energies

Article
Identification and Prioritization of Risk Factors in
an Electrical Generator Based on the Hybrid
FMEA Framework
Moath Alrifaey 1 , Tang Sai Hong 1, *, Eris Elianddy Supeni 1 , Azizan As’arry 1 and Chun Kit Ang 2
1 Department of Mechanical and Manufacturing Engineering, Faculty of Engineering,
Universiti Putra Malaysia, Serdang 43400, Selangor, Malaysia; [email protected] (M.A.);
[email protected] (E.E.S.); [email protected] (A.A.)
2 Department of Mechanical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, UCSI University, Taman Connaught,
Kuala Lumpur 56000, Malaysia; [email protected]
* Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +60-38-946-6332




Received: 16 November 2018; Accepted: 6 December 2018; Published: 17 February 2019


Abstract: The oil and gas industry is looking for ways to accurately identify and prioritize the failure
modes (FMs) of the equipment. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is the most important
tool used in the maintenance approach for the prevention of malfunctioning of the equipment.
Current developments in the FMEA technique are mainly focused on addressing the drawbacks of
the conventional risk priority number calculations, but the group effects and interrelationships of
FMs on other measurements are neglected. In the present study, a hybrid distribution risk assessment
framework was proposed to fill these gaps based on the combination of modified linguistic FMEA
(LFMEA), Analytic Network Process (ANP), and Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory
(DEMATEL) techniques. The hybrid framework of FMEA was conducted in a hazardous environment
at a power generation unit in an oil and gas plant located in Yemen. The results show that mechanical
and gas leakage FM in electrical generators posed a greater risk, which critically affects other FMs
within the plant. It was observed that the suggested framework produced a precise ranking of
FMs, with a clear relationship among FMs. Also, the comparisons of the proposed framework with
previous studies demonstrated the multidisciplinary applications of the present framework.

Keywords: Analytic Network Process (ANP); Decision Making Trial and Evaluation (DEMATE);
electrical generators; failure modes; linguistic FMEA; oil and gas industry

1. Introduction
In the field of reliability and safety engineering, a number of powerful risk investigation tools
have been established and applied. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a structured technique
to identify possible FMs and their consequences for the system during the process or design stage
within a life period [1]. Furthermore, FMEA is extended for a criticality analysis to Failure Mode,
Effects Critical Analysis (FMECA). In the 1960s, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) introduced the design FMEA approach for reliability and safety purpose in the aerospace
industry [2]. The FMEA is categorized as a functional design and process [3,4].
Industries dealing with the production and maintenance of machines have to be reliable in order
to meet the market demand and maintain integrity. To achieve reliability of the functional working
machines, FMEA suggests a structured procedure for preventing failures or to reduce the effect of their
consequences [5]. According to Doostparast, et al. [6], FMEA is used in preventative activities for the
most important maintenance planning. However, the high-risk components must be inspected and
maintained frequently rather than components with a lower risk [7,8].

Energies 2019, 12, 649; doi:10.3390/en12040649 www.mdpi.com/journal/energies

Energies 2019, 12, 649 2 of 22

Studies have shown that FMEA has a wide area of application that ranges from wind turbine
reliability, healthcare, automotive, nuclear, and manufacturing [9–13]. Moreover, in the electrical
distribution field, FMEA has been used in the determination of critical equipment and is mostly
combined with a reliability centered maintenance (RCM) to improve the maintenance reliability [14].
The work of Matteson [15] shows the identification process for FMs and their consequences with
the classification of the severity and occurrence. In another development, Scipioni [16] reveals that
FMs are ranked through their risk priority number (RPN), which is a multiplication of three factors:
occurrence, detection, and severity (O,D,S). In spite of all the advantages of FMEA, several studies
have reported its shortfalls, as follows [11,12,17–24]:

1. The same RPN value may be generated from different values of O, S, and D; however, their
hidden risk rank could be wholly dissimilar.
2. RPN calculation considers that the three risk elements have the same important weight, which is
difficult to be installed in practice.
3. Three factors are difficult to accurately evaluate by experts with a different background.
4. Interdependencies are not considered between several failure approaches and effects.

Several methods have been proposed to overcome the drawback of FMEA, for instance, fuzzy
theory with the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) [25], Technique for Order of Preference by
Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) [26], VIKOR (an acronym in Serbian of multi-criteria optimization
and compromise solution) [27], ANP-DEMATEL [28], and House of Reliability (HOR) with VIKOR [17].
The DEMATEL, AHP, and ANP are the essential multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM)
approaches. The DEMATEL method was established by the Battelle Memorial Institute to solve complex
and interrelated issues [29], whereas ANP, which is an extension method of AHP, was introduced by
Saaty [30]. A critical comparison of ANP and AHP revealed that ANP has more advantages than AHP
due to the ability of AHP to deal with the variation of the internal relationship, interdependencies,
and reaction feedback among alternatives and criteria across the hierarchies [31]. Similarly, clear
advantages of ANP over AHP have been demonstrated by Saaty [30] and Liang [32]. These are:

(1) The ability to clarify the independence on alternatives or criteria.

(2) The ability to offer the interdependence between the criteria in the same cluster and offer feedback
of alternatives or sub-criteria to the main criteria.

However, using the “supermatrix” as a new calculation procedure in ANP presents another
successful method in maintenance tasks. It is very often observed that the Fuzzy ANP method has a
capability to deal with uncertain decision makers [33]. For instance, ANP was used in risk assessment
and decision-making effectiveness [34]. Moreover, ANP was also combined with Quality Function
Deployment (QFD) to improve the decision analysis and assessment in many applications, such as in
the development process for requirements of Product Service System (PSS) [35], and hazard assessment
for working tasks in construction industry [36]. Furthermore, ANP and DEMATEL were combined
to be used as the best risk tool due to the ability to visualize the difficulty of interrelationships,
dependencies, and feedbacks, among factors [37]. According to Dedasht [38], DEMATEL-ANP is
the best risk technique that assists the decision maker in estimating problems and making decisions.
The DEMATEL-ANP methodology has been applied to different research disciplines, such as the crude
oil supply chain [37], oil and gas construction projects [38], product development [39], and green
project management [40]. Moreover, some of the risk priority frameworks were developed to improve
the traditional FMEA technique, such as waste priority number and fuzzy RPN with alpha levels [41].
Furthermore, an extended RPN calculation has been proposed for multiple risk factors, with a weight
value to add the failure importance value to the system [24]. The work of Li and Wu [42] has clearly
demonstrated the application of text mining to extract hidden reliability and risk information from
traditional FMEA reports. However, the study did not cover the effect of the interrelationships between
the failure mode and the failure cause.
extract hidden reliability and risk information from traditional FMEA reports. However, the study
did not cover the effect of the interrelationships between the failure mode and the failure cause.
In the previous studies, it was observed that FMEA frameworks were modified to simplify the
failure modes analysis and prioritization [43–46]. Similarly, the work of Nazeri and Naderikia
Energies 2019, 12, 649 3 of 22
[28]
has clearly demonstrated an improved traditional FMEA by integrating expert weights, fuzzy
methods, and other techniques into the analysis. However, unlike the study of Nazeri and Naderikia
In the previous studies, it was observed that FMEA frameworks were modified to simplify the
[28], most of the improved versions lack a focus on the back impact of failure modes on the main
failure modes analysis and prioritization [43–46]. Similarly, the work of Nazeri and Naderikia [28] has
domain.
clearly demonstrated an improved traditional FMEA by integrating expert weights, fuzzy methods,
To our knowledge, no previous research focuses on establishing the relationship among
and other techniques into the analysis. However, unlike the study of Nazeri and Naderikia [28], most
different
of the FMs
improvedand versions
domains lackwith theonimpact
a focus the backofimpact
external risk modes
of failure withinona the hazardous environment,
main domain.
especially Tothe
ouroil and gas area.
knowledge, Therefore,
no previous a new
research approach
focuses is neededthe
on establishing torelationship
fill this gap. Hence,
among a new risk
different
ranking
FMs framework
and domainswas withproposed
the impactviaof linguistic FMEA
external risk (LFMEA),
within a hazardousDEMATEL,
environment, andespecially
ANP techniques
the
to overcome
oil and gas thearea.
drawbacks of atraditional
Therefore, new approachFMEA.is needed to fill this gap. Hence, a new risk ranking
framework
The aim ofwas this proposed
paper isvia
tolinguistic
introduceFMEA (LFMEA),
a hybrid FMEA DEMATEL,
framework and ANP
with techniques to overcome
the objective to overcome
the drawbacks of traditional FMEA.
the problems associated with traditional FMEA, with a clear graphic representation of clusters and
the FMs The aim of this paper is to introduce a hybrid FMEA framework with the objective to overcome
interrelationship.
the problems associated with traditional FMEA, with a clear graphic representation of clusters and the
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the new hybrid risk priority
FMs interrelationship.
framework using the linguistic FMEA, ANP, and DEMATEL approach. Sections 3 and 4 demonstrate
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the new hybrid risk priority
the discussion and results of the framework implementation using a case study in a Yemen oil and
framework using the linguistic FMEA, ANP, and DEMATEL approach. Sections 3 and 4 demonstrate
gas plant of the electrical
the discussion generators.
and results Finally,implementation
of the framework Section 5 concludes
using a the
casepaper
study inwith future
a Yemen oilwork.
and gas
plant of the electrical generators. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with future work.
2. Proposed Method of Hybrid LFMEA Framework
2. Proposed Method of Hybrid LFMEA Framework
A hybrid risk priority framework was developed based on linguistic FMEA, ANP, and
DEMATEL A hybrid risk priority
approaches. Theframework was developed
expert weights based onto
are calculated linguistic
obtain FMEA,
a moreANP, and DEMATEL
precise weight of risk
approaches. The expert weights are calculated to obtain a more precise weight of risk factors. Figure 1
factors. Figure 1 shows the methodology of the proposed framework for the FMs ranking in the oil
shows the methodology of the proposed framework for the FMs ranking in the oil and gas industry
and gas industry with a hazardous environment.
with a hazardous environment.

Theproposed
Figure1.1.The
Figure proposed methodology
methodologyofofthe framework.
the framework.
Energies 2019, 12, 649 4 of 22

The methodology of the proposed framework consists of five steps and is described as follows:
Step 1: Classify main dimensions and failure modes of the system in the industrial plant to
be analyzed through the methodology. Data is extracted from the Computerized Maintenance
Management System (CMMS) database, vendor documents, a literature review, and the opinion of
experts. A team of n experts Et = E1 , E2 , . . . , En will structure and organize the data into m main risk


factor dimensions MD = { MD1 , MD2 , . . . , MDm } and failure modes FM = { FM1 , FM2 , . . . , FMk },
where k is the number of failure modes.

2.1. Extended Linguistic FMEA

Linguistic FMEA uses linguistic variables that were introduced by Zadeh [47] to handle
the conditions to be expressed, which are complex or vague. The linguistic scale Vvalue risk =
{Vs |s = 1/z, . . . , 1/2, 1, 2, 3, . . . , z} is assumed, where VS is a variable and S represents the possible
linguistic value. Ordinarily, the suitable language scale is identified by expert members for use in the
RPN qualitative evaluation, where the number of scale elements is 2z − 1, and these linguistic values
have the following properties [48,49]:

• k ⊗ VA = Vk⊗ A
• (VA )k = VAk
• VA ⊕ VB = VB ⊕ VA = VA+ B
• VA ∗ VA = VA ⊗ VA = VA∗ B

Every expert has a different background, knowledge, and personal experience. As a result, they
may have the risk of a bias in their evaluation during FMEA assessment. Consequently, extended
LFMEA uses the fuzzy priority and linguistic operator techniques to determine the expert weights
according to their prejudices. Thus, the influence of a bias on the FMEA assessment is reduced [49].
Step 2: Apply the improved linguistic FMEA risk evaluation method to obtain weights for experts
and failure modes with the main clusters based on fuzzy priority and the linguistic operator.
In this step, the weights of risk factors and experts are determined to obtain the linguistic priority
risk number for every FM. The steps of the proposed LFMEA method are introduced as follows:

(i) Calculate the risk factor weights by the experts as W = (wO , wS , w D ) through an Analytic
Network Process (ANP) where ∑ W = 1.
(ii) Calculate linguistic evaluation matrix values Vtj for main risk factor clusters of failure mode,
which will consist of n rows of expert and m columns of main FM clusters.
Vtj = {(VtjO , VtjS , VtjD )}, where t = {1, 2, 3, · · · , n }, j = {1, 2, 3, · · · m}

VtjO , VtjS , VtjD are risk language evaluation weights given by expert Et for FM j failure mode, where
E is the expert weight.
(iii) Calculate the risk priority number VtjRPN for every j main risk factor and t expert member with
power of weights of the risk factor W = (wO , wS , w D ), where ϕx is the risk constant calculated
by experts.
w w w
VtjRPN = (ϕO VtjO ) O × (ϕS VtjS ) S × (ϕD VtjD ) D (1)

(iv) Calculate a weight for every expert W Et = (w E1 , w E2 , . . . , w En ) by using the fuzzy priority
matrix F for the prioritization purpose, as in Equations (2)–(5).
Rank of failure modes for every expert { FM1t , FM2t , . . . , FMmt is FM1t > FM2t > · · · > FMm t

(Note: C > D, means C leads D).

Construct the matrix F of the fuzzy priority matrix for the prioritization purpose with FM failure
mode fuzzy preference pij for FM j failure mode. Describe the partial order of the pijt fuzzy
priority number [49]:
Energies 2019, 12, 649 5 of 22

1, FMit is superior to FMtj




 0.5, FMt is equal to FMt

pijt = t,
i j
(2)


 1 − p ij when i 6 = j;

0, i = j or other
n
pij = ∑t=1 pijt ; i, j = 1, 2, · · · , m (3)
 
p11 p12 · · · p1m
 p21 p22 · · · p2m 
 
F=
 .. .. .. .. 
 . . . . 

pm1 pm2 ··· pmm

For example, if the rank of failure modes for an expert t is equal to Rt = FM5t > FM3t > FM1t >
· · · > FMxt , the ordering consistency index will be γt = p51 + p53 + p51 + · · · + p5x + p31 + · · · +
p3x + · · · + ptx .
Then, calculate the summation of every row in the fuzzy priority matrix F and rank them to get
Rt . Assume the rank of the summation column is Rs = ∑im=1 p2i > ∑im=1 p5i > ∑im=1 pmi > · · · >
∑im=1 p3i , and γ( Rs ) will be calculated in the same equation used with a consistency index γt [49]:

γ Rt


γt = ; γt e[0, 1] (4)
γ( Rs )
n
W Et = γt / ∑ γt (5)
t =1

Then, calculate the expert constant β t :

1, i f VtjRPN ∼
(
= VxjRPN
βt = (6)
max{ γt / ∑nt=1 γt }, other

(v) Determine the linguistic priority risk number LVjrisk for every failure mode FM j using expert weights.

n
W Et
∏ ( β t VtjRPN )

W E1
W E2
W En
LVjRPN = = β 1 V1j × β 2 V2j × · · · × β n Vnj (7)
t =1

2.2. DEMATEL Approach

Step 3: Identify the relationship weights between the main risk factor dimensions and failure
modes using the DEMATEL approach through a pairwise comparison matrix and using the following
steps [50,51]:

1. Determine the direct relation matrix D by pairwise comparisons. Experts are questioned to give
the influence values as the pair-wise comparison between each pair of the main risk factor or
within each cluster of failure mode elements. These calculations will give a matrix D with the
dimensions of m × m:
FM
1 FM2 ... FMm 
FM1 0 a12 ... a1m
 a a2m
FM2  0 ...

21 
D= ..  .. .. .. 
. . . 0 .
 
 
FMm am1 am2 ... 0
Energies 2019, 12, 649 6 of 22

2. Calculate the normalized direct relation N as the following equation:

N = s × D (8)

The normalization factor is

" #
1 1
s = Min , (9)
Max1≤i≤m (∑m a
j=1 ij ) Max m
1≤ j≤m ( ∑i =1 aij )

3. Calculate the total-influence matrix T by the following equation formula:

 
t11 t12 . . . t1m
 t21 t22 . . . t2m 
T = N ( I − N ) −1 = 
 
.. .. . . ..  (10)
. . . .
 
 
tm1 tm2 . . . tmm

4. The cause and effect relationships are determined by the total relation matrix T, where ri , c j are
the summation of row i and column j, respectively, as follows:

r1 = ∑ m
 
t11 t12 ... t1m j=1 t1j
m

 t21 t22 ... t2m  r2 = ∑ j=1 t2j

T= .. .. .. ..  ..

. . . .

 . = ∑mj=1 tmj

tm1 tm2 ... tmm r m
c1 = ∑im=1 ti1 ; c2 = ∑im=1 ti2 ; · · · ; cm = ∑im=1 tim
" # " #
m m
∑ tij ∑ tij
 
[ r i ] m ×1 = , c j 1× m = (11)
j =1 m ×1 i =1 1× m

5. Finally, draw the cause and effect graph after removing some negligible effects in matrix T
through calculating a threshold value α [52].

∑im=1 ∑m
 
j=1 tij
α= (12)
m×m


The cause and effect graph can be drawn by plotting the data set of ri + c j as the x-axis to
(ri − c j ) as the y-axis.

2.3. ANP Approach

ANP is used to identify the special dependence effects between the risk factors with the help of
experts to evaluate every possible failure mode and risk by pairwise comparison to form super-matrix
weights. The ANP methodology is described in the following step.
Step 4: Apply the ANP process to evaluate the weights of all failure mode risks. The details of
the ANP method are described in the following [30,53,54]:

• Arrange failure modes and clusters of the network structure based on the nature of the relationship
between clusters and failure modes. The influence of clusters and FMs can be exemplified in the
following supermatrix, which will provide the feedback and the interdependence of FMs in the
higher level in ANP.
Energies 2019, 12, 649 7 of 22

MD1 ··· MDm

FM1 ··· FMk
w11 · · ·
 
MD1 FM1 w1m (13)
A= .. ..  .. .. .. 
. .  . . . 
MDm FMk wm1 · · · wmm

• The weights of the supermatrix are calculated through the expression

Aw = λmax w (14)

where A is the pairwise comparison matrix, λmax is the largest eigenvalue of A, and w is an
eigenvector. The inconsistency ratio (CR) for the pairwise comparison matrix must be smaller
than 0.1 [55]:
λmax − n
CR = (15)
RI(n − 1)
where RI is a random inconsistency value.
• Calculate the weighted supermatrix Wr by dividing each column by its summation.
• Calculate the limit supermatrix W L by powering the weighted supermatrix Wr to (2k + 1) to get
the equalized weights, as follows:
W L = Wr2k+1 (16)

2.4. Hybrid Risk Priority Weight

The final ranking of failure modes is conducted by the final weight formal of the proposed
framework that is described in the following step.
Step 5: Calculate the final risk weights of all failure modes and main clusters by using the
proposed hybrid formal which contains all weights of the LFMEA, DEMATEL, and ANP supermatrix,
as follows:
f inal
HRPVj = LVjRPN × (r + c) j × Wj (17)
f inal
HRPVj is the final hybrid risk priority value of failure mode FM j .

3. Case Study
A practical case study was conducted in a Yemen oil and gas plant for electrical generator risk
assessment to prove the effectiveness of the suggested FMEA framework in a hazardous area. Electrical
generators are the main parts of a power generation unit and provide power to plant facilities like
pumps, compressors, and any movement machines. However, the reliability of an electrical generator
is important for plant availability and operation demand. The Yemen oil and gas plant has a power
generation unit consisting of four electrical gas turbines and three emergency diesel generators. All data
for maintenance, such as trips, failure, shutdowns, and condition monitoring system of generators, are
stored in the Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS). Moreover, data was collected
from the CMMS database, vendor documents, a literature review, and the opinion of plant experts.

Implementation of the Proposed Framework

Failure modes and breakdown causes were collected from the CMMS database in a Yemen
oil and gas plant. Five experts were selected Et = E1 , E2 , E3 , E4 , E5 from five departments


of the plant, which are safety, electrical, instrumentation and control, mechanical, and operation.
Experts identified and organized the electrical generator risk into five main clusters of failure modes
(main risk factor dimensions of FMs) MD = { MD1 , MD2 , . . . , MD5 } and 20 FMs were analyzed
FM = { FM1 , FM2 , . . . , FM20 }, as shown in Table 1.
Energies 2019, 12, 649 8 of 22

Table 1. Main risk clusters and failure modes.

Main Clusters
Main FM. Symbol FMi Risk of FM Description
MD
OP1 = wrong operator action
Operation OP2 = overload/unbalanced voltage
MD1
(OP) OP3 = wrong startup
OP4 = wrong shutdown
Instrumentation IN1 = instrumentation failure
and control IN2 = failure of calibration
MD2
system IN3 = failure of the control system
(IN) IN4 = failure of data communication
EL1 = rotor failure
Electrical EL2 = stator failure
MD3
(EL) EL3 = winding & insulation failure
EL4 = output power failure
ME1 = cooling system failure
Mechanical ME2 = bearing failure
MD4
(ME) ME3 = shaft failure
ME4 = gearbox failure
OT1 = material degradation
Other external
OT2 = failure of the purging system
MD5 risks
OT3 = lubricant contamination
(OT)
OT4 = gas leakage

4. Result and Discussion

4.1. Linguistic FMEA Weights

In this step, an improved linguistic FMEA risk evaluation method with fuzzy priority was
conducted to produce the FMs risk assessment by the FMEA evaluation experts. Five experts used
ANP to determine the weights W = (0.322, 0.441, 0.237) for the O, S, and D risk factors. These weight
ties are in agreement with previous studies [49,56], wherein the severity weight (0.441) has a larger
weight among the risk factors with a lower weight (0.237) for detection. For selecting the language
scale, it is assumed that z = 5, and the language scale number is then 2z − 1 = 9. These linguistic term
sets are illustrated as a linguistic scale set with nine values from V1/5 to V5 , as shown in Table 2.
Every expert Et provided evaluation weights (VtjO , VtjS , VtjD ) for every cluster of failure mode MD j ,
as shown in Table 2.
According to Equation (1), the linguistic risk priority value VtjRPN was calculated from evaluation
weights (VtjO , VtjS , VtjD ) for every j cluster of FM and expert member t.
Table 3 shows the linguistic risk priority number for every cluster and expert, with its ranking
based on the principle that a higher linguistic priority number indicates a higher risk factor.

Table 2. Linguistic assessment values for the cluster of failure modes.

( VO S D
tj ,Vtj ,Vtj ) OP IN EL ME OT
E1 (V2 , V1/3 , V1/4 ) (V3 , V1/4 , V1/5 ) (V1/4 , V2 , V1/2 ) (V2 , V3 , V1/5 ) (V2 , V1/5 , V1 )
E2 (V3 , V1/4 , V1/5 ) (V2 , V1/4 , V1/4 ) (V1/3 , V1 , V1 ) (V1 , V2 , V1/4 ) (V1 , V1/4 , V1/4 )
E3 (V4 , V1/5 , V1/4 ) (V1 , V1/5 , V1/5 ) (V1/5 , V1 , V1/2 ) (V2 , V1 , V1/5 ) (V1/2 , V1/3 , V1/2 )
E4 (V1 , V1/3 , V1/3 ) (V1 , V1/5 , V1/4 ) (V1/4 , V1/2 , V1 ) (V2 , V1 , V1/4 ) (V1/2 , V1/5 , V1 )
E5 (V5 , V1/5 , V1/2 ) (V4 , V1/5 , V1/3 ) (V4 , V1/3 , V2 ) (V3 , V3 , V1/4 ) (V1/2 , V1/2 , V1/3 )

Table 3 illustrates that the ranking of the five main clusters of FMs given by five experts were
not identical; except for a stable rank for ME failure mode, the remaining FMs displayed a relative
variance in priorities.
Energies 2019, 12, 649 9 of 22

Table 3. The cluster linguistic risk priority number and ranking.

VRPN
ti OP IN EL ME OT FM Priority
E1 0.554 0.528 0.737 1.386 0.615 ME > EL > OT > OP > IN
E2 0.528 0.488 0.702 0.978 0.391 ME > EL > OP > IN > OT
E3 0.553 0.336 0.505 0.854 0.418 ME > OP > EL > OT > IN
E4 0.475 0.354 0.471 0.900 0.393 ME > OP > EL > OT > IN
E5 0.701 0.592 1.135 1.665 0.454 ME > EL > OP > IN > OT

However, expert weights were calculated to give a final decision in this step, and Equations (2)
and (3) were used to calculate a matrix F:
 
0 1 0.4 0 0.8

 0 0 0 0 0.4 

F= 0.6 1 0 0 1
 

 
 1 1 1 0 1 
0.2 0.6 0 0 0

From the above F matrix, group failure priority was determined from row summation
of the F matrix as {2.2, 0.4, 2.6, 4, 0.8}, Rs = {ME > EL > OP > OT > IN} =
{ MD4 > MD3 > MD1 > MD5 > MD2 }. Equations (4) and (5) were used to determine the consistency
index γt = {γ1 , γ2 , γ3 , γ4 , γ5 } = {0.933, 0.978, 0.978, 0.978, 0.978}, and expert weights W Et = (0.192,
0.202, 0.202, 0.202, 0.202).
Individual priority γt indicated that expert E1 has a lower weight (0.192) among the expert group
due to the fact that the expert’s evaluation E1 departs from the majority of experts. As a result, the risk
of bias in the FMEA assessment is reduced.
The linguistic priority risk number LVjRPN is determined for the main cluster of FMs
using Equations (6) and (7) {0.558,0.448,0.674,1.114,0.446} with prioritization {ME>EL>OP>IN>OT}.
Moreover, this result was compared with other FMEA approaches, the comparison will be shown in
Table 14 at the final step.
Similarly, the same steps of calculation were conducted for failure modes within the cluster.
Finally, Table 4 presents the linguistic risk value LVjRPN for all failure modes and their ranking within
the cluster.

Table 4. Risk priority number for FMs.

Main FM LVRPN
j Ranking within
FMs O S D
Clusters Risk Priority Number Cluster
OP1 2 0.5 0.2 1.179 1
OP2 0.2 4 0.333 1.118 3
OP
OP3 4 0.25 0.2 0.869 4
OP4 0.5 0.5 0.333 0.681 2
IN1 2 0.333 1 1.155 2
IN2 0.2 0.333 0.25 0.873 3
IN
IN3 1 1 0.5 1.273 1
IN4 3 0.25 0.2 0.695 4
EL1 0.2 2 0.25 0.873 1
EL2 0.2 1 0.2 0.610 3
EL
EL3 0.333 1 0.333 0.812 2
EL4 1 0.25 0.2 0.556 4
ME1 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.500 4
ME2 0.5 1 1 1.200 3
ME
ME3 0.2 4 1 1.646 1
ME4 0.2 4 0.5 1.397 2
OT1 0.25 1 1 0.960 3
OT2 0.333 5 0.2 1.462 1
OT
OT3 0.2 0.5 2 0.776 4
OT4 0.25 5 3 2.533 2
Energies 2019, 12, 649 10 of 22

Table 4 shows that the most critical FMs are OT4, ME3, OT2, and ME3, which are related to the
gas hazard and failure of mechanical parts. The ranking of electrical and operation FMs is not clear
due to hidden interrelationship effects among FMs, which will be determined in the next steps.

4.2. Interrelationships among Clusters and FMs

In this step, the DEMATEL technique is used to evaluate interdependent and feedback relation
between five main FM clusters and between failure modes within their cluster. Experts are questioned
to obtain the influence values as the pairwise comparison between each pair of clusters and failure
modes. The average matrix D was calculated based on pairwise comparisons according to five-levelled
scales (0 = no effect, 1 = low effect, 2 = media effect, 3 = high effect, 4 = very high effect). Then, the total
influence matrix T was derived from Equations (8)–(10). In sum, the total relation matrix for the main
clusters is shown in Table 5. The network relationship map (NRM) was created by Equation (11) and
drew the cause and effect graph after calculating a threshold value (α = 0.339) to remove the minor
Energies 2018, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 10 of 22
effects by Equation (12), as shown in Figure 2.
Similarly,
by Equationthe (11)
same steps
and drewof calculation
the weregraph
cause and effect followed for failurea modes
after calculating within
threshold every
value (α cluster, as
= 0.339)
shown in Tables 6–10 and Figures 3–7.
to remove the minor effects by Equation (12), as shown in Figure 2.
Similarly, the same steps of calculation were followed for failure modes within every cluster, as
shown in Tables 6–10Table 5. The3–7.
and Figures total relation matrix for the main clusters.

OP IN EL 5. The total
Table ME relationOT
matrix forc the
Sum r Sum
main clusters. (ri + cj ) (ri − cj ) Status
OP 0.274 OP0.147IN 0.226
EL ME0.389 OT 0.292c Sum 2.519
r Sum (𝒓1.328
𝒊 + 𝒄𝒋 ) (𝒓𝒊3.847 −1.192
− 𝒄𝒋 ) Status effect
IN 0.506
OP 0.2740.090
0.147 0.417
0.226 0.380 0.261
0.389 0.292 2.519 0.671
1.328 1.655
3.847 2.325
−1.192 0.984
effect cause
EL 0.417 0.075
IN 0.506 0.090 0.167
0.417 0.313 0.215
0.380 0.261 0.671 1.898
1.655 1.186
2.325 3.084
0.984 − 0.712
cause effect
ME 0.691 0.244
EL 0.417 0.075 0.569
0.167 0.360 0.448
0.313 0.215 1.898 1.934
1.186 2.312
3.084 4.245
−0.712 0.378
effect cause
OT 0.631 0.115 0.520 0.492 0.241 1.458 1.999 3.457 0.542 cause
ME 0.691 0.244 0.569 0.360 0.448 1.934 2.312 4.245 0.378 cause
Note: Bold values in matrix T of main
OT 0.631 0.115 0.520 0.492 0.241 1.458 clusters that are above
1.999 a threshold
3.457 value (α
0.542 = 0.339).
cause
Note: Bold values in matrix T of main clusters that are above a threshold value (α = 0.339).
As shown in Table 5, instrumentation and control system (IN), mechanical (ME), and other
As shown in Table 5, instrumentation and control system (IN), mechanical (ME), and other
external risks (OT) had a positive value (ri − cj ), and were thus the main clusters affecting other
external risks (OT) had a positive value (𝒓𝒊 − 𝒄𝒋 ), and were thus the main clusters affecting other
clusters. In Figure 2, operation (OP) and electrical (EL) are located in the bottom, meaning they have a
clusters. In Figure 2, operation (OP) and electrical (EL) are located in the bottom, meaning they have
little effect andeffect
a little are simply
and areaffected by other
simply affected byrisk factors.
other Mechanical
risk factors. failure
Mechanical mode
failure (ME)
mode andand
(ME) operation
failure mode (OP) have the top two significant weights (
operation failure mode (OP) have the top two significant weights ri + c )
j (𝒓𝒊 + 𝒄𝒋 ) within the main clusters, OP is
within the main clusters, where
an effect and ME is a cause group with the inner dependency value of 0.360.
where OP is an effect and ME is a cause group with the inner dependency value Moreover, cluster (IN) is
of 0.360. Moreover,
cluster (IN) is not affected by others,
not affected by others, as shown in Figure 2. as shown in Figure 2.

Figure
Figure 2. The
2. The cause
cause andandeffect
effectrelationship
relationship map
mapforfor
thethe
main clusters.
main clusters.

The results
The results surpassedthose
surpassed those of
of previous
previousstudies, whichwhich
studies, only gave weights
only gaveforweights
failure modes
for failure
[43,49,56]. These results provide a clear image of the interdependent and feedback relation between
modes [43,49,56]. These results provide a clear image of the interdependent and feedback relation
five main clusters and between failure modes within every cluster, presenting necessary information
for risk prevention and maintenance plan optimization compared with the results of previous
studies.
Based on Table 6, wrong shutdown (OP4) has the largest weight value (2.069) among operation
FMs and OP4 is effected by other OP failure modes, whereas overload/unbalanced voltage (OP2) has
the smallest important weight value (1.115). The prioritization of the important operation failure
Energies 2019, 12, 649 11 of 22

between five main clusters and between failure modes within every cluster, presenting necessary
information for risk prevention and maintenance plan optimization compared with the results of
previous studies.
Based on Table 6, wrong shutdown (OP4) has the largest weight value (2.069) among operation
FMs and OP4 is effected by other OP failure modes, whereas overload/unbalanced voltage (OP2)
has the smallest important weight value (1.115). The prioritization of the important operation failure
modes (OP) is OP4 > OP3 > OP4 > OP2.

Energies 2018, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 11 of 22

Table 6. The total relation matrix for operation FMs.

OP OP1 OP2 Table

OP36. The totalOP4
relation matrix
c Sum for operation
r Sum FMs. (r + c ) (ri − cj ) Status
i j

OP1 0 OP OP1 0.199 OP2 0.49OP3 OP4 0.596c Sum r0Sum (𝒓1.285 𝒊 + 𝒄𝒋 ) − 𝒄𝒋 ) Status
(𝒓𝒊 1.285 1.285 cause
OP2 0 OP1 0
0.0630.199 0.16
0.49 0.596 0.348 0 1.285
0.544 1.285
0.571 1.285
1.115 cause 0.027 cause
OP3 0 OP2 0
0.0750.063 0.082
0.16 0.348 0.4140.544 0.958 0.571 1.115
0.571 0.027
1.529 cause −0.387 effect
OP4 0 OP3 0
0.2070.075 0.226
0.082 0.414 0.1390.958 1.497 0.571 1.529
0.572 -0.387
2.069 effect −0.925 effect
OP4 0 values
Note: Bold 0.207in matrix
0.226 T 0.139
of OP FMs 1.497
that are0.572 2.069
above a threshold -0.925
value effect
(α = 0.188).
Note: Bold values in matrix T of OP FMs that are above a threshold value (α = 0.188).

Wrong Wrong
operator action
operator (OP1)
action is aiscause
(OP1) a causegroup
group and notaffected
and not affected
by by others,
others, whilewhile
wrongwrong shutdown
shutdown
(OP4) is(OP4)
an effect
is an effect FM, as shown in Figure 3. These results demonstrate that experts have to focus more more
FM, as shown in Figure 3. These results demonstrate that experts have to focus
attention on wrong
attention shutdown
on wrong (OP4),
shutdown wrong
(OP4), wrongoperator action(OP1),
operator action (OP1), and
and cause
cause and and
effecteffect FM status.
FM status.

Figure 3. The
Figure cause
3. The and
cause andeffect
effectrelationship map
relationship map forfor operation
operation FMs.FMs.

For theFor
instrumentation FMs,FMs,
the instrumentation failure of the
failure control
of the system
control system(IN3)
(IN3)and
andinstrumentation failure (IN1)
instrumentation failure
were the(IN1)
twowere
most theimportant
two most important FMs within
FMs within the INthe IN cluster
cluster based
based onon higherweight
higher weight values
valuesofof
1.472
1.472 and
and 1.350, respectively, but both were in the effect group based on negative values (r − c) of −1.214
1.350, respectively, but both were in the effect group based on negative values (r − c) of −1.214 and
and −0.530, respectively. According to Table 7, the IN prioritization of the FMs was IN3 > IN1 > IN2
−0.530, >respectively. According to Table 7, the IN prioritization of the FMs was IN3 > IN1 > IN2 > IN4.
IN4. It can be observed that IN2 and IN4 are not affected by others and both were in the cause
It can begroup,
observed
as shown inIN2
that and
Figure 4. IN4 are not affected by others and both were in the cause group, as
shown in Figure 4.
Table 7. The total relation matrix for Instrumentation and Control system FMs.
Table The total
IN 7. IN1 IN2relation
IN3 matrix
IN4 for Instrumentation
c Sum r Sum (𝒓 and
+ 𝒄 )Control
(𝒓 − 𝒄system FMs.
) Status
𝒊 𝒋 𝒊 𝒋
IN1 0.034 0 0.376 0 0.940 0.410 1.350 −0.530 effect
IN IN1 IN2 IN3 IN4 c Sum r Sum (ri + cj ) (r − cj ) Status
IN2 0.41 0 0.513 0 0.000 0.923 0.923 0.923 causei
IN1 0.034IN3 0
0.094 0 0.376
0.035 0 0 1.343 0.940
0.129 0.410
1.472 1.350 effect
−1.214 −0.530 effect
IN2 0.41IN4 0
0.402 0 0.513
0.419 0 0 0.000 0.000
0.821 0.923
0.821 0.923 cause0.923
0.821 cause
IN3 0.094 Note: Bold
0 values in0.035
matrix T of IN0FMs that are
1.343 (α = 0.143).−1.214
0.129 value1.472
above a threshold effect
IN4 0.402 0 0.419 0 0.000 0.821 0.821 0.821 cause
Note: Bold values in matrix T of IN FMs that are above a threshold value (α = 0.143).
Energies 2019, 12, 649 12 of 22
Energies 2018,
Energies 11,11,
2018, x FOR PEER
x FOR REVIEW
PEER REVIEW 12 12 of 22
of 22

Figure 4. The
Figure cause
4. The and
cause effect
and effectrelationship map
relationship map forfor instrumentation
instrumentation FMs. FMs.
Figure 4. The cause and effect relationship map for instrumentation FMs.
According to Table
According 8, rotor
to Table faults
8, rotor (EL1),
faults (EL1),stator faults(EL2),
stator faults (EL2), andand winding
winding and insulation
and insulation failure failure
(EL3)
(EL3) have have
the
According theto
largest largest
Table weight
weight8, rotorvalues
values faults(2.843,
(2.843, 2.746,
2.746,
(EL1), and
and
stator 2.599,
2.599,
faults respectively), but both
respectively),
(EL2), and winding butandwere
both in the cause
were
insulation in the cause
failure
group,
(EL3) have whereas
the output
largest power
weight failure
values (EL4)2.746,
(2.843, is theand
effect group
2.599, with the smallest
respectively), but important
both were in weight
the cause
group, whereas output power failure (EL4) is the effect group with the smallest important weight
valuewhereas
(2.30), and the prioritization of the important electrical failure modes (EL) is EL1 > EL2 > EL3 >
valuegroup,
(2.30),
EL4.
and the
These
output
results
power failure
prioritization
demonstrate
of the
that
(EL4)
operation
is the effect
important
experts have
group
electrical
to
with
failure
place
the
modes
more
smallest important
(EL)on
attention
isoutput
EL1 >powerweight
EL2 > EL3 >
EL4. value
These (2.30), and the prioritization of the important electrical failure modes (EL) is EL1 > EL2 > EL3 >
failure (EL4) to reduce power outage, as shown Figure 5, and output power failure (EL4) was affected power
results demonstrate that operation experts have to place more attention on output
EL4. These results demonstrate that operation experts have to place more attention on output power
failure (EL4)
by otherto electrical
reduce power
FMs. outage, as shown Figure 5, and output power failure (EL4) was affected
failure (EL4) to reduce power outage, as shown Figure 5, and output power failure (EL4) was affected
by other electrical FMs.
by other electrical FMs. Table 8. The total relation matrix for electrical FMs.

EL EL1 Table
EL2 The
8.EL3
Table 8. Thetotal
EL4relation
total c Sum
relation matrix
r Sum
matrix for (𝒓𝒊 + 𝒄𝒋FMs.
forelectrical
electrical ) FMs.
(𝒓𝒊 − 𝒄𝒋 ) Status
EL1 0.215 0.446 0.406 0.742 1.034 1.809 2.843 0.775 cause
EL ELEL2 EL1
EL1 EL2EL2
0.443 0.212 EL3 EL4EL4c1.034
0.397 0.660 Sum c SumSum (𝒓
r1.712 𝒊 + 𝒄𝒋 )
r2.746
Sum (r𝒊i −
(𝒓
0.678 + c𝒄j𝒋)) cause
(ri − cj )
Status Status
EL1 EL1
0.215 0.215
EL3 0.342 0.446 0.406
0.4460.342 0.406 0.742
0.197 0.598 1.034 1.809
0.7421.120 1.034
1.479 2.843
2.599
1.809 0.775
0.359
2.843 cause cause
0.775 cause
EL2 EL2
EL4 0.443
0.443 0.034 0.212
0.2120.034 0.397
0.120 0.660
0.397 0.6601.034
0.060 1.712
2.060 1.034
0.248 2.746
2.308
1.712 0.678
−1.812
2.746 effect cause
0.678 cause
EL3 EL3 Note:
0.342 0.342 0.342
0.342
Bold values in0.197
matrix T0.598
0.197 0.598
of EL 1.120
FMs that are1.479
1.120 2.599 value0.359
1.479
above a threshold 2.599 cause
(α = 0.328). 0.359 cause
EL4 0.034
EL4 0.0340.034 0.120 0.060
0.034 0.120 0.0602.060 2.0600.248 0.248
2.308 2.308
−1.812 −1.812
effect effect
Note:
Note: Bold
Bold values
values in matrix T of EL FMs
FMs that
that are
are above
aboveaathreshold
thresholdvalue
value(α
(α==0.328).
0.328).

Figure 5. The cause and effect relationship map for electrical FMs.

Figure 5. The
Figure cause
5. The causeand
andeffect
effect relationship mapforfor
relationship map electrical
electrical FMs.
FMs.
Energies 2019, 12, 649 13 of 22

Energies 2018, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 13 of 22

Based on Table 9, shaft failure (ME3) and bearing failure (ME2) have the highest weight values
(3.256 andBased
3.159,onrespectively)
Table 9, shaft within
failure (ME3) and bearingcluster
the mechanical failure (ME),
(ME2) but
have(ME3)
the highest weight
is a cause valueswhile
group
(3.256 and 3.159, respectively) within the mechanical cluster (ME), but (ME3) is a cause group while
(ME2) is an effect group, based on the latter’s negative value (−1.221). According to Table 9 and
(ME2) is an effect group, based on the latter’s negative value (−1.221). According to Table 9 and Figure
Figure 6, the ME prioritization of the FMs was ME3 > ME2 > ME4 > ME1. Cooling system failure
6, the ME prioritization of the FMs was ME3 > ME2 > ME4 > ME1. Cooling system failure (ME1) is
(ME1)the
is most
the most critical
critical FM because
FM because it has aitdirect
has aimpact
directon
impact on three
the other the other three mechanical
mechanical FMs. FMs.

Table 9. The
Table total
9. The totalrelation
relation matrix formechanical
matrix for mechanical FMs.
FMs.

ME ME
ME1 ME1 ME2ME2 ME3
ME3 ME4ME4c Sumc Sum 𝒊 + 𝒄𝒋 ) (r
r Sum r(𝒓Sum (𝒓i 𝒊+−c𝒄j )𝒋 ) status
(r i − cj ) Status
ME1 ME1
0.056 0.056
0.6960.696 0.56
0.56 0.518
0.518 0.255 1.830
0.255 2.085
1.830 1.575
2.085 cause
1.575 cause
ME2 ME2
0.033 0.033
0.2490.249 0.331
0.331 0.356
0.3562.190 2.190
0.969 3.159
0.969 −1.221
3.159 effect
−1.221 effect
ME3 ME3
0.13 0.130.7250.725 0.296
0.296 0.560.56 1.545 1.545
1.711 3.256
1.711 0.166
3.256 cause
0.166 cause
ME4 ME4
0.036 0.0360.520.52 0.358
0.358 0.219
0.2191.653 1.653
1.133 2.786
1.133 −0.520
2.786 effect
−0.520 effect
Note: Bold
Note: Bold values
values in
in matrix
matrix TT of
ofME
MEFMs
FMsthat
thatare
areabove
aboveaathreshold
thresholdvalue
value(α(α==0.353).
0.353).

Figure 6. The
Figure cause
6. The and
cause andeffect
effectrelationship mapfor
relationship map formechanical
mechanical FMs.
FMs.

According to Table
According 10,10,
to Table thethe
material
materialdegradation (OT1)had
degradation (OT1) hadthethehighest
highest weight
weight value
value of 4.374,
of 4.374,
followed by lubricant contamination (OT3) with a value of 3.559, but (OT1) was in the cause
followed by lubricant contamination (OT3) with value of 3.559, but (OT1) was in the cause group group
and (OT3) was was
and (OT3) in the effect
in the group.
effect group.

Table
Table 10.10.
TheThe totalrelation
total relationmatrix
matrix for
forother
otherexternal
externalFMs.
FMs.
OT OT1 OT2 OT3 OT4 c Sum r Sum (𝒓𝒊 + 𝒄𝒋 ) (𝒓 − 𝒄 ) Status
OT OT1 OT2 OT3 OT4 c Sum r Sum (ri𝒊 + cj )𝒋 (ri − cj ) Status
OT1 0.485 0.642 0.910 0.330 2.007 2.367 4.374 0.360 cause
OT1 0.485
OT2 0.642
0.330 0.143 0.910
0.536 0.3301.744 2.007
0.073 1.082 2.367
2.826 4.374
−0.662 0.360
effect cause
OT2 0.330 0.143 0.536 0.073 1.744 1.082 2.826 −0.662 effect
OT3 0.495 0.214 0.304 0.110 2.436 1.123 3.559 −1.313 effect
OT3 0.495 0.214 0.304 0.110 2.436 1.123 3.559 −1.313 effect
OT4 0.697 0.745 0.686 0.155 0.668 2.283 2.951 1.615 cause
OT4 0.697 0.745 0.686 0.155 0.668 2.283 2.951 1.615 cause
Note: Bold values in matrix T of OT FMs that are above a threshold value (α = 0.428).
Note: Bold values in matrix T of OT FMs that are above a threshold value (α = 0.428).

The other FMs were prioritized as OT1 > OT3 > OT4 > OT2, respectively. From Figure 7, OT1 has
The other FMs
a self-effect valuewere prioritized
of 0.485. as OT1
The failure in>the
OT3 > OT4system
purging > OT2,(OT2)
respectively.
had the From Figure
smallest 7, OT1 has
FM weight
a self-effect
(2.826),value
but it of 0.485.
is one Themost
of the failure in the
critical FMspurging system
due to its (OT2)
influence on had the smallest
the operation and FM weight
electrical (2.826),
FMs,
but itas
is shown
one of in
the most7.critical FMs due to its influence on the operation and electrical FMs, as shown
Figure
in Figure 7.
 Energies 2018, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 14 of 22

Energies 2019, 12, 649 14 of 22

Energies 2018, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 14 of 22

Figure 7. The cause and effect relationship map for other external FMs.
Figure 7. The
Figure cause
7. The and
cause andeffect
effectrelationship mapfor
relationship map forother
other external
external FMs.
FMs.
In addition, it can be found that the DEMATEL gives more information about FM weights and
In addition, it can
In addition, be be
it can found that
found thatthe
theDEMATEL
DEMATEL givesmore
more information about
FM FM weights
and and
their relationship. Therefore, the DEMATEL methodgives
results in ainformation about
higher discriminationweights
of clusters and
their their
relationship. Therefore, thethe
relationship. DEMATEL
DEMATELmethod results in a higher discrimination of clusters
and and
failure modes than Therefore,
the traditional FMEA method
method.results in
Figurea higher discrimination
8 portrays of clusters
the DEMATEL weights of
failure
failure modes modes
than than the traditional
the traditional FMEA FMEA method.
method. Figure
Figure 8 portrays
8 portrays the DEMATEL
the DEMATEL weights
weights of
of clusters
clusters and FMs.
clusters and FMs.
and FMs.

Figure 8. DEMATEL weights for clusters and FMs.

Figure8.8.DEMATEL
Figure DEMATELweights
weightsfor clusters
for and
clusters FMs.
and FMs.
4.3. The Interdependency and Impact Feedback
4.3. The Interdependency and Impact Feedback
4.3. The Interdependency
The ANP was applied and Impact
in thisFeedback
step to evaluate the interdependency among clusters and impact
feedback
The ANPofwas FMsapplied
on clusters, where
in this stepthetopairwise
evaluate comparisons were done according
the interdependency to a nine-leveled
among clusters and impact
The ANP was applied in this step to evaluate the interdependency among clusters and impact
scaleof
feedback [55] andon
FMs 26 clusters,
pairwise comparison matrices were
where the pairwise organizedwere
comparisons to complete this evaluation.
done according Besides,
to a nine-leveled
feedback of FMs on clusters, where the pairwise comparisons were done according to a nine-leveled
scale the
[55]relative
and 26weights
pairwise of FMs can be determined
comparison matrices based
were on the eigenvalue
organized method.
to complete this evaluation. Besides,
scale [55]For the FM feedback effects, 20 tables were structured to form the matrix this
and 26 pairwise comparison matrices were organized to complete columnsevaluation.
(𝑤 ), fiveBesides,
the relative weights of FMs can be determined based on the eigenvalue method.
the tables
relative weights
were of FMs
organized can be
for every FMdetermined
cluster to formbased on thecolumns
the matrix eigenvalue(𝑤 ),method.
and one table was used
For the FM feedback effects, 20 tables were structured to form the matrix columns (w23 ), five
For
for thethe FMclusters
main feedback
witheffects,
respect 20 tables
to the goalwere
to formstructured form (𝑤
the matrixtocolumn the matrix weights of(𝑤
). These columns the ), five
tablespairwise
were organized formatrix
every A FM cluster to supermatrix
form the matrix columns (w32 ), and(13)
w by Equations
oneand
table was used
comparisonfor
tables were organized every FMwerecluster
put into columns
form the matrix columns (𝑤 ), and one (15),was
table as used
for the main
will main clusters
be shown with
in Table respect to the goal to form the matrix column ( w )
21using Equation (14). the
. These weights of
for the clusters with11, with an
respect toinconsistency
the goal to formratio (CR) of less column
the matrix than 0.1 by(𝑤 ). These weights of the
pairwise
Then,comparison
the matrix A were
limited supermatrix put in supermatrix columns(16) w byobtain
Equations (13) andweights,
(15), as will
pairwise comparison matrix Awas were calculated by using Equation
put in supermatrix columnstow the stabilized
by Equations (13) and (15), as
be shown
whereinthe
Table
13th11, with was
power an inconsistency
used to weight ratio
the (CR) of less than
supermatrix. Matlab0.1 2017b
by using Equation
software was (14). Then, the
efficiently
will be shown in Table 11, with an inconsistency ratio (CR) of less than 0.1 by using Equation (14).
limited supermatrix was calculated by using Equation (16) to obtain the stabilized weights, where the
Then, the limited supermatrix was calculated by using Equation (16) to obtain the stabilized weights,
13th power was used to weight the supermatrix. Matlab 2017b software was efficiently used for these
where the 13th power was used to weight the supermatrix. Matlab 2017b software was efficiently
calculations. Furthermore, visual c++ 2017 software can be used to calculate the numerical results.
Final ANP weights of each cluster and FMs will be shown in Table 12. The results show that
electrical and operation affect other clusters with regard to the interdependency among clusters and
Energies 2018, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 15 of 22

used for these calculations. Furthermore, visual c++ 2017 software can be used to calculate the
numerical results.
Energies 2019, 12, 649 15 of 22
Final ANP weights of each cluster and FMs will be shown in Table 12. The results show that
electrical and operation affect other clusters with regard to the interdependency among clusters and
the effects of electrical and operation. As As shown
shown inin Figure
Figure 9, the largest dependency among FMs
appeared for rotor failure EL1 and operator error OP1, meaning that failure prevention prevention of the rotor
electrical and
and operator can enhance electrical and operation
operation in
in the
the context
context of
of setting
settingup
upananelectrical
electricalgenerator.
generator.
Finally, the data from from the
the ANP
ANP were
were analyzed
analyzed and
and also
also presented
presentedin inTable
Table13.
13.
These findings of the ANP step support the view that the failure modes influenced the main
However, when
cluster weights. However, when comparing
comparing ANP
ANP results
results to
to those
those of previous studies [20,28], the
feedback effect of FMs on the main cluster must be pointed out and considered. considered.

Figure 9.
Figure 9. ANP weights for clusters and FMs.

4.4. Final Prioritization with Comparison

4.4. Final Prioritization with Comparison
f inal
The final
The finalhybrid
hybridrisk
riskpriority value
priority HRPV
value 𝐻𝑅𝑃𝑉
j waswas
calculated usingusing
calculated Equation (17) of(17)
Equation eachofcluster
each
and failure mode FMi . In addition, the proposed FMEA framework weights for linguistic RPN,
cluster and failure mode 𝐹𝑀 . In addition, the proposed FMEA framework weights for linguistic
DEMATEL, and ANP are presented with a final rank in Table 13.
RPN, DEMATEL, and ANP are presented with a final rank in Table 13.
Table 13 shows that ME (mechanical) has the highest risk priority among clusters and FMs,
Table 13 shows that ME (mechanical) has the highest risk priority among clusters and FMs,
followed by OT4 (gas leakage) due to gas effects in the hazardous area, which validate the proposed
followed by OT4 (gas leakage) due to gas effects in the hazardous area, which validate the proposed
approach. IN 4 (failure of data communication) has the lowest risk priority due to the ability of the
approach. IN 4 (failure of data communication) has the lowest risk priority due to the ability of the
electrical generator to be locally controlled with no effect on other FMs.
electrical generator to be locally controlled with no effect on other FMs.
The ranking of the main FM clusters is ME  OP  EL  OT  IN, while the ranking of the first
The ranking of the main FM clusters is ME ≻ OP ≻ EL ≻ OT ≻ IN, while the ranking of the first
five sub-FMs is OT4  ME3  OT2  EL1  ME4. Hence, the ranks of other FMs change distinctly in
five sub-FMs is OT4 ≻ ME3≻ OT2≻ EL1 ≻ ME4. Hence, the ranks of other FMs change distinctly in
all steps. This changing reveals that ME shows the highest risk among clusters and FMs, even though
all steps. This changing reveals that ME shows the highest risk among clusters and FMs, even though
risk FMs are given different importance weights. Furthermore, the OT4 and OT2 are related to gas
risk FMs are given different importance weights. Furthermore, the OT4 and OT2 are related to gas
leakage, while ME3 and EL1 are related to the rotary mechanical part of the shaft and rotor that should
leakage, while ME3 and EL1 are related to the rotary mechanical part of the shaft and rotor that
be considered with a high priority of correction for the current maintenance plan. The critical risks for
should be considered with a high priority of correction for the current maintenance plan. The critical
clusters are OP1 (wrong operator action), IN3 (failure of the control system), EL1 (rotor failure), ME3
risks for clusters are OP1 (wrong operator action), IN3 (failure of the control system), EL1 (rotor
(shaft failure), and OT4 (gas Leakage). Moreover, given that the ranking of FMs fluctuates with the
failure), ME3 (shaft failure), and OT4 (gas Leakage). Moreover, given that the ranking of FMs
varying of risk weights, the final weights of FMs given by framework are reasonable.
fluctuates with the varying of risk weights, the final weights of FMs given by framework are
reasonable.
Energies 2019, 12, 649 16 of 22

Table 11. Supermatrix of Clusters and FMs.

Goal OP IN EL ME OT OP1 OP2 OP3 OP4 IN1 IN2 IN3 IN4 EL1 EL2 EL3 EL4 ME1 ME2 ME3 ME4 OT1 OT2 OT3 OT4
Goal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OP 0.045 0 0 0 0 0 0.221 0.312 0.168 0.201 0.227 0.260 0.299 0.169 0.235 0.249 0.221 0.190 0.217 0.219 0.247 0.212 0.171 0.273 0.186 0.210
IN 0.073 0 0 0 0 0 0.221 0.060 0.102 0.060 0.133 0.333 0.172 0.109 0.058 0.106 0.108 0.063 0.092 0.091 0.069 0.076 0.158 0.091 0.099 0.210
EL 0.123 0 0 0 0 0 0.158 0.312 0.130 0.175 0.224 0.110 0.299 0.273 0.336 0.293 0.240 0.436 0.205 0.219 0.247 0.206 0.186 0.273 0.162 0.173
ME 0.506 0 0 0 0 0 0.124 0.187 0.300 0.313 0.091 0.110 0.102 0.058 0.129 0.189 0.192 0.144 0.217 0.299 0.326 0.243 0.240 0.091 0.246 0.173
OT 0.253 0 0 0 0 0 0.275 0.129 0.300 0.251 0.325 0.187 0.127 0.392 0.243 0.164 0.240 0.166 0.270 0.172 0.111 0.264 0.245 0.273 0.306 0.234
OP1 0 0.517 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OP2 0 0.168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OP3 0 0.077 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OP4 0 0.238 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IN1 0 0 0.158 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IN2 0 0 0.108 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IN3 0 0 0.649 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IN4 0 0 0.085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EL1 0 0 0 0.561 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EL2 0 0 0 0.168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EL3 0 0 0 0.227 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EL4 0 0 0 0.044 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ME1 0 0 0 0 0.039 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ME2 0 0 0 0 0.126 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ME3 0 0 0 0 0.565 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ME4 0 0 0 0 0.270 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OT1 0 0 0 0 0 0.085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OT2 0 0 0 0 0 0.522 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OT3 0 0 0 0 0 0.051 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OT4 0 0 0 0 0 0.051 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Energies 2019, 12, 649 17 of 22

Table 12. Limited Supermatrix of Clusters and FMs.

Goal OP IN EL ME OT OP1 OP2 OP3 OP4 IN1 IN2 IN3 IN4 EL1 EL2 EL3 EL4 ME1 ME2 ME3 ME4 OT1 OT2 OT3 OT4
Goal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OP 0 0.237 0.237 0.237 0.237 0.237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IN 0 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EL 0 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.242 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ME 0 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.179 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OT 0 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.223 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OP1 0.123 0 0 0 0 0 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123
OP2 0.040 0 0 0 0 0 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040
OP3 0.018 0 0 0 0 0 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
OP4 0.056 0 0 0 0 0 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056
IN1 0.019 0 0 0 0 0 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
IN2 0.013 0 0 0 0 0 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
IN3 0.077 0 0 0 0 0 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077
IN4 0.010 0 0 0 0 0 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
EL1 0.136 0 0 0 0 0 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136
EL2 0.041 0 0 0 0 0 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041
EL3 0.055 0 0 0 0 0 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055
EL4 0.011 0 0 0 0 0 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
ME1 0.007 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
ME2 0.023 0 0 0 0 0 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
ME3 0.101 0 0 0 0 0 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101
ME4 0.048 0 0 0 0 0 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048
OT1 0.019 0 0 0 0 0 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
OT2 0.116 0 0 0 0 0 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116
OT3 0.011 0 0 0 0 0 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
OT4 0.076 0 0 0 0 0 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
Energies 2019, 12, 649 18 of 22

Table 13. The final hybrid risk priority value of clusters and FMs.

Clusters LRPN DEMATEL ANP final Final Rank

HRPVj
and FMs Weights Weights Weights Within Clusters Without Clusters
OP 0.558 3.847 0.237 0.509 2 4
IN 0.448 2.325 0.119 0.124 5 12
EL 0.674 3.084 0.242 0.503 3 5
ME 1.114 4.245 0.179 0.846 1 1
OT 0.446 3.457 0.223 0.344 4 7
OP1 1.179 1.286 0.123 0.186 1 10
OP2 1.118 1.116 0.040 0.050 3 18
OP3 0.869 1.530 0.018 0.024 4 21
OP4 0.681 2.068 0.056 0.079 2 16
IN1 1.155 1.351 0.019 0.030 2 20
IN2 0.873 0.923 0.013 0.010 3 23
IN3 1.273 1.470 0.077 0.144 1 11
IN4 0.695 0.821 0.010 0.006 4 25
EL1 0.873 2.843 0.136 0.338 1 8
EL2 0.610 2.747 0.041 0.069 3 17
EL3 0.812 2.598 0.055 0.116 2 13
EL4 0.556 2.308 0.011 0.014 4 22
ME1 0.500 2.085 0.007 0.007 4 24
ME2 1.200 3.159 0.023 0.087 3 14
ME3 1.646 3.255 0.101 0.541 1 3
ME4 1.397 2.785 0.048 0.187 2 9
OT1 0.960 4.373 0.019 0.080 3 15
OT2 1.462 2.825 0.116 0.479 2 6
OT3 0.776 3.558 0.011 0.030 4 19
OT4 2.533 2.951 0.076 0.568 1 2

A comparative study is conducted with other FMEA framework approaches based on the electrical
generator case study. The new hybrid framework based on linguistic FMEA, DEMATEL, and ANP
approaches is applied to alleviate the drawbacks of the traditional FMEA method. Hence, the
traditional FMEA, the linguistic FMEA framework [49], and the Fuzzy FMEA framework [28] are
selected for comparison to investigate the benefits of the proposed risk framework. Table 14 reveals
the ranking results of the five FMs produced from the above four FMEA framework approaches.

Table 14. Final risk priority number with FMEA method ranking comparison.

Method Name OP IN EL ME OT Failure Mode Priority

Traditional FMEA 29.4 10.4 51 58 7.6 ME  EL  OP  IN  OT
LFMEA framework [49] 0.558 0.448 0.674 1.114 0.446 ME  EL  OP  IN  OT
Fuzzy FMEA framework [28] 0.132 0.053 0.163 0.199 0.099 ME  OP  EL  OT  IN
Proposed method 0.509 0.124 0.503 0.846 0.344 ME  OP  EL  OT  IN

Figure 10 shows that some important findings can be clearly deduced. First, the ranking orders
of the proposed framework (ME, EL, OP, IN, and OT) are in agreement with the ranking order of the
Fuzzy FMEA framework approach [28]. This demonstrates the validity of our proposed risk priority
framework. Additionally, a ranking of the traditional FMEA and the linguistic framework [49] is
almost the same, except rank order has been exchanged between OP, EL, and OT, IN. The reason for
the differences is due to the advantages of using DEMATEL and ANP approaches, which had a better
impact on the final risk. This interrelationship and impact feedback result in OT being before IN in
the order and OP being before EL. Therefore, the proposed ranking framework is more precise than
the traditional FMEA and the linguistic FMEA framework [49]. By comparison, the proposed FMEA
framework can reveal weights of the expert team and FMs interrelationship more precisely.
Energies 2018, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 20 of 22

the traditional FMEA and the linguistic FMEA framework [49]. By comparison, the proposed FMEA
Energies 2019, 12, 649 19 of 22
framework can reveal weights of the expert team and FMs interrelationship more precisely.

Figure 10. Comparison of FMEA methods for the considered rank of FMs.

This study shows that the proposed framework is the most suitable for ranking FMs in the
hazardous
hazardous area
area due to a systematic computational process. This will efficiently help industrial experts
in decision making and in overcoming the complexity and time-consuming nature of extended FMEA
methods,
methods, such
suchasasHOR
HORwithwiththe
theVIKOR
VIKOR FMEA
FMEA framework
framework [17], andand
[17], the the
TODIMTODIMFMEA FMEAframework [56].
framework
Moreover, the results
[56]. Moreover, of the
the results ofproposed
the proposedframework
framework are useful for for
are useful the the
maintenance
maintenance policy maker
policy makerto
select a suitable maintenance policy for equipment or machines to prevent
to select a suitable maintenance policy for equipment or machines to prevent potential failurespotential failures and
reduce their consequences. Industrial decision makers could be improved structure analysts for risk
assessment
assessment andandtask
taskplanning
planning forfor
thethe
effective management
effective management system. However,
system. the study
However, the gave
studya precise
gave a
priority with a clear relationship in a simple and straightforward manner, which
precise priority with a clear relationship in a simple and straightforward manner, which makes riskmakes risk analysis
more realistic
analysis more for the decision
realistic for theordecision
policy maker. Themaker.
or policy decisionThe maker can have
decision maker particular
can havebenefits for
particular
developing
benefits for analysis
developingand analysis
judgments andinjudgments
complex orinvague conditions,
complex or vague likeconditions,
hazardouslikeenvironments.
hazardous
The proposed methodology
environments. The proposed canmethodology
be applied to canotherbehazardous
applied management
to other hazardousapplications, such as
management
aerospace
applications,healthcare, a nuclear healthcare,
such as aerospace plant, or any chemical
a nuclear industries
plant, or any where
chemical there is a riskwhere
industries of flammable
there is
gases or liquids.
a risk of flammable gases or liquids.
As a result, for the case study of the electrical generator, the finding of FMs ranking and
interrelationship has been offered to a maintenance team of the oil and gas plant to adjust the
maintenance plan in order to prevent
prevent system
system failures.
failures.

5. Conclusions
5. Conclusions
A
A new
new hybrid
hybrid risk
risk priority
priority framework
framework for for FMEA
FMEA in in aa hazardous
hazardous environment
environment whichwhich integrates
integrates
linguistic
linguistic FMEA, ANP, and DEMATEL is presented. The linguistic FMEA method was used
FMEA, ANP, and DEMATEL is presented. The linguistic FMEA method was used to define
to define
the
the weight
weight ofof risk
risk factors
factors and
and expert
expert members,
members, and and therefore
therefore decreased
decreased the the influence
influence ofof the
the injustice
injustice
of
of experts on assessment results. Moreover, the linguistic calculation was applied to overcome the
experts on assessment results. Moreover, the linguistic calculation was applied to overcome the
drawbacks
drawbacks of of the
the fuzzy
fuzzy method,
method, likelike data
data losses
losses as
as aa result
result ofof the
the de-fuzzy
de-fuzzy process.
process. The
The framework
framework
applies the DEMATEL
applies the DEMATELtotounderstand
understandthe the interrelationships
interrelationships among
among thethe clusters
clusters andand the FMs
the FMs and
and then
then
uses the hybrid formal to calculate the importance weights of the FMs. The new formula is
uses the hybrid formal to calculate the importance weights of the FMs. The new formula is
implemented to give the final weight of FMs. A Yemen oil and gas plant was
implemented to give the final weight of FMs. A Yemen oil and gas plant was chosen as a case study chosen as a case study to
validate the framework
to validate the framework and its and
implementation in real practice.
its implementation in real Integrating
practice. the three methodologies
Integrating the three
reveals that the major shortcoming of the traditional FMEA could
methodologies reveals that the major shortcoming of the traditional FMEA could be be overcome. The application
overcome. of The
this
framework
application could
of thisprovide
framework a better
couldunderstanding
provide a better of decisions in an oilofand
understanding gas plant.
decisions in anFurthermore,
oil and gas
the comparison of this model with other models clearly demonstrates
plant. Furthermore, the comparison of this model with other models clearly demonstrates the former’s better efficiency
the
and applicability
former’s in electric and
better efficiency generators of oil and
applicability in gas in hazardous
electric generators environments.
of oil and Thisgas is
in because
hazardousthe
framework
environments.incorporates strategies
This is because the to offer the linking
framework information
incorporates about
strategies to failure interaction
offer the effects and
linking information
priority
about failure interaction effects and priority weights. The work also studied the combined approach
weights. The work also studied the combined effects of failure modes rather than the effects of
Energies 2019, 12, 649 20 of 22

of traditional FMEA, which only analyzes failure modes individually and ignores the important effects
of combined system failures.
Based on the case study, it can be deduced that among the five clusters, the most important ones
are the mechanical ME and operation OP. Also, among the twenty FMs, the gas leakage OT4 is the
most important FM, followed by the shaft failure ME 3 and purging system failure OT2. Both OT4 and
OT1 are related to the external hazard of gas leakage. In consequence, the operation and electrical FMs
are critical FMs and affected by other clusters. In addition, industries dealing with electrical power
generation are prone to many hazards. This could tap into this framework to evaluate and classify
risk in order to prevent system failure and help practitioners in relevant decision-making, especially
hazardous areas like a nuclear power plant.
This study is limited to risk identification and ranking. Further research should incorporate
relative optimization tools, such as GA, PSO, and deep learning, which could be included in framework
optimization so that experts can better understand and distinguish failure effects at the design or
running stage.

Author Contributions: The research topic was proposed by M.A.; M.A. and T.S.H. structured and wrote the first
draft of the paper; M.A. conducted the research and drafted the methodology; A.A., E.E.S., and C.K.A. took part
in the validation and analysis of results; M.A. made the conclusions and wrote most parts of the paper with T.S.H.;
C.K.A. validated the idea and reviewed the final paper with M.A.; all other co-authors contributed to the writing
of the manuscript and the supervision of this work.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Acknowledgments: The open access preparations of this article were funded by the Research Centre of University
Putra Malaysia. We thank the maintenance and production team of the oil and gas plant Yemen, for the great
support and joint work team.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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