Berces V.guingona
Berces V.guingona
Berces V.guingona
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL
ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY
FACTS:
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against respondent Naomi C. Corral, the incumbent Mayor of Tiwi, Albay with
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay:
(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92 for abuse of authority and/or oppression for non-payment of accrued leave
benefits.
(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92 for dishonesty and abuse of authority for installing a water pipeline which is
being operated, maintained and paid for by the municipality to service respondent's private residence and
medical clinic.
Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for
the stay of execution thereof in accordance with Section 67(b) of the Local Government Code. The Office of the
President issued an Order on July 28, 1993. this Office hereby orders the suspension/stay of execution of:
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the aforesaid Order of the Office of the President.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is R.A. No. 7160, which contains a
mandatory provision that an appeal "shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory." He argues that
administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitle "Prescribing the Rules and Regulations Governing
Appeals to Office the President") authorizing the President to stay the execution of the appealed decision at any time
during the pendency of the appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160.
ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18?
RULING:
Petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f), R.A. No. 7160, which provides:
All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, administrative
regulations, part or parts thereof, which are incosistent with any of the provisions of this Code, are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 because it failed to
identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to be repealed.
We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not
irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together.
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or
executory." As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay
the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of
the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention.
The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the entire
provisions in which it is found, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the
other. In the case at bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.