On Duties to Oneself

Author(s): Marcus G. Singer

Source: Ethics, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Apr., 1959), pp. 202-205
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2379349 .
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 ON DUTIES TO ONESELF
MARCUS G. SINGER

QNE of the commonestdivisions of duties it to you and not to anyone else (unless you
is that based on the distinction between have assigned the debt to another), and I
those that one has "to oneself" and those can be said to have a duty to you-namely,
that one has "to others." Thus it is often to pay back what I have borrowed-and
said that it is a duty that one owes to one- I do not thereby have a duty to another.
self to preserve one's own life or develop (This, of course, is what is said more simply
one's talents or preserve one's self-respect. and idiomatically in the statement that I
Consequently it is often held that suicide owe you a certain sum of money.) Now, if
and sloth are morally wrong, on the ground I have a duty to you, then you have a right
that they violate one's duty to oneself. Few, against or with respect to me. Thus, if I owe
perhaps, would go so far as Kant in claim- you a certain sum of money, then you have
ing that "Our duties towards ourselves are a right to receive and demand that money
of primary importance and should have from me. In general, if A has a duty to B,
pride of place . .. the prior condition of our then B has a right against or with respect
duty to others is our duty to ourselves.... ) to A.3 But it follows from this that to have
Yet many would agree that the distinction a duty to oneself would be to have a right
is both genuine and important, and it seems against oneself, and this is surely nonsense.
well embedded both in traditional moral What could it mean to have a right or a
philosophy and in ordinary moral thinking. claim against oneself? (Could one sue one-
Nevertheless, it is actually impossible, as self in a court of law for return of the money
I shall argue, for there to be any duties to one owes oneself?)
oneself, in any literal sense, for, if taken Yet I do not wish to rest my case on the
literally, the idea involves a contradiction. claim that it is nonsense to speak of a right
Thus what are called "duties to oneself" are against oneself, and that this is a necessary
either not genuine moral duties at all, or, if consequenceof speaking of a duty to oneself.
they are, they are not duties to oneself. This Considerfurther.It is essential to the nature
leaves, of course, the question of what can of an obligation that no one can release
be meant by the various expressionsin which himself from an obligation by not wishing
such "duties" are imputed, for I am certain- to perform it or by deciding not to perform
ly not arguing that such expressionsare es- it, or, indeed, in any other way whatsoever.
sentially meaningless or ought never to be In other words, no one can release himself
used. My answer to this question will follow from an obligation, just as no one can re-
directly. lease himself from a promise. To be sure,
There are certain duties that we can quite one can break the promise or the obligation.
clearly regard as being relative to persons, One can refuse to perform it. But this is not
in the sense that we can speak of a duty to to release oneself. One can, however, be re-
someone to do or forbear from doing certain leased from an obligation by the person to
acts. This is especially true of duties (or whom he has the obligation, just as one can
obligations) arising out of contracts or be released from a promise by the person to
agreements, although it is not restricted to whom he has made it. For one can give up
such cases.2 If I have promised you to do his right against someone, or decide not to
something, then I have a duty to you to do exercise it, and by this means release some-
what I have promised, and you are the per- one else from an obligation. But a duty to
son to whom I am under obligation. If I oneself, then, would be a duty from which
have borrowedmoney from you, then I owe one could release oneself at will, and this is
202

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 DISCUSSION 203
self-contradictory.A "duty" from which one or forcibly restrain himself, though such
could release oneself at will is not, in any language can on occasion be psychologically
literal sense, a duty at all. or even socially useful.)
The situation is the same in the analogous These very same points apply to the no-
case of a promise to oneself. Can one prom- tion of a duty to oneself. To say that some-
ise oneself to do something? Such language one has a duty to (or owes it to) himself
is frequently used. People say "I have prom- to do something is an emphatic way of as-
ised myself to . . ." But a promise to oneself serting that he has a right to do it-that
would be a promise from which one could there are no moral considerations against
release oneself at will, and thus not a gen- it-and that it would be foolish or impru-
uine promise at all. The language here must dent for him not to. It is, to be sure, to say
be metaphorical. To say "I have promised that he ought to do the act in question, but
myself to . . ." is to say "I have strongly only in the prudential sense of "ought."
resolved to. ..." It is to express a settled Thus, to suppose that one can actually have
determinationto do the act in question, and a moral duty to oneself, in any literal sense,
in some cases the wish not to be dissuaded is to confuse both a right to do something
from it. Thus, though a "promiseto oneself" with a duty to do it, and an imprudent act
is in some respects like a promise, it is not with an immoral one.
a genuine or in any literal sense a promise. If my argument is sound, then, such ex-
For one can make a genuine promise with- pressions as I have considered cannot be
out resolving or intending to do what he has given a literal interpretation.Yet they serve
promised,just as one can intend to do some- an interesting function in discourse. To say
thing without promising to do so. In the "I have promised myself to . . ." can often
former case, he would have made a false be a way of warding off objections to one's
or lying promise, but he would still have announced course of action and of enabling
made a promise. There is no analogue here one to withstand them, as well as a way of
with a "promise to oneself." To promise reinforcing one's determination to do it. If
oneself to do something just is to be strongly we come to think that we have a duty to do
resolved to do it, and if one were to change something this can often save us from the
his mind and not do what he intended he oneroustask of having to make up our minds
would not have broken any promise. what to do. To tell someone else that he
Consideragain such expressionsas "I owe owes it to himself, or has a duty to himself,
it to myself to . . ." or "You owe it to your- to do something, can often be effective in
self to. . . ." Can one literally owe some- persuading him to do it. For it can convey
thing to oneself, be in debt to oneself? Here the idea that here is a case where both self-
again the language must be metaphorical. interest and duty combine in demanding a
To say "I owe it to myself to. . ." is both a certain course of action. Apparently, then,
way of emphasizing one's right to do some- what we have here is an appeal to self-
thing and of expressing one's determination interest disguised in the language of duty.
to do it. To tell someone that he owes it to The argument that I have presented,
himself, say, to take a vacation, is an em- against the idea that there are self-regard-
phatic way of asserting that he has a right ing duties, rests essentially on the following
to do it and of expressing one's belief that three propositions: (1) If A has a duty to
it would be decidedly imprudent for him B, then B has a right against A; (2) if B
not to. Thus it says no more than that he has a right against A, he can give it up and
ought to, in the sense that it would be im- release A from the obligation; and (3) no
prudent for him not to ("You need a vaca- one can release himself from an obligation.
tion, you'd be foolish not to take one"), I must confess that I do not see how these
only it says it more forcefully. (Similarly, propositions can rationally be denied. Yet
no one can literally threaten or command one possible objection against the thesis I

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204 ETHICS

have presented might take the following less misleading, and I doubt whether the
form: In not every case can one be released distinction can really be sustained along
from an obligation or duty. This may hold these lines.
only where the duty arises out of a contrac- What has just been said is sufficient to
tual relationship or some other voluntary dispose of another possible objection to the
undertaking. But not all duties arise out of argument I have been presenting, which
contracts or promises or voluntary under- may be derived from the arguments by
takings. Hence it may be that self-regarding which certain alleged duties are alleged to
duties are not duties of the sort from which be duties. I have my doubts whether,to take
one can be released. the examples that are most usually given, it
My answer to this objection is that the is a duty, in general and apart from special
relation I am presupposing as holding be- circumstances, to preserve one's life or de-
tween rights and duties-proposition (1) velop one's talents. But suppose that it is,
above-is only asserted as holding for those and that it is morally wrong to commit sui-
duties or obligations that one can be said cide or waste one's talents. It would not at
to have to someone. Consequently, if one all follow that these are duties to oneself,
could sensibly be said to have a duty to merely because they would be duties with
oneself, one would have a right against one- respect to oneself. Someone under military
self that one could give up, thereby releas- discipline may have the duty of keeping his
ing oneself from the duty, which would con- shoes shined and his hair cut, and, in gen-
tradict proposition (3), and be, in effect, eral, of maintaininga trim and neat appear-
self-contradictory. Now I can see no good ance. But these are not duties to himself,
reason for supposing that every duty must nor are they alleged to be. Kant's arguments
be a duty to someone. Many duties, to be (in his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of
sure, are thus relative to persons-are duties Morals) to show the immorality of suicide
to some assignableindividual or group-and and sloth (his first and third illustrations of
this feature, as I have said, is characteristic the categorical imperative) have not the
of duties arising out of contracts or prom- slightest tendency, even if sound, to show
ises. But not all duties arise out of contracts that these are breachesof one's duty to one-
or promises. Why then must all duties be self. That there are duties to oneself is a sup-
supposed to have this characteristic? It is position from which Kant starts, not a con-
important here not to confuse the person to sequence of his argument. In effect, then,
whom one is under an obligation with the the question whether all duties are relative
person regarding whom one is under the in the sense specified is not a matter of in-
obligation-that is, the person who stands ordinate importance.A duty that cannot be
to benefit by its performance-for they are said to be relative in this way to some spe-
not always one and the same.4 A may have cifically assignable individual or group still
a duty regardingC without having a duty to need not be supposed to be a duty to one-
C. Thus A may have a duty to B to pay C a self. It can be regarded, if one so chooses,
certain sum of money, in which case it is B, as a duty to one's society, or to mankind
and not C, who has the correlative right generally. (In that case, it would be what
against A. It may be that it is this latter might be called a general duty, correlative
confusion that is responsible for the con- to a general or "real" right, rather than a
fusion about self-regardingduties. It may be special duty [or obligation], correlative to
that so-called "duties to oneself" are duties, a special or "personal" right.) Hence, if it
or alleged duties, regarding oneself-in the really is a duty to preserve one's life, this
sense that it is oneself who would be primar- can be regardedas a duty to mankind gen-
ily or in the first instance affected by their erally. (But this presupposesanother classi-
performance or non-performance-rather fication of duties than the one mentioned
than duties to oneself. But this interpreta- at the outset.)
tion would not make this language any the One final point. In denying that there are

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 DISCUSSION 205

duties to oneself, in any literal sense, I am dential vice. On the other hand, if it is harm-
not of course denying that there are what ful to another or to society, then it is un-
might be called self-regardingfaults or vices. desirable with respect to their interests, and
Similarly, in denying that one can literally is thus morally undesirable. It is, conse-
promise oneself something, owe anything to quently, a moral vice. But not all vices, and
oneself, or threaten, command, or forcibly so not all virtues, are moral ones, and it may
restrain oneself, I am not denying that one be suspected that those who have crusaded,
can harm oneself, or hurt oneself, defeat on moral grounds, against just such things
one's own purposes, or do what is detrimen- as smoking, have been guilty of just this sort
tal to one's own best interest. Of course one of obfuscation. On this matter, I think, Mill
can. A vice, after all, is a defect or an un- has said very nearly, though not quite, the
desirable trait of character, a habit that it last word:
would be desirable not to have. Smoking, Self-regarding faults . . . are not properly
for example, is often said to be a vice. Sup- immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may
pose that it is. If it is, it is because, on be carried, do not constitute wickedness. They
may be proofs of any amount of folly, or
the evidence available, it is likely to prove
want of personal dignity and self-respect; but
harmful to the agent and is thus a habit they are only a subject of moral reprobation
which, from the point of view of his own when they involve a breach of duty to others,
best interests, it would be desirable for him for whose sake the individual is bound to have
not to have. But it does not follow that it care for himself. What are called duties to
is a moral vice. In saying that a vice is an ourselves are not socially obligatory, unless
undesirable trait or habit, we must distin- circumstances render them at the same time
duties to others. The term duty to oneself,
guish the interests with respect to which it when it means anything more than prudence,
is undesirable, the person or group of per- means self-respect or self-development; and
sons for whom it is undesirable.If it is harm- for none of these is any one accountable to
ful to the person who has it, then it is un- his fellow creatures, because for none of them
desirable with respect to his interests, and is it for the good of mankind that he be held
thus from the point of view of prudence. It accountable to them.5
is, consequently, a self-regarding or pru- UNIVERSITYOF WISCONSIN

NOTES
1. Kant, Lectures on Ethics (trans. Infield, Lon- (c) property rights, which are rights in or to some-
don, Methuen, 1930), pp. 117-18. thing. These different kinds of rights are related to
2. Although I think that, for certain purposes, each other in different ways, and they are also re-
such a distinction might usefully be made, I am lated in different ways to obligations, so that what
not here distinguishing between duties and obliga- holds of one may not hold of another. Cf., for an
tions. Cf. H. L. A. Hart, "Are There Any Natu- analogous distinction, Roscoe Pound, An Introduc-
ral Rights ?" Philosophical Review (April, 1955, tion to the Philosophy of Law (New Haven: Yale
LXIV), 179 n.; also pp. 180-81. University Press, 1922), pp. 191-92.
3. This statement by no means exhausts the sub- 4. Cf. Hart, op. cit., p. 181: "It is important for
ject of the relations between rights and duties. It is the whole logic of rights that, while the person who
not intended to. The subject is complex, yet I can- stands to benefit by the performance of a duty is
not forbear mentioning that the question whether discovered by considering what will happen if
and how rights and duties are correlative has been
the duty is not performed, the person who has a
clouded, not only by a failure to distinguish be-
right (to whom performance is owed or due) is
tween different senses of "correlative," but also by
a failure to distinguish different kinds of rights. discovered by examining the transaction or ante-
There are, I think, at least three: (a) action rights, cedent situation or relations of the parties out of
which are rights to do certain things, or to act in which the 'duty' arises." See also, on this distinction,
certain ways; (b) what may be called receivatory W. D. Lamont, The Principles of Moral Judgment
or treatment rights, which are rights to receive cer- (Oxford, 1946), pp. 80ff.
tain things, or to be treated in certain ways; and 5. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, chap. iv, par. 6.

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