Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338 Case Digest

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Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, G.R. No.

168338

Facts:

On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the
opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an
audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of
the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the
COMELEC. The conversation is about the manipulation of 2004 presidential
election, which was instructed by Arroyo to win the election.

On June 8, 2005, the respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales warned


reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those
broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-
Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He
also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a
continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if
the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence.

On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued a press release wherein it pronounced
that the said audio tape have not been duly authenticated nor the tapes contain
an accurate or truthful representation of what was recorded therein. As such, the
NTC warned that the broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
misrepresentation shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies.

Due to the aforementioned events, Petitioner Chavez filed a petition


under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against respondents Secretary Gonzales and
the NTC, “praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, as
extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the
unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the
respondents.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the airing of the said wiretapped conversation passed the
clear and present danger rule which was done to test the content-based
restriction.

2. Whether or not the airing of the said wiretapped conversation by the


broadcasting companies violates RA4200.
Ruling:

1. Yes. The Court provides:

To recapitulate, a governmental actionthat restricts freedom of


speech or of the press based oncontent is given the strictest
scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule.
This rule applies equally to all kinds ofmedia, including broadcast
media. This outlines the procedural map to follow in caseslike the
one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test;(b) the
presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party todischarge the
burden; and (e) the quantum of evidencenecessary. On the basis of
the records of the case at bar,respondents who have the burden to
show that these actsdo not abridge freedom of speech and of the
press failed tohurdle the clear and present danger test. It appears
thatthe great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing
of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law.
The records of the case at bar, however, are confused and
confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the
clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the
Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also
suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions,
one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an
“altered” version. Thirdly, the evidence of therespondents on the
who’s and the how’s of the wiretappingact is ambivalent,
especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of
the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related
and relevan tproofs are some of the invisibles of this case.
Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even
arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

2. No. The Court held:

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing


the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of
different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of
conduct which even if violated have only an adverse effect on a
person’s private comfort but do not endanger national security.
There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself
and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and
free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be
sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain
freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious
effects of the violation to private and public interest must be
calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the
Constitution and by related international covenants protecting
freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and
calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to
determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the
Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law.
By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by
the State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat,
the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise
of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can
lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to
offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court
has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free
press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-
wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the
State.

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