Gerochi v. DOE 2015979620july2017202007
Gerochi v. DOE 2015979620july2017202007
Gerochi v. DOE 2015979620july2017202007
Files
Property
Reminder
Status Open
URL https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jul2007/gr_159796_2007.html
Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge, and
Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) which seeks to implement the said
imposition, be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed upon the consumers be
refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO) be issued directing the respondents to refrain from implementing, charging,
and collecting the said charge.
Main Points
Collections by the distribution utilities and the TRANSCO in any given month shall
be remitted to the PSALM Corp.
The PSALM Corp., as administrator of the fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund
which shall be disbursed only for the purposes specified herein in an open and
transparent manner. All amount collected for the universal charge shall be
distributed to the respective beneficiaries within a reasonable period to be provided
by the ERC.
Facts
April 5, 2002 - National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group8 (NPC-
SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the
availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification
May 7, 2002 - NPC filed another petition with ERC praying that the proposed share
from the Universal Charge for the Environmental charge be approved for withdrawal
from the Special Trust Fund (STF) managed by Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Group (PSALM) for the rehabilitation and management of watershed
areas.
December 20, 2002 - ERC issued an Order provisionally approving the share of the
NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the
National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the
same from its end-users on a monthly basis.
April 2, 2003 - Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P.
Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their
respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.
June 26, 2003 - ERC rendered its Decision which modifies its Order on Dec. 20, 2002;
an additional amount per kilowatt-hour is added from the amount provisionally
authorized by the Commission in the said Order.
Petitioner Arguments
1. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said
power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional,
giving the same unlimited authority.
3. The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected
should be used.
Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax
and is collected to fund the operations of the NPC.
Additional infos:
Petitioners filed a complaint because they sustained a direct injury as a result of the
imposition of the Universal Charge as reflected in their electric bills.
Petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they filed this
"Complaint" directly to the Supreme Court
The Complaint is bereft of any allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the ERC or any of the public respondents, in order for the Court to consider it as a
petition for certiorari or prohibition.
It has long been established that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
Respondent Arguments
Respondent PSALM contends that unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income
for public purposes, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific regulatory
purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry.
Thus, it is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police power.
Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC share the same view that
the Universal Charge is not a tax because it is levied for a specific regulatory
purpose, an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power.
Respondents further contend that said Universal Charge does not possess the
essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound to the benefit
of the electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is uniformly
levied on electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the
individual taxpayer's ability to pay.
Respondents deny that there is undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC
since the EPIRA sets forth sufficient determinable standards which would guide the
ERC in the exercise of the powers granted to it.
Respondents argue that the imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive
and confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power of the State and it
complies with the requirements of due process.
Issues
1. Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax;
and
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of
the ERC.
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's
police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked.
It can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in
the exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is surely promoted.
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to
Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it
contains sufficient standards.
The law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative
power.
We therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and
not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative
Principles
Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property.
Police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as
parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the
purpose for which the charge is made.
References:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jul2007/gr_159796_2007.html
https://lawyerly.ph/digest/cac17?user=424