European Commission Demography Report 2010

European Commission
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Union
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Demography Report
2010
DEMOGRAPHY REPORT 2010

VÍNCULO A LA NOTICIA EN ESPAÑOL
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This publication is a joint effort by Commission services, mainly the Directorate General for
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion and Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Union. The
'in-house' contributors are as follows
Summary: DG EMPL (Emanuela Tassa);
Part I (Main Demographic Trends):
• chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7: Eurostat (Veronica Corsini, Albane Gourdol, Katarzyna Kraszewska,

Monica Marcu, Apolonija Oblak Flander and Katya Vasileva);
• end-parts of chapters 6 and 7 and the boxes: DG EMPL (Ettore Marchetti);
Part II (Borderless Europeans): DG EMPL (Ettore Marchetti)
Annex on Migration in the Recession: Eurostat (Piotr Juchno and Apolonija Oblak Flander) and DG
EMPL (Ettore Marchetti).
Country Annexe: DG EMPL (Ettore Marchetti)
The report could not have been prepared without contributions from
• Giampaolo Lanzieri (Eurostat) for his populations projections by foreign background;
• the organisations Gallup (1) and Clandestino (2), for data on migration intentions and irregular
migration;
• researchers at the NIDI institute (3), especially Gijs Beets, Jeannette Schoorl, Nico van Nimwegen and
Peter Ekamper, who provided analysis of 'Borderless Europeans';
• researchers at the VID institute (4), especially Dimiter Philipov and Julia Schuster, who provided
analysis of the 'tempo effect' on fertility, long-term effects of migrants on national population
structures;
• researchers at the MPI-Rostock (5), especially Sigrun Matthiesen, Jim Vaupel and Harald
Wilkoszewski, who provided the analysis of healthy life expectancy in the box;
• Hans-Peter Kohler (University of Pennsylvania) for data and analysis on the relationship between
fertility and economic development;
• members of the Demography Expert Group, who provided feedback on the country summaries.
(1) http://www.gallup.com/
(2) http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/
(3) http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/smartsite.dws?lang=NL&ch=NID&id=2807
(4) http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/
(5) http://www.demogr.mpg.de/
iv
Acknowledgements
Any remaining errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors in the European Commission.
v
CONTENTS
Summary 1
Überblick 7
Résumé 14
Part I: Main Demographic Trends 23

1. Introduction 25
2. Fertility 26
2.1. Recovery of Fertility 26
2.2. Women still postponing births 27
2.3. Revisiting fertility trends 29
3. Mortality 31
3.1. Mortality Trends over the Past 30 years 31
3.2. Recent gains in life expectancy 31
4. Migration: Trends 40
4.1. Migration flows 40
5. Migration: Foreign Population 46
5.1. Non-nationals in the EU 46
5.2. Acquiring citizenship of EU Member State 47
5.3. Foreign-born population 49
5.4. Education levels of the foreign-born 51
5.5. Non-nationals younger on average than nationals 55
6. Population Change and Structure 57
6.1. Population growth 57
6.2. Population ageing 60
7. Families 66
7.1. Fewer marriages, more divorces 66
7.2. A rise in births outside marriage 67
7.3. Fertility and the family 67
7.4. Changing household structure 70
Part II: Borderless Europeans 73

1. Introduction 75
2. Migrants across Generations 78
2.1. How migrants shape the structure of EU-27 populations 78
2.2. Integration of migrants and their descendants across generations 80
2.3. How migrants can shape future EU populations 86
3. Moving into and across the EU 89
3.1. Ancestry and Life choices 90
3.2. Connectedness and Attitudes 92
4. Further Ways of Connecting to Other Countries 93
4.1. Commuting across borders 93
4.2. Personal and cultural connections across borders 94
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Part III: Annex - Demography and the Recession 97
1. Introduction 99
2. Migration in the recession 100
2.1. How the recession affected migration 100
Country Annex 107

1. The European Union 108
1. Belgium 110
2. Bulgaria 112
3. The Czech Republic 114
4. Denmark 116
5. Germany 118
6. Estonia 120
7. Ireland 122
8. Greece 124
9. Spain 126
10. France 128
11. Italy 130
12. Cyprus 132
13. Latvia 134
14. Lithuania 136
15. Luxembourg 138
16. Hungary 140
17. Malta 142
18. The Netherlands 144
19. Austria 146
20. Poland 148
21. Portugal 150
22. Romania 152
23. Slovenia 154
24. Slovakia 156
25. Finland 158
26. Sweden 160
27. The United Kingdom 162
1. Country Indicator Sources 164
LIST OF TABLES
I.1.1. Main demographic trends: Main findings 25
I.2.1. Total Fertility Rate (TFR), selected years 26
I.2.2. Mean age of women at childbirth, selected years 27
I.2.3. Total fertility rate and mean age of women at childbirth in
EU-27, 2002-2008 28
I.2.4. Fertility rate differences (2006-2008) and 'tempo' adjustment 30
I.3.1. Life expectancy at birth by sex, 1993 and 2009 31
I.3.2. Life expectancy at age 65 by sex, 1993 and 2009 33
I.3.3. Life expectancy in EU-27 by age and sex, 2002-2008 33
I.3.4. Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group, men
1993 and 2009 34
I.3.5. Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group,
women 1993 and 2009 35
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I.3.6. Healthy life years at birth, by gender, 2007 and 2009 36
I.3.7. Life expectancy by sex and educational attainment at
selected ages, 2008 39
I.4.1. Top ten citizenships of immigrants to EU-27 Member States,
2008 42
I.4.2. Median age of the population (as of 1 January 2009) and
immigrants by basic citizenship groups, 2008 45
I.5.1. Population by group of citizenship, 2009 (units and share of
the resident population) 46
I.5.2. Acquisitions of citizenship, 2001-2008 (in thousands) 48
I.5.3. Population by group of country of birth, 2009 (units and
share of the resident population) 50
I.5.4. Main countries of birth of foreign-born residents, for selected
EU-27 Member States, 2009 51
I.5.5. Educational attainment of population aged 25-54 by group
of country of birth, 2009 (%) 52
I.5.6. Population aged 25-54 with high educational level having a
medium or low skilled job as a proportion of persons with
high educational level respective population by group of
country of birth, 2009 (%) 53
I.5.7. Median age of the population by group of citizenship, 2009 56
I.6.1. Demographic balance for EU-27 in 2009 59
I.6.2. EU-27 Member States by contribution of natural change and
net migration (1) to population growth/decline in 2009 59
I.6.3. Crude rates of population change in 2000, 2008 and 2009 60
I.6.4. Population age structure by major age groups, on 1st
January 1990 and 2010 61
I.6.5. Median age and age dependency ratios, 1st January 2010,
by country 61
I.7.1. Crude marriage rate, by country, 1960-2009, (in marriages
per 1000 residents) 66
I.7.2. Crude divorce rate, by country, 1960-2009, (in divorces per
1000 residents) 67
I.7.3. Live births outside marriage, as proportion of total live births
(%), by country, 1960-2009 67
I.7.4. Young adults living with at least one parent and no
spouse/partner, by sex and age group, 2009, (%) 72
II.1.1. Borderless Europeans: main findings 75
II.2.1. Differences between actual 2007 population and 2007
population based on projections that exclude migration
from 1960, age 0-79 (thousands and % of actual population) 78
II.2.2. Unemployment rates of women aged 25-54 by place of
birth, own and of parents, 2008 81
II.2.3. Unemployment rates of men aged 25-54 by place of birth,
own and of parents, 2008 81
II.2.4. Employment rates of women aged 25-54 by place of birth,
II.2.5. Employment rates of men aged 25-54 by place of birth, own
and of parents, 2008 82
II.2.6. Women aged 25-49 with ISCED 0-2 level of education, by
place of birth, own and of parents, 2008 (%) 83
II.2.7. Men aged 25-49 with ISCED 0-2 level of education, by place
of birth, own and of parents, 2008 (%) 83
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II.2.8. Employment rates of women aged 25-49 by place of birth,
II.2.9. Employment rates of men aged 25-49 by place of birth, own
and of parents, 2008 84
II.2.10. EU nationals feeling that they belong to minority or majority
groups, by ancestry, 2010 (%) 85
II.2.11. Foreign-born population by world area of residence (millions
and %) 87
II.3.1. Attachment to specific foreign countries, by ancestry and
life-choices, 2010 (%) 92
II.3.2. Attachment to the EU, by ancestry and life-choices, 2010 (%) 92
II.3.3. Likelihood of moving abroad in the future, by ancestry and
life choices, 2010 (%) 92
II.4.1. EU nationals with foreign friends or relatives, by ancestry,
2010 (%) 94
II.4.2. EU nationals with cultural links to other countries, by
connectedness (ancestry and life-choices), 2010 (%) 95
III.2.1. New residence permits issued and valid permits at the end
of the year, 2008 and 2009 105
LIST OF GRAPHS
I.2.1. Number of live births in EU-27, 1980-2009 26
I.2.2. Total fertility rate and mean age of women at childbirth,
2009 28
I.2.3. Fertility of mothers aged 30 and over, 2000 and 2009
(ordered by difference 2009-2000) (%) 29
I.2.4. Fertility by age group of mothers, 2009 (%) 29
I.3.1. Number of deaths in EU-27, 1980-2009 31
I.3.2. The gender gap (women – men) in life expectancy at birth,
1993 and 2009 32
I.3.3. The gender gap (women — men) in life expectancy at age
65, 1993 and 2009 33
I.3.4. Infant mortality rate, 1993 and 2009 (ranked by size of
reduction) 36
I.3.5. Life expectancy gaps between high and low educational
attainment at selected ages, by sex, 2008 38
I.4.1. Age structure of the population on 1 January 2009 and of
immigrants in 2008, EU-27 40
I.4.2. Immigration, EU-27, 2004-2008 40
I.4.3. Relative change in migration inflows to EU Member States by
citizenship groups, EU-27, 2002-2008 41
I.4.4. Immigrants by citizenship groups, EU-27, 2008 41
I.4.5. Immigrants by groups of country of birth, EU-27, 2008 41
I.4.6. Immigrants to EU-27 (from outside EU) by the level of
development of the country of previous residence, EU-27,
2008 42
I.4.7. Non-EU immigrants by continent of country of citizenship, EU-
27, 2008 42
I.4.8. Immigration (per 1 000 inhabitants), EU-27, 2008 44
I.4.9. Age structure of immigrants by basic citizenship groups, EU-
27, 2008 45
I.5.1. Non-nationals in the EU by country of residence, EU-27, 2009 46
x
I.5.2. Distribution of non-nationals by EU/non-EU citizenship, as a
percentage of the usually resident population, 2009 47
I.5.3. Ten most numerous groups of foreign citizens usually resident
in the EU-27, in millions and as a % of the EU total foreign
population, 2009 47
I.5.4. Acquisitions of citizenship per thousand non-nationals, 2008 48
I.5.5. Main previous citizenship of persons acquiring citizenship of
an EU-27 Member States, 2008 49
I.5.6. Share of foreign-born and non-nationals of the total
population, 2009 49
I.5.7. Educational attainment of population aged 25-54 by sex
and group of country of birth, EU-27, 2009 (%) 52
I.5.8. Educational attainment of non-nationals aged 25-54, 2009
(%) 53
I.5.9. Foreign-born aged 25-54 with high educational level having
a medium or low skilled job as a share of persons with high
educational level respective population by sex, 2009 (%) 54
I.5.10. Non-nationals aged 25-54 with high educational level
having a medium or low skilled job as a share of persons
with high educational level respective population, 2009 (%) 55
I.5.11. Age pyramid of the national and foreign population, EU-27,
2009 55
I.6.1. Population on 1 January, EU-27, 1960-2010 57
I.6.2. Population change by component, EU-27, 1961-2009 58
I.6.3. Live births and deaths in EU-27, 1961-2009 58
I.6.4. Population pyramids, EU-27, 1990 and 2010 62
I.6.5. Proportion of population aged 65 years or over, %
increase/decrease 1990-2010 62
I.6.6. Median age of the total population, EU-27, 1990-2010 62
I.6.7. Median age of population 63
I.6.8. Population age structure by major age groups, EU-27(1) 63
I.6.9. Population pyramids, EU-27, 2010 and 2060 64
I.6.10. Percentage of 65+ in the EU, Sweden , Germany and
Slovakia, 2010-2060 64
I.7.1. Proportion of live births outside marriage and total fertility
rate, 2009 68
I.7.2. Employment rate of women aged 25-49 and total fertility
rate, 2009 68
I.7.3. Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 and total fertility
rate, 2009 68
I.7.4. Households with children by type (1), 2009 (%) 70
I.7.5. Single parents among women aged 15-24, 2009, (%) 71
I.7.6. Percentage of young adults who live with at least one
parent and no spouse/partner, by sex and age group, EU-
27, 2009, (%) 71
II.2.1. France, population without migration since 1960 and
migration effect, including non-nationals, by age group,
2007 (millions) 79
II.2.2. Spain, population without migration since 1960 and
migration effect, including non-nationals, by age group,
2007 (millions) 79
II.2.3. Ireland, population without migration since 1960 and
migration effect, by age group, 2007 (100,000s) 79
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II.2.4. Portugal, actual population, including non-nationals, and
population without migration since 1960, by age group, 2007
(100,000s) 80
II.2.5. Lithuania, population without migration since 1960 and
migration effect, by age group, 2007 (100,000s) 80
II.2.6. Resident population aged 25-49 born in EU-27, by birth-
place of parents, 2008 (%) 83
II.2.7. Projected foreign-born population and their descendants,
2061 (%) 87
II.2.8. Theoretical net migration (% of the population aged 15+) 88
II.3.1. EU nationals who have lived and worked abroad in the past,
by age, 2009 (%) 89
II.3.2. EU nationals who have lived and worked abroad in the past,
by age at end of full-time education, 2009 (%) 90
II.3.3. Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life choices/no
ancestry by sex, EU, 2010 (%) 90
II.3.4. Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life-choices/no
ancestry by age group, 2010, (%) 91
ancestry by age at end of full-time education, EU 2010 (%) 91
ancestry by occupation, EU, 2010 (%) 92
II.4.1. Workers residing in another Member State and residents
working in another Member State, among workers, 2009 (%) 93
II.4.2. EU nationals who have close friends who live abroad, 2010
(%) 94
II.4.3. EU nationals who speak at least one other language (than
that of the interview) (%) 94
II.4.4. EU nationals who spend regularly holidays in another
country, 2010 (%) 95
III.2.1. Immigration to selected EU-27 Member States (Spain,
Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy), 2003-2009
(thousands) 100
III.2.2. Structure of immigrants to selected EU-27 Member States
(Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom) by citizenship groups,
2008-2009 (thousands) 100
III.2.3. Immigration to selected EU-27 Member States (Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Ireland), 2003-2009
(thousands) 101
III.2.4. Structure of immigrants to selected EU-27 Member States
(France, Austria and Sweden) by citizenship groups, 2008-
2009 (thousands) 101
III.2.5. Structure of immigrants to Ireland by citizenship groups,
2007-2009 (thousands) 101
III.2.6. Emigration from selected EU-27 Member States (Germany,
the United Kingdom Spain and Italy), 2003-2009 (thousands) 102
III.2.7. Structure of emigrants from selected EU-27 Member States
(Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom) by citizenship groups,
2008-2009 (thousands) 102
III.2.8. Emigration from selected EU-27 Member States (Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Ireland), 2003-2009
(thousands) 103
III.2.9. New residence permits issued, by reason, EU-27, 2008 and
2009 104
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LIST OF BOXES
I.3.1. Living longer healthy lives 37
I.4.1. Where immigrants come from 43
I.7.1. Does wealth increase fertility in developed countries? 69
II.1.1. Cross-border Migration, Mobility and Marriages 76
II.2.1. Are there many irregular migrants? 86
xiii
SUMMARY
Since the last 2008 Demography Report was published in 2008, the EU
population has passed the 500 million mark while continuing to develop
along lines that were already discernible two years ago. The EU’s
demographic picture has become clearer: growth is fuelled mainly by
immigration, whereas the population is becoming older and more diverse.
The impact of the economic crisis is still difficult to assess.
In its October 2006 Communication entitled ‘The Demographic Future of

Europe — from Challenge to Opportunity’(6), the Commission presented its
views on the demographic challenges the EU was facing and on options for
tackling them. The Communication expressed confidence in Europe’s ability
to cope with demographic change and an ageing population in particular, but
also stressed the need to act in five key policy areas: demographic renewal,
employment, productivity, integration of migrants and sustainable public
finances.
This third Demographic Report aims to provide the latest facts and figures
that are needed for an informed debate on these issues. In addition to the EU-
level overview, data are provided as far as possible for each EU-27 Member
State, enabling policy makers and stakeholders to compare their own
country's situation with that of other Member States, to understand the
specific characteristics of their country and, possibly, to identify other
countries that could provide interesting experiences from which to learn.
This year the report is a joint undertaking between the Directorate General
for ‘Employment, social affairs and inclusion’ and Eurostat, and draws on
Eurostat's experience in demographic analysis. It consists of two parts, a
short annex on migration in the recession and a country annex.
Part I looks at historical and recent trends in fertility, life expectancy and
migration - the three drivers of population change. It includes a review of
population structure by age and family composition.
Part II explores an increasingly important phenomenon that was identified in

a recent Eurobarometer survey: the increasing number of European citizens
who seek opportunities across national borders for study, work, life
experience and inspiration, resulting in different forms of international
connectedness across national borders.
1. MORE, OLDER AND MORE DIVERSE EUROPEANS
1.1. New patterns lead to slight increases in fertility
Gradual but nonetheless major changes are affecting the population of

Europe. Two main positive trends are emerging: a slight increase in fertility
and greater life expectancy. Lowest-low fertility – below 1.3 children per
woman – has ended in all Member State and the most recent figure for EU-27
was 1.6 and could rise to over 1.7 if adjustments for the postponement of
births (the so-called ‘tempo effect’) are taken into account. This small
adjustment does not make up for the shortfall in relation to the replacement
6
( ) COM(2006) 571, adopted on 12 October 2006.
1
Demography Report, 2010
ratio of 2.1, but it could contribute to a slower rate of population decline in

the medium/longer term, in conjunction with a possible increase in fertility as
EU Member States become wealthier.
The modest increase in fertility results from somewhat new family building
patterns: countries with fewer marriages, more cohabitation, more divorces
and an older average age of women at childbirth tend to have higher fertility
rates. Changing social perceptions of the role of marriage and greater fragility
of relationships have resulted in more extramarital births, including to lone
parents, or in childlessness.
The impact of family policies on these trends is difficult to assess since

cultural factors play an important role. However, the data suggest that
postponement of childbearing to a later age is accompanied in some countries
(France, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands for instance) by higher
fertility rates and relatively generous public support for parents. At the other
end of the scale, in countries such as Romania, Slovakia and Hungary, a
lower age at childbirth is not associated with a high fertility rate.. This would
also be consistent with the first indications that fertility rises again with
wealth, after decades of decaying fertility as countries grew richer. The
emerging evidence reinforces the case for having better policies that can help
parents to cope with the constraints of a modern society.
1.2. An "ageing" population structure
Although it is difficult to predict the impact of policies, an analysis of the

impact of changes in population structure is more straightforward. Low
fertility rates are only one side of the coin, the other being a decline in the
number of deaths or, in more positive terms, an increase in life expectancy. In
2009, the median age of the population was 40.6, and it is projected to reach
47.9 years by 2060.
The EUROPOP2008 projections prepared by Eurostat and presented in the

previous Demography Report indicate that by 2014 the working age
population (20-64) will start to shrink, as the large baby-boom cohorts born
immediately after World War II are now entering their sixties and retiring.
The number of people aged 60 and above in the EU is now rising by more
than two million every year, roughly twice the rate observed until about three
years ago. The working population is also ageing, as the proportion of older
workers in employment increases compared to the cohorts made up of
younger workers. Every year about 5 million children are born in the EU-27
and over 2 million people immigrate from third countries. Births outnumber
deaths by several hundred thousand persons each year, whereas net migration
is well over a million. As a result, migration accounts for the largest
proportion of the EU's population growth.
In 2008 life expectancy for the EU-27 was 76.4 for men and 82.4 for women.
Differences among Member States are still very significant, ranging from
almost 13 years for men to 8 for women. Infant mortality in 2009 was also
still relatively high in some countries like Romania (10.1 ‰) and Bulgaria
(9.0 ‰), even though a reduction of about 50% for EU-27 has been achieved
over the last 15 years. Socio-economic status appears to play a major role,
especially in some Central European countries. Consequently, by improving
the life expectancy of disadvantaged groups, a general increase in overall life
expectancy is also to be expected.
2
Summary
A possible development is the improvement in healthy life expectancy by

delaying the stage at which physical condition starts to deteriorate rapidly,
thereby postponing death to a later age. More evidence and analysis is
required on this important subject.
Policies which address the ageing of the population and the work force focus
on enabling older workers to remain active and productive for a longer
proportion of their life span. One of the benefits of an ageing population is
that it offers more opportunities for flexible arrangements during the life
course. A longer active life allows for extended or recurring periods in
education; greater working-time flexibility during the intense years when
childbearing and career commitments coincide; occasional career breaks
when it becomes necessary to take care of family members; and productive
retirement through volunteering and general engagement in the civil society.
1.3. Europe on the move
Migration, especially from non-EU countries, could provide a (temporary)

respite from population ageing, since most people migrate primarily as young
adults (aged 25-34). As young cohorts of foreigners feed progressively into
the older national cohorts, the total population is rejuvenated and diversity
increases. Unprecedented levels of immigration both from third countries and
within the EU-27 (intra-EU mobility) over the past decade have substantially
increased the proportion of European inhabitants who do not live in their own
native country or culture.
EU-27 Member States are host to some 20 million non-EU-nationals. A

further 10 million EU nationals are living in another Member State, and
about 5 million non-nationals have acquired EU citizenship since 2001. As
most migrants are relatively young and have arrived quite recently, they
contribute to the size of the EU-27 labour force. In the future, the labour
force will increasingly include people with a migration background. Among
EU nationals, in addition to the approximately 8% of foreign-born (7) people
residing in the EU, a further 5% have at least one foreign-born parent, and
this category will continue to grow. By 2060, persons of all nationalities with
at least one foreign-born parent are expected to account for close to a third of
the EU-27 population. An even larger percentage of the work-force will be of
foreign descent.
These trends imply that additional efforts are needed to ensure that
immigrants have the opportunity to integrate into their host society and,
crucially, to enable them to contribute to the labour market by making full
use of their education. A mobile population can be seen as an asset to the host
countries. As more people seek experience abroad, they can contribute to a
more efficient and productive economy, while also enhancing their personal
skills.
2. AN INCREASINGLY DIVERSE AND MOBILE EU POPULATION
As the flows of migration from non-EU countries and mobility between

Member States have intensified, a growing proportion of the working-age
population (15% in 2008) was either born abroad or has at least one parent
who was born abroad.
7
( ) Here foreign-born includes those who were born in a different Member State than the one in which they reside.
3
Changing patterns of migration and mobility in Europe are making national

sentiments and feelings about belonging to a particular nation more diffuse
and complex, especially in the case of mobility between EU Member States.
Although traditional long-term, employment-driven, male-dominated
migration still takes place, other forms of migration and mobility are
emerging. Mobility flows have also changed: some of the major traditional
emigration Member States have become poles of attraction for migrants.
Large-scale migration and mixing of cultures are clearly not new phenomena
in the history of the EU. Past flows have had a different impact on the size
and structure of the population in most EU-27 Member States, and they have
contributed to a more European outlook among its citizens. Immigrants often
want to maintain a close attachment to their country of origin, but these
linkages tend to weaken over time.
The integration of immigrants across generations occurs rather rapidly. In

most countries with a substantial proportion of second-generation
immigrants, these fare far better in education and on the labour market than
first-generation immigrants and almost as well as those of no foreign descent;
this applies to descendants of mobile people from other Member States and
of immigrants from non-EU countries. Nevertheless, even after three
generations – the time it usually takes for full integration – descendants of
migrants maintain some attachment to the countries of their ancestors,
through their knowledge of foreign languages, for example.
Alongside traditional migration and mobility, new forms of mobility are

taking place. People are moving abroad for shorter periods, mainly to other
Member States, to seek work, pursue their education or other life
opportunities. These mobile people tend to be well-educated young adults,
towards the higher end of the occupational scale. Increasingly, this form of
mobility is based on personal preferences and life choices, and not only on
economic opportunities. The increased propensity to be mobile could be of
great benefit to the EU by enabling a better matching of skills and language
ability with job opportunities. The results of a Eurobarometer survey (8) point
to the presence of a diverse, growing number of mobile young people
characterised by a common interest in looking beyond national borders.
The Eurobarometer survey also indicates that around one in five of the EU-27
respondents has either worked or studied in another country at some point,
lived with a partner from another country or owns a property abroad. Half of
these respondents have ties to other countries by ancestry; the other half are
most often young and well educated and consciously making a life choice
that brings them into contact with other countries. They share a strong
willingness, if not propensity, to move abroad, up to four times greater than
those who do not have any connections with another country. Given that this
phenomenon is likely to become even more important in the future, policy
makers may want to consider its implications in planning for the socio-
economic future of the European population.
3. DEMOGRAPHIC POLICY IN THE RECESSION
Before the economic recession, EU Member States' commitment to

implementing the policy goals in the Lisbon agenda had begun to show
results in the form of employment for young people, women, older workers
8
( ) Eurobarometer EBS 346 at at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf
4
Summary
and migrants. When the recession struck, the first groups to be affected were
younger people and immigrants. Governments faced increasing difficulties in
balancing support for families, consolidation of budgets, assistance for young
people and immigrants in a shrinking labour market, and funding for
retirement schemes.
It is too early to draw any firm conclusions about the effect of the crisis on
fertility and life expectancy. Recent experience with past recessions indicates
that both fertility and mortality may initially decrease slightly, only to return
to their pre-recession levels shortly after the crisis has ended.
New Eurostat data on residence permits throws light on the reasons for
migration from non-EU countries. The available data show that the decline in
migration is largely due to a reduction in migration for employment and
family reasons, while the number of residence permits issued for education
and other reasons increased slightly from 2008 to 2009.
4. WHAT IS BEING DONE
In June 2010 the European Council adopted the new 10-year Europe 2020
strategy for more jobs and smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (9). The
strategy sets out to reorientate existing policies from crisis management to
medium- and longer-term goals to promote growth and employment and
ensure the future sustainability of public finances. The latter is a precondition
for sustainable social cohesion in the EU.
The recession has not diminished the commitment of Member States to

respond to the demographic challenge; on the contrary, the commitment
appears to have been reinforced. The strategy adopted in addressing
demographic change seems to dovetail with the overall thrust of the new
Europe 2020 strategy. In the wake of the recession, and despite the bleak
outlook for public finances, the European Commission is convinced that the
demographic dimension deserves to be taken fully into account by Member
States when they are formulating their exit strategies from the current
recession.
The need to mobilise the EU’s demographic potential was already

highlighted in October 2006 in the Commission Communication on Europe’s
Demographic Future (10). This Communication suggested that the problem of
low fertility should be addressed by creating better conditions for families to
deal with the problem of a shrinking labour force by raising employment
rates and productivity levels, by relying on immigration and better integration
and, finally, by preserving the ability to meet the future needs of an ageing
society by creating sustainable public finances. Member States are
responsible for deciding how they realise their potential. The Communication
highlighted the type of support that the EU can offer to Member States in
terms of existing policy coordination. At the request of the Member States,
and with the support of the European Parliament, this process is
complemented by the activities organised under the umbrella of the European
9
( ) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm
10
( ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0571:FIN:EN:PDF.
5
Alliance for Families (11) and the planned European Year 2012 for Active
Ageing (12).
The success of the strategy hinges largely on the EU’s ability to face up to
the major demographic transformations of this coming decade.
Europe’s future depends to a great extent on its capacity to tap the strong
potential of the two fastest growing segments in its population: older people
and immigrants. Three policy areas appear crucial to boost economic growth
and achieve greater social cohesion:
– The promotion of active ageing: older people, and in particular ageing

baby-boomers, can look forward to many more years of healthy life, and they
possess valuable skills and experience. More opportunities for active ageing
will allow them to continue to contribute to society, even after retirement.
– The integration of migrants and their descendants: this is crucial for

Europe because migrants will make up an even larger share of Europe’s
labour force. The low employment rate of migrants is both socially and
financially unaffordable.
– The reconciliation of paid work and family commitments: people

with caring responsibilities still lack adequate support and suitable
arrangements for combining their different responsibilities. As a result,
economic growth is hampered because too many people are not able to
exploit their high level of skills and education on the labour market. Women
are particularly affected because of the persistent gender–employment and
pay gaps.
At the same time, Europe needs to find ways of maintaining greater

productivity while preparing for increasing levels of ageing-related
expenditure, despite the demise of public finances as a result of the recession.
11
( ) http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm
12
( ) http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=860
6
ÜBERBLICK
Seit der Veröffentlichung des letzten Demografieberichts im Jahr 2008 hat

die EU-Bevölkerung die 500-Millionen-Marke überschritten und sich weiter
in die bereits vor zwei Jahren erkennbare Richtung entwickelt. Mittlerweile
liegt ein klareres Bild der demografischen Situation in der EU vor: Das
Wachstum wird hauptsächlich durch Immigration genährt, während die
Bevölkerung immer älter und vielfältiger wird. Überdies sind die
Auswirkungen der Wirtschaftskrise noch schwierig abzuschätzen.
Im Oktober 2006 hat die Kommission die Mitteilung ‘Die demografische

Zukunft Europas – Von der Herausforderung zur Chance’(13) herausgegeben
und ihre Ansichten zu den demografischen Herausforderungen der EU und
den möglichen Herangehensweisen vorgestellt. In der Mitteilung wurde zum
Ausdruck gebracht, dass man darauf vertraue, Europa werde mit dem
demografischem Wandel und insbesondere der alternden Bevölkerung
zurechtkommen, aber es wurde auch Handlungsbedarf in fünf politischen
Schlüsselbereichen ermittelt: demografische Erneuerung, Beschäftigung,
Produktivität, Integration von Migranten und zukunftsfähige öffentliche
Finanzen.
Mit diesem dritten Demografiebericht sollen die aktuellen Fakten und Zahlen
vorgelegt werden, die für eine fundierte Debatte über diese Punkte vonnöten
sind. Neben dem EU-weiten Überblick werden soweit möglich Daten für alle
27 Mitgliedstaaten der EU vorgelegt, die politische Entscheidungsträger und
Interessenvertreter nutzen können, um die Situation ihres Landes mit der
anderer Mitgliedstaaten zu vergleichen, um die besonderen Merkmale ihres
Landes zu verstehen und um etwaige andere Länder zu ermitteln, die über
interessante Erfahrungen berichten, von denen man lernen kann.
Der diesjährige Bericht ist das Ergebnis eines Gemeinschaftsprojekts

zwischen DG ‘Beschäftigung, Soziales und Integration’ und Eurostat und
stützt sich auf die Erfahrung von Eurostat im Bereich demografischer
Untersuchungen. Er besteht aus zwei Teilen, einem kurzen Anhang zur
Abwanderung in Zeiten der Rezession und einem Länderanhang.
Teil I befasst sich mit den früheren und aktuellen Entwicklungstrends in

puncto Geburtenhäufigkeit, Lebenserwartung und Migration, den drei
Faktoren, die Bevölkerungsveränderungen auslösen. Darin enthalten ist ein
Überblick über die Bevölkerungsstruktur nach Alter und
Familienzusammensetzung.
In Teil II wird ein zunehmend an Bedeutung gewinnendes Phänomen

untersucht, das in einer kürzlich durchgeführten Eurobarometer-Studie
ermittelt wurde. Die Studie war der steigenden Zahl europäischer Bürger
gewidmet, die sich ins Ausland begeben, um dort zu studieren, zu arbeiten,
Lebenserfahrung zu sammeln oder nach Anregungen suchen, was zu
unterschiedlichen Formen internationaler Verbundenheit über Staatsgrenzen
hinweg führt.
13
( ) KOM(2006) 571, angenommen am 12. Oktober 2006.
7
1. VERMEHRT ÄLTERE UND VIELFÄLTIGERE EUROPÄER
1.1. Neue Lebensweisen führen zu geringfügiger Steigerung

der Geburtenhäufigkeit
Die Bevölkerung Europas ist von allmählichen Veränderungen betroffen, die

jedoch beträchtliche Ausmaße erreichen. Es sind zwei positive Haupttrends
auszumachen: ein leichter Anstieg der Geburtenrate und eine höhere
Lebenserwartung. Die Geburtenrate befindet sich in keinem Mitgliedstaat
mehr auf niedrigstem Niveau (weniger als 1,3 Kinder pro Frau). Neuesten
Zahlen für die EU-27 zufolge lag sie bei 1,6 und könnte bei Bereinigung um
die Geburtenverschiebung (der sogenannte ‘Tempoeffekt’) auf über 1,7
steigen. Diese kleine Anpassung kann das Defizit in Bezug auf die Ersatzrate
von 2,1 nicht ausgleichen. Sie könnte jedoch zusammen mit einer möglichen
Zunahme der Geburtenrate bei zunehmendem Wohlstand in den EU-
Mitgliedstaaten mittel- bis längerfristig zu einem langsameren
Bevölkerungsrückgang beitragen.
Der mäßige Anstieg der Geburtenzahlen ergibt sich aus ziemlich neuen
Mustern der Familienzusammensetzung: In Ländern, in denen weniger
geheiratet wird, mehr eheähnliche Gemeinschaften bestehen, es mehr
Scheidungen gibt und Frauen, die Kinder gebären, ein höheres
Durchschnittsalter haben, liegt die Geburtenrate tendenziell höher. Die sich
verändernde gesellschaftliche Wahrnehmung der Bedeutung des Heiratens
und die geringere Dauerhaftigkeit von Beziehungen haben zu mehr
außerehelichen Geburten, auch alleinerziehender Eltern, bzw. Kinderlosigkeit
geführt.
Es ist schwierig, den Einfluss der Familienpolitik auf diese Trends zu

ermitteln, da eine wichtige Rolle kulturellen Faktoren zukommt. Die Daten
lassen allerdings darauf schließen, dass das spätere Kinderkriegen in einigen
Ländern (z. B. Frankreich, Dänemark, Finnland und die Niederlande) mit
höheren Geburtenraten und relativ großzügiger staatlicher Unterstützung für
die Eltern einhergeht. Auf der anderen Seite besteht für Eltern in Ländern,
wie z. B. Rumänien, die Slowakei und Ungarn, die ein niedrigeres Alter bei
Geburt der Kinder aufweisen kein Zusammenhang mit einer hohen
Geburtenrate herstellen.,. Dies würde auch mit den ersten Anzeichen
übereinstimmen, die darauf hindeuten, dass die Geburtenraten mit
steigendem Wohlstand auch wieder steigen, nachdem zuvor jahrzehntelang
genau das Gegenteil der Fall gewesen war. Aus den vorliegenden
Anhaltspunkten geht hervor, dass wir eine bessere Politik benötigen, die
Eltern dabei unterstützt, mit den Zwängen einer modernen Gesellschaft
zurechtzukommen.
1.2. Eine „alternde“ Bevölkerungsstruktur
Es ist schwierig, die Auswirkungen politischer Maßnahmen vorherzusagen.

Eine Analyse der Konsequenzen einer sich verändernden
Bevölkerungsstruktur ist da einfacher. Niedrige Geburtenraten sind nur die
eine Seite, auf der anderen steht ein Rückgang der Sterblichkeitsziffer oder
positiv ausgedrückt eine längere Lebenserwartung. 2009 betrug das
durchschnittliche Bevölkerungsalter 40,6. Hochrechnungen zufolge wird es
2060 bei 47,9 Jahren liegen.
8
Überblick
Laut den Eurostat-Projektionen EUROPOP2008, die im vorangegangenen

Demografiebericht enthalten waren, wird sich ab 2014 ein Rückgang der
Erwerbsbevölkerung (20–64) bemerkbar machen, da die Babyboomer, die
direkt nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg geboren wurden, jetzt Anfang 60 sind
und in Rente gehen. Die Zahl der 60- und Über-60-Jährigen in der EU steigt
gegenwärtig um über 2 Millionen jedes Jahr, rund doppelt so schnell wie
noch vor drei Jahren. Auch die Erwerbsbevölkerung altert, da der Anteil
älterer Arbeitnehmer in Arbeit verglichen mit den jüngeren
Arbeitnehmergruppen zunimmt. Jedes Jahr werden rund 5 Millionen Kinder
in der EU-27 geboren und wandern über 2 Millionen Menschen aus
Drittländern ein. Jedes Jahr werden mehr Geburten als Sterbefälle gezählt,
wobei die Differenz mehrere Hunderttausend beträgt, und werden unter dem
Strich weit über eine Million Einwanderer verzeichnet. Die Zuwanderung
trägt folglich am meisten zum Wachstum der EU-Bevölkerung bei.
2008 lag die Lebenserwartung von Männern in der EU-27 bei 76,4 und von
Frauen bei 82,4 Jahren. Es gibt nach wie vor signifikante Unterschiede
zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten, die von knapp 13 Jahren für Männer bis zu 8
bei Frauen reichen. Außerdem war die Säuglingssterblichkeit 2009 in einigen
Ländern wie Rumänien (10,1 ‰) und Bulgarien (9,0 ‰) noch immer relativ
hoch, auch wenn in den vergangenen 15 Jahren ein Rückgang von um die
50 % in der EU-27 erreicht wurde. Eine größere Rolle scheint dabei der
sozioökonomische Status zu spielen, insbesondere in einigen
mitteleuropäischen Ländern. Infolgedessen darf eine Erhöhung der
Lebenserwartung insgesamt erwartet werden, wenn die Lebenserwartung von
benachteiligten Gruppen verbessert wird.
Eine mögliche Entwicklung ist die Verbesserung der gesunden

Lebenserwartung, durch Verzögerung des Stadiums, in dem der
Gesundheitszustand sich rasch zu verschlechtern beginnt, und dadurch die
Verschiebung hin zu einem höheren Sterbealter. Zu dieser Frage sind weitere
Belege und Untersuchungen nötig.
Programme, die sich mit der alternden Bevölkerung und Erwerbsbevölkerung

befassen, sorgen schwerpunktmäßig dafür, dass ältere Arbeitnehmer länger
im aktiven und produktiven Erwerbsleben bleiben können. Einer der Vorteile
einer alternden Bevölkerung liegt darin, dass sich mehr Möglichkeiten für
flexible Vereinbarungen im Laufe des Lebens bieten. Ein längeres aktives
Leben ermöglicht ausgedehnte oder wiederkehrende Weiterbildungsphasen,
eine höhere Arbeitszeitflexibilität während der Jahre, in denen Kinder und
berufliche Verpflichtungen nur schwer miteinander vereinbart werden
können, die Unterbrechung der beruflichen Laufbahn, wenn man sich um
Familienangehörige kümmern muss, und ein produktives Ausscheiden aus
dem Arbeitsleben durch ehrenamtliche Mitarbeit und allgemeines
gesellschaftliches Engagement.
1.3. Europa in Bewegung
Die Migration, insbesondere aus Nicht-EU-Staaten, könnte die Überalterung

der Bevölkerung (vorübergehend) stoppen, da in erster Linie junge
Erwachsene (im Alter von 25–34) in andere Länder abwandern. Durch die
jüngeren ausländischen Personengruppen, die zunehmend zu den älteren
nationalen Personengruppen hinzukommen, verjüngt sich die
Gesamtbevölkerung und erhöht sich die Vielfalt. Aufgrund der
Einwanderung sowohl aus Drittländern als auch aus der EU-27
(innereuropäische Mobilität) in bislang unbekanntem Ausmaß während des
9
vergangenen Jahrzehnts hat sich der Anteil der Europäer, die nicht in ihrem
Heimatland oder Kulturkreis leben, beträchtlich erhöht.
In den Mitgliedstaaten der EU-27 leben rund 20 Millionen Nicht-EU-

Staatsbürger. Weitere 10 Millionen EU-Staatsbürger leben in einem anderen
Mitgliedstaat und etwa 5 Millionen Menschen haben seit 2001 die EU-
Staatsbürgerschaft erworben. Da die meisten Einwanderer relativ jung sind
und erst vor recht kurzer Zeit in die EU gekommen sind, leisten sie einen
großen Beitrag zur Erwerbsbevölkerung der EU-27. In der Zukunft wird sich
die erwerbstätige Bevölkerung zunehmend aus Menschen mit
Migrationshintergrund zusammensetzen. Von den EU-Staatsbürgern haben
neben den rund 8 % der EU-Ansässigen ausländischer Herkunft(14) weitere
5 % mindestens ein im Ausland geborenes Elternteil, und dieser Anteil wird
weiter wachsen. Man geht davon aus, dass der Anteil der Personen aller
Staatsangehörigkeiten mit mindestens einem im Ausland geborenen Elternteil
bis zum Jahr 2060 knapp ein Drittel der Bevölkerung der EU-27 betragen
wird. Bei der Erwerbsbevölkerung wird ein noch größerer Teil ausländischer
Abstammung sein.
Diese Trends erfordern, dass zusätzliche Anstrengungen unternommen

werden, um sicherzustellen, dass Immigranten die Möglichkeit haben, sich in
die Gesellschaft ihres Gastlandes zu integrieren. Noch wichtiger ist es, ihnen
zu ermöglichen, sich ihrem Bildungsniveau entsprechend am Arbeitsmarkt zu
beteiligen. Eine mobile Bevölkerung kann eine Bereicherung für die
Gastländer sein. Immer mehr Menschen möchten Auslandserfahrung machen.
Dadurch können sie zu einer effizienteren und produktiveren Wirtschaft
beitragen und außerdem ihre persönlichen Kompetenzen verbessern.
2. EINE ZUNEHMEND VIELFÄLTIGE UND MOBILE EU-

BEVÖLKERUNG
Da die Zuwanderung aus Drittländern und die Mobilität zwischen den

Mitgliedstaaten zunimmt, stammt ein wachsender Teil der
Erwerbsbevölkerung (15 % im Jahr 2008) aus dem Ausland oder verfügt über
mindestens ein Elternteil, das im Ausland geboren wurde.
Durch die sich verändernden Muster der Zuwanderung und Mobilität

innerhalb Europas wird das Gefühl der Zugehörigkeit zu einer bestimmten
Nation diffuser und komplexer, insbesondere im Falle der Freizügigkeit
zwischen den EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Wenngleich die traditionelle langfristige,
beschäftigungsbedingte und männerdominierte Zuwanderung nach wie vor
existiert, immigrieren zunehmend auch Frauen und bilden mittlerweile in
einigen Mitgliedstaaten die Mehrheit. Auch die Richtung der Mobilität hat
sich geändert: Einige der Mitgliedstaaten, aus denen traditionell viele
Auswanderer stammten, sind mittlerweile sehr beliebte
Einwanderungsländer.
Es ist definitiv kein neues geschichtliches Phänomen, dass die Bürger der EU
in andere Länder abwandern und die Kulturen sich vermischen. Frühere
Migrationsströme haben sich unterschiedlich auf die Größe und Struktur der
Bevölkerung in den meisten EU-27-Mitgliedstaaten ausgewirkt und bei den
Bürgern zu einer verstärkt europäischen Perspektive beigetragen.
Einwanderer möchten häufig eine enge Bindung zu ihrem Herkunftsland
14
( ) Zur Gruppe der im Ausland Geborenen zählen hier Personen, die in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat geboren sind als dem, in dem
sie wohnen.
10
Überblick
aufrechterhalten, diese Verknüpfungen nehmen jedoch mit der Zeit

tendenziell ab.
Die generationsübergreifende Integration von Einwanderern erfolgt recht

zügig. In den meisten Ländern, in denen ein beträchtlicher Anteil an
Einwanderern der zweiten Generation lebt, schneiden diese in der Schule und
im Berufsleben deutlich besser als die erste Generation und fast so gut wie
die Einwohner ohne ausländische Wurzeln ab. Dies gilt sowohl für
Nachkömmlinge von Migranten aus anderen Mitgliedstaaten als auch für
diejenigen aus Drittländern. Trotz allem sind die Nachkommen von
Migranten auch noch in der dritten Generation – der üblichen Dauer bis zu
vollständigen Integration – in gewisser Weise mit dem Herkunftsland ihrer
Vorfahren verbunden, beispielsweise in Form von
Fremdsprachenkenntnissen.
Neben der traditionellen Migration und Mobilität sind auch neue Formen der
Mobilität zu erkennen. Umzüge ins Ausland finden hauptsächlich innerhalb
der Mitgliedstaaten und für kürzere Zeiträume auf der Suche nach Arbeit, im
Rahmen der Ausbildung oder zwecks Wahrnehmung sonstiger Möglichkeiten
statt. Bei diesem mobilen Teil der Bevölkerung handelt es sich in der Regel
um gut ausgebildete junge Menschen, die eher am oberen Ende der
Berufsskala angesiedelt sind. Diese Form der Mobilität basiert zunehmend
auf persönlichen Präferenzen und der Wahl eines bestimmten Lebensstils,
und nicht ausschließlich auf wirtschaftlichen Gründen. Die erhöhte
Mobilitätsneigung könnte für die EU von großem Nutzen sein, da so ein
besserer Abgleich von Kompetenzen und Sprachkenntnissen mit
Stellenangeboten möglich wird. Die Ergebnisse einer Eurobarometer-Studie
(15) deuten auf das Vorhandensein einer vielfältigen und wachsenden Anzahl
mobiler junger Menschen hin, die sich dadurch auszeichnen, dass sie allesamt
gerne einen Blick über die eigenen Landesgrenzen hinweg werfen möchten.
Der Eurobarometer-Studie ist ferner zu entnehmen, dass ungefähr ein Fünftel

der Teilnehmer aus den 27 EU-Ländern irgendwann im Laufe des Lebens
entweder im Ausland gearbeitet oder studiert hat, mit einem Partner aus
einem anderen Land liiert war oder Immobilien im Ausland besitzt. Bei der
Hälfte dieser Befragten sind Vorfahren aus anderen Ländern der Grund für
die Verbindung, bei der anderen Hälfte handelt es sich meistens um junge
und gut ausgebildete Menschen, die sich bewusst für eine bestimmte
Lebensform entscheiden, um andere Länder kennenzulernen. Ihre
Bereitschaft, wenn nicht gar Lust, auszuwandern, ist bis zu viermal höher als
bei Personen, die keinerlei Verbindungen zu einem anderen Land haben. Da
dieses Phänomen künftig wahrscheinlich noch stärker an Bedeutung gewinnt,
sollte die Politik die damit verbundenen Konsequenzen in die Planung der
sozioökonomischen Zukunft der europäischen Bevölkerung mit einbeziehen.
3. BEVÖLKERUNGSPOLITIK WÄHREND DER REZESSION
Vor Beginn der Rezession hatte das Engagement der EU-Mitgliedstaaten im

Hinblick auf die Umsetzung der politischen Zielsetzungen des Vertrags von
Lissabon bereits erste Ergebnisse in Form von Beschäftigung für junge
Menschen, Frauen, ältere Arbeitnehmer und Einwanderer gezeigt. Die ersten,
die die Rezession zu spüren bekamen, waren jüngere Menschen und
Einwanderer. Den Regierungen fiel es zunehmend schwer, die Unterstützung
15
( ) Eurobarometer EBS 346 abrufbar unter http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf
11
für Familien, die Konsolidierung der Haushalte, die Leistungen für junge
Menschen und Einwanderer sowie die Finanzierung der Rentensysteme vor
dem Hintergrund eines schrumpfenden Arbeitsmarktes miteinander zu
vereinbaren.
Es ist noch zu früh für sichere Schlussfolgerungen in Bezug auf die

Auswirkungen der Krise auf die Geburtenhäufigkeit und Lebenserwartung.
Die in vergangenen Rezessionsperioden gemachte Erfahrung zeigt, dass
sowohl die Geburtenrate als auch die Sterblichkeit anfangs leicht
zurückgehen, aber dann kurz nach Ende der Krise wieder auf den Stand vor
der Krise steigen.
Neue Wohnsitzdaten von Eurostat lassen Rückschlüsse auf die Gründe für
die Einwanderung aus Drittländern zu. Den verfügbaren Daten ist zu
entnehmen, dass der Zuwanderungsrückgang hauptsächlich darauf
zurückzuführen ist, dass weniger Menschen aus beruflichen und familiären
Gründen auswandern, während die Zahl der zu Studien- und sonstigen
Zwecken ausgestellten Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen zwischen 2008 und 2009
leicht angestiegen ist.
4. WAS WIRD UNTERNOMMEN?
Im Juni 2010 verabschiedete der Europarat die neue zehnjährige Strategie

Europa 2020 für mehr Beschäftigung und intelligentes, nachhaltiges und
integratives Wachstum (16). Die Strategie dient der Neuausrichtung
vorhandener politischer Maßnahmen weg vom Krisenmanagement hinzu
mittel- bis längerfristigen Zielsetzungen zur Förderung von Wachstum und
Beschäftigung sowie zur Sicherstellung der zukünftigen Tragfähigkeit
öffentlicher Finanzen. Letzteres ist eine Grundvoraussetzung für den sozialen
Zusammenhalt in der EU.
Die Rezession hat das Engagement der Mitgliedstaaten, sich den

demografischen Herausforderungen zu stellen, nicht geschmälert. Die
Mitgliedstaaten scheinen im Gegenteil noch stärker dazu entschlossen zu
sein. Die Strategie, mit der man den demografischen Veränderungen
begegnen wollte, stimmt anscheinend genau mit dem Grundtenor der neuen
Strategie Europa 2020 überein. Als Folge der Rezession – und trotz der
trüben Aussichten für die öffentlichen Haushalte – ist die Europäische
Kommission davon überzeugt, dass der demografische Aspekt von den
Mitgliedstaaten bei der Ausarbeitung ihrer Strategien zur Überwindung der
derzeitigen Rezession umfassend berücksichtigt werden muss.
Bereits im Oktober 2006 hat die Kommission in ihrer Mitteilung zur

demografischen Zukunft Europas (17) hervorgehoben, dass sich die EU die
demografischen Möglichkeiten zunutze machen sollte. In der Mitteilung hieß
es, man solle das Problem der niedrigen Geburtenraten durch Schaffung
besserer Bedingungen für Familien angehen, damit das Problem der
schrumpfenden Erwerbsbevölkerung gelöst würde, indem man die
Beschäftigungsquote und Produktivitätsrate erhöht, sich auf Zuwanderung
und bessere Integration stützt und letztendlich auch die zukünftigen
Bedürfnisse einer alternden Gesellschaft durch Schaffung tragfähiger
öffentlicher Haushalte erfüllt. Es liege in der Verantwortung der
Mitgliedstaaten, zu entscheiden, wie sie ihr Potenzial verwirklichen. In der
16
( ) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_de.htm
17
( ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0571:FIN:DE:PDF
12
Überblick
Mitteilung wurde die Art der Unterstützung hervorgehoben, welche die EU

den Mitgliedstaaten im Hinblick auf die Koordinierung der bestehenden
politischen Maßnahmen anbieten kann. Auf Ersuchen der Mitgliedstaaten
und mit Unterstützung des Europäischen Parlaments wird dieser Prozess
durch die Aktivitäten ergänzt, die unter dem Dach der Europäischen Allianz
für Familien (18) und des geplanten Europäischen Jahres für aktives
Altern 2012 (19) organisiert werden.
Der Erfolg der Strategie ist weitgehend an die Fähigkeit der EU gebunden,
sich den großen demografischen Veränderungen des kommenden Jahrzehnts
zu stellen.
Die Zukunft Europas hängt in hohem Maße davon ab, ob das hohe Potenzial
der beiden am schnellsten wachsenden Bevölkerungsteile genutzt werden
kann: ältere Menschen und Einwanderer. Es lassen sich drei politische
Bereiche ausmachen, die für die Förderung des Wirtschaftswachstums und
die Schaffung eines stärkeren sozialen Zusammenhalts entscheidend sein
dürften:
– Die Förderung des aktiven Alterns: Ältere Menschen und

insbesondere die älter werdende Generation der Babyboomer können sich auf
ein langes gesundes Leben freuen und verfügen über wertvolle Kompetenzen
und Erfahrungen. Durch ein größeres Angebot an Möglichkeiten des aktiven
Alterns können diese Personengruppen auch nach ihrer Pensionierung noch
einen sozialen Beitrag leisten.
– Die Integration von Migranten und deren Nachkommen: Dieser Punkt

ist für Europa von entscheidender Bedeutung, da Migranten sogar einen noch
größeren Teil der Erwerbsbevölkerung ausmachen werden. Die niedrigen
Beschäftigungsquoten von Migranten sind sowohl in sozialer als auch
finanzieller Hinsicht nicht tragbar.
– Die Vereinbarkeit von bezahlter Arbeit und familiären

Verpflichtungen: Personen mit Betreuungsverantwortung erhalten immer
noch keine angemessene Unterstützung und geeignete Optionen, um ihre
unterschiedlichen Pflichten miteinander zu vereinbaren. Als Folge davon
wird das Wirtschaftswachstum blockiert, weil zu viele Menschen ihre
erstklassigen Kompetenzen und erworbenen Kenntnisse auf dem
Arbeitsmarkt nicht in vollem Umfang nutzen können. Besonders Frauen sind
aufgrund der hartnäckigen geschlechterbezogenen Kluft in Bezug auf Beruf
und Gehalt betroffen.
Gleichzeitig müssen in Europa aber auch Wege gefunden werden, wie eine
höhere Produktivität aufrechterhalten werden kann, während man sich auf
steigende Kosten in Verbindung mit einer alternden Gesellschaft einstellen
muss, und das vor dem Hintergrund schrumpfender öffentlicher Haushalte
infolge der Rezession.
18
( ) http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm?langId=de&id=1
19
( ) http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=de&catId=89&newsId=860
13
RÉSUMÉ
Depuis le dernier Rapport 2008 sur la démographie, publié la même année, la

population de l’UE a franchi le seuil des 500 millions d’individus tout en
continuant à se développer conformément à l’évolution déjà perceptible il y a
deux ans. Le tableau démographique de l’UE a gagné en précision : la
croissance est principalement alimentée par l’immigration, tandis que la
population vieillit et se diversifie. L’influence de la crise économique est
toujours difficile à évaluer.
En octobre 2006, dans sa communication intitulée «L’avenir démographique

de l’Europe, transformer un défi en opportunité»(20), la Commission a
présenté ses points de vue sur les défis démographiques rencontrés par l’UE
et sur les options pour les relever. La communication a exprimé sa confiance
en la capacité de l’Europe à faire face aux changements démographiques et
au vieillissement de la population en particulier, mais a également souligné la
nécessité d’agir dans cinq secteurs clés : le renouveau démographique,
l’emploi, la productivité, l’intégration des migrants et les finances publiques
soutenables
Ce troisième Rapport sur la démographie vise à fournir les derniers chiffres et

données nécessaires pour un débat éclairé sur ces questions. Outre la vue
d’ensemble au niveau communautaire, les chiffres sont donnés, dans la
mesure du possible, pour l’ensemble des 27 États membres de l’UE,
permettant aux décideurs politiques et aux parties prenantes de comparer la
situation de leur propre pays avec celle des autres États membres, de
comprendre les caractéristiques spécifiques de leur pays et, si possible,
d’identifier d’autres pays qui pourraient apporter d’intéressantes expériences
dont on pourrait s’instruire.
Cette année, le rapport est réalisé en collaboration avec la Direction Générale

«Emploi, affaires sociales et inclusion» et Eurostat, et tire parti de
l’expérience d'Eurostat en matière d’analyse démographique. Il se compose
de deux parties, d’une brève annexe sur la migration au cours de la récession
et d’une annexe contenant des fiches par pays.
La partie I est consacrée aux tendances historiques et récentes concernant la

fécondité, l’espérance de vie et la migration, qui sont les trois facteurs clés de
l’évolution de la population. Elle inclut un examen de la structure de la
population par âge et composition familiale.
La partie II se penche sur un phénomène de plus en plus important qui a été

identifié dans une récente enquête Eurobaromètre : un nombre croissant de
citoyens européens recherchent des opportunités au-delà des frontières de
leur pays pour étudier, travailler, puiser leur inspiration et vivre des
expériences, ce qui conduit à la création de différentes formes de liens par-
delà les frontières nationales.
20
( ) COM(2006) 571, adoptée le 12 octobre 2006.
14
Résumé
1. DES EUROPÉENS PLUS NOMBREUX, PLUS ÂGÉS, VIVANT

DANS UNE PLUS GRANDE DIVERSITÉ
1.1. Des modèles nouveaux entraînent une légère

augmentation de la fécondité
Des changements progressifs, mais néanmoins significatifs, touchent la

population en Europe. Deux tendances positives principales émergent : une
légère augmentation de la fécondité et une plus grande espérance de vie. La
très faible fécondité – inférieure à 1,3 enfant par femme – n’est plus de mise
dans l’ensemble des États membres. Le chiffre le plus récent pour l’Europe
des 27 s’est élevé à 1,6 et pourrait grimper à plus d’1,7 si les ajustements
pour le report des naissances (les dénommés « effets de tempo ») sont pris en
considération. Ce petit ajustement ne compense pas le déficit par rapport au
seuil de renouvellement de 2,1, mais pourrait contribuer à un ralentissement
du taux de la baisse de la population à moyen/plus long terme, parallèlement
à une possible augmentation de la fécondité à mesure d’un enrichissement
des États membres de l’UE.
La progression modeste de la fécondité est le résultat de modèles quelque peu

nouveaux en termes de schéma familial : des pays avec moins de mariages,
davantage de concubinage, plus de divorces et une moyenne plus élevée de
l’âge des femmes au moment de l’accouchement tendent à engendrer une
fécondité plus élevée. Le changement des perceptions sociales quant au rôle
du mariage et une plus grande fragilité des relations sont à l’origine d’un
nombre plus élevé de naissances extraconjugales, y compris dans les familles
monoparentales, ou d’une infécondité.
L’impact des politiques familiales sur ces tendances est difficile à évaluer
dans la mesure où les facteurs culturels jouent un rôle important. Cependant,
les données suggèrent que l’ajournement de la maternité à un âge plus avancé
s’accompagne dans quelques pays (France, Danemark, Finlande et Pays-Bas
par exemple) de taux de fécondité plus élevés et d’aides publiques
relativement généreuses pour les parents. À l’autre extrémité de l’échelle,
dans des pays comme la Roumanie, la Slovaquie et la Hongrie, un âge
inférieur à l’accouchement n’est pas associé à un taux de fécondité élevé.
Cette situation serait également en phase avec les premiers éléments
indiquant que la fécondité s’accroît encore avec la richesse, après des
décennies de fécondité en berne alors que les pays s’enrichissaient.
Cette évidence émergente étaie la thèse selon laquelle il est nécessaire de

disposer de meilleures politiques pouvant aider les parents à faire face aux
contraintes d’une société moderne.
1.1. Une structure de la population « vieillissante »
Bien qu’il soit difficile de prédire l’influence des politiques, une analyse de
l’impact des changements dans la structure de la population est plus simple.
Les faibles taux de fécondité ne constituent qu’un des deux aspects du
phénomène, l’autre aspect étant une baisse du nombre des décès, ou en
termes plus positifs, d’une hausse de l’espérance de vie. En 2009, l’âge
moyen de la population était de 40,6 et il devrait atteindre, selon les
prévisions, 47,9 ans d’ici 2060.
15
Les projections EUROPOP2008, préparées par Eurostat et présentées dans le

précédent Rapport sur la démographie, indiquent que d’ici 2014, la
population active (20-64) commencera à se contracter alors que
d’importantes cohortes de « baby-boomers » nés immédiatement après la
Seconde Guerre atteignent désormais la soixantaine et prennent leur retraite.
Le nombre d’individus âgés de 60 ans et plus au sein de l’UE croît
actuellement de plus de deux millions chaque année, à peu près deux fois le
taux observé jusqu’il y a encore trois ans. La population active vieillit
également du fait de l’accroissement de la proportion des travailleurs plus
âgés en activité par rapport aux groupes de travailleurs plus jeunes. Chaque
année, environ 5 millions d’enfants voient le jour dans l’Europe des 27 et
plus de 2 millions de personnes immigrent de pays tiers. Les naissances
dépassent les décès de plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes chaque
année tandis que l’immigration nette est nettement supérieure à un million.
En conséquence, l’immigration représente la part la plus importante de la
croissance de la population de l’UE.
En 2008, l’espérance de vie pour l’Europe des 27 était de 76,4 ans pour les
hommes et de 82,4 ans pour les femmes. Les écarts parmi les États membres
sont toujours très significatifs, allant de presque 13 ans pour les hommes à 8
ans pour les femmes. La mortalité infantile en 2009 est aussi toujours
relativement élevée dans certains pays tels que la Roumanie (10,1 ‰) et la
Bulgarie (9,0 ‰), même si une baisse d’environ 50 % pour l’UE-27 a été
enregistrée au cours des 15 dernières années. Le statut socio-économique
semble jouer un rôle majeur, notamment dans certains pays d’Europe
centrale. Par conséquent, en améliorant l’espérance de vie des catégories
désavantagées, une hausse générale de l’espérance de vie globale devrait
également se profiler.
Une évolution possible serait l’amélioration de l’espérance de vie en bonne

santé, en retardant le moment auquel les conditions physiques commencent à
se détériorer rapidement, reportant de ce fait la mort à un âge ultérieur. . Ce
sujet important exige d’autres preuves et analyses.
Les politiques abordant le vieillissement de la population et la main-d’œuvre

visent à permettre aux travailleurs plus âgés de rester actifs et productifs
pendant une plus longue période de leur vie. L’un des avantages d’une
population vieillissante est qu’elle offre plus de possibilités en termes de
souplesse des dispositions au cours de la vie. Une plus longue vie active
permet des périodes prolongées ou périodiques en matière d’éducation ; une
plus grande flexibilité du temps de travail pendant les années d’effervescence
où la maternité et les engagements professionnels coïncident ; une
interruption de carrière temporaire quand il devient nécessaire de prendre
soin de membres de la famille ; et une retraite productive via le volontariat et
un engagement général dans la vie sociale.
1.2. L’Europe en mouvement
L’immigration, notamment en provenance des pays non membres de l’UE,

pourrait fournir un sursis (provisoire) au vieillissement de la population,
puisque la plupart des personnes émigrent principalement lorsqu’elles sont de
jeunes adultes (25-34 ans). Alors que les groupes de jeunes étrangers entrent
progressivement dans les cohortes nationales plus âgées, l’ensemble de la
population rajeunit et la diversité s’accroît. Des niveaux sans précédent
d’immigration provenant tant de pays tiers que de l’UE-27 (mobilité
intracommunautaire) au cours de la dernière décennie ont sensiblement
16
Résumé
augmenté la part d'habitantseuropéens qui ne vivent pas dans leur propre pays
natal ou dans leur milieu culturel.
Les États membres de l’UE-27 accueillent environ 20 millions de

ressortissants ne provenant pas de l’UE. 10 autres millions de ressortissants
de l’UE vivent dans un autre État membre et environ 5 millions de
ressortissants tiers sont devenus citoyens européens depuis 2001. Étant donné
que la plupart des migrants sont relativement jeunes et sont arrivés assez
récemment, ils contribuent notablement à l’ampleur de la main-d’œuvre de
l’UE-27. À l’avenir, la main-d’œuvre comptera de plus en plus de personnes
provenant de l’immigration. Parmi les ressortissants de l’UE, outre le taux
approximatif de 8 % de personnes résidant dans l’UE et nées à l’étranger (21),
5 % supplémentaires ont au moins un parent né à l’étranger, et cette catégorie
continuera à croître. En 2060, les personnes de toute nationalité ayant au
moins un parent né à l’étranger devraient représenter près d’un tiers de la
population de l’UE-27. Un pourcentage encore plus important de la main-
d’œuvre sera d’origine étrangère.
Ces tendances impliquent que des efforts supplémentaires sont nécessaires

pour garantir que les immigrés aient l’opportunité de s’intégrer dans leur
société d’accueil et, fondamentalement, de leur permettre de contribuer au
marché du travail en utilisant pleinement leurs qualifications. Une population
mobile peut être perçue comme un atout par les pays d’accueil. Dans la
mesure où de plus en plus de gens recherchent une expérience à l’étranger, ils
peuvent contribuer à une économie plus efficace et productive tout en
renforçant leurs compétences personnelles.
2. UNE POPULATION EUROPÉENNE DE PLUS EN PLUS DIVERSE

ET MOBILE
Alors que les flux migratoires en provenance des pays non membres de l’UE
et la mobilité entre États membres se sont intensifiés, une proportion
croissante de la population active (15 % en 2008) est née à l’étranger ou a au
moins un parent né à l’étranger.
L’évolution des schémas migratoires et de la mobilité en Europe rendent le

sentiment national relatif à l’appartenance à une nation particulière plus
diffus et complexe, en particulier dans le cas de la mobilité entre les États
membres de l’UE. Bien que l’immigration traditionnelle à long terme,
motivée par l’emploi, principalement masculine, soit toujours à l’ordre du
jour, les femmes immigrantes sont de plus de plus présentes et sont
désormais majoritaires dans certains États membres. Les flux de mobilité ont
également changé : certains des principaux États membres traditionnels
d’émigration sont devenus des pôles d’attraction pour les migrants.
La migration à grande échelle et le mélange des cultures ne sont évidemment

pas un nouveau phénomène dans l’histoire de l’UE. Les flux passés ont eu un
impact différent sur la taille et la structure de la population dans la plupart
des États membres de l’UE-27 et ils ont contribué à une perspective plus
européenne parmi ses citoyens. Les immigrés souhaitent souvent conserver
un attachement proche à leur pays d’origine, mais ces liens tendent à
s’amenuiser au fil du temps.
21
( ) L’expression « nées à l’étranger » inclut ici les personnes nées dans un État membre différent de celui dans lequel elles résident.
17
L’intégration des immigrés à travers les générations s’effectue plutôt

rapidement. Dans la plupart des pays disposant d’une proportion substantielle
d’immigrés de la seconde génération, ceux-ci réussissent nettement mieux sur
le plan de l’éducation tout comme sur le marché du travail que les immigrés
de la première génération et presque aussi bien que les individus sans origine
étrangère ; cela s’applique aux descendants des migrants provenant des autres
États membres et des immigrés en provenance des pays non membres de
l’UE. Néanmoins, même après trois générations, – le temps habituellement
nécessaire pour une intégration totale – les descendants des migrants
conservent un certain attachement aux pays de leurs ancêtres, par leur
connaissance des langues étrangères par exemple.
Parallèlement à l’immigration et à la mobilité traditionnelles, il existe de

nouvelles formes de mobilité. Les individus se déplacent à l’étranger,
principalement dans d’autres États membres, pour des périodes plus courtes
en vue de chercher du travail, de poursuivre leur formation ou pour toute
autre opportunité de vie. Ces individus mobiles tendent à être de jeunes
adultes instruits, dirigés vers l’extrémité supérieure de l’échelle
professionnelle. Cette forme de mobilité est basée de plus en plus sur des
préférences personnelles et des choix de vie, et pas seulement sur des
opportunités économiques. La propension accrue à la mobilité pourrait être
très bénéfique à l’UE en permettant une meilleure mise en adéquation des
qualifications et des capacités linguistiques avec les offres d’emploi. Les
résultats d’une enquête Eurobaromètre (22) mettent en évidence la présence
d’un nombre varié et croissant de jeunes gens mobiles caractérisés par un
intérêt commun pour ce qui se fait au-delà des frontières nationales.L’enquête
Eurobaromètre indique également qu’une personne sondée sur cinq de l’UE-
27 a étudié ou travaillé dans un autre pays à un moment donné, vécu avec un
conjoint d’un autre pays ou possède un bien immobilier à l’étranger. La
moitié de ces personnes sondées a des liens avec d’autres pays par
ascendance ; l’autre moitié est le plus souvent jeune et instruite et effectue
consciemment un choix de vie qui la met en contact avec d’autres pays. Ils
partagent une forte volonté, sinon une propension à se déplacer à l’étranger,
jusqu’à quatre fois plus que les personnes qui ne disposent d’aucune
connexion avec un autre pays. Étant donné que ce phénomène est susceptible
de devenir bien plus important à l’avenir, il est possible que les décideurs
politiques souhaitent tenir compte de ses implications dans la planification de
l’avenir socio-économique de la population européenne.
3. POLITIQUE DÉMOGRAPHIQUE AU COURS DE LA

RÉCESSION
Avant la récession économique, l’engagement des États membres de l’UE à

mettre en application les objectifs politiques inscrits dans le programme du
traité de Lisbonne avait commencé à donner des résultats sous la forme de
l’emploi des jeunes, des femmes, des travailleurs plus âgés et des migrants.
Quand la récession est survenue, les premiers groupes à être affectés ont été
les jeunes et les immigrés. Les gouvernements ont fait face à des difficultés
croissantes en équilibrant soutien aux familles, consolidation des budgets,
aide aux jeunes et aux immigrés sur un marché du travail en contraction, et en
finançant les régimes de retraite.
22
( ) Eurobaromètre EBS 346 sur http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf
18
Résumé
Il est trop tôt pour tirer toute conclusion définitive concernant l’impact de la
crise sur la fécondité et l’espérance de vie. L’expérience récente des
récessions passées indique que la fécondité et la mortalité peuvent baisser
légèrement dans un premier temps pour revenir à leurs niveaux antérieurs à la
récession peu de temps après la fin de la crise.
Les nouvelles données d’Eurostat sur les permis de séjour mettent en lumière
les raisons de l’immigration en provenance des pays non membres de l’UE.
Les données disponibles montrent que la baisse de l’immigration est en
grande partie due à une réduction de l’immigration pour des raisons
professionnelles et familiales, alors que le nombre de permis de séjour
délivrés pour les études et d’autres raisons a légèrement augmenté de 2008 à
2009.
4. MESURES PRISES
En juin 2010, le Conseil européen a adopté la nouvelle stratégie Europe2020

pour les dix ans à venir afin de créer davantage d’emplois et parvenir à une
croissance intelligente, durable et exhaustive (23). La stratégie définit une
réorientation des politiques existantes depuis la gestion de la crise jusqu’aux
objectifs à moyen et plus long terme pour favoriser la croissance et l’emploi
et pour assurer la durabilité future des finances publiques. Ce dernier point
est une condition préalable pour la cohésion sociale durable dans l’UE.
La récession n’a pas amenuisé l’engagement des États membres à relever le

défi démographique. Au contraire, cet engagement semble avoir été renforcé.
La stratégie adoptée pour aborder la mutation démographique semble
concorder avec la poussée globale de la nouvelle stratégie Europe 2020. Dans
le sillage de la récession, et en dépit des mornes perspectives pour les
finances publiques, la Commission européenne est convaincue que la
dimension démographique mérite d’être entièrement prise en considération
par les États membres lorsqu’ils formulent leurs stratégies de sortie de la
récession actuelle.
La nécessité de mobiliser les possibilités démographiques de l’UE a été déjà

soulignée en octobre 2006 dans la communication de la Commission sur
l’avenir démographique de l’Europe (24). Cette communication a suggéré que
le problème de la faible fécondité devrait être abordé en créant de meilleures
conditions pour aider les familles et traiter le problème d’une contraction de
la main-d’œuvre en relevant les taux d’emploi et les niveaux de productivité,
en se fiant à l’immigration et à une meilleure intégration et, pour finir, en
préservant la capacité à répondre aux besoins futurs d’une société
vieillissante en créant des finances publiques durables. Il appartient aux États
membres de décider de quelle manière réaliser leur potentiel. La
communication a mis en évidence le type d’aide que l’UE peut apporter aux
États membres en termes de coordination des politiques existantes. À la
demande des États membres et avec l’appui du Parlement européen, ce
processus est complété par les activités organisées sous l’égide de l’Alliance
européenne pour les familles (25) et de l’Année européenne du vieillissement
actif désignée pour 2012 (26).
23
( ) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_fr.htm
24
( ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0571:FIN:FR:PDF
25
( ) http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm?langId=fr&id=1
26
( ) http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=fr&catId=89&newsId=860
19
Le succès de cette stratégie s’articule en grande partie autour de la capacité

de l’UE à faire face aux principales transformations démographiques de cette
prochaine décennie.
L’avenir de l’Europe dépend dans une large mesure de sa capacité à exploiter

le grand potentiel des deux segments augmentant le plus rapidement au sein
de sa population : les personnes âgées et les immigrés. Trois secteurs
semblent essentiels pour relancer la croissance économique et parvenir à une
plus grande cohésion sociale :
– la promotion du vieillissement actif : les personnes âgées, et en

particulier les baby-boomers vieillissants, peuvent espérer vivre de plus
longues années en bonne santé, et détiennent des qualifications et des
expériences précieuses. Davantage d’opportunités en vue d’un vieillissement
actif leur permettront de continuer à apporter leur contribution à la société
même après la retraite.
– l’intégration des immigrés et de leurs descendants : c’est primordial

pour l’Europe parce que les immigrés constitueront une part encore plus
importante de la main-d’œuvre européenne. Les faibles taux d’emploi des
immigrés sont socialement et financièrement très élevés.
– la conciliation d’un travail rémunéré et d’obligations familiales : les

personnes ayant une charge familiale manquent toujours d’une aide adéquate
et de mesures appropriées pour combiner leurs différentes responsabilités. En
conséquence, la croissance économique est entravée, trop de personnes ne
pouvant pas mettre leur niveau élevé de qualifications et d’éducation à
disposition du marché du travail. Les femmes sont particulièrement touchées
en raison de la persistance des différences d’emploi selon le sexe et des écarts
de salaire.
Parallèlement, l’Europe doit trouver les moyens de maintenir une plus grande
productivité tout en se préparant à des niveaux croissants de dépenses liées au
vieillissement en dépit de l’assèchement des finances publiques consécutif à
la récession.
20
INTRODUCTION
The Commission's Europe 2020 Strategy has identified concern about population ageing, together with
globalisation, climate change, competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances, as one of the key
challenges that the European Union needs to overcome.
Sixty years ago the number of births rose sharply and remained high for about 20 to 30 years. Now the
first of those baby-boomers, have reached the age of 60 and have started retiring. This marks a turning
point in the demographic development of the European Union and makes it all the more important to
consider the policy responses that are required by this major change. Population ageing, long discussed as
a looming prospect, has now become a reality.
This Report is the third in a series of biennial European Demography Reports to which the Commission
committed itself in its 2006 Communication 'The Demographic Future of Europe — From Challenge to
Opportunity'. This Communication showed that Europe has reasons to envisage its demographic future
with confidence. Population ageing is above all the result of economic, social and medical progress, as
well as greater control over the timing of births and the number of children that people have. The same
progress affords Europe significant opportunities for responding to the challenges of demographic
change, notably in five key areas:
– better support for families;
– promotion of employment;
– raising productivity and economic performance;
– better support for immigration and the integration of migrants;
– sustainable public finances.
Major reforms and decisive action are necessary to meet these challenges. The Communication stressed
that there is only a small window of opportunity, of about 10 years, during which further employment
growth remains possible. Increasing the number of highly productive and high quality jobs is the key to
ensuring that Europe's economy and societies will be able to meet the needs of ageing populations. The
current economic crisis has not invalidated the EU’s strategy; on the contrary, it has made the speedy
implementation of this strategy more urgent.
The 2006 Communication announced that every two years the Commission would hold a European
Forum on Demography to take stock of the latest demographic developments and to review where the
European Union and the Member States stand in responding to demographic change. The first Forum
took place on 30-31 October 2006, the second on 24-25 November 2008 and the third on 22-23
November 2010. The purpose of the present Demography Report is to provide the up-to-date facts and
figures that are needed for an informed debate with the stakeholders taking part in the Forum and, in
particular, with the group of government experts on demography, involved in the conception of this
report.
As far as possible, data are provided for all EU-27 Member States, allowing policy makers and
stakeholders to compare their own country’s situation with that of others, to understand the specific
characteristics of their country and, perhaps, to identify countries that provide interesting examples of
practice from which lessons could be learned. In so doing, the report responds to request from Member
States wishing to learn from the range of national experience across the European Union.
Comments and suggestions to help the Commission improve the Report will be gratefully received and
should be sent to:
21
Unit D4 (Demography, Migration, Social Innovation and Civil Society)
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities
European Commission
B-1049 Brussels
[email protected]
Data sources and comments
Online data Most of the data in this publication come from Eurostat's data base. Individual data
codes tables used in the various figure (graph or table) are referenced by a code provided
under each figure. To find more complete, updated or detailed data, visit
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database and
insert the code(s) in the 'search in tree' textbox.
Where a code is not available, the data are not available as a standard table and were
obtained in answer to a special query.
Some data comes from Eurobarometer surveys. Two main surveys are used in this
publication, namely the November 2009 survey on mobility (EBS 337, from the EB
round 72.5, can be found at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_339_320_en.htm and the
report at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_337_en.pdf) and the
March 2010 survey on the 'New Europeans' (EBS 346, from the EB round 73.3,
survey at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_359_340_en.htm#346 and the
report at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf).
This publication made use of other more ad-hoc sources and their links can be found
in the text or in footnotes.
Comments Comments and suggestions on this report will be gratefully received at
Unit D4
Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
European Commission
1049 Brussels – Belgium
[email protected]
22
Part I
Main Demographic Trends
1. INTRODUCTION
As the 500-millionth person was born – or arrived younger average age at childbirth goes with lower
from abroad as an immigrant – EU-27 was, and fertility rates. Wealth and life expectancy are not
still is, undergoing major demographic changes. strongly linked; some Member States are poorer
These changes are slow, but they are very than others and yet their citizens live longer. There
significant. may be signs that as countries become wealthier,
fertility increases.
Indicators observed just before the recession
suggest that fertility seems to be increasing again, Other patterns of change are less surprising in a
albeit only slowly. Life expectancy keeps rising. developed, ageing society. The population of
The labour force keeps growing and EU-27 has working age has been increasing less and will start
attracted large numbers of migrants. shrinking soon. The first decade of the 21st century
has seen large waves of immigrants come from
When ten new countries joined the EU-27 in 2004, outside the EU. The first post-World War II ‘baby
most of them had known little economic migration. boomers’ are entering their 60s, and are retiring.
Then, many of them experienced significant From now on, the older population will keep
emigration but, recently, some of them have swelling.
attracted migrants. Life expectancy in these
countries had not improved much in the 1990s, and
had even regressed in some countries, but in the
early 2000's, the figures started to catch up with
the 15 pre-2004 Member States.
In the meantime, EU-27 has developed some

peculiar demographic patterns. Across countries,
those where there are more marriages do not
necessarily report more births – on the contrary. A
Table I.1.1: Main demographic trends: Main findings
Fertility is slightly on the rise. Lowest-low fertility, i.e. below 1.3 children per woman, has ended in every
Member State and the average is approaching 1.6 as of 2008.
Fertility indicators confirm the ongoing postponement of births to later ages in life. An adjustment for
this ‘tempo’ effect would raise the 2008 fertility rate in the EU to just over 1.7. This is still well below the
replacement rate of 2.1.
Life expectancy continues to rise, especially from gains at older ages. Since there are large
discrepancies among and within countries, there is scope for raising average life-spans for the less-
advantaged groups.
Not only people are living longer lives; they may be living longer healthy lives. There is evidence that the
process of ageing, during which people become progressively disabled until they die, is not becoming
slower; rather, it is progressively delayed. However, some data indicate that healthy life expectancy fell
from 2007 to 2009, and there is a need for more information on this subject.
The most recent large wave of immigrants, that has swollen the cohorts of foreigners in mediterranean
countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain, has abated in 2008.
Immigrants tend to be less-well educated and employed in jobs below their qualifications
The EU population ages at varying speed. Populations that are currently the oldest, such as Germany's
and Italy's, will age rapidly for the next twenty years, then stabilise. Some populations that are currently
younger, mainly in the East of the EU, will undergo ageing at increasing speed and by 2060 will have
the oldest populations in the EU.
25
2. FERTILITY
Fertility is increasing, albeit slightly. Most of the Table I.2.1 shows the TFR in the EU-27 and in all
increase is in countries that have experienced Member States for selected years. The total
extremely low fertility in the recent past, that is, fertility rate declined steeply between 1980 and
fertility below 1.3 children per woman. At the 2000-2003 in many Member States, falling far
same time, women are delaying motherhood, below replacement level. In 2000, values had
giving birth much later in their lives. fallen below 1.3 in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Greece, Spain, Italy, Slovenia and Slovakia. After
reaching a minimum between 2000 and 2003, in
2.1. RECOVERY OF FERTILITY the six years to 2009, the TFR had risen in most
Member States, and in 2009, all EU-27 countries
In 2009, around 5.4 million children were born in were displaying rates above 1.3.
the EU-27, compared to about 7.5 million at the
beginning of the 1960s. The highest annual total Table I.2.1: Total Fertility Rate (TFR), selected years
for the EU-27 was recorded in 1964, with 7.7 1980 1990 2000 2003 2009
million live births. Over the past 30 years, the total EU-27 : : : 1.47 1.60
number of live births has been growing again, BE 1.68 1.62 1.67 1.66 1.84
albeit moderately, after reaching a low in 2002 BG 2.05 1.82 1.26 1.23 1.57
(less than 5 million live births, see Graph I.2.1). CZ 2.08 1.90 1.14 1.18 1.49
DK 1.55 1.67 1.77 1.76 1.84
Graph I.2.1: Number of live births in EU-27, 1980-2009 DE : : 1.38 1.34 1.36
7
EE : 2.05 1.38 1.37 1.62
6 IE 3.21 2.11 1.89 1.96 2.07
5
EL 2.23 1.40 1.26 1.28 1.52
ES 2.20 1.36 1.23 1.31 1.40
4
Million
FR 1.95 1.78 1.87 1.87 1.98

3
IT 1.64 1.33 1.26 1.29 1.42
2 CY : 2.41 1.64 1.50 1.51
1
LV : : : 1.29 1.31
LT 1.99 2.03 1.39 1.26 1.55
0
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 LU 1.50 1.60 1.76 1.62 1.59
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind), HU 1.91 1.87 1.32 1.27 1.32
MT 1.99 2.04 1.70 1.48 1.44
The slowdown in population growth in the EU-27 NL 1.60 1.62 1.72 1.75 1.79
is due partly to lower fertility. AT 1.65 1.46 1.36 1.38 1.39
PL : 2.06 1.35 1.22 1.40
The main indicator of fertility is the Total Fertility PT 2.25 1.56 1.55 1.44 1.32
Rate (TFR): this is the mean number of children RO 2.43 1.83 1.31 1.27 1.38
that would be born alive to a woman during her SI : 1.46 1.26 1.20 1.53
lifetime if she were to pass through her SK 2.32 2.09 1.30 1.20 1.41
childbearing years conforming to the age-specific FI 1.63 1.78 1.73 1.76 1.86
fertility rates of a given year. A total fertility rate SE 1.68 2.13 1.54 1.71 1.94
of around 2.1 children per woman is considered to UK 1.90 1.83 1.64 1.71 1.96
be the replacement level, that is, the average EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_find)
number of children per woman required to keep
the population size constant in the absence of
inward or outward migration. A TFR below 1.3 Over the past 30 years, total fertility rates in the
children per woman is described as ‘lowest-low EU-27 Member States have been converging: in
fertility’. TFR is used as an indicator for the 1980, the disparity between the highest (Ireland)
fertility level and is comparable across countries, and the lowest (Luxembourg) was 1.7. By 1990,
since it takes into account changes in the size and this difference had decreased to 1.1 (between
structure of the population.
26
Part I
Cyprus and Italy); in 2009 it was down to 0.8, with Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus,
Ireland and Latvia representing the two extremes. Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Finland
and Sweden.
Among the countries for which 1980 data are
available, in eight Member States (Belgium, Table I.2.2 shows that in the past 30 years, mean
Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, age at childbirth rose by as much as six years in
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom), the Luxembourg. The difference is striking between
2009 TFR is equal to or higher than that in 1980. Member States that joined the EU after 2004 and
On the other hand, the TFR fell by more than 40 % the others: in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
between 1980 and 2009 in Romania and Portugal. Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia, the mean
In absolute terms, the decline in the total fertility age rose relatively little (and in some cases even
rate was steepest in Ireland, from 3.21 to 2.07. fell) between 1980 and 1990, whereas the rise was
more marked in the other Member States.
Groups of countries with similar trends in TFR can However, since 1990, a catching-up is also taking
be identified in Table I.2.1. A steady increase in place in Member States that joined the EU after
TFR is found in Denmark, the Netherlands and, to 2004. In fact, since 1990, while mean age at
a lesser extent, Finland. A small group composed childbirth has been rising most rapidly in countries
of Cyprus, Malta and Portugal displays a steadily- that joined the EU after 2004, the trend appears to
declining TFR since 1980. In other Member States, be gradually slowing down in the other Member
the trend is more often in the form of a U-shaped States.
curve, with the TFR bottoming out around 2000 or
2003, and recovering by 2009. By contrast, Table I.2.2: Mean age of women at childbirth, selected
Germany, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and years
Portugal had lower fertility in 2009 than in 2000. 1980 1990 2000 2003 2009
EU-27 : : : 29.3 29.7
The (slight) increase in fertility between 2000 and BE 26.6 27.9 28.8 29.6 29.6
2009 may be partly due to a catching-up process, BG 23.9 23.9 25.0 25.5 26.6
following postponement of the decision to have CZ 25.0 24.8 27.2 28.1 29.4
children. When women give birth later in life, the DK 26.8 28.5 29.7 30.1 30.5
total fertility rate first decreases, then recovers. DE : : 28.8 29.2 30.2
EE : 25.6 27.0 27.7 29.1
While in 2003, EU-27 TFR was 1.47 children per
IE 29.7 29.9 30.4 30.8 31.2
woman, by 2009 it had risen to 1.6. The lowest
EL 26.1 27.2 29.6 29.5 30.2
value in 2009 was in Latvia (1.31 children per
ES 28.2 28.9 30.7 30.8 31.0
woman), while rates in Belgium, Denmark,
FR 26.8 28.3 29.4 29.6 30.0
Ireland, France, Finland, Sweden and the United
IT 27.5 28.9 30.4 30.8 31.1
Kingdom were above 1.8. CY : 27.1 28.7 29.3 30.4
LV : : : 27.2 28.4
LT 26.7 25.9 26.6 27.1 28.6
2.2. WOMEN STILL POSTPONING BIRTHS LU 24.4 28.4 29.3 29.6 30.7
HU 24.6 25.6 27.3 27.9 29.1
Over the past 30 years, the timing of births has MT 28.8 28.9 27.9 28.8 29.2
also changed significantly: the mean age of women NL 27.7 29.3 30.3 30.4 30.7
at childbirth has been postponed (27). The highest AT 26.3 27.2 28.2 28.8 29.7
ages at childbirth in 2009, as shown in Table I.2.2, PL : 26.2 27.4 27.9 28.6
were in Ireland (31.2 years) and Italy (31.1 years), PT 27.2 27.3 28.6 29.0 29.7
whereas the lowest were in Bulgaria (26.6 years) RO 25.3 25.5 25.7 26.2 26.9
and Romania (26.9 years). The difference between SI : 25.9 28.2 28.9 30.0
the highest and the lowest mean age at childbirth SK 25.2 25.1 26.6 27.3 28.5
was 4.6 years. In 2009, women in the following 13 FI 27.7 28.9 29.6 29.8 30.1
Member States tended to have their children when SE 27.6 28.6 29.9 30.3 30.7
they were aged 30 or over: Denmark, Germany, UK 26.9 27.7 28.5 28.9 29.3
EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_find)
(27) A more appropriate indicator to measure birth
postponement would be the mean age of women at first
childbirth; however, this indicator cannot be produced for
Table I.2.3 summarises the TFR and the mean age
all Member States due to lack of data. of women at childbirth for the EU-27 from 2002 to
27
2008, the only years for which information is Member States, both the TFR and the mean age of
available for all 27 Member States composing the mothers at childbirth are below the EU-27 values.
EU aggregate. The total fertility rate rose slowly
but consistently from 1.45 children per woman in The third group of Member States shows mothers
2002 to 1.60 in 2008. The mean age of mothers at with a higher age at childbirth and lower TFR as
childbirth also rose between 2003 and 2008, by 0.4 compared to the EU-27 average: this is the case in
years, to reach 29.7 years in 2008. Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus,
Luxembourg and Slovenia. The fourth and last
Table I.2.3: Total fertility rate and mean age of women at group is composed of Belgium, Estonia and the
childbirth in EU-27, 2002-2008 United Kingdom, countries for which the TFR is
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
higher than the EU-27 value, but where the mean
TFR 1.45 1.47 1.50 1.51 1.54 1.56 1.60
age of mothers is lower. However, the age at
Mean age at
: 29.3 29.4 29.5 29.6 29.7 29.7
childbearing childbirth is still above 29 in these countries.
TFR in 2002: EU-27 is estimated without BE
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_find) At the end of the first decade of the 21st century,
women in the EU-27 appear to be having fewer
The comparison among countries paints a different children while they are young, and more later.
picture. While the fertility rates of women aged under 30
have declined since the 1980s, those of women
Graph I.2.2 shows that many of the countries with aged 30 and over have risen, which would seem to
the highest total fertility rate also display a high confirm that the long-term decline in fertility rates
mean age for women at childbirth. Based on the within the EU-27 is associated with the
point representing the EU-27, four different groups postponement of childbirth.
of Member States can be identified. One group is
composed of Denmark, Ireland, France, the Graph I.2.3 compares fertility rates of mothers
Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, where both the aged 30 and over between 2000 and 2009. The
TFR and the mean age at childbirth are above the proportion has increased in all the EU-27
EU-27 average. In the diagonally opposite countries. In the Czech Republic, Cyprus,
quadrant lie most of the countries that joined the Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia, the increase was
EU after 2004, plus Austria and Portugal. In these above 15 percentage points (p.p.) in the eight years
Graph I.2.2: Total fertility rate and mean age of women at childbirth, 2009
2.2
IE
FR
2.0
UK SE
Total Fertility Rate
1.8 BE FI DK NL
EE EU-27
LU
1.6 EL
LT CZ
BG SI
MT CY IT
SK AT
1.4
RO PL ES
DE
LV HU PT
1.2
26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Mean age at childbirth
EU-27, IT, UK, 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France

Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_find)
28
Part I
considered. At the other end of the scale, the Graph I.2.4: Fertility by age group of mothers, 2009 (%)
increase was smaller, but still positive, in Spain < 30 years old ≥ 30 years old
and in the Netherlands (both +2 p.p.). EU-27
IE
Graph I.2.3: Fertility of mothers aged 30 and over, 2000
ES
and 2009 (ordered by difference 2009-2000)
IT
(%)
NL
2000 2009 LU
SE
ES
DK
NL
DE
FI EL
IE CY
IT FI
UK PT
FR FR
EL SI
DK AT
UK
BE
CZ
SE
MT
LV
BE
PT
HU
RO EE
PL SK
DE PL
LU LT
AT LV
BG RO
BG
LT
MT 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
EE EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France

CY Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_frate)
SK
HU
SI
The postponement of births makes it difficult to
CZ estimate ‘real’ total fertility rates: postponement
depresses the TFR until the process comes to an
0 20 40 % 60 80 100
end.
IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France ;LV:

2002 instead of 2000
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_frate)
2.3. REVISITING FERTILITY TRENDS
The postponement of births introduces a bias in

In 2009, 51 % of the EU-27 fertility rate in was to
Total Fertility Rates, since fertility rates are
mothers aged under 30 and 49 % to mothers aged
computed in a given year using information across
30 and over. In Ireland, Spain, Italy, the
different cohorts of women. Postponement results
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark,
in the TFR being underestimated. Because it is
Germany, Greece, Cyprus and Finland, ‘young’
possible to estimate the postponement effect, the
fertility, i.e. births to mothers aged below 30,
TFR can be adjusted. The ‘tempo’ effect is one
represents less than 50 % of the total fertility rates
such method of adjustment.
in 2009 (Graph I.2.4). These Member States are
also found in Table I.2.2 to have the highest mean
age of women at childbirth. Ireland displays the
highest TFR in EU-27 in 2009, mainly due to the
high fertility rate among women aged 30 and over.
Conversely, in Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia,
Romania and Bulgaria, fertility of women aged
under 30 represents more than 60 % of the TFR,
and these are countries with low fertility rates.
29
Table I.2.4: Fertility rate differences (2006-2008) and Postponement does not bias fertility estimates for
'tempo' adjustment ever. Eventually, even unadjusted TFR increases,
Tempo- as more births are recorded for women at higher
TFR TFR
2006 2008
adjusted Gap Diff. TFR ages. In fact, the difference between the 2008 and
TFR 2006 TFR is generally in the same direction and is
(a) (b) (c) (c)-(a) (b)-(a) often proportional to the difference between the
EU-27 1.54 1.60 1.72 0.18 0.07 tempo-adjusted and unadjusted TFR, thus lending
BE 1.80 1.86 1.85 0.05 0.06
BG 1.38 1.48 1.73 0.35 0.10 support to the tempo estimate.
CZ 1.33 1.50 1.79 0.47 0.17
DK 1.85 1.89 1.97 0.13 0.04 An estimate of just over 1.7 children per woman in
DE 1.33 1.38 1.62 0.29 0.05
EE 1.55 1.65 1.90 0.36 0.11 the EU-27, as suggested by the tempo adjustment,
IE 1.93 2.10 2.08 0.15 0.17 does not, however, result in a sustainable rate. A
EL 1.40 1.51 1.52 0.12 0.11 large inflow of immigrants would still be required
ES 1.38 1.46 1.40 0.02 0.08
FR 1.98 1.99 2.13 0.15 0.01
to prevent the size of the population from
IT 1.35 1.42 1.47 0.12 0.07 shrinking in the long run. This adjusted estimate is
CY 1.45 1.46 1.96 0.51 0.01 much higher than the current 1.6, at which the
LV 1.35 1.44 1.61 0.26 0.10
LT 1.31 1.47 1.75 0.44 0.16
population would shrink naturally at a much faster
LU 1.65 1.61 2.05 0.40 -0.04 rate. If, in addition, socio-economic development
HU 1.34 1.35 1.65 0.31 0.01 plays a positive role in increasing fertility (see Box
MT 1.39 1.44 1.59 0.20 0.05
NL 1.72 1.77 1.79 0.07 0.05
I.7.1), observed fertility might rise to a level above
AT 1.41 1.41 1.66 0.25 0.00 the 1.7 children tempo estimate. Nonetheless, it
PL 1.27 1.39 1.50 0.23 0.12 seems unlikely that the increase will reach the
PT 1.36 1.37 1.56 0.20 0.01
RO 1.32 1.35 1.55 0.23 0.04
replacement level of 2.1, or that the ageing of the
SI 1.31 1.53 1.60 0.28 0.21 population in Europe will be reversed.
SK 1.24 1.32 1.66 0.42 0.08
FI 1.84 1.85 1.93 0.09 0.01
SE 1.85 1.91 1.94 0.09 0.05
UK 1.84 1.96 2.07 0.22 0.11
Tempo adjusted refers to the mean for 2005-2007 (IT: 2004-
2006); FR: Metropolitan France
Source: (a) and (b): Eurostat (online data code:
demo_find); (c): VID, European Demographic Data Sheet
2010
Table I.2.4 compares the unadjusted total fertility

rate TFR with its adjusted version (28): the figures
reported suggest that actual fertility could
represent almost 0.2 children per woman more in
the EU-27 than the unadjusted TFR.
The adjustment seems to be smaller (fewer than

0.15 children per woman) in countries such as
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Italy, the
Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, indicating that,
in these countries, the postponement process seems
to be coming to an end. By contrast, the
adjustment is most marked in the Czech Republic,
Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Slovakia,
where it is over 0.4 children per woman. These
findings suggest that, at least in these countries, the
unadjusted TFR indicator may significantly
underestimate actual fertility.
(28) The adjusted TFR is calculated by the Vienna Institute of

Demography (VID), for more information please refer to
http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/datasheet/index.html.
30
3. MORTALITY
Over the past 50 years, life expectancy at birth has 3.2. RECENT GAINS IN LIFE EXPECTANCY
increased by about 10 years for both men and
women in the EU-27. Further gains will be In the 16 years between 1993 and 2009 (see Table
achieved mostly from the reduction in mortality at I.3.1), the rise in life expectancy at birth for men in
older ages. the EU-27 Member States has ranged from a
minimum of 2.5 years (in Bulgaria) to a maximum
While life expectancy is rising in all Members of 7.5 years (in Estonia); for women, the rise has
States, there are still major differences between ranged from 2.3 years (in Bulgaria) to 6.2 years (in
and within countries. In some cases, improvements Estonia).
in education and standards of living have
contributed to longer life expectancy, suggesting Table I.3.1: Life expectancy at birth by sex, 1993 and 2009
that it could be extended further in future. Men Women
Country 1993 2009 1993 2009
EU-27 : 76.4 : 82.4
BE 73.0 77.3 79.9 82.8
3.1. MORTALITY TRENDS OVER THE PAST 30 BG 67.6 70.1 75.1 77.4
YEARS CZ 69.3 74.2 76.5 80.5
DK 72.6 76.9 77.8 81.1
Since 1980, the annual number of deaths in the DE 72.8 77.8 79.4 82.8
EE 62.3 69.8 74.0 80.2
EU-27 has remained fairly stable at around 4.9
IE 72.5 77.4 78.1 82.5
million. A peak was reached in 1993, with about 5 EL 75.0 77.8 79.8 82.7
million deaths. ES 74.1 78.7 81.4 84.9
FR 73.4 78.0 81.7 85.0
Graph I.3.1: Number of deaths in EU-27, 1980-2009 IT 74.6 79.1 81.0 84.5
CY 74.7 78.6 79.8 83.6
7
LV : 68.1 : 78.0
6 LT 63.1 67.5 75.0 78.7
LU 72.2 78.1 79.6 83.3
5
HU 64.7 70.3 74.0 78.4
4 MT : 77.8 : 82.7
Million
NL 74.0 78.7 80.1 82.9

3
AT 72.8 77.6 79.5 83.2
2 PL 67.2 71.5 75.9 80.1
PT 71.0 76.5 78.1 82.6
1
RO 65.9 69.8 73.4 77.4
0 SI 69.4 75.9 77.6 82.7
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
SK 67.8 71.4 76.3 79.1
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind) FI 72.1 76.6 79.5 83.5
SE 75.5 79.4 80.9 83.5
UK 73.5 77.8 78.9 81.9
The total number of deaths depends on the size of EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
the cohorts reaching the end of their life cycle and Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec)
on mortality rates. A simple but very powerful way
of illustrating the trend in mortality is to consider
life expectancy at birth. Economic development 3.2.1. Life expectancy by Member State
and the improvement of environmental conditions Differences in life expectancy at birth throughout
and health systems across Europe have resulted in the EU-27 Member States of remain significant
a continuous rise in life expectancy at birth. This (Table I.3.1). For men, the lowest life expectancy
process has been going on for longer in Europe in 2009 was recorded in Lithuania (67.5 years) and
than in most other countries of the world, making the highest in Sweden (79.4 years). For women,
the EU-27 a world leader for life expectancy. The the range was narrower, from a low of 77.4 years
gradual reduction in mortality is the most in Bulgaria and Romania, to a high of 85.0 years in
important factor contributing to the ageing of the France.
population in the EU-27, in conjunction with the
reduction in fertility. In 1993, the differences between the highest and
lowest life expectancies among EU Member States
31
amounted, respectively, to 13.2 years for men Graph I.3.2: The gender gap (women – men) in life
expectancy at birth, 1993 and 2009
(between Sweden and Estonia) and 8.3 for women
1993 2009
(between France and Romania). In 2009, the
differences were 11.9 years for men and 7.7 years EU-27
for women. Thus, while life expectancy has been

LT
rising in all countries, it has gone up slightly more
EE
in some of the countries where it was lower. There LV
has been some catching up. PL
HU
SK
3.2.1. Life expectancy by gender
RO
BG
In all EU-27 Member States, women live longer
FR
than men, but the difference varies substantially
FI
between countries (see Graph I.3.2). In 2009, the SI
gender gap in life expectancy at birth varied from CZ
four years in the United Kingdom and Sweden to ES
over 11 years in Lithuania. In the Baltic States, PT
women can expect to live more than 10 years AT
BE
longer than men; the difference is under five years
IT
in six Member States (Denmark, Greece, Malta,
LU
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United IE
Kingdom). DE
CY
During the 16-year period, the gender gap MT
decreased, with the exception of Romania, where EL
NL
the difference between the sexes increased by 0.1
DK
years. The reduction in the gender gap was largest UK
in Luxembourg (7.4 years in 1993 and 5.2 years in SE
2009) and the Netherlands (6.1 years in 1993 and
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
4.2 years in 2009). Years
EU-27, LV, MT: not available in 1993; EU-27, IT, UK: 2008
As people live longer, interest has shifted to the instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec)
older generations; Table I.3.2 shows life
expectancy at age 65 by sex.
In 2009, once a man had reached the age of 65, he
could on average expect to live at least another
13.4 years, as in Latvia and in Lithuania, and a
maximum of 18.7 years, as in France. The life
expectancy of women at age 65 was higher. In
2009, it ranged from 17.0 years in Bulgaria to 23.2
years in France.
32
Part I
Table I.3.2: Life expectancy at age 65 by sex, 1993 and Graph I.3.3: The gender gap (women — men) in life
2009 expectancy at age 65, 1993 and 2009
Men Women 1993 2009
1993 2009 1993 2009 EU-27

EU-27 : 17.2 : 20.7
BE 14.5 17.5 18.9 21.1 EE
BG 12.9 13.8 15.5 17.0
LT
CZ 12.6 15.2 16.0 18.8
LV
DK 14.0 16.8 17.6 19.5
FR
DE 14.5 17.6 18.3 20.8
PL
EE 11.7 14.0 15.7 19.2
IE 13.4 17.2 17.0 20.6 HU
EL 15.9 18.1 18.1 20.2 FI
ES 15.9 18.3 19.8 22.5 ES
FR 16.0 18.7 20.6 23.2 SI
IT 15.6 18.2 19.5 22.0 SK
CY 15.7 18.1 18.0 20.9 MT
LV : 13.4 : 18.2 LU
LT 12.6 13.4 16.6 18.4 IT
LU 14.2 17.6 18.7 21.4 BE
HU 11.9 14.0 15.7 18.2 CZ
MT : 16.8 : 20.6 AT
NL 14.4 17.6 18.9 21.0 NL
AT 14.7 17.7 18.4 21.2 PT
PL 12.5 14.8 16.2 19.2 IE
PT 14.2 17.1 17.5 20.5
RO
RO 12.8 14.0 15.2 17.2
BG
SI 13.2 16.4 17.1 20.5
DE
SK 12.4 14.1 16.2 18.0
SE
FI 14.1 17.3 18.0 21.5
SE 15.6 18.2 19.3 21.2 CY
UK 14.2 17.7 17.9 20.3 DK
UK
EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec) EL
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Years
Table I.3.3 shows life expectancy at birth and at
EU-27, LV, MT: not available in 1993; EU-27, IT, UK: 2008
age 65 for men and women for the EU-27 from instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
2002 to 2008: these are the only years for which Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec)
information is available for all 27 Member States
composing the EU aggregate. Graph I.3.3 shows the changes in the gender gap in
life expectancy at age 65 between 1993 and 2009:
Table I.3.3: Life expectancy in EU-27 by age and sex, due to the faster rise in life expectancy for women
2002-2008 at older ages, the gender gap at age 65 widened in
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Men about half of the EU-27 Member States over the
At birth 74.5 74.6 75.2 75.4 75.8 76.1 76.4 period. The largest rise in the gap was observed in
Age 65 15.9 15.9 16.4 16.4 16.8 17.0 17.2
Women Estonia with +1.2 years between 1993 and 2009.
At birth 80.9 80.8 81.5 81.5 82.0 82.2 82.4
Age 65 19.5 19.4 20.0 20.0 20.4 20.5 20.7
In the other Member States, the gender gap
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec) narrowed over the period; the decrease was largest
(more than half a year) in Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden
In the six years between 2002 and 2008, life
and the United Kingdom.
expectancy at birth in the EU-27 rose by 1.9 years
for men and by 1.5 years for women. The rise for
In 2009 the largest gaps in gender differences were
men and women who had reached the age of 65
in the Baltic States, where women are expected to
was, respectively, 1.3 and 1.2 years. The gender
live around five years longer than men; at the other
gap at birth in the EU-27 decreased from 6.4 in
end of the scale, the smallest gap, two years, was
2002 to 6.0 in 2008. The gender gap at age 65 fell
in Greece.
to 3.5 years in 2008, down from 3.6 years in 2002.
33
Table I.3.4: Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group, men 1993 and 2009
Increase (in
years) in life
Age expectancy
0 1-9 10 - 19 20 - 29 30 - 39 40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79 80+ Total at birth
EU-27 4.8 2.0 2.7 4.9 5.1 11.7 6.7 18.9 25.5 17.7 100% 1.9
BE 8.8 1.7 2.7 5.3 4.4 7.8 6.6 20.4 28.0 14.3 100% 4.1
BG 18.3 7.9 3.8 7.1 13.9 17.3 8.6 3.0 12.5 7.6 100% 2.5
CZ 10.0 2.6 2.6 4.2 5.6 11.2 16.8 20.4 20.2 6.3 100% 4.9
DK 5.2 2.2 2.7 2.8 8.0 9.0 10.0 25.9 25.2 9.0 100% 4.3
DE 4.1 1.6 2.9 4.9 7.0 8.9 11.6 23.0 23.0 13.1 100% 5.0
EE 11.4 4.0 5.9 9.3 12.3 18.3 15.3 13.8 6.1 3.5 100% 7.5
IE 4.5 1.7 1.1 0.5 -1.6 2.9 14.9 30.4 32.6 13.0 100% 4.8
EL 14.8 1.5 1.5 1.3 2.4 3.9 4.5 25.9 23.8 20.4 100% 2.9
ES 6.4 2.2 3.0 11.0 12.8 7.8 8.7 16.3 19.5 12.4 100% 4.6
FR 6.1 2.0 3.2 8.1 10.5 9.4 8.7 19.6 18.8 13.6 100% 4.5
IT 6.5 2.4 2.9 5.6 7.1 5.9 12.9 24.7 22.3 9.7 100% 4.6
CY 8.6 4.6 7.1 -0.5 0.9 7.8 11.1 25.7 30.3 4.2 100% 3.9
LV 6.5 5.1 1.8 12.3 16.2 21.0 18.3 10.1 4.7 4.0 100% 3.5
LT 16.7 5.0 3.3 11.5 13.8 23.5 14.9 3.8 6.5 0.9 100% 4.4
LU 6.9 2.5 4.2 9.9 7.6 7.3 9.3 21.4 24.4 6.4 100% 5.9
HU 10.3 2.3 1.7 5.8 17.5 21.3 13.9 13.5 9.2 4.5 100% 5.6
MT 22.9 4.0 5.8 1.3 1.5 8.1 12.8 21.2 15.2 7.2 100% 3.1
NL 5.0 1.6 2.6 2.8 4.1 6.1 11.7 25.3 27.6 13.0 100% 4.7
AT 5.4 1.5 3.8 6.4 6.0 8.6 11.8 21.6 22.6 12.2 100% 4.8
PL 19.0 2.7 2.0 3.8 7.1 11.1 13.7 18.1 15.6 7.0 100% 4.4
PT 8.2 4.9 5.8 11.2 8.7 4.1 9.3 18.9 18.8 10.1 100% 5.5
RO 25.6 10.9 2.6 5.7 12.2 12.4 8.4 7.4 8.8 5.9 100% 3.9
SI 6.8 0.9 2.9 7.1 8.8 10.9 17.3 21.9 15.7 7.8 100% 6.5
SK 10.7 1.3 2.4 4.1 8.0 16.3 18.5 19.9 14.0 4.8 100% 3.6
FI 4.0 2.4 1.2 3.0 4.7 8.4 12.0 22.5 28.7 13.1 100% 4.5
SE 5.6 0.9 1.4 0.9 4.9 7.6 12.3 23.3 28.3 14.7 100% 3.9
UK 3.2 1.4 2.0 2.2 0.3 2.3 12.2 29.5 32.0 14.9 100% 4.3
EU-27: 2002-2008; IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; LV: 2002 instead of 1993; MT: 1995 instead of 1993. FR: Metropolitan France
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlifetable)
Gains in life expectancy by age group (Arriaga

3.2.2. Gains in life expectancy at older ages decomposition)
Improvements in life expectancy at birth are In Tables I.3.4 and I.3.5, , the last column is the absolute
difference between life expectancy at birth in 2009 and life
achieved by lowering mortality throughout the life expectancy at birth in 1993 (according to available data).
cycle. Therefore, when analysing changes in life The columns to its left represent the percentage
expectancy at birth over time, it is useful to contribution from mortality decreases in the corresponding
age group to the total increase in life expectancy: positive
estimate the contribution of specific age groups to values indicate that mortality has decreased in that age
changes in life expectancy. Tables I.3.4 and I.3.5 group, thus contributing to longer life expectancy.
report the percentage breakdown of changes in life For example, taking the row for EU-27, life expectancy for
expectancy, known as the ‘Arriaga men at birth increased in total by 1.9 years: 4.8 % of this
increase is due to lower infant mortality (deaths before the
decomposition’, for men and women between first birthday), 2.0 % is due to lower mortality at ages 1-9,
1993 and 2009 by age groups, for each of the 27 and similarly for older age groups. Since the decomposition
is based on 2 years of data, results should be interpreted
Member States and the EU-27 aggregate. with caution in countries recording a small number of
deaths.
In most countries, the decline in mortality was
particularly marked for men in their sixties and
seventies and for women aged over 60 years old.
In more detail, for men, more than 50 % of the rise
in life expectancy at birth is found to occur
between the ages of 60 and 79 in Denmark
(51.1 %), Ireland (63.0 %), Cyprus (56.0 %), the
Netherlands (53.0 %), Finland (51.2 %), Sweden
(51.6 %) and the United Kingdom (61.5 %).
For women, the age groups 60-79 explain more

than 50 % of the rise in life expectancy in the
Czech Republic (50.5 %), Ireland (53.6 %), Greece
(60.0 %), Cyprus (54.8 %), Malta (61.3 %),
34
Part I
Table I.3.5: Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group, women 1993 and 2009
Increase (in
years) in life
Age expectancy
0 1-9 10 - 19 20 - 29 30 - 39 40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79 80+ Total at birth
EU-27 5.6 1.8 1.6 2.2 3.1 6.7 4.9 12.4 27.9 33.9 100% 1.5
BE 9.4 1.8 1.7 3.3 2.3 5.4 3.2 13.5 28.8 30.7 100% 2.7
BG 15.2 7.0 2.8 4.4 3.5 1.3 4.4 19.0 25.6 16.8 100% 2.3
CZ 9.2 1.9 1.5 2.2 3.2 5.9 9.2 20.5 30.0 16.5 100% 4.0
DK 4.7 1.8 1.5 1.4 4.4 9.2 14.8 25.6 20.8 15.8 100% 3.3
DE 4.9 1.9 1.8 2.2 4.6 7.2 7.2 17.7 30.9 21.7 100% 3.4
EE 12.4 3.9 3.5 1.8 4.2 9.3 11.6 17.9 20.5 14.9 100% 6.2
IE 5.1 0.9 0.1 -0.2 0.7 2.7 9.1 22.4 31.1 28.0 100% 4.4
EL 13.3 1.3 1.9 0.8 1.0 3.8 5.2 23.9 36.1 12.9 100% 2.9
ES 6.8 2.7 1.6 3.9 4.6 2.7 5.0 14.5 27.3 30.8 100% 3.6
FR 5.5 2.0 2.6 4.6 4.5 3.8 4.0 11.7 22.4 38.9 100% 3.2
IT 7.6 3.3 1.5 3.1 4.3 4.2 7.1 15.1 27.3 26.5 100% 3.5
CY 11.9 0.7 1.8 4.1 0.6 1.7 4.7 18.5 36.3 19.8 100% 3.8
LV 6.2 7.8 5.1 0.9 5.5 6.9 15.2 12.8 18.6 21.0 100% 2.0
LT 18.4 5.9 2.1 3.7 4.1 9.6 11.3 13.3 20.6 11.0 100% 3.7
LU 4.0 2.0 4.7 4.9 5.0 8.0 6.7 10.8 26.4 27.5 100% 3.7
HU 10.7 2.2 1.3 3.1 10.5 11.5 8.1 16.6 20.0 16.0 100% 4.4
MT 3.0 -1.8 0.4 -3.9 -1.1 4.4 7.8 17.8 43.4 29.9 100% 3.2
NL 5.3 2.5 1.3 2.6 4.6 4.9 5.3 15.4 26.9 31.2 100% 2.8
AT 4.7 1.6 2.0 2.3 3.6 7.8 8.2 14.1 28.3 27.2 100% 3.7
PL 16.9 2.1 0.8 1.4 3.4 6.4 5.2 16.2 28.1 19.7 100% 4.3
PT 8.1 4.2 2.6 3.5 3.4 4.8 8.8 15.2 28.0 21.3 100% 4.4
RO 21.6 8.3 1.2 2.7 6.7 6.4 7.6 13.9 19.9 11.8 100% 4.0
SI 4.8 1.5 1.3 3.1 4.8 7.1 9.5 19.1 26.3 22.5 100% 5.0
SK 11.3 2.5 1.1 2.5 4.7 5.1 10.9 23.6 28.2 10.2 100% 2.8
FI 2.4 1.2 0.2 0.8 2.8 3.3 4.0 14.8 36.0 34.6 100% 3.9
SE 5.4 1.5 1.5 2.5 4.3 6.1 8.0 14.7 26.1 29.9 100% 2.6
UK 3.8 1.2 1.5 1.1 0.8 3.3 9.6 26.0 31.8 20.8 100% 3.0
EU-27: 2002-2008; IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; LV: 2002 instead of 1993; MT: 1995 instead of 1993. FR: Metropolitan France
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlifetable)
Slovakia (51.8 %), Finland (50.7 %) and the United 3.2.3. Falling infant mortality
Kingdom (57.7 %). The ages 80 and above
contribute more than 25% to the rise in life Infant mortality rates (29) halved in the EU-27,
expectancy at birth for women in Belgium, Ireland, from 8.7 to 4.3 ‰ between 1993 and 2009 (see
Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Graph I.3.4). The fall in the Central and Eastern
Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden. Member States is greater than in other Member
States. Despite this progress, in some Member
On the other the other hand, in some of the other States, the 2009 infant mortality rate was still
countries, lower infant mortality (defined as deaths relatively high: Romania (10.1 ‰) and Bulgaria
of children under one year of age) had a greater (9.0 ‰). The lowest infant mortality rate within
impact on life expectancy at birth between the two the EU-27 in 2009 was in Slovenia (2.4 ‰).
years analysed; above 20 % for men in Malta
(22.9 %) and Romania (25.6 %), and for women in
Romania (21.6 %). A few countries showed
smaller but still substantial (>10 %) gains from
lower infant mortality for men or for women:
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece,
Cyprus, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
In several Member States, particularly for men, the

gains in life expectancy at birth from lower infant
mortality are much more significant in percentage
terms than the gains due to the older ages (80 and
above). This is the case in Bulgaria, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland and Romania and, to a lesser extent,
in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia,
Hungary and Slovakia.
(29) The rate is defined as the number of deaths of children
under one year of age per 1000 live births in a given year.
35
Graph I.3.4: Infant mortality rate, 1993 and 2009 (ranked Table I.3.6: Healthy life years at birth, by gender, 2007
by size of reduction) and 2009
1993 2009 women men
EU-27 2007 2009 2007 2009
EU-27 62.3 62.0 61.5 60.9
RO
BE 63.7 63.5 63.3 63.7
EE
BG 73.8 65.6 67.0 61.9
LT
CZ 63.2 62.5 61.3 60.9
PL
DK 67.4 60.4 67.4 61.8
LV
HU
DE 58.3 57.7 58.8 56.7
BG
EE 54.6 59.0 49.5 54.8
CZ IE 65.3 65.2 62.7 63.7
EL EL 67.1 60.9 65.9 60.2
CY ES 62.9 61.9 63.2 62.6
PT FR 64.2 63.2 63.0 62.5
SK IT 61.9 61.2 62.8 62.4
BE CY 62.7 65.8 63.0 65.1
SI LV 53.7 55.8 50.9 52.6
LU
LT 57.7 60.9 53.4 57.0
ES
LU 64.6 65.7 62.2 65.1
IT
HU 57.6 58.0 55.0 55.7
IE
MT 70.6 70.6 68.9 69.1
MT
FR
NL 63.7 59.8 65.7 61.4
AT
AT 61.1 60.6 58.4 59.2
NL PL 61.3 62.1 57.4 58.1
DK PT 57.3 55.9 58.3 58.0
SE RO 62.3 61.4 60.4 59.5
DE SI 62.3 61.5 58.6 60.6
UK SK 55.9 52.3 55.4 52.1
FI FI 58.0 58.4 56.7 58.1
0 5 10 15 20 25 SE 66.6 69.5 67.5 70.5
The rate is defined as the number of deaths of children UK 66.1 66.3 64.9 65.0
under one year of age per 1000 live births. EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009.
FR: Metropolitan France Source: Eurostat (online data code: tsdph100)
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_minfind)
3.2.5. Life expectancy among highly

3.2.4. Healthy life expectancy
educated men and women
The average number of healthy life years that a
newborn can expect to live is about 62 for a Another important factor contributing to the
woman and 61 for a man. The difference between disparity in life expectancy is ‘socio-economic
the sexes is smaller than for life expectancy; this status’. The inverse relationship between status
indicates that although women tend to live longer, and mortality is well known, based on a number of
they also live longer with activity limitations. studies (30): the higher the status, the lower the
There are large disparities among Member States mortality rates and, consequently, the higher life
and there have been large variations in some expectancy. There are significant inequalities in
Member States between 2007 and 2009. the EU-27 Member States regarding socio-
economic status, with negative consequences for
health, social cohesion and economic
development. In all countries, mortality, health and
the age at which people die are strongly influenced
by socio-economic factors such as education,
employment and income.
(30) For an overview, see for example Mackenbach J.P.,

Meerding W.J., Kunst A., 2007, Economic implications of
socio-economic inequalities in health in the European
Union, study supported by the European Commission, DG
SANCO, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/socio_economic
s/documents/socioeco_inequalities_en.pdf.
36
Part I
Box I.3.1: Living longer healthy lives
In comparison with earlier generations, people Table 1: Life expectancy at age 65, with and
today spend longer in education, start working without long-term, limiting illnesses,
later, start having children later and spend fewer Denmark; by sex and year
Expected lifetime
years of their life in family building; they die at a
with long-
later age; life expectancy has increased by about 2 standing, without long-standing,
total
years per decade (1). People's lives are being limiting limiting illnesses
stretched out over an ever longer period. illnesses
years years years %
Men
The same analysis could be applied to frailty: the 1994 14.1 6.2 7.9 56.2
period in a person's life when s/he starts to develop 2000 15.0 6.1 8.9 59.1
2005 16.0 5.4 10.5 66.0
a disabling condition that makes them dependent Women
and vulnerable, leading eventually to death. Life 1994 17.6 9.4 8.2 46.6
expectancy has increased not because frailty lasts 2000 18.1 8.6 9.5 52.3
2005 19.0 7.9 11.1 58.4
longer, but rather because it starts at a later age; as
a result, healthy life expectancy has been increasing Source: Danish Health Interview Survey
at about the same rate as life expectancy (2).
The connection between national wealth and health
Health problems that used to be characteristic at the are not well understood. Frailty is being delayed
age of 70 are now characteristic of the age of 80, due to advances in public health (treatment and
and conditions that prevailed at age 80 now prevail prevention) and living conditions. In principle,
at age 90. The number of years spent in self- prosperity makes better treatment possible; more
perceived good health has been increasing in most productive and prosperous populations also expect
of the countries studied. to be healthier. However, two countries at the same
level of per capita income may have different
The findings about frailty need to be examined healthy life expectancies, and some countries with
further. Poor health is more difficult to measure modest standards of living perform as well as
than death and is often reported unreliably. wealthier ones; as examples in the EU, Spain and
Italy, as well as France and Sweden, have the
The evidence about the severity of disabilities in highest life expectancy.
old age is mixed, especially for individuals over the
age 85: whereas some severe disabilities appear to Overall, most people in wealthier countries, and
be declining, some less severe forms of disability increasingly in developing countries, can look
and certain illnesses seem to be increasing, forward to relatively long, and mostly healthy,
although this may be due to earlier diagnosis and lives. This prospect enables people to make fuller
greater life expectancy. . use of their lives, for example by re-allocating their
time during their lives and planning their education,
Some detailed data are available from the Danish employment and retirement over the life span.
Health Interview Survey (Table 1).(3) They show
not only that healthy life expectancy has been Greater life expectancy does not necessarily entail
increasing, but also that the proportion of the the collapse of the social system under the growing
remaining life expectancy in good health increased mass of frail elderly people. Many older people are
between 1994 and 2005; healthy life expectancy in good health and can play an active part in the
has thus been growing faster than overall life labour force according to their condition and
expectancy. abilities, contributing to the economy and allowing
younger people to extend their education.
(1) J. Oeppen and J. W. Vaupel, ‘Broken limits to life
expectancy, Science, 10 May 2002;. In J.W. Vaupel's words: 'While the 20th century
(2) J.W. Vaupel, H. Lundström, ‘The future of mortality
at older ages in developed countries, in ‘W. Lutz
was the century of redistribution of wealth, the 21st
(ed.), The Future Population of the World. What can century may be the century of the redistribution of
we Assume Today?, 1994; and J.W. Vaupel, work to older age groups'.
‘Biodemography of human ageing’, Nature 464, 25
March 2010, 536-542. .
(3) see http://www.si-
folkesundhed.dk/Forskning/Befolkningens%20sundh
edstilstand/Sundhed%20og%20sygelighed%20SUSY
.aspx?lang=en
37
Overall levels of mortality have been declining between educational attainment groups for women
across socio-economic groups. But differences in than for men.
life expectancy between higher and lower socio-
economic status groups have on the whole Graph I.3.5: Life expectancy gaps between high and low
educational attainment at selected ages, by
remained unchanged. In some cases, the gap has sex, 2008
even widened.
Age 30, 2008
BG
For the first time, Eurostat has published estimates, CZ
Men Women
based on provisional data, of life expectancy in DK

EE
2007-2008 by sex, age and educational attainment IT
HU
level for a selected number of EU-27 Member MT
States (31). These results confirm the inverse PL
RO
relationship between educational attainment as a SI
FI
proxy for ‘socio-economic status’ and SE
mortality (32). 15 10 5 Years
5 10 15
Age 60, 2008

As reported in Table I.3.7, in most of the countries BG
examined, for both men and women, life CZ Men Women
DK
expectancy increases with educational attainment. EE
The more education people have, the longer they IT
HU
are expected to live. Life expectancy for women at MT
PL
a given educational attainment level is always RO
higher than that for men at the same level. SI
FI
However, differences between the sexes decline as SE
educational attainment increases. Based on the 15 10 5

Years
5 10 15
data in Table I.3.7, life expectancy ‘gaps’ or IT: 2007 instead of 2008
mortality differentials between educational Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpecedu)
attainment groups can be assessed. They are
generally larger among men than among women; Large differences in life expectancy by educational
in many cases they are twice as large. Also, as can attainment level are evident among the Member
be observed in Graph I.3.5, these gaps are larger States examined, and particularly so for men in the
among young men. available Member States that joined the EU after
2004 — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Gaps in life expectancy between men with medium Hungary, Poland, Romania. Among the other
and low educational attainment at any age in Table countries examined, differences are less
I.3.7 are also much bigger than between men with pronounced.
high and medium levels. For women at any age,
life expectancy gaps between those with high and The published data highlight another important
medium educational attainment and between those ‘mortality advantage’ that women have over men:
with medium and low levels are less pronounced. the life expectancy of men with higher education is
While life expectancy for women is consistently lower than the life expectancy of women with the
higher than for men, the differences are smaller lowest level of educational attainment. In other
words, on average, all women live longer than
well-educated men. As can be observed in Table
(31) For details see I.3.7, this was true in 2008 at all ages for Italy,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_ Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Finland and
details/publication?p_product_code=KS-SF-10-024. Sweden. For the other countries under study, this
(32) Low educational attainment corresponds to pre-primary,
primary and lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0, 1, was true in about 50 % of cases, mostly at ages 50,
2); medium corresponds to upper secondary and post 60 and 70.
secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED levels 3 and 4);
high corresponds to tertiary education (ISCED levels 5 and
6). The selection of countries is dependent on data
availability: to calculate the required indicator, detailed
data are needed broken down by sex, age and educational
attainment for both mortality and population stocks.
Although all countries can provide mortality data by sex
and age, only a few can provide data also by socio-
economic characteristics such as educational attainment.
38
Part I
Table I.3.7: Life expectancy by sex and educational attainment at selected ages, 2008
Educational Men Women
attainment Age 30 Age 40 Age 50 Age 60 Age 70 Age 30 Age 40 Age 50 Age 60 Age 70
Total 41.6 32.3 23.8 16.6 10.7 48.3 38.7 29.4 20.8 12.9
Low 33.9 25.9 19.6 14.7 10.3 44.1 35.4 27.4 19.7 12.5
BG
Medium 44.5 34.9 25.9 18.0 11.1 49.7 40.0 30.5 21.6 13.3
High 47.4 37.6 28.0 19.2 11.6 51.4 41.5 31.8 22.6 13.8
Total 45.0 35.5 26.5 18.7 12.1 51.0 41.3 31.8 23.0 14.9
Low 38.0 29.5 21.8 15.5 10.9 51.4 42.0 32.7 23.7 15.2
CZ
Medium 44.8 35.3 26.3 18.6 12.2 50.3 40.5 31.1 22.4 14.6
High 51.4 41.5 31.8 22.4 13.5 54.5 44.5 34.7 25.1 15.8
Total 47.5 38.0 28.8 20.4 13.1 51.5 41.8 32.4 23.6 15.6
Low 44.0 35.3 26.8 19.3 12.6 49.0 39.8 30.9 22.7 15.3
DK
Medium 47.8 38.1 28.9 20.5 13.2 52.2 42.5 33.0 24.1 15.8
High 50.4 40.6 31.0 22.0 13.9 53.6 43.8 34.1 24.9 16.3
Total 40.5 31.5 23.2 16.4 11.0 50.4 40.8 31.5 22.9 15.0
Low 30.7 23.3 17.0 13.0 9.3 45.0 35.8 28.3 21.4 14.5
EE
Medium 41.2 32.1 24.0 17.2 11.4 49.5 39.9 30.8 22.7 15.0
High 47.7 38.1 28.7 20.0 12.4 54.0 44.1 34.3 24.7 15.7
Total 49.7 40.1 30.8 22.0 14.2 54.8 45.0 35.4 26.2 17.6
Low 48.0 38.6 29.7 21.4 14.1 54.0 44.3 34.9 26.0 17.5
IT
Medium 52.9 43.1 33.4 24.1 15.2 56.6 46.8 37.0 27.5 18.2
High 53.1 43.2 33.5 24.1 15.1 56.7 46.8 37.0 27.4 18.1
Total 41.1 31.7 23.4 16.8 11.2 49.0 39.3 30.3 22.0 14.4
Low 34.0 25.2 18.4 13.7 10.8 46.3 37.0 28.7 21.2 14.3
HU
Medium 43.7 34.2 25.8 19.2 12.0 50.6 40.9 31.7 23.2 14.9
High 47.1 37.3 28.0 19.6 12.3 51.1 41.2 31.7 22.7 14.4
Total 48.5 39.0 29.7 20.9 13.4 53.1 43.3 33.6 24.4 16.0
Low 48.0 38.7 29.5 20.8 13.3 53.0 43.2 33.5 24.3 15.9
MT
Medium 49.4 39.5 29.9 21.8 13.8 53.5 43.5 33.6 25.1 16.3
High 51.0 41.2 31.6 21.9 13.8 54.6 44.6 35.2 25.3 16.3
Total 42.6 33.4 25.1 17.9 11.9 50.8 41.1 31.8 23.2 15.2
Low 36.5 28.6 22.3 16.7 11.4 48.6 39.3 31.0 22.8 15.1
PL
Medium 43.1 33.9 25.3 18.0 12.0 51.0 41.3 31.9 23.3 15.4
High 48.7 38.9 29.5 20.8 13.0 53.2 43.3 33.7 24.4 15.8
Total 41.6 32.4 24.0 17.1 11.2 48.6 38.9 29.7 21.1 13.4
Low 35.3 26.9 20.6 15.9 10.8 46.4 37.1 28.7 20.8 13.3
RO
Medium 44.5 35.1 26.5 19.0 12.0 50.7 40.9 31.5 22.5 14.0
High 43.4 33.7 24.8 17.1 11.0 48.7 39.0 29.7 21.0 13.4
Total 46.5 37.0 28.0 20.1 12.9 53.1 43.3 33.8 24.8 16.4
Low 42.7 33.6 25.3 18.2 12.3 51.8 42.3 33.0 24.4 16.2
SI
Medium 47.0 37.4 28.4 20.4 13.1 53.6 43.8 34.2 25.2 16.6
High 50.0 40.2 30.7 21.9 13.7 54.3 44.5 34.8 25.6 16.7
Total 47.6 38.2 29.2 21.2 14.0 53.9 44.1 34.6 25.7 17.2
Low 44.8 36.2 27.9 20.5 13.8 51.8 42.5 33.7 25.3 17.1
FI
Medium 47.5 38.0 29.2 21.2 14.0 54.0 44.3 34.8 25.8 17.3
High 50.8 41.1 31.5 22.7 14.5 55.2 45.3 35.6 26.3 17.4
Total 50.0 40.4 30.9 22.1 14.3 53.8 44.0 34.4 25.3 16.9
Low 48.1 38.9 29.9 21.5 14.1 52.2 42.6 33.4 24.7 16.7
SE
Medium 50.1 40.4 31.0 22.2 14.3 53.8 44.0 34.4 25.3 16.9
High 51.9 42.1 32.4 23.1 14.6 55.0 45.1 35.5 26.1 17.2
(1)IT: 2007 instead of 2008
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpecedu)
Consequently, by improving the life expectancy of

disadvantaged groups, a general increase in overall
life expectancy is also to be expected (33).
COM/2009/0567 ‘Solidarity in health: reducing health

inequalities in the EU’, available at
(33) The European Commission has raised the issue of health http://ec.europa.eu/health/social_determinants/policy/commissi
inequalities in the Member States as well as the question of on_communication/index_en.htm .
disparities in life expectancy, especially for disadvantaged The EU is thus working directly, through EU policies, and
people. A proposal to address the problem was outlined in indirectly, through national authorities and stakeholders, to
the October 2009 European Commission Communication reduce health inequalities.
39
4. MIGRATION: TRENDS
Migration is the main driver of population growth Graph I.4.1: Age structure of the population on 1 January
2009 and of immigrants in 2008, EU-27
in the most of the EU-27 Member States.
Migratory movements are making the EU’s 85+
80 Solid colour: population Bordered: immigrants
population more diverse and creating new
75
challenges and opportunities for European 70
societies. 65
60
55
50
4.1. MIGRATION FLOWS
45
40
The first decade of the 21st century has seen large 35
waves of migration both within the EU and from 30
25
outside it. The highest inflow in that decade
20
appears to have peaked in 2007. 15
10
5
4.1.1. Migration as one of the key drivers of 0
population growth in EU Member States 2% 1% 0% 1% 2%
Men Women
Migration plays a significant role in the population
EU-27 immigration data excluding BE, EL, CY, RO and UK
dynamics of European societies. In recent years, Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_pop2ctz,
the increase in the population of the EU-27 migr_imm2ctz)
Member States has mainly been due to high net
migration rates (34). The share of international In 2008, 3.8 million people migrated to and
migration in total population growth in the EU has between the EU-27 Member States and at least 2.3
varied. million emigrated from them, resulting in a net
gain of 1.5 million residents(35). In comparison to
From 2004 to 2008, the population of EU Member 2007(36), immigration decreased by 6 % (Graph
States increased, on average, by 1.7 million per I.4.2) and emigration by 13 %.
year, solely because inflows outweighed outflows.
Although immigration to the EU-27 Member Graph I.4.2: Immigration, EU-27, 2004-2008
States fell in 2008 and emigration increased, net Millions
5
migration still contributed 71 % of the total
population increase. 4
In many EU-27 Member States, immigration is not 2

only increasing the total population, but also
1
bringing in a much younger population. The age
structure of the EU-27 Member States' total 0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
population at 1 January 2009 and of immigrants to
EU Member States in 2008 is illustrated by the age Includes also migration between EU-27 Member States.
pyramid in Graph I.4.1. Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz)
(35) Includes also migration between EU-27 Member States.

(36) 2007 migration data are not fully comparable with 2008,
(34) The expression ‘total net migration’ of the EU Member since several EU-27 Member States changed methodology
States is to be distinguished from the expression ‘total net and definitions to improve and harmonise the data. For
migration to/from the EU as a whole’: the former also further details see the Eurostat Metadata page. Detailed
includes international migration between the EU Member analysis of comparable data shows that these
States. methodological changes had a limited impact.
40
Part I
4.1.2. EU citizens are becoming more mobile Slightly above 10 % of immigrants were returning
to their own country of birth (see Graph I.4.5). The
Immigrants to EU Member States are of a wide majority of immigrants were, however, born
variety of origins, especially since the outside the EU and were moving to it (52 %),
enlargements of 2004 and 2007. Larger numbers of thereby exceeding the number of non-EU citizens
EU-27 citizens have been included in migration by almost 4 %.
flows. The number of EU-27 citizens migrating to
a Member State other than their own country of Graph I.4.5: Immigrants by groups of country of birth, EU-
citizenship increased on average by 12 % per year 27, 2008
during the period 2002-2008, and peaked in 2007 Unknow n
(see Graph I.4.3). In 2008, 36 % of migrants to 0.5% Nativ e-born
EU-27 Member States were citizens of another 11.6%
Member State, 2 points lower than was observed in

2007 (38 %).
Born outside
Graph I.4.3: Relative change in migration inflows to EU
EU Born in EU
Member States by citizenship groups, EU-27,
2002-2008 52.3% countries other
than home
All immigrants Nationals
country
% Other EU-27 citizens Non-EU citizens
35.6%
200
180 Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm3ctb) and

160 Eurostat estimates
140
120
4.1.3. Origins of immigrants
100
80 It is estimated that more than half (55 %) of

60
immigrants to the EU in 2008 were previously
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
residing outside the EU, while 44 % of immigrants
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz) and had previously also been residing in an EU-27
Eurostat estimates
Member State (other than the country of
immigration). Immigrants to the EU can be further
The percentage of immigrants with non-EU differentiated according to the level of
citizenship has been growing at a somewhat slower development of the country of previous residence.
pace. In 2008, non-EU citizens accounted for 49 % The Human Development Index (HDI) was used to
of all immigrants to EU-27 Member States (see reflect this structure (37).
Graph I.4.4). When nationals moving to their
country of citizenship are excluded, 57 % of According to this indicator, half of all immigrants
immigrants are found to be citizens of countries to the EU previously resided in medium developed
outside the EU. countries, slightly fewer in highly developed
countries (44 %) and only 6 % arrived from less
Graph I.4.4: Immigrants by citizenship groups, EU-27, 2008 developed countries (Graph I.4.6).
Unknow n This distribution is almost in line with the

0.4% Nationals distribution of the total population in those
14.6% countries, according to the level of development of
the countries in question. On the basis of the latest
Citizens of
non-EU
(37) This index is calculated by the United Nations (UN) under
countries
the UN Development Programme. It is a composite index
48.8% incorporating statistical measures of life expectancy,
Citizens of
literacy, educational attainment and GDP per capita. The
other EU MS Eurostat list of countries by the level of development,
36.3% based on UN’s 2006 classification, was used in order to
reflect this structure. In this index countries are classified
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz) and as highly, medium and less developed. Since the countries
Eurostat estimates are evolving, each year they are classified, based on the
new values for the statistical indicators included in the
index (for details see the UN site at: http://hdr.undp.org/).
41
available United Nations, Eurostat and national terms). The United Kingdom was the main
data for the total population in these countries, it is destination for citizens of India.
estimated that the share of the population living in
countries categorised as medium developed is Table I.4.1: Top ten citizenships of immigrants to EU-27
68 %, whereas the share of the total population in Member States, 2008
EU citizens EU citizens
highly developed countries is 22 %, with 10% for (including nationals) (excluding nationals)
Non-EU citizens
less developed countries. country of in country of in country of in

citizenship thousands citizenship thousands citizenship thousands
Romania : 1) Romania 384 Morocco 157
The noticeable difference is that immigrants from Poland 302 Poland 266 China 97
Germany 196 Bulgaria 91 India 93
highly developed countries were over-represented United Kingdom 146 Germany 88 Albania 81
by 22 % among immigrants to the EU-27 Member France 126 Italy 67 Ukraine 80
Italy 105 France 62 Brazil 62
States, compared to the share of the total Bulgaria 92 United Kingdom 61 United States 61
Netherlands 81 Hungary 44 Turkey 51
population living in countries classified as highly Spain 61 Netherlands 40 Russian Federation 50
developed. Belgium 48 Portugal 38 Colombia 49
(1) At least 384 000.

Graph I.4.6: Immigrants to EU-27 (from outside EU) by the Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz) and
level of development of the country of Eurostat estimates
previous residence, EU-27, 2008
Less
Graph I.4.7 suggests that the biggest group of non-
EU nationals migrating to one of the EU-27
dev eloped
Member States in 2008 was formed by citizens of
6.3% countries in Asia (29 %), followed by North,
Central and South America (24 %).
Medium Highly
Graph I.4.7: Non-EU immigrants by continent of country of
dev eloped dev eloped
citizenship, EU-27, 2008
49.9% 43.7%
Oceania
1.7% non-EU
No detailed data for BE, HU and UK.
Asia Europe
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm5prv) and
Eurostat estimates 29.0% 23.0%
In 2008, the EU-27 Member States received nearly

two millions migrants of other EU nationalities.
Romanians were the most mobile, followed by
Africa
Poles and Germans (note that these migrants were America 21.9%
not necessarily previously residing in their country 24.4%
of citizenship). If returning nationals (see category
‘EU citizens (excluding nationals)’ in Table I.4.1)
are excluded from the analysis, Romanians still Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz) and
ranked first, followed by Poles and Bulgarians. Eurostat estimates
The EU-27 Member States received 384, 000

Romanian citizens, 266, 000 Polish citizens,
Poland and 91, 000 Bulgarian citizens.
The remaining 1.8 million immigrants to EU-27

Member States were non-EU citizens. Among
them, Moroccans were the biggest group, the only
one exceeding 100 000, followed by citizens of
China, India, Albania and the Ukraine.
Most Moroccans migrating in 2008 went to Spain

(almost 94 000) or to Italy (37 000). In the same
year, Spain also received the largest share of all
Chinese immigrants (28 % or 27 000 in absolute
42
Part I
Box I.4.1: Where immigrants come from
Eurostat data on residence permits that were valid More permits were issued in 2009 in the United
at the end of 2009 can be broken down to show the Kingdom to immigrants from North America
geographical origins of non-EU nationals(1) by and/or Oceania, than the total number of valid
continent (Table 1). permits at the end of 2009 in any other country.
The total of 16.7 million residence permit holders – The largest number of authorisations to reside in an
excluding Denmark, Luxembourg and the United EU-27 Member State in 2009 was issued to the
Kingdom – is spread unevenly among the citizens of India (190,000), followed by United
continents of origin. The numbers are roughly States (176,000), China (170,000) and Morocco
proportional to the population of the continents of (156,000). These four countries accounted for
origin, although Europe is over-represented nearly 30% of all permits issued in EU-27 in 2009.
whereas Asia and North America are under- The largest proportion of Indians and Chinese
represented. entered the EU for the purpose of education or
employment. Respectively 72,000 Chinese and
Each of the five largest EU-27 Member States 61,000 Indians were issued with education related
attracts the majority of the people from a particular permits, whereas 51,000 Chinese and 63,000
continent: most Africans hold permits in France Indians entered the EU for employment reasons. By
(1.6 million), most Asians in Italy (1.1 million), contrast, Moroccans were granted the highest
most Europeans in Germany (2.6 million), and number of permits issued for family reasons in EU
most South Americans in Spain (1.5 million). (62,000), and only less than 5 per cent (7,000) were
granted permission to reside for education reasons.
The country ranking based on new permits is
(1) EU nationals still needing residence permits under similar to the one from other official sources (see
transitional measures are not included in the table Table I.4.1), although there are some differences.
below; for the transitional measures see
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=
466
Table 1: Valid residence permits at 31 December 2009, by issuing country and continent of origin, (in units)
Africa Asia Europe North America South America Oceania other total
EU-27 4,436,036 2,962,637 6,575,292 277,785 2,258,451 61,161 108,807 16,680,169
BE 160,021 70,910 86,322 21,081 16,340 2,127 8,138 364,939
BG 246 2,095 9,192 689 105 93 24 12,444
CZ 4,263 95,429 196,084 6,231 1,885 1,219 35 305,146
DE 210,150 647,296 2,622,613 83,124 85,386 17,987 28,588 3,695,144
EE 104 1,554 210,475 583 120 38 0 212,874
IE 34,252 64,829 12,119 9,237 9,229 4,062 424 134,152
EL 21,157 86,004 450,487 2,469 2,302 339 2,837 565,595
ES 1,000,602 307,849 162,178 25,151 1,486,214 2,028 8,470 2,992,492
FR 1,588,957 255,987 280,283 30,677 111,641 4,048 1,635 2,273,228
IT 1,071,553 899,489 1,206,788 41,241 365,362 3,220 0 3,587,653
KY 8,831 85,720 29,640 1,206 474 214 22 126,107
LV 112 1,896 382,340 601 133 241 0 385,323
LT 153 2,451 20,786 512 80 4,651 0 28,633
LU
HU 3,826 32,045 49,829 4,453 1,911 437 17 92,518
MT 719 1,862 1,667 191 112 51 6 4,608
NL 115,223 97,926 104,401 19,537 21,751 4,801 52,875 416,514
AT 13,007 35,434 383,038 5,588 7,484 1,251 188 445,990
PL 4,054 25,912 52,571 2,391 1,263 1,090 64 87,345
PT 122,032 30,315 82,418 2,994 122,210 293 60 360,322
RO 3,718 21,498 33,375 2,076 705 428 0 61,800
SI 170 1,603 86,336 350 422 89 109 89,079
SK 678 7,200 12,699 944 390 144 13 22,068
FI 16,165 36,432 47,343 4,004 2,770 1,877 4,323 112,914
SE 56,043 150,901 52,308 12,455 20,162 10,433 979 303,281
Residence permits issued in 2009 (only flow data available for the countries below)
DK 2,056 15,644 5,937 4,187 1,440 985 6 30,255
UK 75,092 365,303 28,241 131,775 34,537 31,680 4,696 671,324
No data available for Luxembourg; the EU-27 total was computed using the 24 available Member States
Source: Eurostat (online data code migr_resvalid and (for DK and the UK) migr_resfirst)
43
Graph I.4.8: Immigration (per 1 000 inhabitants), EU-27, 2008
Immigration
per 1 000 inhabitants
40
30
20
10
0
EU-27 LU MT CY ES BE SI IE AT SE DK UK IT NL DE CZ FI HU FR SK PT LT EE LV PL BG
Immigration data for EL and RO include non-nationals only and are therefore not included.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind, migr_imm1ctz)
4.1.4. Spain, Germany and the United women outnumbered men in the biggest group of
Kingdom reported the highest immigrants (with Romanian citizenship in the case
immigration in EU in 2008 of Italy, and Moroccan citizenship in Spain). In
addition, among immigrants to Italy, women
The as a whole is attractive for immigrants, but outnumbered men among citizens of Ukraine,
Member States differ as to scale and patterns of Moldavia, Poland and Russia, while in Spain, the
migration. The majority of EU-27 Member States same applied for citizens of Pakistan and Senegal.
in 2008 reported more immigration than
emigration, but in Germany, Poland, Romania, 4.1.6. Impact on the age structure of the EU
Bulgaria and the three Baltic States (Lithuania, population
Latvia and Estonia) emigrants outnumbered
immigrants. In 2008, immigrants to the EU-27 Member States
were, on average, younger than the population of
In absolute terms, Spain, Germany and the United their country of destination. Whereas the median
Kingdom were the EU countries with the highest age of the total population of all EU Member
immigration. They received more than half (53 %) States (calculated from five-year age groups) was
of all immigrants in 2008, but at the same time, 40.6 on 1 January 2009, the median age of
they also experienced high emigration. immigrants in 2008 was 28.4.
Relative to the size of the resident population, Graph I.4.9 compares the age of immigrants to
Luxembourg (with 36.3 immigrants per 1 000 EU-27 Member States in 2008 by basic citizenship
inhabitants) had the highest immigration in the EU groups.
in 2008, followed by Malta with 21.9 and Cyprus
with 17.8 (Graph I.4.8).
Luxembourg, the country with the highest

immigration per capita and one of the smallest
countries in the EU in terms of population size,
also reported the highest rate of emigration in
2008, with 20.6 emigrants per 1 000 inhabitants.
4.1.5. More men than women migrate
In 2008, there were more men than women in

migration flows to and from EU Member States in
general. Around 48 % of immigrants were women.
By contrast, Cyprus, Italy, Spain, France and
Ireland reported that women outnumbered men
among immigrants. In Cyprus, this was mainly due
to women with Filipino, Sri Lankan and
Vietnamese citizenship, whereas in Italy and Spain
44
Part I
Graph I.4.9: Age structure of immigrants by basic Table I.4.2: Median age of the population (as of 1 January
citizenship groups, EU-27, 2008 2009) and immigrants by basic citizenship
groups, 2008
85+
80 Solid colour: nationals Bordered: non-nationals Immigrants
75 Foreigners
Total
70
population
65 Total Nationals Citizens of Non-EU
Total
(other) EU MS citizens
60
55 EU-27 40.6 p 28.4 s 30.2 s 28.2 s 29.3 s 27.5 s
50 BE 40.8 : : : : :
45 BG 41.1 32.6 32.4 35.2 52.5 35.0
40 CZ 39.2 28.4 33.4 28.3 30.8 27.5
DK 40.3 26.6 27.0 26.5 27.4 25.7
35
DE 43.7 29.8 31.2 29.6 31.5 27.7
30 39.3 30.4 31.1 29.0 33.3
EE 30.8
25 IE 33.8 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7
20 EL 41.4 : : 37.5 42.3 35.1
ES 39.5 28.3 32.9 28.2 29.9 27.7
15
FR 39.5 p 26.0 25.0 26.3 27.9 25.5
10 42.8 34.5 28.8 29.3 28.5
IT 29.1
5 CY 35.9 29.9 34.2 30.0 28.9 32.4
0 LV 39.8 29.4 4.0 33.3 32.0 36.1
LT 38.9 31.1 29.5 35.8 27.0 36.8
2% 1% 0% 1% 2%
LU 38.7 29.7 29.8 29.7 29.8 29.1
Men Women 39.6 3.2 29.5 30.5 28.6
HU 28.7
MT 39.0 30.3 29.1 30.6 35.9 27.0
EU-27 excluding BE, EL, CY, RO and UK. NL 40.3 27.6 28.2 27.5 27.6 27.5
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm2ctz) AT 41.3 28.8 35.6 28.2 29.5 26.3
PL 37.5 27.7 26.5 33.7 37.4 32.6
PT 40.4 24.8 18.8 28.2 32.1 27.5
Among immigrants, there were noticeable RO 38.0 : : : : :
SI 41.2 31.1 32.5 31.1 37.6 30.6
differences in the age of nationals, EU nationals SK 36.5 30.6 31.7 30.5 32.5 28.7
and non-EU nationals. Non-EU nationals were the FI 41.8 28.0 29.1 27.7 29.6 26.7
SE 40.7 27.0 28.2 26.8 28.7 25.7
youngest, with a median age of 27.5 years, UK 39.4 p : : : : :
followed by EU nationals at 29.3 years (see Table No detailed data by age available for BE, RO and UK.
I.4.2). Nationals were the oldest, with a median Immigration data for EL include non-nationals only.
age of 30.2 years. The share in the 15-64 age group (s) Eurostat estimate; (p) provisional data
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_pop1ctz,
was highest among non-national men (87 %) and migr_imm1ctz) and Eurostat estimates based on 5-year age
lowest among women returning to the country of group data
their citizenship (71 %).
45
5. MIGRATION: FOREIGN POPULATION
The diversity of citizenship can be observed not five countries represent more than 75 % of the total
only in the annual migration flows, but also in the EU foreign population (Graph I.5.1).
non-national population stock of each EU-27
Member State. Graph I.5.1: Non-nationals in the EU by country of
residence, EU-27, 2009
Other MS
Austria (13.7%) Germany
5.1. NON-NATIONALS IN THE EU
(2.7%) (22.6%))
A total of 31.9 million persons with citizenship of Greece

a country different from their country of residence (2.9%)
were living on the territory of the EU-27 Member Belgium
States on 1 January 2009, representing 6.4 % of the (3.1%)
total EU-27 population. Of these non-nationals, France
more than a third (11.9 million persons) were (11.8%) Spain
citizens of another Member State. (17.8%)
5.1.1. Main countries of residence Italy (12.2%)

UK (13.2%)
In absolute terms, the largest numbers of foreign
citizens reside in Germany, Spain, the United Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_pop1ctz)
Kingdom, France and Italy. Non-nationals in these
Table I.5.1: Population by group of citizenship, 2009 (units and share of the resident population)
Citizens of non-EU
Total population Foreigners % Citizens of other EU MS % %
countries
EU-27 499,703,311 31779900 s 6.4 11937200 s 2.4 19842700 s 4.0
BE 10,753,080 : : : : : :
BG 7,606,551 23,838 0.3 3,532 0.0 20,306 0.3
CZ 10,467,542 407,541 3.9 145,814 1.4 261,727 2.5
DK 5,511,451 320,033 5.8 108,667 2.0 211,366 3.8
DE 82,002,356 7,185,921 8.8 2,530,706 3.1 4,655,215 5.7
EE 1,340,415 214,437 16.0 9,632 0.7 204,805 15.3
IE 4,450,030 441,059 9.9 364,847 8.2 76,212 1.7
EL 11,260,402 929,530 8.3 161,611 1.4 767,919 6.8
ES 45,828,172 5,650,968 12.3 2,274,158 5.0 3,376,810 7.4
FR 64,366,894 3,737,549 5.8 1,302,351 2.0 2,435,198 3.8
IT 60,045,068 3,891,295 6.5 1,131,767 1.9 2,759,528 4.6
CY 796,900 128,200 16.1 78,200 9.8 50,000 6.3
LV 2,261,294 404,013 17.9 9,406 0.4 394,607 17.5
LT 3,349,872 41,505 1.2 2,511 0.1 38,994 1.2
LU 493,500 214,848 43.5 185,354 37.6 29,494 6.0
HU 10,030,975 186,365 1.9 109,804 1.1 76,561 0.8
MT 413,607 18,128 4.4 8,245 2.0 9,883 2.4
NL 16,485,787 637,136 3.9 290,417 1.8 346,719 2.1
AT 8,355,260 864,397 10.3 316,995 3.8 547,402 6.6
PL 38,135,876 35933 p 0.1 10315 p 0.0 25618 p 0.1
PT 10,627,250 443,102 4.2 84,727 0.8 358,375 3.4
RO 21,498,616 31,354 0.1 6,041 0.0 25,313 0.1
SI 2,032,362 70,554 3.5 4,195 0.2 66,359 3.3
SK 5,412,254 52,545 1.0 32,709 0.6 19,836 0.4
FI 5,326,314 142,288 2.7 51,923 1.0 90,365 1.7
SE 9,256,347 547,664 5.9 255,571 2.8 292,093 3.2
UK 61,595,091 4,184,011 6.8 1,793,197 2.9 2,390,814 3.9
These figures are based on national definitions that may not be fully comparable. In particular, the figures for Bulgaria and
Romania are believed to exclude significant numbers of resident foreign citizens and to overcount national citizens.
(s) Eurostat estimate; (p) provisional data
Source: Eurostat (online data code migr_pop1ctz)
46
Part I
In relative terms, the EU Member State with the 5.1.2. Main groups of non-nationals
highest percentage of non-nationals is
Luxembourg (43.5 %). In 2009, a high proportion The citizenship structure of foreign populations in
of non-nationals (10 % or more of the resident the EU-27 Member States varies considerably, and
population) was also observed in Latvia, Estonia, is influenced by factors such as labour migration,
Cyprus, Spain and Austria, while the countries historical links between countries of origin and
with the lowest share of non-nationals (less than destination, and access to established networks in
1 %) were Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. the destination countries.
Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium (38), Cyprus, Citizens of Turkey, Romania, Morocco and Poland
Slovakia and Hungary were the only countries are the most numerous among the EU’s non-
where the majority of non-nationals were EU national population (Graph I.5.3). With 2.4 million
citizens. In all other Member States, the majority people, Turks accounted for 7.5 % of all non-
of non-nationals were citizens of non-EU nationals living in the EU in 2009. The second
countries. biggest group is composed of Romanian citizens
living in another EU Member State (6.2 % of the
Graph I.5.2: Distribution of non-nationals by EU/non-EU
EU total foreign population), followed by
citizenship, as a percentage of the usually Moroccans.
resident population, 2009
Graph I.5.3: Ten most numerous groups of foreign citizens

EU-27 usually resident in the EU-27, in millions and as
a % of the EU total foreign population, 2009
LU
LV
EE
Turkey (7.5%)
CY
ES
Romania (6.2%)
AT
IE
Morocco (5.8%)
BE
DE
Poland (4.6%)
EL
UK
Italy (4.0%)
IT
SE
Albania (3.2%)
DK
FR
Portugal (3.1%)
MT
PT
UK (2.9%)
CZ
NL
Germany (2.5%)
SI
FI
China (2.1%)
HU
LT
SK 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
BG Millions
RO
PL
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_pop1ctz)
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
EU foreigners non-EU foreigners

In the period 2001–2009, the number of
Romanians outside their country increased most
For BE latest available data (for 2008) are used markedly: from 0.3 million in 2001 to 1.9 million
by 2009. The number of citizens of Poland and
China also increased significantly, joining the 10
In the case of Latvia and Estonia, the proportion of most numerous non-national groups in 2009.
non-EU citizens is particularly large due to the
high number of ‘recognised non-citizens’. They
are mainly citizens of the former Soviet Union, 5.2. ACQUIRING CITIZENSHIP OF EU MEMBER
permanently resident in these countries, but who STATE
have not acquired Latvian, Estonian or any other
citizenship. This phenomenon is also reflected in Changes in non-national populations over time
the median age of the foreign population of these depend on several factors, such as the number of
two countries (see Table I.5.7). births and deaths, the level of immigration and
emigration, as well as the number of acquisitions
of citizenship, which, depending on citizenship
laws in each Member State, may be granted either
by naturalisation or other means, such as marriage
or adoption. Between 2001 and 2008, the number
(38) Based on latest available data.
47
Graph I.5.4: Acquisitions of citizenship per thousand non-nationals, 2008
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
EU-27 SE PT PL FI HU NL FR MT UK CY SI DK EL ES IT DE AT LV EE SK LT IE LU CZ
BG and RO are excluded because the available data on non-national population stocks are not fully comparable.
Data not available for BE.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_acq, migr_pop1ctz)
of non-nationals living in EU Member States citizens and, therefore, already benefit from rights
increased by 10.2 million. It should be also noted comparable to those of nationals in the host
that during the same period, 5.5 million people, country.
mainly third-country nationals, acquired
citizenship of an EU-27 Member State (Table 2008, 696 000 persons acquired citizenship of an
I.5.2). EU Member State, compared with 707 000
recorded in 2007 (see Table I.5.2). This was the
Table I.5.2: Acquisitions of citizenship, 2001-2008 (in second decrease in consecutive years since 2001.
thousands)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
In 2008, the largest number of citizenships were
EU-27 s 627.0 628.2 648.2 718.9 723.5 735.9 707.1 696.1
BE 62.2 46.4 33.7 34.8 31.5 31.9 36.1 :
granted by France (137 300), the United Kingdom
BG : 3.5 4.4 5.8 5.9 6.7 6.0 7.1 (129 300) and Germany (94 500); these three
CZ : 3.3 2.2 5.0 2.6 2.3 2.4 1.2 countries together accounted for over half of all
DK 11.9 17.3 6.6 15.0 10.2 8.0 3.6 6.0 citizenships granted by EU Member States. Since
DE 180.3 154.5 140.7 127.2 117.2 124.6 113.0 94.5
2002, these three countries have always granted
EE 3.1 4.1 3.7 6.5 7.1 4.8 4.2 2.1
IE 2.8 : 4.0 3.8 4.1 5.8 4.6 3.2
the largest number of citizenships, but their
EL : : 1.9 1.4 1.7 2.0 3.9 16.9 contribution to the overall EU total decreased from
ES 16.7 21.8 26.5 38.2 42.9 62.4 71.9 84.2 an average of 60 % over the period 2002-2007 to
FR : 92.6 139.9 168.8 154.8 147.9 132.0 137.3 slightly more than 50 % in 2008.
IT : : 13.4 19.1 28.7 35.3 45.5 53.7
CY : 0.1 0.2 4.5 4.0 2.9 2.8 3.5
LV 9.9 9.4 10.0 17.2 20.1 19.0 8.3 4.2
In relation to the number of non-nationals, most
LT 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 citizenships were granted in Sweden (54.2 per
LU 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1 000 resident non-nationals,), Portugal (50.6),
HU 8.6 3.4 5.3 5.4 9.9 6.1 8.4 8.1 Poland (48.1), Finland (46.6) and Hungary (43.5).
MT : : : : : 0.5 0.6 0.6
The lowest rates were found in the Czech Republic
NL 46.7 45.3 28.8 26.2 28.5 29.1 30.7 28.2
AT 31.7 36.0 44.7 41.6 34.9 25.7 14.0 10.3
(3.0), Luxembourg (5.6) and Ireland (6.3). The
PL 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.9 2.9 1.1 1.5 1.8 EU-27 average was 22.6 citizenships granted per
PT 2.2 2.7 2.4 2.9 3.0 4.4 : 22.4 1000 resident non-nationals (see Graph I.5.4).
RO 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 5.6
SI 1.3 2.8 3.3 3.3 2.7 3.2 1.6 1.7
In 2008, only in two countries were the majority of
SK 2.9 3.5 3.5 4.0 1.4 1.1 1.5 0.5
FI 2.7 3.0 4.5 6.9 5.7 4.4 4.8 6.7
new citizenships granted to citizens of another EU
SE 36.4 37.8 33.2 28.9 39.6 51.2 33.6 30.5 Member State: Hungary (71.9 %) and Luxembourg
UK 89.8 120.1 130.5 148.3 161.8 154.0 164.5 129.3 (56.2 %). In Hungary, citizenship was granted
(s) Eurostat estimate mostly to Romanians; in Luxembourg, to former
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_acq) citizens of Portugal, Italy, Belgium and Germany.
On average, around 90% of the citizenships The largest groups to acquire citizenship of an EU
granted are to former citizens of non-EU countries. Member State were former citizens of Morocco
Third-country nationals generally have much (63 800), Turkey (49 500), Ecuador (27 300),
greater incentive to apply for citizenship of an EU Algeria (23 000) and Iraq (20 400) (Graph I.5.5).
Member State than do persons who are already EU France granted 45 % of all citizenships acquired in
48
Part I
the EU-27 by Moroccans, Germany 49.3 % of foreign-born, although they have held the
those acquired by Turks, Spain 93.5 % of those citizenship of the reporting country since birth. In
acquired by Ecuadorians, France 87.9 % of those other cases, the recorded country of birth no longer
acquired by Algerians, and the United Kingdom exists under the same name or borders, as, for
43.5 % of those acquired by Iraqis. example, the former Yugoslavia, or the former
Soviet Union, and those people would be included
Graph I.5.5: Main previous citizenship of persons acquiring in the foreign-born population even though they
citizenship of an EU-27 Member States, 2008
may never have migrated to another country.
Morocco
Turkey More than 13 % of the population in Luxembourg,
Ecuador
Algeria
Estonia, Latvia, Austria, Ireland, Sweden and
Iraq Spain are foreign-born (Table I.5.3). In all of these
Colombia countries (with the exception of Sweden), more
Albania
than 10 % of the population are also non-nationals.
Russian Federation
India
The specific situation in Sweden can be explained
Serbia by the fact that it is the Member State with the
Romania highest rate of acquisition of citizenship per
Pakistan
Tunisia
inhabitant in the EU.
Moldova
Afghanistan In general, the number of foreign-born residents in
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 each Member State exceeds the number of non-
Thousands
nationals (Graph I.5.6). The differences are most
Source: Eurostat
significant in Sweden, the Netherlands and
Slovenia, where the number of people born abroad
is more than double the number of people with
foreign citizenship living in these countries.
5.3. FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION
In Luxembourg, the number of foreign-born

Persons who have acquired the citizenship of their
persons is lower than the number of foreigners.
country of residence are no longer counted as non-
This can be explained by the significantly high
nationals. Nevertheless, the foreign background of
share of foreigners from other EU-27 countries
these people can be captured by the country of
(who are less likely to acquire citizenship of their
birth variable, which records the country in which
country of residence). There is thus a high number
the birth took place, or the country of residence of
of foreign-born persons who keep their original
the mother at the time of the birth. In some cases,
citizenship and whose descendents are usually
people who were born on the territory of a
native-born foreign citizens. Similarly, in Ireland,
Member State’s former colony, and who later
most non-native-born people are from EU-27
migrated to that Member State, are recorded as
Graph I.5.6: Share of foreign-born and non-nationals of the total population, 2009
%
Foreign-born Non-nationals
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
LU EE LV AT IE SE ES SI DE EL FR NL UK DK PT IT MT LT FI CZ PL SK RO
Data by country of birth not available for BE, BG, CY and HU.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_pop1ctz, migr_pop3ctb)
49
Table I.5.3: Population by group of country of birth, 2009 (units and share of the resident population)
Born in a non-EU
Total population Foreign-born % Born in another EU MS % %
country
EU-27 499,703,311 : : : : : :
BE 10,753,080 : : : : : :
BG 7,606,551 : : : : : :
CZ 10,467,542 384,161 3.7 135,061 1.3 249,100 2.4
DK 5,511,451 486,003 8.8 145,570 2.6 340,433 6.2
DE 82,002,356 9,548,865 11.6 3,421,094 4.2 6,127,771 7.5
EE 1,340,415 220,315 16.4 15,399 1.1 204,916 15.3
IE 4,450,030 625,896 14.1 485,774 10.9 140,122 3.1
EL 11,260,402 1,246,973 11.1 312,803 2.8 934,170 8.3
ES 45,828,172 6,339,346 13.8 2,282,149 5.0 4,057,197 8.9
FR 64,366,894 7,103,644 11.0 2,111,476 3.3 4,992,168 7.8
IT 60,045,068 4,375,240 7.3 1,391,149 2.3 2,984,091 5.0
CY 796,900 : : : : : :
LV 2,261,294 352,036 15.6 37,164 1.6 314,872 13.9
LT 3,349,872 220,110 6.6 28,888 0.9 191,222 5.7
LU 493,500 159,030 32.2 131,581 26.7 27,449 5.6
HU 10,030,975 : : : : : :
MT 413,607 27,655 6.7 13,519 3.3 14,136 3.4
NL 16,485,787 1,793,744 10.9 410,129 2.5 1,383,615 8.4
AT 8,355,260 1,268,358 15.2 507,489 6.1 760,869 9.1
PL 38,135,876 1014905 p 2.7 232469 p 0.6 782436 p 2.1
PT 10,627,250 782,008 7.4 182,229 1.7 599,779 5.6
RO 21,498,616 161,597 0.8 60,069 0.3 101,528 0.5
SI 2,032,362 243,404 12.0 28,056 1.4 215,348 10.6
SK 5,412,254 50,450 0.9 29,982 0.6 20,468 0.4
FI 5,326,314 214,118 4.0 76,891 1.4 137,227 2.6
SE 9,256,347 1,280,908 13.8 468,626 5.1 812,282 8.8
UK 61,595,091 6,769,300 11.0 2,165,508 3.5 4,603,792 7.5
These figures are based on national definitions that may be not fully comparable.
(p) provisional data
Source: Eurostat (online data code migr_pop3ctb)
Member States. In all other countries, the non-EU- • former territories and colonies (for example,
born constitute a larger group than the EU-born Yugoslavia and Suriname respectively),
population.
• recent conflicts (Iraqi-born persons living in
Table I.5.4 on the following page shows the three Sweden),
main countries of birth of the foreign-born
residents in 13 EU Member States for which • increased opportunities for intra-EU migration
detailed data are available. following the EU enlargements.
The distribution by country of birth, as for the

country of citizenship, is influenced largely by:
• geographical proximity (Finnish-born people

residing in Sweden and vice versa, people born
in Germany residing in Austria, those born in
Ukraine residing in Poland and the Czech
Republic),
• common history and/or language (for example

between the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
Russia and Latvia, Brazil and Portugal),
50
Part I
Table I.5.4: Main countries of birth of foreign-born proportions who are highly educated foreign-born
residents, for selected EU-27 Member States, reach more than 40 % in some Member States
2009
(Ireland, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Estonia and
Country of birth number of foreign-born % of total for-born
Poland). Several countries tend to attract
Ukraine 117,295 30.5
CZ Slovakia 72,424 18.9 immigrants with a lower level of education,
Vietnam 45,818 11.9 particularly in the southern EU Members States
Germany 33,236 6.8
DK Turkey 31,771 6.5 (Greece, Portugal, Malta, Italy and Spain) and
Poland
United Kingdom
24,732
228,680
5.1
36.5
France, where 40 % or more of immigrants have a
IE Poland 69,850 11.2 low level of education (see Table I.5.5).
Lithuania 34,092 5.4
Romania 747,201 11.8
ES Morocco 723,334 11.4
Ecuador 469,712 7.4
Russia 183,407 52.1
LV Belarus 61,241 17.4
Ukraine 44,294 12.6
Turkey 195,665 10.9
NL Suriname 186,707 10.4
Morocco 166,884 9.3
Serbia and Montenegro 188,251 14.8
AT Germany 187,023 14.7
Turkey 157,750 12.4
Ukraine 433,058 42.7
PL Belarus 150,442 14.8
Russia 83,113 8.2
Angola 124,510 15.9
PT p Brazil 118,311 15.1
France 83,605 10.7
Moldova, Republic of 44,564 27.6
RO Bulgaria 19,036 11.8
Ukraine 13,077 8.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina 97,142 39.9
SI Croatia 56,202 23.1
Serbia and Montenegro 20,403 8.4
Sweden 30,640 14.3
FI Estonia 19,174 9.0
Russia 6,702 3.1
Finland 175,113 13.7
SE Iraq 109,446 8.5
Poland 63,822 5.0
(p) provisional value

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_pop3ctb)
5.4. EDUCATION LEVELS OF THE FOREIGN-

BORN
The population born outside the host country,

being in the prime working ages of 25-54, tends to
have lower educational attainment than the native-
born population (39). In the EU as a whole, foreign-
born people tend to be marginally under-
represented at the high educational level (1 point
difference) and over-represented to a much greater
extent at the low educational level (12-point
difference).
The proportions of the foreign born population

with tertiary and low education differ significantly
across individual EU Member States. EU Member
States do not seem to attract large numbers of
tertiary-educated immigrants, even though the
(39) The level of education is aggregated into three levels: low

(below the second cycle of secondary education – up to
ISCED level 3c short); medium (second cycle of secondary
education – ISCED levels 3-4 other than 3c short); high
(tertiary education – ISCED levels 5-6).
51
Table I.5.5: Educational attainment of population aged 25-54 by group of country of birth, 2009 (%)
Native-born Foreign-born EU27 born Non-EU27 born
low medium high low medium high low medium high low medium high
EU-27 23 49 27 35 38 26 26 45 29 39 36 25
BE 22 41 37 38 30 32 30 32 38 44 29 27
BG 19 57 24 : (51) (45) : : : : (54) (41)
CZ 7 77 17 14 62 24 14 63 23 14 61 25
DK 20 42 37 28 37 35 13 37 51 32 37 31
DE 9 63 28 : : : : : : : : :
EE 10 53 36 (4) 55 42 : (47) (52) (4) 55 41
IE 25 38 37 16 34 50 19 37 44 10 26 64
EL 31 43 27 49 37 14 28 52 20 54 33 13
ES 44 21 35 43 34 23 30 39 31 48 32 20
FR 22 45 32 41 31 28 39 34 28 41 30 29
IT 40 43 16 43 44 12 31 57 12 50 38 13
CY 20 42 38 25 38 37 16 45 39 32 33 35
LV 13 60 28 7 68 25 (16) 61 23 6 68 26
LT 7 60 33 : 63 34 : : : : 63 35
LU 18 53 29 25 30 45 25 30 46 24 34 41
HU 17 62 21 13 55 32 13 59 27 (11) 44 45
MT 68 17 15 53 (27) (20) (50) : : 55 28 :
NL 21 44 35 37 34 29 21 34 45 41 34 25
AT 12 68 20 30 50 20 10 58 32 40 46 14
PL 9 67 24 : 56 41 : : : : (59) (40)
PT 68 16 16 49 30 21 40 31 29 51 29 19
RO 21 65 14 : : : : : : : : :
SI 12 61 27 32 57 11 : 64 (32) 35 56 9
SK 7 76 17 : 68 23 : 68 22 : 68 :
FI 12 47 41 25 45 30 18 52 29 29 40 31
SE 12 53 35 29 36 36 19 39 42 32 35 34
UK 24 41 35 20 44 36 15 53 32 21 41 38
Figures in brackets lack reliability due to the small sample size; ':' colon indicates unavailable or extremely unreliable data.
Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey
In addition, the data indicate that the proportion of non-nationals amounts to 23%, compared to 38 %
women with tertiary education — regardless of for those with the low educational level.
groups of country of birth — tends to be slightly
higher than for men (see Graph I.5.7). In 2009,
28 % of foreign-born women (25 % of men)
resident in an EU-27 Member State were highly
educated, and 31 % of women (28 % of men) who
moved from another EU-27 Member State. The
proportion of female immigrants who moved into
the EU from outside amounted to 26 %, against
24 % for their male counterparts.
Graph I.5.7: Educational attainment of population aged

25-54 by sex and group of country of birth, EU-
27, 2009 (%)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60% high
medium
50%
low
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
men w omen men w omen men w omen men w omen
Native-born Foreign-born EU27 born Non-EU27 born
Similar results are found when analysing data for

the non-national population. At EU level, the data
indicate that the proportion of highly-educated
52
Part I
Graph I.5.8: Educational attainment of non-nationals aged education who moved from another EU-27
25-54, 2009 (%)
Member State occupy medium- or low-skilled
high medium low
jobs. The problem of ‘over-qualification’ is even
EU-27
greater for immigrants from outside the EU, for
IE
whom the proportion in medium- or low-skilled
SE
jobs reaches 37 %.
LU
DK Table I.5.6: Population aged 25-54 with high educational

UK level having a medium or low skilled job as a
BE
proportion of persons with high educational
level respective population by group of
country of birth, 2009 (%)
CY
NL
CZ Native-born Foreign-born EU27 born Non-EU27 born

HU
EU-27 19 34 29 37
FI
BE 22 30 23 40
MT
BG 21 : : :
FR
CZ 7 17 : 42
EE
DK 13 26 (16) 32
AT
DE 20 : : :
ES
EE 21 43 : 45
DE
IE 28 40 41 36
LV
EL 18 66 39 78
PT
ES 31 55 49 58
EL
FR 20 28 22 30
IT
IT 14 50 34 59
SI
CY 26 54 43 63
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
LV 15 22 : 23
Data for MT and SI (high educational attainment) lack LT 19 (31) : (33)
reliability due to the small sample size. For BG, LT, PL, RO, SK - LU : 4 (3) (11)
data extremely unreliable at least for one category.
HU 11 (9) : :
MT : : : :
NL 12 23 18 26
The proportion of non-nationals with tertiary and AT 20 27 18 39
low educational attainment levels differs PL 15 : : :
significantly across the EU. The proportion of PT 12 30 23 34
RO 10 : : :
tertiary-educated non-nationals is over 40 % in
SI 7 (11) : (8)
Ireland, Sweden and Luxembourg. However, there
SK 9 : : :
are also Member States with large numbers of non- FI 18 29 (28) (29)
nationals who have a low level of education. In the SE 11 32 23 38
southern Member States, France and Slovenia, UK 21 25 25 25
more than 40 % of non-nationals have a low level Given the differences in educational systems and
of educational attainment (see Graph I.5.8). qualifications between countries, this result must be taken
with caution. Figures in brackets lack reliability due to the
small sample size; ':' colon indicates unavailable or
5.4.1. Good qualifications, lower-level jobs for extremely unreliable data.
the foreign-born
According to 2009 data, in almost all EU Member There are several explanations for this situation.
States, the foreign-born population with tertiary- For instance, migrants can experience problems in
level education is more likely to perform jobs having their educational attainment and formal
requiring lower levels of qualification than their qualifications recognised and accepted. Even if
native-born counterparts (see Table I.4.96). In the their qualifications are properly recognised, their
EU as a whole, 19 % of the native-born population skills may not match the requirements of the
with tertiary education have jobs requiring a labour market in the host country, or they may
lower-level qualification, compared to 34 % for have to accept unskilled jobs while they are
immigrant workers. acquiring necessary skills, for example, by
becoming fluent in the host country’s language, to
Furthermore, the data indicate that 29 % of the enable them to exploit their full potential
foreign-born population with tertiary-level
53
The countries where a particularly large proportion observed, but the over-qualification rates for non-
of the highly-educated foreign-born population are nationals are generally slightly higher than those
employed in jobs that only require a lower level of for foreign-born persons. The situation is similar at
qualification are in southern Europe: Greece the European level as a whole, and in the majority
(66 %), Spain (55 %), Cyprus (54 %) and Italy of individual Member States.
(50 %).
In 2009, 37 % of non-nationals in employment
In most EU Member States, the mismatch between with tertiary-level education were overqualified for
qualifications and jobs among the immigrant their job.
population was more pronounced for highly-
educated women than for highly-educated men Analysing the situation for individual countries,
(see Graph I.5.9). In the EU as a whole, 31 % of the shares of highly-educated non-nationals
tertiary-educated immigrant men were performing jobs requiring lower qualifications
overqualified for their job, compared to 37 % of were highest in the southern countries (Greece,
tertiary-educated immigrant women. By contrast, Italy, Cyprus, and Spain). Only in Luxembourg
there is no difference between over-qualification was the proportion of overqualified tertiary-
rates of male and female native-born (19 % each). educated non-nationals under 10 % (see Graph
These data reflect the particular difficulties that I.5.10).
highly-educated immigrant women may face in
integrating into the labour market in host countries
Graph I.5.9: Foreign-born aged 25-54 with high

educational level having a medium or low
skilled job as a share of persons with high
educational level respective population by
sex, 2009 (%)
EU-27
EL
IT
ES
EE
CY
IE
SE
men
DK
women
LV
BE
FI
PT
FR
UK
AT
NL
SI
CZ
LU
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Data for FI, SI (men) and LU lack reliability due to the small
sample size. For BG, LT, HU, MT, PL, RO, SI (women) and SK -
data extremely unreliable. DE: data not available.
Comparing the data on foreign-born persons to that

for non-nationals, a rather similar picture can be
54
Part I
Graph I.5.10: Non-nationals aged 25-54 with high educational level having a medium or low skilled job as a share of persons
with high educational level respective population, 2009 (%)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
EU-27 EL IT CY ES PT EE IE FI SE FR LV DK BE DE UK NL AT CZ LU
Data for FI lack reliability due to the small sample size. For BG, LT, HU, MT, PL, RO, SI and SK - data extremely unreliable.
In 2009, the median age of the EU-27 national

5.5. NON-NATIONALS YOUNGER ON population was 41.2 years. German nationals have
AVERAGE THAN NATIONALS the highest median age, 44.5 years, followed by
citizens of Italy, Luxembourg and Greece. Apart
Analysis of the age structure of nationals and non- from Ireland, the newer Member States, Latvia,
nationals separately shows that at EU-27 level, the Slovakia and Estonia, are among the countries with
foreign population is younger than the national the youngest national populations in the EU-27.
population, particularly in the lower working-age
group. This applies to both men and women and is As the age structure of the national population is
illustrated by the age pyramid below. largely reflected in the age structure of the total
population, German nationals have consequently
Graph I.5.11: Age pyramid of the national and foreign the highest median age of 44.5 years followed by
population, EU-27, 2009
citizens of Italy, Luxembourg and Greece. Apart
85+
80
from Ireland, the newer Member States Latvia,
75 Slovakia and Estonia are among the countries with
70
the youngest national population in the EU.
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
3% 2% 1% 0% 1% 2% 3%
Men Women
Solid color: national population - Bordered: foreign population
No data available for BE, CY and RO on population by

single year of age.
55
Table I.5.7: Median age of the population by group of

citizenship, 2009
Foreigners
Nationals Total Citizens of Citizens of non-

foreigners other EU MS EU countries
EU-27 41.2 34.3 36.9 33.0

BE : : : :
BG 41.2 39.4 34.1 40.3
CZ 39.6 34.7 36.8 33.7
DK 41.0 32.1 33.7 31.2
DE 44.5 36.6 40.1 34.7
EE 37.3 49.3 38.1 49.8
IE 33.9 33.2 33.9 30.8
EL 42.6 34.1 44.0 32.2
ES 41.1 32.6 35.5 31.1
FR 39.3 38.3 46.2 34.1
IT 43.9 32.3 32.9 32.0
CY : : : :
LV 36.5 52.4 38.4 52.7
LT 39.0 33.4 39.6 32.5
LU 43.0 34.9 34.9 34.9
HU 39.7 37.4 37.7 37.0
MT 39.2 36.6 48.4 30.6
NL 40.8 34.0 36.1 32.6
AT 42.3 33.9 35.5 32.9
PL 37.8 42.4 49.8 40.0
PT 40.9 34.0 38.0 33.3
RO 37.9 34.1 40.3 33.1
SI 41.4 37.3 41.7 37.1
SK 36.7 36.0 38.0 32.9
FI 42.1 33.0 36.2 31.3
SE 41.3 34.0 39.1 30.7
UK 40.3 31.7 32.2 31.4
Source: Eurostat
The median age of non-nationals living in the EU

in 2009 was 34.3 (36.9 for the EU non-nationals
and 33.0 for citizens of non-EU countries. Apart
from Latvia, Estonia and Poland, non-nationals
tend to be younger than the national populations in
the EU Member States. The lowest median age for
this group, around 32, was observed in Denmark
and Italy.
Similarly, third-country nationals tend to be

younger than EU non-nationals in all Member
States, with the exception of Bulgaria, Latvia and
Estonia. Latvian and Estonian non-EU foreigners
have the highest absolute median ages, 52.7 and
49.8 years respectively, in contrast to their
relatively young nationals. On the other hand, non-
EU citizens in Malta, Spain and the Nordic
countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) have
the very lowest median ages in the EU-27,
between 30.6 and 31.2.
56
6. POPULATION CHANGE AND STRUCTURE
The population of the EU-27 is growing, while the Population growth

age structure of the population is becoming older. Population growth is the positive population change.
A turning point occurred in the early 1990s, when Population change in a given year is the difference
between the population size on 1 January of the given
net migration became the main driver of year and on 1 January of the following year. It consists of
population growth and has since far outpaced two components: natural change (the difference between
natural change in the population. live births and deaths) and net migration (the difference
between the number of immigrants and the number of
emigrants). In the context of the ‘population change’
The impact of demographic ageing within the EU statistics, Eurostat produces net migration figures by taking
the difference between total population change and the
is likely to be of major significance in the coming natural change; this concept is referred to in this chapter
decades. Consistently low fertility levels and as ‘net migration plus statistical adjustment’. A positive
higher life expectancy will transform the shape of natural change is also called natural increase.
the EU-27’s age pyramid. The most important The trend in EU-27 population growth has been
change is likely to be the marked transition unbroken since 1960. However, the rate of
towards a much older population. This trend is population growth has been gradually slowing
already becoming apparent in several Member down in recent decades. In the period 1990-2009,
States. The share of older persons in the total the population of the EU-27 increased on average
population will increase significantly in the by about 3.2 per 1000 inhabitants per year,
coming decades, as a greater proportion of the compared to annual average of around 8 per 1000
post-war baby-boom generation reaches inhabitants per year in the 1960s (Graph I.6.1).
retirement. This will, in turn, lead to an increased
burden on those of working age to provide for Graph I.6.1: Population on 1 January, EU-27, 1960-2010
social expenditure required by the ageing 550
Million
population.
500
6.1. POPULATION GROWTH 450
400
The current demographic situation in the EU-27 is
characterised by continuing growth. Although the
350
population of the EU-27 as a whole increased in
2009, the population in eight EU-27 Member 300
States was already declining. 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_pjan)

6.1.1. Over half a billion inhabitants in the EU
and still growing
6.1.2. Net migration as the main driver of
On 1 January 2010, the population of the EU-27 population growth in the EU-27
was estimated to be 501.1 million, 1.4 million The population of the EU-27 grew by 1.4 million
people more than in the previous year. in 2009, due to natural increase (the positive
difference between live births and deaths) of 0.5
million and net migration (40) of 0.9 million.
Compared to 2008, both components of population

growth, natural change and net migration,
decreased in 2009. In terms of crude rates, the
population growth of 4.1 per 1000 inhabitants was
due to a natural increase of 1.2 and net migration
of 2.9 in 2008. In 2009, natural increase accounted
for 1.0 and net migration for 1.8 in the total
population growth of 2.8 per 1000 inhabitants.
(40) Including statistical adjustments.
57
Graph I.6.2: Population change by component, EU-27, 1961-2009
11
10
9
8
7
6
per 1000 population
5
4
3
2
1
0
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
-1
-2
-3
Natural change Net migration (1) Total population change

(1) Including statistical adjustment.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind)
Net migration continued to be the main Graph I.6.3: Live births and deaths in EU-27, 1961-2009
determinant of population growth, by contributing 8.0
Million
63 % to the total population increase in the EU-27. 7.0
6.0
The contribution of net migration to total 5.0
population growth has become more significant 4.0
than that of natural increase since 1992 (see Graph 3.0
I.6.2) and has peaked in 2003 (95 %). Since then, 2.0
the contribution of natural increase to population 1.0
growth has risen slowly. 0.0

1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Live births Deaths
The relatively low contribution of the natural Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind)
increase to total population growth is the result of
two factors: first, net migration in the EU-27 has
6.1.3. Population growth within EU-27 Member
increased considerably since the mid-1980s;
States
secondly, the number of births has fallen, while the
number of deaths has increased. The gap between Although the population of the EU-27 as a whole
live births and deaths (see Graph I.6.3) has still grew in 2009, the growth was unevenly
considerably narrowed since 1960. Since the distributed across the Member States (see Table
number of deaths is expected to increase as the I.6.1). In 2009 the population increased in 19 EU
baby-boom generation begins to age, and assuming Member States.
that fertility remains at a relatively low level, a
negative natural change (more deaths than births)
cannot be excluded in future. If this happens, the
extent of population decline or growth will depend
on the contribution of migration to total change.
58
Part I
Table I.6.1: Demographic balance for EU-27 in 2009

Population Live Deaths Natural Net Total Population
1.1.2009 births change (1) change 1.1.2010
Country migration
(Thousand)
A B C D=B-C E=F-D F=G-A G
p p p p
EU-27 499703.3 5371.9 4848.8 523.1 877.1 1400.1 501103.4
BE 10753.1 127.3 104.5 22.8 64.0 86.8 10839.9
BG 7606.6 81.0 108.1 -27.1 -15.7 -42.8 7563.7
CZ 10467.5 118.3 107.4 10.9 28.3 39.3 10506.8
DK 5511.5 62.8 54.9 7.9 15.3 23.3 5534.7
DE 82002.4 665.1 854.5 -189.4 -10.7 -200.1 81802.3
EE 1340.4 15.8 16.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 1340.1
IE 4450.0 74.3 28.9 45.4 -27.6 17.8 4467.9
EL 11260.4 117.9 108.3 9.6 35.1 44.7 11305.1
ES 45828.2 494.5 381.9 112.6 48.2 160.8 45989.0
p p p p
FR 64367.0 825.6 548.7 276.9 70.2 347.1 64714.1
IT 60045.1 568.9 591.7 -22.8 318.1 295.3 60340.3
CY 796.9 9.6 5.2 4.4 1.8 6.3 803.1
LV 2261.3 21.7 29.9 -8.2 -4.7 -12.9 2248.4
LT 3349.9 36.7 42.0 -5.4 -15.5 -20.8 3329.0
LU 493.5 5.6 3.7 2.0 6.6 8.6 502.1
HU 10031.0 96.4 130.4 -34.0 17.3 -16.7 10014.3
MT 413.6 4.1 3.2 0.9 -1.6 -0.6 413.0
NL 16485.8 184.9 134.2 50.7 38.5 89.2 16575.0
AT 8355.3 76.3 77.4 -1.0 21.1 20.0 8375.3
PL 38135.9 417.6 384.9 32.6 -1.2 31.5 38167.3
PT 10627.3 99.5 104.4 -4.9 15.4 10.5 10637.7
RO 21498.6 222.4 257.2 -34.8 -1.6 -36.4 21462.2
SI 2032.4 21.9 18.8 3.1 11.5 14.6 2047.0
SK 5412.3 61.2 52.9 8.3 4.4 12.7 5424.9
FI 5326.3 60.4 49.9 10.5 14.6 25.1 5351.4
SE 9256.3 111.8 90.1 21.7 62.6 84.3 9340.7
p p p p
UK 61595.1 790.2 559.6 230.6 182.4 413.0 62008.0
(1) Including statistical adjustments
(p) provisional data
Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_gind)
Conversely, the population declined in the Baltic Out of the 19 countries where the population grew
states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), in the south- in 2009, both natural increase and net migration
eastern countries (Bulgaria, Hungary and contributed to population growth in 14 cases.
Romania), and in Germany and Malta. Population growth was mostly due to migration,
with the exception of Spain, France, the
Table I.6.2: EU-27 Member States by contribution of Netherlands, Slovakia and the United Kingdom,
natural change and net migration (1) to where a natural increase was still the main
population growth/decline in 2009
Demographic drivers EU-27 Member States
demographic driver of population growth. In
Growth due only to natural change IE, PL Ireland and Poland, a natural increase compensated
Growth due mostly to natural change CY, ES, FR, NL, SK, UK
Growth due mostly to net migration BE, CZ, DK, EL, LU, SI, FI, SE
for negative net migration. In three other countries,
Growth due only to net migration IT, AT, PT Italy, Austria and Portugal, positive net migration
Decline due only to natural change HU, EE
Decline due mostly to natural change BG, DE, LV, RO compensated for negative natural change.
Decline due mostly to net migration LT
Decline due only to net migration MT

Eight EU Member States reported a negative total
Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_gind) population change in 2009. In most cases, this was
mainly due to negative natural change, with an
Analysing the two components of population additional effect from negative net migration
change at a national level, eight types of change (Bulgaria, Germany, Latvia and Romania). In
can be distinguished, separating growth from Lithuania, the negative total change was mainly
decline, and the relative weights of natural change due to negative net migration. In Malta, the natural
and net migration (Tables I.6.12 for the typology increase was offset by negative net migration,
and Table I.6.1 for the data). while in Hungary and Estonia, positive net
migration could not compensate for the negative
natural change. The population of seven Member
59
Table I.6.3: Crude rates of population change in 2000, 2008 and 2009
Crude rates of population change (per 1000 inhabitants)
Country Total Natural change Net migration (1)
2000 2008 2009 2000 2008 2009 2000 2008 2009
p p
EU-27 2.1 4.1 2.8 0.6 1.2 1.0 1.5 2.9 1.8
BE 2.4 8.0 8.0 1.1 2.2 2.0 1.3 5.9 5.9
BG -5.1 -4.4 -5.6 -5.1 -4.3 -3.6 0.0 -0.1 -2.1
CZ -1.1 8.3 3.7 -1.8 1.4 1.0 0.6 6.9 2.7
DK 3.6 6.5 4.2 1.7 1.9 1.4 1.9 4.6 2.8
DE 1.2 -2.6 -2.4 -0.9 -2.0 -2.3 2.0 -0.7 -0.1
EE -3.7 -0.4 -0.2 -3.9 -0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0
IE 14.5 11.0 4.0 6.1 10.6 10.2 8.4 0.4 -6.2
EL 2.5 4.1 4.0 -0.2 0.9 0.9 2.7 3.2 3.1
ES 10.6 12.0 3.5 0.9 2.8 2.4 9.7 9.0 1.1
p p
FR 7.1 5.6 5.4 4.4 4.5 4.3 2.7 1.2 1.1
IT 0.7 7.1 4.9 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 0.9 7.1 5.3
CY 10.2 9.6 7.8 4.5 5.1 5.5 5.7 4.5 2.3
LV -7.4 -4.2 -5.7 -5.0 -3.1 -3.6 -2.3 -1.1 -2.1
LT -7.2 -4.9 -6.2 -1.4 -2.6 -1.6 -5.8 -2.3 -4.6
LU 12.4 19.9 17.2 4.5 4.1 4.0 7.9 15.8 13.2
HU -2.1 -1.4 -1.7 -3.7 -3.1 -3.4 1.6 1.6 1.7
MT 6.1 8.1 -1.5 3.8 2.1 2.2 2.3 5.9 -3.8
NL 7.7 4.9 5.4 4.2 3.0 3.1 3.6 1.9 2.3
AT 2.3 4.4 2.4 0.2 0.3 -0.1 2.2 4.1 2.5
PL -10.4 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.9 0.9 -10.7 -0.4 0.0
PT 6.0 0.9 1.0 1.4 0.0 -0.5 4.6 0.9 1.4
RO -1.1 -1.4 -1.7 -0.9 -1.5 -1.6 -0.2 0.1 -0.1
b b b
SI 1.2 10.9 7.2 -0.2 1.7 1.5 1.4 9.2 5.6
SK -3.7 2.1 2.3 0.5 0.8 1.5 -4.1 1.3 0.8
FI 1.9 4.9 4.7 1.4 2.0 2.0 0.5 2.9 2.7
SE 2.4 8.0 9.1 -0.3 1.9 2.3 2.7 6.0 6.7
p p
UK 3.6 6.6 6.7 1.2 3.5 3.7 2.4 3.1 3.0
(p) provisional data; (b) break in the series
Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_gind)
States continued to decrease, as in 2008; that of Eurostat’s population projections foresee that the
Malta decreased in 2009, after increasing in 2008. ageing process will continue in future decades.
As shown in Table I.6.3, Luxembourg, Sweden, 6.2.1. Population structure in 2010

Belgium, Cyprus and Slovenia had the highest
growth rates in 2009, more than 7.0 per 1000 Table I.6.4 shows the distribution of population by
inhabitants. major age groups in the EU-27. On 1 January
2010, the young population (0-19 years old)
The highest positive crude rate of natural change in accounted for 21.3 %, the population aged 20-64
2009 was in Ireland (10.2 per 1000 inhabitants) (considered to be the population of working age
and Cyprus (5.5 per 1000 inhabitants). The highest for the purposes of this publication and the new
net migration (including adjustment) was in Europe 2020 targets) for 61.3 % and the population
Luxembourg, with net migration of more than 13.2 aged 65 years and over for 17.4 %.
per 1000 inhabitants, followed by Sweden,
Belgium, Slovenia and Italy, all above 5.0 per Across Member States, Ireland had the largest
1000 inhabitants. proportion of 0-19 year olds, 27.5 %, and Germany
the smallest, 18.8 %. Germany had the largest
proportion of those aged 65 or over, 20.7 %,
6.2. POPULATION AGEING followed by Italy. 20.2 %. The lowest proportion
of those aged 65 or over was in Ireland (11.3 %),
The age structure of population in the EU-27 is Slovakia (12.3 %) and Cyprus (13.1 %).
becoming older, due to increasing life expectancy
and low levels of fertility sustained for decades.
60
Part I
Table I.6.4: Population age structure by major age Table I.6.5: Median age and age dependency ratios, 1st
groups, on 1st January 1990 and 2010 January 2010, by country
Proportion of population (%) Share of
Young age Old age Total age
Country 0-19 years old 20-64 years old 65 years old or over population
Median age dependency dependency dependency
1990 2010 1990 2010 1990 2010 Country aged 80 or
ratio ratio ratio
EU-27 26.7 21.3 59.5 61.3 13.7 17.4 over
BE 24.8 22.9 60.3 59.9 14.8 17.2 (years) (%)
BG 27.8 19.1 59.3 63.4 13.0 17.5 EU-27 40.9 34.8 28.4 63.2 4.7
CZ 29.7 20.1 57.9 64.7 12.5 15.2 BE 40.9 38.2 28.6 66.8 4.9
DK 24.3 24.4 60.1 59.3 15.6 16.3 BG 41.4 30.1 27.7 57.7 3.8
DE 21.8 18.8 63.3 60.6 14.9 20.7 CZ 39.4 31.0 23.5 54.6 3.6
EE 29.3 21.2 59.2 61.7 11.6 17.1 DK 40.5 41.2 27.5 68.8 4.1
DE 44.2 31.0 34.1 65.1 5.1
IE 36.7 27.5 51.9 61.2 11.4 11.3
EE 39.5 34.4 27.7 62.0 4.1
EL 27.0 19.4 59.3 61.6 13.7 18.9
IE 34.3 44.9 18.5 63.4 2.8
ES 28.8 19.8 57.8 63.3 13.4 16.8
EL 41.7 31.5 30.7 62.3 4.6
FR 27.8 24.4 58.3 58.8 13.9 16.8
ES 39.9 31.3 26.6 57.9 4.9
IT 24.5 19.0 60.8 60.8 14.7 20.2 FR 39.9 41.5 28.6 70.2 5.3
CY 33.5 24.0 55.7 63.0 10.8 13.1 IT 43.1 31.2 33.3 64.5 5.8
LV 28.4 20.1 59.8 62.5 11.8 17.4 CY 36.2 38.1 20.7 58.8 2.9
LT 30.1 22.2 59.1 61.7 10.8 16.1 LV 40.0 32.2 27.8 60.0 3.9
LU 23.2 23.7 63.4 62.4 13.4 14.0 LT 39.2 36.0 26.0 62.1 3.6
HU 27.9 20.8 58.8 62.6 13.2 16.6 LU 38.9 38.0 22.4 60.4 3.6
MT 30.9 22.3 58.8 62.9 10.4 14.8 HU 39.8 33.2 26.5 59.7 3.9
NL 25.7 23.7 61.5 61.0 12.8 15.3 MT 39.2 35.4 23.5 58.9 3.3
AT 24.4 20.8 60.7 61.5 14.9 17.6 NL 40.6 38.9 25.1 64.0 3.9
PL 32.6 21.8 57.4 64.7 10.0 13.5 AT 41.7 33.9 28.6 62.5 4.8
PT 29.3 20.5 57.5 61.6 13.2 17.9 PL 37.7 33.7 20.9 54.6 3.3
RO 31.9 21.0 57.8 64.0 10.3 14.9 PT 40.7 33.3 29.0 62.3 4.5
SI 28.2 19.2 61.2 64.3 10.6 16.5 RO 38.3 32.9 23.3 56.2 3.1
SK 33.5 22.1 56.3 65.6 10.3 12.3 SI 41.4 29.9 25.7 55.6 3.9
FI 25.4 22.9 61.3 60.1 13.3 17.0 SK 36.9 33.7 18.7 52.4 2.7
SE 24.5 23.4 57.7 58.5 17.8 18.1 FI 42.0 38.0 28.3 66.3 4.6
UK 25.9 23.9 58.4 59.8 15.7 16.3 SE 40.7 40.1 31.0 71.0 5.3
UK 39.4 40.0 27.2 67.3 4.6
2010: UK 2009.
EU-27 and FR exclude France's overseas departments. UK: 2009.
Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_pjanind) EU-27 and FR exclude France's overseas departments.
Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_pjanind)
The median age of the EU-27 population was 40.9

By adding the number of young people (aged 0-19)
years. This means that half the EU-27 population
to the older population, the resulting total age
today is aged 40.9 years or over. The median age
dependency ratio of 63.2 % in the EU-27 is
of the population in the Member States ranged
equivalent to about three people of working age for
from 34.3 years in Ireland to 44.2 years in
every two dependent people. In 2010, the lowest
Germany (see Table I.6.5).
total age dependency ratio was in Slovakia
(52.4 %) and the highest in Sweden (71.0 %).
The dependency ratios (41) are used as indicators of
the potential level of support needed by young
The population pyramids in Graph I.6.4 show the
people (aged 0-19) and/or older people (aged 65
structure of the population by sex and by five-year
and over) from the population of working age. The
age groups. Each bar corresponds to the proportion
ratios are expressed in terms of the relative size of
of the given sex and age group to the total
the young and/or older population to the
population.
population of working age.
The population pyramid at EU-27 level in 2010 is
In 2010, the old-age dependency ratio of the EU-
narrow at the bottom and becomes more rhomboid
27 was 28.4 %. This means that the EU-27 had
as the baby boomer cohorts resulting from high
around 3.5 persons of working age for every
fertility rates in several European countries up to
person aged 65 years and over. The old-age
mid-1960s move up the age pyramid. The baby
dependency ratio in the Member States ranged
boomers continue to represent a significant part of
from 18.5 % in Ireland to 34.1 % in Germany.
the population of working age. The first of these
large cohorts born over a period of 20-30 years are
now reaching retirement age, as illustrated by the
comparison with the 1990 population pyramid.
(41) In this section, the age dependency ratios are expressed in

terms of the relative size of the young (0-19 years) or/and
of the old (65 and over) population to the working age
population (20-64), instead of the common definition,
which considers the 0-14 years as young population and the
15-64 years as working age population. This adjustment is
made on grounds that, in the EU-27’s Member States, most
people aged 15-19 are still in education, and few of them
are in paid work.
61
Graph I.6.4: Population pyramids, EU-27, 1990 and 2010 Graph I.6.5: Proportion of population aged 65 years or
over, % increase/decrease 1990-2010
80+
75_79 Men Wom en EU-27
70_74
65_69
SI
60_64
55_59 DE
50_54 LV
Age
45_49 IT
40_44
EE
35_39
EL
30_34
25_29
LT
20_24 RO
15_19 PT
10_14 BG
5_9
MT
0_4
FI
4.5 3.5 2.5 1.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5
PL
Per cent
ES
Women (2010) Men (2010) Women (1990) Men (1990)
HU
FR
EU-27 excludes France's overseas departments. CZ
Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_pjan) AT
NL
BE
CY
6.2.1. Past and current trends of population SK
ageing in EU-27 DK
LU
UK
Population ageing is a long-term trend which SE
IE
began several decades ago in the EU-27. This
-1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
ageing is visible in changes in the age structure of
Percentage points
the EU population and is reflected by the growing
EU-27 and FR exclude France's overseas departments.
proportion of older persons, while the proportion UK: 2009 instead of 2010.
of those of working age in the total population Slovenia: the graph may be affected by the change of
declines. population definition from 2008 onward.
Between 1990 and 2010, the working-age

population (20-64 years) in the EU-27 increased The change in the median age of the EU-27
by 1.8 percentage points, while the older population also provides an illustration of
population (aged 65 and over) increased by 3.7 population ageing. In the EU-27, the median age of
percentage points (see Graph I.6.5). These the total population rose steadily from 35.2 years
increases came at the expense of a decrease of in 1990 to 40.9 in 2010, as shown in Graph I.6.6.
5.4 % in the proportion of younger people (0-19
Graph I.6.6: Median age of the total population, EU-27,
years). 1990-2010
42
The low levels of fertility that were sustained for
41
decades (see chapter I.2 on Fertility) have
40
contributed to the process of population ageing,
39
with fewer births leading to a decline in the
Age
38
proportion of young people in the total population.
37
This process is known as ‘ageing from the bottom’
36
of the population pyramid, and can be observed in
35
the reduction of the base of population pyramids
34
between 1990 and 2010 (Graph I.6.4). 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
EU-27 excludes France’s overseas departments.

Since the proportion of older people increased Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_pjanind)
between 1990 and 2010, the top of the 2010 age
pyramid is wider (Graph I.6.4). The growth in the The median age of the population rose in all
proportion of older people can be explained by Member States over the same period. It rose
gains in longevity and is known as ‘ageing from steeply, by more than six years, between 1990 and
the top’ of the population pyramid. A significant 2010, in Slovenia, Portugal, Lithuania, Germany,
increase in life expectancy at birth was recorded in Spain, Malta, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria.
all EU-27 Member States for the past decades (see
chapter I.3 on Mortality).
62
Part I
Graph I.6.7: Median age of population progressive ageing of the older population itself.
IE
The proportion of those aged 80 and over (‘oldest-
CY old’) is growing faster than any other segment of
SK
PL the population, and is projected to almost treble by
RO 2060.
LU
MT
LT
CZ
The old age dependency ratio (population aged 65
UK and over in relation to that aged 20-64) is projected
EE
HU to more than double from 28.4 % in 2010 to 58.5 %
ES
FR
in 2060. The total age dependency ratio (calculated
LV as the ratio of children and young people aged
DK
NL
under 19 and older people aged 65 and over to the
SE population aged 20-64) is expected to rise from
PT
BE 63.2 % in 2010 to 95.5 % in 2060. The implication
BG is that there will be almost one person of working
SI
AT age for every dependent person aged under 19 or
GR
FI over 65 years in the EU-27.
IT
DE
Graph I.6.8: Population age structure by major age
EU27 groups, EU-27(1)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
2060 18.9 51.1 17.8 12.1
Age
1990 1990-2010 2050 18.8 52.3 17.8 11.0
2040 18.9 54.2 18.0 8.9

EU-27 and FR exclude France's overseas departments.
2030 19.7 56.7 16.6 6.9
UK: 2009 instead of 2010.
Year
Slovenia: the graph may be affected by the change of 2020 20.5 59.5 14.4 5.7
population definition from 2008 onward. 2010 21.3 61.3 12.7 4.7
2000 23.7 60.7 12.3 3.3
1990 26.7 59.5 10.6 3.1
6.2.2. Future trends in population ageing 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Proportion of total population
0-19 years 20-64 years 65-79 years 80+ years
Population ageing is a generalised process across
EU Member States, and it is expected to continue 1990 – 2010: Observed populations.
2020 – 2060: EUROPOP2008 convergence scenario.
in future decades. EU-27excludes France’s overseas departments.
Source: Eurostat (online data codes demo_pjan and
proj_08c2150p)
Population projections
Eurostat produces population projections at a national
level every three years. These projections are what-if Graph I.6.9 shows a future-oriented version of the
scenarios that aim to provide information about the likely population pyramid in Graph I.6.4.
future size and age structure of the population based on
assumptions of future trends in fertility, life expectancy and
migration; this publication is based on the main results of
the EUROPOP2008, convergence scenario.
According to Eurostat 2008-based population
projections, the EU-27’s population will be
slightly larger by 2060, while the age structure of
the population will be much older than it is now.
The likely change in age structure is of more

concern than the change in population size. The
median age is projected to rise to 47.9 years by
2060. The population of working age is expected
to decline steadily. Older people would account for
an increasing proportion of the population
according to the same projections. The share of the
population aged 65 and over is projected to
increase from 17.4 % in 2010 to 30.0 % in 2060
(see Graph I.6.8). Even Also significant is the
63
Graph I.6.9: Population pyramids, EU-27, 2010 and 2060 more slowly and barely reaches 30 % over the next
85+
two decades.
80-84 Men Women
75_79
70_74 Graph I.6.10: Percentage of 65+ in the EU, Sweden ,
65_69
60_64
Germany and Slovakia, 2010-2060
55_59
Age 50_54 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
45_49
40_44
35_39
30_34
25_29
EU
20_24
15_19
10_14
5_9
SE
0_4
4.5 3.5 2.5 1.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5
Per cent DE
Men (2060) Women (2060) Men (2010) Women (2010)
2010: Observed populations.

SK
2060: Europop2008 convergence scenario.
EU-27 excludes France's overseas departments.
Source: Eurostat (online data codes demo_pjan and 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
proj_08c2150p)
Source: Eurostat, data online via code proj_08c2150p
In the coming decades, the large number of ageing

In summary, over the next 50 years, the age class
baby boomers will swell the number of older
65 and over will increase its share in the EU-27
people. The baby boom bulge will move up the
population from 17.4 % to 30.0 %. Most of this
population pyramid, leaving the middle
increase is projected to occur between 2020 and
(population of working age, 20-64), and the base
2040.
(ages 0-19), considerably narrower in 2060.
While population projections show that ageing will
6.2.3. The speed of population ageing affect all Member States, individual countries will
experience the process at different rates and at
The previous section showed that EU-27’s
different times; in other words, there will be
population is expected to age considerably by
variations in the pattern of ageing.
2060, thereby raising a number of questions. Will
ageing be faster over the coming years or at the
Most Member States that will experience a slow
end of the projection period? How will ageing play
pattern of ageing start with a moderately old to
out in different countries?
older population, as illustrated by the Swedish
case. In 2010, its proportion of the population aged
Statisticians generally measure the speed at which
65 and over was the fourth highest (18.1 %) in the
the population ages by observing the proportion of
EU-27. By 2060, due to a slower pattern of ageing,
older people in the population and the age
it is projected to have the eighth lowest proportion
dependency ratio. Both indicators were found to
of population aged 65 and over (26.6 %) and well
increase for the EU-27 in the projection period
below the EU-27 average (30.0 %). Similar, albeit
(2008-2060).
slightly faster development, is projected for
Belgium, Denmark, France, Cyprus, Luxembourg,
Graph I.6.10 illustrates this, measured as the
Portugal, Finland and the United Kingdom. The
increase in the proportion of the population aged
Netherlands, while also belonging to this group,
65 and over, for the EU-27 and three Member
display an atypical pattern; their proportion of the
States. The leftmost segment of each bar indicates
population aged 65 and over was low in 2010
the proportion of the population aged 65 and over
(15.3 %), is set to increase rapidly until 2040 and
in 2010, ranging from 12.3 % in Slovakia to 20.7 %
then to stabilise at a level which is about the same
in Germany. Moving to the right, the subsequent
as the others in its country group, (27.3 %).
segments indicate the likely increase in the
proportion of the population aged 65 and over in
Another group of Member States have in common
subsequent decades; the longer each segment is,
populations that were already relatively old in
the faster the increase in its decade. At EU-27 level
2010, and projected to age at a moderate rate. An
(top bar), the proportion of the population aged 65
example is Germany, where the proportion of the
and over is projected to increase rapidly until
population aged 65 and over in 2010 was 20.7 %,
2040, to reach the high-20 % range; it then grows
the highest in the EU-27. Germany’s ageing is set
64
Part I
to proceed at a sustained pace until 2040 and then

to almost halt in the 2040s and the 2050s. Other
countries, namely Austria, Greece, Spain, Italy and
Slovenia, are projected to follow similar patterns.
Ireland shows a similar moderate-ageing pattern,
albeit starting from a younger population and with
sustained ageing until 2050. These two groups of
countries will experience very moderate ageing
from 2040.
The highest rates of population ageing, especially

from 2040 onward, are expected in a third group,
which includes several central and east European
Member States, according to population
projections,. These are illustrated by Slovakia.
Here the percentage of the population aged 65 and
over (12.3 %) was the second lowest in the EU-27
in 2010, above only Ireland (11.3 %), but is
projected to rise to 36.1 % in 2060, thereby
becoming the second highest rate, just below
Poland (36.2 %). In Slovakia, ageing is likely to
continue at a fast pace even in the 2040s and
2050s. Similar ageing, although at a slightly less
rapid pace, is expected in Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland and
Romania. In all of these Member States, the
proportion of the population aged 65 and over is
currently comparatively low, and is projected to
increase slowly until 2020. However, it is then set
to grow rapidly throughout the remainder of the
projections period.
Furthermore, the graph indicates that while the

spread across Member States is narrow in 2010 at
about 2 percentage points, in 2060 there will be
much larger differences between Member States,
due to differences in the speed of ageing.
65
7. FAMILIES
‘Family’ is a shifting concept. What it means to be Since 1970, the crude marriage rate in the EU-27
a member of a family and the expectations people has declined by 38 % (from 7.9 per 1 000
have of family relationships vary with time and inhabitants in 1970 to 4.9 in 2007).
across countries, making it difficult to find a
universally-agreed and applied definition. At the same time, marriages have become less
stable, as indicated by the rise in the crude divorce
Legal alternatives to historically conventional rate, from 0.9 per 1000 inhabitants in 1970 to 2.1
marriage, such as registered partnerships, have in 2007. Part of this rise is due to the fact that
become more widespread, and national legislation divorce was legalised in several countries during
has evolved to confer more rights to unmarried the period.
couples. Alongside these new legal forms, other
forms of non-marital relationships have appeared, Table I.7.1: Crude marriage rate, by country, 1960-2009,
making it more difficult for statisticians to collect (in marriages per 1000 residents)
Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009
data that can be compared across countries. EU-27 7.9 6.8 6.3 5.2 4.9
BE 7.1 7.6 6.7 6.5 4.4 4.0
BG 8.8 8.6 7.9 6.9 4.3 3.4
In their attempt to capture and track changing CZ 7.7 9.2 7.6 8.8 5.4 4.6
family forms and composition, demographers most DK 7.8 7.4 5.2 6.1 7.2 6.0
DE 9.5 7.4 6.3 6.5 5.1 4.6
often refer to the family nucleus and to private EE 10.0 9.1 8.8 7.5 4.0 4.0
household units. Due to differences in the timing IE 5.5 7.0 6.4 5.1 5.0 5.2
EL 7.0 7.7 6.5 5.8 4.5 5.2
and formal recognition of changing patterns of ES 7.8 7.3 5.9 5.7 5.4 3.8
family formation and dissolution, these concepts FR 7.0 7.8 6.2 5.1 5.0 3.9
IT 7.7 7.3 5.7 5.6 5.0 4.0
have become more difficult to operationalise. CY 8.6 7.7 9.7 13.4
b
7.9
Analysts of demographic statistics therefore have LV 11.0 10.2 9.8 8.9 3.9 4.4
LT 10.1 9.5 9.2 9.8 4.8 6.2
access to relatively few complete and reliable LU 7.1 6.4 5.9 6.1 4.9 3.5
datasets with which to make comparisons over HU 8.9 9.3 7.5 6.4 4.7 3.7
MT 6.0 7.9 8.8 7.1 6.7 5.7
time and between and within countries. NL 7.7 9.5 6.4 6.5 5.5 4.4
AT 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.9 4.9 4.2
PL 8.2 8.6 8.6 6.7 5.5 6.6
It can be observed, however, that the number of PT 7.8 9.4 7.4 7.2 6.2 3.8
marriages is decreasing and the number of RO 10.7 7.2 8.2 8.3 6.1 6.3
SI 8.8 8.3 6.5 4.3 3.6 3.2
divorces is increasing, although these trends may SK 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.6 4.8 4.9
be due in part to the ageing of the population. In FI 7.4 8.8 6.1 5.0 5.1 5.6
SE 6.7 5.4 4.5 4.7 4.5 5.1
addition, more and more children are born to un- UK 7.5 8.5 7.4 6.6 5.2 4.4
married women, and the countries with the highest 2009: EU-27 and IE, 2007; UK, 2008
extramarital birth rates are often also those with CY: Before 2002, total marriages contracted in the country;
from 2003 onward marriages in which at least one spouse
the highest fertility rates. was resident in the country.
Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_nind)
7.1. FEWER MARRIAGES, MORE DIVORCES Table I.7.1 shows that, in 2009, the crude marriage
rate among the EU-27 Member States was highest
Marriage as recognised by the law in each country in Cyprus (7.9 per 1 000 inhabitants) and Poland
has long been considered to signal family (6.6). At the other end of the scale, the lowest
formation. This section examines the trends in crude marriage rates were reported by Slovenia
family formation and dissolution though marriage (3.2) and Bulgaria (3.4).
and divorce.
Regarding divorce, Ireland (0.8 per 1 000
In 2007, 2.4 million marriages and 1.2 million inhabitants) and several southern European
divorces took place in the EU-27. The crude Member States, including Italy (0.9), Slovenia
marriage rate, i.e. the number of marriages per (1.1) and Greece (1.2) have significantly lower
1 000 inhabitants, was 4.9, and the crude divorce crude divorce rates than Belgium (3.0 per 1 000
rate was 2.1 per 1 000 inhabitants. inhabitants), Lithuania and the Czech Republic,
66
Part I
both with 2.8 (see table I.7.2). Divorce is not legal country recording the highest rates of live births
in Malta. outside marriage, namely Estonia (59.2%).
Table I.7.2: Crude divorce rate, by country, 1960-2009, (in Table I.7.3: Live births outside marriage, as proportion of
divorces per 1000 residents) total live births (%), by country, 1960-2009
Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009 Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009
EU-27 : 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.1 EU-27 : : : 17.4 27.4 37.4
BE 0.5 0.7 1.5 2.0 2.6 3.0 BE 2.1 2.8 4.1 11.6 28.0 45.7
BG : 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.5 BG 8.0 8.5 10.9 12.4 38.4 53.4
CZ 1.4 2.2 2.6 3.1 2.9 2.8 CZ 4.9 5.4 5.6 8.6 21.8 38.8
DK 1.5 1.9 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 DK 7.8 11.0 33.2 46.4 44.6 46.8
DE 1.0 1.3 1.8 1.9 2.4 2.3 DE 7.6 7.2 11.9 15.3 23.4 32.7
EE 2.1 3.2 4.1 3.7 3.1 2.4 EE : : : 27.2 54.5 59.2
IE - - - - 0.7 0.8 IE 1.6 2.7 5.9 14.6 31.5 33.3
EL 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.6 1.0 1.2 EL 1.2 1.1 1.5 2.2 4.0 6.6
ES - - - 0.6 0.9 2.1 ES 2.3 1.4 3.9 9.6 17.7 31.4
FR 0.7 0.8 1.5 1.9 1.9 2.1 FR 6.1 6.8 11.4 30.1 42.6 52.9
IT 2.4 2.2 4.3 6.5 9.7 23.5
IT - - 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.9
CY : 0.2 0.6 0.7 2.3 11.7
CY : 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.7 2.2
LV 11.9 11.4 12.5 16.9 40.3 43.5
LV 2.4 4.6 5.0 4.0 2.6 2.3
LT 3.7 6.3 7.0 22.6 27.9
LT 0.9 2.2 3.2 3.4 3.1 2.8
LU 3.2 4.0 6.0 12.8 21.9 32.1
LU 0.5 0.6 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.1
HU 5.5 5.4 7.1 13.1 29.0 40.8
HU 1.7 2.2 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.4 MT 0.7 1.5 1.1 1.8 10.6 27.4
MT - - - - - - NL 1.4 2.1 4.1 11.4 24.9 43.3
NL 0.5 0.8 1.8 1.9 2.2 1.9 AT 13.0 12.8 17.8 23.6 31.3 39.3
AT 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.2 PL 5.0 4.8 6.2 12.1 20.2
PL 0.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.7 PT 9.5 7.3 9.2 14.7 22.2 38.1
PT 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.9 1.9 2.5 RO : : : : 25.5 28.0
RO 2.0 0.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 SI 9.1 8.5 13.1 24.5 37.1 53.6
SI 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.1 SK 4.7 6.2 5.7 7.6 18.3 31.6
SK 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.7 1.7 2.3 FI 4.0 5.8 13.1 25.2 39.2 40.9
FI 0.8 1.3 2.0 2.6 2.7 2.5 SE 11.3 18.6 39.7 47.0 55.3 54.4
SE 1.2 1.6 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4 UK 5.2 8.0 11.5 27.9 39.5 46.3
UK : 1.0 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.2
1990: EU-27 excludes RO
2009: EU-27 and IE, 2007; EL, FR, IT, and UK, 2008 FR: Metropolitan France
Divorce was not possible by law in ES before 1981, IE before Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_find)
1995 and IT before 1970. Divorce is not legal in MT.
Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_ndivind)
7.3. FERTILITY AND THE FAMILY

7.2. A RISE IN BIRTHS OUTSIDE MARRIAGE
Analysis of the relationship between patterns of
The proportion of live births outside marriage in fertility and age at childbirth (Graph I.2.2) shows
EU-27 continues to increase, signalling new that, in 2009, fertility was higher in several
patterns of family formation alongside the more countries where women have children at a later
traditional pattern where children were born within age. Box I.7.1 below argues that, in the EU – and
marriage. Extramarital births occur in non-marital generally among developed countries – fertility
relationships or cohabiting couples as well as to rises with wealth. Graphs I.7.1 and I.7.2 below
lone parents. indicate that fertility was also higher in several
countries where more children are born outside
Extra-marital births have been increasing in almost marriage and where there are higher employment
every country in EU-27, and in some Member rates for women. However, among all determinant
States, mostly in northern Europe, the majority of of the different fertility levels in the 27 EU
live births are now outside marriage (Table I.7.3). Member States studied here, the most important is
Mediterranean countries like Greece, Cyprus, Italy child-care provision (Graph I.7.3).
and Malta, along with Lithuania, Poland, and
Romania are at the other low end of the scale with Births outside marriage and fertility
a large proportion, over 70%, of births occurring
within marriage. Countries with higher proportions of births outside
marriage are often observed to have higher fertility
The gap between the countries with the highest and rates. In Estonia, Sweden, France, Denmark, the
lowest rates of live births outside marriage United Kingdom and Belgium, high rates of live
increased over the period under review. In 2009, births outside marriage (above 45% of live births)
Greece (6.6%) and Cyprus (11.7%) display rates, are associated with total fertility rates (42) above
respectively nine and five times below in the
(42) The total fertility rate is defined in Chapter I.2.
67
the EU-27 average of 1.60 children per woman in Childcare provision and fertility
2008 (Graph I.7.1).
Overall, fertility is higher in those countries that
made an earlier transition to more gender equality
Graph I.7.1: Proportion of live births outside marriage and
total fertility rate, 2009 and female participation in employment, allowing
2.2 for flexible, less traditional family-forming and
child-bearing patterns.
IE
2.0
FR
UK
SE Graph I.7.3: Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 and
Total fertility rate
1.8
FI BE DK total fertility rate, 2009
NL
2.2
EU-27
1.6 BG EE
LU IE
LT SI 2.0
EL CY FR
CZ
SK
UK SE
1.4 MT
PL IT AT

ES
RO DE 1.8 FI BE DK
PT HU LV NL
1.2 EU-27
1.6 EE
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 BG LT LU
Live births outside marriage (% in total live births) CZ EL CY SI
PL MT
Total fertility rate for EU-27, IT and UK: 2008. 1.4
SKRO AT
IT ES
Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_find) HU LV
DE
PT
1.2
0 20 40 60 80
Children aged 0-2, in formal childcare (%)
Women's employment rates and fertility
Total fertility rate for EU-27, IT and UK: 2008.
Arguably one of the most important trends of the Source: Eurostat (online data code demo_find and
past 50 years affecting family life has been the ilc_caindformal)
marked increase in female employment rates.

Since the 1960s, more women have become Graph I.7.3 shows a strong correlation at country
economically active and have entered paid level between fertility and the provision of
employment outside the home, particularly in the childcare, indicating that, in some of the countries
public sector, rather than working on the land or in where the transition to more diverse family
a family enterprise as in the past. Women's patterns and to support parenthood in kind may
employment rates have, thereby, moved closer to have helped to raise their fertility levels. The
those of men. childcare provision is measured as children cared
for (by formal arrangements other than by the
Graph I.7.2: Employment rate of women aged 25-49 and family) as a proportion of all children in the same
total fertility rate, 2009 age group.
2.2
Ensuring suitable childcare provision is an

IE
2.0
FR
essential step towards equal opportunities in
UK SE
1.8 BE FI
employment between women and men. In 2002, at
the Barcelona Summit (43), the European Council
DK
NL
1.6
EU-27
EE set the targets of providing childcare, by 2010, to
LU
EL
BG
CY
LT
SI at least 33% of children under 3 years of age.
CZ
1.4 MT
IT ES SK PL AT
Other forms of family support were
RO DE
HU LV PT comprehensively mapped across all 27 Member
1.2
45.0 55.0 65.0 75.0 85.0
States in a recent EU-funded project (44) revealing
Employment rate (% ) considerable differences both in public policy as
well as in cultural approach as regards informal
Total fertility rate for EU-27, IT and UK: 2008.
Source: Eurostat (online data codes demo_frate and support within families.
lfsa_ergan)
Graph I.7.2 shows that the Member States with

higher rates of employment for women also tend to
have higher fertility; though this relationship is not
very strong. (43) For the Barcelona (2004) targets see
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEM
O/08/592&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLa
nguage=en
(44) See www.multilinks-project.eu for details.
68
Part I
Box I.7.1: Does wealth increase fertility in developed countries?
In the past century, fertility rates have decreased as But, at the highest stages of development, the
national wealth has increased. Women in negative fertility trend changes into a positive one;
developing countries still have large numbers of in many countries, high levels of development are
children, whereas the wealthier half of the world observed in conjunction with relatively high
population has below-replacement fertility. With fertility rates. In Graph 1, this situation applies in
on-going development, is the trend towards lower the dense cluster of 15-30 countries at the bottom-
fertility irreversible? right. Graph 2 shows the data from Graph 1 limited
to EU-27 Member States. The clustered 9 countries
A recent study(1) challenges the traditional view by with higher fertility (around or above 1.75 children
demonstrating that, in many countries at advanced per woman) are those with higher HDI (around
stages of development, fertility levels are now 0.95 or above).
increasing rather than decreasing. The traditional
relationship between wealth and fertility seems to Graph 2: Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and Human
be reversed. Development Index (HDI), by country in
the EU-27, 2005
Graph 1: Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and Human

Development Index (HDI), by country in 2
the world, 2005
1.75
Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
8 1.5
1.25
6
Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
1
5
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
Human Development Index (HDI)
4
Source: United Nations

3
2 These relatively high fertility rates at higher levels

of development are not due simply to the so-called
1
‘tempo effects (Table I.2.4). The study suggests
that, above a certain level of development, further
0
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 development may result in higher fertility rates.
Human Development Index (HDI)
Source: United Nations Further research into these mechanisms is needed

because the researchers found notable exceptions.
To reach these conclusions, the researchers Japan, South Korea and Canada are at advanced
analysed the relationship between the Total stages of development, but without increasing
Fertility Rate (TFR) and Human Development fertility. These exceptions indicate that
Index (HDI). The HDI combines indicators for life development alone is not sufficient to reverse the
expectancy, education, standard of living and GDP, downward fertility trend.
thus taking into account factors other than material
wealth alone. On the other hand, the Scandinavian countries have
high labour force participation, innovative family
The left and central parts of Graph 1, taken from policies and among the highest fertility levels in
the study, show that TFR is high in societies at EU-27. Thus, the fertility reversal may be due to
lower levels of development (the left-hand side of better policies to improve gender equality and
the J-shaped curve) and declines rapidly as facilitate a work-family balance. In fact, failure to
development advances. address gender equality, work-family balance and
flexibility in labour markets may well explain why
(1) Myrskylä, Kohler & Billari, Nature fertility in rich countries in Asia continues to
2009 http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v460/n72 decrease as they grow wealthier.
56/pdf/nature08230.pdf
69
Graph I.7.4: Households with children by type (1), 2009 (%)
single parent couple other type

100
80
60
40
20
0
EU BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
(1) Distribution of type of households among all households with children. No data available for Denmark and Sweden
Source: Eurostat (online data codes lfst_hhnhtych)
Within the EU the traditional stereotype of poorer 7.4.1. Smaller households

families having several children seems to have
given way to a resumption of pre-industrial Average family and household size has been
revolution patterns whereby better-off families declining since the 1960s. Despite the slight
tend to have more children. Nevertheless, at the increase in fertility rates in the early years of the
other end of the income range, there is a persistent 21st century, the decline in household size
association between poverty and number of continued between 2005 and 2009 in all EU-27
children. The EU SILC (45) reported that in 2008 Member States, except Austria, Belgium,
the risk of poverty in the EU grows with the Germany, Hungary, Romania and the United
number of dependent children; considering two- Kingdom, where it remained stable. For EU-27,
adult households, this is 16.3% overall, 11.4% average household size fell from 2.5 members to
with one dependent child, 14.5% with two 2.4, with the largest reduction recorded in
dependent children and 25.9% with three or Lithuania (-0.5) and Slovakia (-0.3).
more. Thus the distribution of children is U-
shaped, with larger families at both ends of the Many reasons have been provided to explain the
income spectrum than in the middle. changes observed in family and household size
over the past half century. The ageing of Europe’s
A recent EU-funded project (46) showed that population reported in the previous chapter led to a
possible important areas of intervention to alleviate decline in the proportion of young people,
obstacles to the fulfilment of young adults' fertility automatically resulting in fewer new candidates for
goals are job security, gender equality and the marriage and family building. At the same time,
reconciliation of work and family. However, social changing value systems contributed to lower
norms and cultural settings also play a crucial role fertility rates and an increase in the number of
and interplay with family policies. childless couples.
7.4.2. More diverse family living arrangements

7.4. CHANGING HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE
The decline in family size associated with lower
Household structure is constantly changing. As the fertility rates and population ageing has been
population ages, more people live in smaller accompanied by a fall in the proportion of married
households, increasingly consisting of a single couples, as non-marital relationships and lone
person. At the same time, many young adults, parenting have become more widely accepted. The
especially men, delay leaving the parental home to proportion of single-person households has also
found their own household. increased, as older people have become less likely
to live with their children or grandchildren.
(45) Statistics on Income and Living Conditions; the data
reported is accessible online via the code ilc_li03; the year The majority of households with children in the
2009 reports on 2008 income in almost all countries.
(46) see www.repro-project.org.
EU comprises two adults (Graph I.7.4), almost
70
Part I
always living in a couple partnership. Between Graph I.7.6: Percentage of young adults who live with at
least one parent and no spouse/partner, by
2005 and 2009, despite the small increase in sex and age group, EU-27, 2009, (%)
fertility rates, the percentage of two-adult
male female
households with children fell from 29% to 27.5% 80
across Europe. This reduction may also be partly
explained by population ageing, as older people
60
are more likely to be living alone.
40
Single-parents households are relatively common
in Estonia and the United Kingdom (both above
20%). In the United Kingdom and Ireland, 8% and 20
6% respectively of young women aged 15-24 are

single parents (Graph I.7.5). 0
20-24 25-29 age 30-34 35-39
Graph I.7.5: Single parents among women aged 15-24, Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey
2009, (%)
EU-27 This situation has changed slightly in recent years.

Between 2005 and 2009, young adults in their
twenties seemed to be leaving the family home a
BE
little earlier, whereas young adults over 30 were
CZ remaining somewhat longer with their parents.
DE
IE The proportion of young adults (aged 25-29) living
ES with their parent(s) varies from 15% or less in
FR France, the Netherlands and Finland (Table I.7.4)
to 55% or more in Bulgaria, Italy, Malta, Slovenia
NL
and Slovakia. It exceeds 50% in 16 Member
PL States. Cultural aspects or different lifestyle
UK arrangements, which are difficult to assess, may
help to explain differences between countries.
0 2 4 6 8 10
A 2001 Eurobarometer survey (47), suggested that

Several Member States are missing due to low values and/or
small sample size material difficulties are the main obstacle to young
Source: Eurostat (online data code lfst_hhaceday) people leaving the parental home. These material
difficulties reflect changes in the housing and
labour markets (for instance, lack of job security),
7.4.3. Age on leaving the parental home and
or the conditions under which young people pursue
entering labour market
their education. These difficulties are also reflected
Young adults in Northern and Western European in the large number of young people living with
countries leave the parental home earlier than in their parents even if they are employed. In 2008,
other EU Member States. In all countries, women this was the case for 51.1% of young adults aged
tend to leave their parents’ home earlier than men 18-34 in EU-27, of whom 36% held a temporary
(Graph I.7.6). The main reason is probably that work contract.
women, on average, marry or move in with a
partner at a younger age than men.
(47) Eurobarometer 151, 2001: 67% of young adults aged 15-24

quoted material difficulties as the main reason for not
leaving their family home. Such difficulties were the main
reason in all countries except Luxembourg and the
Netherlands.
71
Table I.7.4: Young adults living with at least one parent

and no spouse/partner, by sex and age
group, 2009, (%)
Men Women
25-29 30-34 25-29 30-34
EU-27 41 20 26 11
BE 34 12 19 6
BG 66 36 40 18
CZ 51 24 31 10
DE 26 11 12 4
EE 24 15 15 (6)
IE 33 16 20 9
EL 66 42 51 23
ES 57 26 40 16
FR 18 7 8 3
IT 70 35 52 19
CY 44 17 27 10
LV 48 29 35 21
LT 40 21 23 14
LU 37 7 23 (4)
HU 57 28 36 16
MT 80 38 59 22
NL 19 5 7 (2)
AT 35 17 20 8
PL 50 23 34 15
PT 61 28 43 18
RO 54 24 29 12
SI 72 38 45 18
SK 68 38 46 23
FI 12 6 4 (2)
UK 26 11 14 5
Figures in brackets have low reliability. No data available for
Denmark and Sweden.
The young adults' difficulties in forming new

families and the rising proportion of the elderly are
decreasing the average household size in the EU.
72
Part II
Borderless Europeans
1. INTRODUCTION
Not only is EU-27 population ageing rapidly; it is The Eurobarometer 'new' European survey
also becoming more diverse and more connected The Eurobarometer (EB) is an opinion survey carried out
across borders. periodically using a standard questionnaire and an ad-hoc
questionnaire on specific topics (EBS, special). Interviewers
visit some 25,000 EU nationals – about 1000 per country –
Firstly, the migratory movements of the past and put the questions to them face-to-face. Non-EU
nationals are excluded from the survey. Partly making up
century have intensified. The great majority of EU- for the small sample and limited coverage, this
27 Member States have become a pole of attraction methodology yields high response and accuracy rates.
for migrants. In recent years, non-EU citizens have The EBS 337 (48) on mobility was carried out in November
been joining EU countries at a rate of 1 to 2 2009. Respondents provided information on their cross-
border mobility experience, knowledge and attitudes.
million per year and intra-EU mobility has also
increased. At the same time, the children and The EBS 346 (49) on new Europeans was carried out in
March 2010. Respondents provided information about the
grandchildren of migrants have been integrating transnational components in their ancestry, life history,
into their host countries. relatives and knowledge/culture. In addition, they were
asked about their attachment to their own country, other
countries and the EU; the likelihood that they would move
Secondly, in recent years, new forms of mobility abroad in the future; their feeling of belonging to minority
have been emerging. Young, well-educated or majority groups and the importance of the EU for them.
Whereas the response rate was generally high, some
Europeans take advantage of opportunities to respondents could not, or did not, answer all the questions,
work, study and live abroad. They usually move making it impossible to report on the degree of
connectedeness for some 17% of respondents.
for short periods of time but are much more
numerous than long-term migrants; they go largely
unnoticed by official statistics, which tend to focus
on longer term migration. These ‘new’ or ‘borderless’ (50) Europeans do not
make up a closed, well-defined group; rather, the
These new migrants bring with them connections majority of citizens experience cross-border
to another Member State or to a country outside connections to varying degrees. For most of them,
the EU. These connections may be the result of the connections are moderate, involving regular
permanent migration, an extended stay in another holidays to a favourite location abroad, following
country or strong personal ties with people in or
from other countries, their culture and their (48) see
customs. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_337_e
n.pdf
49
( ) see
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_e
n.pdf
50
( ) The Eurobarometer report focuses on counting EU citizens
with varying degrees of connections; this report underlines
the connections themselves in degrees of borderless-ness.
Table II.1.1: Borderless Europeans: main findings
By 2008, 12.7% of EU-27 residents aged 15-74 were foreign-born or had at least one foreign-born
parent. By 2060, the proportion is projected to double and reach over 25%.
The potential for sustained immigration to the EU is strong. Many EU-27 Member States rank at the
top of the scale of attractiveness as destinations for migrants from other countries in the world
In the four Member States with the largest cohorts of second-generation migrants and reliable data
(BE, FR, NL, AT, UK), integration typically occurs two-to-three generations, when the children of
migrants come close to the education levels and approach the labour market levels of local
populations; overall in the EU-27, by the third generation, grandchildren of migrants no longer feel
that they are part of a minority group.
A new group of mobile Europeans is emerging: they tend to be younger and better educated than
the average in the host country; and they often move between countries for short periods of time.
People who are connected to other countries (both traditional migrants and 'new' mobile people)
tend to be more proficient in foreign languages and to envisage moving abroad for study or work.
75
Box II.1.1: Cross-border Migration, Mobility and Marriages
There are a small number of long-term migrants in

the EU, compared to, for instance, North-America. Table 1: Counting Borderless Europeans (% and
They are on the increase and, together with their millions)
descendants, are increasing the diversity in the EU % millions
1. Non-EU citizens living in the EU 4 20
populations. 2. EU citizens who were born abroad 10 50
3. EU citizens born in the country but
However, a lot more people are experiencing whose parents or grandparents were born 5 25
abroad
shorter-term forms of mobility and intermarrying.
While these change populations less dramatically 4. EU citizens with work/study experience 11 55
abroad or have/had a foreign partner (1)
and in subtler ways, they help spreading a sense of
cross-border connections. (1) Group 4. excludes those born abroad or with
foreign-born ancestry
Source: 1. Eurostat online data code migr_pop1ctz; 2.-4.
Table 1 presents rough estimates of the numbers of Eurobarometer EBS 346
people falling into different categories, made non-
overlapping. Apart from the 20 million (4%) non-
In total, people with migration background,
EU citizens living in the EU (Eurostat population
mobility experience or foreign spouse/partners
statistics), the estimates are based on a
represent one third of Europe’s population, or
Eurobarometer survey, which only includes EU-
around 150 million people.
nationals in its sample.
In addition to them, many more people, not
About 10% of EU citizens do not live in the
belonging to any of the above groups, are
country in which they were born. An additional 5%
connected to other countries in other ways. They
have at least one parent or grandparent who was
speak foreign languages, including non European
born abroad.
languages, have friends or relatives abroad or from
abroad, follow foreign news, eat foreign foods.
A fourth major group are EU citizens who have
worked or studied abroad or live or have lived with
a foreign partner. Not counting here are those with
foreign ancestry – up to their grandparents -, they
make up a further 11% of EU nationals.
foreign news and the like. For a smaller proportion increased mobility within the EU leads to an ‘ever
of them, being married to a foreigner or having closer union’ at a personal level.
lived or been born abroad, the connections are
stronger. Increasing cross-border connectedness of Europe’s
population has important implications for future
Official statistics provide some information on the migration patterns. It creates a more cohesive and
cross-border connectedness of Europeans. They inclusive society. It has the potential to make
categorise Europe’s population as nationals and labour markets more efficient through cross-border
non-nationals (EU and non-EU) or native-born and matching of supply and demand. It promotes the
foreign-born. Some surveys also collect exchange of knowledge and experience.
information about citizenship at birth, as in the
case of a special module of the Labour Force At the same time, as people become more
Survey covering respondents’ parents. connected across country boundaries, they also
become more prone to short- and long-term
This part of the report draws largely on sources migration. This influences population dynamics
such as the Eurobarometer. It tries to go beyond and, more importantly, it exposes policy makers to
the traditional dichotomies, which tend to divide the risk of unprecedented responses from the
populations into nationals and foreigners or people public to their demographic policies. Europeans
with and without a background of migration; such with connections to other countries are more aware
categorisations are certainly relevant, but they of opportunities elsewhere and more willing to
should be supplemented with indications of past move. They are up to four times more likely to do
migration experiences. The Eurobarometer offers so than those without any foreign experience or
some information about the degree to which background. For instance, Member States
76
Part II
experiencing social and economic difficulties

could rapidly lose people, not just to other EU
Member States but also to other developed
countries such as the United States, or to the
countries of origin of migrants present in the EU,
such as Turkey. The people most likely to move
are the younger and better educated, so that the
impact on economic growth in the countries
affected could be significant.
77
2. MIGRANTS ACROSS GENERATIONS
This chapter presents a time-line of migration Table II.2.1 shows the impact of migration on the
within and into the EU. It draws mostly on official population size of different Member States (51).
sources for the most part and focuses on
traditional, long-term migration as opposed to the The population of Germany and France has
new forms of mobility introduced in the next increased by 16% and 17% respectively as a result
chapter. of migration. An increase of more than 10% can
also be noted in Belgium, Spain, Austria and
Migratory flows over past decades have had a Sweden, whereas in the United Kingdom
significant impact on the current population size in migration has only resulted in a 5% increase in
most Member States, although the picture is very total population. Portugal (-21%) and Bulgaria (-
diverse. Some Member States have lost people. 14%), on the other hand, would have had a larger
Others have gained as a result of migration. For population without migration. In the case of Italy,
some member States, the impact of past migrations recent immigration has compensated for the effects
is far larger than is revealed by statistics on foreign of emigration losses at the beginning of the period
nationals. under review.
Generally speaking, long-term migrants and their Table II.2.1: Differences between actual 2007 population
descendants integrate fairly well as regards and 2007 population based on projections
that exclude migration from 1960, age 0-79
education outcomes, and less well as regards (thousands and % of actual population)
labour market outcomes, into their host countries
thousands %
within the second generation. In so doing, they
tend to retain some of their traditions, for instance BE 1,204 12
the language of their ancestors. BG -1,010 -14
CZ -19 0
Europe continues to attract migrants and the share DK 346 7
of migrants and their descendants is projected to DE 12,352 16
increase in the future.
EE 106 8
ES 5,555 13
2.1. HOW MIGRANTS SHAPE THE STRUCTURE FR 10,047 17
OF EU-27 POPULATIONS IE 158 4
IT 1,867 3
The migration flows of the past decades have left
LT -42 -1
their mark on population size and structure in
many Member States. In this section, some HU 46 0
simulations are presented that compare the NL 1,412 9
population in 2007 with what it would have been if AT 1,139 14
no migration had taken place since 1960. These PL -1,731 -5
simulations take account of the fact that PT -2,144 -21
immigrants settle down and have partners, children
SK -182 -3
and grandchildren in the host country.
FI -243 -5
Fertility and mortality rates are used to calculate a SE 1,226 14
theoretical population that would have been UK 2,671 5
observed in 2007 had there been no migration. It is The data necessary for this analysis was not available for
possible, through a comparison with the actual Cyprus, Greece, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Romania and
Slovenia.
population, to visualise the long-term impact of Source: D. Philipov and J. Schuster, see note (51), (Table 5)
migration on both total population numbers and
age structure. Where applicable, a comparison with
the number of non-nationals allows visualising the (51) Data are from D. Philipov and J. Schuster ‘Effect of
'hidden' impact of migration, that is the impact migration on population size and age composition in
beyond the proportion of non-nationals from Europe’, 2010, at
http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/download/edrp_2_10.pdf, following
official statistics. ‘method 2’; the source for the foreign population in the
Graphs is Eurostat (online data code migr_pop1_ctz)
78
Part II
Graphs II.2.1-5 illustrate the impact of migration few additional people at very young ages,
across the age range of five selected countries, representing the children of recent immigrants.
representing five different types of effects that
migrants have had on the populations of EU Graph II.2.2: Spain, population without migration since 1960
and migration effect, including non-nationals,
Member States. by age group, 2007 (millions)
non-nationals in 2007
France (Graph II.2.1) has been receiving migrants effect of migration since 1960 (excludes non-nationals in 2007)
theoretical 2007 population without migration since 1960
for a long time, and their impact is particularly 4
visible in the younger age groups which, in the

3
absence of immigration would be about 25%
smaller. In 2007, the actual population was about 2
60.5 million; had there been no migration, it would
have been only 50.5 million. Of the 10 million 1
difference caused by migration since 1960, 3.5
million is made up by the non-nationals in 2007; 0
0-4 5-9 10- 15- 20- 25- 30- 35- 40- 45- 50- 55- 60- 65- 70- 75-
the outstanding 6.5 million are a wider 14 19 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79
demographic impact taking into account the
The effect of migration since 1960, dashed area, is
immigrants' children and grandchildren (52). estimated as the difference between the actual 2007
Moreover, the difference is larger at the younger population and the population projected from 1960 to 2007
age groups. The vast majority of these additional using only natural growth.
Source: D. Philipov and J. Schuster; Eurostat; see note (51)
young people are French nationals, whereas in the
older age groups immigrants are much less likely
to have acquired French citizenship. Ireland (Graph II.2.3(53)) has been traditionally an
emigration country, but in recent years – before the
Graph II.2.1: France, population without migration since
recession – it experienced a significant inflow of
1960 and migration effect, including non- migrants, including Irish nationals returning to
nationals, by age group, 2007 (millions) their country. As a result, the working-age
non-nationals in 2007
effect of migration since 1960 (excludes non-nationals in 2007) population is significantly larger than it would
5 have been in the absence of migration. In the
youngest age groups, however, past emigration has
4 left a small deficit. The 2008 recession has
dampened the effect of immigration to Ireland, as
3
many foreigners have left the country.
2
Graph II.2.3: Ireland, population without migration since

1 1960 and migration effect, by age group, 2007
(100,000s)
0
0-4 5-9 10- 15- 20- 25- 30- 35- 40- 45- 50- 55- 60- 65- 70- 75- without migration since 1960 actual population
14 19 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79
5
The effect of migration since 1960, dashed area, is
estimated as the difference between the actual 2007 4
population and the population projected from 1960 to 2007
using only natural growth. 3
Source: D. Philipov and J. Schuster; Eurostat; see note (51)
2
Spain (Graph II.2.2) presents a very different 1

picture, due to the fact that it has only recently
0
experienced large-scale immigration. As a result, 0-4 5-9 10- 15- 20- 25- 30- 35- 40- 45- 50- 55- 60- 65- 70- 75-
the population increase resulting from immigration 14 19 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79
is concentrated in the working-age population. The effect of migration since 1960, dashed area, is
Most of the additional population resulting from estimated as the difference between the actual 2007
population and the population projected from 1960 to 2007
migration since 1960 (some 5.6 million) is made using only natural growth.
up of foreign nationals, although there are also a Source: D. Philipov and J. Schuster; see note (51)
(52) This does not represent an estimate of the number of (53) A line graph has been used to make show that the lines
children and grand-children of immigrants since 1960. representing the actual and hypothetical populations cross.
79
Portugal’s population today is significantly smaller Graph II.2.5: Lithuania, population without migration since
1960 and migration effect, by age group, 2007
than it would have been in the absence of (100,000s)
migration (Graph II.2.4). In 2007, the total
population was slightly over 10 million; if there without migration since 1960 actual population
had been no migration, it would have been well 3

over 12 million. Portuguese nationals represent the
largest group of foreigners in Luxembourg and
2
France. The effect of emigration is visible across
almost the entire age range of the population, with
the exception of the very old age group. 1
Graph II.2.4: Portugal, actual population, including non-

nationals, and population without migration 0
since 1960, by age group, 2007 (100,000s) 0-4 5-9 10- 15- 20- 25- 30- 35- 40- 45- 50- 55- 60- 65- 70- 75-
14 19 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79
actual population in 2007 The effect of migration since 1960, dashed area, is
estimated as the difference between the population
10
projected from 1960 to 2007 using only natural growth and
9
the actual 2007 population.
8
Source: D. Philipov and J. Schuster; see note (51)
7
6
5
4
Like Lithuania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania
3 have experienced a decade of large population
2
losses also due to the emigration of young adults.
1
0
0-4 5-9 10- 15- 20- 25- 30- 35- 40- 45- 50- 55- 60- 65- 70- 75-
14 19 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79
2.2. INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND THEIR
The effect of migration since 1960, dashed area, is DESCENDANTS ACROSS GENERATIONS
estimated as the difference between the population
projected from 1960 to 2007 using only natural growth and
the actual 2007 population.
This section presents new data on the second- and
Source: D. Philipov and J. Schuster; Eurostat; see note (51) third-generation migrants. The data from the 2008
ad-hoc module of the EU Labour Force Survey (54)
Some Central and Eastern European Member allows estimating the education levels and labour
States have recently become emigration countries market outcome by place of birth of the respondent
on a significant scale. Lithuania (Graph II.2.5) is a and their parents. The data from the Eurobarometer
case in point. Emigration resulted in a population 346, limited to EU-27 citizens, allows estimating
deficit among the prime working-age groups, the feeling of belonging to a minority group and
which also led to fewer children being born in the the knowledge of foreign languages by place of
country. birth of the respondents and of their parents and
grandparents.
2.2.1. Second-generation migrants
This sub-section focuses on the traditional, broad

definition of second-generation migrants, as
anyone who was local-born, but who has at least
one parent born in another country, including
another EU Member State. However, a special
case is made for people whose parents where born
in another EU-27 Member State. The analysis
covers labour market outcomes.
(54) In 2008 the Labour Force Survey included an ad-hoc

module which also covered the place of birth of the
respondents' parents. Data are available for most Member
States.
80
Part II
The percentage of people aged 25-54 is only Table II.2.3: Unemployment rates of men aged 25-54 by
significantly high in Belgium, France, Italy, the place of birth, own and of parents, 2008
Netherland, Austria and the United Kingdom (55). Born

local-born with parents born
In other countries labour market outcome statistics, abroad
abroad local
total EU-27
especially for unemployment, generally lack the
BE 14.0 12.1 (8.9) 3.3
necessary reliability. CZ (4.7) 5.0 5.5 2.6
ES 14.3 10.7 10.6 7.6
Globally, employment rates of second-generation FR 11.1 8.9 : 4.4
migrants converge towards those with local-born IT 5.3 (4.7) : 4.6
parents. However, this convergence is hampered NL 5.0 (3.4) : 1.2
by persisting high unemployment. AT 5.5 (4.8) : 2.1
UK 6.0 4.7 3.8 3.6
Unemployment Figures in brackets have low reliability. The figures for

Germany, Finland and Sweden are omitted because they
Unemployment rates of the foreign-born are are affected by very high rates of non-responses; the figures
always higher than those of the native-born with for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia are omitted
because of the exceptional nature of their second-
native-born parents. This applies to both sexes. generation immigrants. Parents are considered as born
abroad when at least one parent is.
Table II.2.2: Unemployment rates of women aged 25-54 by
place of birth, own and of parents, 2008
local-born with parents born
Born
abroad Employment
abroad local
total EU-27 Employment rates improve from the first to the
BE 14.1 12.8 10.2 4.5 second generation. Among the women, data from
CZ 10.6 10.9 11.6 5.1
the Netherlands show the fastest convergence;
ES 15.1 21.5 22.1 10.8
FR 12.8 8.9 : 6.6 second generation foreigners have the same
IT 11.3 (7.3) : 7.5 employment rates as those with local-born parents
LU 5.5 (5.4) (5.6) (3.0) (Table II.2.4).
NL 6.0 (2.8) : 2.1
UK 5.5 4.6 3.6 3.2 Table II.2.4: Employment rates of women aged 25-54 by
place of birth, own and of parents, 2008
Figures in brackets have low reliability. The figures for local-born with parents born
Germany, Finland and Sweden are omitted because they Born
abroad
are affected by very high rates of non-responses; the figures abroad local
total EU-27
for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia are omitted
because of the exceptional nature of their second- BE 53.4 62.2 66.3 79.0
generation immigrants. Parents are considered as born CZ 68.8 70.8 70.0 75.6
abroad when at least one parent is. IE 66.2 73.2 72.9 70.2
EL 55.7 55.9 50.0 62.9
ES 65.9 60.4 61.3 66.0
Among the women, unemployment remains high FR 58.8 74.9 78.7 80.5
even at the second generation, although in France IT 56.7 67.5 68.6 60.9
CY 78.7 73.9 76.9 76.4
it becomes substantially lower (Table II.2.2). In
LU 68.9 72.4 71.6 69.5
Spain, it becomes higher at the second generation. HU 68.0 73.1 74.3 67.9
NL 62.5 83.4 83.5 83.5
Among the men (Table II.2.3), unemployment for AT 70.8 78.8 80.7 82.6
the native-born with foreign-born parents is PL (65.1) 68.8 59.7 70.7
substantially lower than for the foreign-born, PT 78.5 81.9 : 76.0
although still far higher than for those with native- SK 81.4 79.6 81.1 72.8
born parents. UK 62.6 75.1 77.5 77.8
Figures in brackets have low reliability. The figures for
(55) Most of the second-generation migrants in Estonia, Latvia are affected by very high rates of non-responses; the figures
and Slovenia are the result of exceptional historical events. for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia are omitted
The data from Germany, Finland and Sweden are not because of the exceptional nature of their second-
reliable due to the high non-response rate. In addition, generation immigrants. Parents are considered as born
Germany does not collect information on country of birth abroad when at least one parent is.
in the Labour Force Survey. In the 2008 LFS ad-hoc Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey
module, citizenship rather than country of birth was
surveyed for the respondents' parents. Therefore, these
countries are excluded from the analysis.
81
Among other countries with many second- their integration is perceived as being relatively
generation immigrants, a fast convergence is difficult. In addition, the analysis focuses on
registered in France, Austria and the United education in addition to employment. This is
Kingdom. In Belgium, on the other hand, because immigrants from non-EU-27 countries
employment rates remain low after one generation. tend to have low education rates, and more
In Italy, second generation migrant women have specifically high rates of low education (ISCED 0-
higher employment rate than local-born with local- 2).
born parents.
The age group used in the comparisons for the
Table II.2.5: Employment rates of men aged 25-54 by detailed country analysis is restricted to 25-49. In
place of birth, own and of parents, 2008 analysing the education attainment, this narrow
local-born with parents born age group limits the influence of trends in
Born
abroad education; in analysing the employment rates, it
abroad local
total EU-27
serves to remove the influence of late-joining and
BE 76.6 76.9 82.1 90.2
CZ 88.8 88.1 87.2 92.4
early-exiting from the labour market.
DK 81.7 89.4 : 93.0
IE 85.9 87.4 86.8 86.7 The percentage of people aged 25-49 born in EU-
EL 93.9 84.3 75.9 90.5 27 with one or both parents born outside EU-27 is
ES 80.4 80.7 79.9 85.3 significant in only a few countries, primarily
FR 81.4 84.7 86.0 90.5 Belgium, France, the Netherland, Austria and the
IT 89.0 89.8 89.5 87.0 United Kingdom; these countries are the focus of
CY 83.9 84.6 81.3 93.8
analysis below (Graph II.2.6).
LU 88.8 92.1 92.3 92.2
HU 87.4 79.3 77.8 80.9
NL 82.1 90.8 90.4 95.0 Globally, education rates of the non-EU-born
AT 85.1 89.7 92.2 92.1 appear to converge fast after one generation; the
PL 88.5 78.7 79.7 83.9 convergence is slower for employment rates.
PT 89.2 80.7 : 87.8
RO 81.4 97.3 : 87.8
SK 87.1 87.8 89.6 85.9 Education
UK 84.1 86.7 86.9 88.5
Integration with respect to educational attainment
The figures for Germany, Finland and Sweden are omitted
because they are affected by very high rates of non-
occurs rapidly in most countries for women aged
responses; the figures for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 25-49 (Table II.2.3). For reasons explained above,
Slovenia are omitted because of the exceptional nature of the analysis below focuses on the share of the
their second-generation immigrants. Parents are considered
as born abroad when at least one parent is. population with low educational attainment
Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey (ISCED 0-2).
The patterns observed for the women also apply to The gap between the non-EU-born and the EU-
the men, although foreign-born men have higher born with both EU-born parents is almost 15
employment rates and a smaller gap compared to percentage points for the women and over 12 for
local-born than women. Here employment rates the men. For both sexes,
rise fast in the second generation in The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Table • The EU-born with both non-EU-born parents
II.2.5). In Belgium, there is hardly any have the same share (zero gap) as those both
improvement, except for foreigners from other parents born in the EU
EU-27 Member States. In Italy, first and second
generation migrants have higher employment rate • The EU-born with one non-EU-born parent
than local-born with local-born parents. have even lower share, that is, even better
education, than those with both parents born in
the EU. Having a non-EU-born mother or
2.2.2. Second-generation migrants from non-
father actually increases the likelihood of
EU countries
remaining in education beyond ISCED 2.
This sub-section focuses on ‘non-EU-born’, i.e.,
the residents who were born outside EU-27; this
applies to both the respondents and their parents.
The focus on the non-EU-born was chosen because
82
Part II
Graph II.2.6: Resident population aged 25-49 born in EU-27, by birth-place of parents, 2008 (%)
one parent born outside the EU both parents born outside the EU
10
0
EU-27 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
The bars for Germany, Finland and Sweden are omitted because they are affected by very high rates of non-responses; the
bars for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia are omitted because of the exceptional nature of their second-generation
immigrants. The EU figures are computed only on the Member States shown.
These EU-level results mask large differences may partly explain their employment patterns (see
among individual member States. The educational Tables II.2.8 and II.2.9).
gap at the second generation is not null for all
countries. Among Member States with large Table II.2.7: Men aged 25-49 with ISCED 0-2 level of
second-generation immigrant populations, it is still education, by place of birth, own and of
parents, 2008 (%)
positive in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and
Non-EU Born in the EU
Austria and negative in the United Kingdom. born Parents born outside the EU
(Table II.2.6). 2 1 none
EU-27 38.6 26.4 19.5 26.2
Table II.2.6: Women aged 25-49 with ISCED 0-2 level of BE 37.4 34.3 20.6 21.9
education, by place of birth, own and of IE 9.0 . (17.9) 26.9
parents, 2008 (%) EL 61.0 (31.5) (22.2) 31.3
Non-EU Born in the EU ES 44.9 27.2 28.4 41.8
born Parents born outside the EU FR 35.5 29.4 17.7 21.2
2 1 none IT 55.4 62.6 34.2 42.1
EU-27 38.1 23.6 18.2 23.4 NL 42.6 29.4 18.3 20.7
BE 39.9 33.8 24.1 16.6 AT 28.8 33.4 5.7 6.2
CZ 18.2 . (14.4) 7.2 PT 49.4 51.6 59.2 71.6
EL 42.7 (35.8) (20.4) 24.2 UK 17.4 20.9 19.8 22.3
ES 42.1 54.3 26.9 35.3 Figures in brackets have low reliability. The figures for
FR 43.4 25.2 21.3 20.1 Germany, Finland and Sweden are omitted because they
IT 44.5 . 14.8 33.9 are affected by very high rates of non-responses; the figures
LU 22.3 (3.5) . 29.0
NL 41.5 25.1 15.1 18.2 generation immigrants. The EU figures are computed only
AT 40.4 29.1 20.0 13.6 on the Member States shown.
PT 47.7 72.1 30.0 62.2 Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey
UK 22.2 17.1 13.8 23.4
Germany, Finland and Sweden are omitted because they Employment
are affected by very high rates of non-responses; the figures
for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia are omitted Similar results are found when analysing the
generation immigrants. The EU figures are computed only employment rates. In almost all Member States,
on the Member States shown. the employment rate of the non-EU-born
population is substantially lower than for the EU-
born with EU-born parents (Table II.2.4 and
Education rate convergence for women is slow in II.2.9); at EU-27 level this gap is over 13
Austria and, especially, Belgium. Here the lower percentage points for the women and 6 for the
education of people with one non-EU-born parent men.
83
• Among the EU-born, the employment gap Table II.2.9: Employment rates of men aged 25-49 by
between those with two non-EU-born parents place of birth, own and of parents, 2008
and those with both parents born in the EU is Non-EU Born in the EU
born Parents born outside the EU
about 7 percentage points for the women and 2 1 none
7.5 for the men; in other words, at the second EU-27 82.7 81.0 86.8 88.6
generation, most of the women's employment BE 69.3 60.9 77.7 90.6
gap between EU-born and non-EU-born CZ 89.2 (100.0) 97.2 92.7
disappears. On the other hand, for the men the DK 88.0 (77.7) . 93.3
IE 79.5 (78.8) 87.9 87.5
(smaller) gap actually increases at the second EL 95.4 89.7 83.8 91.2
generation when both parents are born outside ES 79.9 72.2 77.1 85.7
the EU. FR 81.4 79.3 87.2 90.7
IT 89.5 90.2 87.3 87.0
• Furthermore, women with one non-EU-born CY 77.3 . 92.0 93.8
LU 71.5 (83.1) 90.4 92.5
parent have even higher employment rates than NL 81.3 89.5 93.3 95.5
those with both parents born in the EU. Among AT 84.4 82.7 86.4 93.5
the men, the employment rates for those with PL 83.9 74.3 80.9 86.1
one non-EU-born parent are lower than those PT 87.9 83.2 82.4 88.6
UK 81.0 84.6 89.0 89.6
with both parents born in the EU; however, the
gap is very small. Germany, Finland and Sweden are omitted because they
are affected by very high rates of non-responses; the figures
Table II.2.8: Employment rates of women aged 25-49 by
place of birth, own and of parents, 2008 because of the exceptional nature of their second-
generation immigrants. The EU figures are computed only
Non-EU Born in the EU on the Member States shown.
born Parents born outside the EU Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey
2 1 none
EU-27 59.7 66.4 76.7 73.2
BE 46.3 41.5 75.5 80.1 2.2.3. Do people of foreign descent feel that
CZ 63.1 . 82.1 73.7 they belong to a minority?
IE 61.7 (51.6) 76.4 71.3
EL 54.8 62.7 73.4 65.0 Many migrants feel that they are part of a minority
ES 67.0 33.0 62.0 67.8
FR 52.7 64.0 76.5 81.1
group or that they are perceived by others as
IT 56.9 60.8 66.4 61.7 belonging to a minority. In the Eurobarometer
CY 82.4 . (69.8) 78.0 survey, 32.2% of foreign-born and only 7.4% of
LU 48.2 (77.4) 77.9 73.2 native-born residents felt that they belonged to a
HU 68.1 . (74.4) 67.7
minority group. Similar differences applied to
NL 58.4 79.1 87.4 85.2
AT 65.8 74.1 77.5 83.4 those who felt they were perceived by others as
PL 67.1 81.3 77.1 72.9 belonging to a minority.
PT 80.7 80.8 78.1 77.8
SK (72.1) . (69.1) 72.9 Over the generations, do people of foreign descent
UK 56.8 69.3 78.5 77.7
feel progressively more integrated? Although the
concept of integration is difficult to define, the
are affected by very high rates of non-responses; the figures Eurobarometer responses provide some indication
for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia are omitted of the extent to which integration is perceived to
generation immigrants. The EU figures are computed only be taking place.
on the Member States shown.
Feelings of belonging to a minority group vary
significantly depending on where people and their
The ‘catching-up’ effect after one generation is parents and grandparents were born (Table
particularly rapid in France, the Netherlands, II.2.10). The summary table presents findings for
Austria and the United Kingdom; it is slow in groups of people who are first-, second- or third-
Belgium and Austria. Interestingly, a slow generation migrants. The largest proportion of
convergence – and even a regression - of respondents who feel they belong to a minority
employment rates in Belgium contrasts with a fast (34.3%) is found among those who were born
convergence in the neighbouring Netherlands abroad, as were their parents and grandparents.
(Table II.2.9). The lowest proportion (6.6%) is for those who
were born in the country of residence as were their
parents and grandparents. The cases in between
84
Part II
show an almost linear relationship between advanced than in terms of employment. Further
ancestry and the feeling of belonging to a minority. study may be required to assess the integration of
different migrant groups/ethnicities in countries
Table II.2.10: EU nationals feeling that they belong to with different policies. In addition, many third-
minority or majority groups, by ancestry, 2010 generation migrants in the EU come from
(%)
Feeling of belonging
countries that now belong to EU-27. In the future,
to a larger proportion of new Europeans may be
a majority a minority descendants of migrants from outside Europe, and
group group
Respondent foreign born? their integration patterns could be different from
Yes 50.7 32.2 those observed here.
No 76.2 7.4
Parents and respondent foreign born?
Both parents foreign born, resp. native 58.2 23.6
One parent foreign born, resp. native 71.9 12.4
Grandparents, parents and respondent foreign born?
Two or more grandparent foreign born,
74.3 10.2
respondent and parent native-born
All grandparents native born 76.9 6.6
Source: Eurobarometer, EBS 346
Among native-born respondents with both parents

born abroad, 23.6% felt that they belong to a
minority, while only 12.4% of those with only one
parent born abroad felt so. 10.2% of native-born
respondents with native-born parents and two or
more foreign-born grand-parents felt that they
belonged to a minority group.
Respondents were also asked if they felt that others

perceived them as belonging to a minority group.
The percentages follow a similar pattern to that
shown in Table II.2.10.
2.2.4. Foreign descent and languages
The same pattern applies to language proficiency.

According to the Eurobarometer 346, among the
foreign-born population in the EU, 75% speak a
foreign language, compared to 45% of those born
in the country of residence. Of those with one
foreign-born parent (but not foreign born
themselves), 65% speak another language. Among
those with foreign-born grandparents (but not
themselves or their parents) about 60% speak
another language, which is well above the average
for those who were not born abroad. Positive
aspects of having foreign roots, such as speaking
other languages, tend to last longer over the
generations than do feelings of belonging to a
minority group.
The findings concerning education levels,

employment rates, feeling of belonging to a
minority group and speaking foreign languages
point to a progressive integration of migrants by
the third generation. At the second generation,
integration in terms of education levels is more
85
Box II.2.1: Are there many irregular migrants?
Official statistics aim to cover all migrants. Most irregular residents are non-EU-nationals. The
However, not all Member States are able to report Clandestino project estimated that between 1.9 and
fully on irregular migrants. 3.8 million people lived ‘irregularly’ in EU-27,
accounting for between 7% and 13% of estimated
The Clandestino(1) project has estimated the foreigners (2). A few may have been included in
number of ‘irregular’ residents and workers in official statistics.
several EU Member States, drawing on records
from border-enforcement agencies, police, labour The number of irregular immigrants appears to
inspections, regularisation exercises and NGOs. have been declining in recent years, mainly because
many are nationals of countries that have joined the
The project also yielded broad and patchy EU. As restrictions to the freedom of movement
breakdowns by gender, occupational status and have been gradually eased, many have found that
sector, and main geographical areas. The reliability their situation has been regularised. Also,
of this information in no way matches that of the periodically, governments allow the regularisation
wealth of the documentation that official statistics of immigrants who have entered the country
provide mainly on regular foreign residents. clandestinely. Hence the number of illegal
immigrants fluctuates considerably from one year
In 2008, an estimated 31 million foreigners lived in to the next.
EU-27 Member States, comprising 11.5 million
citizens from other EU Member States and 19.5
million non-EU nationals. (2) The percentages are computed over the total number
of non-nationals from official statistics. The
comparison between official data and Clandestino
estimates is undermined by partial coverage overlap
(1) The project was funded by the EU. See and the low reliability of Clandestino.
http://irregular-migration.hwwi.net/Home.6177.0.html
Under these assumptions about future immigration

2.3. HOW MIGRANTS CAN SHAPE FUTURE EU used in the population projections, the number of
POPULATIONS people of foreign background (either born abroad
or the children of foreign-born parents) is
Immigration is generally expected to continue to projected to increase significantly.
be an important determinant of population trends
in the EU, notably as the working-age population According to the ad-hoc module of the EU Labour
starts to shrink from 2014. Force Survey implemented in 2008 (see also
Graph II.2.7), 12.7% of the EU residents aged 15-
2.3.1. Migrants and their descendants in the 74 were foreign-born or had at least one foreign-
future born parent.
On the basis of the migration assumptions used in According to a research study (57), in 2060 this
the latest (2008) population projections by group may more than double and exceed 25% of
Eurostat (56) the total population in 2060 would be the population (Graph II.2.7) across all ages.
91 million people larger than it would have been in
the absence of migration. Due to immigration, the
population projection indicates that, in 2060,
Europe’s population is projected to be slightly
larger than today, even though the number of
deaths in the EU is expected to exceed the number (57) See G. Lanzieri, ‘Fewer, older and multicultural? A
of births. projection of the populations of the European Union
Member States by foreign/national background’. Paper for
the European Population Conference, Vienna, 1-4
September 2010
(56) see
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics http://epc2010.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId
/search_database, online data codes proj_08c. =100315
86
Part II
Graph II.2.7: Projected foreign-born population and their Table II.2.11: Foreign-born population by world area of
descendants, 2061 (%) residence (millions and %)
2011 2061 Number of foreign-born
EU-27 Millions %
EU-27 34.7 19.8
BE Europe, other 25.3 14.4
BG US + Canada 40.4 23.0
CZ
America, other 6.1 3.5
DK
Oceania 5.1 2.9
DE
Asia 48.2 27.4
EE
Africa 16.0 9.1
IE
Total 175.7 100.0
EL
ES
Source: Global Migrant Origin Database
FR
IT
The 34.6 million foreign-born in the various EU-
CY
LV
27 Member States include some 15 million who
LT were born in another Member State (see Table
LU I.5.3).
HU
MT
Europe is likely to continue to attract migrants.
NL
AT
The supply will depend to some extent on
PL economic and political developments in home
PT countries.
RO
SI
There are, however, signs that the potential for
SK
FI
further migration into the EU will not cease in the
SE near future. In a recent world-wide survey of
UK people's intention to migrate if the opportunity
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 arose, many more people declared that they would
migrate to an EU Member State than would
France without its overseas territories emigrate.
Source: Model 1 in Lanzieri G. (2010) see note (57)
Graph II.2.8 indicates the net migration that would

According to the same projections, the proportion be observed if all the expressed interest in
of people of foreign background may vary migrating materialised and people moved to their
substantially across Member States. In several target countries. Only EU Member States, the
countries, it would largely exceed 25% of the United States and three countries at the top of the
population, thereby increasing the number of EU destination list are included. The Graph shows the
residents with foreign ancestry. degree of attractiveness of EU Member States and
the potential for population increase through
In addition, among young adults the proportion of migration.
first and second generation immigrants is projected
be far greater than today.
2.3.2. The potential supply of migrants
EU-27 is host to about one fifth of world migrants

according to estimates by the Development
Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and
Poverty (58) (Table II.2.2).
(58) At http://www.migrationdrc.org/ . The figures differ from

those presented in Part I since they refer to a different year
and are based on a different methodology.
87
Graph II.2.8: Theoretical net migration (% of the population aged 15+)
100
80
60
40
20
0
EU BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR IT LV LT HU NL AT PL PT RO FI SE UK US CA CH AU
-20
-40
Theoretical net migration is the expected increase that would occur if all those who expressed their wish to migrate to a
specific country do so. Canada's expected increase is 160%, Switzerland's and Australia's 150%.
Source: Gallup, see http://www.gallup.com/poll/142364/Migration-Triple-Populations-Wealthy-Nations.aspx#2
The most attractive destinations include many EU

Member States. Almost all of them project gains
from the interest expressed in migrating. Generally
speaking, EU-15 Member States (members before
2004) tend to be prospective migrant destinations,
whereas newer Member States tend to be sources
of emigrants.
Across the world, a small number of countries are

at the top of the list of those expecting to gain from
immigration, the largest being Australia and
Canada. While the United States attracts more
migrants than the EU as a whole, some of the
larger EU-27 countries are just as attractive as the
United States in proportion to their adult
populations.
The increase in migration recorded at the start of

the 21st century, and which may continue, is not
the only driver of increased diversity. The number
of people of foreign descent – first or second
generation – is expected to grow on account of the
current, large migrant cohort of childbearing age.
The proportion of people of foreign descent will
depend on continuing migration flows and the
degree to which young migrants intermarry with
the host population (59). In turn, migration flows
will depend on the political, social and economic
situation in other countries, as well as the capacity
of EU Member States to integrate migrants.
(59) The higher fertility and mortality rates of migrants are an

additional, albeit less important, factor.
88
3. MOVING INTO AND ACROSS THE EU
In the early years of the European Economic in this section come from ad-hoc Eurobarometer
Community, citizens of Member States migrated surveys (60).
across Europe for long periods, in many cases for
life. They were often forced out of their countries While only 2% (61) of EU citizens currently live in
by poverty and joblessness. They were mostly another Member State, many more have had
men, although some migrated with their families. experiences of living abroad in the past. Some
They were generally moving from the south and 10% of the Eurobarometer respondents had lived
provided manpower for the industrial sectors in the and worked in another Member State (Graph
north. II.3.1).
Gradually, as the early intra-European migrants Also, most people experience work abroad as
were settling and integrating into the populations young adults in their twenties and thirties. Despite
they had joined, different groups and types of the fact that older citizens have had more time to
migrants began to emerge. accumulate experiences abroad, fewer of them
have taken advantage of the opportunity to do so.
Firstly, the origins and destinations of the main If more young adults had worked and lived abroad
flows changed. In 2008 nationals of non-EU-27 in the past century, larger numbers of older people
outnumbered EU nationals by more than 50% would be expected to have recorded work
(Graph I.4.4). Within the EU, almost every experience abroad in recent surveys. The
enlargement has brought a wave of migrants from Eurobarometer results below demonstrate that this
joining Member States into the other Member was not the case.
States. Earlier sources of migration, mostly
Mediterranean countries, including Italy and Graph II.3.1: EU nationals who have lived and worked
abroad in the past, by age, 2009 (%)
Spain, are now characterised by large-scale net
migration. In relative terms, perhaps the most 15%
notable change occurred in Ireland, which became

a pole of attraction for migrants, although the 2008
recession reversed the trend in 2009. 10%
Secondly, women are now much more likely to

migrate than in the past. In some cases, they move 5%
simply to join a spouse who has already migrated,

under family reunification schemes, but many
more women are migrating to take up service 0%
15-24 25-39 40-54 >54 total
sector jobs in the receiving countries.
Over the same period, the number and percentage
of migrants in the population have also increased. There are similarly striking and telling differences
by educational level. The Eurobarometer survey
Thirdly, and most importantly, mobility within analysed the data with reference to the age at
Europe has become increasingly dominated by which respondents left full-time education.
people moving for short periods of time. Most of
the new mobile population are young and well
educated. It is not that they are being forced out of
their countries of origin, rather that they are being
attracted by opportunities elsewhere. They move
independently or on secondment from their
companies. Like their predecessors, most of this
new mobile population are men.
(60) For a description of the Eurobarometer survey, see Chapter
II.1
Official statistics are not designed to study short- (61) This percentage is taken from official statistics. Since
term mobility since people who move for less than people who are abroad on short stays are largely excluded,
2% (about 12 million people) is an underestimate of the
one year are usually excluded. The indicators used amount of the movement of citizens to other Member
States.
89
Graph II.3.2: EU nationals who have lived and worked propensity for connectedness to other countries
abroad in the past, by age at end of full-time
education, 2009 (%)
that are linked to mobility
20%
Ancestry
An EU citizen is ‘Borderless by ancestry’ if s/he
15% - was born abroad, or
- has at least one parent who was born abroad, or
- has at least one grandparent who was born abroad.
10% The aggregate ‘Borderless Europeans by ancestry’ used in
this section includes anyone who matches one or more of
the above criteria and who had at least one grandparent
who was born as a non-national of the country where s/he
5%
(the grandchild) resides.
Life choices
0%
<16 16-19 >19 Still studying
An EU citizen is ‘Borderless by life choice’ if s/he
- has worked abroad for at least three consecutive months,
Source: Eurobarometer, EBS 337 or
- has studied abroad for at least half a school year, or
- lives/has lived with a foreign-born spouse/partner, and/or
Most EU citizens who have had experience of - owns a property abroad.
The aggregate ‘Borderless Europeans by life choice, no
work mobility are well educated. This contrasts ancestry’ used in this section includes anyone who
with the relatively low level of education of matches one or more of the above criteria and who does
not meet the ancestry requirements (definition above). The
(longer-term) migrants when compared to purpose of this exclusion is to avoid overlapping
nationals (see Part I, Chapter 5.4). Similarly, categories.
striking differences are found by occupational
3.1.1. Men are still more mobile
level: managers and self-employed workers are
much more likely to be mobile. Again, given that Whereas as many women as men have some cross-
the profiles are rather different from those of border ancestry, many more men than women have
current migrants, it can be concluded that most of experience of cross-border life choices (Graph
the periods of work experience abroad were short. II.3.3).
The Eurobarometer survey used in Graphs II.3.1 Graph II.3.3: Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life
and II.3.2 yielded similar results when EU citizens choices/no ancestry by sex, EU, 2010 (%)
were asked about periods of study abroad and the ancestry life choices (no ancestry)
experience of residing abroad without studying or
working. Female
Unlike more traditional patterns of migration, Male

these new short-term forms of mobility do not
enable people to leave difficult situations in their 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
own countries. Rather, they seem to offer short-

term opportunities for professional and personal Source: Eurobarometer EBS 346, 2010
development abroad. The new mobility is driven

more by ‘pull’ rather than ‘push’ factors. 3.1.2. Young adults across borders
The findings of the above analysis by age of

3.1. ANCESTRY AND LIFE CHOICES respondents reporting work experience abroad are
further reflected in the analysis by age of ancestry
A distinction has been made between traditional, and life choices as factors determining Europeans'
long-term migration and the more recent degree of connectedness.
phenomenon of shorter-term mobility. A further
distinction is made in this section between It takes young EU nationals some time before they
‘ancestry’ and ‘life choices’ as factors determining feel attached to other countries and at ease with
European connectedness. crossing national borders. However, younger
adults are found to have more opportunities for
The term ‘life choices’ is used, for example, to cross-border connections, suggesting that overall
describe individuals who are living or have lived rates could rise in the future.
with a foreign spouse and/or own a property
abroad. These are considered as indicators of the
90
Part II
According to the Eurobarometer survey, the largest Graph II.3.5: Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life-
choices/no ancestry by age at end of full-
number of respondents with connections abroad is time education, EU 2010 (%)
found among young adults, aged 25-34 (Graph
ancestry life-choices (no ancestry)
II.3.4). This applies to connections both by
50%
ancestry and by life choice abroad.
40%
Graph II.3.4: Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life-
choices/no ancestry by age group, 2010, (%) 30%
ancestry life-choices (no ancestry)
50 20%
40 10%
30
0%
20 <14 16-19 >19 Still Studying
10 Source: Eurobarometer EBS 346

0
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 >64 The link between education and cross-border
experiences interacts with the age effect since the
Source: Eurobarometer EBS 346
younger generations also display higher levels of
educational attainment. The implication is that, in
3.1.3. The better educated are more the future, the proportion of those with connections
connected across borders will increase and extend into older
age groups as a result of the ageing of the current
Education plays an important role in cross-border young and connected generation, and due to
experience. Better educated people are much more increasing levels of education.
likely to seek experiences abroad.
The education factor is strongest for life choices, 3.1.4. More cross-border connections for
especially among respondents who are not managers
connected by ancestry (Graph II.3.5). Of those
Among the socio-occupational groups identified in
who remained in education until age 20 or above,
the Eurobarometer survey, European managers
about one in four made important life choices
seem more likely to have foreign connections than
connecting them to other countries. These scores
other groups (Graph II.3.6). Whereas they score
are well above (double) the rates for those who
relatively high on ancestry, they are far more likely
studied until the age of 16-19 or left education
to have made life choices abroad than respondents
before the age of 16 (one third higher). This
in other occupations. Manual workers and students
finding applies to all high scores for life choices,
are also relatively often of foreign ancestry; for
the effect being stronger for those who have
manual workers, this may be explained by the
studied abroad.
characteristics of traditional migrants, their
children and grandchildren.
Unemployed respondents tend to report a high

incidence of foreign ancestry, which may in turn
be explained by higher unemployment rates among
migrants and their descendants. Students most
frequently refer to foreign ancestry, although few
of them were born in another country (6%), which
is slightly below the overall proportion of those
born in another country (7%). Many are the
children of foreign-born parents.
91
Graph II.3.6: Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life- Table II.3.2: Attachment to the EU, by ancestry and life-
choices/no ancestry by occupation, EU, 2010 choices, 2010 (%)
(%)
Connected by ancestry 50
ancestry life choices (no ancestry) Connected by life choices 55
Neither 51
Students
total 51
Retired
Unemployed Source: Eurobarometer EBS 346
Homemaker (1)
Manual workers
Other white collars
Both forms of connectedness also make little
Managers difference to feelings of attachment to the EU.
Self-employed
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 3.2.2. Likelihood of moving abroad
(1) ‘Homemaker’ refers to people without an occupation Many more respondents of foreign ancestry (23%)
who look after the home expect to move abroad compared to those without
any foreign ascendants (6%).
Part of the explanation is that many of the

3.2. CONNECTEDNESS AND ATTITUDES
respondents are of foreign ancestry ‘by choice’
insofar as they migrated to their current host
Respondents with ancestry or life-choice
country at an adult age and are, therefore, of
connections tend to behave and feel differently
foreign ancestry because they chose to move
from other respondents. They are more likely to
abroad. They are distinguished from those who
feel an attachment to other countries and to
were born in the host country of foreign ancestors
envisage moving abroad to work, study or to live.
and those who moved there with their families.
They are also more likely to feel that they belong
People who are connected by life choices may be
to a minority, although this applies in particular to
more likely to repeat the move abroad since they
people of foreign ancestry.
have already shown a readiness to cross borders.
3.2.1. Attachment to specific foreign countries Overall, respondents of foreign descent and/or
and the EU having had experiences abroad are almost four
times more likely than those not of foreign descent
Respondents with foreign connections are more
to consider moving abroad. Those connected by
likely to feel attached to other countries as well as
life choice (24 %) are as likely as those connected
the EU, whether they are connected by ancestry or
by ancestry (23 %) to move abroad (Table II.3.3).
life choices.
Table II.3.3: Likelihood of moving abroad in the future, by
Table II.3.1: Attachment to specific foreign countries, by ancestry and life choices, 2010 (%)
ancestry and life-choices, 2010 (%)
Fairly or very likely
Connected by ancestry 74
Connected by life choices 77 Connected by ancestry 23
Neither 41 Connected by life choices 24
total 51 Neither 6
total 11
Source: Eurobarometer EBS 346
Both ancestry and life choices make a difference

when it comes to being attached to other countries, The high propensity to move (move again, in many
suggesting that experience and background have a cases) is a sign that in the past moving has proven
lasting effect. to be a beneficial experience; it may be part of a
wider history of mobility, or be explained by
having a partner from another country, insofar as
people may acquire a willingness to move to a
partner’s country.
92
4. FURTHER WAYS OF CONNECTING TO OTHER
COUNTRIES
Moving abroad, or having a foreign The comparison of outgoing and incoming flows
partner/spouse, creates strong links with other in each country provides an indication of the
countries. There are also other, less direct ways in economic performance of a country in relation to
which people develop connections across borders. its neighbours. Luxembourg displays a very high
rate of cross-border commuting since a large
Some take up jobs in other countries while proportion of its work force (37%) resides abroad,
continuing to live in their own. In many such mainly in neighbouring Germany, France and
cases, they live near a border. Cross-border Belgium.
commuting is relatively common among the
closely-linked countries in the centre-north of the Graph II.4.1: Workers residing in another Member State and
residents working in another Member State,
EU (France, Germany and, especially, Belgium, among workers, 2009 (%)
Luxembourg and the Netherlands).
Residents who work in another Member State
Workers who reside in another Member State
Other people feel attached to the culture of another
EU-27
country. They speak the language, follow its news,
and spend holidays there regularly. This type of BE
BG
connectedness is far more widespread than for the CZ
links illustrated in previous chapter. DK
DE
EE
IE
GR
4.1. COMMUTING ACROSS BORDERS ES
FR
IT
CY
There are about one million cross-border workers LV
within the EU, representing 0.4% of the working LT
LU
population. They reside in one EU Member State HU
and work in another. About five times as many MT
NL
people (roughly 1% of EU's resident nationals) AT
PL
declare that they have been cross-border workers PT
at some time during their life (62). RO
SI
SK
FI
Most commuters live near a border in one country SE
and have a job just across the border; they UK
commute across the border daily or weekly. 0% 1% 2%
However, a few are in less common arrangements.

Values that fall outside the Graph are Belgium 2%; Estonia
These include seasonal workers, tele-workers, or 2.7%; Luxembourg 37.1%; Slovakia 5.5%.
people who divide their work across more than one Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey
location.
Other countries with a substantial proportion of
Graph II.4.1 sets out Labour Force Survey data, workers residing abroad are: the Czech Republic,
showing the percentage of workers who reside in Austria and the Netherlands, which receive
each Member State while working in another, as commuters from Slovakia and Belgium. In
well as the percentage of those who work in each addition, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland are
Member State while residing in another. commuting destinations for French, Dutch,
Swedish and British residents in the main.
As the Graph presents percentages, the main factor
is the geographical size of the country. In smaller Slovakia, by contrast, has the highest percentage of
countries, people are more likely to live or work workers who work abroad (half of them commute
closer to a border and to seek opportunities on the to the Czech Republic). Far behind in second place
other side. is Estonia, with many commuters to Finland; a
close third is Belgium, with commuters to
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
(62) See Eurobarometer EBS 337, November 2009
93
Graph II.4.2: EU nationals who have close friends who live abroad, 2010 (%)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
to be living in contact with communities that are

4.2. PERSONAL AND CULTURAL joined by people from abroad.
CONNECTIONS ACROSS BORDERS
Table II.4.1: EU nationals with foreign friends or relatives, by
The Eurobarometer survey revealed that a ancestry, 2010 (%)
Borderless European by ancestry
substantial minority of respondents have either yes no total
relatives (27%) or close friends (40%) abroad, or Close relatives living abroad 57 21 27
close friends of foreign origin in their own country Close friends living abroad 65 34 40
(29%). Close friends who moved from
56 23 29
abroad
The prevalence of this type of cross-border Source: Eurobarometer, EBS 346
connection is thus much higher than for the other
forms of connectedness considered in the previous Marked differences are found across Member
chapter, namely foreign ancestry and life choices. States for the three types of relationships
considered, reflecting the importance of emigration
Foreign ancestry is a major determinant of and immigration flows. At the higher end of the
connectedness through friends and relatives (Table spectrum are Luxembourg and Ireland. The
II.4.1). Many of the respondents with foreign percentage of people with close friends abroad by
ancestry moved from abroad and left friends and country is illustrated in Graph II.4.2.
relatives behind. In addition, they are more likely
Graph II.4.3: EU nationals who speak at least one other language (than that of the interview) (%)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
94
Part II
The Eurobarometer survey considered a number of Graph II.4.4: EU nationals who spend regularly holidays in
another country, 2010 (%)
cultural links to other countries. One important
indicator of cultural ties is fluency in at least one
EU-27
other language (Graph II.4.3). Almost one third of
the EU citizens questioned say that they are able to
BE
hold a conversation in a language other than that of
BG
the country in which they were interviewed.
CZ
DK
This proportion exceeds three quarters in
DE
Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Denmark, Lithuania
EE
and the Netherlands. It tends to be lower in the
IE
larger countries and in countries where English is
EL
widely spoken as the mother tongue. The United
ES
Kingdom and Ireland, together with Italy, are the
FR
countries with the lowest number of respondents
IT
fluent in a second language.
CY
LV
About 22% of EU nationals regularly spend their
LT
holidays in one particular country abroad (Table
LU
II.4.2). The percentages are generally higher in
HU
smaller countries. However, the percentage is also
MT
above the EU average in Germany and the United
NL
Kingdom.
AT
PL
Cultural links with other countries are more
common than other strong forms of connectedness, PT
RO
through ancestry or life choices, with which they
are likely to overlap (Table II.4.2). SI
SK
FI
Table II.4.2: EU nationals with cultural links to other
countries, by connectedness (ancestry and SE
life-choices), 2010 (%) UK
all 0 25 50 75 100
ancestry life choices
fluent in foreign language 34 62 66
eat foreign food 36 62 62 Source: Eurobarometer, EBS 346
follow foreign news 34 53 58
4.2.1. Seeking health care abroad

All cultural forms of connectedness to other
countries are clearly influenced by ancestry or life According to a Eurobarometer survey, some 4% of
choices. Whereas, on average, only about a third of EU nationals received medical treatment in another
respondents report cultural links to other countries, EU Member States in 2007 (63). Many found
about two-thirds of EU citizens with connections themselves in need of medical attention while on
through ancestry or life choices do so. The short visits abroad. Health care abroad is now
percentages are lower for respondents who facilitated by the Cross Border Healthcare
regularly spend holidays in another country. Here Directive, adopted in February 2011 (64).
the relative proportions for the whole population
and for EU citizens with connections abroad are
the same.
Although few EU citizens are of foreign ancestry

and few have an opportunity to experience life (63) see http://ec.europa.eu/health-
abroad, many more express their connections to eu/doc/crossbordereurobaro_en.pdf
64
other countries in more modest ways. ( ) see
http://ec.europa.eu/health/cross_border_care/policy/index_
en.htm
95
Part III
Annex - Demography and the Recession
1. INTRODUCTION
This brief section highlights the main findings

concerning demography and demographic policy
during and after the recent recession. It is not an
exhaustive analysis of the impact of the recession
on demography or demography policy.
It is too early to assess the impact of the recession

on fertility, mortality and family formation; this
may become more evident next year, so the next
report will include more evidence. However, there
are already some indications of the impact the
recession has had on migration, so the following
chapter will look at this.
Demography policy overlaps with other domains

which are analysed in other publications produced
by the European Commission and other EU
institutions:
• For an overview of the impact on social

protection:
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st
16/st16905.en10.pdf
• For a review of the measures taken on family

support, see the specific report:
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplwe
b/families/admintool/userfiles/file/Final%20rev
ised.pdf
• For the impact on employment and joblessness,

see the ‘Employment in Europe’ report:
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&
catId=113&newsId=948&furtherNews=yes
• For education and productivity, see the ‘2010

Joint Report on Education and Training’:
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st
05/st05394.en10.pdf
• For the impact on migration policies, see the

report from the ‘Independent Network of
Labour Migration and Integration Experts’:
http://www.labourmigration.eu/research/report/
12-migration-and-the-economic-crisis-
implications-for-policy-in-the-european-union
• For public finances, see the latest issue of the

European Economic Forecasts (Autumn 2010):
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/foreca
sts/2010_autumn/statistical_en.pdf
99
2. MIGRATION IN THE RECESSION
Economic and social conditions sooner or later of citizens from Latin America, with Ecuadorian,
affect demographic trends. The overall impact of Colombian, Peruvian, Brazilian, Argentinean,
the recent recession on demography will not be Paraguayan and Dominican citizenship.
known for quite some time and will depend to a
large extent on the speed, timing and scale of the Graph III.2.1: Immigration to selected EU-27 Member States
(Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom and
recovery in global and national economies. Italy), 2003-2009 (thousands)
ES DE UK IT
However, migration is one of the components of 1200
demography that is more responsive to change in 1000

economic and social conditions, both in sending
800
and receiving countries.
600
400
2.1. HOW THE RECESSION AFFECTED
MIGRATION 200
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Due to limitations in the availability of comparable
migration data for longer time series, data analysis
Source: Eurostat, online data code: migr_imm1ctz and
in this chapter will focus on the period 2003-2009 national data
and on selected EU-27 Member States only(65).
In Italy, the reduced inflow in 2009 compared to
2.1.1. EU Member States that received the 2008 was mainly due to a fall in the numbers of
largest number of immigrants citizens of other EU-27 Member States, in
particular Romanians (69 000 fewer in 2009 than
Analysis of immigration data for the period 2003- in 2008) and fewer immigrants with non-EU
2009 for the countries experiencing the highest citizenship, especially Albanians, Moldavians and
flows of immigration in the EU (over half a Moroccans.
million immigrants per year) has shown that the
recent recession has had varied effects on In the United Kingdom, the slight decrease in
migratory flows (see Graph III.2.1). Immigration immigration was mainly due to a fall in the
to Italy and Spain started to fall from 2007 to 2008 number of migrants from other EU-27 Member
and continued in 2009. In the United Kingdom, States (Graph III.2.2).
immigration was broadly stable from 2004, and
fell slightly in 2009. In Germany, the number of Graph III.2.2: Structure of immigrants to selected EU-27
immigrants has been slowly increasing from 2006 Member States (Spain, Italy and the United
Kingdom) by citizenship groups, 2008-2009
and continued to rise in 2009. (thousands)
Non-EU MS citizens EU MS citizens Nationals
In Spain, the overall decrease in the flow of 800
immigrants by almost one third (31 %) from 2008 700
to 2009 was mainly due to the reduced inflow of 600
non-EU immigrants (35 % down) and fewer 500
immigrants from other EU-27 Member States 400
(25 % down). The highest absolute fall in 300
immigrants to Spain was recorded for Moroccan 200
citizens (falling by 32 000 in just one year), 100
followed by citizens of Ecuador (by 20 000) and 0

2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
Romania (by 19 000). Most of the decline in the ES IT UK
number of non-EU nationals migrating to Spain Data on immigrants by citizenship groups for DE for 2009 are
(apart from Moroccans) was due to lower inflows not available and therefore not included.
Source: Eurostat, online data code: migr_imm1ctz and
national data
(65) In order to have comparable data for a longer time series,
in some cases data by national definitions were used.
100
Part III
2.1.2. Trends in immigration in selected EU-27 Graph III.2.4: Structure of immigrants to selected EU-27
Member States (France, Austria and Sweden)
Member States (receiving on average by citizenship groups, 2008-2009 (thousands)
100 000 to 500 000 immigrants per year) Non-EU MS citizens EU MS citizens Nationals
250
Several different patterns can also be identified
illustrating the effects of the recent recession on 200
EU Member States that receive between 100 000

and 500 000 immigrants per year(66) (Graph 150
III.2.3). In Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, 100

immigration stabilised in 2008 and did not increase
further in 2009. Austria differs since immigration 50
was already starting to fall after 2004, slightly

increased in 2006-2008 but then decreased slightly 0
2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
again from 2008 to 2009. FR AT SE
Data on immigrants by citizenship groups for BE and NL for

Graph III.2.3: Immigration to selected EU-27 Member States 2009 are not available and therefore not included in the
(Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden comparison
and Ireland), 2003-2009 (thousands) Source: Eurostat, online data code: migr_imm1ctz and
BE NL AT SE IE national data
180
160 Ireland, one of the three EU Member States that

140 opened its labour market to all citizens from the
120
2004 accession countries, and the country with the
100
highest GNP growth among the EU-15 countries in
80
the period 2000 and 2007(67), experienced high
levels of immigration from 2003, peaking in 2005
60
and 2006. At the peak of immigration, it received
40
just over 100 000 immigrants per year. After the
20
peak, Ireland experienced one of the highest
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
relative drops in immigration among EU Member
Data for BE for 2008 and 2009 are provisional.
States; a 64 % fall in the period 2006-2009 (Graph
Source: Eurostat, online data code: migr_imm1ctz and III.2.3). This was mainly due to a steep fall in
national data immigration of non-nationals and particularly of
other EU Member States nationals. In 2007,
Comparable data for 2008 and 2009 by citizenship Ireland received in total 52 000 EU foreigners
for France, Austria and Sweden showed that the representing 59 % of all immigrants, dropping
number of immigrants with EU citizenship has sharply to only 16 000 in 2009 (Graph III.2.5).
decreased in all three countries (in France by 11 %,
in Austria by 4 % and in Sweden by 12 %), Graph III.2.5: Structure of immigrants to Ireland by
although Sweden reported a slight overall increase citizenship groups, 2007-2009 (thousands)
in immigration (Graph III.2.4). Non-EU MS citizens EU MS citizens Nationals

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2007 2008 2009
Source: Eurostat, online data code: migr_imm1ctz
(67) See: The Irish Economy in the Early 21st Century, 2008,
(66) France could not be included in the comparison since 2003 No 117, National economic and Social Council, p. 1.
because data are available for 2008 and 2009 only. .
101
2.1.3. The effect on emigration from EU-27 groups (i.e. nationals, EU citizens and non-EU
Member States citizens — see Graph III.2.7).
Previous economic recessions have given some Graph III.2.7: Structure of emigrants from selected EU-27
evidence that emigration of nationals and Member States (Spain, Italy and the United
foreigners rises if the social and economic Kingdom) by citizenship groups, 2008-2009
(thousands)
conditions in the host country worsen. Data for the Non-EU MS citizens EU MS citizens Nationals
EU-27 Member States with the highest emigration 450
since 2003 shows that emigration from Germany 400
had started to rise in 2007 and 2008 and stabilised 350
300
in 2009. Although immigration to Germany in
250
2008 and 2009 was one of the highest among EU-
200
27 Members States, emigrants outnumbered 150
immigrants, resulting in negative net migration 100
(Graph III.2.6). 50
0
2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
The United Kingdom also saw a relatively high ES IT UK
increase in emigration in 2007-2008, but it fell in
Data on emigrants by citizenship groups for DE for 2009 are
2009, almost to the same level as that in 2007. not available and therefore not included in comparison
Emigration from Italy has been fairly stable, with a Source: Eurostat, online data code: migr_emi1ctz and
small increase after 2007. In Spain, however, national data
emigration has increased since 2006 and continued

to rise in 2009. To obtain a more complete picture of the effects of
the recent economic recession on emigration, a
Graph III.2.6: Emigration from selected EU-27 Member further analysis of emigration was carried out for
States (Germany, the United Kingdom Spain the countries that have received on average
and Italy), 2003-2009 (thousands)
100 000 to 500 000 immigrants in recent years (the
DE UK ES IT
800 same countries that were included in the analysis
700 in paragraph 2.1.2), although in some cases,
600
emigration did not reach 100 000 per year.
500
400
The analysis showed that the effects of the
300
economic recession on emigration in these
200
100
countries varied markedly (Graph III.2.8).
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 In Sweden, emigration has decreased in recent
Comparable emigration data are for ES available from 2006
years, whereas in Belgium and Ireland it has
on only increased slightly, and in the Netherlands and
Source: Eurostat, online data code: migr_emi1ctz and Austria, emigration has increased significantly.
national data
In the period 2006-2009, emigration from Spain

increased on average by 33 % per year. From 2008
to 2009, emigration from Spain increased mainly
due to the rise in emigration of EU nationals,
especially Romanians. Although most of the
emigration in 2008 and in 2009 was of non-
nationals, the emigration of nationals was higher
than other individual citizenships, such as
Moroccans, Romanians, Bolivians, Ecuadorians
and Brazilians.
In Italy, emigration fell in 2009 compared to 2008.

In the United Kingdom too, emigration decreased
and this was due to a decrease in all citizenship
102
Part III
Graph III.2.8: Emigration from selected EU-27 Member For Germany and the United Kingdom, countries
States (Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria,
Sweden and Ireland), 2003-2009 (thousands)
with a long immigration tradition, the effect of the
recession on migration flows was less marked.
BE NL AT SE IE
120
Flows have generally been stable with small
annual increases or decreases.
100
In Belgium and the Netherlands, immigration
80 appeared to stabilise in 2009 at the level recorded
in 2008, but emigration continued to increase.
60
40
2.1.5. Migration from non-EU countries
Flows and stocks of migrants from non-EU

20
countries can be monitored through residence
0
permit data, which are now also collected and
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 published by Eurostat. This section looks at new
permits issued in 2008 and 2009 and at the totals
Data for BE for 2008 and 2009 are provisional
Source: Eurostat, online data code: migr_emi1ctz and of all valid permits, including those issued before
national data 2008(68). Roughly speaking, over 16.7 million
foreigners reside in the EU (69) under a valid
In the Netherlands, emigration increased by 24 % permit, and in both 2008 and 2009, more than 2
in 2009, compared to 2008, and in Austria by million new permits were issued in the EU.
15 %. In Austria, most of the increase in
emigration was due to German and Romanian In 2009, EU Member States issued about 2.3
citizens. However, as in Spain, emigration of million new residence permits (70) to third-country
nationals was higher than other individual nationals. This represents a reduction of over 8 %
citizenships. compared to the previous year and approximately
210 000 fewer permits in absolute terms.
2.1.4. Overall effect of the recent recession on
selected EU-27 Member States
Regarding the main reasons for issuing permits,
there was a fall in the number of authorisations
The overall effect of the recession on migration granted for family (e.g. family reunification and
flows is not straightforward: not all countries have formation) and employment-related reasons.
been affected to the same extent.
About 8 %, i.e. about 55 000 fewer permits, were
In absolute terms, Spain seems to have been most issued in 2009 (Graph III.2.9) for family-related
severely affected by the recession, resulting in a reasons.
fall in immigration since 2007 (especially by
Moroccans and citizens of Latin America) and However, the decrease was greater in the number
increasing emigration (especially of EU nationals). of permits issued for employment reasons. In
However, the balance between the inflow and 2009, the number of third-country nationals
outflow still resulted in positive net migration. granted an employment-related permit in the EU
fell by 28 %. This represents more than 215 000
The recession has also affected Italy, but the effect fewer persons from third countries allowed to
has mainly been a reduction in the number of work in the EU in 2009 compared to the previous
immigrants, in particular Romanians. year. As a result of this sharp decrease, the share of
employment-related permits in the volume of all
Ireland, the EU country that experienced one of the permits issued shrank from 30 % in 2008 to about
fastest increases in immigration at the beginning of 24 % in 2009.
the 21st century, already experienced a sharp fall
in immigration in 2007, which was combined with (68) Data collection only started in 2008 and certain
a significant increase in emigration, resulting in methodological discrepancies may occur.
negative net migration in 2009. (69) No data available for Luxembourg and United Kingdom.
(70) First residence permit is defined as a permit issued to a
person for a first time and permits issued after at least 6
months since the expiry of the previous permit. Only
permits with a validity of at least 3 months are included.
103
Graph III.2.9: New residence permits issued, by reason, EU- (46 000 more permits than in 2008). The United
27, 2008 and 2009
Kingdom remains by far the top destination
2008 2009 country for non-EU citizens entering the EU for
the purpose of education, accounting for more than
Employment
50 % of all such permits issued in the EU.
Education The highest number of authorisations to reside in

EU Member States in 2009 was issued to citizens
Family reasons of India (190 000), followed by the United States
(176 000), China (170 000) and Morocco
Other reasons
(156 000). These four countries accounted for
nearly 30 % of all permits issued in the EU in
0 200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 2009. The majority of Indians and Chinese entered
the EU for the purpose of education or
Other reasons are a miscellaneous group of reasons not
covered by the three main reasons, such as international employment. 72 000 Chinese and 61 000 Indians
protection, residence without right to work (e.g. for were granted education-related permits, while
pensioners), diplomatic, and people in intermediate phases
of a regularisation process.
51 000 Chinese and 63 000 Indians entered the EU
Source: Eurostat (online data code migr_resfirst) for employment reasons. By contrast, Moroccans
were granted the highest number of permits for
A permits were issued in 2009 in the majority of family reasons in EU (62 000), and less than 5 %
Member States, although the sharpest fall was (i.e. 7 000) were granted permission to reside for
recorded in most of the Baltic and Eastern education reasons.
European Member States. The number of permits
issued halved or more than halved in Latvia,
Hungary, Czech Republic and Lithuania. However,
with nearly 110 000 fewer permits, Spain recorded
the highest drop in absolute terms in 2009.
Only in a few Member States did the number of

persons granted authorisation to reside increase in
2009 (see Table III.2.1). Noticeably, due to the
large increase in education-related permits, the
United Kingdom had the highest absolute increase
in permits issued (up by 38 000). High relative
increases were also recorded in Austria (29 % or
6 000) and Belgium (27 % or 12 000).
The number of employment-related permits fell in

the vast majority of Member States, particularly
sharply in Latvia, Czech Republic, Spain and
Hungary, where the number of persons granted
employment-related permits fell within a year by
approximately three quarters. In absolute terms,
the number of employment-related permits
decreased most noticeably in Spain (70 000 less
than in 2008), followed by Italy (down by 37 000),
Czech Republic (down by 32 000) and the United
Kingdom (down by 23 000).
Contrary to overall developments in 2009, the

number of residence permits issued for education
reasons increased in 2009 (up 11 % or 51 000). The
increase in education-related permits in the EU
almost entirely stemmed from the sharp increase in
authorisations issued in the United Kingdom
104
Part III
Table III.2.1: New residence permits issued and valid

permits at the end of the year, 2008 and 2009
New permits issued Valid permits on 31/12
2008 2009 2008 2009
EU27 2,520,045 2,307,704 15,717,133 16,680,169
BE 46,201 58,939 350,392 364,939
BG 3,933 4,385 11,168 12,444
CZ 61,350 27,539 306,316 305,146
DK 31,655 30,255 : :
DE 114,289 121,954 3,643,677 3,695,144
EE 3,884 3,777 216,628 212,874
IE 28,926 25,509 141,816 134,152
EL 40,411 45,148 522,752 565,595
ES 399,827 290,813 2,680,720 2,992,492
FR 188,723 188,491 2,299,301 2,273,228
IT 550,226 506,833 3,035,573 3,587,653
CY : : 113,309 126,107
LV 7,706 2,304 397,628 385,323
LT 5,298 2,659 29,032 28,633
LU : : : :
HU 36,602 14,289 101,331 92,518
MT 4,989 3,682 4,875 4,608
NL 73,769 56,151 418,300 416,514
AT 21,783 28,035 457,034 445,990
PL 40,907 33,427 72,126 87,345
PT 63,715 46,324 357,439 360,322
RO 19,354 15,380 58,736 61,800
SI 29,215 15,759 96,284 89,079
SK 8,025 5,336 19,962 22,068
FI 21,873 18,034 107,015 112,914
SE 84,144 91,337 275,719 303,281
UK 633,240 671,344 : :
EU totals are only for available country data, thus totals are
underestimated. In Italy, children are not included in the
number of permits issued during the year but are included in
the number of all valid permits.
Source: Eurostat (online data code migr_resfirst and
migr_resvalid)
For the EU as a whole, the total number of valid

permits increased by nearly 1 million between
2008 and 2009.
105
Part IV
Country Annex
1. THE EUROPEAN UNION
EU-27 *
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 1970 2000 2009 2030 2050
1 Population (on 1 January; in thousands) 435,474 482,768 501,103 69,224 74,506 2010
2 Total Fertility Rate (number of children per woman) : : 1.60 1.84 1.84
3 Life expectancy at birth for women in years : 80.3 82.4 85.0 87.7
4 Life expectancy at birth for men in years ; 75.5 76.4 80.9 83.8
5 Life expectancy at age 65 for women in years : : 20.5 : :
6 Life expectancy at age 65 for men in years : : 17.0 : :
7 Natural growth (births minus deaths) in thousands 2,563.1 70.7 523.1 157.6 109.6
8 Net migration (including corrections) in thousands -728.3 143.9 877.1 150.9 126.3
9 Mean age of women at childbirth : 28.5 29.7 : :
10 Old age dependency ratio (65 and + / 15-64 years old), in % : 24.3 24.5 33.2 38.0
Population distribution by age Population growth, 1995-2050
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 3,000,000
Natural
2,500,000 growth
EU-27
2,000,000
projected
2009 1,500,000
1,000,000
Pop. under 25 Net
500,000 migration
EU-27 Pop. aged 25-64
0 projected
2030 Pop. aged 65-79
Pop. aged 80+ -500,000
-1,000,000 Total
population
EU-27 -1,500,000 growth
2050 -2,000,000 projected
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
3 BEST MS
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS 2000 2009 2009
11 Employment rate, women 20-64 years, in % 57.3 62.5 74.4
12 Employment rate, men 20-64 years, in % 75.8 75.8 83.1
13 Employment rate, women 25-54 with at least 1 child : 68.2 81.1
14 Employment rate, men 25-54 with at least 1 child : 88.5 94.0
15 Gender pay gap (unadjusted) in % 17 18 7 2008
16 Employed women working part time, % 28.9 31.4 4.9
17 Employed men working part time, % 6.5 8.1 2.4
18 Average number of usual weekly working hours, women : 33.0 38.9
19 Average number of usual weekly working hours, men : 39.9 42.2
20 Childcare provision for children (0-2 years), % : 28 56 2008
21 Childcare provision for children (3 yrs to compulsory school age), % : 83 97 2008
22 Children (< 16 yrs) at risk of poverty after social transfer, % : 20.1 10.7 2008
23 Children 0-16 yrs living in jobless households, % : 10.2 4.1
24 Social protection benefits targeted at family support, (% in kind) 25.4 32.1 58.9 2008
(Un)employment rate (%), persons 15-64 yrs, 1995-2009 Education, 2009
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU WOMEN
50 and TRA.
40 EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
with tertiary level) WOMEN
10
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
%
EU-27 EMPLOYMENT EU-27 UNEMPLOYMENT
EU-27 3 BEST MS
3 HIGHEST MS EMPLOYM. 3 HIGHEST MS UNEMPLOYM.
EU 27 3 BEST MS
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET 2000 2009 2009
25 Employment rate, women 55-64 yrs, in % 27.4 37.8 61.4
26 Employment rate, men 55-64 yrs, in % 47.1 54.8 70.4
33 Average exit age from the labour market, women : 60.8 64.0 2008
34 Average exit age from the labour market, men : 62.0 64.7 2008
35 Inactive for health reasons, population 50-64 yrs, in % 18.0 21.0 48.4
36 Internet use, population 55-64 yrs, in % : 44 75 2010
108
Country Annex
The European Union
EU 27 3 BEST MS *
4 PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D 2000 2009 2009
37 Early leavers from education and training, women 18-24 yrs, in % 17.5 12.5 3.7
38 Early leavers from education and training, men 18-24 yrs, in % 18.8 16.3 5.9
39 Educational attainment, women 30-34 yrs with tertiary education level., in % 22.2 35.7 54.9
40 Educational attainment, men 30-34 yrs with tertiary education level., in % 22.7 28.9 44.4
41 University graduates 20-29 yrs per 1 000 of the population of that age : : 88.6 2008
42 Employment rate by education level (tertiary), age 20-64, in % 82.5 83.0 87.7
43 Employment rate by education level (upper secondary), 20-64, in % 69.7 70.5 79.7
44 Employment rate by education level (less than upper secondary), 20-64, % 54.9 54.4 66.5
45 Total public expenditure on education, % of GDP 4.9 5.0 7.15 2007
46 Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 yrs in education and training), in % : 9.1 25.3
47 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, % of GDP 1.9 2.0 3.52
48 Percentage of the employed population working in high-tech sectors 4.8 3.7 6.1
49 Internet use, in % : 63.0 86
50 Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100) 100.0 105.6 156.4
Employment rates (%), 2009 Social Protection (% of GDP), 2008
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children EU27
MEN 25-49 with children EU-27

0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3 BEST MS PENSIONS HEALTH CARE FAMILY OTHER
5 MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION 2000 2009 2009

51 Share of non-nationals in the population, in % : 6.4 21.4
52 Employment rate of nationals, women , 25-54, in % 70.0 72.9 20.6
53 Employment rate of nationals, men , 25-54, in % 88.2 85.4 20.0
54 Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women , 25-54, in % : 52.7 71.7
55 Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men , 25-54, in % : 72.9 72.4
56 Education level (tertiary), nationals 25-49 yrs, in % : 28.4 18.5
57 Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals 25-49 yrs, in % : 22.3 16.8
58 Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27, 25-49 yrs, in % : 20.4 16.7
59 Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27, 25-49 yrs, in % : 43.8 42.2
6 SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION 2000 2009 2035 2060 2009
60 General government consolidated gross debt, % of GDP 61.9 74.0 : : 12.1
61 General government primary balance, % of GDP 4.2 -4.2 : : -0.1
62 Total general government revenue, % of GDP 45.4 44.0 : : 54.1
63 Public expenditure on pensions, % of GDP 13.9 13.5 11.9 12.6 7.0 2008
64 Public expenditure on health care and sickness, % of GDP 6.9 7.5 7.7 8.2 3.9 2008
65 Public expenditure on family and children, % of GDP 2.1 2.1 : : 3.6 2008
66 Public expenditure on social protection, % of GDP 25.3 25.3 : : 13.8 2008
67 Expenditure on social protection, PPS / inhab. 4829.9 6337.2 : : 1,688.9 2008
68 Percentage of total population at risk of poverty after social transfers : 16.3 : : 10.2 2008
69 Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio) : 4.9 : : 3.4 2008
70 People 18-59 yrs living in jobless households 10.2 10.1 : : 6.1
*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table) *
3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking
109
1. BELGIUM
BELGIUM EU-27 *
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 1970 2000 2009 2030 2050 2009
1 Population (on 1 January; in thousands) 9,660 10,239 10,840 11,745 12,194 501,103 2010
2 Total Fertility Rate (number of children per woman) 2.25 1.67 1.84 1.77 1.78 1,60
3 Life expectancy at birth for women in years 74.2 81.0 82.8 85.4 87.8 82.4
4 Life expectancy at birth for men in years 67.8 74.6 77.3 80.2 83.1 76.4
5 Life expectancy at age 65 for women in years 15.4 19.8 21.1 : : 20.54
6 Life expectancy at age 65 for men in years 12.2 15.6 17.5 : : 16.99
7 Natural growth (births minus deaths) in thousands 23.5 10.7 22.8 4.1 -13.8 523.1
8 Net migration (including corrections) in thousands -32.7 14.3 64.0 31.4 25.2 877.1
9 Mean age of women at childbirth 27.2 28.8 29.6 : : 29.7
10 Old age dependency ratio (65 and + / 15-64 years old), in % 21.2 25.5 25.9 37.6 43.9 25.6

100,000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
EU-27 80,000
Natural
growth
2009
BELGIUM 60,000 projected
Pop. under 25 Net

EU-27 Pop. aged 25-64 40,000 migration
2030 Pop. aged 65-79 projected

Pop. aged 80+ 20,000
BELGIUM
Total
populatio
0 n growth
EU-27 projected
2050
-20,000
BELGIUM
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
EU-27 3 BEST MS
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS 2000 2009 2009 2009
11 Employment rate, women 20-64 years, in % 56.4 61.0 62.5 74.4
12 Employment rate, men 20-64 years, in % 76.1 73.2 75.8 83.1
13 Employment rate, women 25-54 with at least 1 child : 73.3 68.2 81.1
14 Employment rate, men 25-54 with at least 1 child : 90.4 88.5 94.0
15 Gender pay gap (unadjusted) in % 13 9.0 17.5 7 2008
16 Employed women working part time, % 37.4 41.5 31.4 4.9
17 Employed men working part time, % 5.5 8.5 8.1 2.4
18 Average number of usual weekly working hours, women 32.8 32.4 33.0 38.9
19 Average number of usual weekly working hours, men 40.4 40.1 39.9 42.2
20 Childcare provision for children (0-2 years), % : 43.0 28 56 2008
21 Childcare provision for children (3 yrs to compulsory school age), % : 99.0 83 97 2008
22 Children (< 16 yrs) at risk of poverty after social transfer, % 11.0 16.4 20.1 10.7 2008
23 Children 0-16 yrs living in jobless households, % 10.8 11.8 10.2 4.1
24 Social protection benefits targeted at family support, (% in kind) 17.5 19.0 32.1 58.9 2008
90
80 MEN
EARLY
70
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
with tertiary
10 level) WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
BE EMPLOYMENT BE UNEMPLOYMENT % BELGIUM EU-27

3 HIGHEST MS EMPLOYM. 3 HIGHEST MS UNEMPLOYM. 3 BEST MS
BELGIUM EU-27 3 BEST MS

3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET 2000 2009 2009 2009
25 Employment rate, women 55-64 yrs, in % 16.6 27.7 37.8 61.4
26 Employment rate, men 55-64 yrs, in % 36.4 42.9 54.8 70.4
33 Average exit age from the labour market, women : 61.9 60.8 64.0 2008
34 Average exit age from the labour market, men : 61.2 62.0 64.7 2008
35 Inactive for health reasons, population 50-64 yrs, in % : 15.3 21.0 48.4
36 Internet use, population 55-64 yrs, in % : 58 44 75 2010
110
Country Annex
Belgium
BELGIUM EU-27 3 BEST MS *

4 PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D 2000 2009 2009 2009
37 Early leavers from education and training, women 18-24 yrs, in % 11.0 9.3 12.5 3.7
38 Early leavers from education and training, men 18-24 yrs, in % 16.4 12.8 16.3 5.9
39 Educational attainment, women 30-34 yrs with tertiary education level., in % 33.3 47.7 35.7 54.9
40 Educational attainment, men 30-34 yrs with tertiary education level., in % 37.1 36.4 28.9 44.4
41 University graduates 20-29 yrs per 1 000 of the population of that age 51.4 73.3 : 88.6 2008
42 Employment rate by education level (tertiary), age 20-64, in % 85.4 81.9 83.0 87.7
43 Employment rate by education level (upper secondary), 20-64, in % 69.1 68.8 70.5 79.7
44 Employment rate by education level (less than upper secondary), 20-64, % 51.2 47.7 54.4 66.5
45 Total public expenditure on education, % of GDP : 6.0 4.96 7.15 2007
46 Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 yrs in education and training), in % : 6.8 9.1 25.3
47 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, % of GDP 1.97 2.0 2.01 3.52
48 Percentage of the employed population working in high-tech sectors 4.83 4.5 3.7 6.1
49 Internet use, in % : 74.0 63 86
50 Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100) 100 103.9 105.6 156.4
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
WOMEN 25-49 with BELGIUM

OLDER WOMEN (55-64)
children
BELGIUM
MEN 25-49 with children EU-27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
5 MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION 2000 2009 2009 2009

51 Share of non-nationals in the population, in % 8.8 9.1 21.4
6 SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION 2000 2009 2035 2060 2009 2009
60 General government consolidated gross debt, % of GDP 107.9 96.2 : : 74 12.1
61 General government primary balance, % of GDP 6.5 -2.4 : : -4.2 -0.1
62 Total general government revenue, % of GDP 49.1 48.1 : : 44 54.1
63 Public expenditure on pensions, % of GDP 13.3 12.7 14.3 14.7 13.5 7.0 2008
64 Public expenditure on health care and sickness, % of GDP 6.0 7.6 8.6 8.8 7.5 3.9 2008
65 Public expenditure on family and children, % of GDP 2.1 2.1 : : 2.1 3.6 2008
66 Public expenditure on social protection, % of GDP 24.9 26.6 : : 25.3 13.8 2008
67 Expenditure on social protection, PPS / inhab. 5969.6 7685.7 : : 6,337 1,688.9 2008
68 Percentage of total population at risk of poverty after social transfers 13.0 14.6 : : 16.3 10.2 2008
69 Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio) 4.3 3.9 : : 4.9 3.4 2008
70 People 18-59 yrs living in jobless households 12.4 12.8 : : 10.1 6.1
Demographic challenges and…

Belgium's fertility rate is well above the EU average and population ageing is projected to be less pronounced than in the EU
as a whole. Largely thanks to migration, Belgium's population is projected to grow by almost 10% until 2050.
… opportunities for tackling them
While childcare availability lies above the EU average it could be extended for very young children. The gender pay gap is
one of the lowest in the EU. Nevertheless, there is scope for women's employment rates to catch up with men's; moreover a
large proportion of women work part-time.
Employment rates of older workers, in particular women, are very low and they represent an important labour force reserve.
Major gains are also possible with regard to the integration of minorities and third country nationals into labour markets and
education systems. However, in the crisis non-EU foreigners have seen unemployment rates rise to the highest value in the
EU, above 30%
Finally, the reduction of public debt, projected to rise to over 100% in 2011, would enhance the ability to meet future social
protection needs linked to ageing
111
2. BULGARIA
BULGARIA EU-27 *
7 Natural growth (births minus deaths) in thousands 61.7 -41.4 -27.1 -44.1 -43.7 523.1
8 Net migration (including corrections) in thousands -11.0 0.0 -15.7 -0.5 1.6 877.1
9 Mean age of women at childbirth : 25.0 26.6 : : 29.7
10 Old age dependency ratio (65 and + / 15-64 years old), in % 14 23.8 25.1 36.3 55.4 25.6

10,000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
0
EU-27
Natural
growth
-10,000
2009
projected
BULGARIA
-20,000
Pop. under 25 Net
-30,000 migration
EU-27 Pop. aged 25-64
-40,000
BULGARIA
Pop. aged 80+
Total
-50,000
populatio
n growth
EU-27 -60,000 projected
2050
-70,000
BULGARIA
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
EU-27 3 BEST MS
15 Gender pay gap (unadjusted) in % : 13.6 17.5 7 2008
16 Employed women working part time, % : 2.7 31.4 4.9
17 Employed men working part time, % : 2.0 8.1 2.4
22 Children (< 16 yrs) at risk of poverty after social transfer, % 19 25.6 20.1 10.7 2008
23 Children 0-16 yrs living in jobless households, % : 12.2 10.2 4.1
90
80 MEN
EARLY
70
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
with tertiary
10 level) WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
BE EMPLOYMENT BE UNEMPLOYMENT % BULGARIA EU-27

BULGARIA EU-27 3 BEST MS

35 Inactive for health reasons, population 50-64 yrs, in % 10.9 23.8 21.0 48.4
112
Country Annex
Bulgaria
BULGARIA EU-27 3 BEST MS *

37 Early leavers from education and training, women 18-24 yrs, in % : 15.8 12.5 3.7
38 Early leavers from education and training, men 18-24 yrs, in % : 13.7 16.3 5.9
39 Educational attainment, women 30-34 yrs with tertiary education level., in % 16 35.6 35.7 54.9
45 Total public expenditure on education, % of GDP 3.97 4.1 4.96 7.15 2007
49 Internet use, in % : 39.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
WOMEN 25-49 with BULGARIA

OLDER WOMEN (55-64)
children
BULGARIA
3 BEST MS
PENSIONS HEALTH CARE FAMILY OTHER

51 Share of non-nationals in the population, in % : 0.3 21.4
52 Employment rate of nationals, women , 25-54, in % : 75.8 20.6
53 Employment rate of nationals, men , 25-54, in % : 82.7 20.0
54 Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women , 25-54, in % : : 71.7
55 Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men , 25-54, in % : : 72.4

Despite the current increase of the total fertility rate which reached the EU average, the total population of Bulgaria is
declining and this decline is projected to continue, as a result of moderately low birth rates, high adult mortality and net
emigration. Mortality is expected to decrease, especially among men aged 40-59.
The negative effect of the decreasing number of women in fertile age registered today will have an impact on the
reproduction of the population in the decades to come. Life expectancy, for both men and women, is currently low and
significant progress is expected; the education level plays an important role in life expectancy. The old-age dependency
ratio, currently at the European average, is projected to rise to a higher level than for the EU as a whole.
Investing in education and lifelong learning, promoting better conditions to combine labour and family duties could
contribute to the employment growth. Productivity is only one third the EU average, so there is an enormous catching-up
potential. Reducing the number of early school leavers and increasing investment in research would contribute to realising
this productivity growth potential.
Current and projected public spending on health and long-term care is significantly below the EU average, however, there
may be pressure for increased spending
113
3. THE CZECH REPUBLIC
CZECH REPUBLIC EU-27 *
7 Natural growth (births minus deaths) in thousands 24.5 -18.1 10.9 -47.0 -53.3 523.1

120,000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
100,000
EU-27
80,000 Natural
growth
2009 60,000
CZECH REPUBLIC projected
40,000
Pop. under 25 Net
2030 Pop. aged 65-79 0 projected

Pop. aged 80+
CZECH REPUBLIC -20,000
Total
populatio
-40,000 n growth
EU-27 projected
-60,000
2050
-80,000
CZECH REPUBLIC
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
EU-27 3 BEST MS
22 Children (< 16 yrs) at risk of poverty after social transfer, % : 12.8 20.1 10.7 2008
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
with tertiary
10 level) WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
CZ EMPLOYMENT CZ UNEMPLOYMENT % 3 BEST MS

EU-27 EMPLOYMENT EU-27 UNEMPLOYMENT EU-27
3 HIGHEST MS EMPLOYM. 3 HIGHEST MS UNEMPLOYM. CZECH REPUBLIC
CZECH REPUBLIC EU-27 3 BEST MS

114
Country Annex
The Czech Republic
CZECH REPUBLIC EU-27 3 BEST MS *

40 Educational attainment, men 30-34 yrs with tertiary education level., in % 13 16.4 28.9 44.4
49 Internet use, in % : 60.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
WOMEN 25-49 with CZECH REPUBLIC

OLDER WOMEN (55-64)
children
CZECH REPUBLIC
MEN 25-49 with children 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
EU-27

61 General government primary balance, % of GDP -2.9 -4.5 : : -4.2 -0.1
68 Percentage of total population at risk of poverty after social transfers : 8.6 : : 16.3 10.2 2008
69 Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio) : 3.5 : : 4.9 3.4 2008

The Czech Republic fertility rate has recovered to almost the EU level, and this may be partly the effect of a transition to
women having children later in life;. These projections indicate a moderately shrinking population and, in spite of below-
average life expectancy, the old-age dependency ratio is projected to rise above the EU average. Life-expectancy
strongly depends on education level, especially for men.
Female employment rates could rise significantly and the gender pay gap remains large. Child-care provisions under age 2
are scarce. Households with children face a higher poverty risk than households without children.
Employment rates for older workers are close to the EU average, which means that there is still room for increasing the size of
the labour force.
While educational attainment is already high, productivity can still increase considerably. The government is also giving
priority to reforming social, health and other public services to improve the conditions for more active and dignified ageing.
Public debt is currently low, but a large ageing-related increase in public pension expenditure is expected, from the current
7% to a projected 12% of GDP in 2060
115
4. DENMARK
DENMARK EU-27 *
3 Life expectancy at birth for women in years : 79.2 81.1 84.5 87.2 82.4
4 Life expectancy at birth for men in years : 74.5 76.9 80.0 82.9 76.4
5 Life expectancy at age 65 for women in years : 18.3 19.5 : : 20.54
6 Life expectancy at age 65 for men in years : 15.2 16.8 : : 16.99
8 Net migration (including corrections) in thousands 21.1 10.1 15.3 8.7 5.7 877.1

40,000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
35,000
EU-27
30,000 Natural
growth
2009 25,000
DENMARK projected
20,000
Pop. under 25 Net
2030 Pop. aged 65-79 10,000 projected

Pop. aged 80+
DENMARK 5,000
Total
populatio
0 n growth
EU-27 projected
-5,000
2050
-10,000
DENMARK
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
EU-27 3 BEST MS
13 Employment rate, women 25-54 with at least 1 child : : 68.2 81.1
14 Employment rate, men 25-54 with at least 1 child : : 88.5 94.0
90
80 MEN
EARLY
70
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
with tertiary
10 level) WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
DK EMPLOYMENT DK UNEMPLOYMENT % DENMARK EU-27

DENMARK EU-27 3 BEST MS

116
Country Annex
Denmark
DENMARK EU-27 3 BEST MS *

41 University graduates 20-29 yrs per 1 000 of the population of that age 54 79.8 : 88.6 2008
49 Internet use, in % : 84.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
WOMEN 25-49 with DENMARK

OLDER WOMEN (55-64)
children
DENMARK
MEN 25-49 with children 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
EU-27

70 People 18-59 yrs living in jobless households : : : : 10.1 6.1

Denmark has currently one of the highest fertility rates in the EU while life expectancy for both men and women are below
the EU average. The projected increase in the old-age dependency ratio is much smaller than for the EU as a whole. Mainly
thanks to assumed immigration the Danish population is projected to grow by over 6% by 2050.
Denmark has already achieved high female employment rates, although the gender pay gap remains significant and
women are much more likely to work part-time than men.
The employment rate of older workers is also far above the EU average, but could still rise in the over-60 age group if health
and disability issues as causes for early labour market exit can be tackled.
There also appears to be scope for a better integration of third country nationals into labour markets and education
systems.
Public debt is low compared to the EU average.
117
5. GERMANY
GERMANY EU-27 *
2 Total Fertility Rate (number of children per woman) : 1.38 1.36 1.42 1.49 1,60
8 Net migration (including corrections) in thousands -271.7 167.9 -10.7 187.1 135.7 877.1

500,000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
400,000
EU-27 300,000 Natural

growth
2009 200,000
projected
GERMANY
100,000
Pop. under 25 0 Net

EU-27 Pop. aged 25-64 migration
-100,000
-200,000
Pop. aged 80+
GERMANY
-300,000 Total
populatio
-400,000 n growth
EU-27 projected
-500,000
2050
-600,000
GERMANY
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
EARLY
70
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
with tertiary
10 level) WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
DE EMPLOYMENT DE UNEMPLOYMENT % GERMANY EU-27

GERMANY EU-27 3 BEST MS

118
Country Annex
Germany
GERMANY EU-27 3 BEST MS *

41 University graduates 20-29 yrs per 1 000 of the population of that age 31 40.5 : 88.6 2008
43 Employment rate by education level (upper secondary), 20-64, in % 70 74.8 70.5 79.7
49 Internet use, in % : 74.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
GERMANY
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with childr
GERMANY
EU-27


Germany's fertility rate lies below the EU average, although there has been a slight increase recently, from 1.33 in 2000 to
1.38 in 2008. Net migration has turned to negative; the population is decreasing and is projected to shrink by 10% until 2050.
Life expectancy in Germany is in line with the EU average while the old-age dependency ratio is already among the highest
in the EU and expected to stay above the EU average.
Employment rates of older workers are already above the EU average and the expected ageing-related increase in social
spending may stay slightly below the EU average. The share of older workers among workers is projected to increase
considerably in the next decade.
To increase and make better use of the labour force potential, the government seems committed to reviewing the role of
immigration in meeting the future labour demand.
To increase the participation of women in the labour market, the Government emphasises increasing childcare facilities; by
2013 there should be place to accommodate at least 35% of all children under 3 years old in childcare facilities; from 2013
onwards all children aged one and older will have a legal right to childcare. In 2007 Germany introduced a new parental
leave scheme that is giving in particular fathers a greater financial incentive to become involved in the daily care of their
children.
The German Business Programme ‘Success Factor Family’ tries to convince enterprises of the usefulness of a more family-
oriented personnel policy.
Public debt is projected to grow to 80% of GDP by 2011.
119
6. ESTONIA
ESTONIA EU-27 *
8 Net migration (including corrections) in thousands 6.1 0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.3 877.1

5,000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
EU-27 0
Natural
growth
2009
ESTONIA -5,000 projected
Pop. under 25 Net

EU-27 Pop. aged 25-64 -10,000 migration

Pop. aged 80+ -15,000
ESTONIA
Total
populatio
-20,000 n growth
EU-27 projected
2050
-25,000
ESTONIA
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
EU-27 3 BEST MS
15 Gender pay gap (unadjusted) in % 25 : 17.5 7 2008
90
80 MEN
EARLY
70
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
with tertiary
10 level) WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
100 80 60 40 20 0 20 40 60
EE EMPLOYMENT EE UNEMPLOYMENT % ESTONIA EU-27

ESTONIA EU-27 3 BEST MS

33 Average exit age from the labour market, women : : 60.8 64.0 2008
34 Average exit age from the labour market, men : : 62.0 64.7 2008
120
Country Annex
Estonia
ESTONIA EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 66.0 63 86
50 Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100) 100.0 139.8 105.6 156.4
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
WOMEN 25-49 with ESTONIA

OLDER WOMEN (55-64)
children
ESTONIA
EU-27

51 Share of non-nationals in the population, in % 20.0 16.0 6.4 21.4
52 Employment rate of nationals, women , 25-54, in % 76.0 76.2 72.9 20.6
53 Employment rate of nationals, men , 25-54, in % 79.2 79.5 85.4 20.0
54 Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women , 25-54, in % : 71.6 52.7 71.7
55 Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men , 25-54, in % : 69.4 72.9 72.4
56 Education level (tertiary), nationals 25-49 yrs, in % : 40.2 28.4 18.5
57 Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals 25-49 yrs, in % : 10.3 22.3 16.8
58 Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27, 25-49 yrs, in % : 20.3 20.4 16.7
59 Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27, 25-49 yrs, in % : 7.9 43.8 42.2

Estonia's fertility rate is currently higher than the EU average. Life expectancy is significantly lower than the EU average,
particularly for men and the less-well educated. The result would be a low old-age dependency ratio. By 2050 the Estonian
population, which is already in decline, is projected to continue shrinking by 12%.
Female employment rates are high and most women work full-time. Among older workers, female employment rates are
higher than men's. However, their pay is significantly lower than men's, indicating scope for a qualitative improvement of
female employment. Also, a high proportion of children live in jobless households.
To help families through the recession and deal with unemployment and especially long-term unemployment the
government increased expenditure on active labour market measures, subsistence benefit, family and parental benefit;
maintained the universal state family benefits system. A high proportion of people in their 50s and 60s are still in employment.
There is room to capitalize on this fact and further reinforce active labour market policies through focus on lifelong learning.
There is much catch-up potential for productivity growth which could build on the high level of educational achievement
and on efforts to ensure that R&D results are translated into innovative services and products. Last year Estonia launched a
National Health Strategy for 2009-2020 aiming to improve health, life expectancy and life quality. In 2020 the preparations
for the development plan of children and families started. The children and family development plan 2011-2020 will focus on
promoting positive parenting, early education and care, child well-being, child protection and child rights, work and family
reconciliation issues.
121
7. IRELAND
IRELAND EU-27 *
4 Life expectancy at birth for men in years : 74 77.4 81.1 83.9 76.4
7 Natural growth (births minus deaths) in thousands 30.7 23.4 45.4 28.2 19.4 523.1

120,000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
100,000
EU-27
Natural
80,000 growth
2009
IRELAND 60,000 projected
Pop. under 25 40,000

Net
20,000
Pop. aged 80+ 0
IRELAND
Total
-20,000 populatio
n growth
EU-27 projected
-40,000
2050
-60,000
IRELAND
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
EU-27 3 BEST MS
15 Gender pay gap (unadjusted) in % 19 : 17.5 7 2008
90
80 MEN
EARLY
70
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
with tertiary
10 level) WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
100 80 60 40 20 0 20 40 60
IE EMPLOYMENT IE UNEMPLOYMENT % IRELAND EU-27

IRELAND EU-27 3 BEST MS

122
Country Annex
Ireland
IRELAND EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 60.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
WOMEN 25-49 with IRELAND

OLDER WOMEN (55-64)
children
IRELAND
EU-27


Ireland has currently the highest fertility rate in the EU and a high share of young people. Life expectancy matches the EU
average. The projections assume that fertility rates will remain high and that life expectancy will stay close to the EU
average. The old-age dependency ratio could more than double, but would remain significantly below the EU average by
2050. Until 2050 the Irish population is projected to increase by almost 50%.
Female labour force participation is already relatively high, but there remains scope for improvement with an employment
rate gap between men and women of 9 percentage points and about one-third of women working part-time. Labour
market opportunities for women could benefit from more accessible childcare. The gender pay gap is below the EU
average. In the crisis many children, especially those living with single parents, found themselves in jobless households.
Migrants have been hit in the crisis and in 2009 there has been net emigration from Ireland.
An increase in public spending on R&D and a reduction of early school leaving would help to raise future productivity.
Although employment rates of older workers are above the EU average, potential still exists for improvement.
Public debt is now one of the highest, above 80% of GDP, and a large ageing-related increase in public social protection
expenditure is projected.
123
8. GREECE
GREECE EU-27 *

100,000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
80,000
EU-27
Natural
60,000 growth
2009
GREECE 40,000 projected
Pop. under 25 20,000

Net
0
Pop. aged 80+ -20,000
GREECE
Total
-40,000 populatio
n growth
EU-27 projected
-60,000
2050
-80,000
GREECE
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
EARLY
70
LEAVERS
from EDU
60
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
with tertiary
10 level) WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
100 80 60 40 20 0 20 40 60
GR EMPLOYMENT GR UNEMPLOYMENT % GREECE EU-27

GREECE EU-27 3 BEST MS

124
Country Annex
Greece
GREECE EU-27 3 BEST MS *

41 University graduates 20-29 yrs per 1 000 of the population of that age : 44.9 : 88.6 2008
45 Total public expenditure on education, % of GDP 3.4 : 4.96 7.15 2007
47 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, % of GDP : : 2.01 3.52
49 Internet use, in % : 36.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with childre GREECE
GREECE
EU-27

51 Share of non-nationals in the population, in % : 8.3 6.4 21.4

The fertility rate and expectancy in Greece are close to the EU average. Greece's old-age- dependency ratio is projected
to rise much more than the EU average in the medium term. Until 2050 the Greek population is expected to grow only
slightly.
Government initiatives aim to maintaining /increasing labour market participation and reducing unemployment especially
of young people and women. Productivity levels might benefit from further improving the business environment and the
climate for R&D and innovation. Raising percentages of the population completing higher education and facilitating
movement between training/ education and the labour market could also bring benefits. Greece continues aggressive
fiscal consolidation effort. The deficit is estimated to decline from 15,4% of GDP in 2009 to 9,4 % of GDP in 2010. The aim for
2011 is to reduce the deficit to 7.4% of GDP. The public debt has risen sharply in the crisis and is now projected to reach
152.6% of GDP in 2011 (Source: Budget of 2011, Greek Ministry of Finance). By 2060, public expenditure on pensions is
projected to approach 25% of GDP.
The recent pension reform (2010) limits the increase of public sector spending on pensions by altering the pension award
formula, introduces a unified statutory retirement age of 65 years by December 2013, increasing in line with changes in life
expectancy, increases the minimum early retirement age to 60 by 2011, increases the minimum contribution period for
retirement on a full pension from 35-37 to 40 years by 2015, simplifies the fragmented pension system, restricts access to early
retirement.
125
9. SPAIN
SPAIN EU-27 *
7 Natural growth (births minus deaths) in thousands 381.0 37.2 112.6 -76.3 -214.6 523.1

1,000,000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
800,000
EU-27
Natural
growth
2009 600,000
SPAIN projected
Pop. under 25 400,000

Net
200,000
Pop. aged 80+
SPAIN
0
Total
populatio
n growth
2050
-400,000
SPAIN
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
EARLY
70
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
with tertiary
10 level) WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
100 80 60 40 20 0 20 40 60
ES EMPLOYMENT ES UNEMPLOYMENT % SPAIN EU-27

SPAIN EU-27 3 BEST MS

126
Country Annex
Spain
SPAIN EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 57.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
WOMEN 25-49 with SPAIN

OLDER WOMEN (55-64)
children
SPAIN
3 BEST MS

66 Public expenPublic expenditure on social protection, % of GDP 19.8 22.2 : : 25.3 13.8 2008

Spain's current fertility rate is lower than the EU average and Spanish women tend to have their first child relatively late in life.
Life expectancy is among the highest in the EU. The projections assume that fertility will recover slightly and that life
expectancies will roughly evolve in line with the EU average. This would result in a high old-age dependency ratio in the EU
in 2060. Over recent years, Spain has attracted large numbers of immigrants, many of whom were regularised, boosting the
official population and employment of Spain. Under the assumption that immigration continues at the present level the
Spanish population could grow considerably by 16% until 2050. However, in the crisis, unemployment among migrants has
risen considerably.
Female employment rates could rise, but this might require a more extensive provision of childcare for the youngest children.
In the crisis, some 10% of households with children have found themselves jobless.
Employment rates of older workers are above the EU average, but could also be further increased. The share of older
workers (55-64) in the work force is projected to increase to well above 20% in 2030.
Educational attainment can be improved and early school leaving reduced; this could help Spain continue narrowing the
productivity gap to the EU average.
. In 2060, public pension expenditure is projected to reach 20% of GDP.
127
10. FRANCE
FRANCE EU-27 *
1 Population (on 1 January; in thousands) : 60,538 64,714 67,982 71,044 501,103 2010
7 Natural growth (births minus deaths) in thousands : 267.5 276.9 131.0 15.4 523.1
8 Net migration (including corrections) in thousands : 166.8 70.2 86.5 69.9 877.1
10 Old age dependency ratio (65 and + / 15-64 years old), in % : 24.3 25.6 39.0 44.7 25.6

600,000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
500,000
EU-27
Natural
growth
2009 400,000
FRANCE projected
Pop. under 25 300,000

Net
200,000
Pop. aged 80+
FRANCE
100,000
Total
populatio
n growth
EU-27 0 projected
2050
-100,000
FRANCE
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
EARLY
70
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
with tertiary
10 level) WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
100 80 60 40 20 0 20 40 60
FR EMPLOYMENT FR UNEMPLOYMENT % FRANCE EU-27

FRANCE EU-27 3 BEST MS

128
Country Annex
France
FRANCE EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 74.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
WOMEN 25-49 with FRANCE

OLDER WOMEN (55-64)
children
FRANCE
MEN 25-49 with children EU-27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
3 BEST MS


France has currently the second-highest fertility rate in the EU and the population projections assume that this will continue.
Life expectancy is assumed to continue to be one of the very highest in the EU. The total population is expected to grow by
about 10% until 2050, while the old-age dependency ratio could evolve more favourably than for the EU as a whole.
Employment opportunities for women are relatively well developed thanks to extensive childcare provision, and the gender
pay gap is below the EU average.
By contrast, there is much scope for increasing the labour force participation of older workers; the average life time in
retirement is the highest in the EU. A more modern employment protection combined with lifelong learning would increase
labour market flexibility. Another area which would generate employment growth is the integration of third country nationals
whose employment rates and educational attainment are particularly low.
Public debt is above the EU average; in 2011, as a result of the crisis, it is projected to reach 90% of GDP. The projected
increase in public social protection expenditure is also roughly in line with the EU as a whole.
129
11. ITALY
ITALY EU-27 *
2 Total Fertility Rate (number of children per woman) 2.38 1.26 1.42 1.46 1.52 1,60 2008
3 Life expectancy at birth for women in years : 82.8 84.5 86.9 89.0 82.4 2008
4 Life expectancy at birth for men in years : 76.9 79.1 81.7 84.3 76.4 2008
5 Life expectancy at age 65 for women in years : 20.7 22.0 : : 20.54 2008
6 Life expectancy at age 65 for men in years : 16.7 18.2 : : 16.99 2008
9 Mean age of women at childbirth 25.1 28.4 31.1 : : 29.7 2008

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 800,000
EU-27
600,000 Natural
growth
2009
ITALY 400,000 projected
Pop. under 25
Net

Pop. aged 80+ 0
ITALY
Total
population
-200,000 growth
EU-27
projected
2050
-400,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
ITALY
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
70
EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
with tertiary level)
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30
IT EMPLOYMENT IT UNEMPLOYMENT % ITALY EU-27
ITALY EU-27 3 BEST MS

130
Country Annex
Italy
ITALY EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 44.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80 EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children

ITALY
MEN 25-49 with children ITALY
EU-27
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3 BEST MS

52 Employment rate of nationals, women , 25-54, in % : 59.2 72.9 20.6
53 Employment rate of nationals, men , 25-54, in % : 84.6 85.4 20.0

Italy currently has the highest old-age dependency ratio in the EU, shared with Germany. With a low fertility rate and high
life expectancy - both being expected to continue - the old age dependency ratio could rise to almost two-thirds (2
persons aged 65+ for every 3 persons of working age). The Italian population size is expected to remain more or less
constant under the assumption that significant numbers of immigrants continue to arrive.
There is significant scope for promoting the labour force participation of women. This would also help in reducing the risk of
poverty for households with children. Employment rates for older workers are also comparatively low. The proportion of older
workers (55-64) in the work-force is projected to become the highest, almost 25%, in 2030.
There is scope for raising productivity, notably by raising educational attainment levels, combating early school leaving and
boosting R&D spending.
Reducing public debt would enhance Italy's ability to meet future social protection needs, even if the projected ageing-
related increase in public expenditure is comparatively small. Italian workers have the second-longest average life-time in
retirement in the EU and its debt ratio in the crisis is projected to near 120% in 2011.
131
12. CYPRUS
CYPRUS EU-27 *
1 Population (on 1 January; in thousands) 612 690 803 1,072 1,251 501,103 2010

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 20,000
18,000
EU-27
Natural
16,000
growth
2009 14,000
CYPRUS projected
12,000
Pop. under 25
Net

Pop. aged 80+
CYPRUS
6,000
Total
population
4,000
growth
EU-27
projected
2,000
2050
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
CYPRUS
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
70
EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
CY EMPLOYMENT CY UNEMPLOYMENT % CYPRUS EU-27
CYPRUS EU-27 3 BEST MS

132
Country Annex
Cyprus
CYPRUS EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 45.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80 EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children CYPRUS
MEN 25-49 with children CYPRUS
EU-27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3 BEST MS


Life expectancy in Cyprus is above the EU average, while fertility is below. This is assumed to continue over the next
decades. Nevertheless, thanks to immigration, Cyprus' population is expected to grow significantly until 2050 and the
increase in the old-age dependency ratio could be moderate compared to the EU average.
Employment rates are above the EU average as is the employment gender gap at 15%. In particular a better availability of
child care, particularly for very young children, might lead to a further increase in female employment. Labour force
participation of older men is high, even in the higher age groups (65-69) but it could grow further for women aged 55-64.
Due to ageing, public expenditure on pensions is projected to rise, exerting a heavy strain on public finances even if the
public debt level remains moderate compared to other EU Member States.
Government policy priorities are focused on introducing parametric reforms to the pension system, to improve its financial
viability, to raise the employment rates of women and older workers and to further reduce the public debt to GDP ratio
133
13. LATVIA
LATVIA EU-27 *
2 Total Fertility Rate (number of children per woman) : : 1.31 1.43 1.50 1,60
3 Life expectancy at birth for women in years : : 78.0 81.5 85.2 82.4
4 Life expectancy at birth for men in years : : 68.1 72.8 78.1 76.4
5 Life expectancy at age 65 for women in years : : 18.2 : : 20.54
6 Life expectancy at age 65 for men in years : : 13.4 : : 16.99
8 Net migration (including corrections) in thousands 6.7 -5.5 -4.7 -0.6 0.7 877.1

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 5,000
0
EU-27
Natural
growth
-5,000
2009 projected
LATVIA
-10,000
Pop. under 25 Net

-20,000
Pop. aged 80+
LATVIA
-25,000 Total
population
growth
2050
-35,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
LATVIA
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
MEN
30 ATTAINMENT
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30
LV EMPLOYMENT LV UNEMPLOYMENT % LATVIA EU-27

3 BEST MS
LATVIA EU-27 3 BEST MS

134
Country Annex
Latvia
LATVIA EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 58.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children LATVIA
LATVIA
MEN 25-49 with children
EU-27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3 BEST MS


Latvia's fertility rate is currently below the EU average, but this may partly be the effect of a transition to women having
children later in life; a further recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections. Life expectancy is significantly
below the EU average, particularly for men, and the gap is expected to remain large over the projection period. As a result
the population, which is already declining, is expected to shrink dramatically (-16% by 2050) while the increase in the old-
age dependency ratio will be higher than the EU's in 2060.
Female employment rates are above the EU average and most women work full-time. A better availability of child care,
particularly for the youngest children, might allow further increases.
The employment rates of older workers are also above the EU average, but they could grow further.
Latvia has a huge potential for catching up in terms of productivity and can build on a high level of educational
attainment. There is also scope for more proactive education and labour market policies to improve the integration of third
country nationals.
Public finances are sound and public social protection expenditure is not expected to rise significantly over the coming
decades.
135
14. LITHUANIA
LITHUANIA EU-27 *
8 Net migration (including corrections) in thousands 6.7 -5.5 -15.5 -0.6 0.7 877.1

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 5,000
EU-27 0
Natural
growth
2009 -5,000
projected
LITHUANIA
Pop. under 25 -10,000

Net
Pop. aged 65-79 -15,000

2030 projected
Pop. aged 80+
LITHUANIA
-20,000
Total
population
growth
EU-27 -25,000
projected
2050
-30,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
LITHUANIA
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
MEN
30 ATTAINMENT
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
LT EMPLOYMENT LT UNEMPLOYMENT % LITHUANIA EU-27

3 BEST MS
LITHUANIA EU-27 3 BEST MS

136
Country Annex
Lithuania
LITHUANIA EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 54.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children LITHUANIA
LITHUANIA
EU-27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3 BEST MS

54 Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women , 25-54, in % : : 52.7 71.7
55 Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men , 25-54, in % : : 72.9 72.4

Lithuania's fertility rate is currently below the EU average, and this may partly be the effect of a transition to women having
children later in life; a further recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections. Life expectancy is significantly
below the EU average, particularly for men, and the gap is expected to remain large over the projection period. As a result,
the population, already in decline, is expected to continue shrinking considerably (-17% by 2050) and the old-age
dependency ratio will increase to be the third-highest in the EU in 2060.
Female employment rates are above the EU average and most women work full-time. A better availability of childcare,
especially in the 0-2 age class, might still allow for further improvements.
The employment rates of older workers are also above the EU average, but could still grow, particularly if health and
disability issues are tackled.
Lithuania has great potential for catching up in terms of productivity and can build on a high level of educational
attainment.
Public finances are sound although public social protection expenditure is expected to rise over the coming decades.
137
15. LUXEMBOURG
LUXEMBOURG EU-27 *
1 Population (on 1 January; in thousands) 339 434 502 607 697 501,103 2010

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 12,000

growth
2009 projected
LITHUANIA 8,000
Pop. under 25 Net


Pop. aged 80+ 4,000
LITHUANIA
Total
population
2,000 growth
EU-27
projected
2050
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
LITHUANIA
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
MEN
30 ATTAINMENT
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
% 3 BEST MS
LU EMPLOYMENT LU UNEMPLOYMENT
3 HIGHEST MS EMPLOYM. 3 HIGHEST MS UNEMPLOYM. LUXEMBOURG
LUXEMBOURG EU-27 3 BEST MS

31 Employment rate, women 65-69 yrs, in % : : 7.4 20.6
32 Employment rate, men 65-69 yrs, in % : 9.0 13.2 28.3
138
Country Annex
Luxembourg
LUXEMBOURG EU-27 3 BEST MS *

48 Percentage of the employed population working in high-tech sectors 3.6 : 3.7 6.1
49 Internet use, in % : 85.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children LUXEMBOURG
LUXEMBOURG
EU-27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3 BEST MS


Luxembourg's fertility rate is above the EU average while life expectancy is close to the EU level. This is projected to continue.
Thanks to immigration, the population is expected to grow by 39% until 2050. The old-age dependency ratio is projected to
be the lowest in the EU by 2050.
Female employment could grow, reducing the current 16 percentage point gap between male and female employment
rates. A large proportion of women work part-time. The expansion in childcare facilities will certainly help in this respect.
Another important labour force reserve is formed by older workers whose employment rates are significantly below the EU
average.
Productivity levels are very high which could allow the country to attract more migrant workers in the future.
Public debt is at a very low level, but the projected ageing-related increase in public pension expenditure is large.
139
16. HUNGARY
HUNGARY EU-27 *
7 Natural growth (births minus deaths) in thousands 31.6 38.0 -34.0 -47.5 -49.1 523.1

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 30,000
20,000
EU-27
Natural
10,000 growth
2009 projected
HUNGARY 0
Pop. under 25 -10,000 Net

-20,000
Pop. aged 80+ -30,000
HUNGARY
Total
-40,000 population
growth
EU-27
-50,000 projected
2050
-60,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
HUNGARY
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
MEN
30 ATTAINMENT
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
HU EMPLOYMENT HU UNEMPLOYMENT % HUNGARY EU-27

3 BEST MS
HUNGARY EU-27 3 BEST MS

140
Country Annex
Hungary
HUNGARY EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 59.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children HUNGARY
HUNGARY
EU-27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3 BEST MS
5 MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION 2000 2009 2009 2009 *

61 General government primary balance, % of GDP 2.1 0.2 : : -4.2 -0.1

Hungary's fertility rate is currently one of the lowest in the EU, but this may partly be the effect of a transition to women
having children later in life; a recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections. In 2009, over 15% of children (0-
17) found themselves in jobless households. Life expectancy is significantly below the EU average, particularly for men, and
the gap is expected to remain large over the projection period. There are also large life expectancy differences by
education level, indicating that there is scope for improvement. As a result, the population, which is already decreasing, is
expected to shrink by 10% by 2050 and the old-age dependency ratio will increase to a level above that of the EU as a
whole by 2060.
Hungary has significant scope for increasing employment through higher labour force participation of women and older
workers.
Productivity levels can also catch up, building on a high level of educational attainment of the population. More R&D
investment could also help boost productivity.
Public debt is close to the EU average and public spending on pensions is expected to rise moderately. Reforms are also
needed in the area of health and long term care, while avoiding deterioration in the quality of the services provided.
141
17. MALTA
MALTA EU-27 *
1 Population (on 1 January; in thousands) 303 380 413 432 415 501,103 2010
4 Life expectancy at birth for men in years : 76.2 77.8 79.9 83 76.4

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 4,000
EU-27 3,000
Natural
growth
2009 2,000
projected
MALTA
Pop. under 25 1,000

Net
Pop. aged 65-79 0

2030 projected
Pop. aged 80+
MALTA
-1,000
Total
population
growth
EU-27 -2,000
projected
2050
-3,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
MALTA
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
MEN
30 ATTAINMENT
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 40 20 0 20 40 60
MT EMPLOYMENT MT UNEMPLOYMENT % MALTA EU-27

3 BEST MS
MALTA EU-27 3 BEST MS

27 Employment rate, women 55-59 yrs, in % : 19.5 51.4 75.5
32 Employment rate, men 65-69 yrs, in % : : 13.2 28.3
142
Country Annex
Malta
MALTA EU-27 3 BEST MS *

39 Educational attainment, women 30-34 yrs with tertiary education level., in % : 22.7 35.7 54.9
40 Educational attainment, men 30-34 yrs with tertiary education level., in % : 19.6 28.9 44.4
47 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, % of GDP : 0.6 2.01 3.52
49 Internet use, in % : 56.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children MALTA
MALTA
EU-27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3 BEST MS


Malta’s fertility in 2008 was below the EU average while life expectancy is higher than the EU27 average for males, and at
par with the EU27 average for females. Declining fertility and a lengthening life expectancy, whose relative advances are
expected to increase even faster over coming decades, will result in more rapid population ageing over the long-term. The
population is expected to grow slightly as a result of developments in net migration inflows. Old-age dependency is lower
than the EU average, mainly due to Malta’s late onset of fertility decline, whereby a higher life expectancy and a lower
fertility rate are expected to lead to a rise in the old-age dependency ratio and in a mild decline in the youth-dependency
ratio over time, although to different levels and with various degree of intensity in this decline; therefore, in the long term
(2060), the population is projected to age substantially.
Measures are being taken to encourage more female participation in the labour market, particularly amongst married
women as the gap between male and female employment rates currently stands at 34 percentage points. Similarly, there is
increasing awareness of the labour force potential of older workers and measures are also being taken to encourage older
workers to remain active in the labour market. Productivity levels are still significantly below the EU average and to close the
gap, educational attainment levels need to be improved and R&D spending boosted.
Public debt is below the EU average, but public expenditure on pensions is projected to grow to 13.4% of GDP in 2060,
whereby the demographic transition to an older population is the main driver underpinning the increase for the public
pension expenditure over the long-term.
143
18. THE NETHERLANDS
NETHERLANDS EU-27 *

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 140,000
120,000
EU-27
Natural
100,000
growth
2009 80,000
NETHERLANDS projected
60,000
Pop. under 25 Net

Pop. aged 80+
NETHERLANDS
0
Total
population
-20,000 growth
EU-27
projected
-40,000
2050
-60,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
NETHERLANDS
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
70
EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
% 3 BEST MS
NL EMPLOYMENT NL UNEMPLOYMENT
3 HIGHEST MS EMPLOYM. 3 HIGHEST MS UNEMPLOYM. NETHERLANDS
NETHERLANDS EU-27 3 BEST MS

144
Country Annex
The Netherlands
NETHERLANDS EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 88.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children NETHERLANDS
NETHERLANDS
EU-27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3 BEST MS


Fertility in the Netherlands is at a relatively high level after having recovered from a much lower level in the 1980s. Life
expectancy is above the EU average. Projections are based on the assumption that fertility will remain high and that life
expectancy will grow slower than for the EU as a whole. These trends combined with significant immigration will result in a
below-EU average old-age dependency ratio by 2050. The Dutch population is projected to grow by only a few percent
until 2050.
Female labour force participation is high, but the contribution of women to the economy could improve if women worked
more hours and the gender pay gap was reduced. Better childcare provision could help in this respect. Employment could
also grow through higher labour force participation of older workers and improved access of minorities and third country
nationals to the labour market and education systems.
Public debt is below the EU average. Public social protection expenditure is expected to rise faster than for the EU as a
whole, albeit to a level that would remain below the EU average.
145
19. AUSTRIA
AUSTRIA EU-27 *

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 80,000

growth
2009 projected
AUSTRIA 40,000
Pop. under 25 Net


Pop. aged 80+ 0
AUSTRIA
Total
population
-20,000 growth
EU-27
projected
2050
-40,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
AUSTRIA
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
MEN
30 ATTAINMENT
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
AT EMPLOYMENT AT UNEMPLOYMENT % AUSTRIA EU-27

3 BEST MS
AUSTRIA EU-27 3 BEST MS

146
Country Annex
Austria
AUSTRIA EU-27 3 BEST MS *

39 Educational attainment, women 30-34 yrs with tertiary education level., in % : 24.0 35.7 54.9
40 Educational attainment, men 30-34 yrs with tertiary education level., in % : 23.0 28.9 44.4
49 Internet use, in % : 68.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
AUSTRIA
AUSTRIA
EU-27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30


Fertility in Austria lies below the EU average and only a moderate recovery is expected. Thanks to life expectancy rising
above the EU average and significant immigration, the population is expected to grow until 2050 by almost 10%. The old-
age dependency ratio is expected to double but will stay slightly below the EU average.
Female employment rates are high, but many women work part-time and their hourly pay is significantly lower than men's;
childcare facilities for children 0-2 years are limited. Older workers represent a significant potential for increasing
employment as their employment rates are well below the EU average, although they have been on a steep increase over
the last years. Employment may also benefit from improving qualification levels of third-country nationals and ensuring their
better integration into the labour market.
Public debt is close to the EU average and public social protection expenditure is expected to rise only moderately over the
coming decades.
The government is particularly concerned about reconciliation of work and family life, integration of young people into the
labour market, improvement of employment rates of older people and ensuring the sustainability of public finances for high
quality social services. It has recently taken important measures to help young people enter the labour market. The
government is keen to further promote the employability of older workers together with a higher effective retirement age
and enhance the participation in pre-school education for children with a migrant background.
147
20. POLAND
POLAND EU-27 *
8 Net migration (including corrections) in thousands -293.6 -409.9 -1.2 -1.3 26.4 877.1

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 50,000
0
EU-27
Natural
-50,000
growth
2009 -100,000
POLAND projected
-150,000
Pop. under 25 Net
2030 Pop. aged 65-79 -250,000 projected

Pop. aged 80+
POLAND -300,000
Total
-350,000 population
growth
EU-27
-400,000 projected
2050
-450,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
POLAND
EU-27 3 BEST MS
15 Gender pay gap (unadjusted) in % : 9.8 17.5 7 2008
18 Average number of usual weekly working hours, women : 37.2 33.0 38.9
19 Average number of usual weekly working hours, men : 41.6 39.9 42.2
22 Children (< 16 yrs) at risk of poverty after social transfer, % ; 22.7 20.1 10.7 2008
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
MEN
30 ATTAINMENT
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
PL EMPLOYMENT PL UNEMPLOYMENT % POLAND EU-27

3 BEST MS
POLAND EU-27 3 BEST MS

148
Country Annex
Poland
POLAND EU-27 3 BEST MS *

48 Percentage of the employed population working in high-tech sectors : 2.7 3.7 6.1
49 Internet use, in % : 54.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children POLAND
POLAND
EU-27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3 BEST MS

70 People 18-59 yrs living in jobless households : 10.2 : : 10.1 6.1

Poland's fertility rate has dropped to one of the lowest levels in the EU, but this may partly be the effect of a transition to
women having children later in life; a moderate recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections; childcare
capacity is still low, almost inexistent for the 0-2 and below 40% for the 3+ in 2008. Life expectancy is significantly below the
EU average and it is not expected that the gap will be closed over the projection period. Over recent years, Poland
experienced significant emigration, but in 2009 this has dwindled almost to zero. Altogether, by 2050, this will lead to a
shrinking of the population by more than 10% and to one of the highest proportions of 65+ in the EU.
There is a large life expectancy gap according to educational attainment, which can lead to overall increases as
education becomes more widespread. Employment rates of both men and women are far below the EU average, leaving
much scope for future employment growth. Promoting the labour force activation of women might also reduce the risk of
poverty, which is higher for households with children. The employment rate gap between Poland and the EU average is
particularly large for older workers.
There is a large potential for productivity growth which could build on a high level of educational attainment.
Public debt is below the EU average and public pension expenditure is even expected to fall significantly over the coming
decades.
149
21. PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL EU-27 *

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 100,000
80,000
EU-27
Natural
growth
60,000
2009 projected
PORTUGAL
40,000
Pop. under 25 Net

0
Pop. aged 80+
PORTUGAL
-20,000 Total
population
growth
2050
-60,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
PORTUGAL
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
MEN
30 ATTAINMENT
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 40 20 0 20 40 60
PT EMPLOYMENT PT UNEMPLOYMENT % PORTUGAL EU-27

3 BEST MS
PORTUGAL EU-27 3 BEST MS

150
Country Annex
Portugal
PORTUGAL EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 47.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
EU-27


The Portuguese fertility rate is below the EU average and has decreased in recent years. The projection expects a moderate
recovery. Life expectancy is close to the EU average, especially for women. Net migration is positive but has been
decreasing steadily since 2002. These underlying trends cause population to grow by 7.5% by 2050 and to increase the old-
age dependency ratio to a level that is above the EU average. The working population is ageing fast and in 2030 it is
projected that one worker in five will be an older worker (55-64). Because of the crisis, the debt ratio is increasing from just
above 60% in 2007 to a projected 90% in 2011.
Labour force participation, the gender employment gap and the gender pay gap compare favourably to the EU average.
But productivity levels are low and the number of early school leavers is high even if educational attainment is rising.
Employment rates of men and women with young children are among the highest in the EU while childcare availability is
increasing. This is likely to reduce the percentage of children at risk of poverty, presently close to the EU average. The
government continues to be concerned about income inequality and for this reason it is targeting social benefits towards
the most vulnerable groups, especially older persons and families with children. Public expenditure could rise further due to
the impact of ageing. The new pension reform aims to make future public finances more sustainable.
151
22. ROMANIA
ROMANIA EU-27 *
2 Total Fertility Rate (number of children per woman) ; 1.31 1.38 1.41 1.48 1,60
8 Net migration (including corrections) in thousands -12.2 -3.7 -1.6 -0.8 12.7 877.1

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 100,000
0
EU-27
Natural
growth
-100,000
2009 projected
ROMANIA
-200,000
Pop. under 25 Net

-400,000
Pop. aged 80+
ROMANIA
-500,000 Total
population
growth
2050
-700,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
ROMANIA
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
MEN
30 ATTAINMENT
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30
RO EMPLOYMENT RO UNEMPLOYMENT % ROMANIA EU-27

3 BEST MS
ROMANIA EU-27 3 BEST MS

152
Country Annex
Romania
ROMANIA EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 33.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children ROMANIA
ROMANIA
EU-27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3 BEST MS


The total population of Romania is expected to decline significantly by almost 16% until 2050 as a result of low birth rates and
a high level of net emigration. Fertility rates are expected to recover from the current low level while net emigration should
come to a halt. As of 2009, 10% of families with children are jobless. Life expectancy, particularly for men, is currently low and
significant progress is expected. Even so, the population is projected to decrease significantly by 2060. The old-age
dependency ratio is expected to remain below the EU average for a couple decades, then increase to well above the EU
average by 2060, when, as a result, public expenditure on pensions if projected to be above 15% of GDP.
Low employment rates mean that there is a major potential for employment growth.
Productivity is just above one-third the EU average, so there is an enormous catching-up potential. Reducing the number of
early school leavers and increasing investment in research and development would contribute to realising this productivity
growth potential.
At the beginning of 2009 the government improved paid parental leave for young children. Parents can now take leave for
any child under the age of two at 85% of the average income. New legislation is also going to make it possible for private
providers to create childcare places.
Current public debt is well below the EU average. Projections of future ageing-related public spending suggest a
considerable increase over the coming decades, in particular in the area of pensions.
153
23. SLOVENIA
SLOVENIA EU-27 *
4 Life expectancy at birth for men in years ; 72.2 75.9 78.9 82.2 76.4

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 25,000
20,000
EU-27
Natural
growth
15,000
2009
SLOVENIA projected
10,000
Pop. under 25 Net

0
Pop. aged 80+
SLOVENIA
-5,000 Total
population
growth
2050
-15,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
SLOVENIA
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
MEN
30 ATTAINMENT
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
SI EMPLOYMENT SI UNEMPLOYMENT % SLOVENIA EU-27

3 BEST MS
SLOVENIA EU-27 3 BEST MS

154
Country Annex
Slovenia
SLOVENIA EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 60.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80 EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children SLOVENIA

SLOVENIA
EU-27
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3 BEST MS

60 General government consolidated gross debt, % of GDP : 35.4 : : 74 12.1

Slovenia's fertility rate has reverted to almost the EU average and is already higher than the projected 2060 value. . Life
expectancy is near the EU average,. The old-age dependency ratio is expected to increase faster than for the EU as a
whole and to exceed the EU-27 level by 2050. Under the current projections, until 2050 the Slovenian population is projected
to decrease by 8% and pension payments will be almost 20% of its GDP.
Female employment rates are well above the EU average and few women work part-time. The gender pay gap is smaller
than for the EU as a whole.
There is significant scope for increased employment of older workers. There is also a high share of older people who have
retired prematurely due to past restructuring; older workers participation rates, currently below 40%, could increase. With
productivity standing roughly at 4/5 of the EU-15 level, there is still some potential for growth. The pension reform and
measures to promote active ageing will contribute to higher employment rate of elderly and later exit from the working life.
Public debt is comparatively low, but projections of future ageing-related public spending suggest a considerable increase
in the decades to come.
155
24. SLOVAKIA
SLOVAKIA EU-27 *
8 Net migration (including corrections) in thousands -35.1 -22.3 4.4 3.9 6.1 877.1

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 20,000

growth
2009
SLOVAKIA 0 projected
Pop. under 25 Net


Pop. aged 80+ -20,000
SLOVAKIA
Total
population
-30,000 growth
EU-27
projected
2050
-40,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
SLOVAKIA
EU-27 3 BEST MS
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
MEN
30 ATTAINMENT
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
SK EMPLOYMENT SK UNEMPLOYMENT
% SLOVAKIA EU-27
3 BEST MS
SLOVAKIA EU-27 3 BEST MS

31 Employment rate, women 65-69 yrs, in % : 2.2 7.4 20.6
156
Country Annex
Slovakia
SLOVAKIA EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 72.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80 EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children SLOVAKIA
SLOVAKIA
EU-27
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3 BEST MS


Slovakia's fertility rate during the period 2005–2009 has increased, especially since 2007, although it is still below the EU
average. This may be the effect of a transition to women having children later in life; a further recovery of fertility is assumed
for the population projections. The low figures above on childcare capacity for children under age 3 are disputed. Life
expectancy is below the EU average, particularly for men, and it is not expected that the gap will be closed over the
projection period. The old-age dependency ratio, currently far below the EU average, is expected to grow fast and to
become the highest in the EU by 2060. Until 2050 the Slovakian population is expected to shrink by 10%.
While the gender gap in employment rates is small (reflecting also low employment rates for men), the pay gap is
particularly large and childcare is only available for a minority of children. There is significant scope for employment growth
by raising the labour force participation of older workers and by assisting the long term unemployed to find work. Slovakia
could also benefit from catching up in terms of productivity and can build on a high level of educational attainment. More
expenditure for R&D and for lifelong learning could also help. Public debt is low and the expected ageing-related increase
in public social protection expenditure is moderate.
157
25. FINLAND
FINLAND EU-27 *

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 30,000
25,000
EU-27
Natural
20,000 growth
2009 projected
FINLAND 15,000
Pop. under 25 10,000 Net

5,000
Pop. aged 80+ 0
FINLAND
Total
-5,000 population
growth
EU-27
-10,000 projected
2050
-15,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
FINLAND
EU-27 3 BEST MS
23 Children 0-16 yrs living in jobless households, % : : 10.2 4.1
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
MEN
30 ATTAINMENT
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
FI EMPLOYMENT FI UNEMPLOYMENT
% FINLAND EU-27
3 BEST MS
FINLAND EU-27 3 BEST MS

158
Country Annex
Finland
FINLAND EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 78.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
FINLAND
FINLAND
EU-27


The average life span has risen by 10 years in the last 30 years in Finland. Fertility rates and life expectancy in Finland are
above the EU average and this positive development is expected to continue. In the next few years, population ageing will
be faster in Finland than in most other EU Member States. In 2020, Finland will have the oldest population in the EU, measured
in terms of the old-age dependency ratio. The working-age population, 15-64-year-olds, has been already decreasing since
2010. From 2010 to 2050 the Finnish population is expected to grow by 2%.
In the current decade, pension expenditure will grow quickly. Finland has funded a major part of the future pension
expenditure and reformed social security and taxation. Finland is preparing itself for demographic change in particular
through active ageing policies. The female employment rate is high and the gap between male and female rates is small.
The employment rate of older workers is also comparatively high, but could be further improved by health promotion and
tackling disability as a major cause for early labour market exit. Extending working careers and improving the productivity of
public services, e.g. by reforming the structure of municipal health and social services, will play a key role. The Government
has launched a policy programme for health promotion as well as a programme promoting employment, entrepreneurship
and work life.
The Government has carried out a broad re-assessment of the impact of ageing on existing policies which was published in
2009.
159
26. SWEDEN
SWEDEN EU-27 *
7 Natural growth (births minus deaths) in thousands 30.1 -3.0 21.7 6.4 5.2 523.1
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 100,000

growth
2009
SWEDEN 60,000 projected
Pop. under 25
Net

Pop. aged 80+ 20,000
SWEDEN
Total
population
0 growth
EU-27
projected
2050
-20,000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
SWEDEN
EU-27 3 BEST MS
13 Employment rate, women 25-54 with at least 1 child : : 68.2 81.1
14 Employment rate, men 25-54 with at least 1 child : : 88.5 94.0
15 Gender pay gap (unadjusted) in % 18 17 17.5 7 2008
23 Children 0-16 yrs living in jobless households, % : : 10.2 4.1
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
MEN
30 ATTAINMENT
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
10 WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
SE EMPLOYMENT SE UNEMPLOYMENT % SWEDEN EU-27

3 BEST MS
SWEDEN EU-27 3 BEST MS

32 Employment rate, men 65-69 yrs, in % : 22.2 13.2 28.3
34 Average exit age from the labour market, men 6.9 5.0 62.0 64.7 2008
36 Internet use, population 55-64 yrs, in % 100.0 111.3 44 75 2010
160
Country Annex
Sweden
SWEDEN EU-27 3 BEST MS *

46 Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 yrs in education and training), in % 21.6 22.2 9.1 25.3
47 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, % of GDP : 3.75 2.01 3.52
49 Internet use, in % : 86 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80 EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
0
OLDER WOMEN (55-64) WOMEN 25-49 with children SWEDEN
SWEDEN
EU-27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
3 BEST MS

61 General government primary balance, % of GDP 7.2 0.0 : : -4.2 -0.1

Sweden's fertility rate is above the EU average and this is expected to continue. Life expectancy is well above the EU
average. This situation is assumed to prevail over the projection period. Combined with significant immigration, these trends
will result in further population growth by near 8% in 2050. The increase in the old-age dependency ratio will be modest to a
level below the EU average. In the crisis, many migrants in Sweden found themselves unemployed.
… Opportunities for tackling them
Sweden has the highest employment rate in the EU and the employment gap between men and women is small. However,
the gender pay gap is larger than the EU average and a large proportion of women work part-time. Employment rates of
older workers are very high too; improvements would require further efforts to prevent increases in disability pensions.
While productivity exceeds the EU-15 average, the high levels of educational attainment and investment in research and
development could allow further growth. Access of minorities and third-country nationals to the labour market and
education system might be improved. The public debt is below the EU average; the expected ageing-related increase in
public social protection expenditure is moderate.
161
27. THE UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED KINGDOM EU-27 *
2 Total Fertility Rate (number of children per woman) : 1.64 1.96 1.84 1.84 1,60 2008
3 Life expectancy at birth for women in years : 80.3 81.9 85.0 87.7 82.4 2008
4 Life expectancy at birth for men in years ; 75.5 77.8 80.9 83.8 76.4 2008
5 Life expectancy at age 65 for women in years : 19.0 20.3 : : 20.54 2008
6 Life expectancy at age 65 for men in years : 15.8 17.7 : : 16.99 2008
9 Mean age of women at childbirth : 28.5 29.3 : : 29.7 2008

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 500,000
450,000
EU-27
400,000 Natural
growth
2009 350,000
UNITED KINGDOM projected
300,000
Pop. under 25
Net

Pop. aged 80+
UNITED KINGDOM 150,000
Total
100,000 population
growth
EU-27
50,000 projected
2050
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
UNITED KINGDOM
EU-27 3 BEST MS
15 Gender pay gap (unadjusted) in % 24 21 17.5 7 2008
20 Childcare provision for children (0-2 years), % : 35 28 56 2008
21 Childcare provision for children (3 yrs to compulsory school age), % : 87 83 97 2008
90
80 MEN
70 EARLY
LEAVERS
60 from EDU
and TRA. WOMEN
50
40
EDUCATION
ATTAINMENT MEN
30
LEVEL
20 (pop. aged 30-34
with tertiary
10 level) WOMEN
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30
UK EMPLOYMENT UK UNEMPLOYMENT %
EU-27 EMPLOYMENT EU-27 UNEMPLOYMENT UK EU-27 3 BEST MS
UNITED KINGDOM EU-27 3 BEST MS

162
Country Annex
The United Kingdom
UNITED KINGDOM EU-27 3 BEST MS *

49 Internet use, in % : 77.0 63 86
WOMEN (20-64)
100
80
EU-27
60
OLDER MEN (55-64) MEN (20-64)
40
20
UK
UK
EU-27


The UK's fertility rate is above the EU average and it is assumed that this will persist. Life expectancy is close to the EU
average, and a more favourable evolution for men is expected in the population projections. These trends, combined with
a significant level of immigration, will lead to a growing population and a much more favourable evolution of the old-age
dependency ratio than for the EU as a whole. The UK population is projected to grow by 20% by 2050. Many children
younger than 17 (17%), especially those with single parents, live in jobless households. The debt to GDP ratio is now above
80%, constraining policies.
The gap between male and female employment rates is smaller than for the EU as a whole, but, at 10 percentage points,
there is scope for further progress. The gender pay gap is particularly large and many women only work part-time. An
improvement in the situation may require better availability of childcare. Improved female employment might also reduce
the risk of poverty for households with children. Employment rates of older workers are high, even for people in their 60s.
Government initiatives are focused on increasing labour market participation by reforming the incapacity benefit policy
and expanding the initiatives to guide people back to work (the Pathways model) - around half the potential customers are
over 50. There is also a focus on skills enhancement – particularly in pre- and in-work support. Public debt is comparatively
low; the expected ageing-related increase in public social protection expenditure is slightly above the increase for the EU as
a whole.
163
1. COUNTRY INDICATOR SOURCES
Title of the indicator Eurostat online data code(s) / online link
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
1 Population (on 1 January; in thousands) demo_pjan
2 Total Fertility Rate (number of children per woman) demo_find
3 Life expectancy at birth for women in years demo_mlexpec
4 Life expectancy at birth for men in years demo_mlexpec
5 Life expectancy at age 65 for women in years demo_mlexpec
6 Life expectancy at age 65 for men in years demo_mlexpec
7 Natural growth (births minus deaths) in thousands demo_gind
8 Net migration (including corrections) in thousands demo_gind
9 Mean age of women at childbirth demo_find
10 Old age dependency ratio (65 and + / 15-64 years old), in % tsdde511
1-10 Population projections 2030 and 2050 Proj_08c1250p Proj_08c1250a
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS
11 Employment rate, women 20-64 years, in % lfsa_ergan
12 Employment rate, men 20-64 years, in % lfsa_ergan
13 Employment rate, women with at least 1 child lfst_hheredch
14 Employment rate, men with at least 1 child lfst_hheredch
15 Gender pay gap (unadjusted) in % tsiem040
16 Employed women working part time, % lfsa_epgaed
17 Employed men working part time, % lfsa_epgaed
18 Average number of usual weekly working hours, women lfsa_ewhais
19 Average number of usual weekly working hours, men lfsa_ewhais
20 Childcare provision for children (0-2 years), % ilc_caindformal
21 Childcare provision for children (3 yrs to compulsory school age), % ilc_caindformal
22 Children (< 16 yrs) at risk of poverty after social transfer, % ilc_li02
23 Children 0-16 yrs living in jobless households, % lfsi_jhh_a
164
Country Annex
Country Indicator Sources
24 Social protection benefits targeted at family support, (% in kind) spr_exp_ffa
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET
25 Employment rate, women 55-64 yrs, in % lfsa_ergan
26 Employment rate, men 55-64 yrs, in % lfsa_ergan
33 Average exit age from the labour market, women tsiem030
34 Average exit age from the labour market, men tsiem030
35 Inactive for health reasons, population 50-64 yrs, in % lfsa_igar
36 Internet use, population 55-64 yrs, in % isoc_ci_ac_i
4 PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D
37 Early school leavers, women 18-24 yrs, in % edat_lfse_14
38 Early school leavers, men 18-24 yrs, in % edat_lfse_14
39 Educational att., women 30-34 yrs with tertiary education level., in % edat_lfse_07
40 Educational att., men 30-34 yrs with tertiary education level., in % edat_lfse_07
41 University graduates 20-29 yrs per 1 000 of the population of that age educ_itertc
42 Employment rate by education level (tertiary), in % lfsa_ergaed
43 Employment rate by education level (upper secondary), 20-64 in % lfsa_ergaed
44 Employment rate by educat. level (less than upper second.), 20-64 in % lfsa_ergaed
45 Total public expenditure on education, % of GDP educ_figdp
46 Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 yrs in education and training), in % trng_lfs_01
47 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, % of GDP rd_e_gerdtot
48 Percentage of the employed population working in high-tech sectors htec_emp_nat2
165
49 Internet use, in % isoc_ci_ac_i
50 Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100) nama_aux_lp
5 MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION
51 Share of non-nationals in the population, in % migr_pop1ctz
52 Employment rate of nationals, women, 25-54 in % lfsa_ergan
53 Employment rate of nationals, men, 25-54, in % lfsa_ergan
54 Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women, 25-54 in % lfsa_ergan
55 Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men, 25-54 in % lfsa_ergan
56 Education level (tertiary), nationals 25-49 yrs, in %
57 Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals 25-49 yrs, in %
58 Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27, 25-49 yrs, in %
59 Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27, 25-49 yrs, in %
6 SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION
60 General government consolidated gross debt, % of GDP gov_dd_edpt1
61 General government primary balance, % of GDP gov_dd_edpt1
62 Total general government revenue, % of GDP gov_a_main (TR)
63 Public expenditure on pensions, % of GDP spr_exp_gdp
64 Public expenditure on health care and sickness, % of GDP spr_exp_gdp
63-4 Expenditure projections ageing report
65 Public expenditure on family and children, % of GDP spr_exp_gdp
66 Public expenditure on social protection, % of GDP spr_exp_gdp
67 Expenditure on social protection, PPS / inhab. spr_exp_ppsh
68 Percentage of total population at risk of poverty after social transfers ilc_li02
69 Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio) ilc_di11
70 People 18-59 yrs living in jobless households lfsi_jhh_a
166

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European Commission

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

DEMOGRAPHY REPORT 2010

Summary: DG EMPL (Emanuela Tassa);

Part I (Main Demographic Trends):

• chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7: Eurostat (Veronica Corsini, Albane Gourdol, Katarzyna Kraszewska,

• end-parts of chapters 6 and 7 and the boxes: DG EMPL (Ettore Marchetti);

Part II (Borderless Europeans): DG EMPL (Ettore Marchetti)

Country Annexe: DG EMPL (Ettore Marchetti)

• Giampaolo Lanzieri (Eurostat) for his populations projections by foreign background;

Part I: Main Demographic Trends 23

Part II: Borderless Europeans 73

Country Annex 107

In its October 2006 Communication entitled ‘The Demographic Future of

Part II explores an increasingly important phenomenon that was identified in

1. MORE, OLDER AND MORE DIVERSE EUROPEANS

1.1. New patterns lead to slight increases in fertility

Gradual but nonetheless major changes are affecting the population of

ratio of 2.1, but it could contribute to a slower rate of population decline in

The impact of family policies on these trends is difficult to assess since

1.2. An "ageing" population structure

Although it is difficult to predict the impact of policies, an analysis of the

The EUROPOP2008 projections prepared by Eurostat and presented in the

A possible development is the improvement in healthy life expectancy by

1.3. Europe on the move

Migration, especially from non-EU countries, could provide a (temporary)

EU-27 Member States are host to some 20 million non-EU-nationals. A

2. AN INCREASINGLY DIVERSE AND MOBILE EU POPULATION

As the flows of migration from non-EU countries and mobility between

Changing patterns of migration and mobility in Europe are making national

The integration of immigrants across generations occurs rather rapidly. In

Alongside traditional migration and mobility, new forms of mobility are

3. DEMOGRAPHIC POLICY IN THE RECESSION

Before the economic recession, EU Member States' commitment to

4. WHAT IS BEING DONE

The recession has not diminished the commitment of Member States to

The need to mobilise the EU’s demographic potential was already

– The promotion of active ageing: older people, and in particular ageing

– The integration of migrants and their descendants: this is crucial for

– The reconciliation of paid work and family commitments: people

At the same time, Europe needs to find ways of maintaining greater

Seit der Veröffentlichung des letzten Demografieberichts im Jahr 2008 hat

Im Oktober 2006 hat die Kommission die Mitteilung ‘Die demografische

Der diesjährige Bericht ist das Ergebnis eines Gemeinschaftsprojekts

Teil I befasst sich mit den früheren und aktuellen Entwicklungstrends in

In Teil II wird ein zunehmend an Bedeutung gewinnendes Phänomen

1. VERMEHRT ÄLTERE UND VIELFÄLTIGERE EUROPÄER

1.1. Neue Lebensweisen führen zu geringfügiger Steigerung

Die Bevölkerung Europas ist von allmählichen Veränderungen betroffen, die

Es ist schwierig, den Einfluss der Familienpolitik auf diese Trends zu

1.2. Eine „alternde“ Bevölkerungsstruktur

Es ist schwierig, die Auswirkungen politischer Maßnahmen vorherzusagen.

Laut den Eurostat-Projektionen EUROPOP2008, die im vorangegangenen

Eine mögliche Entwicklung ist die Verbesserung der gesunden

Programme, die sich mit der alternden Bevölkerung und Erwerbsbevölkerung

1.3. Europa in Bewegung

Die Migration, insbesondere aus Nicht-EU-Staaten, könnte die Überalterung

In den Mitgliedstaaten der EU-27 leben rund 20 Millionen Nicht-EU-

Diese Trends erfordern, dass zusätzliche Anstrengungen unternommen