and although patrol planes were in- ners not only maintained continuous contact but
strumental in sinking only five Japanese sub- landed on the open sea to pick up the personnel
marines, viligance was never relaxed and a of carrier planes shot down during the action.
 -
The last 6 months of the war saw the culmina- ping with bombs, rockets, and guided missiles
tion of patrol aviation. New plane types be- and laid mines in the principal shipping lanes.
came available in increasing numbers. To At the extreme top of the Japanee Empire,
-
avoid the duplication of labor inherent in build - search planes from the Aleutians regularly vis-
ing a plane and then modifying it extensively. ited the Kurile Islands.
the Navy designed a version of the Liberator to The effectivess of this reconnaissance in
meet its special requirements and gave it the terms of area covered can be seen from the charts
nautical name Privateer (PB4Y-2). A two- on pages 12 and 13 which compare the searches
engine land plane, the Ventura (PV-1) orig- in effect at the end of the war with those at the
inally developed for antisubmarine work in the time of the Guadalcanal landings. The effec-
Atlantic was also employed in the Pacific, and a tiveness in terms of results achieved is indicated
new model named the Harpoon (PV-2 ) ap- above. All of this was accomplished with the
peared in 1945. In preparation, but not ready greatest economy. At no time did the Navy
in time for war operations, was the Neptune have in operation in the Pacific area more than
( P2V ) one of which startled the world in 1946 500 search planes of all types.
by flying from Perth, Australia, to Columbus,
Ohio, a distance of over 11,000 miles and the
longest flight on record. What a plane with that
range and ease of operation would have meant in At the outset of the war, operating procedure
1941 may easily be imagined. for the rescue of pilots and air crews was unde-
By the spring of 1945 the Navy operated veloped. On the other hand a number of basic
searches that literally covered the Pacific from safety devices had been provided permitting a
the Aleutians to Australia, from Seattle to Singa- pilot to survive the unexpected failure of his
pore. Especially important was the area be- plane. The parachute, the inflatatable life jacket
twen the Philippines and the mainland of Asia popularly known as the "Mae West,” and the
through which vital supplies from the East Indies rubber life raft with its emergency survival and
passed to Japan. To sever these lines of com- signalling gear were standard equipment. Dur-
municatin, patrol planes proved particularly ing the war, safety gear was steadily improved
useful not only sinking ships themselves but and the probabilities of survival were all in
favor of the flyer, whether the trouble was simple
guiding submarines to likely targets and even
engine failure or being shot down in flames. In
calling up Army bombers to dispose of one con-
the first half of 1942 many pilots survived
voy too large for a single patrol plane to handle.
crashes in combat areas but frequently little or
This coordinated campaign reduced Japanese nothing could be done to effect their recovery.
shipping to such a thin trickle that by summer A number of rescues, however, were made
the big planes were crossing to French Indo- usually as the result of individual initiative, and
China where they went after the railroads which after the battleof Midway, Catalinas picked up
were the last link in enemy communications with many pilots.
the southern regions. Farther north other naval Organized rescue operations developed in the
aircraft, based on Okinawa and Iwo Jima, were Solomons campaign. Catalinas, popularly
conducting patrols along the coast of China as known as “Dumbos,” were dispatched to pick
far as Korea and around the coasts of the Jap- up personnel who had been shot down. At first
anese home islands. They also attacked ship- this was an incidental duty assigned as the occa-

726015 47 2 11
sion arose, but it later developed to a point where acute. Since only the most skillful and experi-
Dumbo circled near the scene of a raid. Posi- enced seaplane pilots could land and take off
tions were reported as planes went down, and again in the enormous swells, the job required
the Dumbo, often protected by planes from the as much seamanship as airmanship, and it be-
strike, recovered the personnel. The bravery of came standard practice to avoid open-sea land-
the rescue crews in landing in positions exposed ings unless conditions were favorable and there
to enemy shore fire became legendary. It was was no other rescue agent available. Ships,
fortunate that no rescue personnel were lost in usually destroyers, made the recoveries wherever
such operations. possible. Catalinas continued not only to be
By 1944 in the Central Pacific the problem of used extensively to search for survivors, to drop
making rescues in open-ocean areas first became emergency gear, and to circle overhead until a

A T T U —
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7 AUGUST 1942-,

AR, HALLS

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,
.
Recoconnaissance, 1942. -–Early in the war, United States naval forces far from the heart of the Japanese Empire wcre able onlv

12
ship could arrive but also to make rescues in operations a 6-plane rescue squadron made 76
fair conditions and in protected lagoons. landings and rescued 183 survivors of all serv-
The tendency towad specialization observable ices. Such special units were employed only
in the creation of photographic squadrons in in areas where the intensity of operations made
1943 also appeared in the creation of rescue calls upon their services frequent; elsewhere in
squadrons in 1944. Equipped with Mariners the Pacific patrol planes continued to provide
modified to permit carrying newly developed Dumbo S as all adjunct to their other duties.
-
rescue gear and with pilots and crews given spe- Because fast-carrier operations were generally
cial training in the techques of air-sea rescue, deep in enemy waters, the only rescue facilities
these squadrons effected rescues under conditions were the seaplanes from the battleships and
impossible to Catalinas. During the Okinawa cruisers, the ships of the task force itself, and

u s.

1
, I

. . . .. —. —.-. —.

I
submarines. Lifeguard submarines were sta- short period, sometimes within a few minutes.
tioned at each objective to rescue flyers forced Air-sea rescue activity in the Pacific shows
down in the vicinity and after standard proce- naval units of all types being successfully em-
dure had been devised, rescue operations were ployed to meet every kind of combat rescue
highly successful. On one occasion the sub- problem. Durng the last year of the war, a
marine Tang recovered 22 flyers off Truk. total of 2,150 flight personnel of all services was
Although several submarines received damage, recoverd by these agencies. The value of air-
none was lost on rescue missions. In atoll la- sea rescue transcended the total of lives saved.
goons, shallow waters, and mine fields, where Everwhere it bolstered morale and encouraged
our submarines and ships could not go, the small flight personnel to greater efforts against the
seaplanes carried by battleships and cruisers of enemy. Since it took longer to train air crews
the carrier task forces provided a satisfactory than to build planes, personnel were more diffi-
answer to this problem. cult to replace than aircraft; economy and senti-
In the vicinity of a carrier task force, screen- ment both contributed to the development of air-
ing and picket destroyers performed rescues. sea rescue.
The attack on the enemy fleet during the Battle
of the Philippines Sea cost 20 United States Aerial Mining
planes shot down and another 55 force by lack
of gas to land on the water before reaching their The offensive mine-laying campaign waged
carriers. Of aproximately 180 personnel in- against Japan was little publicized but the re-
volved all but 16 pilots and 22 aircrewmen sults were highly successful. At least 649,736
were recovered, the majority by destroyers tons of shipping were sunk and another 1,377,-
before dawn. 780 tons damaged, of which 378,827 were still
Many types of rescue operation required close out of use at the end of the war. The total sunk
coordination between commands that normally and damaged represented one quarter of the pre-
operated more or less independently. Such co- war strength of the Japanese merchant marine.
ordination reached its high point in connection In addition 9 destroyers, 4 submarines, and 36
with bombing of Empire targets by B–29’s. A auxiliary craft went down as the result of mine
chain of ships and submarines, each with a sup- explosions; and 2 battleships, 2 escort carriers.
porting plane circling overhead, was provided 8 cruisers, 29 destroyers or destroyer escorts, a
along the route from the Marianas to the target. submarine, and 18 other combatant vessels were
Submarines were stationed from the Empire damaged, In the course of the war 25,000
coast to about 400 miles out and destroyers or mines were laid, 21,389 or 85 percent by air-
similar ships the rest of the way. When a plane craft. From a total of 4,760 sorties, only 55
went down, the assigned air-sea rescue plane, mine-laying planes failed to return.
which on the most remote stations was usually a Although surface vessels and submarines were
specially equipped B–29 “Super Dumbo" and also employed, airplanes proved particularly
adapted to mine-laying. They could penetrate
the surviors and directed the comparatively enemy harbors and repeat the operation without
slow-moving ship or submarine to the scene. being endangered by mines previously sown.
With this system most B-29 survivors, no matter Much of the work could he carried on at night
at what point on their 1,200 -mile over-water with relatively little loss of accuracy and with
route they went down, were recovered in a increased secrecy as to the exact location of the

14
mines, which added to the Japanese difficulty in being conducted in nearby areas.
sweeping. All United States and Allied air Over half the naval mines expended during
services participated, using practically every the war were laid by the Superfortresses of the
type of bombing plane from the Avenger (TBF) Twentieth Air Force in and about the home
to the Superfortress ( B–29), and, of course, the islands, particularly in the straits of Shimonseki
ever-present Catalina. The mines themselves and around the Inland Sea. This forced the
were developed, produced, supplied and serv- Japanese to carry goods from the Asiatic main-
iced largely by the United States Navy with a land to ports in northern Honshu from which
few British types being employed in Burma and adequate
1 distribution by rail was impossible.
the Southwest Pacific. Naval mine-warfare offi- To complicate the enemy’s problem Navy Pri-
cers collaborated in the planning and execution vateers from Okinawa mined the shores of the
-
of all operations. Yellow Sea as far as the southern coast of
Although mining resulted in the destruction of Korea. The movement of ships of over 1,000
large numbers of vessels , , it had other important tons was stopped altogether. Careful mine-
effects not so easily determinable. It forced the laying prevented the use of all but three of
Japanese to close ports until they could be swept, Japan’s merchant-marine shipyards, thus pre-
thereby causing the loss of valuable ship time. venting the repair of vessels already damaged.
Even with relatively few mines at a time often Cut off from the East Indies by air and sub-
repeated attacks resulted in the abandonment of marine action, the enemy saw his last link with
many harbors. To prevent the enemy from the Asiatic mainland severed bv aerial mines.
staging his fleet through certain anchorages they American and Allied services working in close
were mined when important operations were in collaboration completed the strangle-hold on
progre S in adjacent a rea s . Shallow waters Japanese industry.
were mined to force shipping into the open sea
where United States submarines could attack. Air Support of Amphibious
In the last month of the war the mining cam- Operations
paign was extended to home waters to cut of the
last Japanese connection with the mainland. The primary missions of air support were
In the outer zone, particularly though the local defense and direct support of troops ashore.
Defense included combat air patrols to ward off
with comparatively small numbers being used enemy air raids, antisubmarine patrols flown
against strategic objectives. The campaign was constantlly around the approaches to the objec-
carried on by Royal Air Force, Australian, and tive area, and special missions such as the silenc-
United States Army aircraft operating from ing of heavy coastal batteries. Direct troop sup-
bases in the Southwest Pacific, China, and India. port consisted prinipally of attacks with bombs,
It prevented the Japanese from using such im- rockets, machine guns and incendiaries on enemy
portant ports as Rangoon to reinforce their troops and defenses. In order to be effective,
troop S in Burma and greatly curtailed their ob- both defensive and offensive air operations re-
taining supplies of oil from sulch places as Sura - quired a high degree of coordination and con-
baya and Balikpapan. In the South and Central trol. This was practically impossible to secure
Pacific, Navy planes used mines for tactical pur- through the normal task-group communication
poses to keep the Japanese Fleet from using cer- channels because in a major amphibious opera-
-
tain harbors while amphibious operations were tion as many as thirty different carrier air

l5
groups and land-based Marine air units might initial assault and the eventual establishment of
be jointly engagd in operations. The task- land-based aircraft ashore.
force and task-group organization involved too It was late in August 1942 before land-based
many echelons of command to permit prompt support operations actually got under way. Use
action on requests for air support. was made of radio for communicating requests
The need for the development of air-support from troops to supporting planes, and from this
doctrine was apparent in the landings on Guadal- experience came a realization of the tremen-
canal and Tulagi in August 1942. Three car- dously increased effectiveness gained from hav-
riers supported this operation, and their air ing liaison officers who worked constantly with
groups reported to a support air director in the the troops and knew the special problems in-
flagship of the amphibious commander and prior olved. As a result, the Navy organized a num-
to the landings carried out missions assigned ber of air liaison parties which, unlike the offi-
by him. Although the Navy had foreseen the cers who went ashore on 7 August, were espe-
need for liaison parties ashore with the troops cially trained to accompany front-line troops and
and had occasionally employed them in peace- to relay their requests to the controlling com-
time maneuvers, on Guadalcanal inadequate mand. Such parties were successfully used at
commuications and lack of experience handi- Kiska, the Gilberts, and in subsequent opera-
capped the direction of support missions after tions. Eventually, their functions were taken
the Marines had landed. over by units within the Marine and Army
The air defense for this operation also left ground organization.
much to be desired. The plan called for a com- In the assault on Tarawa on 20 November
bat air patrol of fighters directed by a ship- 1943, there appeared for the first time the over-
whelming concentration of air power that char-
His function was to receive information from acterized all landing operations in the Central
ships’ radars of enemy air raids and the posi- Pacific. A total of 17 aircraft carriers with a
tion of friendly fighters, to relay this informa- complement of 900 planes participated. Eight
-
tion to the patrolling fighters, and to direct them were the new, comparatively slow escort carriers
to a point where they could make visual contact assigned exclusively to tactical air support, a
with enemy planes. As the radar of the cruiser mission for which they were well fitted and which
on which he was embarked failed to detect the permitted the release of the fast carriers for use
raids, the fighter director was against enemy air bases and other distant targets.
unable to carry out his mission. As escort carriers become available in increas-
After the first two days the carriers were ing numbers it was possible to expand enor-
-
obliged to withdraw, leaving the amphibious mously the volume of air support.
force and the troops ashore entirely without local During the Gilberts campaign use was also
air support until a captured airfield on Guadal- made of a specialized troop-support control unit
canal could be completed and supplied with land- afloat equipped both to receive and filter the re-
based aircraft. The tragic history of the weeks qests for help and to assign offensive support
that followed, during which planes available for missions to the aircraft overhead. In each suc-
defense and for troop support were pitifully few, ceeding operation air-support control units grew
clearly demonstrated the importance of main- in size, number, and complexity, eventually as-
taining a continuous supply of carrier-based air suming complete control of every air-borne
power during the critical period between the plane in the objective area. These units func-

16
tioned first on battleships and later on command rate controllers on the same ship it was possible
ships. The latter were converted transports to select the most effective type of weapon (air,
with the necessary concentration of radar and naval, or artillery) for each request from the
radio-communications equipment. These ships ground troops.
were used as joint headquarters by the amphibi- In September 1944 came simultaneous land-
ous, shore, and air commanders. ings at Morotai and the Palaus. Esort carriers
Fighter direction, the control of defensive air provided the direct support for both. While the
support, was conducted in the Gilberts from des- Morotai landing was virtually unopposed, fanat-
ignated ships in the landing fleet, but there was ical resistance from underground positions and
little coordination between such ships. After the caves was encountered at Bloody Nose Ridge on
experience of this operation control of all am- Peleliu. In hand-to-hand fighting precision at-
phibious fighter-director teams was centralized tacks by support aircraft were provided as close
in the existing air-support control organization, as 100 yards from front-line positions, a feat
so that all support aircraft, both offensive and that would have been impossible without the
defensive, received direction and coordination rigid air discipline and concentrated control sys -
from a single command. The two activities tem developed in earlier operations.
were thereafter physically located in adjacent In the campaign for the recapture of the Phil-
control rooms on a command ship, which was in ippines, Army, Navy, and Marine aircraft par-
constant communication with subordinate con- ticipated together in tactical air support. Land-
trol units or teams whether on other command ings in the Leyte-Samar area were made on 20
ships, picket destroyers, or ashore. October 1944 by forces under the command of
In January 1944 the amphibious forces of the General of the Army MacArthur. Although
Central Pacific invaded Kwajalein. The pat- after softening-up by air and ship bombardment
tern of tactical air support in Pacific amphibious the landings were successfully made without too
operations emerged clearly. Although later op- much ground opposition, Japanese sea and air
erations brought increasing complexity and re- resistance developed on an all-out scale. In the
finement in technique, no important departures ensuing Battle for Leyte Gulf, the Air Support
from this pattern were made. Commander carried his control to the point of
In the Marianas assault of June 1944 air- diverting aircraft from troop-support missions to
support control employed three command ships strikes against enemy surface forces. This was
with additional standbys available. The de- an outstanding example not only of the versatil-
-
velopment of standardized techniques made it ity of carrier aircraft but also of the flexibility
possible to pass control of the air-support opera- of air power made possible by the type of air-
tions without interruption from one ship to an- support organization developed and perfected in
other. Similarly, aS land-based aircraft became the Pacific war.
established ashore, it was found feasible to trans- In the Lingayen Gulf landing in January and
fer elements most closely integrated with troop the assault on Iwo Jima in February, air support
movements to a control center on the beachhead followed the established pattern. The increas-
while retaining afloat fighter direction, anti- ing use of Kamikaze attacks by the Japanese,
submarine patrol, and air-sea rescue. Another however, emphasized the defense function of the
new technique developed in the Marianas was air-support control units.
the coordination of shore-based artillery, naval The largest amphibious operation of the Pa-
gunfire, and air support. By placing the sepa- cific war, the assault and occupation of Okinawa,

17
 saw air support at its highest level. From 20 carriers and by the antiaircraft guns of the car-
to 31 carriers provided tacticat air support for rier forces which were not under air-support
1,213 ships and 451,866 combat and service control.
troops. As landing fields on Okinawa were cap- Enemy air tactics had been foreseen and 15
tured and activated, a total of over 400 shore- radar picket stations, located from 20 to 95 miles
based Marine and Army planes were addded pro- from the center of the area, had been established
gressively to the carrier-based aircraft. to cover paths of approach. Each station was
The statistics are impressive and indicative of manned by a radar-equipped destroyer or
the scope of the support function of aircraft. smaller vessel with a fighter-director team
During 88 dayS, 1,904 direct-support missions aboard. These teams were linked with the cen-
were flown involving a total of 17,361 individ- tral air-defense control organization. They di-
ual offensive sorties. An average of 560 planes rected fighter patrols assigned to their sectors
was in the air each day on all types of missions, and passed control and information to other
including defensive patrols. These aircraft ex- units as the raiders left their area. The picket
pended 7,141 tons of bombs, 49,641 5-inch rock- line was so effective in intercepting enemy raids
ets, 1,573 wing tanks containing 260,000 gallons that the Japanese switched tactics and began to
of napalin, the blazing gasoline jelly, and 9,300,- concentrate on picket vessels which heretofore
000 rounds of 50-caliber ammunition. had been neglected for larger and more profit-
Okinawa provided a crucial test for amphib- able targets. Despite the pounding these picket
ious fighter direction. As in the Philippines, stations received, which resulted in 7 destroyers
the intensity of Japanese opposition increased sunk, 18 seriously damaged, and 6 damaged
the importance of air defense. With an area of slightly, fighter-director ships were still on sta-
approximately 7,850 square miles to cover and tion when responsibility for air defense was
with the majority of the enemy air strength based transferred ashore to the Air Defense Com-
only 350 miles away in Kyushu to the north and mander 82 days after the original landings.
in Formosa to the southwest, the magnitude of Air-support control as it functioned in the
the centralized air-defense responsibility is ap- Okinawa campaign had grown to include more
parent. During the first 54 days, 18,675 fighter- than aircraft. It provided for the integration
plane sorties were flown for the protection of the of all available weapons -- land, sea, and air.
amphibious force alone, while in addition the For limited forces operating far from bases,
fast and support carriers provided their own economy in the use of weapons became manda-
combal air patrol. In the 82 days during which tory. The control system provided for defense
the amphibious forces air-support control unit with a minimum of fighter planes, releasing oth-
was responsible for the defense of the objective ers for support missions. It made possible the
area. the Japanese dispatched 896 air raids in - use of aircraft only against targets susceptible to
volving more than 3,089 planes. Of these the air attack and saw that nava l gunfire or field
centrally controlled combat air patrol over the artiliery was used where more efficient. Such
objective area shot down 1,067 planes, including an economical use of power grew from the
50 shot down by night fighters. Antiaircraft Navy’s concept of organization which treated all
fire and suicide dives destroyed at least 948 elements of the naval forces as integral parts
more, making a total of 2,015 Japanese planes. of the whole complex required for control of
These figures do not include Japanese planes the sea. Each should be used in the manner
shot down by the combat air patrols over the best suited to its inherent characteristics and all

18
should be formed into a unified operating ma- necessary the final amphibious assault on the
chine through the task-force system. The air- enemy homeland, the Okinawa operation demon-
support control units were themselves a special- strated the ability of the United States to trans-
ized adaptation of the task-force pattern for the port its forces over vast sea distances and to land
accomplishment of a well-defined mission. them on a hostile shore. The possession of this
Although the surrender of Japan made un- technique altered the world’s strategic picture.

19
 IN BATTLE ARRAY
An Essex-class Carrier P1O wS Through Pacific Waters
 THE JAPANESE OFFENSIVE--PEARL HARBOR
IV TO MIDWAY

The nature of the area with its island bases force their existing positions in the Marshalls.
and long lines of water communications made Attainment of these objectives was to be followed
the conflict with Japan essentially a naval war. by economic development of the Southern Re-
The advent of the airplane revolutionized the sources Area and consolidation and strengthen-
methods of attack but did not alter the basic con- ing of their newly acquired defensive perimeter
cepts of strategy or decrease the necessity for in the Central and South Pacific. Japanese car-
controlling the sea. As an island empire, Japan rier forces operating from interior lines and sup-
was peculiarly susceptible to any interruption of ported by a land-based air force would be able to
its water-borne supply system and particularly meet the United States counterattack if, and
to any action that would sever the connection when, it came. The limited nature of these ob-
with the East Indies whence came indispensable jectives was apparent in the failure to include
-.
raw materials. seizure of the principal United States naval base
The actual conflict may be divided into three in the Pacific at Pearl Harbor or damage to the
phases: the Japanese offensive from 7 December Panama Canal and the ports on the west coast
1941, to 5 June 1942; the offensive-defensive of the United States.
from 7 August 1942, to 19 November 1943, The Japanese recognized that control of the
during which Japan had lost the initiative but the air was an essential condition to amphibious op-
A11ies commanded resources only to mount lim- erations. The Japanese Fleet was therefore
ited operations and the United States offensive built around a striking force of 6 carriers to be
from 19 November 1943, to 15 August 1945. drawn from a total of 10 available and 7 more
Japan’s decision to launch a war was based under construction or being converted from mer-
on the assumption that the conflict in Europe chant hulls.
would render Russia and Great Britain neg- With a high degree of tactical success this
ligible factors in the Far East. It was based force struck Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941,
on the further assumption that the United States, employing 360 of 414 embarked aircraft. Half
already committed to near belligerency in the the attacking force was directed against airfields
Atlantic could not, even if finally successful in in the Hawaiian Islands; half against fleet units
that theater, mount an offensive in the Pacific in in Pearl Harbor. Nineteen warships were hit
1ess than 18 months to 2 years and would not among which were 5 battleships that came to
in any case be willing to pay the price of total rest on the bottom.
victory in the Pacific. The Japanese then proceeded to the conquest
The Japanese set out to conquer the Philip- of the Southern Resources Area which they com -
pines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and pleted in an incredibly short time. The com-
Burma, which they appropriately called the nined aircraft strength of the Japanese Army and
Southen Resoures Area. Judging that their Navy, carrier- and shore-based, was approxi-
principal enemy was the United States, the Jap- matey 2,625 units. These were opposed by
anese planned as initial objectives the destruc- approximately half that number of land-based
tion of a part of the United States Fleet and the aircraft widely dispersed among the various
acquisition of a line of military bases to rein- United States and Allied bases in the Far East.
At the points of conflict the Japanese achieved achieved their initial objectives in the first five
by virtue of the mobility inherent in a properly months of the war and perhaps influenced by the
emplloyed carrier force a numerical superiority carrier-launched Dolittle raid, the Japanese
of at least 4 to 1. To this factor must be added undertook the extension of their original defen-
the intangible value of surprise, superb training, sive perimeter. At the cost of delaying the de-
and combat experience. With the exception of velopment of their newly acquired bases, they
three destroyers sunk by Allied submarines, not determined to cut the lines of communication
one Japanese major combat vessel was lost and between the United States and Australia by seiz-
very few were damaged. Their air, ground, ing Port Moresby, the last important Allied foot-
and shipping losses were equally insignificant, hold in New Guinea, New Caledonia, the Fijis,
while the United States, Great Britain, the Neth- and Samoa, and to improve the defensive per-
erlands, and Australia lost the majority of sea, imeter on the east and north by the capture of
land, and air forces engaged. April 1942 Midway and the western A1eutians.
found the Japanese with their empire greatly The Japanese then embarked on a three-
enlarged, their fleet intact, and morale at a high pronged offensive. The first avance was di-
level. rected against Port Moresby. In early May
Between 7 December 1941 and 9 Apri11942, 1942, an amphibitous force supported by three
the Japanese carrier striking force had operated carrers, steamed south into the Coral Sea. A
across a third of the earth’s circumference, from United States task force including the carriers
Hawaii to Ceylon, and conducted strikes against Lexington and Yorktown discovered the trans-
ships and shore installations at Pearl Harbor, ports on 7 May and sank the light carrier Shoho
Rabaul, Ambon, Darwin, Tjilatja, Colombo, by air attack. Throughout the rest of the day
and Trincomalee. Allied losses to Japanese both Japanese and United States carrier forces
carrier air included five battleships, one aircraft searched unsuccessfully for each other. Early
carrier, one cruiser, and seven destroyers sunk the next morning contact was made and simul-
or very heavily damaged; three battleships, three taneous air attacks launched. A Japanese car-
cruisers, and one destroyer damaged and thou- rier, the Shokaku, received severe damage from
sands of tons of auxiliaries and merchant ships hits by dive bombers. The Yorktown took light
sunk. Hundreds of Allied aircraft, as well as damage; the Lexington with uncontrollable gas-
docks, hangarsa and base facilities, were de- oline fires was abandoned and sunk by United
stroyed or captured. The enemy force was sel- States destroyers.
dom sighted and never effectively attacked. With their control of the air at the objective
Control of the Western Pacific and its island and in serious doubt, the Japanese retired. The en-
coastal perimeter lay in Japanese hands until gagement, the first of four carrier duels to take
such time as forces to challenge them could be place during the next 6 months, was tactically
contructed and assembled. The Japanese had indecisive but of considerable strategic conse-
not, however, brought to action the carrier quence. Japanese occupation of Port Moresby
forces of the United States Pacific Fleet, which by sea was defered to July and finally aban-
remained the sole immediate threat capable of doned following the Battte of Midway. The
striking through their newly acquired defensive Japanese Army thereafter attempted the con-
perimeter and of turning further amphibious quest of Port Moresby over the Owen Stanley
advance into defeat. Mountains without air support. The result was
Encouraged by the ease with which they the disaster at Buna.

22
 Aware of the fact that available United States prise, Hornet, and Yorktown. Three Japanese
carrier strength had been in or enroute to the carriers were sunk. A fourth, seriously
South Pacific as late as 8 May, the Japanese crippled, was finally destroyed by the Japanese
designated 6 June aS the date for the occupa- theselves. In a counterattack the Yorktown
tion of Midway to be preceded by a diversionary was heavily damaged by aerial torpedoes and
-
carrier strike on Dutch Habor in the Aleutians. the following day sunk by an enemy submarine.
-
Against Midway was sent a transport force cov- As at Coral Sea, with control of the air irre-
ered by the main strength of the Japanese Fleet trievably lost, the Midway invasion force turned
including four carriers. A group of two car- back. The Japanese, nevertheless, landed on
riers and escorts was assigned the task of raiding Kiska and Attu on 6 and 7 June but canceled
Dutch Habor; this attack was to be followed by the occupation of Adak.
the occupation of Adak, Kiska, and Attu in the Two important naval actions had been fought
Aleutian chain. without the forces themselves engaging in oppos-
On 3 June naval patrol planes made initial ing surface gunfire. Aviation had demonstrated
contact with the southern transport force steam- its latent power as the principal offensive ele-
ing east toward Midway, and early on 4 June ment of the new American Navy. The loss of
the main body of the Japanese Fleet was discov- four of their finest aircraft carriers weakened
ered. Concentrating on the destruction of the the powerful striking force with which the Jap-
Midway air group, composed of Marine and anese had achieved their conquests. Battleships
Army aircraft and naval patrol planes, and di- and seaplane tenders were withdrawn from the
verted by torpedo-plane attack, the Japanese fleet for hasty conversion to carriers, but the
carriers were’ taken by surprise and fell before Japanese Navy never regained the position it
the dive bombers of a hastily assembled Amer- lost at Midway. The initiative had shifted to
ican carrier task force composed of the Enter- the United States.

23
 ON GUARD -
A Helldiver Escorts a Convoy
 OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE—GUADALCANAL
v TO BOUGAINVILLE

The war plans in effect at the outbreak of connaissance of the eastern Marshalls and north-
the war were predicated on fighting the axis ern Gilberts. A task group built around the
powers simultaneously. Since Germany was re- Lexington was approaching Rabaul on 20 Febru-
garded as the more dangerous, it was made the ary when it was detected and forced to retire
preferred objective of United States efforts. after successfully repulsing a Japanese bomber
Forces in the Pacific were experted to protect attack. Four days later the Enterprise and ac-
Allied territory and to limit the Japanese expans- companying screen bombed and shelled Wake
sion as much as possible. and then went on to launch strikes against
With the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marcus. On 10 March the Lexington and York-
-
in January 1942, a more definitive strategic town aircraft flew over the Owen Stanley Moun-
concept was devised, and in April 1942 revised tains to attack shipping at the eastern New
war plans were adopted. The Pacific was di- Guinea ports of Lae and Salamaua where the
vided into two theaters of United States responsi - Japanese had landed three days earlier. The
bility, the Pacific Ocean Area and the Southwest Doolittle raid of 19 April on Tokyo was launched
Pacific Area. Forces assigned had the general from the Hornet which, since it had Army bomb-
tasks of containing the Japanese in their respec- ers on deck, was supported by the Enterprise.
tive areas, protecting their own communications, Those early raids all met with a high degree of
and supporting operations in the adjacent thea- tactical success and demonstrated that carriers
ter. Although the victory over Germany re- were not exclusively a Japanese weapon.
mained the primary objective, nevertheless, as With the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway,
forces became available in the Pacific the strat- United States and Japanese carrier strength be-
egy was gradually to become offensive. The came nearly equal. At the same time the news
Allies were ultimately able to conduct major that the Japanese advance was creeping down
campaigns in both theaters of the global war. the Solomons and commencing the construction
On 7 December 1941, the United States Navy of an airfield onGuadalcanal made it advisable
had seven carriers, of which only the Lexington to undertake a limited offensive in the South
and Enterprise were immediately operational in Pacific. In view of the danger to supply lines
the Pacific. The Saratoga was on the West to Australia and with the reassurance that the
Coast ; the Wasp, Yorktown, and Ranger were United States had 12 fast and 15 escort carriers
in the Atlantic; and the Hornet was shaking down on the ways, the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined
in the Caribbean. to accept the risk, and orders were issued direct-
From Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea the Wasp and ing operations against the Japanese in the Solo-
Ranger remained committed to the Atlantic. Op- mon Islands. The first test of the Japanese per-
-
erations of the remaining carricrs conformed to imeter came a year before the enemy expected it.
the wholly defensive strategy in the Pacific. On 1 On 7 August 1942, the United States Marines
February, a series of carrier raids was launched landed on Guadalcanal, quickly overcame minor
to delay or divert the enemy’s advance. The opposition, and captured a half-constructed air-
Enterprise and Yorktown particiated in a com- field. The operation was covered initially by a
bined air attack, surface bombardment, and re- task force of three carriers. Although the Jap-
25
26
final night action on 30 November. The way ers and led to their inclusion in the first air
was then clear for a land offensive which pushed echelon sent into captured bases. It provided
back the poorly supplied Jap troops. In Febru- opportunity for perfection of fighter direction
ary 1943 some 10,000 survivors of the 30,000 and other techniques. It posed the question,
troops which the Japanese had invested piece- only partially answered by heavy-bomber strikes,
meal in the campaign were evacuated. of an effective means of denying the enemy
United States forces began a slow advance up the use of the airstrips remaining in his pos-
the Solomons chain leading toward Rabaul. As session in the northern Solomons and Bismarcks.
the Navy lost two carriers in the early part of It emphasized the importance of adequate search
the campaign, its first-line strength in the Pacific and reconnaissance including the use of land-
was reduced to two carriers, and this was a pri- based Navy aircraft, capable of penetrating
mary factor in explaining the slow progress of enemy-held areas without escort, and of special
succeeding months. Guadalcanal air bases were photographic squadrons. Last, it saw the de-
expanded; the Russells were taken for an ad- velopment of the Black Cats as all effective
vanced fighter base; an amphibious campaign means of dealing with Japanese night shipping
...
covered by planes from those bases took Munda activities.
and other points on New Georgia. From those The air war was conducted principally by
airfields short amphibious advances took Vella Marine and Navy shore-based planes of carrier
Lavella and an island in the Treasury group on types. Using largely dive and glide-bombing
which further bases were built. A foothold at tactics, small planes proved most suited to this
Torokina on Bougainville was obtained in No- type of sea and island warfare in a theater where
vember 1943. Only from here and from bases the supply problem was critical. Whether in
secured in similar short Southwest Pacific ad- terms of hits per gallon of gasoline, hits per
vances from New Guinea could land-based fight- pound of plane weight reflected in turn in time
ers finally reach the main Japanese base at Ra- and effort of airfield construction, hits per dollar
baul. Sixteen months elapsed from the date of invested or flight crewmen risked, hits per hour
the landing at Guadalcanal until the first South flown, and in hits per ton dropped, the small,
Pacific fighter planes flew over Rabaul less than single-engine, low-altitude bomber with its crew
-
700 miles distant. Even then it was deemed of two or three and its ability to fly from short
desirable to take and develop further bases at and narrow fields was the most effective weapon.
Green Island and Emirau before the Rabaul area The campaign further demonstrated that the
could be considered adequately covered; this time required in the advance of a land based air
consumed 3 months more. force from one newly constructed air base to
The lessons and consequences of this long another placed a serious limitation on the ability
drawn-out campaign were numerous. It afforded of United States forces to capitalize on the de-
an opportunity to perfect tactics by which the struction of an opposing Japanese air force. By
heavily armored United States fighter planes the time the new position was fully developed
could master the brilliantly maneuverable but and prepared to support a decisive air offensive,
unarmored Japanese. It confirmed the need for the Japanese had reorganized and reformed their
close support of troops by aircraft and provided units unhindered at the next base to the rear.
in numerous landings a school for the develo- Whatever the lessons from the first sustained
ment of suitable techniques. It confirmed Eu - experience with United States power, the Jap-
ropean experience as to the need for night fight- anese failed to profit from them. In the face of
726015 47 —3 27
rapid progress in radar search and fire control, ships were overshadowed by the attrition suf-
night surface action once favorable to the in- fered in destroyers and other escort types which
ferior force and for which they had long trained plagued them to the end of the war. Most seri-
was no better than action by day. But more ous of all was the l0SS of experienced air per-
important was what the Japanese lost: 2 carriers, sonnel, a loss which was never overcome. The
2 battleships, 6 cruisers, 39 destroyers, and some Solomons campaign was a valuable laboratory
3,000 aircraft and crews. The losses in heavy to the side which could profit from experience.

28
 THE UNITED STATES OFFENSIVE-
VI TARAWA TO TOKYO

The offensivc against Japan depended upon be conducted by the Army supported by land-
United States forces supplemented by such units based air and relatively light naval forces. The
as its Allies could spare from commitments Central Pacific, however, presented the problems
elsewhere. By the autumn of 1943 the United of much longer over-water operations starting
States waS able to supply the Pacific theater with from the Ellice Islands and proceeding from the
sufficient ships, planes, ground forces, and sup- Gilberts through the Marshalls and Marianas to
porting equipment to undertake operations on a the western Carolines from which a long jump
large scale. could he made to the Philippines in collabora-
Except for the Solomons and the Aleutians, tion with the Southwest Pacific forces. Because
where Attu and Kiska had been retaken, the Jap- land-based air cover was impossible to maintain
anese still held the perimeter which they had beyond 300 miles from base, carrier aviation
staked out in 1942. The weakness in their stra- necessarily played a major role. As it waS ex-
tegic pattern was the separation of the industrial pected that the Japanese Fleet would make its
homeland from sources of raw material and the main resistance in this area, both carriers and
consequent dependence on water transportation heavy naval units were assigned to the Central
not only to supply wide-flung military and naval Pacific. With the taking of the Philippines, the
units but also to maintain the Empire economy. same forces could be withdrawn and used to
Shipping and the supply routes presented an in- move north and west from the Marianas to-
viting objective. The second possibility was a ward the Bonins and Okinawa and finally to
bombing attack on the home industries which prepare an amphibious assault on the Japanese
could be effectively conducted once strategic homeland.
islands within range had been captured. Both The contribution of naval aviation to the
these objectves could be atained if the United Southwest Pacific advance was largely in recon-
States won control of the sea in the western Pa- naissance and antishipping attacks. Marine air
cific. This in turn required the defeat and, if units were retained in the northern Solomons and
possible, the destruction of the Japanese Navy the Admiralties to interdict bypassed enemy gar-
and1 the capture by amphibious landings of those risons on Bougainville, New Britain, and New
bases necessary to the operations of United Ireland. In the Central Pacific the Navy had
States air and naval foces. From the Marianas . . .
available both fast and escort carriers in increas-
it would be possible to bomb Japan and from ing nunbers, its land-based and tender-based
the Philippines to sever the route to the Southern squadrons, and Marine garrison air forces. Al-
Resources Area. though the Army-Air Forces supplied heavy and
Simultaneous advances were to be conducted medium bombardment groups as needed, the
by Southwest and Central Pacific forces. Based nature of the Central Pacific made the theater
on Australia, the first was to proceed by a series primarily a Navy responsibility. With the
of amphibious hops along the north coast of New necessary equipment on hand and assured of a
Guinea to Morotai and thence to the Philippines. continuing supply of replacements and reinforce-
Except for three of the longer jumps, this cam- ments, the United States prepared to launch its
paign did not require carrier aviation and could drives at the Japanese Empire.
29
 The summer of 1943 saw the Marine and carrer forces conducted strikes against Marcus
Army air units in the Solomons and the Fifth in August, Tarawa and Makin in September, and
Army Air Force in New Guinea engaged in a Wake in October. These were in the nature of
death struggle with Japanese naval aviation training and probing operations for the new
-
based at Rabaul and Bougainville. Because it Essex- and Independence-class carriers as they
was expected that an advance on the Marshalls arrived in the Pacific. By November four large
might be met with opposition of the same inten- and five small carriers had been added to the
sity and caliber the first steps were cautious. existing force which comprised only the Enter-
Airfields were constructed at Funafuti, Nanomea, prise and Saratoga, and a total of eight escort
and Nukufetau in the Ellice chain, and Baker carrers had been assembled. It was now pos-
Island was developed as a staging base for Army sible for the first major carrier-paced offensive
bombers based at Canton. Search and photo- to begin.
graphic reconnaissance by Navy squadrons and The air garrisons in the Gilberts, 100 miles to
bombing by Army aircraft were initiated against the north at Mille in the Marshalls, and 530
the Gilberts and southern Marshalls. The fast- miles to the west at Nauru were overwhelmed

SEA POWER
U. S. Warships in the Admiralties

30
by carrier strikes on 19 and 20 November. jalein Atoll, and by 4 February enemy resistance
-
These were carried out by the 11 fast carriers was overcome. In the meantime Majuro had
organized in 4 task groups, the largest carrier been occupied without opposition. The loss of
force yet assembled by any navy. On 20 No- bases in the Marshalls caused the Japanese to
vember the marines landed on Tarawa, which withdraw the First Mobile Fleet from Truk, part
fell after 2½ days of heavy fighting. The es- to Singapore and the remainder to home waters,
cort carriers and 1 fast-carrier group provided Although it had not been planned to take
direct support, while other groups covered the Eniwetok until May, the speed with which Kwa-
approaches. Makin and Apamama were taken jalein Atoll had fallen was exploited by changing
with ease and although the Japanese Navy made plans on the spot. Uncommitted reserves from
no effort to contest the landing by surface action, that operation landed on Eniwetok on 17 Febru-
it did launch a series of troublesome and damag- ary, and within 6 days the atoll was secure.
ing night torpedo attacks by aircraft from Kwa- Truk was not only the reputed center of Jap-
jalein. Despite daily bombings and daylight anese naval strength but was also the base from
fighter patrols the planes staged through Mille which air reinforcements could have been flown
in the evening. into the Marshalls. During the capture of Kwa-
With the Gilberts in friendly hands prepara- jalein and Majuro, night torpedo attacks like
tions were made for the assault on the Marshalls. those experienced in the Gilberts had been pre-
Photographic reconnaissance by a carrier task vented by keeping a combat air patrol over Eni -
force on 4 December 1943, confirmed by the wetok through which enemy planes would have
pictures later brought back by Navy Liberators. had to stage. When an attack on the latter atoll
showed that the enemy had fortified Maloelap, was scheduled, the time seemed ripe for a raid
Wotje, and Mille in the outer ring of islands but against Truk itself. Although the nature and
had much less extensive installations on Kwa- extent of the enemy installations had been a
jalein and Eniwetok farther to the west and none carefully guarded secret, Marine photo-Libera-
at all on Majuro, an atoll with sufficiently large tors from the Solomons had obtained a few pic-
anchorage for the fleet and land space for an air- tures on 4 February which indicated that an air
field. Rather than assault the main Japanese strike would be well within the capabilities of
defenses with the resultant heavy casualties as the fast carriers and the targets would be worth
had occurred at Tarawa, Kwajalein, and Majuro the risk. Achieving complete tactical surprise,
became the first objectives in the Marshalls to be a force of 5 large and 4 light carriers struck
followed by landings on Eniwetok. Truk on 16 and 17 February, destroying 26
The operation commenced with an air bom- merchant vessels, 6 warships, and 270 aircraft
bardment by Army, Marine, and Navy units and inflicting damage on installations. One
based in the Gilberts. Profiting from the ex- United States carrier was damaged in a night
ample of the enemy at Pearl Harbor, the fast car- aerial-torpedo attack and, with 2 other carriers
riers approached from a direction in which Jap- to provide cover, retired to Pearl Harbor.
anese searches were known to be weak. On 29 Success at Truk led to a decision to turn north
January 1944 approximately 700 aircraft struck and investigate Japanese bases in the Marianas.
Kwajalein, Maleolap, and Wotje and by evening Detected during the approach on 21 February.
there was not a Japanese plane operational east the six-carrier force fought its way without sig-
of Eniwetok. The latter was cleaned out the nificant damage through a night-long series of
next day. Two landings were made on Kwa- attacks by land-based aircraft and carried out

31
the operation as scheduled. The Japanese First wak in the longest hop yet made by Southwest
Air Fleet, already greatly reduced by actions Pacific forces. Although the Fifth Army Air
in the Marshalls and at Truk, lost much of its Force in a series of brilliant operations had de-
-
remaining strength and the first photographs stroyed enemy air opposition in New Guinea, it
were obtained of installations and beaches in the was feared that the Japanese might bring up rein-
Marianas. forcements and attack the amphibious force be-
The Truk and Marianas raids demonstrated yond the range at which land-based air could
the decisive striking and defensive power of the provide continuous cover. The presence of car-
fast-carrier task force. Although tactical sur- riers insured carrying out the landings without
prise was achieved freqently during the war, interference, and because the enemy refused to
the Japanese in the Marianas were fully warned risk further losses, the carrier planes had little
by their search planes about 18 hours in ad- to do.
vance. The Japanese failure to stop the attack Returning from Hollandia, the fast carriers
indicated that, concentrated in sufficient numbers struck a second time at Truk on 29 and 30 April.
and properly handled, carriers could operate Since there were only a few small craft in the
against shore-based aircraft even without the harbor, the attack was directed against shore in-
element of surprise. stallations and the remaining air strength. Jap-
With the development of United States bases anese naval officers later testified that the two
in the Marshalls, Palau and adjacent atolls be- carrier strikes effectively destroved Truk as an
came the only Japanese fleet anchorages in the air and logistics base, a blow from which subse-
Central Pacific remaining free from land-based quent bombardment by Army aircraft from Bou-
air attack and reconnaissince. To prevent its gainville and Eniwetok prevented all recovery.
use during Southwest Pacific operations at Hol- Between 29 January and 30 April 1944, fast-
landia, Palau was chosen as the next target for carrier operations not only caused the enemy
the fast carriers. Approaching from the south- severe losses in ship and planes, but also pro-
east through the Admiralties, the carriers de- vided information about Japanese installations
stroyed the Palau air garrison on 30 M a r c h a n d in the Carolines, Palaus, and Marianas. From
a wave of air reinforcements the following day. Eniwetok and other bases in the Marshalls and
A feature of the attack was the first mining by from South and Southwest Pacific airfields on
carrier planes, which effectively closed the har- Bougainville, Green, and Emirau, naval search
bor for a month to 6 weeks. The enemy also planes could continue the collection of intelli-
lost 104,000 gross tons of war and merchant gence and carry on antishipping attacks. Ma-
ships including 6 tankers of 47,000 tons, and rine garrison air forces effectively neutralized
150 aircraft were destroyed. Because complete bypassed islands and Army bombers prevented
surprise had not been obtained, 4 war vessels further use of the great base at Truk and raided
and 15 to 20 merchantmen had escaped on 29 other installations.
March. In the meantime the carrier and amphibious
After replenishment the fast-carrier task force forces prepared for landings in the Marianas.
went on to cover and support the landings of In staging planes from the home islands to the
Southwest Pacific forces at Aitape and Hollandia South Pacific, the enemy had a choice of going
on the north coast of New Guinea on 21 April either through Formosa and the Philippines or
1944. These landings involved bypassing through the Bonins and Marianas to the Palaus
strong enemy positions at Hansa Bay and We- and Carolines. Shipping also proceeded along

32
much the same routes. The capture of the Mari- Sulu Archipelago. The Japanese Fleet was
anas would sever one of the main lines between preparing to give battle. Misled concerning
the Empire and the south, result in the acqui- United States intentions by the timely landing
sition of bases from which to bomb Japan, and of Southwest Pacific forces at Biak on 27 May,
assist southwest Pacific forces advancing along the Japanese expected a major landing in the
New Guinea toward the Philippines. As the Palaus or Moluccas. It was not until the am-
comnander in chief of the Japanese combined phibious force, assembled in the Admiralties,
fleet, Admiral Toyada, declared, “The war is turned north toward the Marianas that the Jap-
drawing close to the lines vital to our national anese learned the objective and started their
defense.” fleet northeast.
Although aware of the departure of the first On receipt of the submarine report the two
carriers from Majuro on 6 June, the Japanese task groups attacking the Bonins were called
did not know their objective until a fighter sweep south. Seaplanes operating from tenders in the
eliminated their aircraft on the afternoon of open sea off Saipan and naval patrol planes
11 June. Tactical surprise was achieved by from Southwest Pacific bases extended their
simultaneous operations in the Southwest Pacific searches to the outer 1imit of endurance. On
area to which the force might have been pro- the 15th, submarines reported large fleet units
ceeding and by nava] patrol planes that shot passing east through the Philippines by San
down or drove off enemy search planes which Bernardino Strait.
might have discovered the carriers in transit. With the Japanese Fleet approaching, a high-
From the eleventh until the landings 4 days later, speed run to the west by the fast carriers was
Guam, Tinian, and Saipan were held under con- considered. The position of the landing forces,
stant attack,
L and on 13 June two fast-carrier task however, was precarious with much needed
groups were sent north to disrupt the movement equipment still being unloaded from the trans-
of enemy aircraft from the home islands through ports. So long as there existed a possibility that
the Bonins. Carrier aircraft destroyed 120 Jap- undetected enemy units might be approaching
anese planes on Iwo and Chichi Jima on 15 and from another quarter, the main elements of the
16 June. United States Pacific Fleet were retained within
Troops went ashore on Saipan as scheduled striking range of Saipan. Once landing forces
on 15 June but met unexpectedly heavy resist- had been committed, they required defense
ance which delayed the planned landings on against any possible interference from outside.
Tinian and Guam from 18 June to 21 July. The The fast carriers, therefore, remained west of
escort carriers, which provided the hulk of the the island until Japanese intentions were defi-
air support and defense against enemy land- nitely known.
based planes, maintained control of the air until At 0730 on 19 June combat air patrols re-
27 June, when 74 Army P-47’s, flown ashore ported increased air activity over Guam, an
from escort carriers, which had brought them indication that the Japanese land-based airforce
from Pearl Harbor, took over the task. Saipan was bringing in planes from the Palaus to co-
was secure on 7 July. ordinate its activities with the approaching
The threat against a vital communications and carriers. By 0950 radar screens began pick-
supply artery brought the enemy fleet to action. ing up large groups of enemy planes to the
On 14 June a submarine reported that large southwest. From the time the first United
forces had sortied from Tawi Tawi in the States planes made contact, air combat persisted

33

.
throughout the day until 1823, when a large the Bonins the participation of the fast carriers
group of enemy planes was intercepted while ended. From 11 June through 5 August,
preparing to land at Guam. The fighter directors United States carrier aircraft had shot down 915
worked efficiently and only a few small, disor- enemy planes and destroyed another 306 on the
ganized flights penetrated to the United States ground. The inner Japanese perimeter had
forces, scoring a bomb hit on the South Dakota been broken and the primary line of communi-
and some near misses which caused negligible cations with the south severed.
damage. In return, the enemy lost 385 planes In the summer of 1944 the area separating
in the air raid 17 on the ground. Central and Southwest Pacific forces was grow-
The defeat of the enemy air force altered the ing smaller. Simultaneous landings at Palau
situation so that the planes of the escort carriers and Morotai in September would bring them
were sufficient to protect the amphibious forces. within 500 miles of one another and make pos-
The fast carriers moved west in pursuit of flee- sible a common advance into the Philippines.
ing Japanese naval units. Although United The plan for Palau also included the capture of
States submarines had already sunk 2 enemy Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines which
carriers, the main fighting strength of the Jap- would provide safe anchorages for the fleet such
anese Fleet remained. Late in the afternoon of as were not available in the Marianas.
20 June a strike was launched and caught the Covering and diversionary operations by Cen-
enemy at extreme range. In the ensuing attack tral Pacific forces began on 31 August when a
another carrier and 2 fleet oilers went down and fast-carrier group hit the Bonin and Volcano
7 ships were left damaged. Even though about 100 Islands followed by further air strikes and cruiser
planes were lost either in combat or through and destroyer bombardment on 1 and 2 Septem-
landing on the water when their fuel ran out. ber. In a11 54 Japanese aircraft were destroyed.
the United States units continued the pursuit The entire task force then raided Palau and Yap
during the night and the next day until it became after which 3 task groups went on for a 6-day
evident that all chance of contact had been lost. series of attacks on Mindanao in the Philippines.
The Battle of the Philippine Sea did not re- Because Japanese forces on Mindanao were un-
sult in the destruction of the enemy fleet, the expectedly weak, the planed attacks were cut
bulk of which escaped to home waters. It did, short on 10 September and the carriers moved
however, mean the end of Japanese carrier avi- north to fuel and prepare for raids on the
ation as an effective fighting force. It never Visayans in the central Philippines.
recovered from the loss of trained air groups Two days of strikes on 12 and 13 September
off Saipan. proved much more profitable. Although Jap-
The remainder of the Marianas campaign anese air attacks were sporadic and ineffective,
passed off without enemy interference. The considerable opposition was experienced over
fast carriers were rotated by groups for replen- airfields, and the final score showed over 300
ishment. Those which remained continued the enemy planes destroyed, and 13 large merchant
neutralization of Iwo Jima and gave support to ships, 20 smaller ones, and 35 sampans or
landings on Guam and Tinian. Even before the barges sunk. 0n conclusion of these strikes, 1
Marine fighter garrison had assumed control at carrier group went south to cover the landings
Guam, the fast carriers went south to photograph on Morotai and 1 east to Palau, while the third
and pound installations at Palau and Yap. With replenished preparatory to attacks on Luzon.
a final carrier raid and surface bombardment of Landings were made by the marines on 15

34
September on Peleliu Island and by the Army sions in full support of the Leyte operations.
on 17 September on Angaur, with direct air sup- Preliminary to the landings, air operations
port furnished by escort carriers augmented by against the Philippines were stepped up. Naval
fast-carrier groups. By 24 September captured patrol-plane searches from the Southwest Pacific
airstrips were in use by shore-based Marine air- were extended to cover the southern and central
craft and a heavy-bomber runway was opera- Philippines and coordinated searches were made
tional by 16 October. Carriers were withdrawn by the Fourteenth Army Air Force based in
on 1 October. The only enemy air opposition China. Throughout October the carriers at-
had been harmless, night attacks by a single float tacked the Ryukyus, Formosa, and the Philip-
plane. Opposition to Southwest Pacific land- pines, destroying another 1,000 aircraft. In
ings at Morotai was light. the most intense air reaction of the war to date,
From 21 to 24 September the fast-carrier task the Japanese sent 600 sorties against the task
force returned to the Philippines. Airfields on force attacking Formosa, but the effectiveness
Luzon and the harbor of Manila were attacked of carrier fighter-plane and antiaircraft defense
for the first time in almost 3 years of Japanese limited the damage to 2 cruisers which were
occupation. After 2 days with excellent results towed back to base.
the carriers returned once more to the Visayans. Directly supported by aircraft from three di-
During the month of September, carrier opera- visions of six escort carriers each, the landings
tions in the Philippines destroyed over 800 en- commenced with the capture of minor outposts
emy aircraft and sank over 150 vessels without in lower Leyte Gulf on 17 and 18 October. On
damage to United States ships and with rel- 20 October the main landings were made on the
atively minor losses in planes. The assault on beaches of upper Leyte Gulf. Although initial
a land mass defended by hundreds of aircraft ground opposition was relatively light, the enemy
dispersed on scores of fields demonstrated on an committed his entire fleet.
unprecedented scale the ability of carriers to The Japanese converged upon Leyte Gulf
gain and maintain control of the air and was from three directions. A southern force, which
basic to any plan for invasion. transited the Sulu Sea, was met and decisively
Because the successes of the fast-carrier defeated in a night surface engagement in Suri-
strikes and intelligence information indicated gao Strait. Enemy carriers approaching from
the weakness of Japanese forces in the Visayans, the north were destroyed by the fast carriers off
it was decided to move against them as rapidly Cape Engano. Although attacked by air on 24
as possible. The plan for the capture of Yap October as it crossed the Sibuyan Sea, a third
was dropped, and landings in the Leyte-Samar enemy force succeeded in passing through San
area were scheduled for 20 October 1944 by Bernardino Strait and surprised an escort-car-
forces under command of General of the Army rier unit off Samar. Despite superiority in
MacArthur. The Seventh Fleet, which operated armament and numbers this force was driven
under General MacArthur, was augmented by off and retired by the route it had come under
units from the Pacific theater including amphibi - constant air attack. The failure of the Jap-
ous elements, 18 escort carriers, and land- and anese to carry off a daring maneuver may be
tender-based patrol planes. The fast-carrier attributed to skillful handling of the older bat-
task forces were retained under Pacific Fleet tleships and to the efficiency of United States
command for covering and supporting the Cent- radars that turned the engagement at Surigao
ral Pacific areas and also were assigned mis- into a disaster and also to the enemy’s inability

35
to coordinate land-based air with the movements efforts to increase their Philippine air strength
of his fleet. As a result, the Japanese lost 4 and on 1 November made strong suicide attacks
carriers, 3 battleships, 10 cruisers, 9 Destroyers, which sank one destroyer and damaged three
a submarine, and some 370 aircraft compared others in Leyte Gulf, the Southwest Pacific com-
with the United States losses of a light carrier, mand immediately requested further assistance
2 escort carriers, 2 destroyers, a destroyer escort, from the carrier forces. A long-planned car-
and 99 planes. rier attack on the Empire was abandoned and
With the Battle for Leyte Gulf control of the throughout November the fast carriers con-
sea passed completely into the hands of the tinued to strike at Japanese aircraft and shipping
United States. The Japanese Navy ceased to in the central Philippines and on Luzon. Over
exist as an effective fighting force. Although 700 aircraft and 134,000 yons of shipping were
at Coral Sea, Midway, and the Philippine Sea destroyed in these attacks.
contact had been between air components of the Although bad weather severely hampered air-
respective fleets, the Battle for Leyte Gulf, one field construction, by early December, Army and
of the great naval engagements of history, was Marine shore-based squadrons had taken over
a combined air-surface action, which demon- control of the air around Leyte. With the
strated the integration and flexibility of the ground campaign progressing satisfactorily,
United States naval forces. It was the combi- Southwest Pacific forces prepared to resume
nation of various agents that brought victory as their advance by landing on Mindoro Island.
the following tabulation of enemy losses will Since the invasion fleet would have to move
show: 13 war vessels were sunk by carrier air- through confined waters within the Philippine
craft alone, 8 by naval surface ships alone, 2 by Archipelago, where it would be peculiarly vul-
submarines alone;
1 a cruiser, crippled by sur- nerable to enemy air attack, direct coverage was
face action, was later sunk by carrier aircraft; furnished from escort carriers of the Seventh
a second such cripple sank after repeated heavy Fleet, which beat off suicide attacks and re-
attacks by Army B–24s; a carrier, mortally stricted losses to two LST’s sunk and a cruiser
damaged by carrier air attack, was sunk by sur- and destroyer damaged. To prevent enemy air
face action; and a cruiser damaged by carrier operations at the source three fast-carrier task
aircraft was sunk by a submarine. groups maintained continuous air patrols over
United States battle damage and aircraft Japanese fields on Luzon. Often referred to as
losses had forced one of the three escort-carrier the Navy’s rolling blanket, this new technique
units to retire, and a second was badly hurt by accounted for 298 enemy planes in three days,
suicide attacks. This reduction in air strength three-fourths of them on the ground. A fur-
at the objective area made it necessary to call in ther 45 Japanese aircraft were shot down by the
the fast carriers for close support. For the re- combat patrols of the escort carriers and another
-
mainder of the month the fast carriers flew 55 were either destroyed by ships’ gunfire or
fighter sweeps over the Visayans and Luzon. expended themselves in suicide dives.
On 27 October, with only one airfield in opera- With Mindoro in the hands of United States
tion, the Army’s Far East Air Forces assumed troops and with the end of organized resistance
responsibility for air defense and support of at Leyte on 20 December, the way was open to
troops in the Leyte-Samar area, and within a commence operations against the important Lu-
few days the remaining carriers withdrew. Be- zon area, the center of Japanese power in the
cause the Japanese were making strenuous islands. Army aircraft began a series of strikes

36
on the great complex of airfields around Manila began suicide attacks on the advancing ships,
and completed the disorganization of Japanese sinking an escort carrier. On the following day
air forces which had been well advanced by over Kamikazes caused damage to another escort
three months of carrier-plane attacks. Already carrier, 2 cruisers, and a destroyer. To relieve
1,500 enemy planes had been destroyed on the the escort carriers already fully occupied with
ground in the Philippines and during the three- defense of the amphibious fleet, the Southwest
month period carrier aircraft had accounted for Pacific command requested that the fast carriers
3,800 Japanese planes in the air and on the operate south of their originally designated area
ground in the Philippines-Formosa-Ryukus so as to cover the chain of bases centered around
area . Clark field near Manila. Repeated strikes on
The climax of the Philippine campaign was 6 and 7 January destroyed over 110 enemy
the invasion of Lingayen Gulf in western Luzon. planes and combined with the sweep of land-
The military objectives of the operation were the based planes and the activities of the escort
seizure of the central Luzon plain and the Ma- carriers, reduced enemy sorties from about 130
nila area and the denial to the enemy of the on the sixth to less than half that number on
northern entrance to the South China Sea. The the seventh.
reinforced Seventh Fleet was to transport, pro- Some aircraft, however, escaped the vigilance
tect, and land the invasion forces by a route of the attacking forces. Since every Japanese
passing west of Luzon through the inland waters plane, except a handful reserved for the evacu-
of the Philippines. Direct air support was to be ation of staff officers, was designated for a sui-
provided by escort carriers while the Army Air cide mission, the invasion forces were exposed
Forces neutralized Japanese air bases to the to serious danger. Although Japanese orders
south and the fast carriers took care of those in directed that Kamikazes concentrate on the trans-
Formosa, the Ryukus, northern Luzon. ports, actualy the combatant ships in Lingayen
Army heavy bombers began raiding Luzon Gulf received the heaviest damage. The situ-
airfields on 22 December. Navy search planes ation appeared so serious that the fast carriers,
from Leyte and Mindoro, coordinated with which had planned to attack Formosa on 7 Jan-
long-range aircraft from China, extended their uary, were retained to continue their raids on
patrols of the sea approaches to cover all the Luzon. Kamikazes continued to appear in twos
Philippines and the South China Sea. On 3 and threes for a week or more but they were
January, as mine-sweeping, bombardment, and merely the remnants of the enemy air forces in
escort-carrier units started their northward ad- the Philippines. On 8 January, the Japanese
vance through the Sulu Sea, the fast carriers naval air commander had left for Singapore and
initiated 2 days of strikes against Formosa and his staff for Formosa, while the commanding
the Ryukyus.
. Despite Japanese efforts at dis- general of the Fourth Air Army retired, without
persal and camouflage, over 100 aircraft were his army, to the hills of Luzon.
destroyed, the majority on the ground. De- The troops went ashore on 9 January. The
signed to prevent reinforcement of Japanese air conquest of the Luzon plain turned out to be
power on Luzon, this effort also reduced the easier than expected, and without air sup-
number of planes on Formosa which were avail- port the enemy could put up effective resistance
able for direct attacks on United States forces in only in mountain areas. When on 17 January
Lingayen Gulf. On 4 January 1945, the the Army Air Forces with which Marine squad-
hoarded remnants of the Philippine air garrison rons were operating assumed responsibility for
 AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
Iwo Jima, 19 February 1945

air support, the escort carriers withdrew. Al- Bay in Indo-China. Such small vessels as the
though the Japanese continued to hold out in Japanese tried to slip through after January
parts of the Philippines until the end of the war, were effectively checked by the collaboration of
the principal naval advantages of the request submarines and naval land-based patrol planes.
were gained by mid-January. United States The Philippines campaign revealed the poor
forces not only controlled the sea but had sev- state of the Japanese air force. Although pro-
ered the last route to the Southern Resources duction of planes had been increased in 1943
Area. Between 10 and 19 January the fast and 1944 so that more aircraft were available
carriers were in the South China Sea, and than ever before and even though the quality of
American planes destroyed 57 ships along the the planes improved, the ratio of losses in com-
coast of Asia, ranging as far south as Camranh bat mounted higher and higher. All United
38
States aviators agreed on the cause. The Jap- port and defense were furnished by escort car-
anese had failed to replace the superb pilots riers with the fast carriers preventing the enemy
who rode so high in the first year of the war. from bringing up reinforcements. The Marines
The enemy's training program had broken down. on shore, however, encountered the most vicious
With adequate numbers of aircraft and poorly and determined defense of the Pacific war. The
trained pilots the Japanese resorted in despera- Japanese had taken advantage of the natural
tion to Kamikaze, suicide tactics; they turned terrain to build a complete underground defense
-
their aircraft into guided missiles and flew them system much of which defied the most intense
onto the decks of United States ships. It was air and surface bombardment. In many parts
an effective, dangerous, but not decisive, ma- of the island the marines had to dig out and kill
neuver. The percentage of hits did not exceed the enemy individually. From 19 February to
that achieved by American carrier flyers using 16 March bitter fighting continued until the Jap-
conventional bombing methods. anese garrison was virtually eliminated.
After the conquest of the Marianas in June If the price for Iwo Jima was high, the results
1944, Central Pacific forces had turned south to were also great. On 8 March, naval patrol
meet Southwest Pacific forces in the Philippines. planes began to use the island for searches that
In February 1945, they were ready again to covered the coast of Japan as far as Tokyo.
move north and west in operations preliminary Army fighter planes from Iwo escorted the B–29’s
to the invasion of Japan itself. Iwo Jima was of the Twentieth Air Force on their devastating
selected as the next objective in order to secure raids against Japanese industries, and the big
a base from which Army fighters could escort bombers used the island as an emergency-land-
B-29 strikes on the Empire and also to stop ing field. Between March 1945 and the close
damaging raids from Iwo against the crowded of the war over 2,400 B–29’s put in at Iwo with
airfields on Saipan. Preliminary bombings of an incalculable saving in planes and 1ives. The
Iwo and the minor air base at Chichi Jima were existence of an emergency field made it possible
conducted by shore-based aircraft from the Mari - to reduce the amount of gas carried for reasons
anas. Reinforced by B–29 reconnaissance of safety and to increase the bomb load.
flights, naval shore-based and tender-based pa- Finally, from Iwo Jima air-sea rescue planes
trol planes extended the air search to the coast could cover most of the B-29 route from the
of Japan itself. Covering operations for the Marianas to Japan.
invasion were begun by the fast carriers on The reconquest of the Philippine’s had per-
. .
16 and 17 Feruary when the first carrier raids mitted the United States to sever the connection
were made on the Tokyo area of the Japanese with the Southern Resources Area. The Japa-
home islands. On those two days and again nese could obtain only a trickle of supplies from
on the 25th strong air opposition was encoun- the mainland by way of the East China Sea and
tered despite bad weather. During these raids, the Straits of Tsushima. Before an assault on
420 Japanese planes were shot down, 228 were the home islands could be launched, more fleet
destroyed on the ground, and a limited number 1
anchorages, airfields, and staging areas for
of sorties were directed against strategic targets troops were required. All of these objectives
such as aircraft-engine plants and airplane could be satisfied by the occupation of Okinawa
factories. in the Ryukyus.
-. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs
The pattern of attack at Iwo followed that of of Staff directed that Central Pacific forces
other amphibious operations. Direct air sup- undertake the operation.

39
 The assault on Okinawa was the largest am- light. Starting on 6 April, the Japanese air
-
phibious operation of the Pacific war. The forces struck with a fury never before encount-
joint expeditionary force included 1,213 ships, ered. The scale of effort in suicide missions
564 support aircraft based on escort carriers, was the outstanding and most spectacular aspect
and 451,866 Army and Marine ground troops. of the Okinawa operation. During the period
Also available for air support as well as to pre- from 6 April to 22 June, 10 major, organized
vent enemy interference and reinforcement were Kamikaze attacks were carried out. The rel-
a fast-carrier force with 82 ships and 919 planes atively short distance from Japanese air bases
and a British carrier force with 22 ships and in Kyushu and Formosa permitted employment
244 planes. For interdiction and neutralization by the enemy of planes of all types and pilots
raids against enemy air bases there were the of every degree of proficiency. In 896 enemy
Army'S Twentieth and Far East Air Forces. air raids approximately 4,000 planes were de-
Preassault operations were initiated by fast- stroyed in combat of which 1,900 were Kami -
carrier attacks on Kyushu, Shikoku, and west- kazes. Damage to United States forces
ern Honshu on 18 and 19 March. Beginning amounted to 28 ships sunk by air attack of
on 23 March, the fast carriers operated continu- which 26 were by Kamikaze planes, and an-
ously for 2½ months in the Okinawa area, pro- other 225 damaged, of‘ which 164 were by
viding direct air support and cover for the am- Kamikazes.
phibious forces. These were the longest sus- The Japanese Navy made a last, despairing
tained carrier operations of the war. effort. At 1520, 6 April, a force consisting of
Islands in the Kerama Retto, 15 miles to the the battleship Yamato, the light cruiser Yahagi
west of Okinawa, were seized on 26 March in and eight destroyers sortied from Tokuyama on
order to provide a protected anchorage and a the Inland Sea with the object of attacking the
base for logistic support. From tenders sea- invasion fleet off Okinawa at daylight on the
plane searches extended far into the Yellow Sea morning of 8 April. This force was sighted by
and to the Straits of Tsushima between Korea United States submarines while proceeding south
and Japan. Day and night antisubmarine pa- through Bungo Channel during the evening of
trols were flown by patrol and carrier planes 6 April. Contact was regained the next morn-
-
completely around- the southern Ryukyus
. . where ing by naval patrol planes and by air search
the surface ships were operating. Search air- groups froml the fast-carrier force. Commenc-
craft, acting in coordination with submarines, ing at about 1240 a series of coordinated attacks
watched the exits from the Inland Sea. by carrier fighters, dive-bomber, and torpedo
At 0830 on 1 April 1945, the amphibious as- planes resulted in the sinking of the Yamato.
sault on Okinawa itself began. Landings were the Yahagi, and four destroyers. Suffering
made over the western beaches against unex varying degrees of damage the remaining de-
pectedly light opposition, and by noon the two stroyers retired to Saseho.
airfields at Yontan and Kadena had becn cap- Heavy air attacks on the amphibious and cov-
tured. As operations ashore progressed, Jap- ering forces continued during April and May,
anese resistance increasd. On 19 April heavily after which they declined rapidly. During this
defended positions to the south were encountered period valuable support was rendered by the
and a long drawn-out battle began. Twenty-first Bomber Command and the Far East
The expected air reaction was slow to ma- Air Forces in attacks on air fields in Kyushu
terialize and for the first few days was relatively and Formosa. In April approximately 40 per-

40

A
cent of the effective sorties of the Twenty-first encountered. B–29’s contributed to the stran-
Bomber Command were on such missions. On gulation of Japan by extensive mine laying in the
7 April the first of the land-based Marine air- Inland Sea and the Straits of Shimonoseki, while
craft attached to the Tactical Air Force arrived Privateers of Fleet Air Wing One carried out
on Okinawa. Consisting originally of Marine the same type of operation along the coasts of
aircraft to which were later added Army fight- Korea. Submarines penetrated the Japan Sea,
ers, this force operated jointly for over 2 months the last link with the mainland outside the reach
with the escort-carrier planes and ultimately re- of United States air prover. Army and Marine
lieved the carriers of responsibility for air de- planes from Okinawa launched a series of raids
fense and direct support of ground troops. on installations in Kyushu that were to begin the
Units of Fleet Air Wing One, including both softening-up for the first landings on the home
seaplanes and landplanes, were based in the islands. As commerce dropped to a mere
Kerama Retto and at Yontan airfield on Okinawa trickle that was of necessity directed to secon-
. . . .
and conducted search and antisubmarine opera- dary ports from which rail distribution was a l-
tions and antishipping strikes in the East China most impossible, the Twentieth Air Force in the
Sea and Korea areas. A British carrier force Marianas continued with the methodical annihi-
neutralized Japanese air bases in Sakishima lation of Japanese industrial centers, and fast-
Gunto and Formosa which were a constant threat carrier task forces of the British and American
from the southwest. This force was present Navies conducted a series of raids to destroy the
from 26 March to 20 April and again from 3 to remnants of the Japanese Fleet and attacked
25 May, and although relatively small, it pro- strategic points in northern Honshu and Hok-
vided valuable and necessary assistance. kaido that were beyond the area of B-29
Ashore the operations proceeded slowly. By operations.
20 April all organized Japanese opposition in Because of a desperate fuel situation Japanese
the northern two-thirds of the island had ceased. ships were found at their dock or anchored in
On 19 April the ground forces launched a large- sheltered inlets. The enemy air forces still
scale offensive in the south, but slow progress possessed about 10,000 planes, of which one-
was made against stubborn resistance. Japa- half were combat types. Together with a sup-
nese defense positions were wel1 planned. The ply of fuel and semitrained pilots all aircraft
rugged terrain with many natural caves and were being hoarded to use in suicide attacks
elaborate under ground installationls presented against an invasion force. Since the enemy re-
difficult obstacles. Direct air support was fur- fused combat, until a landing had been begun,
nished by both fast and escort carriers and by United States aircraft roamed at will over Japan.
land-based Marine planes. Naval gunfire was In a series of 9 raids between 10 July and 15
provided throughout the campaign. On 21 August, the fast carriers destroyed over 1,200
June all organized resistance on Okinawa ceased aircraft, 90 percent of them on the ground, dam-
and the last escort carriers departed after a stay aged most of what was left of the Japanese Navy,
of 88 days in the area. and destroyed the Aomori-Hokadate railroad
From 1 July to 15 August, when the Japanese ferry system that connected Honshu and Hok-
acccpted Allied terms, the final actions of the kaido Islands. On occasion the battleships and
war took place. From Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and cruisers of the carrier task force moved in close
the Philippines naval search planes scoured the enough to bombard industrial plants on shore.
waters and sank whatever enemy shipping they The unremitting military pressure, in which

41
Navy, Marine, Army, and British air units all The war was over.
played their appointed roles, underlined an In the advance across the Central Pacific the
argument going on in Japan itself. The inva- carrier task force with its extreme flexibility and
sion of Okinawa had brought a change of cab- mobility had been the dominant factor. It
inet, and the new prime minister, Admiral Su- established the conditions under which long-
zuki, was feeling his way toward peace through range amphibious advances were possible. It
a difficut domestic situation. It was a case of never failed to gain command of the air at the
overruling the military and naval fanatics who required time and place, successively over-
had long dominated Japanese policy and pre- whelming the air garrisons not only of the Jap-
cipitated the war in the first place. They de- anese perimeter but of the major fortresses of
sired to coutinue the struggle to the bitter end on Formosa and the Philippines, and it maintained
the excuse that some compromise peace might command of the air until shore-based air forces
be attained. Otherwise they would drag the could be established. This remained true even
country to ruin with themselves. Between 6 and when the enemy in desperation converted the
10 August, two atomic bombs were dropped and remnants of his air force into guided missiles.
Russia entered the war on the side of the A1lies. In a naval war conducted across vast stretches
Whether these events determined the Japanese of ocean, it destroyed the Japanese carrier air
to immediate acceptance of the Potsdam Decla- force at Midway and in the Marianas, and the
ration will probably never be known; they cer- surface fleet in the battle for Leyte Gulf. In an
tainly provided a powerful punch line to an amphibious war where it was necessary to storm
already winning argument. the beaches against a well-emplaced and fanat-
0n the morning of 15 August the fast carriers ically tenacious enemy, it excelled in the direct
launched their aircraft for raids on the Tokyo support of troops. In a war whose pace was at
area. The first strike had already gone in and all times governed by what was logistically pos-
the seecond was approaching the target when sible, the carrier task force was an economical
word of the Japanese surrender arrived. In a weapon independent of the investments in time,
last demonstration of the excellent control main- personnel, and priceless shipping space required
tained over air-borne planes, the second strike for construction of airfields and facilities soon
was recalled. During the day combat patrols to be left far behind the advancing front. Its
were kept flying. Either out of curiosity or mobility gave to the attacker the advantages of
piloted by hotheads who refused to accept the continuous initiative and surprise. NO weapon
emperor’s orders, a few Japanese aircraft ap- is equally good at all times or in all places, but
proached too close and were shot down “in a for the Pacific war the carrier task force was
friendly fashion,” as Admiral Halsey termed it. ideal.

42
VII TACTICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF NAVAL AVIATION

A prerequisite to control of the sea was con- equipped a number of its standard Hellcats and
trol of the air above it. In the first days of the Corsairs with the necessary instruments and de-
war, the Japanese prevented the British from veloped special training for night pilots. Before
interfering with the movement of troops to Ma- the Army’s Black Widow reached the Pacific
laya by a successful aerial attack on the Prince theater the Navy had night fighters on all large
of Wales and the Repulse. To drive the enemy carriers and at land bases in forward areas.
from the air in vital areas was the first mission Fighter directors worked out a technique by
of naval aviation. With the development of which interceptions were made as far as 80
night tactics this became a 24-hour job which miles from base. With a loss to themselves of
required specially equipped night planes as well 3 aircraft. Hellcats alone shot down 163 enemy
as conventional day fighters. For patrol planes planes in night combat.
-
it meant the ability to penetrate enemy-held areas Important as were these special aspects of air
alone, to possess the firepower necessary to drive activities, the enemy lost the major portion of
off interceptors, .and to return to base with vital his air forces in conventiona l daylight opera-
information. tions. Although, owing to the destruction of
When the Catalina proved to have insufficient Japanese records, exact figures will never be
speed and armament to defend itself, the Navy obtainable, naval aviation accounted for three-
obtained Liberators for use in forward areas. fifths or almost 15,000 of the total enemy planes
Even this type did not have enough guns and destroyed. Of these, the most reliable record
required other modifications to change it from credits 9,000 as having been shot down and the
a high-level bomber into a patrol plane. From remainder as having been knocked out on the
experiments that amounted to altering 50 per- ground. In aerial combat the Navy lost only
cent of the Liberator’s internal arrangements, 897 aircraft for an advantage of 10 to 1.
the Navy developed the Privateer. In 1944 and Even during the period of heavy losses in
1945, planes of these 2 types flew 15,000 patrols 1941-42, naval aircraft destroyed 830 enemy
and destroyed 504 of the 937 Japanese aircraft planes while suffering 265 air combat losses for
encountered, against a loss of 18. During the a favorable ratio of 3 to 1. In 1944 when naval
same period, Mariner and Coronado flying boats aviation cracked the enemy air defenses of Ra-
on similar missions shot down 24 enemy planes baul and carried the offensive to the Marshalls,
and lost 3. Carolines, Marianas, and Bonins, and to the ex-
In 1943, Japanese night torpedo attack indi- tensive chains of enemy air bases in the Philip-
cated a need for night fighters, but neither the pines and Formosa, the ratio rose to 15 to 1;
Army nor Navy had suitable radar-equipped 4,021 Jap planes shot down against 261 air
planes available. Royal Air Force experience combat losses. In 1945 when the naval offen-
favored the development of specially designed sive concentrated on the Ryukus and Japan, the
twin-engine, two-seater aircraft. Since the Navy ratio rose further to 22 to 1; 3,161 Japanese
could neither wait for the completion of the new planes shot out of the air against 146 losses
planes nor could it hope to operate them from suffered at the hands of enemy pilots.
carriers without further design changes, it The above figures, include the air engagements
726015--47---4 43
of all types of naval aircraft. Fighter planes in combat on 742 occasions, and lost only 18
naturally enjoyed a superior record and de- planes to enemy fighters. Although many of
stroyed 13 Japanese planes in the air for each 1 these flights occurred in areas where the en-
lost in combat. During the last 12 months of emy’s air force had already been annihilated,
the war, the Hellcat, mainstay of the carrier the remainder indicated the effectiveness of the
forces, knocked down 3,518 Jap planes against cover furnished by Navy fighters. Even in 1942
a 1oss of 160; the Corsair, used by both Navy when the Japanese air force was at its peak, it
and Marine pilots, 1,042 against 49; the Wild- customarily lost 20 to 40 percent of its aircraft
cat, used on escort carriers, 377 against 9 losses. in any mission encountered by Navy planes.
These ratios were 22 to 1, 21 to 1, and 42 to 1, Although complete figures are not available for
respectively. both land and carrier-based aircraft, the latter
Control of the air was also reflected in the destroyed 70 percent of the enemy bombers and
ability of a bombing effort to reach the enemy 50 percent of the fighters intercepted. No air
and the corresponding ability to break up and force could stand such losses over an extended
prevent an enemy attack from reaching its ob- period of time without becoming in fact, if not
jective. During 1944 and 1945, Navy and in name, a suicide force. The Kamikaze merely
Marine dive-bombing and torpedo planes made acknowledged an existing situation.
102,000 sorties against the Japanese, engaged Aerial combat was essentially a defensive
COMPARATIVE U. S. & JAPANESE AIRCRAFT LOSSES
13,000
12,300
11,000
I0,000
9,000
8,000
7,000 D
6,000
5,000 AT
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
1,000
2,000
U.S. NAVY U.S.NAVY & U. S.ARMY
CARRIER MARINE AIR
AIRCRAFT LAND-BASED FORCES
AIRCRAFT
Comparative Aircraft Losses.--Japanesc 1 0 s S are based on the best available United States Army and Navy figures. Although
it is impossible, to check these figures from enemy sources, they are believed to be approximately correct. Japanese aircraft
destroyed by British Empire and Netherlands Air Forces are not included.

44
function designed to protect the fighter’s own thirds. Although at no time was it possible to
air-borne or surface forces from direct attack. dispense with combat air patrols only about 28
If freed from this duty, the fighter plane could percent of the enemy aircraft destroyed were
perform operations of an offensive nature. Of shot down in the defense of United States forces
500,000 sorties flown by naval fighter planes in as against 32 percent in the air over enemy ships
the Pacific war, only 12,000, or 2½ percent, and installations and 40 percent on the ground.
resulted in aerial combat; the remainder was In overcoming the Japanese in the air, carrier
largely for other purposes. planes destroyed 18 enemy to each of their own
More than able to overcome air-borne oppo- that was lost, while naval and Marine land-based
sition, naval aviation pressed its attack against aircraft enjoyed an advantage of 8 to 1. The
airfields and grounded planes. Because during disparity resulted not from a difference in plane
amphibious operations vast numbers of ships in types, which were the same, but from the ability
a restricted landing area were especially vul- to concentrate carriers and send them into the
nerable to bombing, the fast carriers first tried heart of a Japanese-held area. Although before
to clear the air of enemy planes and then went the war it was frequently stated that the added
on to destroy parked aircraft and to render fields weight and other design factors necessary in
inoperable, thus stopping hostile air activity at carrier planes made it impossible to operate
the source. Approximately one-third of the them against shore-based aircraft, this turned
sorties by carrier aircraft were for this purpose out not to be true. Carriers were mobile units
and in some campaigns the number reached two- that, when assembled in sufficient numbers, COU ld
JAPANESE WARSHIP TONNAGE SUNK, WORLD WAR II

BY U.S.NAVY BY U.S. NAVY BY U.S. NAVY BY U.S.ARMY BY ALL

AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT SUBMARlNES SURFACE AIRCRAFT
ALONE AND OTHER ALONE VESSELS AND MINES OTHER AGENTS &
AGENTS ALONE COMBINATIONS
Warship Tonnagc Sunk. --The predominance of United States naval forces, particularly aircraft, in the destruction of the Jap-
anese, Fleet is clearly illustrated above. United States Navy units alone accounted for 85 percent of all sinkings and par-
ticipated with other forces in an additional 5 percent. Naval aircraft alone accounted for 38 percent and participated in
an additional 8 percent.

45
overwhelm an enemy’s airforce in any area that Naval aircraft were also responsible for dam-
the United States desired to penetrarte. Develop- aging a large number of major enemy warships
ment of radar and fighter-direction technique in- which then required extended periods of repair.
sured only a minimum of planes being used for This damage frequently had as important an
defense and relieved the remainder for offensive effect on the course of the war as the sinkings.
missions against either shore installations or Hits on units of the Japanese carrier force in
hostile fleet movements. With control of the air the Battle of the Coral Sea were an important
overhead and with adequarte air support, the factor in the abandoment of plans for invading
Unitd States Fleet could move freely about the Port Moresby. Similar damage in the Battle
sea and land troops and equipment wherever the of the Eastern Solomons caused the withdrawal
strategic plan demanded. of Japanese naval forces, giving our sea and land
Command of the sea also required the destruc- forces in the Solomons a needed breathing spell
tion of Japanese warships which might threaten and opportunity for reinforcement. Damage to
our ships using Pacific waters. It was further Japanese carriers by carrier attacks in 1943
nessary to deprive Japan of its merchant ma- resulted in the permanent withdrawal of heavy
rine both to prevent its use to reinforce and sup- warships from Rabaul and removed the threat
ply enemy bases and to cripple the entire of naval interference with the occupation of
Japanese economy, which was dependent on ship- Bougainville. After the latter actions the Jap-
ping for the bulk of its oil, iron ore, cooking coal, anese refused again to risk heavy warships
rubber, aluminum and other nonferrous metals. within range of naval aircraft, except with
and for much of its food. massed carrier support as in the Battle of the
-
Naval aircraft were highly effective against Philippine Sea, or on an admittedly last-ditch
shipping targets. Dive bombers were developed sucide mission as in the Battle for Leyte Gulf
by the Navy as a means of controlling maximum and the last sortie of the Yamato.
accuracy with minimum hazard to planes in at- Important in naval air action against enemy
tacks on heavily armed warships. The torpedo warships was the ability to inflict damage with
plane was designed to launch the most lethal a minimum expenditure of effort. Only about
weapon yet devised for shipping attack. To 160 bombers and escorting fighters, carrying
these initial tactics were added three additional about 80 tons of bombs and torpedoes, made the
means of attacking ships: masthead bombing, attacks which sank 1 Japanese carrier and dam-
pioneered in the Pacific by the Fifth Air Force, aged another at the Coral Sea. In the attacks
rocket attack, and strafing. on the second day of the Battle of Midway,
Armed with these weapons, naval aircraft which resulted in the sinking of 4 carriers and
sank 745,000 tons of Japanese warships and co- proved to be the major turning point of the Pa-
operated with other agents in sinking an addi- cific war, the hits on enemy carriers were in-
tional 167,000 tons. Included in the vessels flicted by about 80 dive bombers. The naval air
sunk by naval aircraft, either alone or with other contribution to the crucial Battle of Guadlalcanal
agents, were 6 out of Japan’s 12 battleships, 12 amounted to less than 350 attack sorties and less
of 20 carriers, 18 of 40 cruisers. Of all sink- than 160 tons of bombs and torpedoes. A bat-
ings in the class of destroyer or larger, naval tleship, a cruiser, and 11 troop transports were
and Marine aircraft accounted for 48 percent credited sunk in whole or in part by these air
and for about 42 percent of combatant tonnage attacks, and other vessels were damaged. In
of all types. the battle for Leyte Gulf two elements of the

46
3-pronged attack were routed with a total nage destroyed by naval planes exceeds that of
expenditure of only 750 tons of bombs. any other agent except submarines which
Naval aircraft unaided sank over 1,500,000 accounted for over half the total.
tons of Japanese merchant vessels during the Complete data on losses of smaller vessels are
war; in cooperation with other forces they as- almost impossible to obtain. It is believed that
-
sisted in sinking another 200,000 tons. These submarines played a smaller and Army and
figures included only vessels of 500 tons or over Navy aircraft and aerial mines a larger part in
but not the hundreds of small barges, sampans, sinking these vessels. Carrier fighters devoted
-
luggers, and other vessels sunk by naval air- an enormous volume of effort to strafing and
craft, whose total has never been compiled. rocket attack on these vulnerable targets. Naval
About 50 percent, 800,000 tons, went down in patrol bombers whose daily searches covered the
the 4 monthS of the Philippines campaign from entire western Pacific made hundreds of indi-
mid-September 1944 to mid-January 1945; vidual masthead-bombing and strafing attacks on
200,000 tons in the Truk, Marianas, and Rabaul isolated small ships. Army bombers and fight-
raids of February 1944; and 100,000 more in ers were effective against these vessels along the
March 1944 at Palau and elsewhere. The ton- of New Guinea and the Bismarck Sea, the
JAPANESE TANKER TONNAGE SUNK, WORLD WAR II
THOUSAND
TONS SUNK

399

95

BY U.S. NAVY BY U.S. NAVY BY U. S.ARMY BY ALL OTHER

SUBMARINES AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT AGENTS AND
ALONE ALONE AND MINES COMBINATIONS

47
East Indies, the Philippines, and Formosa. In the Japanese from harassing communications.
the last months of the war mines laid by B–29’s Strikes were also made against specific beach-
further crippled the remnants of this junior head defenses and adjacent supply facilities in
merchant fleet, by then confined largely to the preparation for a landing. Finally, planes af-
inland waters of Japan, and harassed even there forded direct close support to ground troops.
by both carrier and naval patrol planes. Although the proportion in each of the three
Only 9 naval planes and only about 4 tons categories is not known, naval aircraft directed
of bombs or torpedoes were required, on the 54 percent of their total attack effort to enemy
average, to sink each 1,000 tons of Japanese war troops, weapons, equipment, defense installa-
or merchant shipping. In executing its decisive tions, and supply facilities. This figure is ex-
campaigns against the enemy fleet and merchant clusive of sorties to neutralize airfields or at-
marine, naval aviation expended only 14 per- tacks on Japanese industrial and transportation
cent of its attack effort and only about 4 percent facilities.
of its combat sorties. The effectiveness of air support was measured
Naval aircraft operated against enemy ground not by the damage inflicted on installations but
forces in all parts of the Pacific. Much of this by the rapidity with which marines and soldiers
effort was devoted to attacks whose main purpose advanced against the enemy. The variety of
was the attrition of enemy units either in advance targets in close-support missions was very great
of an invasion or on bypassed islands to prevent and was dictated by the need of the troops, the

TONNAGE OF JAPANESE MERCHANT VESSELS SUNK, WORLD WAR II

(VESSELS OF 500 TONS AND OVER)

4,00
I
3,000

2,000

1,000

0
BY U.S. NAVY BY U.S.NAVY BY U.S. NAVY AICRAFT BY U.S.ARMY BY U.S.ARMY BY ALL
SUBMARINES AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT OTHER
ALONE ALONE AND OTHER AGENTS ALONE AGENTS &
MINES
COMBINATIONS
Japanese Merchant Vessels Sunk. ---Submarines alone accounted for 54 percent of sinkings; naval aircraft alone, 18 percent. Navy
units participated in 77 percent of all sinkings and were the sole agents in 76 percent. The principal elements represented
in the last bar of the chart are losses to British Empire and Netherlands forces and marine casualties.

48
suitability of the target for airplane attack, and size of the target decreased, or when weather and
the availability of aircraft and other weapons other factors affected accuracy, the full ton-
such as naval gunfire and shore-based artillery. nage dropped remained a cost of the attack, but
Enemy gun positions on the reverse side of a the effect on the enemy depended on what propor-
hill could be put out of operation only by air- tion of the bombs hit the target. For example the
craft. Planes frequently discovered their own Strategic Bombing Survey reported that of 30,-
targets behind Japanese lines and, as in the case 000 tons of bombs dropped in high-altitude at-
of supplies or reinforcements, prevented their tacks on 3 large German oil and chemical plants
reaching the front lines. Frequently aircraft with a total area of 3½ square miles, only 1
were called upon to keep the enemy down as bomb in 8 hit within the plant fences and only 1
friendly troops moved up. Such activities can- of 30 inflicted physical damage to manufacturing
not be represented statistically. Although in facilities.
ground combat the achievement of victory rested Probably the largest Japanese targets custom-
with the foot soldier, naval aviation provided arily bombed by naval aircraft were airfields.
him with invaluable assistance, facilitated his The average large runway had an area of about
advance, and by its accurate methods of attack 50 acres, considerably smaller than one of the
saved thousands of American lives. oil plants mentioned above. The largest type of
The foregoing discussion has set forth naval enemy ship attacked by naval planes, a large air-
aviation’s part in the Pacific war. It demon- craft carrier, had a deck area of about 2 acres.
strates how effectively the Navy balanced the po- Against a submarine, the lethal area in which a
tentialities of air weapons against their limita- bomb had to hit was about a quarter acre and on
tions, developed them, and used them with other a beachhead a gun position presented an area of
weapons to implement the strategic plan. Yet only one two-hundredth of an acre. The tonnage
it is pertinent briefly to isolate naval aviation of bombs dropped in attacks against such targets
from the naval structure as a whole to consider was of very little significance but the question
its efficiency as an air force. often arose whether the target could he efficiently
One of the most pervasive phenomena of the bombed at all. The statistical chance against
war was the popular tendency to evaluate the hitting a 25-foot diameter gun revetment was 10,-
effectiveness of air attack in terms of bomb ton- 000 to 1 in high-altitude bombing, 600 to 1 in
nage. This was readily understandable in view low-altitude glide bombing, 300 to 1 in the most
of our national predilection for great size and accurate dive bombing, and about 100 to 1 in
quantitative measures and the ease of compari- masthead bombing. The development of the
son which a tonnage figure provides. From the high explosive rocket reduced the chance to 21 to
standpoint of military analysis bomb tonnage is 1; and, if it was desired to put the gun temporarily
to some extent a measure of effort but only oc- out of action while troops advanced or friendly
casionally a good measure of effectiveness. It bombers were carrying out an attack, this could
was most significant in attacks on large urban cen- he accomplished by a fighter plane with a few
ters made under favorable weather conditions so hundred rounds of ammunition.
that most bombs could not help but hit the area. Except for patrol planes, naval aviation oper-
Yet even in the attacks on Japanese cities, there ated from carriers or from small land fields in
was wide variation in the area laid waste per ton advanced areas, both of which required small air-
of bombs depending on the type of bombs used craft with limited bomb capacity. As an integral
and on the concentration of their fall. As the part of the naval forces, it had as targets primarily

49
 naval objecctives--ships, parked aircraft, shore over 100,000 rockets in the Okinawa campaign.
installations and close support of amphibious Finally, naval planes employed machine guns and
troops. Because the types of plane and the na- light cannon against many small targets.
ture of the targets put a premium on accuracy and In measuring the tactical effectiveness of an
effectiveness of each bomb dropped, naval avia- air force it was not the volume of effort but attain-
tion did not engage in high-altilude, pattern bomb- ment of objectives and the cost of results that
ing. Three methods of bomb attacks were com- counted. Each type of target and operation had
monly used: glide bombing at altitudes from to be considered separately; there was no com-
1,000 to 4,000 feet; dive bombing at the same mon standard. To destroy half of Tokyo re-
altitudes but with an angle of 65° to 90°; and quired 14,000 tons of bombs. Less than one-
minimum-altitude, or masthead bombing, from twentieth of this tonnage won the battle for Leyte
50 to 300 feet. Especially against war vessels Gulf; a few dozen dive bombers won the Battle of
aerial torpedoes were used at close range and low Midway. The comparative importance of these
altitude. With the introduction of the high- achievements is not found in any measure of
explosive rocket in 1944, naval aviation acquired sorties or bomb tonnage. They are in fact, not
a weapon more suitable than bombs against such comparable at all, except as each was a vital con-
targets as small shipping and ground installa- tribution to victory achieved by skilled applica-
tions. An index of its importance was the use of tion of appropriate weapons.

50
VIII LESSONS LEARNED

The lessons of any naval war are of great im- tremely doubtful that Allied superiority would
portance to the Unietd States. The lessons of have long prevailed.
the war against Japan are unique. Unlike the Those who questioned the importance of the
great conflicts of the eighteenth century and the airplane were equally far from the mark. The
First World War, where blockade and relatively disappointment of officers who planned for fleet
passive control of sea lanes provided limited, al- engagements after the fashion of Trafalgar and
though decisive, naval objectives. Japanese ex- Jutland was doubtless as great as that of theo-
pansion and the United States victory were cam- rists who had confidently dismissed the battle-
paigns fought across the sea. ship as a modern weapon, only to find it pro-
World War II also witnessed the full develop- foundly useful and singularly invulnerable in
ment of aviation. In view of the complete lack support of amphibious landings. The conclu-
of factual evidence, many of the opinions ex- sion is that while times do change, revolutions
pressed between the two World Wars on the role are seldom as complete as the revolutionaries
of air in naval operations were based largely on hope.
theory and to a considerable degree were ulti- The efforts of the various nations between the
mately proved false. Bombing of anchored and wars to solve the problems of the employment
undefended battleships off the Virginia Capes of aircraft in naval warfare were instructive.
after the last war led to statements that navies The debilitating effects of Britain’s separate air
were obsolete and that no ship could operate force on the British Navy are well known. The
within range of land-based aircraft. Although effectiveness of the lumbering Swordfish torpedo-
certain advocates of independent air power ques- plane was a high tribute to the gallantry of the
tioned both the possibility and usefulness of close pilots but hardly complimentary to the organi-
support of troops, such support was proved not zational system which produced it. Counting on
only possible but indispensable. The accuracy their geography, the Italians established a land-
of high-level, precision bombing was vastly over- based air force with which they thought to con-
estimated, as witness both the ineffectiveness of trol the Mediterranean. Constantly outfought
this means of attack against shipping and the im- by British carrier aircraft, the greatest victory
proved efficiency of B–29 attacks after the adop- of the Italian Air Force was scored against its
-
tion of medium-altitude, area bombing. A con- own navy which it once put to ignominious flight.
siderable body of opinion in both the Army and The Japanese developed aviation as part of their
the Navy held that the airplane would quickly fleet, and the operations of their carrier striking
master the submarine. While this was ultimately force from Pearl Harbor to Ceylon set the pat-
accomplished, it came about rather late in the tern of the Pacific war, but they failed to solve
war after immense e ffort in research and design the defensive problem and this failure, with their
of new equipment and in the development of limited recuperative abilities, nullified their
techniques for cooperation of planes and surface whole war plan. The outbreak of war found
ships. Certain improvements in U-boat design United States aviation, both military and naval,
and equipment, which appeared too late to be- woefully deficient in types and quantities of air-
come operational on a wide scale, made it ex- craft. Doubly fortunate in geography and in-
 STRIKE ON TOKYO
Planes from Carrier Task Force Pass Mount Fujiyama, February 1945
dustrial power the country was able to go for- been far different. On the other side of the
ward with the building of great forces incorpo- picture, had the Germans developed the proxim -
rating the early lessons of the war and the most ity fuse for antiaircraft fire, the important effect
recent technology, thus achieving an unexpect- of the heavy bomber in Europe, achieved as it
edly early victory. As it may not again be pos- was at great cost in men and effort, might have
sible to extemporize, the importance of correct been drastically reduced.
evaluation of the experience cannot be over- The United States possessed no single weapon
estimated. sufficiently effective in itself to defeat Japan.
The experiences of warfare, however, are All the tools of modern war were used in the
never conclusive. They cannot be controlled advance across the Pacific. The integrated em-
like experiments in a laboratory but must be ployment of all forces each possessing its spe-
taken as they occur. Two examples from the cialized weapons and equipment was essential to
recent conflict may be cited to show the dangers accomplish the ultinate aim. Each assault
of facile generalization from insufficient evi- clearly demonstrated that we had no single
dence. In the past it had been taken for means of destroying the enemy or securing the
granted that aircraft carriers could not operate objective. The extent to which man could pro-
for extened periods within range of a large tect himself and absorb punishment, particularly
number of enemy air bases, yet from September from air attack, was a striking feature of World
1944 until the end of the war this was done and War II and revealed limitations in the capabil-
in every instance the shore bases had the worst ities of modern weapons.
of it. It would be unwise to deduce from this The fact is that there exists no single science
experience too rigid theories for the future be- of war. There are many sciences with which
cause against an enemy, equal plane for plane war is concerned, but war itself is a practical
and pilot for pilot, it would have been much art and skill. It is impossible ever wholly to
more difficult and costly, although at what point anticipate war’s requirements as the experiences
such operations would become unprofitable it is of the Germans and the Japanese revealed. Any
impossible to determine. Likewise the opera- exclusive adoption of a single weapon or type
tional capabilities of B–29’s with full bomb of weapon immediately limits freedom of action
loads against heavily defended targets were and greatly simplifies the enemy’s probem of
somewhat limited. Although islands within defense. War is a phenomenon of immense
1,300 miles of Tokyo had been secured, it was complexity whose problems are solved prag-
necessary to pay a great price for Iwo Jima, matically by hard experience and clear thinking.
600 miles nearer the objective, in order that the There is danger that investigation of a single
bomber bases might be free from attack and aspect of one war may give rise to an unbalanced
that the bombers might have fighter protection interpretation. Limitations are as significant as
and an emergency landing field. accoplishments.
The impact of technology on modern warfare Certain features of the war in the Pacific,
is such as to render generalization and predic- however, are of such importance that they must
tion doubly dangerous. Although the carrier be considered in any planning for the future:
task force was the outstanding fighting unit in 1. Control of the air was prerequisite to con-
the advance across the Pacific, if the develop- trol of the sea.
ments in radar and fighter direction had not oc- 2. Control of the sea permitted the concentra-
curred when they did, the event would have tion of carrier air power to control the air, and

53
the construction of bases necessary. for continued nineteenth century, it has been three times en-
local control of the air. gaged in war. On each occasion it has been
3. Local control of the sea permitted the able to carry the confict to the enemy because
landing, support, and supply of amphibious it possessed control of the sea. Behind a shield
forces on hostile shores. of sea power, the country has employed its great
4. General control of the sea was decisive resources and industrial machine to build the
against an enemy dependent on ocean commerce forces for victory Whether the growing range
for vital supplies. of bombing aircraft and the greatly increased
5. Control of the sea, including the landing destructiveness of explosives has made immu-
of mililary forces on a hostile shore, was prop- nity from air attack impossible in the future is
erly a naval function achieved by air, surface, arguable. However, the amount of explosive
and submarine forces acting in concert. carried will continee to vary inversely with the
6. Naval aviation was an integral part of the distance a plane must travel. Each added mile
naval forces and, as such, possessed the espe- of range increases the opportunity for intercep-
cially designed planes and equipment and em- tion before the attacking aircraft reaches its ob-
ployed the special tactics necessary to fullfill its jective. Although air raids may level cities,
role. they do not lay waste an entire countryside as
7. With control of the sea gained and main- large-scale land operations do. So long as war
tained by the Navy, it was possible for land remains a possibility, control of the sea will be
forces to control large-scale offensive operations vital to the national defense.
and for strategic bombing to destroy enemy's When the Japanese entered the conflict, they
industrial potential at will. had a plan for a war of limited objectives. They
Technology is never static, it produces seized a perimeter but soon found that it was
changes in the methods and tactics of warfare, insufficient for proper defense. In Europe the
but it does not alter basic concepts of strategy. Germans conquered large amounts of territory
For centuries control of the sea has permitted a but failed to put either England or Russia out
belligerent to remove the field of operations of the conflict, and so long as those belligerents
from his own shores and to fight on the territory remained in the field Hitler could not force a
of an enemy. Since the United States achieved peace. Experience proves that in the modern
status as a great power in the last quarter of the world there is no such thing as a war of limited

T0DAY'S, “SHIP OF THE LINE”

New Midway-class Carrier Devloped During the War

54
objectives; there is only total war which ends of range will increase the likelihood of intercep-
with the exhaustion and defeat of one of the tion and decrease the bomb load of the attacker.
contestants. Such defeat can best be accom- As the naval task force found in combating
plished by an attack on the enemy’s homeland, guided missiles in the form of Kamikazes, early
the source of his ability to wage war. Against warning increases the chance of breaking up a
Germany a direct land campaign was required; raid. For that reason alone, bases which can
the Japanese recognized the inevitability of de- only be supplied and held as long as control of
feat as the strategic air attack was reaching high the sea is maintained will remain important. In
gear and as the invasion forces were assembling. the second place, the belligerent possessing bases
In offensive air operations the closer the base to closest to an enemy will have the advantages
the objective the more effective and the less of being able to launch a more concentrated at-
costly will the task be. For the United States tack with fewer aircraft. Since the United
this means the establishment of bases supplied States is not connected by land with any great
-
by ships, and for the free movement of ships power, the necessary bases must be away from
control of the sea is mandatory. Control of the its shores; i. e., in an area where possession can
sea will also remain vital to the offfense. be maintained only by sea communications.
Submarines and aircraft, within the limits im-
posed by range, penetrated enemy-held areas the war on an enemy’s territory with all the de-
without support. Neither of them could cap- struction that such a campaign implies. In the
ture and hold territory or supply a beachhead. War of 1812, superior sea power allowed the
When the Japanese lost their carriers at Midway enemy to burn Washington. In two great wars
the invasion fleet turned back without attempt- of the twentieth century the United States pro-
ing to land. Control of the air was prerequisite tected by the Navy was safe from devastation.
to control of the sea. When United States forces Except for strategic bombing, in which the
moved across the Central Pacific, they encoun- Navy did not engage aviation does not function
tered a string of strong, mutually supporting. independently. It exists as one of the elements
-
Japanese air bases which were frequently re- necessary for control of the land or control of
ferred to as so many "unsinkable aircraft car- the sea and operates with other forces having the
riers.” With control of the sea it was possible same end in view, and the techniques for control
to concentrate enough “sinkable carriers” to of land and sea are not the same. The experi-
overwhelm and isolate the area under attack and ence of other nations shows, and the lessons of
to reduce the Japanese bases to so many unsink- the war confirm, that modern warfare is highly
able hulks. After strategic islands had been specialized and each phase requires its partic-
captured, the freedom of United Stattes ships to ular aircraft, equipment, and tactic’s, for the use
sail the ocean made it possible to construct instal- of which special training is necessary. In the
lations and to keep the occupying forces con- United States this has resulted in the creation of
tinually supplied with men, equipment, and air- separate military and naval air components,
craft, which in turn contributed to control the capable when the situation demands of operat-
air in the vicinity. Control of the sea was vital ing in support of one another, but each concen-
to control of the air. trating on the development of planes, equipment,
Spanning oceans with loads of atomic explo- and tactics best suited to its normal sphere of
sives may become technolgically possible but action. In naval warfare the necessity for com-
will not alter the basic fact that each added mile plete integration of aviation with the other naval

55
forces was completely demonstrated in the con- The mission in the case of each was different,
flict with Japarn. Because naval aircraft used The Navy must retain every component neces-
the same air, because on occasion they took off sary to its effectiveness, and must further develop
from the same bases, did not mean that they the unity of purpose, training, and command
duplicated the work of the Army Air Forces. that brought victory in the Pacific war.

U.S. GOVERRMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1947

56