G.R. No.

187167
Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
August 16,2011

FACTS:
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the maritime baselines of
the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the
sovereign right of States parties over their “territorial sea,” the breadth of which, however, was left
undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960
(UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five
decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting
typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522. The change was prompted by the
need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III
prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic states like the
Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf.
Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as “regimes of islands” whose islands generate their
own applicable maritime zones.

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit- YES
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522- YES
3. Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional- NO

RULING:
1. Petitioners possess locus standi as citizens. Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of
locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of
legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and
implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens
with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which
undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed,
owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants
possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the
requirements for granting citizenship standing.

2. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of
statutes. When the Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we
have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to
test the constitutionality of statutes, and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.
 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no
bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this
nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass
upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding.
The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.

3. RA 9522 is not unconstitutional. It is a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral
treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i,e., the territorial waters
[12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among
United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world‟s
oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States‟ graduated authority
over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties
to work-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either
straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf.

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States- parties to
delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this
gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely: the exercise
of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit
the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77).

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or
diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, states acquire (or
conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by
executing multilateral treaties on the regulation of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to
comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial
claims to land features are outside UNCLOS IIII, and are instead governed by the rules on
general international law.

RA 9522’s use of the framework of Regime of Islands to determine the maritime zones of the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal is not inconsistent with the
Philippines’ claim of sovereignty over these areas.

The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522
merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA
9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and
thus comply with UNCLOS III‟s limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA
3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines
drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind
out of petitioners‟ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines‟
claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.

Petitioners‟ assertion of loss of “about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters”
under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by
optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines‟ total maritime space
(covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 154,216 square
nautical miles x x x.

Further, petitioners‟ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the
baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2
of the law commits to text the Philippines‟ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction
over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal x x x

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the
Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have
committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. X x x

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable
distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight
baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably
“depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of our archipelago.”

Xxx

[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the
outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf provided by Article
47 of [UNCLOS III].

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines‟ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal,
Congress‟ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as “‟Regime[s] of Islands‟
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121” of UNCLOS III manifests
the Philippine State‟s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under
UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any “naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,” such as portions of the KIG, qualifies
under the category of “regime of islands,” whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones