ASSIGNMENT

CRIMINAL LAW 2
TOPICS REPORT & CASE
DIGESTS
(Article 351 – 365)

Submitted by:

WILLY C. DUMPIT
First Year – LLB
Art. 351. Premature marriages. Any widow who shall marry within three hundred and
one days from the date of the death of her husband, or before having delivered if she
shall have been pregnant at the time of his death, shall be punished by arresto mayor
and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.

Persons liable for premature marriages:

1. A widow who married within 301 days from the date of the death of her
husband, or before having delivered if she is pregnant at the time of his death.

2. A woman who, her marriage having been annulled or dissolved, married

before her delivery or before the expiration of the period of 301 days after the
date of the legal separation.

Art. 352. Performance of illegal marriage ceremony. Priests or ministers of any

religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the
Marriage Law.

The offender is punished under the Marriage Law.

The penalty is imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two
years, or a fine not less than P200 nor more than P2,000. (Sec. 39, Act No.
3613, Marriage Law)

Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or
of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Elements of defamation:

1. That there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or

imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstance.

2. That the imputation must be made publicly.

3. That it must be malicious.

4. That the imputation must be directed to a natural or juridical person, or one

who is dead.
 5. That the imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt
of the person defamed.

LEOUEL SANTOS, Petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent

GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995

FACTS:

On September 20, 1986 Leouel and Julia exchanged vows. A year after the
marriage, the couple when quarreling over a number of things including
the interference of Julia’s parents into their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia
finally left for the United States. Leouel was then unable to communicate with her for
a period of five years and she had then virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed a
case for nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should be
appreciated?

HELD:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. The psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated and must be incurable. Mere abandonment cannot
therefore qualify as psychological incapacity on the part of Julia.

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance

of any legal, moral, or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
 proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.

Art. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. A libel committed by means
of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical
exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods1 or a fine ranging from 200
to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.

A libel may be committed by means of:

1. Writing 6. Phonograph

2. Printing 7. Painting,

3. Lithography 8. Theatrical exhibition,

4. Engraving 9. Cinematographic exhibition,

5. Radio 10. Or any similar means.

Art. 356. Threatening to publish and offer to prevent such publication for a
compensation. The penalty of arresto mayor2 or a fine of from 200 to 2,000 pesos,
or both shall be imposed upon any person who threatens another to publish a libel
concerning him or the parents, spouse, child, or other members of the family of the
latter, or upon anyone who shall offer to prevent the publication of such libel for a
compensation or money consideration.

Acts punished under Art. 356:

1. By threatening another to publish a libel concerning him, or his parents,

spouse, child, or other members of his family.

2. By offering to prevent the publication of such libel for compensation, or

money consideration.

Art. 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official

proceedings. The penalty of arresto mayor3 or a fine of from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or
both, shall be imposed upon any reporter, editor, or manager of a newspaper, daily or
magazine, who shall publish facts connected with the private life of another and
offensive to the honor, virtue, and reputation of said person, even though said
publication be made in connection with or under the pretext that it is necessary in the
narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been
mentioned.

Elements:

1. That the offender is a reporter, editor or manager of a newspaper daily or

magazine.

2. That he publishes facts connected with the private life of another.

3. That such facts are offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said
person.

Art. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period4 if it is of a serious and insulting
nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos.

Slander is oral defamation.

Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term oral
defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base
and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade,
business or means of livelihood. (Villanueva vs. People: G.R. No. 160351, April 10,
2006, 487 SCRA 42)

Two kinds of oral defamation:

1. Simple slander.

2. Grave slander, when it is of a serious and insulting nature.

REYES, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE, Respondent

G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529, March 28, 1969

FACTS:

The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the
Navy Exchange, whose services were terminated. He led a group of about 20 to 30
persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the United States Naval
Station. They carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;"
"To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay
ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia
di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others. At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office
inside the naval station. When he learned about the demonstration he became
apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection.
After Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence, Col.
Monzon sped away. The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of
Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and
posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding
the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala
ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the
motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of
Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.

ISSUE:

Whether lower court erred in convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation

when the evidence tend to establish that of simple slander only?

HELD:

No. The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words,
"Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is
often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is
seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the
virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced
by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic.

Art. 359. Slander by deed. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period5 or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not included and
punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another
person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos.

Elements:

1. That the offender performs any act not included in any other crime against
honor.

2. That such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons.

3. That such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended party.
 GONZALES, Petitioner vs. ARCILLA, Respondent
G.R. No. 27923 November 18, 1991

FACTS:
• With intent to cash dishonour, discredit and contempt upon one Filipinas
Ordonez, Marcela Gonzales uttered publicly in the presence and within the
hearing of several persons the following defamatory words, to wit: “MANG-
AAGAW NG ASAWA NG MAY ASAWA! TIBIHON! PUTANG INA MO!
WALANG HIYA! PATAY GUTOM!”
• Information for slander against Gonzales was filed before the City Court of
Davao by Fiscal Celi. Gonzales moved to quash the information contending that
the fiscal did not have authority to file the information and the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case.
• Motion to quash was denied. MR was also denied. Thus, Gonzales filed with
CFI of Davao a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Gonzales’ Argument Fiscal’s Argument

The alleged defamation imputes The slanderous words alleged in the
the crime of adultery and thus information contain imputations not only
cannot be prosecuted de oficio. to one crime but to other offenses like
The other remarks, however, do vice, defect and condition which are
not charge a crime. The distinct from independent of each other;
complaint, must, therefore be one, admitted to be adultery and other
brought at the instance of the are public crimes which can be
offended party, which was not prosecuted de oficio.
done in this case. Thus, fiscal did
not have authority to file the
information and the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case.

• CFI decided for Gonzales. It ruled that:

1) The entire context of the information should be read together as a whole.
2) The Fiscal correctly construed in English the significance of the first portion
of the defamation in question by imputing the commission of the crime of
adultery.
3) However, the Fiscal didn’t interpret the correct meaning of the succeeding
group of clauses. Expressions of this kind and tenor are commonly used by
many people according to their custom specially who are unschooled and
coming from the lower strata. They may be defamatory or not depending upon
the tenor and import conveyed by the accompanying statements.
 4) In view of all the foregoing, the words mentioned in the latter part of statement
do not impute the commission of any public offense that may be considered
distinct and independent from the conveyed in the first sentence, but they are
simply intended to give more spice to the main thought expressed in the whole
statements.
• Fiscal appealed to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a criminal action for Gonzales’ alleged defamation can be
brought de oficio?

HELD:
• Yes. Slander is oral defamation, where there is public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real, or imaginary or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance trending to cause the dishonour,
discredit or contempt of natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead. Defamatory words are to be construed in their entirety, and
should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would
naturally be understood by persons hearing them, unless it appears that they
were used and understood in another sense.
• CFI’s interpretation of the first portion of the alleged defamatory utterance is
erroneous. “Mangaagaw ng asawa ng may asawa” , even if translated as “one
who grabs another’s husband” does not necessarily mean an adulteress. At
most, it may imply that the person to whom it is addressed is a “flirt, a temptress,
or one who indulges in enticing other husbands”. It is an imputation of some
kind of moral depravity, immoral conduct or a vice, but certainly not a crime.
• CFI’s interpretation of the other portion as” mere accompanying and
supporting phrases and terms used to give more vivid color and importance to
the first portion” is also erroneous. These remarks were uttered merely to
expose all possible vices, defects, real or imaginary, status, or condition of the
offended party. ‘Tibihon” means a person suffering from tuberculosis, and not
“consumptive” as translated by the fiscal. “Putang ina Mo,” although referring
to a mother, was meant to suggest that the offended party’s is not a legitimate
daughter of her mother. “Walang-Hiya, which means “shameless”, could related
to the offended party’s being a flirt, seducer, or a daughter of a prostitute.
“Patay-Gutom” is a derogatory remark connoting abject poverty entirely
unrelated to the first portion. None of these, however, imputed any crime.
• Accordingly, the last paragraph of RPC 360 which provides that:
“No criminal action for defamation which consist in the imputation of a
crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall brought except at the
instance of and upon complaint expressly fileed by the offended party.”
 which has specific reference to the crimes against chastity, and the
second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 110 of ROC which provides: “The
crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon
a complaint filed by the offended spouse”. are not applicable in this case,
since, as above discussed, the alleged slanderous utterance subject
of the assailed information do not impute any crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio. Order of the City Court of Davao in the criminal
case denying to the motion to quash is hereby REINSTATED and said
court is directed to proceed with the arraignment, if one has not yet been
had, and the trial of the case on its merits.

Art. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.

The persons responsible for libel are:

1. The person who publishes, exhibits or causes the publication or exhibition of

any defamation in writing or similar means. (Art. 360, par. 1)

2. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet.

3. The editor or business manager of a daily newspaper magazine or serial

publication. (Art. 360, par. 2)

4. The owner of the printing plant which publishes a libelous article with his
consent and all other persons who in any way participate in or have connection
with its publication. (U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. 752

Art. 361. Proof of the truth. In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be
given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is
true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends,
the defendant shall be acquitted.

When proof of truth is admissible.

Proof of truth is admissible in any of the following:

1. When the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of whether

the offended party is a private individual or a public officer.

2. When the offended party is a Government employee, even if the act or

omission imputed does not constitute a crime, provided, it is related to the
discharge of his official duties. (See Ocampo vs. Evangelista, et al, C.A., 37
O.G. 2196; Tumang vs. People, 73 Phil. 700)
Art. 362. Libelous remarks. Libelous remarks or comments connected with the
matter privileged under the provisions of Article 354, if made with malice, shall not
exempt the author thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from
criminal liability.

Art. 363. Incriminating innocent person. Any person who, by any act not constituting
perjury, shall directly incriminate or impute to an innocent person the commission of a
crime, shall be punished by arresto mayor.

Elements:

1. That the offender performs an act.

2. That by such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person

the commission of a crime.

3. That such act does not constitute perjury.

PEOPLE, Petitioner vs. ALAGAO, Respondent

G.R. No. L-20721, April 30, 1966

FACTS:

City Fiscal of Manila filed an information against the defendants-appellees

charging them of the complex crime of incriminatory machinations thru unlawful
arrest, as follows: "That on or about the 28th day of February, 1961, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then members of the Manila Police
Department, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously incriminate or impute to one Marcial
Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime by bribery thru unlawful arrest, in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused, on the aforesaid date, without reasonable
ground therefor and for the purpose of delivering said Marcial Apolonio y Santos to the
proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest said
Marcial Apolonio y Santos; that after the said Marcial Apolonio y Santos had been
arrested in the manner aforestated, and while the latter was supposedly being
investigated by the said accused, the said accused did then and there place on
commingle a marked P1.00 bill together with the money taken from said Marcial
Apolonio y Santos, supposedly given to the latter by one Emerita Calupas de Aresa,
so that he (Marcial Apolonio y Santos), then an employee of the Local Civil
Registrar's Office of Manila, would appear to have agreed to perform an act not
constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his (Marcial Apolonio y
Santos) duties, which was to expedite the issuance of a birth certificate, thereby
directly incriminating or imputing to said Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of
the crime of bribery." -defendants filed a motion to quash saying that (1) the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense (because the two crimes
cannot be complexed); and (2) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged -CFI granted motion to dismiss agreeing with defendants -MFR
was denied -appeal by fiscal before SC

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI erred in granting motion to quash?

HELD:

YES - It is very apparent that by the use of the phrase "thru unlawful arrest" in
the information an idea is conveyed that the unlawful arrest was resorted to as a
necessary means to plant evidence in the person of the offended party, thereby
incriminating him.

From a reading of the info the SC finds a close connection between the act of the
accused in first unlawfully arresting the offended party and then investigating him; and
it was during that investigation that they plated incriminatory evidence against him.
SC agrees with the Solicitor General in his contention that the accused first had to
resort to unlawful arrest in order to be able to plant the P1.00 bill among the money
taken from the offended party.

Also the court a quo has jurisdiction to try the accused of the offense charged in
the information. The crime of unlawful arrest is punishable with arresto mayor
or imprisonment of from one month and one day to six months, and a fine not
exceeding P500.00; 5 and the crime of incriminatory machinations is punishable
with arresto mayor, or imprisonment of from one month and one day to six months.

Art. 364. Intriguing against honor. The penalty of arresto menor or fine not
exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed for any intrigue which has for its principal
purpose to blemish the honor or reputation of a person.

Ganaan, Petitioner vs. IAC, Respondent

G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

FACTS:

On October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s residence discussing the terms for
the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the
City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the
proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same
morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and
advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer,
Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.

When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the

telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called
again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’.
Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the
office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his
friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine
Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. When he
received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of
the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached
the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against
complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with
modification hence the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or

arrangement” under Rep. Act No. 4200?

HELD:

No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or
arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or
the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept,
or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use
thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to
be there for ordinary office use.

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its medium period;1 if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods2 shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period3 shall be
imposed.
 The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall
impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed, in
the period which they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile

Law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall
be punished by prision correccional in its medium and the maximum periods

NORMAN A. GAID, Petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009

FACTS:

On October 25, 2001, petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-
lane road where the Laguindingan National High School is located toward thedirection
of Moog in Misamis Oriental

At the time several students were coming out of the school premises.
Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), wasseen by
eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left side of the road.
From where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag down
petitioner’s jeepney which was traveling on the right lane of the road. However, nei
ther did petitionernor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging
down the jeepney to ride at that point. The next thing Bongalto saw,Dayatas feet was
pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat on the ground behind
the jeepney

Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who was also situated on
the left side of the street but directly in front of the school gate,heard a strong impact
coming from the jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order to hurdle
an obstacle. Dayata was then seenlying on the ground] and caught in between the
rear tires. Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and the
vehicle tiltedto the right side.-

Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause
of death. She testified that the head injuries of Dayata couldhave been caused by
having run over by the jeepney.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is negligent?

HELD:

Yes but Gaid is not liable.-presence or absence of negligence on the part of

petitioner is determined by the operative events leading to the death of Dayata which
actuallycomprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began when Dayata
flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the roadand ended when
he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage covered the span between the
moment immediately after the victim was runover and the point when petitioner put the
jeepney to a halt.