EN BANC

[G.R. No. 112099. February 21, 1995.]

ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner, v s . HON. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF
PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and
MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING

APPEALS TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (ADM. ORDER NO. 18); NOT
REPEALED BY R.A. NO. 7160. — Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of
Section 530 (f), R.A. No. 7160. The aforementioned clause is not an express
repeal of Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 because it failed to
identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to be
repealed. If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by R.A. No.
7160, it is through implication though such kind of repeal is not favored.
There is even a presumption against implied repeal. An implied repeal
predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict
must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express
repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless
an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the
new and old laws. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible. There must
be such a repugnancy between the laws that they cannot be made to stand
together.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISION (SEC. 68) THAT APPEAL SHALL NOT
PRESENT A DECISION FROM BECOMING FINAL OR EXECUTORY; CONSTRUED.
— We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcilably inconsistent and
repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together. The first sentence
of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision
from becoming final or executory." As worded, there is room to construe said
provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution
of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the
reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the
appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language
expressive of such intention. The execution of decisions pending appeal is
procedural and in the absence of a clear legislative intent to remove from
the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of execution, such
authority can be provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals
of elective officials in administrative cases. The term "shall" may be read
either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the
entire provision in which it is found, its object and the consequences that
would follow from construing it one way or the other. In the case at bench,
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 there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.

DECISION

QUIASON, J : p

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the

Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction,
assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with
grave abuses of discretion. Said Orders directed the stay of execution of the
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending the Mayor of Tiwi,
Albay from office. LLphil

I
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against respondent Naomi C.
Corral, the incumbent Mayor of Tiwi, Albay with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Albay, to wit: cdasia

(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92 for abuse of authority

and/or oppression for non-payment of accrued leave benefits due the
petitioner amounting to P36,779.02.

(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92 for dishonesty and abuse

of authority for installing a water pipeline which is being operated,
maintained and paid for by the municipality to service respondent's
private residence and medical clinic.

On July 1, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disposed the two

Administrative cases in the following manner:
"(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Mayor Naomi C. Corral of Tiwi, Albay,

is hereby ordered to pay Achilles Costo Berces, Sr. the sum of THIRTY-
SIX THOUSAND AND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE PESOS and TWO
CENTAVOS (P36,779.02) per Voucher No. 352, plus legal interest due
thereon from the time it was approved in audit up to final payment, it
being legally due the Complainant representing the money value of his
leave credits accruing for services rendered in the municipality from
1988 to 1992 as a duly elected Municipal Councilor. IN ADDITION,
respondent Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL is hereby ordered SUSPENDED
from office as Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay, for a period of two (2)
months, effective upon receipt hereof for her blatant abuse of authority
coupled with oppression as a public example to deter others similarly
inclined from using public office as a tool for personal vengeance,
vindictiveness and oppression at the expense of the Taxpayer (Rollo , p.
14). LLjur

"(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Mayor NAOMI C.

CORRAL of Tiwi, Albay, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
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 SUSPENSION from office as Municipal Mayor thereof for a period of
THREE (3) MONTHS beginning after her service of the first penalty of
suspension ordered in Administrative Case No. 02-92. She is likewise
ordered to reimburse the Municipality of Tiwi One-half of the amount
the latter have paid for electric and water bills from July to December
1992, inclusive" ( Rollo , p. 16).

Consequently, respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the

President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay
of execution thereof in accordance with Section 67(b) of the Local
Government Code, which provides:
"Administrative Appeals. — Decision in administrative cases may,
within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the
following:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the

sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panglungsod of highly
urbanized cities and independent component cities."

Acting on the prayer to stay execution during the pendency of the

appeal, the Office of the President issued an Order on July 28, 1993,
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

"The stay or execution is governed by Section 68 of R.A. No.

7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated 12 February
1987, quoted below:

'SEC. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. — An appeal shall not

prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. The respondent
shall be considered as having been placed under preventive
suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such
appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be
paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the
appeal (R.A. No. 7160).
'SEC. 6. Except as otherwise provided by special laws, the
execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from is stayed
upon the filing of the appeal within the period prescribed herein.
However, in all cases, at any time during the pendency of the appeal,
the Office of the President may direct or stay the execution of the
decision/resolution/order appealed from upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem just and reasonable (Adm. Order No. 18).'"
xxx xxx xxx

"After due consideration, and in the light of the Petition for

Review filed before this Office, we find that a stay of execution pending
appeal would be just and reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to
public interest.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby orders the
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 suspension/stay of execution of:
a) the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay in
Administrative Case No. 02-92 dated 1 July 1993 suspending Mayor
Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of two (2) months, and

b) the Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay in

Administrative Case No. 05-92 dated 5 July 1993 suspending Mayor
Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of three (3) months" (Rollo , pp.
55-56). Cdpr

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the

aforesaid Order of the Office of the President.
On September 13, 1990, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.
II
Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is R.A. No.
7160, which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal "shall not
prevent a decision from becoming final and executory." He argues that
Administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitled "Prescribing
the Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to the Office of the President")
authorizing the President to stay the execution of the appealed decision at
any time during the pendency of the appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160,
which took effect on January 1, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 5-6).
The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f), R.A. No.
7160, which provides:
"All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, administrative regulations, part or parts thereof,
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code, are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly." cdasia

The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6 of

Administrative Order No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the
laws or executive orders that are intended to be repealed ( cf . I Sutherland,
Statutory Construction 467 [1943]).
If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by R.A. No. 7160,
it is through implication though such kind of repeal is not favored (The
Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. The Philippine American
Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 [1973]). There is even a
presumption against implied repeal.
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition
that a substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In
the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
exists in the terms of the new and old law. ( Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, Inc. v. Feliciano , 13 SCRA 377 [1965]). The two laws must be
absolutely incompatible (Compania General de tabacos v. Collector of
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 Customs, 46 Phil. 8 [1924]). There must be such a repugnancy between the
laws that they cannot be made to stand together (Crawford, Construction of
Statutes 632 [1941]).
We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section
6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcilably inconsistent and
repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together.
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall
not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory." As worded, there
is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing
officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to
infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to
order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal
Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct
language expressive of such intention.
The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the
absence of a clear legislative intent to remove from the reviewing officials
the authority to order a stay of execution, such authority can be provided in
the rules and regulations governing the appeals of elective officials in
administrative cases.
The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory
depending upon a consideration of the entire provision in which it is found,
its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way
or the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case at
bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.
cdasia

The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor
from office might be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus, in order not to
disrupt the rendition of service by the mayor to the public, a stay of the
execution of the decision is in order. Cdpr

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr ., Romero,

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

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